NEWSLETTER

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REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER

Regionally Aligned Forces

Newsletter

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Foreword

"Regional alignment delivers better prepared Army forces for the full range of Combatant Commanders' requirements and is a crucial element of the Army's "Prevent, Shape, Win" strategy, which includes collaborating with host nations to enable them to shape their security environments and strengthen their ability to prevent conflicts. If conflict does occur, our forces are prepared and will win against any aggressor who threatens our national security interests."

— Talking Points, Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), 20 December 2013

The Army began executing RAF in early 2013, most prominently in United States Army Central and United States Army Africa. This newsletter provides a background on why and how the Army developed the regionally aligned concept, with some historical examples of past solutions that did and did not provide the successful outcome desired. The newsletter also provides some initial observations and lessons from Army experience with RAF in this first year.

Key points in the newsletter include the following:

- Why RAF is important to the Army.
- Where Army RAF fits the National Security Cooperation Strategy.
- Intelligence lesson from a RAF brigade.
- Why Army military-to-military engagement activities are important.
- Observations and lessons from brigade combat teams providing RAF to combatant commands.
- Observations and lessons from an Army Service component command employing RAF in its region.

THOMAS H. ROE
COL, IN
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned

Regionally Aligned Forces Newsletter

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Introduction

Combatant commands (CCMDs) have had a long standing need for forces that are readily available to support the full range of CCMD requirements. Many Army Service component commands (ASCCs) lacked the assigned forces they could use to resource these missions. ASCCs were made to rely on a request for forces to United States Army Forces Command, a lengthy process that in the end was not responsive enough to satisfy the CCMD.

The Army developed the regionally aligned policy as an answer to the CCMDs' needs. Regionally aligned forces (RAF) are Army units and other Army enablers assigned to CCMDs, apportioned for contingency planning, and forces likely to be allocated to a CCMD. Aligned forces maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals but also possess a regional mission and training focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed.

The RAF concept is part of the Chief of Staff Army's Prevent – Shape – Win Strategy. The RAF provides the combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment by quickly responding to meet a full range of CCMD requirements. Army forces retain their responsibility to be globally responsive while remaining regionally engaged to the CCMD. Regionally aligned forces:

- Meet combatant commanders' requirements with a focus on *prevent* and *shape*.
- Develop Army Total Force Soldiers and units.
- Engage with partner national security forces:
    - Highly trained.
    - Culturally savvy.
- Connect the Army globally through an expeditionary mindset.

To support this effort, Headquarters, Department of the Army directed the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to:

- Support the operating and generating forces with developing processes to capture lessons learned to facilitate future regionally aligned force activities.
- Provide analysis and dissemination that supports doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes and current operations.
- Based upon lessons learned analysis, assist proponents with integrating results into DOTMLPF changes to stability operations, security force assistance, security cooperation, and other related areas.

To this end CALL will accomplish the following:

- Provide lessons, best practices, and related products that assist and inform the Army with planning, preparing, organizing, training, equipping, executing, and assessing for RAF missions and tasks as directed by the regional ASCC.

- Assist units with documenting refinements to provided lessons and best practices and submitting new lessons and best practices as appropriate via the RAF Forum on milBook.

- Contribute to the development and continued refinement of the lessons delivery and collection plan.

- Optimize and enhance the unit's ability to share and apply lessons and best practices internally and link as seamlessly as practical with external organizations to allow efficient and effective flow of information.

- Assist units with building their after action reviews.

- Continuously advocate use of the RAF Forum on milBook to build an interactive community of practice that shares lessons and best practices and facilitates collaboration to address information gaps and requests for information. (The link to this sight is https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/regionally-aligned-force-raf?view=overview.)

Numerous other advantages are to be derived from RAF. These advantages include our ability to develop partner nations, interact with interagency and intergovernmental partners, challenge and excite our Soldiers and, of course, assist the Army in its ability to maintain an active global presence in support of the National Defense Strategy. RAF builds on the Army's 12 years of operational experience in security cooperation and human engagement.

Chapter 1

Regionally Aligned Forces: Business *Not* as Usual

Kimberly Field, James Learnomt, and Jason Charland

Reprinted with permission from *Parameters* 43(3), Autumn 2013

The term Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is widely familiar today; however, few understand the basic elements of the concept, or the goals the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Raymond T. Odierno, wants to achieve with it. Officers in HQDA have been on the road communicating the RAF concept to as broad an audience as possible. But the concept has drawn its share of skeptics. The most common questions fall into three broad categories: 1) Regional alignment for what? What are the ground force requirements for today? What is the real demand? 2) Isn't this just a way for the Army to justify force structure? Is the Army really doing anything differently? 3) Is the RAF even affordable? Won't it "collapse under its own weight" due to our extraordinary fiscal challenges? This article addresses each of these broad questions and presents the basic concept and rationale for RAF.

Why RAF?

At its core, RAF is the CSA's initiative for aligning Army capabilities to an expanded set of requirements for the Joint Force—post-2014. As General Odierno stated at the Association of United States Army Eisenhower Dinner in October 2012, we will leverage the Army's mission command capability by "organizing our missions around highly trained squads and platoons—the foundation for our company, battalion, and brigade combat teams—for specific mission sets and regional conditions." This "*regional alignment of forces*" will not only offer combatant commanders access to the full range of capabilities resident in the Army today, it will "provide maximum flexibility and agility to national security decision-makers."[1]

RAF is a critical first step in operationalizing the concept of "Strategic Landpower," which is the combination of land, human, and cyber activities that make decisive outcomes more likely, and increases options for preventing and containing conflict.[2] RAF is integral to the Army vision of being "Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged" and it is fundamental to our ability to "Prevent, Shape and Win" across the globe. It is essential to the US defense strategy and represents the Army's commitment to provide culturally attuned, scalable, mission-prepared capabilities in a changing strategic environment characterized by combinations of nontraditional and traditional threats.

Army Regionally Aligned Forces are defined as 1) those units *assigned* to or *allocated* to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained capabilities *aligned* with combatant commands and prepared by the Army for regional missions. They are drawn from the Total Force, which includes the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. They consist of organizations and capabilities that are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting (or ready to support) combatant commands through reach-back capabilities from outside the area of responsibility. They conduct operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. RAF specifically addresses those requirements that are enduring in nature for the combatant commander, from "set-the-theater" to the most-likely contingencies. Accomplishing such regional missions requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries

of the countries where RAF are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others. Hence, much of the Army is and remains aligned by virtue of assignment or allocation to a combatant commander.

In contrast, Global Response Forces (GRFs) are the designated Joint GRF that maintains a 24/7 global mission to deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours, as well as the other service retained units that are required to stay intact and at a high states of readiness. The Army will also provide a strategic forcible-entry package, as well as some of the other capabilities that are low density but required for the initial weeks of a limited or no-notice high intensity contingency operation.[3]

The RAF concept provides numerous benefits. Strategically, it offers the United States both influence in and access to host nations through enhanced trust and understanding facilitated by enduring engagements. Operationally, it enables better integration between conventional Army forces and special operating forces, as well as between the Army and interagency partners, specifically the Department of State and Country Teams.

In a sense, RAF means "forces—military and nonmilitary—with not only the ability to destroy but also the decisive ability to understand the population within the context of the operational environment and then take meaningful action to influence human behavior toward achieving the desired outcome."[4] At the tactical level, RAF drives cultural and regional expertise and language awareness training giving US forces an improved understanding of the operational environment. As a result, combatant commands receive units better prepared to work in specific theaters and better able to gain situational understanding when deployed anywhere, even to a region to which they are not aligned. It also fosters an expeditionary mindset for an Army that is more CONUS-based than ever, while also affording a greater degree of mission predictability and stability.

For nearly a decade, the Army had to respond to combatant command requirements, outside Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with personnel from the Total Force who were sometimes minimally prepared. As we reduce our commitment to Afghanistan and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), regional alignment will improve the Army's ability to generate strategically, operationally, and tactically relevant forces for the geographic combatant commands on a broader basis.

With the recent availability of forces returning from the CENTCOM area of responsibility and the Army's commitment to provide whatever the geographic combatant commands request, the demand for Army forces is both significant and diverse. This demand appears in the increased requirements registered in the FY14-19 Program Objective Memorandum. The activities range from military police assistance in Africa to an increase in State Partnership activities in South America, to preparing the American contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Reaction Force, to returning Pacific Command's aligned forces to its most likely contingency operations.

Currently, America's Army has more than 158,000 soldiers deployed or assigned overseas, with a substantial number engaged in stability operations in Afghanistan or executing missions in Korea, Kosovo, the Sinai, Guantanamo, the Horn of Africa, Honduras, and other locations around the globe. Even after the drawdown in Afghanistan, on any given day the Army will typically have at least 100,000 soldiers forward deployed. Land forces will continue to be the most engaged and employed of the Joint team, and through constant engagement and assessing

the effectiveness of activities on the ground among humans, will be well positioned to continue to evolve direct and indirect options for the use of the military instrument for policymakers.

Regional Alignment for What?

The Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 defined a new strategic direction for the Department of Defense, assigning the Joint Force the mission of addressing myriad complex threats in uncertain operational environments. The Army will not be sized for the types of operations it conducted in the last decade. The defense guidance further directed a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Theater, while also giving high priority to the Middle East and to other partners and friends around the world. It directed that the Joint Force must be capable of performing 11 primary missions, but left it to the services to determine how:

- Counterterrorism and irregular warfare
- Deter and defeat aggression
- Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges
- Counter weapons of mass destruction
- Operate effectively in cyberspace
- Operate effectively in space
- Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
- Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities
- Provide a stabilizing presence
- Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
- Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations

The defense guidance clearly implied that the “old ways” of conducting these missions were no longer suitable, either operationally or fiscally. Most of us agree the present era is one of persistent conflict and instability. The strategic and operational environments are driving the United States and its allies and friends toward an emphasis on “shaping missions” in unstable regions in addition to preparing for existential threats. We anticipate an expanding range of smaller, shorter, rapidly changing missions. These new requirements are compelling the Joint Force and the Army toward superior agility; expanded expeditionary capabilities; precise lethality; enhanced cultural awareness and people savvy; as well as a better ability to integrate with special operations forces and other agencies. Importantly, the concept of partnering with other countries and building the capacity of others is both inherent and explicit in this new paradigm.

The bottom line is the Army, as part of the joint force and in conjunction with foreign partners, must respond to the requirements of the combatant commanders which are those the defense guidance missions outlined. At the same time, it must ensure it can mass to conduct any high-end

combat mission anywhere. Accordingly, the evolution of the RAF concept has been grounded in a number of critical principles driven by the operational and fiscal environment, defense guidance, and as expressed by the CSA:

- The Army, together with the Marines and the United States Special Operations Command, will continue to develop the concept of Strategic Landpower.
- The Army will remain capable of fighting and winning major combat operations.
- While maintaining a modular, brigade-centric structure, the Army will increase its agility through leader development at all levels, and world-class training, to include enhanced Combat Training Center rotations for as many brigades as possible.
- The reduction of forces will be conducted in a way that does not break faith with soldiers and Army civilians and their families and that maintains the most ready force possible to meet Combatant Commander needs.
- Tough choices will have to be made regarding roles of Active and Reserve components in accordance with defense missions, but the Reserve Component will remain an essential part of the Total Army.
- With the redistribution of United States forces stationed overseas, the Army will be almost entirely based in the continental United States for the first time in many generations.

Embracing these principles will help offset the turbulence of today's strategic environment and underpin the development and execution of Regionally Aligned Forces. Over the past decade, the Army conducted both combat and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We need to retain the knowledge and skills gained in those conflicts, and yet prepare for the broader range of requirements of the future environment under severe fiscal constraints. This is an incredible challenge, yet the current operating environment demands it.

Is the Army Really Doing Anything Differently?

Regional alignment is a fundamentally different orientation for the Army. As the Army further defines the concept of Strategic Landpower, RAF begins to provide for, organize, man, train, and equip operations and activities in the land, human, and cyber "domains." Rather than coming home from Iraq and Afghanistan to focus on training as the Army sees fit, our first priority is to understand the requirements of geographic combatant commands and to prepare forces for those activities. In addition to its decisive action training, an aligned unit is now preparing with an eye to the region to which it is focused. More forces will be assigned, allocated, and service-retained-combatant-commander-aligned than ever before for nonwartime missions: this is unprecedented for the Army. And, significantly, every geographic combatant command will have at least one brigade, as well as a division or corps headquarters with all the capabilities it provides.

Does this justify force structure? Certainly. These requirements, which will be dispersed with potentially degraded readiness over time, are both real and in addition to those associated with major contingency operations. But RAF is most centrally about an Army that is committed to meeting geographic combatant command needs, thereby retaining and refining its relevance in a changing operational environment.

RAF in Execution

Alignment of Service

Retained forces will provide unit training and education focus (predictable preparation), and these units will be the first called on if a combatant commander needs more personnel and capabilities than assigned or allocated forces can provide (predictable sourcing). Habitual alignment (lasting longer than one Army Force Generation [ARFORGEN] cycle) will occur at Echelon above Brigade (corps and division levels) and we are considering all options in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance for FY15. Full habitual alignment will likely be achieved in FY17. While it is desirable to maintain habitual alignment at brigade combat team level, the realities of current 60 defense missions makes this aspirational rather than practicable. As a result, service-retained, combatant-command-aligned forces will rotate annually in accordance with the ARFORGEN process. Alignment is occurring under United States Army Forces Command's FY13/14 Mission Alignment Order (MAO). The FY15 MAO will increase global alignments, made possible largely because of the drawdown in Central Command's area of responsibility.

- Corps. For FY13, I Corps is assigned to Pacific Command, III Corps is allocated to Central Command, and the XVIII Airborne Corps is Service retained but aligned to the Global Response Force. These alignments will endure. Formalizing the relationship between corps and ASCCs and tethered brigade combat teams is subject to ongoing work from US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

- Division. Active component division HQs with their separate brigades will be habitually aligned to provide at least one Joint Force-capable HQ to each combatant command. This is perhaps the most important capability the Army is providing to geographic combatant commands, as it can access a full range of capabilities from planning to specific enablers. It is also capable of scaling to provide mission command for missions of various sizes, tailoring as the situations change. These headquarters will lean forward to support combatant commanders, working through the Army Service Component Command, as indicators and warnings of instability emerge. An example of this is the 1st Armored Division (1AD) as briefly described above. It deployed to Jordan as part of the joint exercise Eager Lion, having already coordinated with Central Command to understand the worsening crisis in Syria. From there, a tactical command post remained in Jordan to assist the Jordanians and other partners with a wide range of activities resulting from the mass humanitarian crisis to the north.

- Brigades and enabler units. For FY13, units below division are assigned, allocated, or service retained, aligned in varying strengths to geographic combatant commands, and to the Global Response Force. 2-1ID Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), now allocated to the United States Africa Command, is the first brigade allocated in this manner. Since March 2013, they have conducted approximately 79 missions in more than 30 countries (as of mid-September 2013).

Training

The Army will adopt a revised ARFORGEN cycle based on a 24-month Active Component and 60-month Reserve Component sequence. It will cover Reset, Train, Ready (year 1) and Available (year 2). Training policy is to focus on achieving baseline proficiency of T1 level

through decisive action training, involving unit maneuver preparation at the Army Combat Training Centers. Fiscal constraints may limit full implementation of that policy. However, all regionally aligned forces will be trained, prior to deployment, to the readiness level required by the combatant commander. Soldiers' baseline training will be supplemented, where necessary, by combatant commander-specified skill acquisition for their assigned missions. This additional training is subdivided into two components to enhance the US Army's ability to work with partners:

- Mission-specific training will be articulated by Army Service Component Commands (based on combatant command requirements) and organized through FORSCOM. Cultural and regional expertise and language awareness training will be conducted at home station throughout the training year and the year of availability, and be supervised by the division/brigade HQs.

- Other Army institutional and training capabilities will support as required. The 162nd Infantry Brigade, now focused on Security Force Assistance (SFA) training, will provide much of the support in the short-term. Future training support will come from regionally aligned formation headquarters and retained advise and assist expertise. As an example, Armored Brigade Combat Team "Dagger" 1ID soldiers received specialized language, regional expertise, and cultural training at their home station in April 2012. This special cultural and regional orientation was known as "Dagger University." Using Africa-born forces from within the brigade, African Studies students from nearby Kansas State University, and the 162nd Infantry Brigade from Fort Polk, Louisiana, the week-long training introduced cultural and linguist information specific to the regions of Africa where the soldiers would most likely work. Based on insights provided by the Africa-born 2nd ABCT Soldiers, as well as the Kansas State University African Studies students, Dagger University provided forces the knowledge they needed to accomplish complex mission sets.

Austere Environments

The Army's deployment experience over the past 12 years focused on units deploying into a priority theater and then falling in on established Forward Operating Bases, some more austere than others, for a set period of time. As we focus on the challenges of operating around the globe in support of the national security strategy, which projects more balanced global support, Army units will develop an expeditionary mindset to ensure they are equipped to train and operate in remote, minimally supported environments. As a result, personnel should be prepared for change to what has been the norm in recent years. The deployment cycle will change from the current 6-12 months with a Brigade formation to a more cyclic tempo of deployments that will be episodic, lasting anywhere from one week to several months, and employing units, teams, and in some cases, individuals. Living conditions and theater-specific equipment and force protection (FP) measures will all be vastly different from the norm. The role of the combatant command and Army Service Component Command in providing basic life support and sustainment will be critical to the success of these deployments.

As an example, recent events in Mali significantly increased Africa Command's requirements for Army support to the Department of State Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)-funded training for partner nation security forces. Army Regionally Aligned Forces from 1-18 IN deployed a 22-person multifunctional training team to Oullam, Niger, on 27 May 2013 to help mentor and train a Nigerian Defense Force for deployment to Mali as part of the African-led

International Support Mission to Mali missions. Through interagency collaboration with the Chief of Mission and the Department of State, US Army personnel were accompanied by seven PAE contractors to execute the training mission. As a multinational dimension, French Army trainers provided tailored training on certain military capabilities; specifically artillery systems. Both the scale (22 people) and the duration (about 10 weeks) of the deployment are indicative of the new operating environment that confronts combatant commands. While conditions on the ground were austere and reflected the harsh nature of the environment, this mission proved popular as junior leaders were empowered to command. The relative short duration of the mission was popular with a cohort that has grown used to, and weary of, 12-month deployments. For many, the fact that they are operating in a different country with unique cultural characteristics and fresh challenges has energized them and provided a much needed operational and training focus.

Is the RAF Affordable?

Given these extraordinary fiscal times, the question of affordability is a good one and the Army continues to balance requirements inside its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget with most likely and most dangerous missions. While the institution has seen an increase in demand from combatant commanders, much of this demand is paid for by other parties. But there is no real possibility of it "collapsing under its own weight." Already in the first year of regionally aligned forces execution, the Army has realized numerous efficiencies by being able to identify when to send squads rather than platoons. This agility will only increase over time.

Some of the direct costs associated with RAF are based on future training strategy, which includes readiness, language training, and the future viability of some training platforms. Costs linked to the actual implementation of regional alignment mostly will come from Title 22, Combatant Commander funds, joint exercise funds, and special authorities, such as the Global Security Contingency Fund. In fact, the initial alignment of 2/1 infantry brigade demonstrated that there are authorities and funding available for more effective and efficient alignment of execution capabilities. With regard to the use of regionally aligned forces in the traditional Title 10 sense where the Army foots the bill, HQDA has noted a 25 percent increase in the FY15 Program Objective Memorandum for security cooperation activities. Some of this is due to the increased availability of US forces to assist combatant commanders for their Theater Campaign Plans. This will require financial offset from elsewhere within the Army budget and the Army is analyzing the feasibility of this.

Nonetheless, the services—the Army especially—have to make tough choices in readying forces for a full range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance in the Pacific, to the crisis response requirements of "new normal" in Northern Africa, to major combat operations in the Middle East or North Korea. The Army has to be ready for each of these missions, yet it stays busy every day with keeping theaters set with intelligence, communications, and logistics architecture, supporting counterterrorism activities, and with military engagement with partners across the globe. The funding for both the readiness and some of the activity itself comes from the Army's top line, its Operations and Maintenance dollars. Balancing readiness for the most likely and most dangerous courses of action has never been more difficult. Meeting combatant commanders' specific day-to-day needs potentially requires a lower level of collective training than do major combat operations, yet those same forces must be ready for the toughest fight, particularly as the total number available for that fight decreases.

Conclusion: Business Not as Usual

Regional alignment will take approximately five years to implement fully. The effects of the reduced budget and the pace of drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan are the key constraints to quicker progress. However, as the concept matures through FY14, the Army's focus on regional alignment will increase across all combatant commands, to include increasing support to and integration with US Special Operations Command. For soldiers, RAF means real-world missions in exciting places. For policymakers and strategists, RAF means a more agile, responsive, integrated Army. To combatant commanders, RAF means many of the Army's capabilities in the continental United States have, in effect, become a part of their areas of responsibility. And for America's role as a global leader, RAF offers a very real mechanism to shape the operational environment, on the land and among humans, more consistently and in conjunction with a range of strategic partners.

Endnotes

1. General Raymond T. Odierno, "Regionally Aligned forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships," Army Live, March 22, 2012, http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/; General Raymond T. Odierno, *CSA's Strategic Intent*, February 5, 2013, http://www.army.mil/article/95729/56 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013.

2. Additionally, the Army's fiscal year 2013 Strategic Planning Guidance says the future force will provide regionally aligned, mission tailored forces scalable in size from squad to corps. Its personnel are to be empowered by technology and training to execute operations under the concept of mission command, underpinned by trust, flexibility, and proficiency. The operating force will, thus, comprise forces both regionally aligned in support of combatant command and those maintaining a global orientation for specific contingency missions. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013, 6.

3. Brigadier General Charles Flynn and Major Joshua Richardson, "Joint Operational Access and the Global Response Force, Redefining Readiness," *Military Review*, July-August 2013. US Landpower in Regional Focus Field, Learmont, and Charland.

4. Charles L. Cleveland and Stewart T. Farris, "Toward Strategic Landpower," *Army Magazine*, July 2013, 22.58 Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013.

Bios:

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U.S. Army Brigadier General Kimberly Field was Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7. She recently became Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Middle East), J-5, the Joint Staff.

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Chapter 2

Security Cooperation Strategic and Operational Guidance: Translating Strategy to Engagement

Dr. Daniel A. Gilewitch, Associate Professor, Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

On a hot, dusty morning, Major Nick Thomas was thankful to enter the air conditioned comfort of the headquarters building. He was excited about his new assignment as a desk officer at the Theater Army, responsible for five countries in the AOR. As he sat down with a hot cup of coffee, the Deputy G-5 walked in and said "Nick, you need to quickly get up to speed in this new job. I want you to start by doing a top-down review of the country campaign plans for all your countries. By that, I mean that I want you to review the most recent national strategic and operational level guidance as a first step. Once you understand that context, back brief me on what you learned and we will then take a close look at the individual country plans themselves." As the Deputy G-5 left his office, Major Thomas scratched his head and sighed, "I wish I had taken that security cooperation elective at CGSOC last year. . ."

For those unfamiliar with the world of security cooperation, there exists a dizzying array of national security and joint strategy documents that guide security cooperation planning and execution. To someone who does not deal with them on a regular basis, their purpose and the relationship between them can be difficult to understand. The linkages between documents are not well publicized, as their purpose occasionally shifts over time; the rampant use of abbreviations is confusing. Regardless, security cooperation practitioners must understand the flow of strategic guidance through the operational level in order to effectively execute their jobs, and to better understand to what ends their efforts serve the Nation. Country campaign plans are at the heart of security cooperation planning and execution. It is crucial that they are informed by strategic and operational guidance.

This paper reviews selected U.S. strategic and operational documents that guide security cooperation planning and activities. The goal is to explain the purpose of each document, to discuss what roles the document serves in the context of security cooperation, and to explain how they relate to and complement each other. This research provides a primer for understanding the promulgation of strategy from the National Security Strategy to the country plan as it exists in early 2014. It should help both the security cooperation workforce and other actors involved in the field to enhance their general understanding of which documents should be considered in security cooperation planning and execution. Note that this research specifically avoids the budget process and budget-related documents.

This study relies heavily on illustrations used to portray the relationship between strategic and operational documents and security cooperation planning and execution. The preferred method for a reader is to first view the illustrations to establish a quick understanding of linkages discussed in the manuscript and then read the text. [Editor's note: Illustrations have been omitted.]

A Caveat: Reports are not strategies

It is important to understand that strategic documents referred to in this paper are written reports of the strategies and not the strategies themselves. For example, the national defense strategy is not embodied completely in the National Defense Strategy document; the strategy is an evolving concept that can and often does change because of changes or anticipation of changes in the global environment. A foreign revolution or the outbreak of war can change U.S. defense strategy overnight (e.g. Cuba, 1959; Iran, 1979; or Libya, 2011). Both major and minor changes to U.S. national-level strategy are communicated in reports, press releases, speeches, interviews or other strategic communications that cannot wait for the next publishing cycle. Strategy reports themselves are simply snapshots in time that characterize current policy in a manner that can be widely disseminated. Because national-level strategies are based on American values, attitudes, and beliefs, the ends (national objectives) reflected in these strategies rarely change quickly. Ways (policies) and means (resources) change often.

The National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is derived from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. These legislative requirements state that the NSS is to be published each year in both classified and unclassified forms, and that the president is to submit it to Congress with the budget for the next fiscal year (50 USC 404a and c). In years when the administration changes, two NSS reports are due, with the incoming president responsible to produce the document within 150 days after taking office (50 USC 404a). Ironically, despite the law, U.S. presidents have only periodically fulfilled this obligation. President Reagan published two NSS reports in his eight years in office; President George H. W. Bush, three; President Clinton, seven; President George W. Bush, two; and so far, President Obama has only published one report, dated May 2010.

The NSS document defines national strategic security outcomes and provides strategic direction for all agencies involved in national security. It is purposefully general in content, discussing U.S. global interests, goals, and objectives vital to national security as well as addressing foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and the adequacy of U.S. capabilities to carry out the strategy.

The NSS is based on enduring American values as expressed by the current administration and, as such, ends articulated in the NSS generally do not change dramatically from one administration to another. However, significant changes can occur in ways to achieve national strategic ends. In the 2002 NSS, for example, President Bush stated that “the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense” (NSS, 2006), which some people viewed as unilateralism (Krauthammer, 2008). In contrast, President Obama has embraced a strategy of “pursuing comprehensive engagement” (NSS, 2010) with other nations, or multilateralism. In the context of security cooperation, the NSS defines the specific national-level strategic outcomes that must be achieved and general ways to achieve them. Simply put, the NSS provides national-level end states and policies to which security cooperation activities must contribute.

Department of Defense Strategic Documents

The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for national defense. As such, it must take strategic direction from the current administration and translate it into priority defense missions

and strategic goals for the DoD. The primary documents the DoD uses to convey this information are the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS).

The Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Strategy

The QDR and the NDS are interlinked. Title X of the U.S. Code requires the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to deliver a QDR to Congress "every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four" (10 USC 118). To date, there have been four QDRs, with the last delivered in February 2011. The QDR is a top-down, recurring, comprehensive examination of DoD strategy, including force structure, force modernization, infrastructure, and budget plans for the next 20 years (10 USC 118a). The SECDEF produces the QDR after close consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Their intent is to cyclically re-balance DoD strategies, capabilities, and forces to address current conflicts and future threats (DoD, 2012). In the context of security cooperation, the QDR is a vehicle for the SECDEF to provide specific strategic guidance regarding priority missions and associated goals. It is the key document that provides strategic direction to the DoD, including Phase 0 activities, where security cooperation activities are often the focus of effort.

The NDS informs and complements the QDR and is the DoD's capstone strategy document. It is unclassified and signed by the SECDEF. It is linked to the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy. It provides a framework for other DoD strategic guidance, specifically for campaign and contingency planning, and intelligence and force development. The NDS addresses how the U.S. armed forces will fight and win the nation's wars and how they will work with partner nations to shape opportunities in order to prevent conflict.

