



# GLOBAL THREAT MITIGATION PROGRAM WEEKLY READ BOOK

12 July 2016

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) This weekly Read Book provides select reports from around the world and United States that may be of special interest to military, intelligence, law enforcement, and Counter-Improvised Threat/EOD communities at the tactical level of operations. Commentary and analysis is provided.

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## (U) THIS WEEK

### GTMP TOPIC OF THE WEEK:

- Thailand – Elections and Increased Insurgency Violence

### GLOBAL WATCH LIST:

- Top Current Events/Emerging Threats by CCMD (South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Orlando Attack, South China Sea)

### TRAINING AND READINESS, RESOURCES:

- NR

### GENERAL INTEREST | PROFESSIONAL READING:

- Chilcot Report

Views expressed in this read-book are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of U.S. Army Forces Command, the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States Government, any U.S. Government Agency, or Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. *The intent of this document is solely to engage, inform, and provoke thought and further analysis.* POC: Ms. Valerie Warner, U.S. FORSCOM Analyst and Integrator to JIDA.  
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The information in this read book is for 1-11 July 2016

The Overall Classification for this Read Book is: **UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**(U) TOPIC OF THE WEEK****(U//FOUO) Thailand (Multiple, July 1-11)**

Thailand has a long and rich history of power struggles, coups, name changes, and leadership styles. After all, “Bangkok” became the capital of “Siam” when a general (later known as King Rama) overthrew and executed King Taksin (who, according to multiple historians, had gone crazy). That was back in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, and the current King – Bhumibol Adulyadej – is also King Rama IX, because the royal line continues. In fact, even the degree of influence and power the Thai Royal Family has had over the past century has swung on a pendulum, depending on the Thai people and the military or leader in charge. The current King wields great constitutional powers, as well as influence – for he is loved by many Thai people. He is also really, really old with a not-so-popular likely successor, and Thailand is currently being managed by military junta leader Prayuth Chan-o-cha in the wake of the recent political unrest and ensuing coup. For one of the easier-to-understand overviews on the Red Shirt v. Yellow Shirt Thai conflict and background, I recommend reading the *BBC*’s write up from 2012 - <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268>




The red-shirts are mainly rural workers from outside Bangkok




The yellow-shirts were the behind street protests that led to the 2006 coup

“...The red-shirts began as supporters of deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted by a military coup in September 2006. This support has transferred to Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party led by his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. The yellow-shirts represent those opposed to Mr Thaksin and they were the force behind the street protests that led to the 2006 coup...” Since that was written, the Pheu Thai Party and Yingluck Shinawatra won a general election:



But, in 2012 Ms. Yingluck’s Government fielded a reconciliation bill that the opposition called a veiled protection effort for the former Prime Minister Thaksin that would pave the way for his return to power from exile some day. The Thai Constitutional Court blocked this bill and by November of 2013, protests broke out in Bangkok. The opposition Democratic Party (blue on the 2011 election map to the left) threatened to boycott the next elections, and protests and riots escalated in scope and violence. You may recall a grenade attack where protesters were killed and injured and there were ensuing gun-battles in the streets. The February 2014 election was incomplete due to protests, and the Constitutional Court nullified election results for provinces that did not vote on the same day.



In May 2014 the Constitutional Court found Ms. Shinawatra and members of her cabinet guilty of abuse of power, and the Thai Army declared martial law and the electoral commission postponed elections. As of today, Thailand is ruled by military junta. *The Diplomat* published the following: <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-thailands-next-election-may-not-matter/>

“...The latest indications from the junta are that the election, first promised for late 2015, will be held around mid-2017. The “6-4-6-4” road map to democracy revealed in September last year posits six months to draft a new constitution, four months to hold a referendum on it, six months to draft organic laws to support the constitution and four months to campaign ahead of the election. The unveiling of a new version of the constitution earlier this month suggests that we are still on track for this timetable, at least for now. But the crux of the problem in Thailand has not been the holding of the election itself, but the unwillingness of various groups to accept the outcome. Political contestation in Thailand over the past decade has occurred against the backdrop of a struggle between the military-backed royalist elite and parties linked to policeman-turned-business tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra. While Thaksin-linked parties have won each of the country’s last three elections – in 2001, 2007 and 2011 – each time they have been ousted by military coups, paralyzing political protests, and other legal maneuvers. With the latest coup in May 2014 deposing Thaksin’s sister Yingluck, Thailand continues to try to find what renowned Thai commentator Thitinan Pongsudhirak describes as a balance between competing sources of elected and unelected political legitimacy...”

**So What?** The latest proclamation is that Thailand will hold elections in 2016 or 2017, (“sometime”). Meanwhile the Thai Southern insurgency persists – and is getting worse. Read through this assessment of the South and its electoral habits back in 2011, <http://asiafoundation.org/2011/07/13/thailands-deep-south-a-political-labyrinth/> which concluded that, “...the Thai government needs to truly understand that the Deep South is by no means a homogenous society, and would be wise to carefully listen to the diverse voices of its southern residents if they are to successfully come up with a resolution that will satisfy the desires of constituents there.”

But wait – there is more:



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No. 167/2016 dated 4 July 2016

## Insurgency in Southern Thailand: More Unrest Ahead?

By Vikram Rajakumar

No. 167/2016 dated 4 July 2016

## Insurgency in Southern Thailand: More Unrest Ahead?

By Vikram Rajakumar

### Synopsis

*Growing discontent in Southern Thailand has led to a significant increase in the number of attacks in the region, a surge in radical online activity as well as the revival of militant groups that are thought to be defunct or dormant. These trends portend more unrest in the coming months and render the region vulnerable to exploitation by groups like ISIL/ISIS.*

### Commentary

ON THE evening of 26 June 2016, a powerful car bomb exploded along a busy street at Sungai Golok (near the Thai-Malaysia border) killing four people, three of whom were Malaysians. This explosion came in the wake of an upsurge of violence in South Thailand since March 2016. Several days earlier, insurgents detonated two floating bombs near a wharf in Pattani; this new form of attack is believed to be a trial run for such devices. Throughout the month, there were three major bomb attacks that killed 12 people, among them several soldiers.