Initially in the 1997 and 2001 QDR reports, the NDS was included as a section. However, in 2005 Secretary Rumsfeld published a separate NDS document, and the 2006 QDR omitted a defense strategy section. Secretary Gates released his own NDS document in 2008. Note that the release dates of these documents are off cycle with the QDR. Both the QDR report and the NDS document are published every four years, but they are offset by two years; a QDR was published in 2006, the NDS Report in 2008, the next QDR was released in 2010 (actual release date was February 2011), and the next NDS should have been published in 2012 (but as of January 2014, it is still not in print). This publication offset is purposeful. Great changes can take place in the world in the space of four years, and it is logical to have a mid-course correction or update published in the interim. The NDS serves as an off-cycle adjustment for the QDR. Unlike the QDR, a separate NDS document is not legislatively mandated. It is published as a choice of the administration, so its future is not certain.

The January 2012 Strategic Guidance Document

A major change in U.S. defense policy was communicated in a document titled "Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," published in January 2012. The president signed the foreword to this document, and the SECDEF signed and released it. The document is similar to the NDS and seems to serve the same purpose. It is off cycle to the QDR and communicates a shift in strategic policy with a "rebalance toward the Asia–Pacific Region" and a rededication to the Middle East. The Obama administration did not publish a separate NDS Report in 2013; it will be interesting to see if the QDR, scheduled for publication in 2014, contains a national defense strategy section. Both the NDS and the 2012 Strategic Guidance documents serve to focus security cooperation resources to support national end states. They

both describe current overarching goals and strategy upon which security cooperation activities must contribute. In particular, both documents have historically stressed the importance of strengthening alliances and building partnerships with foreign nations.

The National Military Strategy Report

The CJCS issues this unclassified document every two years (even numbered years), providing his strategic guidance and vision to all U.S. armed forces. The NMS articulates military objectives related to the current strategic environment and aligns ways, means, and risk with strategic ends articulated in the NSS. It explains how the military will accomplish defense objectives established in the QDR and looks 2–8 years into the future. It is legislatively mandated by Title 10 USC 153 as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act, but the last report was actually published in 2010.

In the realm of security cooperation, the CJCS uses the NMS to communicate his understanding of the capabilities, adequacy, and interoperability of regional allies and friendly nations to support U.S. armed forces in combat or other operations for extended periods of time. It also conveys his advice with regard to the security environment and the necessary military actions to protect vital U.S. interests. The NMS, therefore, serves as a guide directly from the CJCS for combatant commanders (CCDRs) to plan security cooperation activities.

The Chairman's Strategic Direction for the Joint Force

Similar to the 2012 Strategic Guidance Document that adjusted QDR and NDS guidance, this document serves as the CJCS's adjustment to the NMS outside the required publication cycle. Released in early February 2012 shortly after the Strategic Guidance Document, the document incorporates changes directed by higher level strategy and explains the chairman's policies and priorities for the joint force. This document is not required by law and appears to be one of the current chairman's methods to communicate guidance off cycle.

Department of Defense Operational-Level Documents

The primary security cooperation planning document at the operational level is the geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) theater campaign plan. However, the SECDEF and CJCS provide more definitive guidance beyond national-level strategy documents through intermediary documents to direct and guide CCDRs.

The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) are companion documents, developed concurrently on a two-year cycle, to provide strategic guidance to theater-level planners. The GEF builds upon strategic direction in the NSS, QDR, and NMS by articulating the strategic end states that GCCs are expected to attain (focusing 5–10 years in the future).[1] Meanwhile, the JSCP actually tasks the CCDRs and service chiefs to prepare operation, contingency, and theater campaign plans (3D Planning Group, 2011; OSD, 2012). One of the major roles of a GCC is to translate strategic guidance into operational-level plans and activities. The GEF and JSCP are essential documents that accomplish that task.

Like the JSCP, the GEF is classified and has limited distribution. The 2010 GEF, for example, was limited to 100 published copies that were tightly controlled, and subsequent GEFs are available only on classified networks. The GEF serves as the DoD capstone document for security cooperation planning and it purposefully complements the Department of State/U.S.

Agency for International Development (DoS/USAID) Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) that I will discuss later. The GEF directs planning for near-term (two years) operational activities and is developed concurrently with the JSCP and with input from the State Department. Its intent is to provide strategic context to link strategy to operations. The GEF presents global posture and force management priorities, security cooperation guidance, and presidential guidance for contingency planning, and incorporates the SECDEF's strategic priorities and policy aims. In other words, it is a vehicle for the SECDEF to translate higher level national security objectives and strategy into DoD priorities and planning direction for the CCDRs and planning staffs.

The centerpiece of the GEF is a requirement for CCDRs to develop campaign plans that integrate and synchronize "steady-state" or Phase 0 activities to achieve end states specified in the GEF. The GEF provides theater strategic end states for GCCs and strategic end states for functional CCDRs. The GEF's emphasis on steady-state activities reflects the importance of security cooperation. Perhaps the most critical guidance in the GEF regarding security cooperation planning and activities is its list of global core partners, critical partners, key supporting partners, and actors of concern for each end state. This classification is important because it guides planners in allocating and prioritizing inherently limited security cooperation resources.

The JSCP, signed by the CJCS, translates strategic policy from the GEF into guidance for CCDRs and service chiefs so they may prepare operation, contingency, and theater campaign plans (3D Planning Group, 2011). The CJCS uses the JSCP to translate strategic policy end states from the GEF into specific campaign and contingency planning guidance for CCDRs. The JSCP expands GEF guidance to include global defense posture, security cooperation, and other steady-state activities. Covering the same two-year planning period as the GEF, the JSCP delivers an apportionment construct for use in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) that I will discuss next. In this regard, it articulates the GCC's force requirements to accomplish tasks assigned to them.

Global Force Management Implementation Guidance

The GFMIG is a classified document, signed by the SECDEF, and is produced and updated biennially. Assignment and apportionment tables within the GFMIG are updated annually. This document integrates force assignment, apportionment, and allocation globally using the apportionment construct from the JSCP. That is to say, the JSCP assigns tasks to the GCCs based largely on strategic policy guidance in the GEF; the GCCs make their plans, then request forces to accomplish the tasks. The GFMIG communicates which forces (both active and reserve) will be available to GCCs to meet the missions and responsibilities required in the JSCP.[2] Those forces will be assigned, apportioned, or allocated. Therefore, in the context of security cooperation, the GFMIG provides guidance allowing a GCC to obtain forces to support his security cooperation plans as well as any other activities.

The Theater Campaign Plan

By definition, a campaign plan is the translation of national strategy into operational concepts (Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 2010). Unlike a traditional campaign plan, the theater campaign plan's (TCP's) main purpose is to provide guidance to coordinate steady-state and Phase 0 activities across an area of responsibility (AOR) (Handbook, p. 4). It takes guidance from all the national strategic-level documents as well as the JSCP, GEF, and GFMIG and incorporates the GCC's planning priorities. The TCP identifies theater objectives and lines of effort to accomplish the regional and

functional end states delineated in the GEF. Theater campaign plans typically contain regional annexes that break down the AOR into more manageable and usually culturally similar areas that allow planners to more clearly define guidance. In the realm of security cooperation, the TCP is the security cooperation plan for an AOR.

The Country Campaign Plan

A country campaign plan (CCP) is published as part of the TCP, usually an annex, and is the responsibility of a desk officer working in the J-5 shop at the GCC. This officer must work closely with the security cooperation office in each country, as well as the embassy country team and the service component commands that provide resources to the GCC. Understanding what influences this plan is central to the purpose of this paper. Therefore, I will discuss the CCP later in more depth.

Service Component Campaign Plans

While a GCC has the responsibility to conduct security cooperation activities in his AOR, he often does not have the authority over forces and resources required to execute them. Resourcing security cooperation and other plans falls to the Service component commands. In the case of the Army, doctrine clearly states that all security cooperation in an AOR will be "by, with, or through the Theater Army" (Field Manual [FM] 3-22, *Security Cooperation,* 2012). Indeed, the GEF directs services to write their own campaign support plans that focus on service activities to achieve CCDR campaign objectives in security cooperation (Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook,* 2012). These are included as annexes to the GCC's TCP.

Service campaign support plans are guided by Service plans and are designed to assist the Service component commands executing their responsibilities in support of the GCC. They aggregate and validate requirements globally (across all AORs) and allocate service resources as appropriate (FM 3-22, 2012). For example, The Army Plan (TAP) is a service plan. The Army's senior leadership publishes the TAP annually to explain their intent for how the Army will fulfill its Title 10 obligations in support of defense and national strategies. It is divided into four synchronized and integrated sections titled Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM), and the Army Campaign Plan (Chipchase, 2012).

The TAP and its subsections provide the strategic framework for The Army Campaign Support Plan. This plan provides a host of institutional initiatives that support and greatly affect ASCC campaign support plans as well as CCPs and TCPs. Examples of Army initiatives that directly support theater security cooperation efforts include the establishment of the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk. The 162nd's mission is to provide Army and joint force commanders with personnel and units trained to build partner nation security capacity (e.g., adviser skills, combat skills, and security force assistance skills) (162nd Infantry Brigade website, 2012). Thus, any Soldier who will deploy to an AOR in an advise-and-assist role in support of the GCC's security cooperation efforts can receive predeployment training from the 162nd. Another example of an Army security cooperation institutional initiative is the establishment of the G-3/5/7's Army Security Cooperation Planner's Course, which was developed, in part, in response to ASCC complaints that newly assigned desk officers had no security cooperation planning background. A third Army initiative is the establishment of regionally aligned forces (RAFs), such as are currently being used in the Africa Command (AFRICOM) AOR to ease the request for forces

(RFF) cycle and more rapidly provide trained and culturally aware Soldiers to an AOR to execute security cooperation missions.

Each of these Army institutional initiatives, as well as those by the other Service components, has influence on planning and execution of the GCC's TCP and nested CCPs. But, other agencies exist within the U.S. government that rightfully have tremendous influence on security cooperation planning and execution, and their guidance must also be considered.

Department of State Guidance

The DoD does not develop a TCP or CCP in isolation. Indeed, in the best Clausewitzian tradition, it can be argued that the CCP is simply an extension of diplomacy, which is clearly under the authority of the Department of State (DoS). As such, CCP planners must consider DoS/USAID requirements and input. This is not always easy because, in part, there is a clear cultural difference between the DoD and the DoS/USAID. Cultural differences between these organizations stem from a variety of things, including resource and personnel disparities. The DoD, for example, has a much larger budget and a much larger workforce than the DoS. DoD planning timelines are relatively short term in focus, while the DoS/USAID planning horizon is usually years out. Finally, the DoD plans using a regional focus, while DoS/USAID planning is country focused. Of course, the mission sets for DoD and DoS differ greatly as well. This cultural schism can be described in a number of ways, but an illustration from two key strategic documents can serve as an interesting insight. [Editor's note: Illustration omitted.]

This cultural difference is specifically reflected in planning philosophy. In general, DoD planning is objectives based. The focus of the planning effort is on objectives, followed by the identification and allocation of resources to achieve the objectives. DoS planning, on the other hand, is resource based. The focus of the planning effort starts with identifying resources and then allocating available resources to achieve objectives (3D 101, 2012). This is a significant difference. Secretary Clinton had made a tremendous effort to transform DoS/USAID in many areas, including the way these agencies approach planning. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) introduced a planning philosophy change and it was further clarified in the 3D Planning Guide (2011). 3D refers to diplomacy, development, and defense. The 3D concept is to improve collaboration and synchronization in all of these realms in an effort to achieve unity of purpose and unity of effort among the DoD, DoS, and USAID at each level (country, region, global/functional). The Secretary of State's (SECSTATE's) goal is the better understanding of the products and processes each agency uses in planning so as to develop better collaboration (3D Planning Guide, 2011). Supporting this effort is the SECSTATE's initiative to replace bureau- and country-level planning documents with more objective-based strategic plans. The foundation of all these initiatives is found in the DoS/USAID QDDR, which will be discussed next.

The Department of State/U.S. Agency for International Development Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

Secretary Clinton established the QDDR in 2010 to answer the question "How can we do better?" This foundational document articulates a blueprint for elevating American civilian power to advance national interests and to be a better partner to the DoD and other agencies (QDDR, 2010). The central theme of the document, "leading through civilian power," refers to directing and coordinating the resources of all America's civilian agencies to prevent and resolve

conflicts; to help countries lift themselves out of poverty into prosperous, stable, and democratic states; and to build global coalitions to address global problems.

Although the DoS QDDR serves some of the same purposes as the DoD QDR, it is not mandated by law. It does require DoS and USAID to transform their planning philosophy to be more objective based. As a result of guidance in the QDDR, significant changes to planning documents are occurring at the DoS bureau and country level.

The Department of State/U.S. Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan

Comparable in scope to the DoD NDS, the JSP identifies the SECSTATE's direction and priorities for both DoS and USAID. It defines the primary aims of U.S. foreign policy and development assistance as well as strategic priorities. Based on direction from the NSS, QDDR, and other national-level guidance and strategies, as well as coordination with other interagency actors, the JSP incorporates the SECSTATE's vision and articulates key priorities, strategies for achieving those priorities, and criteria for measuring results. The JSP also guides the DoS/USAID budget process (3D Planning Process, 2012).

Joint Regional Strategy and the Functional Bureau Strategy

Prompted by the QDDR, these two new documents represent a major change in how DoS and USAID view strategy, and the changes they direct will be phased in across all bureaus before the end of 2014. The Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) provides guidance to prioritize diplomatic engagement and resources and respond to unanticipated events within each regional bureau. The Functional Bureau Strategy (FBS) establishes direction and priorities for each functional bureau. Both documents are complementary to each other and collectively they replace the Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan (BSRP). Unlike the BSRP, which was an annual document that combined strategy with resourcing and did not include USAID, the JRS and FBS are true joint[3] publications published once every three years with an intent to focus planning on strategic objectives rather than available resources. Bureau chiefs will, of course, adjust the content of the document within the three-year cycle as the operating environment changes. In a clear break from previous philosophy, a separate bureau resource request (BRR) will accompany the JRS. Formerly, the BSRP served primarily as a resource document with strategic justification. Now, strategic objectives and policy drive the strategy, and the resource request is in support.

AORs, Bureaus, and Regions….

I want to mention an interesting and important planning consideration regarding DoS, DoD, and USAID at this point because of the additional complexity it adds to the interagency security cooperation planning process. Somewhat analogous to the DoD GCC's AOR, DoS has divided the world geographically into bureaus. However, the boundaries of the DoS bureaus do not align with DoD AORs. Therefore, the JRS for each bureau does not align directly with the GCC's TCP, thus adding another layer of coordination for planning that must be accomplished. Similarly, USAID has also divided the world into geographic regions, and these regions do not line up perfectly with either the DoD AORs or the DoS bureaus, again adding another layer of complexity with which a planner must contend. Finally, it should also be understood that DoS has established functional bureaus (e.g., Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, etc.)

somewhat akin to the DoD functional commands (e.g., TRANSCOM, USSOCOM, etc.). These functional bureaus have, like the DoD functional commands, their own strategic plans.

Integrated Country Strategy

The Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) is another new document prompted by the QDDR, this time at the diplomatic mission level. It replaces the Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) that was authored by the chief of mission (COM) every year in each of the countries having diplomatic relations with the United States. Like the JRS and FBS, the new ICS is a three-year document, but it is country specific and contains mission goals and diplomatic strategy for each mission as well as the security, justice, and development strategy, if warranted. It is integrated because it requires a whole-of-government planning effort with involvement by mission personnel from DoS, USAID, DoD, and other government agencies that operate within the mission (Clinton, 2011). The ICS is supported by the mission resource request (MRR) which, similar to the BRR, is a funding document designed to access funds in support of the strategy.

The ICS is the COM's strategic plan and it therefore has a great effect on security cooperation planning. Virtually no work by the U.S. government occurs in a country without the ambassador's consent. Therefore, military-to-military engagements, training, foreign military sales (FMS) or direct commercial sales (DCS), for example, should not be included in the CCP without support of the COM.

USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy

A Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) is a five-year strategy document (although it may be shorter for countries in transition) that focuses on USAID-implemented assistance and related U.S. government nonassistance tools (CDCS, 2012). The USAID mission chief develops the plan for each country where the USAID operates, and this plan must be considered as integral to security cooperation planning and execution. A great deal of synergy could be gained by a CCP that complements USAID efforts. The CDCS is often found as an annex to the COM's ICS.

The Country Campaign Plan, Revisited

From the discussion presented so far, it is clear that myriad guidance documents from the national level to the country level exist and influence the CCP. Planners must be aware of this guidance and incorporate it in the development of individual CCPs. In particular, planners must understand that, despite the CCP being a GCC planning document, they must take into account many other influences to be effective. Not only should the CCP reflect guidance from DoD, DoS, and other U.S. agencies, but also it must consider the desires of partner nations, a point that cannot be overemphasized.

Partner nations are sovereign and have their own strategies, capabilities, and perceived threats that may or may not coincide with U.S. perspectives. The influence the United States may have on another country is inherently limited, and planners must understand the culture, motivation, and strategy that a partner nation will follow. There exists only one area in which security cooperation activities can take place and be effective. That is where the partner nation, DoS/USAID, and DoD interests overlap. CCP planners must understand this overlap and use it effectively to produce a coherent and successful plan.

Conclusion

The CCP is where all the guidance discussed in this paper must come together in a viable plan. In order to develop a realistic and useful CCP, planners must understand and consider guidance from the national and operational levels, the interagency, DoS/USAID, and the wants and needs of actors outside of the U.S. government, including the partner nation. In other words, the CCP has to be a well-integrated and flexible planning document.

The purpose of this paper is to review selected U.S. strategic- and operational-level documents that guide security cooperation planning and activities and explain how they relate to and complement each other to ultimately provide effective security cooperation. The intent is to assist planners in understanding what key guidance documents they should review as they plan. As important as these documents are, successful planners must understand that the strategies these documents communicate are constantly changing and being refined. Planners must know where to look and what to review to gain insight into the translation of strategy from the national level to security cooperation engagement that takes place at the tactical level. No CCP can be effective if it works at cross purpose with higher level guidance, input from DoS/USAID and other interagencies, or the partner nation.

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Glossary – Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFCC – Air Force Component Command
AOR – Area of responsibility
APGM – Army Program Guidance Memorandum
APPG – Army Planning Priorities Guidance
ASCC – Army Service Component Command
ASPG – Army Strategic Planning Guidance
BRR – Bureau resource request
CCDR – Combatant commander
CCP – Country Campaign Plan
CDCS – Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CGSOC – Command and General Staff Officer's College
CJCS – Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff
DoD – Department of Defense
DoS – Department of State
FBS – Functional Bureau Strategy
GCC – Geographic combatant commander
GEF – Guidance for Employment of the Force
GFMIG – Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
ICS – Integrated Country Strategy
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSP – Joint Strategic plan
MARCC – Marine component command
MRR – Mission resource request
NAVCC – Navy component command
NDS – National Defense Strategy
NMS – National Military Strategy
NSS – National Security Strategy
QDDR – Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
RAF – Regionally aligned force
RFF – Request for forces

SECDEF – Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE - Secretary of State
SOCC – Special Operations Component Command
TAP – The Army Plan
TCP – Theater Campaign Plan
USAID – United States Agency for International Development

Endnotes

1. Strategic end states in the GEF cannot often be achieved in the two-year publication cycle. Therefore, while the document itself focuses on a two-year planning period, strategic end states articulated in the GEF have a longer time line.

2. Emergent requirements are time sensitive and are not captured in the GFMIG publication cycle. These requirements are handled by off-cycle adjudication by the Global Force Management Board and published in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (included as a subsection of the GFMIG), which is updated annually or as needed.

3. Unlike the DoD definition of joint, the word “joint”is used here as DoS and USAID uses it: to mean both DoS and USAID.

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Chapter 3

Security Cooperation in Support of Theater Strategy

LTC Michael Hartmayer, U.S. Army, Retired, and
LTC John Hansen, U.S. Army, Retired

> Our ability to sustain . . . alliances, and to build coalitions of support toward common objectives, depends in part on the capabilities of America's Armed Forces. Similarly, the relationships our Armed Forces have developed with foreign militaries are a critical component of our global engagement and support our collective security.
>
> — National Security Strategy, May 2010[1]

The execution of security cooperation in the service component commands around the globe is an evolving process that occurs in many forms and utilizes myriad methods. Requests for assistance for security forces also come in many forms. They may be country or country-team nominated; they may be at the request of an international organization (e.g., United Nations, NATO) or sub-regional organization (e.g., European Union, African Union); they may be directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, or geographic combatant commands; or they could be requested by a sister service component. However, the huge number of events, the variety of outside actors with separate agendas, and the difficulty in linking these actions and activities to strategy create a challenging environment in which to execute a coherent plan. The problem for the strategist is to synergize or fashion these efforts and players through a process that supports the commander's goals and objectives.

Key Components of Security Cooperation

The purpose of this article is to identify and link the key components of security cooperation and strategy development processes for those outside the small group of practitioners who wrestle with them normally. Critical steps in building and maintaining a viable theater-level strategy are listed below:

- Set the theater security cooperation strategy.
- Use the security cooperation planning process.
- Align, develop, and prioritize security cooperation activities within theater.

All are critical steps to build and maintain a viable theater-level strategy. The challenge at the component level is planning with and synchronizing a large number of activities and agencies. When coordinating with his parent service or higher headquarters, the strategist often finds a "map with a thousand pins" approach to security cooperation. Briefings often include multiple screenshots of the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System or similar databases, on which maps of countries or regions suddenly become filled with thousands of map pins depicting the entire spectrum of U.S. military activity from conference attendance to major exercises. This gives the impression of a robust and creative theater security cooperation program, when in reality the activities may be of little substance and require minimal

coordination. Even if a command's staff fully understands security cooperation strategy and planning and also executes it well, it can become an ad hoc or purposeless drill if the staff ignores or loses its expertise. The process needs codifying in doctrine and standard operating procedure publications to make it deliberate, much the way the Army has ingrained the military decisionmaking process into generations of officers. The benefit of a successful theater security cooperation strategy or Phase 0 concept plan ultimately is conflict avoidance, so we must resource theater security cooperation.

To set the stage for understanding security cooperation in the context of theater strategy, it is important to be familiar with the historical context. The geographic combatant commands have had authority and responsibility for theater engagement planning since 1948 under the Unified Command Plan.[2] The geographic combatant commands' appreciation of security cooperation necessarily starts with an understanding of the National Defense Strategy. The strategic environment portrayed in the National Defense Strategy identifies a spectrum of challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources. Climate, demographic, and environmental challenges, along with globalization and increasing economic interdependence, create an environment characterized by uncertainty and risks.

Guidance for Employment

Building on the National Defense Strategy, the Guidance for Employment of the Force takes this strategic guidance and consolidates and integrates it into a single, overarching document. The Guidance for Employment of the Force provides strategic policy guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, its companion document, provides the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff implementing guidance and formally tasks the development of specific campaign, campaign support, and contingency plans. Importantly, the Guidance for Employment of the Force transitions Department of Defense planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach.

Restated in clearer terms, the Guidance for Employment of the Force approaches planning from the perspective of achieving broad theater or functional end states, not contingencies. Notably, the guidance contains the requirement for geographic combatant commands to develop campaign plans that integrate and synchronize the "steady-state" activities and operations they must perform to achieve the regional or functional end states specified in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. This is the mandate for the Theater Security Cooperation Support plan at the service component command level. Critically, for the service component commander as part of the joint team, the emphasis in the Guidance for Employment of the Force on "steady-state" activities to achieve end states and objectives reflects the centrality of security cooperation activities in our national strategic guidance documents.

To understand where steady-state security cooperation fits in the service component commander's mission essential tasks, it is important to understand what we have asked him to accomplish. In simple terms, he must support ongoing operations, fulfill Title 10 USC responsibilities, be prepared to deploy a contingency command post (previously a joint task force-capable headquarters), and execute theater security cooperation missions. Arguably, security cooperation is the most important because it is a condition setter and enabler for the other three tasks. The definition in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary*

of Military and Associated Terms, describes how it performs as an enabler for the other three tasks:

> *All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.*[3]

To build on the above definition and to better align security cooperation activities with theater strategy, a process is necessary to avoid the "pins on the map" analogy. The nuances of the process may differ from command to command and service to service, but there are basic parts that should look the same regardless of service or location. The Army's targeting methodology (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) is a time-tested model that can serve as a foundation upon which to base the process.[4] The creativity of the service component commander and staff is the only limit on the development of theater- or service-specific security cooperation planning models or methods. What is important about any process is that it accomplishes what the commander needs it to accomplish. We can envision this process in its simplest form as a matching game — a column of security activities on the left, matched or paired against a column of theater strategic objectives on the right. The synchronization of strategy and security cooperation hinges on several key activities: identification of component supporting objectives, identification of requirements, prioritization of countries and resources, and assessment.

Objectives

The development of component security cooperation objectives (effects or goals, depending on the doctrinal perspective) facilitates synchronizing the myriad efforts. Development of proper objectives facilitates and encourages the linkage of action to the geographic combatant command's theater security objectives. Ideally, these objectives would be purpose focused and linked to the commander's intent for security cooperation. While not an exhaustive list, some purpose-based objectives include gaining access, improving regional U.S. force readiness, building partner capacity, increasing interoperability in assigned regions, strengthening partner relationships, and improving partner nation leadership and ministries. Identifying objectives also helps develop task sets and allows planners to focus their efforts.

We deem that certain operations, activities, and actions are aligned with the task set, and then we prioritize them. Prioritization leads to concept development, followed by assessment. From a doctrinal perspective, these tasks could be part of the Universal Joint Task List along with measures and criteria. Verb tense aside — the most important criterion for a task will be linking the activity to posture requirements and overseas bases such as cooperative security locations and forward operating sites. Security cooperation activities should also incorporate national requirements and link joint and combined exercises with day-to-day events and contingency plans.

A successful security cooperation planning process will curtail purposeless or episodic activities with limited potential for long-term impact — in effect, bringing a common sense approach to the "pins on the map" analogy. Maneuver officers will recognize this as the purpose side of the task and purpose approach, because the main question the security cooperation planner and strategist must ask himself is "Why?" Why are we doing this activity, and how does it support our goals and objectives in theater? The best way to get after the answer to this question is to

prioritize, allowing the matching of valuable security cooperation resources against outcomes or effects in countries deemed important. The prioritization process can be as simple or complex as the planner desires it to be, but in general terms, it should prioritize activities and countries to determine where to best spend the command's security cooperation dollars. Activities with a low "why" score should be at the bottom of the "to do" list, or disappear altogether.

The criteria against which we measure security cooperation activities and countries may vary from theater to theater. However, in a generic sense they could align with the Guidance for Employment of the Force, support specific theater objectives and outcomes or end states, service partnership guidance, follow guidance from the geographic combatant commands, use country prioritization or commander's intent, constrain themselves to set fiscal resources, obey authorities conducting the engagement, link to other events, respond to the source of the requirement, or take advantage of potential opportunity for "real world" linkage.[5] Once we evaluate these events, the next step in many commands is for a requirements board or its equivalent at the geographic combatant command and service component command level to vet it.

A successful prioritization process should result in a prioritized list of theater security objectives — e.g., military-to-military relationships, foreign military sales, and senior leader engagements, exercises — that will focus the command's fiscal and planning efforts. If the activity, event, or requirement is valid, then it generates a concept, or plan, a staff lead is assigned, and the general support of the staff is employed to make the event a success. Critically, operations, activities, and actions and concepts that do not meet planning guidance or priorities are eliminated, and purposeless or episodic activities therein with limited potential for long-term impacts are curtailed.