Southern Thai insurgents have also been very active on social media domains as reported in an earlier Commentary. (See Vikram Rajakumar "Insurgency in Southern Thailand: What Does ISIL's Black Flag of Pattani Portend?") (08 April 2016). Social media platforms have become a new front for the insurgents to win recruits and rally support for their militant campaign for autonomy. Their online propaganda efforts have clearly resonated in the real world as seen in the attacks targeted at government and security personnel and institutions.

### Revival of Southern Thai Insurgent Groups

Since the shutting down of an Islamic school (Jihad Wittaya or "Pondok Jihad") by the Thai government in 2005 and confiscation of its land by the courts in December 2015, the trust between the government and the southern Thai Malay Muslim community has been severely impaired. It has proved to be the turning point for the insurgency as seen in the escalation of bombings and attempted bombings since early this year. Although there have been many bombing incidents since 2008, April 2016 alone saw a 42% increase in attacks, according to terrorism specialist Dr. Zachary Abuza on 1 May 2016.

The upsurge in violence and online activity has been accompanied by the revival of hitherto defunct and dormant breakaway factions of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), one of the most active insurgent groups in the south. The resurrection of these groups, which include the Nampra Army (PULO's armed wing that was active from 1976-1990) and the Pattani Liberation Army, are possible game changers to the restive region. (Nampra stands for Negara Melayu Patani Raya or the Malay State of Patani Raya.)

The appearance of Nampra Army in February 2016 was confirmed when rocket explosives were found with the PULO MKP's sticker flags (PULO MKP is a term used by radicals to distinguish PULO's two factions). The PULO MKP split from PULO several years ago and is directed by Kasturi Mahkota who is based in Gothenburg, Sweden. Kasturi's faction is part of MARA Pattani, a coalition made up of six insurgent groups formed in August 2015.

The coalition had expressed the desire to engage in a peace dialogue with the Thai government on the condition that the Thai state officially recognises it as an official entity with legal and diplomatic immunity. Though this has been reported in the media, the Thai government has not acknowledged it.

## Alleged Human Rights Abuses

The Pattani Liberation Army (PLA) was an organisation formed in 2009 when PULO and the Group of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) formed an alliance. They agreed to jointly form a unified military wing, the PLA, under the command of the First Deputy Military Commander of PULO. The PLA was thought to be defunct, but in the last one week, there have been Facebook posts suggesting that the PLA has been revived and has re-joined forces with PULO's main arm.

The upsurge of violence and simultaneous burst of online radical activity and revival of defunct or dormant insurgent groups are portentous developments. They reflect the strained relations between the Thai government and southern Thais, stemming from the 'Pondok Jihad' dispute as well as issues concerning tight military control and alleged human rights abuses and ill-treatment of detainees.

Traditional insurgent networks and alliances are being utilised in unpredictable ways. That social media accounts related to Thai insurgent groups have begun using flags and symbols of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as ISIS are ominous; whether these groups have adopted the same goals as ISIS however remains unclear.

PULO had issued a statement in February 2016, declaring that it does not have anything to do with ISIS. However, given the spike in violence since this statement, and the increase in online clamour for autonomy using Islam as a cantilever, more investigation is necessary to determine whether there are any links between local insurgents and ISIS.

## Remembering Krue Se and Tak Bai

Recent developments suggest that ISIS is increasing its presence in Southeast Asia and targeting vulnerable groups in South Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Thailand. ISIS has published the first edition of a newspaper meant for speakers of the Malay Language which is also widely spoken in Southern Thailand. The publication, Al-Fatihin, was revealed on 20 June 2016 by Furat Media, an IS-affiliated media agency.

This was followed by the release of a 21-minute video by the Islamic State's Philippines Media Office entitled "The Solid Structure", featuring Southeast Asians from Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, pledging allegiance to the group. One of the individuals, Abu 'Aun Al-Malizi, a Malaysian, identifies Thai nationals as part of the Katibah Nusantara (a dedicated Southeast Asian military unit in ISIS), and that fighters will return to their homelands with new skillsets, ready to wage jihad.

ISIS videos with Malay subtitles are also being widely circulated on Thai social media. These significant developments to the jihadi landscape have the potential to aggravate radicalism and militancy in the already simmering south.

The possibility of more attacks like the Sungai Golok blast on 26 June cannot be ruled out. Social media platforms are teeming with radical activity, disseminating videos displaying the training of insurgents and the making of bombs as well as sermons, caricatures and pictures depicting atrocities that southern Thais had to endure.

Insurgents may view this year as an opportune moment to dramatise their cause as it marks the 12th anniversary of the Kru Se mosque and Tak Bai incidents, pivotal events in the history of the conflict; they coincide with the upcoming Thai Constitutional Referendum scheduled on 7 August 2016, when Thais will head to the polls to vote on the ruling junta's proposed military-guided democracy. Insurgents may seize this period to mount attacks not only to commemorate past tragedies, but also to send a strong message to the Thai government that "We are still here".

In light of Vikram Rajakumar’s presentation of information and predictions of greater violence, the following



Surapan Boonthamon—Reuters

Thai security forces inspect the site of a bomb attack that wounded two police officers at Nong Chik district in the troubled southern province of Pattani, Thailand, on July 5, 2016

The next four images are provided for you by Mr. Jason Predmore at 20<sup>th</sup> CBRNE from a 26 June 2016 attack:

IED on 26 June 2016, Provincial Police Station, Su-Ngai Kolok District (Narathiwat Province)

Comparison of the communication radio


front  
ด้านหน้า

back  
ด้านหลัง

## Evidence recovered in the incident

- |                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| 1. Container            | 15-kilogram gas tanks, explosive weight 60-90 kilograms                  |
| 2. Method of initiation | Initiated by command with long-distance communication radio and IC timer |
| 3. Energy source        | 9 volt battery   |
| 4. Main charge          | Main charge, high-energy HME, to be verified                             |
| 5. Fragmentation        | Metal cable cut into 8 mm pieces   |

5. ส่วนสังหาร เหล็กเส้นตัดท่อน ขนาด 8 มม.



The following brief on Thailand IED trends is provided for you by the JIDA J33 LTC Wallace, and Information Assurance Team. It is also posted in its entirety on my Inteldocs site at:

<https://inteldocs.intelink.gov/inteldocs/page/repository#filter=path%7C/User%2520Folders/w/wa/warner/valerie.i.warner/PUBLIC%2520READ%2520FILE%2520-%2520FORSCOM%2520INTEGRATOR%2520TO%2520JIDA/PACOM/THAILAND&page=1>

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HELPING WARFIGHTERS ADAPT

**JIDA**  
JOINT IMPROVISED-THREAT DEFEAT AGENCY

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## (U) Executive Summary




- (U//FOUO) Twenty-seven month examination of IED Explosion, Find, and Cache events in Thailand. Period of examination was 1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16.
- (U//FOUO) Two hundred ninety-seven events were noted. Corresponding device records were also retrieved, resulting in three hundred eighty-four records. Because the event/device information is drawn from open source reporting, technical exploitation details about the devices are sparse. Details on TTP, perpetrator, explosive type, triggers/detonators, and main charge are mostly lacking.
- (U//FOUO) The heavily contested provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani (south Thailand) account for 85% of all events (253 of 297).
- (U//FOUO) Notable TTPs include targeting of first responders, complex attacks, and “come-along” events designed to lure the target to the IED.
- (U//FOUO) Cooking gas cylinders, fire extinguishers, and metal boxes were the most commonly noted containers. They were typically buried when emplaced, but were also used in conjunction with VBIEDs. Command switches were the most frequently noted initiation devices.
- (U//FOUO) Roadside emplacements were also frequently noted. These emplacements were commonly buried, but roadside VBIEDs and concealment by foliage was also noted.
- (U//FOUO) Common device designs noted were pipe bombs, box bombs, and “ping pong ball” bombs.





# (U) Events by Category

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



# (U) Event Summary

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16

Province	EXPLOSION	FIND	PREMATURE DETONATION	CACHE	Grand Total
Narathiwat	102	4		4	110
Pattani	82	8	1	3	94
Yala	40	6	1	2	49
Krung Thep	7	2	1	7	17
Songkhla	5	1		1	7
Nakhon Ratchasima	1		1	1	3
Chon Buri	1	1			2
Nakhon Si Thammarat	1		1		2
Surat Thani	2				2
Lop Buri				1	1
Samut Sakhon				1	1
Ranong	1				1
Khon Kaen				1	1
Sara Buri				1	1
Nakhon Pathom	1				1
Phetchaburi	1				1
Trat				1	1
Chiang Mai			1		1
Chai Nat	1				1
Nonthaburi		1			1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>297</b>

(U//FOUO) Events by Category by Province

(U//FOUO) JIDA Analyst Comment: Top three provinces account for 85% of all events (253 of 297). (heavily contested provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani (south Thailand))

Province	KIA	WIA	Casualties
Pattani	36	300	336
Narathiwat	16	210	226
Yala	16	158	174
Krung Thep	23	137	160
Songkhla	3	16	19
Nakhon Ratchasima	1	9	10
Surat Thani	0	7	7
Nakhon Si Thammarat	1	6	7
Chiang Mai	0	1	1
Chai Nat	0	1	1
Trat	0	0	0
Sara Buri	0	0	0
Samut Sakhon	0	0	0
Khon Kaen	0	0	0
Lop Buri	0	0	0
Phetchaburi	0	0	0
Nakhon Pathom	0	0	0
Ranong	0	0	0
Chon Buri	0	0	0
Nonthaburi	0	0	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>845</b>	<b>941</b>


(U//FOUO) Casualties by Province

# (U) Events by Target (when specified)

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



(U//FOUO) JIDA Analyst Comment: Target Unknown or N/A in 77 of 297 events (26%). When target is known, Military accounts for 95 of 220 events (43%)




# (U) Events by Perpetrator (when specified)

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16




(U//FOUO) JIDA Analyst Comment: Perpetrator Unknown in 262 of 297 events (88%).




# (U) Complex Attacks

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



# (U) Common Emplacement Technique (Buried)


1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



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# (U) Common Emplacement Technique (Roadside)

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16




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# (U) First Responder Targeting

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16




(U//FOUO) JIDA Analyst Comment: Typical scenario is the emplacement of a second explosive device that targets the arrival of EOD after an initial explosion.



# (U) "Come Along" TTP

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16




(U//FOUO)  
**JIDA Analyst Comment:** In a typical Banner Come - Along, an IED is emplaced IVO a banner/sign that lures the target to the area.

When they attempt to remove the banner, the device detonates.


# (U) Device Initiation Means (when specified)

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



# (U) Device Container (when specified)

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16




# (U) Cache Contents

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



Explosives Found	Gunpowder	Nitroglycerin	TNT	Unspecified	Grand Total
Cache - Components				8	8
Cache - Explosives	1			3	4
Cache - Gunpowder	1				1
Cache - IED		1	1	5	7
Cache - Imp Claymore				1	1
Cache - Ping Pong Bombs (similar to M-80 fireworks)				2	2
Cache - Pipe Bomb				5	5
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>28</b>




(U//FOUO) JIDA Analyst Comment: Caches were discovered as the result of raids (some based on tips), firefights with insurgents, premature detonations, and IVO political demonstrations

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# (U) Common Design Type – Pipe Bomb


1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



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
# (U) Common Design Type – Box Bomb

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



# (U) Common Design Type – Ping Pong Ball Bomb


1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



(U//FOUO) JIDA Analyst Comment: Hard plastic 3 cm key chain soccer ball filled with gunpowder, with a fuse. (Similar to an M-80 firecracker)

# (U) Common Design Type – VBIED/MBIED

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16






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# (U) Common Design Type – Gas Cylinder/Fire Extinguisher


1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16



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# (U) Device Explosive Content (when specified)

1 Jan 14 through 31 Mar 16





## (U) Conclusion

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- (U//FOUO) Notable TTPs include targeting of first responders, complex attacks, and “come-along” events designed to lure the target to the IED.
- (U//FOUO) Cooking gas cylinders, fire extinguishers, and metal boxes were the most commonly noted containers. They were typically buried when emplaced, but were also used in conjunction with VBIEDs. Command switches were the most frequently noted initiation devices.
- (U//FOUO) Roadside emplacements were also frequently noted. These emplacements were commonly buried, but roadside VBIEDs and concealment by foliage was also noted.
- (U//FOUO) Common device designs noted were pipe bombs, box bombs, and “ping pong ball” bombs.