To understand how well these activities meet the service component commander's objectives and support the security cooperation intent, we must assess all events against the goals and objectives identified in the theater campaign plan for the geographic combatant command and the theater campaign support plan for the service component command. After action reports and trip reports are vital to the service component command's strategy development efforts. The assessments inform campaign plans, facilitate adjustments to the integrated priority list and comprehensive joint assessment, and help refine resource requirements. Ultimately, the objective is to inform the service component command leadership on the progress of the mission and the status of effects in support of desired outcomes, strategic objectives, or goals. This process should be quantitative and link the key tasks, objectives, lines of effort, partner nations, and operations, activities, and actions so the command can develop theater priorities in terms of objectives for each partner nation and determine whether the efforts and activities synchronize with the priorities.

Trends

During a cycle of constrained defense spending, we cannot be everything to everyone. A commander's most important security cooperation decision is where to spend his resources to most effectively support theater and national security priorities. Although the United States conducts security cooperation to assure creation of a dominant coalition, enhance its influence, and gain regional access and access to decision makers, we may not have the processes and systems in place to execute an effective security cooperation strategy. In this era of a new fiscal reality, we will need to better manage, align, and synchronize security cooperation resources. The development of these resources is paramount to being proper stewards.

We need to address two key trends, both with negative connotations. The first is the tendency to accept quantity over quality. The number of engagements in a certain country has little bearing on the effectiveness in an overarching strategy. The second trend is failing to define future security cooperation strategy beyond that of our most recent experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan. Building a security force is far different from building and maintaining a coalition.

The fact that there may be several hundred "engagements" with a specific country may be a great data point, but it should raise further questions for the strategist. He should focus on the quality of the engagements as they affect larger strategy. The service should prioritize the types of engagements as part of a global strategy that addresses gaps or shortfalls and weighs resources to accomplish that strategy. For example, the National Security Strategy states, "Our ability to sustain these alliances, and to build coalitions of support toward common objectives, depends in part on the capabilities of America's Armed Forces. Similarly, the relationships our Armed Forces have developed with foreign militaries are a critical component of our global engagement and support our collective security."[6] The services should define the broader strategy of how they fit into the National Security Strategy and how they intend to allocate the strategy to the theaters along with the resources.

Our most recent prominent reference point should not impede our ability to look at future requirements. The capability to build a security force from nothing is a component of a larger strategy, and should not necessarily be the primary focus. Interoperability with capable allies and partners requires mission command and operational units to ensure future coalitions integrate quickly and operate across the spectrum of operations. Improving and, in some cases, sustaining interoperability with future coalition partners is more complex and perhaps more expensive than teaching individual skills and small unit tactics, but remains a vital investment in our national security and ultimately provides significant and often overlooked cost savings. An example is current NATO contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Approximately 85 percent of contributing members to ISAF are NATO allies contributing the equivalent of 8–10 brigades' worth of forces.[7] Those forces occupy battle space and execute missions that U.S. forces would otherwise be required to execute. Coalition operations will remain the norm, and activities focusing on enhanced proficiency and increased interoperability with allies will pay off many times over in the future.

Ultimately, the goal of theater security cooperation is to improve national security through well-postured, prepared, and interoperable partners. Synchronized and nested Phase 0 operations are a vital component in preventing the requirement for later phases. A clear, coordinated strategy with measurable end states applied to security cooperation at the theater and national levels will assure the execution of a broader national security strategy. While acknowledging the current superb security cooperation activities going on around the globe, it's clear that a well-considered and understood security cooperation planning methodology will bring about successful execution with maximum efficiency and ensure we expend resources only on activities that will achieve the desired results.

Chapter 4

Mission Command in the Regionally Aligned Division Headquarters

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"Life at the corners of four map sheets" is how then-Lt. Gen. Vincent Brooks, as the commanding general of Army Central Command (ARCENT), described the role of the regionally aligned force. The 1st Armored Division, as the first regionally aligned force division headquarters, has found that life at the intersection of those map sheets requires a change from old habits and mindsets. Success as an aligned force requires embracing mission command as a philosophy, establishing mission command systems to keep hands on the forward problem, and adopting a forward-focused mindset. Mission command enables the regionally aligned force to create shared trust and understanding within the headquarters, build the relationships and teams necessary to support the geographic combatant commander, and develop the flexibility necessary to provide mission-tailored command posts to the combatant command.

In May 2012, the Army expanded the concept of regionally aligning units from only brigade combat teams to division headquarters. Forces Command aligned the 1st Armored Division to support U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), making our team one of the first regionally aligned division headquarters. The chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Ray Odierno, outlined his intent for regionally aligned forces on 25 October 2012, indicating their purpose: "to provide the combatant commander with up to a Joint Task Force capable headquarters with *scalable, tailorable* capabilities to enable him to shape the environment." Our 1st Armored Division team viewed alignment as a tremendous opportunity. Our commanding general at the time, Maj. Gen. Dana J.H. Pittard, described the division's role in this way, nested with the chief of staff of the Army's intent: "Our goal is to broadly collaborate our understanding and build trust (at all levels), which will best allow our supported combatant commander to prevent conflict, shape the environment (as needed), and posture us to win (if needed)."

Before You Ask the Question: The Answer Is Yes

First Armored Division committed early on in our regionally aligned force mission to provide complete support to our supported combatant commander. The question was, "How do we best, and in the most responsive way possible, add value to the combatant command?" The operating environment is already challenging—our view was that the regionally aligned force does not need to add additional challenges or complications. Combatant commands will sometimes encounter this type of response when requesting assets from Army units:

- Combatant commander: "I need 100 soldiers."
- Supporting Army unit: "Acknowledged, we'll send a brigade (or equivalent)."

Such inflexibility means that Army loses some credibility within the combatant command. If the combatant commander needs 10 soldiers, that is what we will send. When a supported combatant commander submits a request, the regionally aligned force should respond within the intent and

guideline of that intent. The bottom line: before a supported combatant commander asks the question, the answer from the regionally aligned force should be "yes."

Get in a Good Stance: Always Forward, Globally Connected, and Expeditionary

Maj. Gen. Pittard encouraged our team to retain an expansive view of our role as a regionally aligned headquarters, to "keep our hands on the problem," and to develop a mindset of being "always forward, globally connected, and expeditionary." The farther an organization is from the problem, the harder it is for that organization to fully understand the problem. We all tend to view the world through a lens that is familiar to us, which, if we are not careful, further inhibits our ability to understand completely the motivations and intentions of our regional partners. Our ability to influence the operating environment directly relates to our proximity to our partners. Regional alignment has required us to "get closer"; engaging partners without understanding the environment means that we lose relevance and our partners will be less willing to engage us.

To keep our hands on the problem, our team applied the tenets of mission command to our staff and unit activities. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, defines mission command as both a philosophy and a warfighting function. Embracing mission command as a philosophy required a change in mindset more than anything else we did. Organizational change is difficult, and moving a large team requires a "big idea." In this case, that idea was retaining a forward footing. In 1st Armored Division, the staff had to buy into the idea that we must look forward to help us better manage transitions and add value to our supported combatant commander from day one. In exercising mission command as a warfighting function, the division staff has repeatedly honed its skills, including conducting the operations process, inform and influence activities, and knowledge and information management.

As part of supporting the combatant commander with what he requires, the division has built and fine-tuned what we call a tailored command post. In developing this concept, the division conducted multiple command post exercise iterations. These included a rotation at the National Training Center in July and August 2012, which was the first time in almost five years that a division level tactical command post deployed to the National Training Center and integrated into the rotation.

A typical pattern for a headquarters is to surge through a command post training event, gain a high level of staff proficiency during execution, but then return to the headquarters, recover equipment, and resume work in cubicles. Facilities are an important component to mission command, and the typical "cubicle farm" works against the principles of mission command. Such cubicles are neither truly private nor open, with high gray walls that discourage collaboration and hinder the building of teams and trust. Other organizational enemies include stove-piping of information in isolated staff sections and staff muscle atrophy—the erosion of staff individual and collective task proficiencies. Our current global operating environment is so complex, changing, and ambiguous that we can no longer afford to conduct business this way.

Rather than viewing command post training as a series of discrete events, the 1st Armored Division approach has been to create an environment at home station that allows us to train and operate in our command post every day. Our goal is to connect to the network using our digital systems and allow our soldiers' daily repetitions to create a level of familiarity and understanding that makes us easily conversant about problems in our aligned region. In that command post—our division operations center—our headquarters links into CENTCOM and ARCENT battle rhythm events such as battle updates. If done right, approaches such as this can mitigate the

problem of "the first 100 days"—that time when units are transitioning and there is great risk due to decreased situational understanding. Staying connected in this way means deploying with a staff that has at least a basic understanding of the operating environment.

The scope of a geographic combatant command's area of responsibility is well beyond that which one division, or even corps, could successfully attempt to understand completely. The commander should designate an area of interest on which to focus the regionally aligned force. For 1st Armored Division, this CENTCOM-directed focus has been largely on the Levant, which includes Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. While not every geographic command will have a similar hotspot, it should still focus the division or corps on a particular portion of the area of responsibility.

Our goal every day has been to understand the current operating environment, the combatant commander's priorities, and potential contingency operations. You cannot get there from a "cold start"; being of value as a regionally aligned force means that you have to constantly study, strive to understand, and work to reduce uncertainty as much as possible.

Building Relationships

The regionally aligned force at division and corps level can provide a valuable asset for the combatant commander's use in shaping operations (Phase 0). By keeping hands on the problem, the aligned force can enhance the combatant commander's shaping efforts. The force can build relationships with the lead federal agency (normally the Department of State), which will pay dividends when and if operations transition to deterring operations (Phase 1) and beyond. Additionally, designating a regionally aligned force in Phase 0 makes transitioning to Phase 1 easier, with the regionally aligned force headquarters prepared to set up the core of a joint task force or a combined joint task force.

Phase 0 activities focus on developing ally capabilities, improving information exchange, and intelligence sharing—all things the regionally aligned force does through mission command. The regionally aligned headquarters can be the consistent face of the U.S. military for the members of the partner nation's military and can establish long-term relationships to aid in building the capacity of our key allies. Such relationships are one of the ways the regionally aligned force can provide value to the combatant commander in the human dimension.

The 1st Armored Division established these relationships with members of the Jordanian Armed Forces, from general officer down through staff level at Exercise Eager Light in November 2012. The relationships proved valuable when the division fulfilled the regionally aligned concept by filling a majority of the positions in a CENTCOM forward-deployed command post. The relationships also led to the Jordanian military leadership specifically requesting 1st Armored Division to participate in Exercise Eager Lion in June 2013.

Exercise, Exercise, Exercise (Politics, Perceptions, Tribes, and Money)

1st Armored Division also participated in two other partnered exercises: Earnest Leader Phase I (a seminar with Saudi Arabian partners at Fort Bliss, Texas) and Earnest Leader Command Post Exercise (in Saudi Arabia). Such exercises are tremendous opportunities and provide a venue for the regionally aligned force to meet the combatant commander's intent of forming teams across his operating environment.

Joint exercises also provide opportunities for training within a fiscally uncertain environment, as significant funding is available at the combatant command level to conduct partnered training and to participate in relationship-building exercises. With the Army force generation programmed training reduced by budgetary constraints, this joint and partnered training environment is a great place in which to find additional opportunities to train.

Exercise management involves politics; however, the Army is in competition with other services to take advantage of these training opportunities, and there are sensitivities about who does what and who contributes where. Other services have built enduring, deep relationships with the combatant command-level action officers who plan and direct partnered training exercises, which makes getting the Army's foot in the door difficult. The regionally aligned force must become fluent in joint exercise language.

Establishing relationships in both the geographic combatant command and Army service component command should be a priority for every regionally aligned corps or division headquarters. Doing so can keep the force nested in the supported command's decision cycle and keep it responsive to the needs of the supported combatant commander.

The regionally aligned force staff must also become conversant in, and comfortable using, the Joint Operation Planning Process. Although exposed to this during Intermediate-Level Education, few Army majors know it well. Training for regional alignment should therefore include staff exercises using this process.

The Regionally Aligned Force Community of Interest

The regionally aligned force must also be "comfortable being uncomfortable," by reaching out to others to challenge staff ideas, encouraging venues that expose the headquarters to different perspectives, and retaining enduring contact with partners across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. Many nuances, key players, and narratives must be considered when integrating into a region; therefore, we cannot afford to limit perspectives to those contained at Fort Bliss or any other installation. Academic outreach is therefore crucial for a regionally aligned force.

The regionally aligned force community of interest is the network of organizations that can share emerging training requirements and best practices with the regionally aligned force. The 1st Armored Division reached out to several academic institutions to develop such a network early on in regional alignment. The first academic engagement was with Leadership Development and Education for a Sustained Peace, which taught an excellent seminar on Levant culture, history, and politics. The network grew when the Army War College sent senior faculty to Fort Bliss to teach a seminar on establishing and leading a combined joint task force headquarters. Additionally, the U.S. Agency for International Development taught the Joint Humanitarian Assistance Operation Course in preparation for a potential humanitarian assistance mission.

The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, particularly its knowledge management team, has provided valuable assistance to the division headquarters. For the regionally aligned force headquarters looking to integrate into a new operating environment, understanding the interagency environment is critical. Our regionally aligned force headquarters is just one part of a larger ecosystem in which our interagency partners have their own decision cycles, spheres of influence, and access to resources, as do military partners throughout our operating environment. We must be comfortable with this—and the only way to have a shot at understanding what is

really going on is to challenge our perspective by embracing the processes, systems, and ideas of those other agencies who work as part of our operational environment. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command helped the division staff understand how to "talk" in a joint environment and to identify critical processes and decision cycles across the operating environment so we could tailor our outputs to become inputs to other processes. Doing this helped us add value to our partners by taking an approach that accounts for their activities, ensuring that we were postured to enable systems and processes across the operating environment.

These organizations have all played an important role in supporting 1st Armored Division as the regionally aligned force, but this is just the beginning of what the community of interest can and should be. It must be a "big Army" effort to influence players Army-wide and across the Department of Defense to become part of a network in support of the regionally aligned force. The Army can also make this network extend beyond the Department of Defense to include relevant joint and interagency partners who are players in the region, and establish a recurring event where all such players come together to collaborate with the regionally aligned force. This network would be a powerful asset for the combatant commander.

Challenges with Being Regionally Aligned

Embracing regional alignment as an Army and best enabling follow-on regionally aligned force headquarters will require improvement in several areas, starting with the network. Regional alignment should grant units access to forward networks from home station, but bureaucracy at multiple levels (Army service component command, and combatant command) makes this a slow process and prevents an easy and seamless connection across our mission command systems with the supported combatant commander.

A second challenge is that the protocols for sharing information with coalition partners are neither fully established nor sourced. Issues here include an ingrained Army habit of over-classifying products and an associated foreign disclosure process that prevents the timely sharing of information with partners; both practices inhibit information sharing. Regionally aligned force headquarters need a cross-domain architecture that allows for rapid transfer of information. They also need hardware, such as additional server stacks, to establish a partnered mission command network. There is a financial cost associated with establishing this level of connectivity, but this is the price of readiness, particularly if the Army wants regionally aligned forces to have the mindset of "always forward, globally connected, and expeditionary."

In lieu of that partnered mission command network, the staff should be prepared to go where partners are the most comfortable—that is, move to analog versus digital systems if needed. This can require a return to basics and training on skills which have atrophied in the Army's move away from map boards and overlays to the digital common operating picture.

A third challenge is the difficulty in establishing inter-organizational unity of effort in a region. Many organizations tend to act unilaterally; collaboration in a region is often casual and, at times, arbitrary. A regionally aligned headquarters can facilitate unity of effort among these organizations by creating venues, which enable collaboration, especially in information fusion and integrated planning. While the lead federal agency in Phase 0 is often the Department of State, the regionally aligned force can assist the Department of State in the region by providing the planning capacity inherent in the headquarters. This interagency coordination should not be reserved for deployments only, but should occur routinely at home station. Again, this will require an Army push to incorporate the right players into this network.

The Army, at the Department of the Army headquarters and the Army service component command level, also has a responsibility to the combatant commander to explain what the regionally aligned force brings to the table. The Army service component should also authorize discussion directly between the regionally aligned force and the combatant command to build relationships at both the action officer and commander level.

An additional challenge is that very little "juice" comes with regional alignment; it currently does not trigger additional resources of people, money, or equipment. The Army should therefore develop a force generation model for regionally aligned headquarters, which addresses personnel manning, additional resources (funding and equipment), and training requirements and opportunities. As an example, additional travel funds are required for leaders to meet partners and build relationships, whether with partner nations or at the combatant command. These types of engagements should be part of the regionally aligned force generation model and scheduled early in the alignment period.

Finally, a challenge internal to the regionally aligned force is in fostering intellectual curiosity across the headquarters. All of the training and touch points described previously—be they academic seminars, relationship building, or command post touch points—build understanding of the operational environment. This is just a beginning, however, and the staff must build on this understanding through its own reading. While leaders cannot instill curiosity, they can encourage it in the staff. The community of interest, for example, can collectively create a recommended reading list as a starting point for such individual studies.

Mission command and the regionally aligned force are mutually supportive concepts. Preventing conflict and shaping the environment in a region require continued engagement, which the regionally aligned force can do through physical presence or from home station. Mission command, as both a philosophy and a warfighting function, enables the force to do this. In its support of the combatant commander, the regionally aligned force can then demonstrate the value and necessity of mission command, as it builds relationships with partners in the region and keeps "hands on the problem."

For 1st Armored Division, embracing mission command meant a shift toward conducting staff operations at home station the same way we do while deployed, including establishing a home station command post linked into the Army service component command and combatant command, setting a battle rhythm at home station similar to that used while deployed, and keeping a "forward mindset" all the time. While there is a cost involved in equipping the regionally aligned force to remain connected forward, this is more about "head ware" than it is about hardware. The regionally aligned force must adopt a forward-focused mindset to be most responsive and add value to the supported combatant commander.

Bios:

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Chapter 5

In Era of Small Wars, U.S. Must Embrace Training Mission

John A. Nagl

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Training U.S. Partner Militaries, February 2013

> From the standpoint of America's national security, the most important assignment in your military career may not necessarily be commanding U.S. soldiers, but advising or mentoring the troops of other nationals as they battle the forces of terror and the instability within their own borders.
>
> — Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, West Point, April 21, 2008

Historically, Western armies have struggled with the task of training, advising and assisting host-nation security forces to defeat irregular adversaries. This is part and parcel of their broader problem with irregular conflict. Conventional military forces are designed for combat against counterpart forces of other states, and they have often been unable to adapt to the demands of irregular warfare when their opponents refused to obligingly fight them in the manner they had prepared for. Perhaps in no area of warfare have Western armies been less able to adapt than in the area of training and advising indigenous forces -- and in no area has that lack of adaptability been more costly.

Although the U.S. Army was the planet's most successful land power in conventional war in the 20th century, it has struggled with the challenge of irregular warfare from Vietnam through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For a host of reasons, ranging from America's conventional military superiority to globalization and resource depletion, the wars we will actually fight in this century are likely to look more like the small wars in which we have struggled than like those, such as Desert Storm, in which we have prevailed comparatively easily. And the most important way the U.S. Army can prevent as many of these wars as possible, and prevail in the ones that it must actually fight, is by developing the capability to train host-nation security forces.

Such advisory efforts are an extremely valuable force multiplier, allowing intervening forces to leverage relatively small numbers of their own soldiers to dramatically increase the effectiveness of indigenous forces while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government. However, despite the demonstrated importance of well-trained, highly qualified and motivated advisers in irregular conflicts, the Army has seldom provided them in sufficient quality and quantity for large-scale efforts, and it has rarely rewarded advisers in a manner commensurate with the impact they have on the course of irregular warfare campaigns.

Local forces have many potential advantages in any irregular warfare campaign. They know the terrain, both physical and human, and generally speak the language. They understand the social networks that make up the society and how they are interrelated. In a war in which finding the enemy is often harder than killing the enemy, local forces have the potential to be enormously powerful warfighters. But they also often suffer from disadvantages, including poor training, illiteracy, low wages, a tendency to engage in indiscriminate use of force and a lack of

the "combat multipliers" that make Western armies so successful in conventional war, namely air and artillery support, medical evacuation and treatment, sophisticated staff techniques and planning tools and, of course, vast funds.

Squaring this circle is the job of advisers, who in the best circumstances bring combat multipliers and an unblinking eye with which to watch over their local-force brethren. However, this is an uneasy marriage, often beset by cultural and linguistic misconnections, which are inevitable, and by institutional neglect and indifference, which are not. In Vietnam, the United States waited too long before it put significant effort into the advisory mission, by which point the American people had already lost faith in the war. The American advisory effort in Iraq was in many ways even less successful than the one in Vietnam. Both experiences offer lessons for the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, where the Army has slowly and somewhat grudgingly come to realize the importance of the advisory effort but continues to settle for suboptimal solutions. Unless it makes significant changes across its doctrine, organization, training and force structure, the Army will continue to be poorly prepared for the most likely security challenges of the 21st century.

This historical survey will attempt to tease out lasting principles of success for this most difficult and most important part of irregular warfare before deriving lessons learned to help the United States more efficiently and effectively apply strategic leverage through effective, responsive advisers to indigenous forces.

THE AMERICAN ADVISORY EFFORT IN VIETNAM

> In the years following the Vietnam War, the Army relegated unconventional war to the margins of training, doctrine and budget priorities. . . . [This] left the service unprepared to deal with the operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq — the consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today.
>
> — Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Oct. 10, 2007

Direct U.S. military involvement in Vietnam began with advisers: a four-man Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to the French army, created by the Army on Aug. 1, 1950. By the fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, the size of the MAAG had increased to 342 advisers. The MAAG focused on creating a conventional military for South Vietnam. Rather than a counter-guerrilla force dedicated to providing local security, the American advisers sought to build a Vietnamese force that mirrored the American Army, trained to fight an air-mobile and mechanized war under the cover of lavish amounts of firepower.

In the northernmost part of South Vietnam, designated I Corps, the U.S. Marine Corps also initially focused on advisory efforts to Vietnamese forces. Maj. Gen. Lew Walt, who took command of the III Marine Amphibious Force in mid-1965, integrated Marine rifle squads into Vietnamese Regional Forces platoons. These "Combined Action Platoons" (CAPs) lived in the villages of I Corps and focused on pacification while regular Marine battalions divided their time between platoon-sized patrols and civic programs. Army Gen. William Westmoreland disagreed with this adviser-based counterinsurgency strategy, arguing that "the Marines should have been trying to find the enemy's main forces and bring them to battle, thereby putting them on the run and reducing the threat they posed to the population." He ultimately disbanded the CAP effort.

Westmoreland was replaced by Gen. Creighton Abrams on July 1, 1968. As the United States began its withdrawal from Vietnam, President Richard Nixon made the primary mission of American troops enabling the South Vietnamese to assume full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. The Nixon administration's policy of turning over fighting responsibilities to the South Vietnamese while the United States continued to supply material and financial assistance, including air support for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), was dubbed "Vietnamization." As a result of the initiative, Saigon rapidly increased the size of its regular and paramilitary forces. The ARVN was given improved equipment and better training, but deficiencies remained in officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. The quality of the ARVN's leadership was not helped by the fact that the American advisory effort was being scaled down even as the need for U.S. advisers increased. Ultimately, South Vietnam was unable to defend itself without American advisers and the combat multipliers they brought to the battlefield.

The advisory effort in Vietnam has been widely criticized as "the other war." Military analysts and former Army officers Peter Dawkins and Andrew Krepinevich have described the often-poor quality of Army advisers in Vietnam and the rather slapdash nature of their predeployment training. Lt. Col. Dennis "Buzz" Bruzina, twice an adviser in Vietnam, confirmed the analysts' assessment of the low priority the Army gave to the adviser mission in a personal statement to this author: "In terms of promotions, in terms of assignments, they would be considered at a second level — the quality would be second-tier quality as opposed to people in divisions. On the other hand, the advisers had a better understanding of the people, of what was required to win."

The American advisory effort in Vietnam can be summed up in the bitter words of an Army officer who served in that lost effort: "Our military institution seems to be prevented by its own doctrinal rigidity from understanding the nature of this war and from making the necessary modifications to apply its power more intelligently, more economically, and above all, more relevantly."

FROM VIETNAM TO AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

> The Department [of Defense] has recognized that stability operations, including developing indigenous security forces such as the Iraqi Security Forces, are a core U.S. military mission. However, the services lack sufficient standing military advisory capacity to meet current and potential future, requirements for that mission.
>
> — "Stand Up and Be Counted"
>
> House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, 2007

After Vietnam, the mission of training and advising indigenous security forces was generally assigned to Special Forces soldiers. They had perhaps their most successful Foreign Internal Defense mission in El Salvador in the 1980s, when Congress placed limitations on the number of American advisers that could be deployed to support the government in its fight against insurgents. But advisory lessons from El Salvador and elsewhere were not absorbed by the conventional Army, which instead focused on preparing for conventional warfare even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the primary cause for an exclusive focus on that kind of war.

This institutional neglect left the Army and the Marine Corps unprepared for irregular campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps in no area has the institutional neglect been more damaging than in the advisory area, where the services have made many of the same mistakes they made in Vietnam. With demand for advisers to the Iraqi and Afghan security forces far exceeding the ability of the Special Forces to meet it, the Army began to create "transition teams" modeled on Special Forces A-Teams.

Military Transition Teams, as they were initially called, were composed of individuals selected from National Guard, Army Reserve and active-duty units on an ad hoc basis; for the first several years, their training was conducted on several different Army posts and varied widely in quality. Doctrine for general-purpose forces assigned to the adviser mission was lacking. As a result, the teams' size and composition was inconsistent, with most teams for Afghanistan consisting of 16 soldiers and no medic, while teams for Iraq comprised 11 soldiers including a medic. Internal and external studies repeatedly concluded that the teams were too small for the tasks assigned; many teams consequently were augmented in-theater by additional security forces, again on an ad hoc basis.

In 2006, the Army centralized training for transition teams at Fort Riley, Kansas, initially giving the training mission to two cadre heavy brigade combat teams, and later consolidating responsibility with the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. This unit created a 60-day training program that included both advisory and combat-survival skills. Unfortunately, very few of the cadre members had been advisers themselves, while the training battalions' rank structure hindered optimal training, as junior sergeants were often assigned to mentor teams composed of senior sergeants and officers.

This institutional neglect occurred despite the fact that the Army itself agreed that the need for well-trained, professional combat advisers was unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Numerous national leaders, from the president on down, highlighted the importance of the adviser teams; then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey stated on a 2007 visit to the Fort Riley Training Mission, "We will not succeed in our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without the Iraqi and Afghan security forces being able to secure themselves. So these missions for the transition teams are absolutely essential for our long-term success."

Iraq absorbed the lion's share of the national effort. By comparison, the war in Afghanistan was under resourced. In no area was the lack of priority more apparent or more damaging than in the advisory effort to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). According to reports from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the ANA advisory effort was manned below 50 percent of required advisers in April 2008. The ANP was even worse, with fewer than one in four police units having some form of adviser support, even as U.S. strategy recognized that the police remained the key interface between the Afghan people and their government. The majority of the advisers serving in Afghanistan, as well as at the brigade headquarters overseeing their tactical employment, were for many years National Guard soldiers.

The shortage of forces on the ground necessitated breaking up teams designed and trained to serve in 16-soldier units into smaller, ad hoc cells. Sometimes just two or three soldiers were assigned to mentor an ANA or ANP battalion. U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel filled positions that in Iraq were filled by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Teams operated far from American logistical and intelligence support, and inadequate support limited their utility in advising Afghan forces, as the primary focus of some teams became their ability to provision themselves and provide for their own security. In a country with few roads, where a mule train or a helicopter can

be the only way to supply a distant police outpost, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the headquarters responsible for the overall adviser mission, possessed not a single dedicated helicopter during a November 2008 visit by the author.