## (U) GLOBAL WATCH LIST

### AFRICOM AOR



### (U) South Sudan Violence Flares (Multiple, July 1-11)


South Sudan, World’s youngest country, experienced another bout of violent fighting between President Salva Kiir’s supporters and former VP and rebel leader Riek Machar’s. As African Union leaders meet in Kigali, there is a nascent ceasefire but it seems unlikely peace can be sustained, even with the 12,000 + U.N. Peacekeepers there.



**So What?** From a U.S. perspective, South Sudan is important because it was intended to be a fledgling democratic success story on the Continent. It is not. It also doesn’t hurt that America having influence in South Sudan likely furtrates China, who gets oil from the country. The cycle of civil war continues – people of different beliefs and groups are displaced by economic crisis, famine, and war. They migrate to safety in nearby countries (in this case Ethiopia,

Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda), causing greater strain on those countries' governments, resources, and social fabric. This in turn causes civil strife between tribal/religious/cultural aligned groups in neighboring countries. The loss of labor, education, consumer market, and "brain drain" further destroys the nation such as South Sudan. And let's be honest here – land-locked South Sudan is mortgaging its future for Kiir's cheap oil sales to finance his power consolidation. As of this moment, one in five Sudanese (2.5 million) are internally displaced (1.6 million) or have fled to other countries (830,000). Cited numbers are the most recent from OXFAM ([www.oxfam.org](http://www.oxfam.org)). See map below:

### UN PoC Sites and IPC\* Data



Source: <http://southsudan.iom.int/sites/default/files/IOM%20South%20Sudan%20Humanitarian%20Update%20%2363.pdf>


On the flip side, the African Union and EAC (East African Countries) are coming together to try and address the crisis and bring about peace. Uganda and Sudan have both played proxy in South Sudan against one another but stand to gain with a brokered peace, as this is more of a cross-border conflict than most international agencies or the U.S. will discuss (in my opinion). Part of that equation is the significant number of armed rebel groups fighting more for resources and security than for any leader (another reason I remain dubious that any cease fire will hold long enough for a structured peace process). If China and the international community won't do anything about Sudan's Al-Bashir (Darfur, what?), and Uganda and the AU can't broker multi-state agreements with enforcement, there will be no end to the violence and humanitarian crisis. And the fight doesn't stay home. Many Sudanese have gone to fight for IS, especially in Libya, such as the recently killed Mirghani Badawi.

**CENTCOM AOR**



### (U) Daesh Daily Summary of Events (Daesh Daily, July 11)

Produced by the Iraq Foundation for Analysis and Development (IRFAD), <http://www.irfad.org/about-irfad/>,  
Daesh Daily uses Arabic media sources to compile an update you can view here: <http://www.daeshdaily.com/>



July 11, 2016

Search



### Today's Major Developments

***US sending military personnel to newly captured Qayara base, to create staging area for Mosul operation.***

***Iraqi units defusing IEDs, clearing out former Daesh locations in Falluja.***

***Over 1,000 Haditha area displaced families return home.***

***Daesh members on the defensive in Shirqat, Qayara villages, Mosul***

***Diyala PC Chairman says most Diyala drug dealers working with Daesh or Al-Qaeda in Iraq.***

***Human Rights Watch accuses Daesh of atrocities in Makhmur.***

***Manbij anti-Daesh campaign now controls large areas of city.***

***Libyan government says it has taken almost all of Sirte from Daesh.***

So, the big story is the U.S. troop increase and taking over the old "Q-West" (cue the rocket attacks and spiders). While the news articles mostly state the importance of Q-West as a hub for basing operations planned for Mosul, I'd also note Q-West is significant because of its proximity to the Iraq-Turkey pipeline...

In other news (*Reuters*, 10 July), Hamza bin Laden announced, ""We Are All Osama," according to the *SITE Intelligence Group*, "We will continue striking you and targeting you in your country and abroad in response to your oppression of the people of Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and the rest of the Muslim lands that did not survive your oppression," Hamza said. "As for the revenge by the Islamic nation for Sheikh Osama, may Allah have mercy on him, it is not revenge for Osama the person but it is revenge for those who defended Islam." I predict Hamza is going to become a powerful voice for Al Qaeda and recruitment over the next few years. He will need to back up his threats with actions to assure his place in history – and no doubt will try.

**(U) Afghanistan for the Long Term (White House Press Release, July 6)**

President Obama made a formal statement on his decision to maintain a force of 8400 U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. Here is the link to his full comments: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/06/statement-president-afghanistan>

Excerpt: "...Instead of going down to 5,500 troops by the end of this year, the United States will maintain approximately 8,400 troops in Afghanistan into next year, through the end of my administration. The narrow missions assigned to our forces will not change. They remain focused on supporting Afghan forces and going after terrorists. But maintaining our forces at this specific level -- based on our assessment of the security conditions and the strength of Afghan forces -- will allow us to continue to provide tailored support to help Afghan forces continue to improve. From coalition bases in Jalalabad and Kandahar, we'll be able to continue supporting Afghan forces on the ground and in the air. And we continue supporting critical counterterrorism operations...My decision today also sends a message to the Taliban and all those who have opposed Afghanistan's progress. You have now been waging war against the Afghan people for many years. You've been unable to prevail. Afghan security forces continue to grow stronger. And the commitment of the international community, including the United States, to Afghanistan and its people will endure. I will say it again -- the only way to end this conflict and to achieve a full drawdown of foreign forces from Afghanistan is through a lasting political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. That's the only way..."