Even the training for Afghanistan-bound teams suffered from that theater's second-class billing. While U.S. Marine Corps adviser teams on their way to Afghanistan trained for mountain warfare in Hawthorne, Nev., to prepare for Afghanistan's difficult terrain, in 2008 there was not a single hour of mountain warfare training in the curriculum for Afghanistan-bound advisers from the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force. Advisers deploying to Afghanistan's Pashtun areas received Dari training, though Dari is not spoken in those areas. Written orders to U.S. Army personnel training for the Afghan adviser mission asked advisers to access an online Arabic language program, despite the fact that Arabic is not one of Afghanistan's languages. As one widely read sarcastic letter from an adviser described the situation, "You will now be sent to the plains of Fort Riley to train as teams for deployment to the mountains of Afghanistan. We will accomplish this by training you to function in Iraq."

In recognition of some of the shortcomings of its previous approach to the problem, in 2009 the Army decided to change the way it sourced advisers for both Iraq and Afghanistan. It modified standard brigade combat teams, providing additional field-grade officers and specialized training to create "advisory and assistance brigades." These brigades had the advantage of being built upon the base of a fully formed unit, providing additional unity of command. Their development and training marks an important step in the evolution of the Army's ability to train and advise host-nation security forces. Also in 2009, the Army finally produced a doctrinal manual for general-purpose forces assigned to conduct the foreign internal defense mission: Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance.*)

Although the execution of the adviser mission has improved over the past several years, because of its importance to U.S. success in current and future conflicts, there is still more to be done. This author has suggested the creation of a permanent Army force structure to perform the adviser mission more efficiently and effectively. Under this proposal, a permanent, 20,000-member Adviser Corps would develop doctrine and oversee the training and deployment of 750 advisory teams of 25 soldiers each, organized into three 250-team divisions. Each division would be commanded by a major general who would deploy with the teams on their yearlong advisory tours. Service members would be transferred to the Adviser Corps for a standard three-year Army tour of duty, during which they should expect to deploy for one year and then hand off the mission to the next advisory division, facilitating the consolidation of lessons learned. Upon the end of their combat tours, some advisers could remain at the Adviser Corps as trainers and doctrine writers, while others could return to the conventional Army sporting their new "Combat Adviser" tab, which should give them a competitive advantage for promotion as the advisory mission becomes the Army's main effort.

Failing the creation of standing advisory forces, the Army at the very least could establish a U.S. Army adviser command led by a lieutenant general with responsibility for improving performance in all areas of the advisory mission. The lieutenant general leading the adviser command would have overall responsibility for all combat adviser training and employment in the U.S. Army — a Title 10 "force provider" role. He would command a staff and school that would develop doctrine for combat advisers and train them for operational employment. He would also have an advisory role to combatant commanders employing his combat advisers, and could conceivably deploy into theater to serve as the senior adviser to a foreign ministry of

defense. Most important, he or she would be the advocate for all aspects of the adviser mission within the institutional Army.

The idea of forming standing advisory forces was endorsed by both Sen. John McCain and then-Sen. Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential campaign, although it has not yet been fully implemented.

In an attempt to at least partially meet these demands, in 2012 Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno attempted to optimize four of the Army National Guard's 28 brigade combat teams for the advisory mission. The idea was rejected by the seven affected state adjutants general, who noted that the plan "does not appear to be a realistic option" because it would create a mismatch between the active-duty Army and the Guard. "'Advise and assist' is a mission that is and has been conducted by [brigade combat teams], not a viable force structure," they wrote.

If the mission is important enough to structure, organize and train National Guard brigades for it, the adjutants general sensibly suggest, the regular Army should build units for that purpose, and the Guard would then follow its lead. It is particularly remarkable that the Army has still not built dedicated units for this mission given that the entire Army mission in Afghanistan will likely shift to an advise and assist one by 2014.

THE WAY AHEAD

> The conventional forces of the United States Army will have an enduring requirement to build the security forces and security ministries of other countries. This requirement is consequently not an aberration, unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. Planning, training, doctrine and acquisition must take account of this mission and support it.
>
> — Retired Lt. Gen. James Dubik

Of the six logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency enumerated in the Army's counterinsurgency field manual, only "Developing Host Nation Security Forces" has its own chapter.

This demonstrates both the extreme importance of developing host-nation security forces in a counterinsurgency campaign and the lack of doctrine for and understanding of this mission in the Army and Marine Corps at the time the manual was published in 2006. Developing and advising host-nation forces is both a campaign in itself and a component of the broader irregular warfare campaign plan. Its success largely determines at what point the main effort of the intervening power can shift from doing the fighting itself to assisting the host-nation forces in doing so. The exit strategy in any irregular warfare campaign is a government able to stand largely on its own, with its security forces able to defeat internal threats.

The continuing requirement for advisers in Afghanistan after the end of the American combat mission there in 2014 as well as the other important security-cooperation efforts encompassed in the long war against radical extremism will continue to outstrip the capacity of the Special Forces to meet demand for security forces assistance. It will thus remain necessary for conventional-purpose forces to be organized, trained, equipped and employed as advisers for as long as the United States remains engaged in this fight.

Other than deterring conventional war, training host-nation security forces is likely to be the Army's most important mission. We need to do it better if we want to win.

Bio:

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Chapter 6

Capacity-Building Key to AFRICOM's Mission

Lesley Anne Warner

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Across the globe, partner capacity-building through steady-state theater security cooperation plays an increasingly important role in the forward defense posture of the United States. The Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review identifies building the security capacity of partner states as a key mission, while the 2010 National Security Strategy argues that the United States can advance its national security by enabling partner states to prevent, deter and respond to transnational security challenges before they pose a threat to U.S. citizens, interests or the homeland. Moreover, at a time of budgetary constraints, partner capacity-building through theater security cooperation can be a means for sharing the cost and responsibility of responding to global security challenges, thus reducing the burden on U.S. resources and military personnel.

Throughout an area of responsibility that includes 53 countries, theater security cooperation is a core function for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). With an emphasis on promoting military professionalism, improving operational capabilities and facilitating regional cooperation, AFRICOM seeks to build the capacity of African militaries to prevent conflict as well as lead military responses to emerging crises if necessary, thus preventing transnational threats from transcending the African continent. Theater security cooperation also increases the likelihood that partner nations will allow U.S. forces peacetime and contingency access, which can be a critical enabler for missions such as the recent noncombatant evacuation operation from the U.S. Embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic, or countering piracy off the coast of Somalia.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Several of AFRICOM's security cooperation activities consist of training programs and joint military exercises. Funded and managed by the State Department, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program trains African peacekeepers on issues that include refugee management and convoy escort procedures, and provides equipment for deployments on peacekeeping missions, such as field medical equipment and mine detectors. ACOTA also has a "train the trainer" element intended to make the program more self-sustaining over time. Approximately 25,000 African peacekeepers are deployed in support of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions at any given time. Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Ghana are some of the leading African contributors to U.N. peacekeeping operations, participating in missions from Haiti to Lebanon to Côte d'Ivoire. In addition to preparing African militaries for such deployments, the ACOTA program also seeks to improve the readiness of African militaries to respond to crises on the continent.

Each year, AFRICOM also holds more than a dozen military exercises across the continent, using real-time, simulated operations to build operational capacity, enhance regional cooperation and increase interoperability. One such exercise is Obangame Express, a multinational naval exercise that focuses on improving the capacity of Gulf of Guinea maritime security forces to counter piracy and other illicit maritime activity. Another exercise, Flintlock, is held in North and West

Africa and seeks to build small-unit Special Forces and counterterrorism capacity. AFRICOM also conducts exercises to improve medical capabilities and readiness, as in Med Accord South in Botswana, and to improve disaster-response planning and preparedness for complex humanitarian emergencies, as in the Pandemic Disaster Response Tabletop Exercises in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and elsewhere on the continent.

Equally important to building the operational capacity of African militaries are programs that focus on military professionalism and technical training. Through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET programs, African military and civilian personnel can attend Professional Military Education institutions in the United States such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval Postgraduate School. These programs also cover officer and enlisted professional development and leadership; technical training on maintenance, logistics and engineering; and the deployment of mobile training teams to African countries to cover topics such as anti-terrorism and force protection, military justice and small-boat operations and tactics. On both personal and institutional levels, these educational and training opportunities are integral to U.S. efforts to foster long-term relationships with individuals who may later assume leadership positions in African defense sectors. More importantly, such training exposes African participants to U.S. norms and democratic principles, such as respect for human rights and the subordination of the military to civilian authority.

AFRICOM's efforts to promote military professionalism extend to defense sector reform in post-conflict countries. Part of AFRICOM's engagement in these countries entails mentoring and advising defense ministries that tend to be either nascent institutions, as in South Sudan, or ones that have been weakened by conflict, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia. Institutional reform in these countries is directed toward addressing capacity gaps in areas like budgeting and human resource management to ensure that defense ministries are capable of managing, sustaining and employing the countries' armed forces. Such engagement also seeks to increase the accountability of the armed forces to civilian authority and make it more likely that AFRICOM's investments in security cooperation are eventually supported by sound institutions in the long term.

Until the current fiscal year, AFRICOM's service component commands — U.S. Marine Forces Africa, U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Navy Africa and U.S. Air Force Africa — had no assigned forces. Requests for forces for theater security cooperation engagements were thus made through the Global Force Management process, and had to compete with requests from other combatant commands. The absence of a reliable source of manpower was a constraint to AFRICOM's efforts to foster strong military-to-military relationships in Africa and expand partner capacity-building activities. In fiscal year 2013, however, U.S. Army Africa has been assigned a regionally aligned brigade [RAF] that will deploy to the continent in small teams to conduct 96 security cooperation engagements in 35 countries. This new concept of operations for security cooperation in AFRICOM's area of responsibility is consistent with the Department of Defense's vision articulated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance to build partner military capabilities through low-cost, small-footprint approaches that rely on rotational presence and bilateral or multilateral training exercises.

CHALLENGES TO THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Most of the challenges that AFRICOM's security cooperation efforts face are a function of broader planning and execution challenges within the U.S. government. As a result, few are unique to AFRICOM in particular.

Among the most prominent of these are the complex dynamics of coordinating U.S. government engagement across multiple agencies and funding streams. There are more than 30 U.S. government agencies, programs and initiatives that can play a role in U.S. engagement with Africa. The Defense Department supports and at times is supported by various other U.S. government agencies on the continent. While not all interagency engagement in Africa concerns security, some non-Defense Department activities overlap with AFRICOM's theater security cooperation activities. For example, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of Justice and the Defense Department all have a role to play in countering narcotics trafficking through West Africa and the Sahel, from vetting, training and equipping partner nation counternarcotics forces to assisting with justice system reform. Another example is the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration's work with fisheries ministries in the Gulf of Guinea on fisheries management and enforcement in partnership with the U.S. Navy as part of the Africa Partnership Station program.

Non-Defense Department agencies bring niche subject matter expertise, nonmilitary resources and existing relationships with African counterparts. Yet, in spite of these examples of convergent security-related interests in Africa, each agency that operates on the continent has its own objectives, planning cycles, allocation of resources and preferred methods of bilateral or regional engagement, which can result in a multiagency, rather than an interagency approach. Consequently, the U.S. government continues to pursue reform to improve security cooperation planning and coordination within the interagency process.

The complex patchwork of funding authorities and the legal, regulatory and fiscal constraints that accompany them further hamper security-cooperation planning and execution in Africa. The process of determining what kind of funding can be used for particular security cooperation activities can be complicated. Theater security cooperation in AFRICOM's area of responsibility uses a mix of funding authorities, primarily under Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) and Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code. The former is overseen by the State Department, and includes funds for the International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement programs. (Though these funds are supervised and directed by the State Department, they may be turned over to the Defense Department for execution.) The latter is overseen by the Defense Department, but requires State Department concurrence, and includes funds for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund and the Counter-Narco-Terrorism and Combating Terrorism Fellowship programs. Other temporary albeit renewable authorities used in AFRICOM's area of responsibility include Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) and the now-expired Section 1207 (Security and Stabilization Assistance) of the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. These different funding authorities have resource allocation and congressional approval timelines of up to two years and require congressional approval for allocated funds to be moved from one country to another, or from one theater security cooperation activity to another.

Further complicating matters, in order to carry out a given theater security cooperation activity, AFRICOM may need to procure funding from multiple sources with different time horizons during which the funds can be used. In addition, under certain authorities, there may be restrictions on the types of activities that can be funded. For example, for Africa Partnership Station, some authorities cover the participation of U.S. Navy forces and assets, while others cover training and equipping African maritime security forces. There may also be restrictions on the types of security institutions that can be engaged within the partner nation, despite what AFRICOM or the partner nation believe to be most appropriate in light of their objectives. These types of challenges constrain AFRICOM's ability to conduct long-term planning and to

sustain programs, as well as its ability to align its activities with the priorities of partner nations and interagency stakeholders. They also make it difficult for AFRICOM to respond to changing conditions within its area of responsibility and capitalize on opportunities for engagement that arise outside of established funding cycles.

A particular challenge for security cooperation in Africa is that, since its inception, AFRICOM has been an "economy of force" combatant command and has had to compete with major theater operations in other parts of the world for resources. Since AFRICOM reached full operational capability in October 2008, resource constraints have impeded planning and execution and contributed to ad hoc, episodic security cooperation engagements. This problem may be mitigated by the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and by the U.S. Army's regionally aligned brigades concept [now RAF], which is being launched as a pilot program in AFRICOM's area of responsibility this year and will eventually be expanded to cover all six regional combatant commands.

IMPROVING THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

There are many areas for improvement to AFRICOM's security cooperation activities on the continent. Yet since AFRICOM is not a policymaking entity, most of these recommendations fall under the purview of civilian institutions such as the State Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

All combatant commands would benefit from U.S. government efforts to streamline the cumbersome authorities for security cooperation funding and develop more flexible multiyear authorities. The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) established by Congress under Section 1207 of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act represents a recent attempt to do so for State and Defense Department funding authorities for security assistance. Jointly administered and funded by the State and Defense Departments, this program came about in response to then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates' proposal to remodel security assistance authorities to improve interagency coordination on the funding and execution of theater security cooperation activities. GSCF is a four-year pilot project that is designed to be responsive to unforeseen contingencies. While there remains no parallel mechanism for non-crisis engagements, GSCF could serve as a model for improving interagency coordination for steady-state theater security cooperation.

The availability of a regionally aligned brigade for theater security cooperation is meant to make training engagements less episodic and provide opportunities for more sustained and reliable partnerships with African militaries. These forces also provide an opportunity for AFRICOM to take advantage of opportunities for engagement that may not have been possible without assigned forces. While this is a step forward for AFRICOM's theater security cooperation planning and execution, these forces both support, and are supported by, other U.S. government engagement on the continent. Accordingly, the Defense Department and other U.S. government agencies should capitalize on this opportunity to better integrate interagency and partner nation interests into theater security cooperation activities for a more holistic approach to addressing security challenges in Africa.

Another area for improvement is that of matching funding with regional priorities. If AFRICOM's priority regions are indeed the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Nigeria, as stated, funding for capacity-building should reflect this. Instead, funding allocations, at least from the State Department's Title 22 funds, favor Morocco and Tunisia. For example, in fiscal year 2011,

the bulk of the $45 million in loans or grants provided to AFRICOM partner militaries to acquire training from the U.S. military and purchase U.S.-manufactured military equipment went to those two countries, with $17 million going to Tunisia and $9 million to Morocco. Other major recipients were Liberia ($7 million), Djibouti ($2 million) and Nigeria ($1 million), leaving only $9 million — a mere 20 percent of Foreign Military Financing funding — to be allocated to the 40-plus remaining countries in AFRICOM's area of responsibility.

Although it is not within the purview of AFRICOM's security cooperation activities, the U.S. government needs to place a greater priority on police reform in Africa. By and large, African police forces tend to be underpaid, poorly trained and insufficiently resourced, which contributes to their lack of professionalism and heavy-handed rules of engagement. Furthermore, many are staffed by those deemed unfit for military service. Using Kenya and Nigeria as examples, police forces tend to be the most frequent perpetrators of domestic human rights violations, with the military being implicated in such abuses mainly when it has been called in to address matters of internal security that the police have proved unable address.

Training foreign law enforcement personnel is restricted by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Thus, any U.S. involvement in training African police forces would have to be done under a waiver. Much like AFRICOM's security cooperation, police reform touches on the missions of multiple agencies and programs, such as the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and its International Law Enforcement Academies in Botswana and Ghana, as well as the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. Left unaddressed, U.S. restrictions on funding police reform will be a gaping hole in U.S. interagency efforts to build partner security capacity in Africa.

Under the Leahy Amendment, foreign military personnel receiving U.S. training must be vetted for past human rights abuses, and AFRICOM is required by law to comply with this policy. While an emphasis on human rights is infused into security cooperation activities, it should be mandatory for all military personnel receiving U.S. training to go through a stand-alone human rights training module. Anything less runs the risk of sending the message that respect for human rights is an optional or altogether unimportant part of U.S. military engagement on the continent. That said, while it is impossible to predict what actions trained personnel will take in the future, mandatory human rights training is at the very least in the spirit of "doing no harm."

The U.S. government should also increase efforts to strengthen institutions in Africa, both within and outside of the security sector, and the current crisis in Mali serves as an illustration of why this is imperative. Mali and its neighbors had been part of the U.S. government's Pan-Sahel Initiative and its successor, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, for more than a decade. The leader of the coup that overturned Mali's civilian government in March 2012, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, had been the beneficiary of multiple Defense Department training and professionalization programs in the United States, and AFRICOM had been conducting counterterrorism capacity building in Mali through Operation Enduring Freedom — Trans-Sahara.

This military-to-military engagement notwithstanding, last spring's coup in Mali demonstrates more than a failure of military training programs. Indeed, U.S.-trained coup-makers were just one example of ineffective U.S. government engagement with the country. Despite the fact that Mali had weak institutions and little more than the formal trappings of democracy, the U.S. government approached Mali as if it were a functional democracy committed to

good governance. In 2006, for instance, it was awarded a five-year $461 million Millennium Challenge Corporation compact to catalyze economic growth and reduce poverty. Nevertheless, present-day Mali has little to show in terms of good governance, rule of law or the subordination of the military to civilian authority.

For AFRICOM, the situation in Mali begs a broader question about its nonoperational security cooperation role, as efforts to professionalize partner militaries may be necessary but insufficient for stability. In fact, if outgoing commander Gen. Carter Ham's recent comments are any indication, AFRICOM may be in the process of rethinking its approach to security cooperation.

When asked about what went wrong with counterterrorism training in Mali, Ham responded that U.S. training focused almost exclusively on tactical and technical competence, and perhaps not enough on values, ethics and military ethos. Events in Mali demonstrate the potential merit in an increased focus on values and institutional capacity, even at the expense of more operationally focused security cooperation. AFRICOM's efforts toward defense sector reform in post conflict countries are an example of this less kinetic approach, but it should be expanded to countries that are steady-state or at risk of violent conflict. The reality, however, is that these areas of focus have less tangible benefits than AFRICOM's counterterrorism operations or its train-and-equip programs, and would only have a measureable impact over the long term. As a result, this may not be a long-lived period of introspection for AFRICOM.

Since its creation five years ago, U.S. Africa Command has adapted to respond to the changing security environment as presented both by the African continent and U.S. national security priorities. While the African Union Mission in Somalia and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali demonstrate that AFRICOM can be a facilitator of African solutions to African problems, incidents like the coup in Mali highlight the limits of building partner military capacity. Because of this complicated landscape, theater security cooperation in the AFRICOM area of responsibility will continue to evolve as part of the United States' small-footprint, forward defense posture.

Bio:

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Appendix A

Intelligence Function Adaptability in a Regionally Aligned Force

MAJ Joseph O. Sanders, 1/4 ABCT S-2

Introduction

In 2013, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 4th Infantry Division deployed to the country of Kuwait in support of Operation Spartan Shield. This unique operation was rife with challenges for the brigade intelligence warfighting function in its first regionally aligned force (RAF) mission. Challenges included lack of established databases such as those that exist in Afghanistan and Iraq, lack of division and corps levels of command and associated intelligence support, and other operational limitations. Despite these issues, 1/4 ABCT was able to adapt to the environment and establish situational awareness though aggressive liaison, internal database development, and establishment of sanctuary operations to ensure the full breadth of the syndicate was brought to bear to answer the commander's priority information requirements.

In addition to partnership operations with indigenous and regional military forces, we, as a heavy armored brigade-size force forward deployed, understood that there was a possibility of being called upon to support contingency missions within the region, to include potential unknown events similar to those that occurred on 11 September 2012, in Benghazi, Libya. With that in mind, the brigade, military intelligence company (MICO), and battalion S-2 sections began to develop intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) of locales within the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) that were unstable due to various threat or environmental factors.

Issue: Lack of a regional significant activities (SIGACTs) database

Discussion: As of the time of this writing, no SIGACTs database, such as the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), is available for use by RAF units in the CENTCOM AOR. Some U.S. forces and agencies in various countries do maintain accurate information gleaned from open source intelligence (OSINT), intelligence reporting, and indigenous forces' information. Information is also available through liaison with U.S. Embassy force protection detachments.

As a regionally aligned force, the 1/4 ABCT warfighting function created a SIGACTs database in Excel format, which facilitated analysis of enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. Data-basing included research of indirect fire activity, improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and other types of lethal activity. Additionally, 1/4 ABCT tracked, to the greatest extent possible, protest activity within potential areas of operations (AOs).

One issue with SIGACTs tracking and analysis is lack of accuracy and information, based on the nature of the information. When utilizing OSINT, 1/4 ABCT analysts would attempt to determine the best available location using any mentioned landmarks, along with applications such as unclassified address searches on Google Earth. This combination could then be used, in conjunction with other topographic tools, to get some idea of where the incident occurred. Despite these efforts, however, many of the incidents lacked accurate data for attack locations,

battle damage assessment, and timing that is typically available for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.

After several months of dedicated effort, 1/4 ABCT was able to develop a database that encompassed the last two years of SIGACT data specific to potential AOs. Even without some accurate data, analysts were able to use the available information to determine enemy threat groups, capabilities, and tactics, as well as predict activity with some degree of accuracy.

Additional Discussion: Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability (IROC) was tasked with development of the SIGACTs database. Issues encountered with this task included lack of solid data, low external support, and conflicting open-source data. When combined with limited manpower, this made for a difficult task. One way that we attempted to address this was through training on CIDNE and the Web-Enabled Temporal Analysis System (WebTAS), organized through CENTCOM in conjunction with their nascent CIDNE Rest of Area Operations (ROAR) server. Our IROC was contacted by a representative from Intelligence Software Solutions, who provided three days of training, nested with our ongoing operations, to introduce analysts to CIDNE and demonstrate how it could work within our mission set. CIDNE capabilities include density plots, export and import features (which work well with Distributed Common Ground System–Army [DCGS-A] and ArcGIS-10), and other reporting features that could simplify the SIGACTs issue if fully implemented throughout the AOR. However, to make full use of CIDNE capabilities, a CIDNE manager needs to be appointed, trained, and tied into the CENTCOM CIDNE manager to ensure report formatting is nested with CENTCOM and meets all criteria for entry into the CIDNE ROAR server.

Recommendation: Units should ensure continued SIGACTs analysis proficiency is maintained, to include unique research methodologies and DCGS-A usage. DCGS-A training would include density plot (heat diagram) development, tactical entity database (TED) maintenance, and TED query tools, as well as basic Excel chart manipulation.

Component commands would be the likely proponent for ensuring a regional SIGACTs database utilizing CIDNE, International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE), or other methodology is developed and maintained. Additionally, component commands could task rotating units, Department of Defense (DOD) analytical support to Department of State (DOS) agencies, or regionally aligned military intelligence brigades with specific AORs for database maintenance.

Additional Recommendation: Brigades should establish an internal CIDNE architecture and acquire prior training on the Web Based Total Army Authorization Document System (WEBTAADS). SIGACTs development should be a part of all pre-deployment operations to ensure deploying units have a SIGACTs methodology and area situational awareness prior to deployment.

Issue: Intelligence reporting not applicable to tactical-level operations

Discussion: As a RAF, 1/4 ABCT developed enemy situational templates for threats along axes of advance and objectives. The nature of current intelligence reporting and lack of associated grids on many reports created additional challenges for analysts developing locations of enemy threat groups. As many reports do not have grids, the ability to use grid extraction tools becomes

limited and manual development becomes necessary. 1/4 ABCT used methodologies to include OSINT research, civilian address Internet applications, and topographic correlation to augment available location information.

Recommendation: S-2s can facilitate analytical efforts by limiting the scope of requirements for accurate location reporting refinement and by defining potential mission parameters, to include mission type and AO, through cross-talk with operations elements.

In order to facilitate reporting location development, units should develop the ability to utilize multiple OSINT venues, to include Opensource.gov and other indigenous information venues, for cross-referencing information.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) elements at all echelons need to strive to develop grid locations, to include map tracking and other methodologies, in order to ensure accurate enemy locations that can then be imported into current U.S. Army DCGS-A, Google Earth, and other mapping programs.

Issue: Lack of regional DCGS-A server

Discussion: As of the time of this writing, no regional DCGS-A database is available for rotating units to synchronize servers and quickly acquire historical reporting. 1/4 ABCT began a local TED database approximately halfway through the deployment after receiving a DCGS-A embedded mentor. Prior to this, brigade intelligence elements had little to no practice in TED development and maintenance; this skill set was not practiced during 1/4 ABCT's decisive action National Training Center rotation in late 2012.

1/4 ABCT utilized a SIGACTs tracker, intelligence database queries (to include M3/HOT-R queries), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)-acquired data to create a local TED that eventually encompassed six months of reporting for potential AORs. In order to develop these fairly expansive data sets, battalions were tasked to develop the TED for defined geographic areas and then synchronize their database with the brigade server. An aviation brigade, also regionally aligned, synchronized their DCGS-A with 1/4 ABCT's, and an additional brigade was in the process as we left theater.

Recommendation: As the RAF concept develops, component commands would be the likely proponent for establishing and maintaining a DCGS-A database and facilitating connection and associated periodic synchronizations. Additionally, component commands could task rotating units, DOD analytical support to DOS agencies, or regionally aligned military intelligence brigades with specific AORs for database maintenance.

Issue: Manning constraints of intelligence personnel forward deployed

Discussion: Based on specific constraints concerning manning, the 1/4 ABCT S-2 section was unable to deploy 100 percent of its personnel to Kuwait. In order to ensure it utilized its full production capability, 1/4 ABCT established "sanctuary operations" at Fort Carson, Colorado. The sanctuary team consisted of a squad-size element led by a 350F warrant officer, two

35F20s, two 35F10s, two topographic engineers, and at times additional enablers from the rear detachment MICO, to include geospatial analysts. This team was responsible for the daily graphic intelligence summary (GRINTSUM), a regionally based SIGACTs tracker, and special project analyses as required by the brigade commander.

In order to provide this team the necessary autonomy, we ensured the brigade commander approved the team's establishment and the rear detachment leadership understood its requirements. This allowed the team to concentrate on intelligence production and not be tasked for other rear detachment operations. Sanctuary operations were established at the Fort Carson foundry facility, which gave it access to over-the-shoulder mentorship, top secret networks and video teleconference capability, and a working environment conducive to intelligence discipline cross-talk.

On multiple occasions, 1/4 ABCT was able to utilize MICO elements forward for analytical products as well as simultaneously use IROC operations, either to support MICO production or develop analysis along separate intelligence requirements.

Recommendation: Units that face similar manning restrictions can establish IROC operations either in organic intelligence workspaces or base foundry facilities. Utilization of a local foundry facility is highly recommended, as it increases operational visibility and intelligence reach while reducing external interference. These teams require strong officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership to maintain intelligence production capability, communicate with rear detachment leadership, and ensure fusion of all-source intelligence into value-added products.

Issue: There was no division- or corps-level intelligence support to facilitate transition from strategic to tactical analysis.

Discussion: 1/4 ABCT found itself working directly under the Army component command for the CENTCOM AOR. This command relationship created intelligence challenges, as the component command was primarily focused on strategic-level analysis and dissemination, where we, as a potential contingency force, were primarily concerned with tactical-level intelligence. Strategic intelligence was utilized for predictive analysis and indicators/warnings.