**So What?** China just shipped military aid to Afghanistan (previously it was only humanitarian aid). We can expect with the reduced U.S. presence, other nations and the Taliban or Islamic State-aligned groups will step up their activity. Perhaps international commitments from India, China, and others can somehow bolster an Afghan economy and convince fighters to move towards more peaceful and lucrative work. It is my opinion that history tells us Afghanistan will never be a functioning "nation-state" and troop levels are somewhat irrelevant if 100,000 Soviet forces and later 100,000 American forces couldn't tame what is basically Pashtunistan and "the other guys" who live nearby. Certainly these groups recognize we are slowly but surely withdrawing, and they merely have to attack and defend against GIRA and coalition forces enough to influence local population and destabilize any progressive governance. It's not a very tall order for an insurgency that once battled ten times the current number of "occupiers."

**(U//FOUO) Multiple Suicide Bombings in Saudi Arabia (Multiple, July 7)**

## Multiple Suicide Bombings in Saudi Arabia

*Product of the Research & Information Support Center (RISC)*

*The following report is based on open source reporting.*

July 7, 2016

### Overview

Multiple suicide bombings occurred in Saudi Arabia on July 4, as Ramadan was ending and the three-day Eid-al-Fitr holiday began on July 6. No group has officially claimed responsibility for the attacks. The [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant \(ISIL\)](#) is the most likely culprit, as the bombings trend closely with previous ISIL attacks in the country. The attacks highlight the ongoing threat posed by terrorism, and a persistent desire by ISIL to show increased capability and coordination in the country. However, the overall limited impact (only one of three attacks led to fatalities besides the bombers themselves), shows that the group still is lacking the capacity to conduct complex, coordinated attacks and overcome Saudi's robust security apparatus. Additionally, the targeting of one of the holiest sites in Islam could hamper the group's support.

### Summary of Events



**First Attack:** Around 2am on July 4, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives in the parking lot of the Dr Suleiman Faqeeh Hospital, adjacent to the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. The bomber himself was killed, and two security officers injured. The bomber detonated when security personnel were questioning him. No U.S. citizens or U.S. Consulate personnel were injured. Authorities later identified the attacker as a Pakistani resident who had been in the country for 12 years.

**Second Attack:** Around 7pm, as many were breaking for Iftar meals, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives in a parking lot near the Prophet's Mosque (al-Nawabi Mosque) in the holy city of Medina. The mosque is one of the most revered by both Shi'a and Sunni Muslims, and is the site of the Muslim Prophet Mohammad's tomb and home. The bomber reportedly detonated as security officers were approaching him, setting several cars on fire. Four security personnel

and the suicide bomber were killed in the attack, and five others were injured.

**Third Attack:** Around the same time, three suicide bombers reportedly detonated while attempting to enter the al-Omran mosque, a Shi'a mosque in Qatif's commercial district in the Eastern Province. The bombers reportedly could not enter the mosque due to security barricades, and detonated from within a vehicle. Only the three bombers are believed to have been killed. Prior to the attack, Qatif was already off-limits for U.S. government personnel due to past violence.

### Consistent Tactics & Targets

Authorities in June reported that there had been 26 terror attacks in Saudi Arabia in the previous two years, the majority of which have been claimed by militants associated with ISIL. The July 4 attacks have

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not been claimed by ISIL at this time, but follow closely to the group's targeting preferences and tactics in Saudi Arabia. ISIL elements in Saudi Arabia traditionally have focused on Shi'a Muslim targets (primarily mosques) and Saudi security forces, with Western interests falling behind these as priorities. The attack on the Prophet's Mosque raised widespread condemnation from the Muslim world, and may risk backfiring for the extremist group. While the bombing may have been designed to undermine the Saudi government by showing the government is unable to maintain security at the most vital religious sites. The backlash against this attack may explain why there has been no claim of responsibility for the July 4 attacks.

Meanwhile, the attack in Jeddah appeared to have targeted the U.S. Consulate, although it is not yet clear where the bomber intended to detonate his explosive had he not been intercepted by security personnel; or if the attack was more so against security personnel given the Consulate was closed at the time. While there have been previous threats against the Western diplomatic community in the Kingdom, and the exact targeting of this attack remains unclear, it marks the first incident directly involving U.S. diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia by ISIL. It remains unclear at this time if this denotes an increased prioritization of Western interests.

ISIL has frequently used suicide bombings during attacks in Saudi Arabia, which have been the most successful to date. Attempts at conducting vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) –which can produce significantly more damage– have largely been intercepted. The group has also used guns in attacks– primarily against security forces; these attacks have gained less attention, and have generally been used more in direct attacks on individuals.

### Advice

The U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia issued two Security Messages ([1<sup>st</sup>](#), [2<sup>nd</sup>](#)) on July 4 regarding the terrorist attacks. These messages encourage U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia to remain aware of their surroundings and take extra precautions when traveling throughout the country. The Department of State urges U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks of traveling to Saudi Arabia and limit non-essential travel within the country. U.S. government personnel and their families are restricted from traveling within 50 miles of the Yemeni border, and to the cities of Jizan and Najran without permission. U.S. government personnel are also similarly prohibited from traveling to the city of Qatif in the Eastern Province and its surrounding suburbs, including Awamiyah, and to the town of Hofuf and its surrounding suburbs in the Al Hasa Governorate due to violent episodes that have occurred there in the past.