As a semi-autonomous ground force, we conducted adjacent unit coordination through liaison with national-level agencies, other Army units in theater such as air defense, fires, and aviation elements. 1/4 ABCT also worked in varying degrees with U.S. Navy and Marine Corps intelligence, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), Asymmetric Warfare Group, and DOS elements. Each of these is a subject matter expert on specific enemy threats, and it became critical to integrate their analysis into our assessments.

To facilitate our analysis, 1/4 ABCT established informal and formal contacts with national-level intelligence agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), and the NGA. The unit would conduct daily searches into these agencies' websites and production to augment our own situational awareness and integrate where possible into locally developed TED databases. Much of the comfort level established for this level of cross-talk was facilitated by the foundry program's predeployment senior leader liaison trips.

Additionally, as instability increased in some portions of the region, the component command would authorize direct liaison with DOS representatives. For intelligence purposes we primarily opened dialogue with DOS regional security offices and force protection elements. These organizations provided critical insight to lethal and nonlethal activity; threats specific to U.S. interests; and other political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) factors needed for the unit to understand the potential operational environment.

Recommendation: Brigade S-2s and their associated intelligence elements should become comfortable working with agencies and military units that are not typically within a brigade combat team's (BCT's) span of influence. These agencies will help span the gap between strategic and tactical intelligence, can provide as good a read on the ground situation as possible, and answer requests for information (RFIs) that would typically not be possible through normal intelligence channels. Liaison can be facilitated by component command intelligence elements, and working by, with, and through these elements, a common operational picture useful to multiple echelons can be developed.

Issue: Human Terrain System (HTS) support is not available in some potential contingency areas.

Discussion: Based on current intelligence doctrine, the need to understand PMESII physical environment and time (-PT) factors has become a critical part of IPOE for intelligence and integrated staff assessments. In Afghanistan and Iraq, embedded teams of sociologists and analysts became a critical enabler to IPOE efforts. While some teams were able to develop additional fidelity through integration with maneuver forces, other HTS support included the ability to outsource analysis to teams in the United States who were able to conduct in-depth research into specific topics.

Many areas in which instability could create the need for additional U.S. military support lack adequate HTS or other PMESII-PT relevant information. 1/4 ABCT contacted HTS to facilitate analysis for contingency missions as well as possible partnership efforts, but HTS was not postured to support RFIs outside of the country of Afghanistan.

Additionally, 1/4 ABCT requested shape files for areas that HTS had previously made, but points of contact were unable to provide these. 1/4 ABCT utilized final products and re-created tribal and other social overlays as needed utilizing the DCGS-A ArcMap software. 1/4 ABCT also used OSINT sources and Intellipedia to develop relevant PMESII-PT assessment.

Recommendation: HTS element support is needed for missions outside of historical deployment AORs and should be enabled/strengthened. Support would include both embedded teams as well as reach-back capability. This effort will be of value to RAFs and will provide critical insight to factors of instability and facilitate predictive analysis as applied to the commander's intelligence requirements.

Issue: Lack of adequate map support for potential contingency mission AOs.

Discussion: 1/4 ABCT had issues acquiring a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) account forward for subsequently ordering maps for possible mission areas. Our topographic team noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) had an account, but did not deploy forward with the brigade. After several months, the brigade S-2 NCOIC managed to acquire an account, which allowed us to order and receive maps for one contingency mission. Currently, no map warehouse is available in Kuwait that could support 1:100,000, 1:50,000, 1:25,000, or city special purpose map requirements.

Based on the multiple potential mission sets, 1/4 ABCT's topographic team understood that it would need to be prepared to hastily print multiple maps for battalion- and company-level use. 1/4 ABCT ordered and maintained multiple rolls of paper and additional ink to maintain the ability to meet any hasty requirements. Additionally, 1/4 ABCT requested and received NGA hard drives with roads, boundaries, hydrology, and points of interest for all of the CENTCOM AOR. These were of great value, but required the topographic analysts to spend two to three days arranging the data along likely mission sets.

Only two 12-series topographic analyst personnel deployed forward to Kuwait with the brigade. In order to ensure this section was able to focus on physical terrain analysis, we placed the element within the established intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platoon footprint. This placement allowed for closer coordination during IPOE efforts.

On several occasions, various staff sections placed RFIs to the topographic team for administrative production. To the greatest extent possible, we recommended utilization of local Training and Audiovisual Support Center (TASC) production facilities to ensure the team could concentrate on terrain analysis as well as maintain supplies and plotter functionality.

Recommendation: Units should ensure they request NGA-provided hard drives for deployment areas and take time to familiarize themselves with the data provided. In many instances, additional shape files and Google Earth-based data was available with NGA products via their classified websites.

Battalions would benefit from ordering plotters, with a 24-inch plotter being a good field-expedient version. DCGS-A ArcMap software allows for battalion-level map development, use of NGA shape files, and additional operational graphics as needed for planning and execution. Additionally, S-3 sections would benefit from deployment of their section plotter and ensure internal elements are trained and appropriate software drivers installed for use of the system.

Four to six months prior to deployment, units should acquire a DLA account and order maps for potential mission sets.

Issue: Intelligence Information Report (IIR) evaluations from an IROC standpoint

Discussion: IIR evaluations require a HOT-R write account that can only be granted by a HUMINT military occupational specialty (MOS). Without this capability, IROC was unable to request information on specific reports or push collection focus for our mission. IROC staffing was one issue that complicated this. All HUMINT Soldiers were posted to the rear detachment

and tasked out. Multiple requests for the establishment of a HOT-R write account remained fulfilled due to rear detachment mission requirements. Having the HOT-R write account would allow 35F analysts to request tactical-level information based on received strategic and operational reporting. A robust IIR evaluation program had potential to fill gaps in SIGACTs development, tactical intelligence, and GRINTSUM development.

Recommendation: All 35Fs need to have HOT-R accounts established prior to the deployment as part of the training cycle. This would not only ensure evaluation capability but also would grow analyst competence with writing IIR evaluations, source-directed requirements, and collection requirement messages.

Issue: Signals intelligence (SIGINT) Use from IROC Standpoint

Discussion: This is mainly a manning issue. IROC had no SIGINT capability, which restricted our ability to fuse and corroborate reporting with multiple sources. We received a Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) SIGINT rollup and acquired limited access to SIGINT through the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Pipeline-S site, which offset some of this. Additionally, foundry SIGINT instructors fed some information to us when they could; however, SIGINT use was limited by the lack of certified SIGINT analysts on the IROC team. Certified SIGINT analysts would add value through direct NSA access and query capability. This would allow directed requirements and queuing on research, fusing HUMINT and SIGINT. The GRINTSUM would have been a much stronger product with this capability.

Recommendation: IROC staffing should remain 35F heavy; however, full mission capability requires at least one HUMINT, SIGINT, geographic intelligence (GEOINT), and topographic MOS. A team of 35Fs can complete the mission as seen over the last 10 months; however, full intelligence support would be value added and ensure the best information gets to the brigade.

Issue: SIGINT mission authority

Discussion: A unique wealth of unrealized SIGINT opportunities exist, which could potentially allow U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) units to contribute to SIGINT missions in the AOR strategically and tactically. Unfortunately, due to a quick turnover of FORSCOM units, previous unit conducted limited SIGINT analysis, and implied lack of continuity, higher element's SIGINT has chosen to maintain control of responsibilities in our deployed theater's AOR.

Recommendation: U.S. Army Central (ARCENT)/CENTCOM has passively allowed this transfer of responsibilities to occur. Army Cryptologic Operations (ACO) should re-engage higher agency SIGINT in order to support FORSCOM units' development of the SIGINT missions in our previously deployed theater.

Issue: Cessation of the Ground SIGINT Operators Course (GSOC) at Fort Huachuca

Discussion: Soldiers coming into tactical FORSCOM units since the cancellation of the GSOC course are severely underprepared arriving straight from the schoolhouse. It is too much to require FORSCOM units to conduct "on-the-job training" on the Prophet system. The PRD-13 is manageable, but the Prophet system is much more complex. You want a unit to hit the deployed ground ready to fight the good fight, but without the GSOC, it is that much harder for deploying units with long lists of additional tasks to complete in a fast-paced deployment cycle.

Recommendation: Re-establish or replicate tactical portions of the GSOC and ensure availability to tactical units during deployment preparation.

Issue: Prior to our deployment, the majority of assigned brigade and battalion operations security (OPSEC) officers were not OPSEC Level II qualified.

Discussion: I contacted ARCENT and made contact with the ARCENT OPSEC Program Manager (PM), who informed me that OPSEC Level II training was available forward at Arifjan during our deployment period. Because we were forward and attending already scheduled training, there was no cost to the unit.

Recommendation: At least six months prior to your deployment (if possible, do it earlier), contact your division's OPSEC PM and determine when OPSEC Level II training is scheduled in your area. If it is not or if it conflicts with scheduled unit training, see if training can be scheduled prior to the deployment. In some regions, OPSEC training is available in theater.

Issue: While the brigade was forward deployed, unwanted lurkers were frequenting unit Facebook pages; some of these personnel had Arabic names and, based on their Facebook pages, were operating in Arabic countries.

Discussion: While forward deployed, we had two particularly alarming incidents where lurkers from Arabic countries were monitoring our unit Facebook pages. One individual, with a "romantic" looking Facebook page with poetry and pictures of himself, attempted to solicit contact with a deployed Soldier's spouse. Once notified, the brigade public affairs officer (PAO) and the unit Facebook points of contact (POCs) blocked both individuals. We also directed that battalion and brigade OPSEC officers review their unit Facebook pages on a weekly basis.

Recommendation: Prior to deployment, ensure that unit OPSEC officers are already reviewing Facebook pages for questionable data. Also ensure that they and the Facebook POCs have already taken the mandatory Facebook for Social Media training.

Issue: Despite receiving required OPSEC training, unit personnel were not abiding by OPSEC guidelines.

Discussion: While deployed, on several occasions personnel and units were observed violating OPSEC, with the primary violation being taking photos of unauthorized locations and equipment. For example, when a Bradley IFV hit an overpass and the 25mm turret was bent, the photo was posted to the U.S. Army "WTF moments" site on Facebook within 24 hours.

Recommendation: OPSEC training must focus not only on what an OPSEC violation is, but clearly define punishments that will be administered if a violator is discovered. As a part of the unit OPSEC standing operating procedures (SOP), the punishments for OPSEC violators should be defined (first violation Company Grade Article 15, second violation Field Grade Article 15, and so on).

Issue: Defense Strategic Debriefing Course (DSDC) funding and utilization in a RAF mission set

Discussion: During the duration of the deployment, debriefing was one of the primary missions for HUMINT operations. Due to funding, the exception for funds to send HUMINT collectors to DSDC was limited to two collectors and did not provide the opportunity to train and certify all collectors in the BCT.

Recommendation: Provide additional funding for this course offered through HUMINT Training–Joint Center of Excellence to units that are tasked with conducting debriefing operations. This will ensure that HUMINT collectors are fully trained and qualified prior to executing real-world collection operations.

Issue: Predeployment training and certification

Discussion: Prior to the deployment, HUMINT collection efforts were focused on decisive action operations, with very limited guidance on the HUMINT collection operations to be conducted during the deployment. With limited guidance from USARCENT, it was challenging to train the HUMINT collectors on critical tasks that would be required to conduct their different mission sets.

Recommendation: Request to have mission details published to the unit 6–8 months prior to the deployment. This will allow the unit to properly plan and execute training on specified tasks to ensure that all HUMINT collectors are properly trained.

Issue: Integration of HUMINT collection assets with supporting units (operational control)

Discussion: The brigade's HUMINT collection assets were tasked to support several different units with different mission sets during the deployment. During the early stages of integration, communication between the supported unit and the parent unit was challenging. Additionally, the roles and responsibilities of each unit to the Soldiers were unclear.

Recommendation: Prior to integration, establishing a memorandum of agreement between the supported unit and the organic unit will resolve several issues on the use of HUMINT assets and will also assist in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each unit to the Soldiers.

Issue: Unit linguist manager (ULM) selection, training, and regulatory guidance

Discussion: 1/4 ABCT deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (Spartan Shield) as the strategic reserve brigade. 1ABCT's lines of effort were partnership with the Kuwaiti armed forces and readiness for regional contingencies. Authorized linguist manning stood at 60 category I (no clearance, U.S. citizens), 20 category II (secret clearance), and 10 category III (top secret clearance). On-hand numbers were between 60 and 90. Linguist numbers are validated twice a year, sent from the end user (1ABCT in this case), through ARCENT to the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). The numbers in place were based on the assumption that the unit should be able to deploy anywhere in the ARCENT AOR with semi-organic linguist support. 1ABCT assigned responsibility for managing the program to the S-2 NCO, a sergeant first class, who reported for linguist issues to the ARCENT theater linguist manager (TLM) (the G2X forward, a major) and to a team of INSCOM Army contracting office representatives (ACORs) consisting of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and a sergeant major. Each battalion appointed a unit linguist point of contact (ULPOC); all of these came from a battalion S-2 section, mostly lieutenants. Putting the program with the intelligence section made sense, given that most operational needs for translation also was subject to some aspect of OPSEC or foreign disclosure. ARCENT and 1ABCT linguist managers were additional duties, meaning that the ULM was still the S-2 NCOIC, and the TLM was actively engaged as the G2X for a theater command. Managing this program was a full-time duty for the ACOR team, each of whom attended training specifically for these duties.

The sole written guidance governing the linguist program was the ARCENT TLM SOP, dated March 2011. This document, while adequate in most respects, was generated before the strategic reserve mission existed in its current state. As a point of reference, about 30 percent of the linguists on hand in February 2013 had come into Kuwait from Iraq with the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The SOP was apparently written to facilitate using large numbers of local hire linguists in an advanced counterinsurgency fight. For example, much of the section dealing with government-issued uniforms and protective equipment was useless to 1ABCT's ULM, since it specifically applied to short-term local hires.

All of the linguists assigned to 1ABCT deployed to country through Individual Replacement Deployment Operations (IRDO, formerly Combat Readiness Center) and had the opportunity to draw personal protective equipment (PPE) and uniforms, which would be carried on their individual clothing records. Instead, their parent company furnished most of them with memos waiving the requirement for PPE, placing the onus of drawing and accounting for this equipment on the ULM and ULPOCs. This was not an issue until March of 2013, when the Central Issue Facility (CIF) in Kuwait stopped serving contractors. Terminated contractors returning to the United States could still turn in equipment, but drawing gear required coordination through supply and the equipment was carried on the unit's property book office (PBO) account. This led 1ABCT's ULM to request a copy of the actual contract between INSCOM and Global Linguist Solutions (GLS) from the TLM and the ACORs. Failure to provide the ULM with this document led to a reliance on the word of the vendor with regard to the contract, with the result that any issues 1ABCT had in executing the contract were invariably resolved in favor of GLS.

Finally, the SOP requirements for linguist usage (eight hours a day, seven days a week) are impossible to fulfill in the strategic reserve mission. With linguist usage almost wholly dependent on the OPTEMPO for partnership operations, there will definitely be prolonged periods, such as Ramadan (or the months of June through September when Kuwait is unpleasantly warm), when there is no productive work to be done. Forcing the ULM or ULPOC to take time from their real jobs to generate, supervise, and perform quality control on busy work to meet the demands of the SOP is literally throwing good man hours after bad money.

Recommendation: INSCOM should provide training to ULMs at a minimum; including ULPOCs would be even better. A one or two day, in-theater class covering the contract, SOP, disciplinary actions, and especially linguist travel would be invaluable. The end user must be provided with the actual contract, to include statements of work, to effectively manage linguists.

Issue: The enduring linguist request validation process

Discussion: After three months, the 1ABCT ULM determined the existing technical exhibit (contract linguist modified table of organization and equipment) was overly generous. The category I linguists especially wildly outnumbered the amount of category I jobs. The enduring linguist request submitted by 1ABCT in June 2013 cut category I numbers from 60 to 22, roughly one per company. Based on numbers provided by GLS employees (again, the ULM did not have access to the actual contract), the ULM estimated this would save the United States roughly $10 million annually. ARCENT enthusiastically received this estimate and forwarded it to INSCOM. The actual result seemed to be at odds with the request, as the 1ABCT ULM received an increase in category I linguists, alongside pressure to gainfully employ all 60 interpreters. In one instance, the ULM told one of the ACORs, “I cannot use these category I linguists; I do not have work for them and have requested their numbers be drastically reduced.” The ACOR replied, “Let’s get these guys working.” As of November 2013, five months after the submission of the much smaller linguist request, the old technical exhibit was still in effect.

Even if the United States was contractually obligated to pay GLS for 60 linguists through the end of the contract (January 2014), once the additional cost in man hours (CIF, installation access, management), food, housing, and transportation are accounted for, it is an unconscionable waste to pay contractors to live in a tent and not work. The cost in man hours to the ULM and ULPOCs has an impact on those individuals’ regular duties; keeping linguists the brigade did not need negatively impacted mission accomplishment by the ULM in his primary duties as the S-2 NCOIC. Additionally, changing any requirements, for example requesting a linguist who speaks different language, goes through the same process. A unit identifying an emerging or previously undetected need for a Farsi linguist can expect to wait at least five months to have its billet filled.

Recommendation: Streamline the validation process. If necessary, break the contract into regions; for example, Afghanistan should be contracted separately from Iraq, Africa should probably have its own contract, and so on. A recommendation that will result in a savings to the Army and better tailor a contracted workforce to the actual tasks at hand should not take five months to gain approval. If this is a case of contract law and the Army is obligated to pay for 60 category I linguists, it would still be better to take the monetary loss, pay GLS for the employees we (the Army) do not need and cannot employ than to feed, house, transport, and manage 30 extra interpreters with no purpose.

Issue: Linguist competency

Discussion: All of the contracted linguists are tested annually in their target language, in this case Modern Standard Arabic. Most of them seemed to be fluent, although the ULM was unable to evaluate this, as he does not speak Arabic. There were several occasions where other contract linguists, 09Ls (Army linguists), and even the Kuwaitis pointed out a lack of functional proficiency. In some cases this was probably cultural: Arabic is spoken in a huge portion of the world, and there are regional differences (as with any widespread language such as English, French, or Spanish). Sometimes this was the result of personality: a lack of confidence, arrogance, or poor social skills will inhibit any conversation. One almost uniformly unsatisfactory area was written English. With one or two notable exceptions, any product, be it correspondence or a PowerPoint presentation, required significant oversight and correction by a native speaker of English. Some linguists admitted to using Google-Translate for things as simple as news articles from the Internet. Some of this may be due to the technical nature of some projects. For example, a military planning document intended for use by brigade and higher echelons will contain terms and concepts unfamiliar to the layperson; however, even simple grammatical constructions were constantly wrong.

Most of the contracted linguists, regardless of category, had poor writing skills. Without access to the contract or any chance that replacements would be any better, the practical choice is to develop these skills on the job. Unfortunately, this creates a situation where a Soldier, probably an NCO who already has a full-time job, is responsible for teaching written English (or PowerPoint, or MS Word, or how to use email) to a contractor who ironically earns more than the NCO. In a static environment, with senior staff-level partnership as a primary line of effort, the linguists have to be able to perform translations at a professional level. Ten really good interpreters familiar with MS Office and capable of writing in English would have been better than 90 who spoke Arabic at a doctorate level, English at the grade school level, and could not type.

Recommendation: Evaluate written communication for any category II or III linguist. Linguists should also be given at least an introduction to common military terms (breach, assault, echelon, cordon, cache, and so on). Include a formalized interview in English prior to engaging any category II or higher linguist.

Issue: 09L U.S. Army interpreter/translators

Discussion: 09Ls are requested through FORSCOM by the rotational unit. This should be done 90–180 days ahead of deployment to allow the 09L parent company time to select and prepare a Soldier. 1ABCT requested two 09Ls 90 days ahead of deployment; they arrived in Kuwait shortly after the brigade and worked at brigade headquarters. About three months into deployment, ARCENT requested approximately 30 additional 09Ls to offset a shortage incurred by a legal dispute between GLS and a Kuwaiti company. Nine of these came to 1st Brigade and were subsequently assigned to each of the battalions. Overall feedback was positive, and in some cases commanders seemed to prefer having a Soldier, rather than a civilian, as their interpreter.

09L management is not a specific ULM function; they are Soldiers, and their management and employment is an S-1/G-1 and unit function. However, because they remain cloistered at only two active duty assignments (Fort Irwin and Fort Polk) and are deployed exclusively as

individual augmentees, they enjoy a certain mystique in the rest of the Army. For example, the ULM was at one point told to write noncommissioned officer evaluation reports for all the 09Ls, despite their being assigned to six different battalions performing duties well outside the ULM's oversight. NCOs, regardless of MOS, should be rated by the person to whom they report daily. Like every other MOS — or demographic for that matter — there is a wide range of competence, maturity, and quality within the MOS. On the whole, 09Ls supporting 1ABCT were outstanding, being much more flexible, easier to house, feed, transport, and employ than their contracted counterparts. Most 09Ls were significantly more fluent in English than the contracted linguists. As a bonus, because they are Soldiers, the 09Ls are available for non-translation duties as well. If there are no key leader engagements, the 09L can assist with motor maintenance, perform a charge of quarters (CQ) shift, participate in or supervise a detail, and is eligible to receive a military driver's license. Finally, the 09Ls have at least been exposed to basic military terms and are easier to coach through a complex staff product than are their civilian counterparts.

Recommendation: First, assign at least one 09L, preferably two, to each BCT. This would give them a presence in the force and get at least staff officers and NCOs familiar with the MOS and its capabilities. FORSCOM assignments would also expose the 09Ls to a wider range of career fields and experiences in garrison, which would in turn increase the value and competencies of individual 09Ls. Second, and this could devolve to on-the-job or unit-funded training, they should be trained in additional skills to add value outside of translation. The low-hanging fruit would be 88M or 42A as a secondary MOS. The brigade command group expects administrative support and drivers, commanders expect a personal security detail, and having at least one Soldier in the brigade who is MTOE'd and assigned specifically as such would ease force management and provide some continuity in those positions. An alternative to expensive, time-consuming advanced individual training would be providing systems training for mission command. Competent Command Post of the Future (CPOF) or Global Command and Control System operators are necessary, but staff has a traditionally high turnover rate and is drawn from MOSs needed outside of staff. A permanently assigned and MTOE'd CPOF operator would be a tremendous benefit to any brigade.

Issue: Linguist logistics

Discussion: 1ABCT was located principally at Camp Buehring. The amenities and quality of life were generous compared to a platoon patrol base in Paktika province, Afghanistan, but less so compared with Camp Arifjan. Staff sergeants and below were housed in tents with a nominal capacity of 60; in practice, occupancy rates ranged from close to 60 for the infantry battalion to the low 20s for the brigade headquarters company. The linguists shared three of these tents — two for males and one for females. The female tent peaked at 14 occupants, the male tents stayed between 25 and 32 occupants each. Management of the living tents rested with the ULM. The first several months were demanding for the ULM, as the individual linguists universally expected him to solve all personal issues with their neighbors. Unfortunately, the ARCENT linguist management SOP specifies that contractors may not supervise linguists, so appointing linguists as "tent sergeant" on a rotational basis was not an option. After several incidents ("My neighbor stays up too late, but I don't want to ask him to be quiet." "Really? I will now turn your lights out at night and on in the morning until you stop complaining.") where individual complaints were brought to the ULM and then solved Army-style, the personal complaints tapered off, but there seemed to be a pervasive refusal among the linguists to address personal issues at a personal level.

The only effective disciplinary tool available to the ULM is releasing a linguist from duties with his/her respective unit. Counseling can be conducted; however, it is not binding or punitive in nature and relies on the linguist's self-preservation instinct for effectiveness. Corrective training and disciplinary techniques can be applied, with the implication that a failure to comply will result in dismissal, but this seems to provide a significant opportunity for a ULM to overstep contractual boundaries and create a vulnerability to the U.S. Army for legal action (especially without ULM access to the contract).

Nonemergency medical care, legal/notary assistance, security clearances, the corresponding "promotion" to category II or III, and visa requirements were all GLS responsibility. In practice, many of the linguists approached the ULM for free notary services (the embassy charged for this), medical concerns (a taxi to the city is expensive), and security clearance adjudication (but really promotion to a higher category).

There was a prolonged period during which many of the linguists could not travel off post due to a legal issue between GLS and a Kuwaiti company. The ULM was able to secure some limited nonemergency medical care during this period, but it took three months for GLS and the ACORs to develop a solution that did not involve begging military medical personnel for favors. During this period, many of the linguists also requested notary assistance, which again relied heavily on handshake deals and the good graces of military personnel working outside their scope. Many of the linguists believed that the ULM had a much greater influence over internal GLS matters, such as who got assigned to Buehring and who went to Arifjan, than was actually the case.

Recommendation: Renegotiate the contract to provide meals, medical care, and legal assistance (limit to wills, POA, and notary) and take the cost out of the contract. Include a malpractice waiver in the hiring process for linguists. Change the SOP to either allow for a tent duty roster or charge GLS site managers with administering their employees' living spaces. Army consideration of others training may also help mitigate some interpersonal issues.

Arrival into theater should include a briefing from the ACORs and GLS management covering contractual responsibilities of the Army, GLS policies, and entitlements. This should be repeated quarterly, with all assigned linguists present, to prevent misunderstanding.

Issue: Linguist organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE)

Discussion: As previously discussed, the linguists deployed to Kuwait through IRDO/CRC, where they all had the opportunity to draw PPE and uniform items. GLS furnished most of the linguists waiver memoranda, allowing them to arrive in theater without helmets, ballistic vests, eye protection and, in many cases (about 40 percent), chemical protective equipment. The individual linguists universally loathed having equipment; it is heavy, expensive to replace if lost or damaged, and tedious to clean. From November 2011 (withdrawal from Iraq) until March 2013 (CIF in Kuwait stops serving contractors), this was not an issue. The linguists would arrive at Camp Buehring, and the ULM would send them to CIF with their letter of authorization to draw uniforms and equipment. After March 2013, this involved having a supply sergeant or S-4 representative accompany the linguist and add issued items to the unit's theater-provided equipment property book or a Soldier's OCIE account. CIF did not even carry Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) (chemical overgarments, part of RFI prior to deployment) or protective masks (which are organizational property book items).

Despite repeated requests — beginning in March 2013 — from the ULM to the TLM, ACORs, and GLS management to force linguists to draw OCIE prior to arrival in theater, linguists were still arriving without helmets and vests in September 2013. The excuse given by GLS was that they required a list of items, since different areas have different PPE and uniform requirements, for example operational camouflage pattern (OCP) (multicam) for Afghanistan. The list provided by the ULM to all parties (helmet, vest, plates, JSLIST and protective mask) was studiously ignored.

Recommendation: Every linguist entering theater does so with a complete issue of OCIE in universal camouflage pattern (UCP) (Army combat uniform) pattern. In the unlikely event an Arabic linguist is required in Afghanistan, they will be issued OCP items as an exception.

Appendix B

1/4 Armored Brigade Combat Team
Military-to-Military Engagement Activities, Host Nation Forces
Center for Army Lessons Learned Commander Interview
18 October 2013

The following are the action items (AIs) and lessons learned:

- (AI) The 1/4 Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) recommends establishing predeployment military-to-military (MIL-to-MIL) training for all regionally aligned forces (RAF), tailored by the Army Service component command (ASCC) in coordination with the brigade combat team's (BCT's) higher headquarters (HQ) prior to the Train/Ready phase beginning.
    - (AI) The 1/4 ABCT recommends affording all RAF BCTs the opportunity to conduct region/country-specific predeployment training.
    - (AI) The 1/4 ABCT recommends training companies and battalions to "T" on core mission essential task list (CMETL) and BCT HQ staffs to proficiency in RAF-specific tasks.
    - (AI) The 1/4 ABCT recommends expanding the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) program and creating a partnering academy program.
- (AI) A specific plan issued by U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) concerning MIL-to-MIL engagements with aligned countries and constant staff engagements by ARCENT will greatly reduce coordination friction.
- (AI) The 1/4 ABCT recommends ARCENT inform all units engaged in MIL-to-MIL activities on the official representation fund (ORF) process.
- (AI) The 1/4 ABCT recommends Defense Institute of Security Assistance (DISAM) or the combatant commands (COCOMs) develop training programs tailored to the assigned region of the world in which each RAF operates.
- (AI) The 1/4 ABCT recommends organizations consider establishing a liaison officer (LNO) or partnership cell to help coordinate MIL-to-MIL engagements with host nations.
- (AI) The 1/4 ABCT recommends adding a Department of State (DOS) LNO to RAFs to increase effectiveness of their partnership line of effort (LOE) and assist the country team with meeting goals and objectives.
- (AI) In order to better support the RAF effort, the BCTs need to be informed on the goals and objectives of the country campaign plan (CCP) prior to arrival in theater.

Unit Mission Statement: 1/4 ABCT partners with regional military units to deter aggression and limit malign influence in the area of responsibility (AOR) to enhance regional stability and reassure regional partners. On order, deploys mission-ready force in support of contingency operations.

This is an unclassified interview. The following questions are intended to assist the 1/4 ABCT in identifying the most important issues and lessons learned from MIL-to-MIL engagement activities.

> Military engagement – The routine contact and interaction between individuals and elements of the Armed Forces of the U.S. and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (Joint Publication [JP] 3-0, *Joint Operations,* and JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*)

Focus and Summary of MIL-to-MIL Engagements

1. Please briefly summarize the MIL-to-MIL engagements and security cooperation activities the 1/4 ABCT conducted with each host nation. Be sure to discuss host nation predeployment training and conducting joint exercises with host nations.

1/4 ABCT conducted MIL-to-MIL engagements with Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstan.

The 1/4 ABCT conducted the following MIL-to-MIL activities with Kuwaiti armed forces:

- Combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFX).
- Combined small arms live-fire exercise (CLFX).
- Capability demonstrations.
- Information exchange seminars.
- Tactical information exchanges.
- Partnership building activities.
- Staff rides.
- Soldier–leader engagements (SLEs).

The 1/4 ABCT conducted one Joint Exercise Program (JEP) — Earnest Leader — with the Saudi armed forces.

The 1/4 ABCT planned to conduct two seminars with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Union Defense Force. The first seminar was on air-ground integration; the second seminar was on the BCT modularization concept. Neither of these seminars occurred due to visa processing issues.

The 1/4 ABCT conducted one JEP — Steppe Eagle — with the armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The 1/4 ABCT commanders and staff conducted a week-long LDESP seminar prior to the deployment. All battalion commanders, company commanders, and brigade staff primaries attended the seminar. LDESP is a Department of Defense (DoD)-funded organization based out of the Naval Postgraduate School. LDESP provided classroom instruction on culture, religion, and history on the prominent host nation countries in the 1/4 ABCT's AOR. The LDESP also provided instruction on the current conflict and political and socioeconomic impacts on the host nation countries. Attendees received instruction on how to conduct SLEs, with emphasis on Arab culture versus Western culture, and how to regulate actions during engagements. Attendees found LDESP contributed to the overall success of MIL-to-MIL engagements. Focused training on prioritized missions will benefit future units.

2. What were the topics of discussion during the 1/4 ABCT's MIL-to-MIL engagements? What processes and procedures did the 1/4 ABCT and host nation forces exchange with each other?

The 1/4 ABCT presented numerous topics during MIL-to-MIL engagements with Kuwaiti Armed Forces (KLF) and Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense (KMOD), but focused primarily on combined–joint strategic and operational planning. Subjects of discussion ranged from strategic to tactical level and included joint and combined operations scenarios. Approximately 80 percent of the MIL-to-MIL activities occurred at the respective Kuwaiti organizations' buildings in Kuwait City, with the remainder occurring at Camp Buehring, Kuwait. The 1/4 ABCT and battalion staffs conducted classes at the KLF Institute with Kuwaiti officers, who were attending their basic and advanced military courses. The KLF instructors requested the 1/4 ABCT to provide instruction on topics that reinforced the school's course curriculum. MIL-to-MIL engagements always focused on topics relevant to the bilateral defense plan and ranged from simple tasks such as basic rifle marksmanship to complex tasks such as joint operational planning.

1/4 ABCT partnered with the KLF brigades. The 1/4 ABCT battalions conducted tactical exchanges, capabilities demonstrations, SLEs, seminars, CLFXs, and CALFXs with their partnered Kuwaiti brigades.

Predeployment: Organization, Training, and Equipment

3. Predeployment: How could your unit have been better prepared, such as better equipment or training, for MIL-to-MIL engagements? Are there any specific predeployment training changes or additions needed at home station, mobilization site, combat training centers (CTCs), Camp Buehring, or elsewhere to ensure organizations are well prepared to complete MIL-to-MIL mission goals upon arrival in theater?

All 1/4 ABCT battalion and company commanders, as well as brigade primary staff, attended a week-long LDESP seminar prior to the deployment. The LDESP, a DoD-funded organization based out of the Naval Postgraduate School, provided classroom instruction on culture, religion, history, economic, political, and the current conflicts and associated socioeconomic impacts of the conflicts on several countries in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR. These classes also provided effective instruction on how to conduct SLEs and the differences between Arab and Western cultures.

4. What predeployment training or training technique was particularly good and should be broadly adopted or standardized Army-wide?

The 1/4 ABCT recommends replacement units obtain more training that focuses on MIL-to-MIL engagements with Kuwait and other nations in the CENTCOM AOR with whom the ABCT will conduct engagements. For example, the 2nd BCT, 1st Infantry Division recently completed predeployment training, which prepared the unit for its new regional alignment to support U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) operations. The training, which is offered monthly to Soldiers of all ranks, included classroom instruction, practical exercises, and role-playing scenarios designed to improve participants' understanding of host nation customs, culture, and history. Advisers from the African Studies Department of Kansas State University provided support to the training. The 1/4 ABCT recommends establishing a similar predeployment training program for all RAFs. The 1/4 ABCT training and deployment schedule did not allow for such a program, but instead focused on combined arms maneuver.

5. Did your personnel complete any DISAM training? If so, how many and which courses do you recommend? Online or classroom? What improvements are needed to DISAM course curriculum to help you conduct your engagements?

No, DISAM classes are focused above the BCT level of involvement. Classes that focus on specific countries for RAFs will prove more effective. The 1/4 ABCT recommends that DISAM or the COCOMs develop training programs tailored to the assigned region of the world in which each RAF operates.

6. Given your existing table of organization and equipment (TOE), was the 1/4 ABCT adequately staffed and trained to meet mission requirements in support of MIL-to-MIL engagement activities? If not, what changes do you recommend? Did you have the right expertise and personnel required?

The 1/4 ABCT recommends adding a DoS LNO to RAF BCTs to increase effectiveness of their partnership LOE and assist the country team with meeting goals and objectives. The LNO could provide the ABCT support in addressing passport and visa challenges.

MIL-to-MIL Activity Coordination

7. What is the approval process for MIL-to-MIL engagements?

All MIL-to-MIL engagements in Kuwait are subject to approval by the Office of Military Cooperation–Kuwait (OMC-K). Approvals for enduring partnerships activities, such as SLE and tactical exchanges, can be granted by the OMC-K to avoid having to obtain approval for each individual exchange. Partnered exercises and multiechelon unit/staff seminars will always require approval from OMC-K. Engagements with host nation leaders, which were typically outside of partnership lanes, required OMC-K approval. The approval process consists of a memorandum stating the nature of the exchange and signed by the ABCT commander, forwarded through ARCENT to the OMC-K. The OMC-K will action the request, contact the Kuwaiti units that are involved, and reply with approval or denial in approximately two weeks. Large-scale exercises and seminars needed the approval of the KLF commander and the KMOD J-3.

8. Describe the process to coordinate MIL-to-MIL engagement activities. With whom did the 1/4 ABCT coordinate MIL-to-MIL engagement activities (for example, ASG-Kuwait, ARCENT staff judge advocate [SJA], host nation forces, and ARCENT)?

The 1/4 ABCT often coordinated MIL-to-MIL engagement activities in Kuwait directly with Kuwaiti military leadership. For example, the 1/4 scheduled office visits through a phone call to the desired Kuwaiti leader. Upon establishing a relationship, most Kuwaiti officers were amenable to 1/4 ABCT staff stopping by for unannounced visits. Office calls with Kuwaiti general officers on the KMOD staff required prior approval from OMC-K. Office calls with general officers on the KLF staff did not require OMC-K approval because the 1/4 ABCT was aligned with KLF for partnership activities.

Most tactical exchanges, capability demonstrations, and lower echelon seminars were coordinated through participating Kuwaiti brigade and KLF staff along with the respective Kuwaiti brigade commander. Exchanges with KLF staff could be coordinated directly with KLF staff. Large exercises or seminars (CLFX, CALFX, and seminars involving multiple brigades, KLF staff, or joint participation) will always require coordination with the respective Kuwaiti general officer (KLF commander or KMOD J-3). ARCENT J-3/5/7 helped coordinate planning of combined–joint activities and influence KMOD staff. Obtaining permission to use ranges and land was easier when conducting a partnered exercise.

9. How could the MIL-to-MIL coordination process be improved? Was there another organization with whom the 1/4 ABCT should have coordinated?

To improve the MIL-to-MIL coordination, ARCENT needs to provide more detailed guidance on country-specific goals that are integrated across all ARCENT subordinate units. Currently, the effort is unsynchronized across ARCENT subordinates. Monthly ARCENT MIL-to-MIL council meetings with subordinate units will improve coordination along the LOE.

The 1/4 ABCT's observations determined that the approach lacks integration across all U.S. elements. The 1/4 leadership observed disconnections between OMC-K and ARCENT as well as little fusion of efforts across brigade-level efforts. What few coordinations we developed were the result of brigade-to-brigade coordination.

10. Describe gaps in coordination and support. What were some challenges in coordinating efforts for engagement activities?

The 1/4 ABCT experienced many challenges in coordinating efforts and engagement activities, but most were easily overcome. The difference in battle rhythms between the Kuwaiti and U.S. forces presented some challenges in coordination. Kuwaiti military units work Sunday–Thursday, while the U.S. forces work Monday–Saturday. The Kuwaiti work day starts at 0800 and terminates around 1400. The short 6-hour work window creates constraints, especially when factoring in the 1.5–2-hour commute to their offices.

The Kuwaitis do not have a discernible battle rhythm for their daily engagement activities, which can adversely affect scheduled visits. Occasionally, Kuwaiti leaders cannot participate in the scheduled MIL-to-MIL activity due to impromptu work requirements. Ramadan will significantly impede the pace of partnership activities. Partnership activities during Ramadan should be focused on maintaining relationships via phone calls and scheduled informal meetings. The Kuwaitis should establish the meeting times during Ramadan to enable them to receive

guests when they are most comfortable. Many Kuwaitis take vacations following the end of Ramadan. These vacations typically range from one week to 30 days, with the average being approximately two weeks. Due to these factors, the 1/4 ABCT recommends replacement units plan limited partnering activities for approximately 60 days during the Ramadan season.

In addition, the Kuwaiti military is a top-down organization where subordinate units do not conduct any activities without formal approval from their higher command. U.S. units should adjust their planning schedules to allow at least one week for the Kuwaiti subordinate unit to receive official approval.

11. What is the relationship between 1/4 ABCT, ARCENT HQ, Effects International Military Affairs (IMA), OMC-K, and the host nation forces regarding coordinating MIL-to-MIL engagements?

ARCENT served as the higher headquarters for the 1/4 ABCT. Consequently, few occasions required the 1/4 ABCT to coordinate MIL-to-MIL activities with ARCENT. The 1/4 ABCT often requested ARCENT to engage with senior Kuwaiti leadership to assist with partnership efforts. The 1/4 ABCT submitted weekly MIL-to-MIL engagement reports to ARCENT. The 1/4 ABCT's relationship with OMC-K was limited to official correspondence seeking approval for MIL-to-MIL engagements. The 1/4 ABCT's most prominent relationship for coordinating MIL-to-MIL activities was with the host nation forces. The 1/4 ABCT leadership and staff were primarily aligned with KMOD and KLF staffs and conducted direct coordination with these entities. The 1/4 ABCT battalions were aligned with KLF brigades and some KMOD special purpose brigades and conducted direct coordination with the leaders and staffs of the Kuwaiti brigades with which they were aligned.

12. From whom did you need better coordination or support? Do you have any challenges in coordinating with other units or organizations? What specific relationships, such as command and control, need to improve and why?

To reduce coordination friction, the 1/4 ABCT recommends ARCENT provide a specific plan on MIL-to-MIL engagements with the partnership countries.

Aligning MIL-to-MIL Objectives/Activities with Theater Security Cooperation Policy, Country Campaign Plan, and Mission Strategic Resource Plan

13. Where did the 1/4 ABCT obtain its units' engagement objectives and guidance for MIL-to-MIL engagement activities?

The 1/4 ABCT received MIL-to-MIL objectives from CENTCOM/ARCENT "Shape" LOE and guidance from ARCENT's commander and deputy operations commander. The 1/4 ABCT commander and subordinate battalion commanders defined the scope, objectives, and statement of intent for their units.

14. Describe how the unit's objectives support ARCENT's theater objectives.

The 1/4 ABCT's partnership objectives included the following:

- Increasing interoperability between U.S. forces and partner nations to improve responsiveness to a crisis.

- Increasing partner nations' ability and capacity to deter foreign aggression and secure their territories.

These objectives are directly nested to ARCENT's "Ready" LOE from the ARCENT Campaign Plan. The 1/4 ABCT achieved these objectives through combined–joint exercises that focused on multinational interoperability and tactics and through conducting exchanges and seminars that concentrated on increasing proficiency.

15. How did your planning of the MIL-to-MIL activities reflect your understanding of the theater security cooperation (TSC) policy and guidance? For example, did the 1/4 ABCT review the theater engagement priorities or policy guidance on how to conduct MIL-to-MIL engagement activities prior to developing its engagement plan?

The US–Kuwaiti Bilateral Defense Plan provided direction and requirements for conducting MIL-to-MIL engagements, focusing on interoperability, joint operational planning, and tactical proficiencies. These engagements strengthened readiness in preparation to execute the Bilateral Defense Plan. The 1/4 ABCT operated under Title 10 authority, which determined the limitations of the above mentioned activities.

16. How did you tailor your MIL-to-MIL to support the U.S. Embassy Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) or CENTCOM/ARCENT CCP?

The 1/4 ABCT leadership met with the political/military (POL/MIL) officer at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait within one month of arrival in theater. The POL/MIL officer stated that the strategic goals included maintaining access to Kuwaiti bases and developing a bilateral defense.

17. Describe how the 1/4 ABCT's engagement activity priorities aligned with the CCP MIL-to-MIL priorities?

The 1/4 ABCT learned through experience and through discussions with ARCENT. In order to better support the RAF effort, the BCTs need to be informed regarding the goals and objectives of the CCP prior to arrival in theater. The COCOM and country team could send representatives to brief the BCT during predeployment training and facilitate a planning session that could result in goals for the BCT.

18. Describe how the 1/4 ABCT's MIL-to-MIL engagements support your organization's mission statement and strategic plans.

The 1/4 ABCT mission statement — "1/4 ABCT partners with regional military units to deter aggression and limit malign influence in the area of responsibility to enhance regional stability and reassure regional partners. On order, the 1/4 ABCT deploys Mission Ready Force in support of contingency operations."— dictates partnership activities in support of specific activities.

The 1/4 ABCT developed a partnership LOE and established MIL-to-MIL engagement goals at the beginning of the deployment to ensure that the ABCT's efforts supported the mission statement. The 1/4 ABCT developed short-term, intermediate, and long-term goals. The short-term goals focused on establishing relationships with KMOD staff, British Military Ministry–Kuwait (BMMK), KLF leaders, staffs, and units. The intermediate goals focused on planning and executing partnered exercises, developing 1/4 ABCT's and KLF's understanding of the Bilateral Defense Plan, and establishing relationships with Kuwaiti National Guard (KNG) and Kuwaiti

special purpose forces (25th Commando Brigade, 94th Brigade, and Amiri Guard). Long-term objectives focused on facilitating defense planning between KMOD, KNG, and KLF; assisting in the development of the KMOD training plan; and the planning and execution of a culminating joint–combined exercise in support of the Bilateral Defense Plan.

The 1/4 ABCT's brigade and battalion commanders, along with primary staff officers, accomplished the short-term goals by aggressively executing SLEs with personnel from KMOD and KLF. The 1/4 ABCT also established an LNO, whose primary purpose was to conduct weekly SLEs with KMOD and KLF staff personnel. The LNO also established a relationship with the staff officers of the BMMK. The 1/4 ABCT's LNO contributed significantly to the successful achievement of intermediate and long-term goals.

1/4 ABCT accomplished intermediate MIL-to-MIL goals through a combination of tactical exchanges, seminars, and partnered planning conferences. The 1/4 ABCT battalions provided the initial momentum by conducting numerous tactical engagements with their partnered brigades. These tactical exchanges focused on honing tactical skill sets that supported security and defensive operations. The 1/4 ABCT staff coordinated and executed a month-long combined planning session with KLF staff concerning the Bilateral Defense Plan, which focused on the use of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to improve the KLF's portion of the plan and its understanding of the adjacent units' requirements in executing the plan. The planning session concluded with the development of the KLF's draft operational plan. 1/4 ABCT initiated partnership activities with KNG and Kuwaiti special purpose forces upon the arrival of two of its battalions to theater.

The 1/4 ABCT achieved long-term objectives through accomplishing short-term and intermediate goals. The Bilateral Defense Plan Conference forced the function of KLF initiating coordination with KMOD staff and KNG. The coordination efforts established the foundation for future partnering with KLF and KNG and opened lines of communication between KLF and KMOD staffs. 1/4 ABCT staff worked with BMM-K staff and KMOD J-5 staff to assist KMOD in developing a Kuwaiti Armed Forces training plan. The training plan provides guidance to all branches of the KLF and contains a four-quarter cycle, which ends with culminating combined–joint exercises that support the Bilateral Defense Plan.

19. Did the 1/4 ABCT use the Army Global Outlook System (ARGOS) or the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System in its planning?

No; the 1/4 ABCT is unfamiliar with this system. If this is helpful for the BCT level, training should be offered for future units.

Developing Engagement Plan

20. Did the 1/4 ABCT develop intended outcomes of engagement plans? What were the intended outcomes?

The 1/4 ABCT commander issued guidance concerning MIL-to-MIL objectives, which the brigade staff, battalion commanders, and battalion staffs used to develop their engagement plans. The commander's guidance was nested with the mission statement and was supported by the partnership LOE. The intended outcomes ranged from strengthening a partnership to successfully conducting a combined–joint exercise.

The 1/4 ABCT's partnership goals included five objectives with supporting goals as follows.

OBJ 1: Partner with KMOD elements.

GOAL 1: Increase planning with KMOD element leaders.

GOAL 2: KLF staff develops division-level operational capabilities.

GOAL 3: KLF increases interoperability with BCT in conventional operations.

GOAL 4: KLF considers irregular warfare as a component of the threat.

GOAL 5: KLF increases interoperability with KNG.

GOAL 6: US/KU partners share common goals.

OBJ 2: Establish KNG partnership.

GOAL 1: Develop engagements with KNG and KLF leaders.

GOAL 2: KNG increases interoperability with BCT in COIN.

GOAL 3: Conduct joint planning exercise with KNG, KLG, and US.

GOAL 4: KLF and KNG conduct joint planning efforts.

OBJ 3: Develop BCT training exercise (TREX) in joint security area (JSA).

GOAL 1: BCT elements are prepared to travel in the joint security operations (JSO).

GOAL 2: Increase engagements with military engagement teams (METs).

GOAL 3: Increase engagements with defense attache offices (DAOs).

GOAL 4: BCT element trained and resourced to execute TREX.

GOAL 5: Conduct TREX deployment operations.

GOAL 6: Facilitate unity of effort across JSA through TREX.

OBJ 4: Conduct ARCENT-directed TREX.

GOAL 1: BCT elements prepared to travel in ARCENT AOR.

GOAL 2: Participate in ARCENT planning conferences.

GOAL 3: Establish LNO at TREX site.

GOAL 4: BCT elements trained and resourced to execute TREX.

GOAL 5: Conduct TREX deployment operations.

OBJ 5: Build relationships with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) partners.

GOAL 1: Increase engagements with JIIM partners.

GOAL 2: Increase partnership with JIIM partners.

GOAL 3: Leverage JIIM partners for new opportunities.

GOAL 4: JIIM partners and 1/4 ABCT work toward common operational goals.

21. Did the 1/4 ABCT develop strategies to achieve those outcomes? What were the strategies and the lessons learned of those strategies? How were these strategies approved/vetted?

To achieve intended outcomes, the 1/4 ABCT established strong, enduring relationships with leaders of KMOD and KLF staffs through an LNO, whose primary purpose was to conduct weekly SLEs with KMOD and KLF leaders. The development of strong relationships with these personnel provided more opportunities for future MIL-to-MIL engagements.

Strong relationships were critical to the 1/4 ABCT's success in conducting combined–joint exercises and developing a combined planning approach for MIL-to-MIL engagements. The 1/4 ABCT's LNO helped gauge the desires and interests of the Kuwaiti military, which helped identify potential MIL-to-MIL engagement activities. Rarely would both partners propose the same idea or course of action. Typically, one side developed an engagement activity and the other would agree to participate.

22. Did the 1/4 ABCT obtain information assessments from previous engagements conducted by predecessor units to help develop an engagement plan?

No. The partnership mission in Kuwait was just developing under the previous unit, which provided us good relationships and insights to some individuals. We expanded the scope and developed a more systematic method of capturing results.

23. Did the 1/4 ABCT develop or update target folders (biography, photograph, motivations, level of influence, summary of previous engagement) and leader preparation forms?

The 1/4 ABCT and battalion staffs developed "baseball cards" on KAF service members who routinely participated in MIL-to-MIL activities. The cards contained biographical information and assessments on their capabilities and attitude toward MIL-to-MIL engagements with the United States. The 1/4 ABCT brigade staff consolidated the cards and used the information to develop strategies to influence engagement outcomes. A 1/4 ABCT battalion S-2 debriefed personnel upon completion of an engagement. The brigade S-2 collected all debriefs from the battalions and used the information to further develop baseball cards and lines of influence.

24. Did the 1/4 ABCT identify or anticipate the host nation's objectives?

The 1/4 ABCT anticipated that most of the host nation's objectives were aligned with their national and Bilateral Defense Plan. This was solidified when CCJ5 visited KMOD within the first 60 days of the deployment to validate the Bilateral Defense Plan prior to its renewal. This was reinforced by the KMOD J-3, Major General (MG) Abdulrazzaq, who issued training guidance to the KAF that MIL-to-MIL engagements will focus on increasing readiness and proficiencies related to the execution of the Bilateral Defense Plan.

Planning the Engagement

25. How did you organize the content of the MIL-to-MIL engagement? Examples: (1) engagement event schedule and engagement preparation timeline/chart; (2) agenda; (3) presentation outlines; (4) summary of what would be discussed (talking points); (5) messages and information operations themes; (6) description of demonstrations; (7) relationship-building topics to discuss; (8) responsibility matrix (assigns tasks and roles to unit staff); and (9) exit strategy.

The content of MIL-to-MIL engagements can vary depending on the type of engagement conducted. The 1/4 ABCT experienced challenges in developing long-range MIL-to-MIL engagements due to the Kuwaitis' irregular battle rhythm. The 1/4 ABCT partnership team discussed talking points, agendas, and relationship-building topics prior to each engagement. The team often conducted rehearsals with linguists during the 1.5–2-hour drive down to KMOD and KLF offices in Kuwait City.

The partnership team developed most of the official correspondence for the brigade commander's signature. Correspondence to specific persons did not necessarily need to be translated if the Kuwaiti possessed strong English proficiency. All official plans or briefings regarding exercises needed to be translated to Arabic. As the translation process was often time consuming, the 1/4 ABCT recommends starting the translation process as soon as possible.

26. How did you reduce errors during MIL-to-MIL engagements? What planning tools did the 1/4 ABCT develop and implement or improve upon, such as standing operating procedures (SOPs), checklists for planning engagements, or quality control inspections, which helped reduce errors or improve engagement planning? Should other units adopt these tools for their use and why?

The 1/4 ABCT developed an LOE with objectives as described in the answer to question 23. We also worked at multiple echelons of the Kuwaiti forces. The BCT staff engaged Kuwait MOD and land forces staffs, while the battalions aligned themselves with brigades of similar structure or capability. We made advances in interoperability at the brigade level through combined operations centers. Some Kuwaiti units developed SOPs.

27. What do you suggest to your replacement to improve the sharing/exchange process? Did you request the host nation provide a presentation on their processes and methods and incorporate time into the schedule for them?

The 1/4 ABCT recommends organizations consider establishing an LNO and partnership cell. The 1/4 ABCT's fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) managed the brigade's partnership LOE. While the cell accomplished much, numerous other requirements reduced its potential to

assist in coordinating MIL-to-MIL engagements. A dedicated partnership cell would increase face time with Kuwaiti partners, improve coordination efforts with ARCENT, and provide more personnel for targeting activities, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the partnership LOE.

28. Did the 1/4 ABCT integrate measures of effectiveness (MOE) into engagement plans? If so, what are some examples? For instance, if building interpersonal rapport with host nation was measured, did your unit participants rehearse or review customs and protocol of social pleasantries prior to engagement?

The 1/4 ABCT developed 19 MOEs, which aligned with ARCENT partnership metrics, and integrated them into all engagement plans. The 1/4 ABCT staff briefed all progress on MOEs to the brigade commander. A particularly helpful MOE was "ABCT has an effective engagement plan and partnership distribution." The brigade staff verified this MOE weekly through MIL-to-MIL engagement reports submitted to the brigade by the battalions. Brigade staff checked the reports to ensure that all subordinate units conducted the necessary engagements with their partnered units.

29. (Safety) What processes did you implement or improve that reduced or prevented injuries for soldiers of the host nation during MIL-to-MIL engagement activities?

The 1/4 ABCT used numerous methods to ensure safety when conducting partnered live-fire exercises. The most effective measures employed included conducting partnered rehearsals and combined range reconnaissance, establishing U.S./Kuwaiti observer/controller (O/C) teams, and establishing a combined operations center. Prior to a partnered live-fire exercise, the 1/4 ABCT conducted a partnered reconnaissance of the range that was to be used during the exercise. During the reconnaissance, U.S. and Kuwaiti staff developed lanes for the exercise and verified the lanes met safety standards and the criteria for the exercise. U.S. and Kuwaiti forces conducted rehearsals together, typically spread over a few days, prior to the execution of the live-fire exercise. The partnered O/C team supervised the rehearsals.

At a minimum, the U.S. and Kuwaiti forces conducted dry and blank ammunition (when available) rehearsals and repeated the rehearsals as necessary prior to the live-fire exercise. Prior to the dry and blank rehearsals, the U.S. and Kuwaiti forces conducted a partnered operation brief and sand table rehearsal. The partnered O/C teams inspected all weapon systems prior to the execution of the blank rehearsal and the live-fire exercise. Safety personnel briefed all participants on casualty evacuation procedures and conducted casualty evacuation rehearsals prior to dry and blank-fire rehearsals. The partnered O/C team inspected all weapon systems at the end of each fire rehearsal to verify all weapons were clear of ammunition. The combined U.S. and Kuwaiti operations center managed the live-fire exercise and maintained direct communications with the partnered O/C teams, who ensured safety of the participating units.

30. Did the 1/4 ABCT plan snacks and drinks for events? What were the lessons learned?

Most of the MIL-to-MIL engagements occurred at Kuwaiti facilities, where the Kuwaitis treated the U.S. Soldiers as their guests and, as per their culture, provided refreshments.