*EUCOM AOR*



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*NORTHCOM AOR*



### **(U) Orlando Attack (FDNY, June 12)**

The following is provided for you by Mr. Jason Predmore, Technical Advisor, G2 Fusion Cell, 20th CBRNE Command:

# Orlando Terror Attack

## Fireguard

### 6/12/16



FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness



## June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016: Orlando ISIS Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub

### ISIS sympathizer opens fire in crowded nightclub

Attacks with military-style weapons

- Assault rifle, handgun

3-hour standoff with hostages

- Most shooting in first 16 min

Pledges allegiance to ISIS


- Phone call and social media

### Worst Mass Shooting in U.S. History

50 dead

- 49 victims, plus gunman

53 injured





# Initial Attack: Mass Shooting

**1:58 am:** Gunman enters club and begins shooting

**2:02 am:** Off-duty police officer (working as security guard) returns fire

**2:08 am:** Police respond and officers force gunman to retreat to the bathroom, where he takes hostages.

**2:18 am:** SWAT team responds



- *Tactics soon switch from “active shooter” to “hostage barricade”*
- *Police units are withdrawn from the building*

## Standoff in the Club

**2:35 am:** Gunman calls 911 and pledges his allegiance to ISIS

**2:48–3:27 am:** Three phone calls with police negotiators

- Says attack is in response to U.S. military operations against ISIS
- Claims to have a vehicle rigged with explosives parked outside
- Uses Facebook to post his allegiance

**4:21 am:** Police help 8 victims escape through an air conditioning vent

**4:29 am:** Escapees report plans to strap victims with explosives




# Police Make Entry

**5:02 am:** Police use armored vehicle to break through building wall

**5:14 am:** Police enter and kill gunman in shootout

- Responders reach victims inside club
- 40 pronounced dead at the scene
- 26 transported, 9 died at the hospital




# Homegrown Terrorist

Gunman identified as 29-year-old Omar Mateen

- American citizen born in NY, lived in Florida
- No direct communication with ISIS
- Noted history of homophobia
- History of domestic violence
- Religious practice recently became more devout

Previously investigated for terrorist ties

- FBI investigated in 2013 and 2014
  - Suspected ties to Florida-born ISIS militant
  - Reportedly boasted of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah ties
- Investigations were closed



## Key Takeaways

- 1) Delayed medical response
- 2) Venues as soft targets
- 3) Military-style equipment
- 4) Electronic messaging
- 5) MCI at the Firehouse

# 1) Delayed Medical Response

*Emergency medical attention to gunshot victims was delayed when police units withdrew from the building*

## Threat of secondary explosive devices led to withdrawal of responders

- Gunman claimed to have bombs
- Battery from exit light mistaken for explosive
- PD remained outside during 3-hour standoff

## Paramedics were denied entry to the building

- Needed PD force protection to make entry
- Remained at staging area out of blast range
- No triage and rapid treatment was attempted



Police help remove a victim, who was then transported in a pickup truck

*Critically wounded victims received no treatment for 3 hours*

# Impact of Delayed Access

*Rapid access to patients is vital in an active shooter incident*

## START is a primary pre-hospital MCI tactic

- START = Simple Triage And Rapid Treatment
- Identify and treat life threatening injuries
- Gunshot wounds, heavy bleeding addressed
- Quick access is critical

## Victims in club treated when area was safe

- Over 3 hours after initial attack
- Of 66 people found inside, only 17 survived
- Many victims had multiple gunshot wounds



*Civilians carry a gunshot victim to responders, staged a distance away*

## Similar incident

San Bernardino, 2015: SWAT team with medic made rapid entry

# Active Shooter vs. Hostage Barricade

*Transition from “active shooter” to “hostage barricade” protocol delayed entry for medical treatment*

PD determined gunman’s actions became a hostage situation

- Retreated to bathroom, took hostages, stopped shooting

Tactics changed to a more defensive approach

- PD units withdrew to building exterior
- Paramedics could not enter with PD protection
- Prioritized preventing escalation over treating existing victims

Prisoners were more likely “doomed captives” than “hostages”

- Tactic used by ISIS and other Islamic terror groups
- Intention is to kill the “hostages” no matter what
- Purpose = maximize media coverage by lengthening attack
  - Tactic referenced in AQ “Inspire” bulletin (see slide 13)



## Similar incidents

- Mumbai, 2008 – Jewish Center
- Paris, 2015 – Bataclan Theater

## 2) Venues as Soft Targets

*Large entertainment venues can be prime soft targets*

- Large number of unsuspecting victims
- Limited egress for fleeing crowds
  - May not be aware of alternate exits
- Can be dark and loud
  - Obscures reality of attack
- Party atmosphere can contribute to confusion
  - Possibly intoxicated victims
  - Expectation of entertainment, costumes

*Many Pulse victims thought gunshots were part of the music*



*Interior of Pulse nightclub*

### Similar incidents

- Paris, 2015 – Bataclan Theater (89 dead)
- Aurora, 2012 – Movie Theater (12 dead)
- Moscow, 2002 – Dubrovka Theater (170 dead)

## Targeted: Gay Nightclub

### Pulse: popular gay nightclub

- Crowded near capacity - roughly 300 people
- Limited egress points = trapped victims
- Loud music masked gunshots
  - Delay in recognizing attack

### Gunman was familiar with club

- Had previously frequented the club
- Knew layout, egress points

### Possible anti-gay motivation

- Homosexuality condemned by radical Islam
  - Punishable by death in some countries
- ISIS has history of executing gay men
  - Distributed multiple videos of executions



*Most victims were part of the gay community*

# Al Qaeda Offers its Insight

*AQ issued a bulletin to celebrate the Orlando attack and analyze tactics for future “Lone Jihadists”*

## AQ’s benefits of targeting “general gatherings”

- Enclosed area made it easy to “chase and hunt targets”
- Late night timing ensured targets were drunk
- Enabled him to “take many hostages and lengthen the battle for as long as possible...so the whole world listened”



## AQ’s future recommendations

- Add homemade explosives to gunfire to maximize death toll
- Attack “areas where the Anglo-Saxon community is generally concentrated”



## 3) Military-style Equipment

*Military-style equipment was central to the attack and police response*

### Terrorist used military-style weapons to maximize bloodshed

- Strength of firearms and size of ammunition contributed to high death toll
- Background as security guard gave him experience with firearms

*Sig Sauer Assault Rifle*

*.223 caliber*

*30 round magazine capacity*

*Similar to AR-15*



*Glock 17 semi-automatic handgun*

*17 round standard capacity*

*9mm caliber*



# Life-saving Protection

*Military-style protective equipment enabled the police to engage and kill the gunman*

Kevlar helmet saved the life of an officer shot in the head while entering the building

*(actual helmet pictured)*

Armored vehicle was used to breach the building wall, allowing police to engage the gunman

*(photo of similar vehicle – not from this incident)*



## 4) Electronic Messaging

*Electronic messaging and social media were used throughout the attack by both the victims and the attacker.*

- Gunman used social media (Facebook) to pledge his allegiance to ISIS and threaten future attacks
- Many hostages sent text and other messages, leading gunman to confiscate cell phones
- Several victims' last moments were captured through electronic messaging (text messages, social media)
- Pulse nightclub used social media (Facebook) to make emergency announcement



*Image of Snapchat video sent to family member before victim was killed*

# Real-time Intelligence

*Electronic messaging provided real-time intelligence from inside the club*

**PD obtained info through 3<sup>rd</sup> party**


- People texted friends/family, who then told PD
- Victims could have communicated to PD directly

**911 calls from bathroom, forced to whisper**

- Speaking may compromise safety

**Social media is emerging communication channel**

- Victims posted to Twitter from inside club
- Gunman posted to Facebook during attack
- Club posted emergency message to Facebook



*Text messages sent by a victim to a family member before he was killed*

**Responders should consider seeking a means of receiving electronic messaging directly from the public**

## 5) MCI at the Firehouse

*Bloodied victims arrived at firehouse before firefighters were aware of the attack*

**Firefighters faced with mass casualty incident with no warning or dispatch information**

- Firehouse was down the street from attack
- Disoriented, bloody victims came to the door
- Gunshots could be still be heard

**Critical decision:**

**Danger to responders vs. Life threatening injuries to victims**

- Consider all available information
- How much action should be taken when faced with uncertain danger?

*Decision made to wait inside firehouse until armed police could be seen outside  
Once assured of safety, firefighters opened doors and provided care*



*Triage was set up across the street from firehouse*



# Next Steps

*Agencies nationwide are working to develop active shooter response policies*

## Potential challenges:

### *Interagency coordination*

- Response will involve multiple agencies
  - Law enforcement (local PD, FBI, etc.)
  - Medical care (FD, EMS, Hospitals)

### *Need for specialized protective equipment*

- Responders must be trained

### *Identifying potential targets*

- Terrorists look for “general gatherings”
- Be aware of areas of public assembly



*Recent video shows ISIS flag over the Las Vegas strip*

*All responders must know response procedures  
Active shooters can strike anywhere...*

**PACOM AOR**



## **(U) China's Claims in South China Sea Rejected by Intn'l Tribunal (Wall Street Journal, July 12)**

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-claim-to-most-of-south-china-sea-has-no-legal-basis-court-says-1468315137>



“An international tribunal ruled Tuesday that China's claim to historic rights in most of the South China Sea has no legal basis... The tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague said China couldn't claim historic rights to resources in the waters within a "nine-dash" line used by Beijing to delineate its South China Sea claims. That was the most significant element of an unprecedented legal challenge to China's claims that was brought in 2013 by the Philippines, one of five governments whose claims in the South China Sea overlap with China's under the nine-dash line. In another blow for Beijing, the tribunal decided that China wasn't entitled to an exclusive economic zone, or EEZ,

extending up to 200 nautical miles from one island in the Spratlys archipelago, Itu Aba, which is claimed by China and currently controlled by Taiwan. The ruling, based on a U.N. convention on maritime law, comes after several years of escalating tension in the region as China has alarmed the U.S. and its allies by using its rapidly expanding naval and air power to assert territorial claims and challenge U.S. military supremacy in Asia...The ruling on Itu Aba is important because the U.N. maritime convention allows countries to build artificial islands in their own EEZs, and all of the seven structures China has built lie within 200 nautical miles of Itu Aba, which Taiwan calls Taiping Island. It also means that China has no legal claim to an EEZ overlapping that of the Philippines. In a statement published on a verified social media feed just before the ruling, China's Ministry of Defense said the decision wouldn't affect its approach in the South China Sea. "No matter what the result of the arbitration, the Chinese military will unswervingly protect the nation's sovereignty, security and maritime rights, resolutely protect the safety and stability of the region, and face down all manner of threats and challenges," it said...The ruling is legally binding for China and the Philippines but can only be enforced through international pressure...In another damaging setback for Beijing, the tribunal ruled that China couldn't claim 12 nautical miles of territorial seas around the two largest of the seven artificial islands that Beijing has built in the Spratlys. That means that U.S. and foreign naval ships can legally come within 12 nautical miles of those two structures, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, which both have airstrips...U.S. officials have warned that China could respond to the ruling by starting land reclamation at another disputed reef near the Philippines, or declaring an air defense identification zone over the South China Sea..." **So What?** China has had since 2013 to plan for every outcome. You can bet China will have a coordinated response of economic, international diplomatic, and military actions to back up its categorical rejection of the tribunal ruling. This is an important time for the international community and the U.S. to reinforce the ruling with presence and action – which will undoubtedly raise tensions even further in the South China Sea. It should also be noted that Taiwan's claims to Itu Aba were nullified, which Taiwan disputes and rejects as well. Wait and see if/how this impacts Taiwan-China relations.




Image Source: CSIS

*SOUTHCOM AOR*



**NR**

**(U) TRAINING AND READINESS, RESOURCES**

**NR**

**GENERAL INTEREST | PROFESSIONAL READING**

**(U) Revisiting the Iraq War, the Chilcot Report (July 2016)**

The Chilcot Report is very much worth your time to scan though. I have not seen an unclassified report by America that compares in depth. The section on WMD assessments is by far the highest on my list of the 12 sections for “must read.” Second, is Section 14.1 – “Military Equipment. “I don’t think any of the contents will be grand revelations to you, but the analysis of the intelligence community, and British/American policy and government interactions are significant. Some commentary to frame this:

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/chilcot-report-iraq-war-lessons-by-richard-n--haass-2016-07>



RichardHaass

**Richard N. Haass**

Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush’s special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. His forthcoming book is *A World in Disarray*.