Resource Requirements and Coordination

31. What do you need to effectively partner with the host nation forces?

The critical resources needed to effectively conduct MIL-to-MIL engagements include non-tactical vehicles (NTVs) and cell phones. Both of these items were in short supply. Due to budget constraints, ARCENT required the 1/4 ABCT to turn in government cell phones and NTVs, which presented challenges for partnership activities. Cell phones were the primary means of communication with Kuwaiti partners. NTVs were required to travel to Kuwait military facilities, as most are located in and around urban areas.

Partnering activities also require linguists. Although many of the Kuwaiti officers are fluent in English, they prefer to speak Arabic when discussing military doctrine and tactics. In addition, linguists are necessary to assist with passing the security gates on the Kuwaiti military bases. Category II linguists are also a necessity, as a significant portion of the information exchanged with the Kuwaitis is classified secret. The 1/4 ABCT recommends rotating linguists routinely to allow the linguist to develop relationships with the Kuwaiti partners, which is critically important in achieving operational flexibility.

32. With whom did you coordinate for resources/supplies (e.g., presentation requirements, classrooms, and handouts) necessary to conduct MIL-to-MIL engagement activities?

Most resources were coordinated through the Kuwaitis, who had available ample audio visual equipment for conferences and presentations. To produce a large number of handouts, units could coordinate with the Kuwaitis or the Training and Audiovisual Support Center on Camp Buehring.

33. Did you leverage existing resources, such as Disposition Services (DS), ARCENT G7, Installation Management Agency (IMA), or TSA funding?

The 1/4 ABCT used ARCENT G-7 resources to fund end-of-tour gifts, a diwaniya (reception), and a formal dinner hosted by the 1/4 ABCT commander, which enabled the unit to reciprocate the Kuwaitis' hospitality and kindness. The 1/4 ABCT recommends units dedicate a member of the partnership coordination cell as the funding/resource agent.

34. When you hand over the reins to your replacement, what will be the one significant supply-related "lesson learned" you want to pass in regard to MIL-to-MIL activities?

The 1/4 ABCT recommands managing NTVs and government cell phones carefully, as these resources are necessary for partnership activities. Partnership leads should have priority for these items.

35. (Technology) What specific tools, equipment, or software do you want more of to better support your engagements with host nations? Which specific tools, equipment, or software do you need to have a more advanced version? And which specific tools, equipment, or software exists in the civilian sector that would be beneficial to acquire to use for your engagements?

CENTCOM restricted all units, including the 1/4 ABCT, from burning compact disks, which proved troublesome when it came to sharing digital information with the Kuwaitis. To overcome the challenge, the 1/4 ABCT submitted a formal request to burn disks to the approving authority;

however, no authorization or denial response was received. Unfortunately, this approach was ineffective in overcoming the problem.

Funding

36. How did the 1/4 ABCT resolve any funding challenges (restrictions on use) such as Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) or Offical Representation Funds (ORF)? (For example, challenges associated with complying with ARCENT's ORF policy letter.)

The 1/4 ABCT experienced difficulty in gaining accss to ORF monies. The ORF can be used to host dinners and for purchasing gifts. The 1/4 ABCT was unaware of this funding source and was only able to access it after the brigade S-4 conducted extensive work. The 1/4 ABCT recommends ARCENT inform all units engaged in MIL-to-MIL activities on ORF funding processes.

37. Did you develop an itemized budget to identify the costs of engagements? Did you obtain assistance from ARCENT G-8 or G-35 on budget estimates?

The 1/4 ABCT developed an itemized budget for United Arab Emirates MIL-to-MIL engagements, which was based on an ARCENT G-8-provided spreadsheet. The budget included airline ticket, rental car, hotel, meals, indicental, and expense rates for the travel area.

38. Did you use the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) to fund any projects with the Kuwaitis?

The 1/4 ABCT informed ARCENT of MIL-to-MIL costs related to DCA. DCA negotiations are above the BCT level.

Developing the Engagement's Presentation Materials

39. How did the 1/4 ABCT divide the time between socializing and business-related activities? Did the 1/4 ABCT follow the standard model for engagements (25 percent casual – develop relationship; 50 percent business; 25 percent closure – relationship time)? What lessons were learned?

The Kuwaitis determined the model for the engagements. Trying to divide engagements into casual versus business is impractical. MIL-to-MIL engagements will primarily be a casual relationship with sprinklings of business. Although not the most efficient means of conducting business, it is how the Kuwaitis conduct business. Formal briefings, seminars, and field exercises are the exception to this, but these events front and back loaded with relationship time. Developing the relationship with the Kuwaitis is the most important aspect of MIL-to-MIL engagements. The American adage of "I don't have to like you to work with you" does not hold true for Kuwaitis. A Kuwaiti must like you to work with you. The 1/4 ABCT recommends meeting with the Kuwaiti counterparts often, at least once a week, regardless of whether business needs to be addressed. Weekly meetings help ensure the forming of the strong bonds necessary to effectively partner with the Kuwaitis.

40. How did you determine the level of detail to include in the presentation that would match the host nation expectations?

The best practice for determining the level of detail needed for a presentation is to know what level of detail your audience can understand. Discussing the level of detail for a scheduled presentation with the partner nation and making adjustments based on its feedback helped the 1/4 ABCT to develop effective presentations. The 1/4 ABCT recommends limiting the length of presentations to less than one hour and keeping the information simple and concise. If the subject presented is complicated, the 1/4 ABCT recommends breaking ithe information down into separate lectures presented over several engagements.

Cultural Awareness

41. How did displaying genuine interest in the host nation's processes (as opposed to purely focusing on presenting U.S. military processes/techniques as the best practice) contribute to the relationship? What do you suggest to your replacement to improve the sharing/ exchange process? Were adequate translators available?

The Kuwaitis are very proud of their culture and enjoy discussing Kuwaiti culture, history, food, and religion. Inquiring about their culture is taken as a sign of respect. The 1/4 ABCT recommends educating MIL-to-MIL participants on Kuwaiti culture and rehearsing inquiring about their culture and history. These actions will not only increase the strength of the relationship but will also prove to be an enjoyable experience.

During the deployment, a linguist contracting issue arose that prevented the use of some of the Category II linguists. The 1/4 ABCT mitigated this issue by coordinating with ARCENT, which retasked O9L Soldiers to support the unit. Although this action helped fill a critical capability, the 1/4 ABCT needed more Category II linguists for MIL-to-MIL engagements. Category II linguists are needed when discussing the Bilateral Defense Plan, which is classified secret.

42. What processes did you improve to reduce or prevent conflicts, social/cultural faux paus with host nation during engagements? Example: Conducted cultural training prior to engagement.

The linguists tend to be the best culture advisers, especially those who have been working in their positions for several years. The 1/4 ABCT reviewed proper engagement etiquette with the linguist prior to engagements. Linguists often served as litmus tests for determining the effectiveness of the engagement. Most of the linguists have worked with the Kuwaiti counterparts for several years and possess a better understanding of their moods and reactions than do U.S. personnel. The 1/4 ABCT recommends conducting a hot wash-type after action review with the linguists immediately after each engagement, as they will be able to assess what needs improvement for the subsequent engagement.

Legal

43. What steps or processes did you implement or improve upon to ensure your engagements did not violate Title 10/22 restrictions?

The 1/4 ABCT focused on tactical interoperability to avoid violating Title 10/22 restrictions.

44. What did the 1/4 ABCT learn regarding Title 10/22 restrictions?

The 1/4 ABCT learned that we were not allowed to participate in the selling of a capability to the host nation partners. We learned about the "Big T, little t" limitations of partnership engagements. As the RAF concept takes hold over the next few years, the nature of the authorizations of Titles 10 and 22 should be reexamined. The current methodology may be outdated for the current operating environment.

45. What are your restrictions in the engagements? For example, can you teach them how or only talk about how you perform military operations and provide demonstrations?

Working under the Bilateral Defense Agreement, the 1/4 ABCT was able to present and demonstrate military processes to the Kuwaitis. Presentations and demonstrations were always conducted as an exchange of military processes between U.S. and Kuwaiti forces. The 1/4 ABCT ensured that sharing of military processes was always a collective activity to increase interoperability between U.S. and Kuwaiti forces.

46. Did you experience foreign disclosure concerns when sharing information? How did you improve the process?

One large concern came from the sharing of concept of operation plan (CONPLAN) details. The CONPLAN is classified "SECRET//REL US-KU." The British Military Mission-Kuwait (BMM-K) is a reliable partner and an embedded asset within the KMOD and throughout their military education structure. The ability to share the CONPLAN with BMM-K can shape the instruction methodology in the officer professional military education system within Kuwait.

To improve on the conditions established by this constraint, we spoke with the BMM-K officers purely in terms of the Kuwait Defense Plan — their internally developed plan.

47. Did you coordinate with the Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) on MIL-to-MIL engagements, such as gifts presented to Kuwaitis? What challenges did you experience or lessons did you learn regarding obtaining approval for gifts and dinners for host nation soldiers?

Upon discovering ORF as a source of funding, the 1/4 ABCT did not experience any difficulty in obtaining approval to use these funds.

Evaluating MIL-to-MIL Engagements

48. How did the 1/4 ABCT assess the engagement's effectiveness? For example, did the engagements build capacity, share information, coordinate mutual activities, improve interoperability, build trust, or maintain influence? What evidence do you have? Examples include: feedback from a survey; comments; or instances where the host nation applied what they learned or adopted from a U.S. practice, such as implementing a physical training program in their organization.

The partnership LOE working group conducted engagement effectiveness assessments. The working group required all engagement participants to submit a report summarizing their engagements. The working group analyzed the reports, along with the partner nation's activities, to determine engagement effectiveness. The 1/4 ABCT determined that the evidence of success lies in the partner nation's performance in planning and executing exercises. For example, during

an engagement, the 1/4 ABCT proposed a Kuwaiti forces training plan that improved readiness, included joint partnered culminating exercises, and was aligned with U.S. forces rotations. The 1/4 ABCT confirmed the engagement's effectiveness shortly thereafter, when a KMOD officer provided a briefing on a new training plan for all Kuwaiti Armed Forces that was very similar to the one the 1/4 ABCT proposed.

49. Did you evaluate interpersonal relations/connections successes?

Successful interpersonal relations with the Kuwaiti partners are an absolute necessity in order to be successful in any of your MIL-to-MIL engagements. If your interpersonal relations are successful, then your MIL-to-MIL engagements will be successful.

50. Did the engagements build a lasting partnership? What evidence do you have? Does the host nation want to continue to meet? What did the host nation request for future engagements? Was it a particular topic to be presented or demonstrated?

Yes. The evidence can be found in the actions of the partner nation. Effective relationships result in partner nations wanting to meet with you on a routine basis, seeking your advice, inviting you to share meals, and requesting training with your unit.

The 1/4 ABCT recently held SLEs with Kuwaiti leaders and our replacement unit's leaders. The Kuwaitis expressed interest in urban operations training as well as medical treatment, logistical planning, communications training, amphibious operations, artillery employment, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) operations, and land navigation.

51. What assessment tools do you need to help you improve engagement effectiveness?

The 1/4 ABCT needs access to surveys in order to obtain helpful feedback from the Kuwaiti partners on how to improve engagement activities.

52. Were adequate translators available? What lessons were learned regarding translators?

1/4 ABCT had numerous Category I linguists available for use. We were limited in the number of Category II linguists that were available due to a contracting issue. This issue was mitigated by the retasking of O9L Soldiers to our unit. This action helped fill a critical capability, but we were still limited in the number of Category II linguists we could employ. Category II linguists are needed when discussing the Bilateral Defense Plan, which is classified as secret. Units should also look internally. We found a native Kuwaiti Arabic-speaking staff sergeant within our BCT and assigned him as the BCT commander's primary linguist.

53. What capabilities do you have that were in high demand by the host nation?

Most units asked for briefings on the following subjects:

- Planning for operations and training.
- First aid techniques.
- Air-ground integration and close air support.

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- Stability operations.
- Urban operations.
- Master gunner reinforcement training.
- Maintenance capabilities.

Interoperability

54. What interoperability lessons were learned?

Secure FM communication between Kuwaiti and U.S. forces is a challenge due to current equipment. The United States utilizes digital communication equipment and the Kuwaitis use analog equipment for mission command, which necessitates the use of some analog systems when conducting partnered exercises with the Kuwaitis. The 1/4 ABCT determined that by establishing combined tactical operations centers (TOCs), staffed by both Kuwaiti and U.S. personnel, some of the mission command gaps could be overcome.

To conduct mission analysis, Kuwaiti Armed Forces use the British seven questions system, which is similar to the U.S. forces' MDMP. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and course of action (COA) development are virtually the same for both methods. Some differences exist in tactics and doctrine for the two forces. For example, executing a "guard" mission means something entirely different to a Kuwaiti force than to a U.S. force. The 1/4 ABCT mitigated these differences by providing extremely specific descriptions for the purpose of the mission to ensure the intended outcome was the same regardless of the label or title of the action.

55. What techniques did you use to facilitate the comparison and sharing of host nation and U.S. military processes, techniques, and constraints?

The 1/4 ABCT employed many techniques to facilitate the exchange of military processes between the U.S. and Kuwaiti forces. The 1/4 ABCT conducted numerous classes at the Kuwaiti Land Forces Institute (LFI) for Kuwaiti officers. These classes provided points of instruction on U.S. military processes. Some of the class topics included the MDMP, fire direction, and coastal defense. The 1/4 ABCT battalions conducted tactical exchanges and seminars with KLF brigades. Both nations presented their best techniques and procedures to each other to improve their own procedures and learn how each other operates.

Tactical exchanges encompassed a wide variety of subjects, to include: first aid treatment, logistical planning, communications training, amphibious operations, artillery employment, urban operations, CBRNE operations, and land navigation. The KLF brigades expressed enthusiasm regarding these exchanges, and the 1/4 ABCT often conducted presentations on these topics at the request of the KLF brigades. The LFI students were also very receptive to the 1/4 ABCT's presentations, which included practical exercises. Observing the Kuwaiti leadership execute the practical exercise provided the U.S. participants insight into how Kuwaiti officers make decisions and solve problems.

56. Did discussions on improving interoperability and comparisons of host nation processes with U.S. military processes and other differences, such as enlisted versus officer responsibilities, strengthen adviser credibility and relationships?

Absolutely. More open discussions between partners increase understanding of each other's processes and strengthen partnership relations. U.S. advisers find that they start this process with some credibility bestowed by the Kuwaitis. The Kuwaitis understand that most of the U.S. leaders with whom they interact are veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Many of the Kuwaitis will inquire about U.S. combat experiences and will request capability exchanges focused on tactics, techniques, and procedures that U.S. forces have honed over the past 12 years of conflict. The Kuwaitis rely heavily on their officer corps.

57. What did the unit learn from the interactions with host nations that improved interoperability or mutual understanding?

The two significant actions that improved the 1/4 ABCT's interoperability and mutual understanding of Kuwaiti military processes were: establishing combined TOCs, which provided a common operating picture and helped integrate mission command between the two forces; and conducting combined planning sessions focused on Kuwait's defense plan. The planning sessions helped the 1/4 ABCT commanders and staff understand how the Kuwaitis planned operations and how they plan and execute mission command.

Wrap-Up Questions

58. (Processes) What processes (your unit's processes or the coordinating organization's processes) need improvement with regard to MIL-to-MIL activities? What processes did your unit improve that other units should consider for adoption and use?

As discussed before, there needs to be a more unified effort across the partnership mission. ARCENT, CENTCOM, and the country team should develop and clearly articulate guidance for the BCT's time in country. This should be delivered early in the BCT's training process and refined along the way through working groups and regular updates to the ARCENT commander. Once in country, monthly working groups with the ARCENT staff would allow for updates to objectives and assessment of progress. Quarterly or bi-monthly updates to the commander or senior representative would then ensure efforts are still in keeping with his guidance and supporting his intent.

59. When you hand over the reins to your replacement, what will be the one significant "lesson learned" you want to pass on with respect to MIL-to-MIL engagement activities?

Have patience. The relationship that the 1/4 ABCT developed with the Kuwaiti Armed Forces is designed to increase readiness of the two countries' military forces, to deter malign influencers in the region, and to protect national sovereignty and interest. The goals established to achieve this end state must be the same for the two nations. U.S. armed forces tend to set high standards and sprint to achieve them. The Kuwaiti military does not possess this mindset. They are a very professional and competent force, but they do not have the same capabilities as the United States.

They strive for high standards, but take their time in reaching them. The 1/4 ABCT's replacement unit must understand the following:

- Progress will be slow.
- Kuwaitis will determine the pace of partnering activities.
- Completing an office call with a Kuwaiti partner consisting of a friendly conversation with no plans or goals achieved is a positive step toward the goals.

These wins will serve as a primer that will lead to achieving your partnership goals.

60. What were the public affairs office lessons learned during the MIL-to-MIL engagement activities? Did you publicize the engagement to promote your successes or downplay the engagements to accommodate local sensitivities?

The Kuwaitis appreciate video taping and photographing training engagements. The 1/4 ABCT could only release these videos and pictures to the Kuwaiti military. Currently, restrictions exist preventing the release of media depicting U.S. and Kuwaiti military conducting combined training.

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Approval for release provided by: COL Joel K. Tyler, Commander, 1/4 ABCT

CALL LNO: LTC Marvin Freel, ARCENT, Camp Arifjan

Appendix C

2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report 31 October 2013

1. Purpose. To provide lessons learned and best practices collected from the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Infantry Division (2/1 ABCT) as the U.S. Army Africa regionally aligned force (RAF). This report provides valuable information for follow-on RAF units. It is secondarily intended for all interested personnel in the operating and generating forces.

2. Background. Three organizations partnered to develop this report: the Army Irregular Warfare Center (AIWC); the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL); and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). The team gained insights and lessons learned from interviews with 2/1 ABCT key leaders on 3–4 SEP 2013, as well as relevant documents collected from 2/1 ABCT.

3. This Lessons Learned Report consists of two sections that provide general information and observations, insights, and lessons learned.

4. Point of contact is Mr. Pat Bremser, AIWC, DSN 552-6383, patrick.l.bremser.civ@mail.mil.

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Distribution: ALARACT

Appendices
Appendix A: General Information
Appendix B: Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned

Appendix A: Situation and General Information

1. 2/1 ABCT is the first BCT to be sourced and prepared as an allocated aligned unit to a combatant command (CCMD) in line with the RAF concept. It began conducting RAF mission activities in April 2013. 2/1 ABCT and other aligned forces now actively support Africa Command (AFRICOM), working within the authorities and limitations established by Congress, the Department of State (DOS), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These forces provide the CCMD with Army capabilities that are responsive to all priority requirements, including operational missions, theater security cooperation activities, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises.

2. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) approved the revised definition of RAF on 11 JUL 2013: "Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to Joint Task Force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities Service retained, CCMD aligned and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army Total Force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including reach-back; and prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others."

3. Definition of the term "Service Retained, CCMD Aligned." This term is the approved phrase to replace what was previously known as "distributed." "Those Army forces and capabilities in the Available Period that are Service retained by the SecArmy and are directed by the chain of command to establish DIRLAUTH [direct liaison authorized] with CCMD via a mission alignment order. Combatant Commands have no inherent authority over these forces other than those specified by an Army Force Provider's alignment order and are made aware of the specific capabilities oriented on his AOR [area of responsibility] for training, planning and reach-back purposes. These forces are the primary option to source CCMD requirements, and will be deployed via applicable Global Force Management Implementation guidance (GFMIG) business rules and Army processes. Army Service Component Commands provide training requirements in order to develop unit readiness for missions."

4. 2/1 ABCT published an operations order to execute the RAF mission in December 2012. The mission of 2/1 ABCT is to: "conduct security cooperation activities within the AFRICOM AOR from 15 March 2013 to 15 June 2014 to develop and protect American interests."

a. The commander's intent: "The purpose of our mission is to build long lasting relationships that promote specific U.S. interests and develop African partnered land forces military capabilities for self defense and/or regional stability to help establish a secure environment."

b. 2/1 ABCT key tasks are:

(1) Engaged leadership that promotes professionalism and understand the partnered learning environment.

(2) Build on previous partnered engagements to develop lasting relationships.

(3) Seize opportunities to nest METL tasks with RAF missions/exercises to maintain global availability while enhancing partnered relationships.

(4) Capture lessons learned of our employment to make the RAF concept better for follow-on units.

5. Higher headquarters orders originally tasked 2/1 ABCT to conduct only theater security cooperation missions, but HQDA amended the plan to include any task suitable to the combatant commander. To prepare to meet this requirement, 2/1 ABCT focused on achieving its Department of Army directed METL proficiency. This was accomplished upon completion of a combat training center (CTC) rotation. FORSCOM validated the brigade's readiness for assumption of the RAF mission through National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 13-04 (Feb 2013).

a. To further prepare for specific, assigned RAF missions, 2/1 ABCT created a brigade-level training capability to complete myriad Army, FORSCOM, and USARAF deployment and training requirements. This capability is called Dagger University and is executed monthly to account for upcoming training missions and incorporates all predeployment tasks.

b. Culture, regional expertise and language (CREL) capability is developed through a variety of methods. Some of these include instruction by the 162nd Infantry Brigade, the Leader Development for the Enhancement of Sustained Peace (Naval Post-Graduate School), on-line language training through Headstart and daily training at Dagger U, and lectures and face-to-face dialogue with country experts and residents available through the Kansas State University Africa Studies Program.

c. Battalon commanders are responsible for certifying the readiness of Soldiers and teams to conduct RAF missions and are required to brief the brigade commander for approval before each deployment.

6. Major missions accomplished from April to August 2013 include:

- Horn of Africa (HOA) mission: Deployment of 1-63AR BN to Djibouti to support Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This mission is in progress and will be assumed by 1-18IN BN.

- Shared Accord 13: Deployment of 2/1 ABCT headquarters and 1-18 IN BN to conduct mil-to-mil training with South African National Defense Force (SANDF).

- Uganda military police train and equip mission: Special troops battalion deploys 19-person team to train Ugandan MP Company in preparation for United Nations peacekeeping mission.

(Situation and general information were derived from historical documents such as the 2/1 ABCT RAF Operations Order [dtd 11 DEC 2012]; the 2/1ABCT memorandum, subj: Government Accountability Office Discussion Question Responses, dtd 3 JAN 2013; the 2/1 ABCT Dagger University Course Book dtd SEP 2013; and the HQDA RAF EXORD dtd 21 DEC 2012. Other documents and artifacts were also reviewed.)

Appendix B: Observations, Insights, and Lessons from Key Leader Interviews

Interviews

- 2/1 ABCT BSTB Cdr and XO: LTC Jim Tenpenny and MAJ Andy Thueme.
- 2/1 ABCT RAF Planners: CPT Charles Cassels (S-3 FUOPS, RAF Element); CPT Jarrod Kassulke (S-3 Plans Office); CPT Jessica Borries (S-2); CPT John Snider (PMO); and CW2 Aaron Sargent (FSO, Targeting).
- 2/1 ABCT XO: MAJ Chuck Slagle; and DCO, LTC Peter Shull.
- 1-18 IN Bn Cdr: LTC Robert MaGee.
- 1-18 IN Bn Co Cdrs and Pltn Sgts: CPT Christoper Petrancosta (A Co Cdr), CPT John Young (B Co Cdr), CPT Stephen Laz (C Co Cdr), SFC Aaron Blastick (B Co Pltn Sgt), SFC Zachary Borja (B Co Pltn Sgt).
- 1-7 FA Bn Cdr: LTC John Mountford.
- 2/1 ABCT Cdr: COL Jeff Broadwater.

Interim Observations

1. Topic: Culture, regional expertise, and language (CREL) training

Observation: 2/1 ABCT CREL training was aided by presentations and products from numerous sources. The purpose of CREL training was to increase Soldiers' knowledge of the operational environment of the continent, country, and, if possible, the specific area they were deploying.

Discussion: Sources used for CREL training included the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) program; Asymmetric Warfare Group; 162nd Infantry Brigade; TRADOC Cultural Knowledge Consortium; TRADOC Culture Center; Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI); and the Kansas State University Africa Studies Program.

The LDESP program, part of the Naval Postgraduate School, uses faculty from NPS and scholars and other subject matter experts to provide education on the African regional, geopolitical, and cultural framework. 2/1 ABCT required all leaders from staff sergeant and above to attend the LDESP three-day seminar as part of Dagger University. Examples of topics provided are: history, culture, religion, geography, economy, governance, security capacity, security threats, tribal factors, engagements, media operations, negotiations, and use of linguists. LDESP also provided one-day seminars for individual RAF missions (e.g., Uganda) to provide further orientation for specific countries. Soldiers also accessed and used LDESP on-line resources.

2/1ABCT leveraged the expertise of 162nd Inf Bde and Assymetric Warfare Group, which included knowledge from operations recently conducted in Africa. The brigade also developed an enduring relationship with the Kansas State University Africa Studies Program. K-State provided professors and students as part of the brigade's CREL training program. A highly beneficial component was informal discussions with K-State African students and RAF team members. African students studying at K-State met with RAF team members to provide information about

their resident countries and also to have dialogue and answer questions. This part of the brigade's CREL program was one of the most popular with Soldiers.

Recommendation: RAF units use multiple sources to provide education and training for the overall CREL program. In particular, RAF units should seek partnerships or relationships with local universities to enhance knowledge and understanding of target regions and countries.

Implications: RAF units of all echelons will benefit from using this methodology to increase understanding of the operational environment. The Army institution can enhance CREL education and training through an analysis of capabilities and shortfalls in CREL doctrine, organizaation, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains.

2. Topic: Challenges determining RAF mission requirements

Observation: Time differences, the complexities of funding missions, embassy country team and host nation coordination, along with DoS and other government agency involvement made planning challenging in some cases. The brigade's detailed planning and aggressive follow-on coordination with the different Army headquarters and many actors involved with each mission mitigated these challenges and enhanced responsiveness.

Discussion: Many factors impact planning and execution of missions in the AFRICOM AOR. The host nation may have fluid political situations, restive populations, changing political leaders, and crisis in neighboring countries that affect agreements between host nation governments and militaries with AFRICOM and U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) planners. These fluid situations can and typically do lead to changes that range from cancelling or delaying missions and significantly modifying mission requirements. In many examples, changes occur well within planning horizons for obtaining passports and visas, changing programs of instruction (POIs), and developing new training plans with associated training aids. In some instances, changes are not realized until the unit is on the ground and face to face with their training audience.

Coordination with U.S. government players adds another dimension to planning, coordination, and execution. U.S. embassies and country teams can vary significantly in size, organization, and priorities. Uniqueness of missions with DOS in the lead introduce another layer of planning and coordination. Typically, the DOS has contracted outside companies to perform training activities. In these instances the military unit is in support.

The brigade combat team (BCT) employs several strategies to mitigate these planning challenges. BCT experience confirms that flexible and adaptive leaders remain key to its success. The BCT has developed a week-long training program called Dagger University that teams attend as part of their predeployment training. This training builds cultural and regional expertise and familiarity with local languages. Additionally, students hone skills through rapport building and advise-and-assist training. The BCT provides depth by designating primaries and alternates who complete all predeployment requirements. Should primaries become unavailable or mission requirements require additional deployers, the BCT has qualified Soldiers on the "bench."

Recommendation: RAF units aggressively coordinate with the country desk officer at Army headquarters level and the country team at ambassadorial level (if authorized) to confirm requirements. Recognize that requirements may still change requiring team members to adjust

training plans or POIs. Commander's intent and guidance provides leaders and Soldiers the latitude to modify actions while still accomplishing the mission.

Implications: Flexible and adaptable leaders remain key to the success of RAF missions.

3. Completion of administrative requirements provides flexibility for unit mission planning.

Observation: To increase the pool of Soldiers available for programmed missions and unanticipated requirements, 2/1ABCT policy was for all Soldiers to complete certain common readiness requirements, such as application for official passports, security clearance (secret level) and government travel card. Ensuring completion of readiness tasks greatly enhanced the ability of units to assign personnel to missions based on specialty, experience, and advisory skills. Readiness requirements could trump skill and experience requirements.