“NEW YORK – Seven years, 12 volumes of evidence, findings, and conclusions, and one executive summary later, the Report of the Iraq Inquiry, more commonly referred to as the Chilcot Report (after its chairman, Sir John Chilcot), is available for one and all to read. Few people will get through all of it; the executive summary alone (well over 100 pages) is so long that it calls for its own executive summary. But it would be a shame if the Report were not widely read and, more important, studied, because it contains some useful insights into how diplomacy operates, how policy is made, and how decisions are taken. It also reminds us of the centrality of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and of the aftermath, for understanding today’s Middle East. A central theme of the Report is that the Iraq War did not have to happen, and certainly not when it did. The decision to go to war was partly based on faulty intelligence. Iraq constituted at most a gathering threat, not an imminent one. Alternatives to using military force – above all, strengthening Turkey’s and Jordan’s lackluster enforcement of and support for the UN sanctions designed to pressure Saddam Hussein – were barely explored. Diplomacy was rushed.

Making matters worse was that the war was undertaken without sufficient planning and preparation for what would come after. As the Report rightly points out, many in both the US and British governments predicted that chaos could emerge if Saddam’s iron grip were removed. The decisions to disband the Iraqi army and to bar all members of Saddam’s Ba’ath Party (rather than just a few of its leaders) from positions in the successor government were huge mistakes. Iraq was not just a war of choice; it was an ill-advised and poorly executed policy.

Much of the Report focuses on British calculations and then-Prime Minister Tony Blair’s support for US policy. The decision to associate the UK with the United States was a defensible strategic choice for a smaller country that derived much of its influence from the closeness of the bilateral relationship. Where the Blair government got it wrong was in not pressing for more influence over the policy in exchange for its support. George W. Bush’s administration might well have rejected such efforts, but the British government could then have exercised the option of distancing itself from a policy that many believed was unlikely to succeed.

Many lessons should be taken from the Iraq War. One is that, because assumptions fundamentally affect what analysts tend to see when they look at intelligence, flawed assumptions can lead to dangerously flawed policies. Nearly everyone assumed that Saddam’s non-compliance with United Nations inspectors stemmed from the fact that he was hiding weapons of mass destruction. In fact, he was hiding the fact he did not have such weapons. Likewise, before they started the war, many policymakers believed that democracy would emerge quickly once Saddam was gone. Ensuring that such fundamental and consequential assumptions are tested by “red teams” – those not supporting the associated policy – should be standard operating procedure. There is also the reality that removing governments, as difficult as that can be, is not nearly as difficult as creating the security that a new government needs to consolidate its authority and earn legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Creating anything like a democracy in a society lacking many of its most basic prerequisites is a task of decades, not months.

The Report said little about the legacy of the Iraq War, but it is important to consider. First and foremost, the war disrupted the regional balance of power. No longer in a position to distract and balance Iran, Iraq instead came

under Iranian influence. Iran was free not just to develop a meaningful nuclear program, but also to intervene directly and via proxies in several countries. Sectarian fighting poisoned relations between Sunnis and Shia throughout the region. The alienation felt by soldiers and officers of Saddam's disbanded army fueled Sunni insurgency and, ultimately, led to the rise of the so-called Islamic State.

The war had a profound effect not just on Iraq and the Middle East, but also on the UK and the US. The British parliamentary vote in 2013 against participation in any military effort to penalize Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for defying explicit warnings not to use chemical weapons in his country's civil war was surely related to the view that military intervention in Iraq had been a mistake. It is also possible that some of the mistrust of elites that led a majority of voters to support "Brexit" stemmed from the Iraq War experience.

The Iraq War and its aftermath similarly affected the thinking of US President Barack Obama's administration, which had little appetite for new military ventures in the Middle East at a time when many Americans were suffering from "intervention fatigue."

The danger, of course, is that lessons can be overlearned. The lesson of the Iraq War should not be that all armed interventions in the Middle East or elsewhere are to be avoided, but rather that they must only be undertaken when they are the best available strategy and when the results are likely to justify the costs. Libya was a recent intervention that violated this principle; Syria has been even more costly, but in its case for what was not done. The Iraq War was costly enough without people learning the wrong lessons from it. That would be the ultimate irony – and only add to the tragedy."

<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/>

## Introduction

1. In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an opposed invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State – Iraq. Cabinet decided on 17 March to join the US-led invasion of Iraq, assuming there was no last-minute capitulation by Saddam Hussein. That decision was ratified by Parliament the next day and implemented the night after that.
2. Until 28 June 2004, the UK was a joint Occupying Power in Iraq. For the next five years, UK forces remained in Iraq with responsibility for security in the South-East; and the UK sought to assist with stabilisation and reconstruction.
3. The consequences of the invasion and of the conflict within Iraq which followed are still being felt in Iraq and the wider Middle East, as well as in the UK. It left families bereaved and many individuals wounded, mentally as well as physically. After harsh deprivation under Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iraqi people suffered further years of violence.
4. The decision to use force – a very serious decision for any government to take – provoked profound controversy in relation to Iraq and became even more controversial when it was subsequently found that Iraq's programmes to develop and produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons had been dismantled. It continues to shape debates on national security policy and the circumstances in which to intervene.
5. Although the Coalition had achieved the removal of a brutal regime which had defied the United Nations and which was seen as a threat to peace and security, it failed to achieve the goals it had set for a new Iraq. Faced with serious disorder in Iraq, aggravated by sectarian differences, the US and UK struggled to contain the situation. The lack of security impeded political, social and economic reconstruction.
6. The Inquiry's report sets out in detail decision-making in the UK Government covering the period from when the possibility of military action first arose in 2001 to the departure of UK troops in 2009. It covers many different aspects of policy and its delivery.
7. In this Executive Summary the Inquiry sets out its conclusions on a number of issues that have been central to the controversies surrounding Iraq. In addition to the factors that shaped the decision to take military action in March 2003 without support for an authorising resolution in the UN Security Council, they are: the assessments of Iraqi WMD capabilities by the intelligence community prior to the invasion (including their presentation in the September 2002 dossier); advice on whether military action would be legal; the lack of adequate preparation for the post-conflict period and the consequent struggle to cope with the deteriorating security situation in Iraq after the invasion. This Summary also contains the Inquiry's key findings and a compilation of lessons, from the conclusions of individual Sections of the report.
8. Other Sections of the report contain detailed accounts of the relevant decisions and events, and the Inquiry's full conclusions and lessons.