Discussion: In any Army operation preparation is a major key to ensure mission accomplishment. 2/1 ABCT faced numerous challenges in preparing Soldiers for these unique missions. One area of preparation was passports. It took from two to six weeks for Soldiers to receive their official passports. It was important to identify personnel early to ensure that not only the passport was processed but also that visas or country clearances were processed. It was important that early in the planning process those passport/visa requirements were identified to ensure Soldiers deployed on time. Other administrative requirements included government travel card and medical screening. Planners needed to ensure they understood both the financial and medical requirements for each country. 2/1 ABCT used the S-1 to track passport and visa tracking, while the brigade medical planner tracked medical readiness. The S-1 and medical planner briefed the S-3 on a weekly basis (or more) on the current status of their actions.

Recommendation: Units need to identify early, through their corresponding ASCC or tasking headquarters, all administrative requirements. They need to have primary and alternate personnel identified in case the primary Soldier cannot meet the deployment requirement(s) (i.e., passport does not come in or failed medical screening). Funding is important. Planners need to know if the Soldiers will need a government credit card or will be paying with cash, or a combination of both. Knowing this early will help alleviate the stress for the Soldiers deploying. Planners need to develop a plan to track the administrative requirements. Task other staff sections such as the S-1, S-2, and medical section to track those important requirements, and brief the commander or planner often to ensure that if any issues do arise, the unit can address them early and get the appropriate command involvement needed.

Implications: Taking care of the administrative details is essential for mission success. The basics (passports, visas, medical, logistics, and financial) need to be addressed early. Not addressing these administrative requirements early could jeopardize the missions. Also, if Soldiers actually deploy but there are still administrative factors open (such as lack of cash), time and attention may shift from mission accomplishment to life support issues.

4. Topic: Redacted.

5. Topic: Soldier adaptability

Observation: Soldiers and leaders demonstrated flexibility and adaptability by quickly adjusting to changing situations in line with the commander's intent. Commander directives to "look for opportunities to teach combat skills, and simultaneously learn from the target unit. Be confident

and not cocky," enhanced subordinates' decision making for disciplined initiative. Numerous examples from 2/1 ABCT provide evidence of how small unit team leaders significantly adapted to unexpected situations on the ground. Commander's measure of success: "Relationships matter — we want the U.S. Army to be the partner of choice."

Discussion: Security cooperation missions by their nature require units to make adjustments to changing situations. Once deployed, the training unit's leaders and Soldiers will face unanticipated situations. Their reactions to these events are tempered by experience, training, the mission itself, and their understanding and application of the commander's intent. Limited communications and reach-back as well as time-distance factors further demonstrate the need for independent action by employed teams.

The BCT commander took great care to ensure his leaders and Soldiers understood their assigned mission and his intent. They would need to be flexible and adaptable and maintain expeditionary mindsets once employed and interacting with their host nation counterpart. The commander emphasized that their ability to articulate what they want to accomplish with the training audience, the U.S. Army's standing reputation as a professional military, and their demonstrated proficiency to perform as a globally available force make them especially capable of advising and assisting their counterparts. He also told his Soldiers to look for opportunities to teach and train their core competencies to sustain proficiency and to learn from their counterparts. Above all, relationships matter. Each encounter should reinforce that the United States is the partner of choice and the host nation benefited from the encounter.

Discussions with leaders and Soldiers confirmed they felt empowered to use their initiative within the commander's intent. Most encounters with the host nation required adjustments to the planned mission. The host nation might change the makeup of the training audience, requiring the BCT to reassess skill levels and then make changes as appropriate to the training plans, usually in a very compressed time. The training teams built rapport with their counterparts that enhanced the training by developing trust and establishing a means for feedback from the host nation to assess effectiveness of the training. Dialogue and solid relationships helped trainers to articulate requirements and refine them based on counterpart input.

The commander's guidance to "look for opportunities to teach combat skills; simultaneously learn from target unit; and be confident and not cocky," enhanced subordinates' decision making for disciplined initiative. Numerous examples from 2/1 ABCT provide evidence of how small unit team leaders significantly adapted to unexpected situations on the ground. Commander's measure of success: "Relationships matter – we want the U.S. Army to be the partner of choice."

Recommendation: Continue to enable mission command through mission orders, guidance, and intent. Continue and promote the empowering of subordinates to exercise initiative in the face of changing or unanticipated situations.

Implications: None.

6. Topic: 2/1 ABCT lessons learned cycle

Observation: Learning organizations methodically review operations and provide leaders feedback to adjust leader development, training, and procedures for follow-on missions based on validated observations and lessons.

Discussion: Leaders assessed all phases of regional operations and documented those assessments in written after action reports (AARs), storyboards, trip reports, and executive summaries (EXSUMs). Leaders found the best methods for transferring lessons and best practices to follow-on units were through purposeful exchanges within Dagger University and leader-to-leader exchanges. Dagger University evolved to include interactive dialogue and reflection between returning and outgoing RAF teams. The battalion's success at documenting experiences of the employed teams quickly led to an abundance of information in many forms and formats. Providing users a means to connect relevant information within the documents was challenging. The BCT plans to use SharePoint as a repository. This will allow users a means to search documents and find useful information to inform planning and preparation for follow-on missions. Not determined during this collection was the access units outside the BCT would have to the the proposed information system for their use when executing similar missions as a RAF. More problematic is determining how useful this information will be considering the BCT found leader-to-leader exchanges much more beneficial than trying to wade through the large amount of documents. Units show steady improvement documenting operational information that captures essential information for refining leader development and training and making changes to policies and procedures. Unfortunately, the Army has not provided users a practical way to determine the relevance of this information.

Recommendation: The Army lessons learned proponent develop and demonstrate a practical means for units to integrate lessons into leader development, training, planning, and execution. Proposals should demonstrate how users store and retrieve relevant observation, lessons, tactics, techniques, and procedures to inform unit planning, preparation (leader development, training, staff actions, etc.), and execution for missions as a RAF (security cooperation, joint and combined training exercises, and operations). Any solution should automatically support horizontal and vertical sharing to units conducting similar missions as well to proponents for supporting changes to DOTMLPF.

Implications: None.

7. Topic: Enduring regional alignment of units

Observation: As units develop experience and expertise in assigned regions, strengthen relationships with partners, and become familiar with higher headquarters operating procedures, they become more effective and efficient in planning and executing likely missions within their assigned region.

Discussion: The BCT employed many resources and techniques to develop its cultural understanding and regional expertise of the AFRICOM AOR. Early in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle, the BCT was given DIRLAUTH with the USARAF HQs. USARAF provided detailed information on the types of missions the BCT could expect to conduct. Seven months from employment of unit personnel, USARAF visited the unit at home station to provide leaders and planners requirements for country clearances, information on the operating environment, and details on known missions. The BCT backbriefed the USARAF commanding general the following month at USARAF HQs. The brigade positioned liaison officers with USARAF headquarters in Vicenza, Italy, to facilitate planning and execution.

HQDA and FORSCOM provided enablers to support unit training, to include LDESP, the 162nd Brigade, and a CTC decisive action rotation. As mentioned in previous discussions, the unit established the Dagger University as a venue to provide deploying teams regional briefs,

opportunities to engage with personnel from the region they would deploy to, rapport training, advise-and-assist training, operational security briefings, and other activities to get teams ready.

The BCT has proved effective at maintaining global availability while simultaneously resourcing and executing regional missions.

Divisons are better resourced to balance BCT global availability while simultaneously executing regional missions, exercises, and operations. Division-level headquarters with more robust planning capability and resources, for example BCTs and enablers, would prove even more effective at maintaining this balance.

Recommendation: ASCCs and RAF units should coordinate early in the ARFORGEN cycle. The Army should consider aligning divisions and subordinate BCTs to better balance global availability requirements.

Implications: None.

8. Topic: 2/1 ABCT organization for RAF mission planning, preparation, execution, and assessment

Observation: The commander organized subordinate units and staff to plan, prepare, and execute USARAF-directed missions and simultaneously maintain global availability to perform as a contingency expeditionary force (CEF).

Discussion: The commander and his staff used FORSCOM and USARAF training guidance and AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development,* requirements, plus detailed analysis of the types of missions USARAF planned to direct the ABCT to conduct to shape staff organization and unit training.

The staff would have to ensure deploying teams met country clearance requirements, which included passport issuance, visas for selected countries, annual training, threat briefings, and medical requirements. Simultaneously, the staff needed to clarify requirements for the missions FORSCOM and USARAF were directing. The staff received missions that fell into four broad categories: operational missions as a globally available decisive action capable force via FORSCOM as well as theater-focused missions via USARAF that included contingency response force missions, security cooperation missions, and missions in support of theater exercises programs.

Units assigned regional missions would have to develop an understanding of the region and country in which they would execute assigned missions. Units would also need training to sharpen their advising skills.

The staff also recognized the need to coordinate closely with its higher headquarters for theater missions, USARAF to track funding, react to changing requirements, and monitor deployed units.

To accomplish these tasks the commander established a region and country-specific training capability (Dagger University), a RAF integrated staff planning cell, a RAF execution cell, and a liaison cell at USARAF headquarters.

Using personnel from the brigade fires coordination cell, 2/1 ABCT organized and managed the resources for creating and managing Dagger University. Dagger University is constantly updating itself with lessons learned and adding additional resources as they can be incorporated.

From the 2/1 ABCT S-3 section, a RAF planning cell, RAF operations cell, and RAF LNO cell were identified. These cells were used to plan and execute RAF missions. 2/1 ABCT still maintained the current operations and future operations capability within the brigade S-3 section. This was important to keep garrison and training operations separate from the RAF mission to leverage expertise gained through each RAF mission executed.

Assessments are conducted at the brigade and battalion levels after each mission by those Soldiers who were involved in the mission planning and execution. These assessments are captured in storyboards and AARs and submitted to USARAF and incorporated in Dagger University when relevant.

Recommendation: Capture and share the brigade staff task organization tactics, techniques, and procedures with units that will be regionally aligned.

Implications: As the Army executes the RAF mission, it needs to capture best practices on how units task-organize their headquarters for the mission and address any shortfalls.

9. Topic: Decisive action training complements regional alignment missions.

Observation: BCTs trained to execute their decisive action-based mission essential task list (METL) are prepared to plan and execute RAF missions.

Discussion: One key task from the 2/1 ABCT RAF operation order (OPORD) was to "seize opportunities to nest METL tasks with RAF missions/exercises to maintain global availability while enhancing partnered relationships." The brigade's methodology for preparing for the RAF mission was to first ensure the brigade was competent in its decisive action METL. This also ensured 2/1 ABCT was prepared to meet its contingency expeditionary force responsibilities. The brigade's "Train/Ready" phase of preparation emphasized reinstituting the core competencies of maneuver in all forms of terrain by utilizing tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and Palidin weapons systems at the battalion level and below while also training mission command competencies at the battalion and brigade levels. The validation for ensuring decisive action METL proficiency (and assumption of the RAF mission) was successful completion of a CTC rotation at the NTC in February 2013.

The application of decisive action METL proficiency to RAF mission execution was the most fundamental aspect of completing the key task cited above. Soldiers and leaders competent in individual and collective METL tasks were well-qualified to instruct others in those same tasks. After preparing and rehearsing classes for individual RAF missions, competency was magnified further, benefiting unit readiness.

Recommendation: Mastery of decisive action mission essential tasks is the most important feature of preparing RAF units to conduct security cooperation missions. The Army must resource RAF brigades (and division HQs) in CTC experiences to ensure validation of METL proficiency.

Implications: Resourcing a BCT for a CTC rotation is expensive but assures mission competency in both expeditionary and RAF missions.

10. Topic: Regionally aligned forces require dedicated secure communications during employment.

Observation: The African theater lacks communications infrastructure in many of the areas where the brigade employed personnel and teams. Most RAF teams were dependent on civilian cell phones and hotel Internet. Many teams were unable to communicate with higher echelons once employed. Force protection considerations, cyber threats, and other factors strongly favor Army investment in appropriate communications capability (e.g., Broadband Global Area Network [BGAN] terminals and/or Global Rapid Response Information Package [GRRIP]).

Discussion: AFRICOM is our least developed COCOM and is the most immature in regard to communications infrastructure. A BCT has limited satellite communications that are portable enough for small teams to employ. The Army has become accustomed to robust communications capabilities that were present in Baghdad and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. The augmentation of satellite communications to a unit deploying to Afghanistan is not received by a RAF unit.

The BGAN and GRRIP are both designed to support small formations. Currently, the mission set for RAF requires multiple small units distributed across a large area, in the case of AFRICOM across the continent of Africa. A BGAN and GRRIP are small in size and have a bandwidth capability that could support two to three devices, such as a laptop and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone.

Most company-sized formations right now do not have an embedded capability to execute satellite communications; 2/1ABCT is one of these units.

This capability would be valuable in cases where RAF units are training in remote areas of the partnered country where reliable communications or communications in general do not exist.

Recommendation: Do further analysis to determine the number of BGAN or GRRIPs that 2/1 ABCT or other BCTs would require for training and mission execution, and resource them directly or through USARAF.

Implications: RAF missions need to be augmented with portable satellite communications to provide reliable communications.

11. Topic: Predeployment site surveys (PDSS)

Observation: PDSS by leaders enhances team predeployment training and preparation.

Discussion: Designated teams conducted site surveys when authorized to confirm requirements, coordinate and/or confirm site support, assess the training audience, and meet key personnel. Key personnel might include country team representatives, host nation players, and other actors depending on mission (e.g., DOS representative, contractors supporting DOS missions, etc.). Unit experiences demonstrated site surveys were helpful, but changes still occur. Flexible and adaptable leaders and Soldiers remain key to accomplishing RAF missions.

Recommendation: Continue PDSS to confirm requirements, coordinate and/or confirm site support, assess the training audience, and meet key personnel.

Implications: PDSS increases costs and requires early identification of deploying team leadership who will participate in the PDSS.

12. Topic: Use of Army doctrine and other literature

Observation: 2/1 ABCT used a combination of doctrinal and other sources to prepare to assume the RAF mission, to include gaining understanding of security cooperation in general and specific missions in particular.

Discussion: 2/1 ABCT used Army doctrine to guide planning and preparation in the attainment of decisive action METL task proficiency, such as Field Manual (FM) 2-0, *Intelligence,* Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations,* and ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process.* UN Infantry Battalion volumes 1 and 2 were used for several of the missions, to include the Niger mission, African-Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Some joint publications were used for Shared Accord (JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*). At least one of the planners read portions of FM 3-22, *Security Cooperation.* Most knowledge about conducting security cooperation was gained by the LDESP seminar.

Recommendation: RAF commanders and staffs continue to use doctrine to guide mission planning and execution. RAFs should also be prepared to reference non-U.S. doctrine, such as NATO and United Nations literature. To assist in RAF mission planning and execution, the Army should consider implementing training on FM 3-22, including it in leader development and education.

Implications: Small monetary and labor outlay by the doctrinal proponent to obtain and mail hard copies of doctrine to aid RAF units in better understanding the security cooperation environment.

13. Topic: Force protection levels for Soldiers and mitigation measures

Observation: Force protection levels for countries are assigned by echelons above brigade, which carry specified mitigation measures.

Discussion: Africa overall is rated as Force Protection Condition Bravo, with certain countries such as Mali and Somalia rated as Force Protection Condition Charlie. Students receive information about insurgencies during Dagger University, which started with a threat briefing by the S-2. Some briefings were classified, but most were unclassified. Threat briefings were tailored to the region and the country, if available. In some cases, the ambassador or regional security officer (RSO) in each country modified force protection measures based on differing conditions. 2/1 ABCT contacted the DOS RSO to determine additional threat and force protection measures. In the USARAF AOR, most threats have to do with criminal activity and theft rather than terror activities or physical harm. One mitigation measure was simply to lock valuables in hotel safes when leaving the room or hotel. Most countries in the AOR had restrictions on possessing firearms, so it would have been very difficult to obtain clearance for RAF mission teams to enter countries with weapons. One exception was the mission to Niger to support the AFISMA. 1-18 IN BN Soldiers were allowed pistols for personal protection due to the high threat level in neighboring Mali and in Niger.

One battalion commander, although satisfied with the overall force protection plan, would have been more comfortable with assured communications with team members. In the event that threat conditions worsened, it would have been challenging to alert the RAF team, which was hours from their hotel and not linked by phone or other means.

Recommendation: RAF units provide deploying Soldiers and teams with general and specific threat information and continually seek updates to force protection conditions up to deployment. Use all sources available to include classified, open source, and first-hand knowledge from RSOs and personnel recently returned from affected countries. Rehearse mitigation measures as part of predeployment preparation training.

RAF units should leverage country teams for their expertise and situational understanding of country security. RAF units should coordinate early and often with country teams to determine alert procedures of deployed RAF teams when there are significant security environment changes. Conversely, RAF planners should be careful not to overwhelm the country team with too many requests for information (RFIs).

The Army invest in assured communications devices for RAF teams to allow immediate contact to adjust force protection measures as conditions change (see item 10).

Implications: As more U.S. Army RAF elements deploy to countries over time, there is more exposure to terror-related threats. The Army must resource unit personnel appropriately, and RAF units must plan and rehearse sound protection measures.

14. Topic: Receipt and understanding of mission requirements

Observation: RAF missions are passed electronically using Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) net Web portals and also by 2/1 ABCT LNOs at USARAF headquarters.

Discussion: USARAF provided mission information using an Excel spreadsheet file called a master activities tracker (MAT), available for downloading on the USARAF SIPR portal. This information was not in the OPORD format that tactical units normally receive from higher headquarters for mission planning. It instead included “bare essentials” of mission requirements, formatted on one spreadsheet line per mission. Spreadsheets were not well formatted for printing on standard paper sizes.

To increase awareness of new missions and requirements, the brigade relies on an LNO at USARAF headquarters. The LNO maintains situational awareness of the USARAF planning working group and calls the brigade as missions develop. The LNO’s work is very important because it keeps the brigade planners up to date on changes to existing missions (or dropped missions) and plans for upcoming missions. The brigade coordinates with USARAF with the 2/1 ABCT LNO and also USARAF RAF action officers, depending on each mission. There are four or five USARAF planners the brigade coordinates with regularly. Some missions or programs, such as Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA), have one manager, which helps in forecasting upcoming missions or changes.

USARAF (and other ASCCs) are transitioning security cooperation information (as found on the MAT spreadsheet) to a joint database called Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS). Many of the RAF missions or taskings on TSCMIS lack

information that was once found on MAT, such as skills required or training tasks to be conducted for the host nation unit.

Due to the nature of security cooperation mission information as found on MAT (and now TCSMIS), 2/1 ABCT requires much time (often weeks) to conduct analysis of each RAF mission. This is important in order to gain enough understanding by unit commanders to properly assign Soldiers and teams and begin preparation and training. Translating security cooperation missions/objectives requires significant mission analysis by RAF units.

Recommendation: ASCCs work to provide increased fidelity of RAF missions. RAF units and ASCCs assess utility of TCSMIS on providing mission information.

Implications: ASCCs and RAF units will gain increased situational understanding of RAF mission planning over time by building long-term relationships with the many actors involved in the entire planning process. This includes such entities as host nation military leaders and civilian representatives, U.S. country team players, hotel owners, rental car providers, and a host of other agents. In time, habitual coordination with enduring actors will improve initial mission development.

15. Topic: Special operations forces (SOF) integration

Observation: Some missions benefit from coordination with SOF elements or units to gain situational awareness of the operating environment. SOF units can be a significant force multiplier for RAF units.

Discussion: SOF units are excellent sources of information about Africa, since they have habitual relationships, institutional knowledge, and better experience in African countries. They also work directly with embassies and country teams. 2/1 ABCT coordinated well with 10th Special Forces (SF) Group during mission preparation and execution of Shared Accord 13. The Operational Detachment A (OD-A) that participated in Shared Accord came to Fort Riley to work with the brigade to synchronize training. The OD-A also provided an intelligence brief for the Niger AFISMA mission.

Recommendation: RAF units utilize knowledge and expertise of U.S. SOF unit experience in foreign countries by coordinating plans and operations with applicable SOF headquarters. ASCCs provide a mechanism for alerting RAF units of SOF elements operating in the ASCC (and country) area of operation.

Implications: SOF unit operations benefit by additional relationships built by conventional force RAF units in foreign countries.

16. Topic: DOD and interagency activities and task organization within RAF mission countries

Observation: Some missions would have been better planned and structured if information about other U.S. government organizations, such as DOD, Department of Justice, DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Peace Corps, and nongovernment organizations and foreign militaries had been known.

Discussion: During the execution of missions, 2/1 ABCT was often one of several U.S. government organizations operating within the country, to include at times other foreign militaries. Often times in military orders a comprehensive task organization and a description of friendly forces within paragraph one of the OPORD will be provided to list all adjacent units to improve understanding of the operational environment. This information was not routinely provided to 2/1 ABCT by USARAF or by the country team.

During a Uganda military police company training mission, a member of 2/1 ABCT was stopped in downtown Kampala by a SOF Marine and asked the question, "What are you doing in my backyard?" The 2/1 ABCT Soldier and the SOF Marine thought their organizations were the only U.S. military personnel in country conducting operations. This example has been partially mitigated for future operations with 10th Special Forces Group's involvement in Dagger University, but this does not account for the greater Special Operations Command (SOCOM) community.

During other missions, foreign militaries were present within the partnered country conducting their own missions. On one such occasion a group of North Korean soldiers were providing equipment and training for the partner nation. This was not known by 2/1 ABCT until their Soldiers saw the North Korean soldiers in country.

This information was provided to 2/1ABCT for the Niger mission. 1-18 IN was told that a U.S. SOF team was operating in the northern portion of Niger several hundred miles from their training location. 1-18 IN's area of operation did not overlap with that of the U.S. SOF team, but this information would have been valuable if a crisis had occurred. Though this U.S. SOF team was hundreds of miles away, it was much closer than any other U.S. military unit.

For RAF units planning and executing operations in the partnered country to better understand the operational environment, the units should have a list/annex of other U.S. government organizations and, when present, foreign militaries operating within the country. This information could be used to improve coordination and identify potential resources that are available should assistance be needed. There could also be other scenarios involving foreign countries of which we do not have typical relations, such as North Korea or Iran. Having this information could prevent our personnel from being placed in a position that could provoke an international incident.

Recommendation: That ASCCs, as part of the planning process in the future, provide RAF units with a detailed situational update that includes a task organization and description of friendly and adjacent units of all U.S. government organizations and foreign militaries in the area to better understand the environment and improve unity of effort.

Implications: RAF units that received detailed task organizations of U.S. government organizations and foreign militaries will gain better understanding of the operational environment, which will improve planning and executing RAF missions. In the event of a crisis within a partner nation, this would also help the RAF unit execute a more informed crisis response. A detailed task organization, to include interagency personnel with the five Ws as well as what other countries are doing, would improve situational awareness and unity of effort.

17. Topic: Selection of Soldiers for RAF missions

Observation: Criteria for selection of Soldiers for RAF missions were generally in three categories: skills and rank, personal attributes, and administrative requirements to conduct the mission.

Discussion: Selecting the right individual(s) is essential and could mean success or failure to the mission. Issues range from the Soldier selected could not achieve the administrative or predeployment training requirements to the Soldier not being the right person by personality, rank, or skill set. Personal attributes, skills, and rank should be negotiated depending on the mission and coordination with the ASCC and/or higher headquarters. The administrative requirements are non-negotiable. For instance, if a Soldier cannot receive a visa, an alternate Soldier with a valid visa needs to deploy instead. Units must take into consideration the maturity and personality of the individual(s) being considered for the mission. 2/1 ABCT took all these considerations into account when it determined who would deploy on a specific mission. Each mission brought about multiple factors (mission, Soldier personality, skills, rank etc.). Leaders need to know their Soldiers and select the right individual(s) for each mission set.

Recommendation: Units need to select one primary and alternate(s) for each mission. Have a process in place to select the right individual(s) for the mission. Conducting some kind of personnel assessment tool could assist in selecting the right personality type. Selecting volunteers is also important. If someone wants to do a specific mission and they meet the requirements for the mission, the chances of success increase. Knowing your Soldiers and their skills help when determining who should support a specific mission. For instance, if you lack someone who meets the specific military occupational specialty, you can search your unit for an alternate who has been trained in the specific skill the mission requires.

It is vital to get the higher headquarters intent for the mission so you can determine what skill set and Soldier(s) are needed. Weekly updates early in the planning process to the ASCC will help prevent issues of Soldier selection from arising. Personalities do matter — someone who is not comfortable advising or interacting with others should not be considered, especially if there will be one-on-one interaction. Culture awareness and sensitivity should be taken into consideration when selecting personnel.

Implications: Soldier selection is critical when conducting mission analysis. Missions may come down that you may not have the right skill set. Negotiation with the ASCC for the right skill may be necessary in that matter. If the right team is not selected for the mission, it could mean mission failure. Administrative requirements, in most cases, are the biggest war stopper if the Soldier(s) cannot deploy and no alternates were selected.

Appendix D

Center for Army Lessons Learned Interim Report on Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) in U.S Army Africa (USARAF) 19 March 2014

1. Purpose: To provide CALL's initial observations of the employment of the RAF concept within USARAF.

2. Background: The regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept is designed to provide an Army force (via the Army Service Component Command [ASCC]) that is quickly available to the geographic combatant command (COCOM) to support certain military missions within the region. U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) is the ASCC supporting U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Previous AFRICOM commanders could never before commit a sourcing solution to a problem brought to them in a high-level meeting with African officials or the Department of State. They always had to come back to the Army and ask for forces. The Army could never provide a time-sensitive answer, as most requests were subject to the standard request for forces (RFF) procedure. This RFF was routed through and required the approval of multiple headquarters, a process that by its length often precluded the utility of an Army response.

In 2006 SETAF (later to transform into SETAF/USARAF in 2008) realized the need for a dedicated force that the ASCC could employ directly in support of the newest COCOM: AFRICOM. SETAF determined that a brigade combat team (BCT) was the best all around force for their needs. At the time, Forces Command (FORSCOM) denied SETAF's request, as the priority for brigades was to the operational requirements of Central Command (CENTCOM) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Over the last two years, with the reduction in Army forces supporting CENTCOM operations OEF and Operation New Dawn (OND), the Army has made forces available to other ASCCs by the regional alignment of forces. For USARAF, the Army provided a regionally aligned force using a BCT from the 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. Currently, that brigade is the 2nd BCT/1st ID. The currently-proscribed length of time as allocated RAF is one (1) year. The next USARAF RAF brigade is 4th BCT/1st ID.

3. Observations:

3.1. Observation: Allocated RAF versus aligned RAF

Discussion: The Army designates RAF in one of three relationships to the ASCC: assigned, allocated, or service-retained regionally aligned.

Having an allocated RAF force reduces the processing time required to get a force into Africa to execute certain types of missions. (This cuts the overall cost of AFRICA missions.) Having a RAF as a dedicated sourcing solution has been very efficient for AFRICOM. From a USARAF perspective, it is cheaper to have a centralized force provider that does all the preparation (and absorbs the cost) before the force is engaged in theater.

The use of allocated RAF reduces the time required to provide forces in support of AFRICOM missions specified in the allocation language. The USARAF staff highlighted that for missions that are included in the ASCC annual task order, forces are turned in a few weeks for typical training missions and African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) missions (as long as the resource requested is organic to the allocated RAF brigade.) [ACOTA is a Department of State program.]

With the allocated RAF, the USARAF staff works directly with the unit and its headquarters. This eliminates the necessity for forces deploying to Africa to work through an intermediate headquarters. USARAF pointed to a recent example of the benefit of allocated RAF. Using the RAF required a General Administrative (GENADMIN) message and 1–2 weeks of email traffic between requesting command and Fort Riley, after which troops boarded an aircraft in Kansas and got off the airplane in Africa, no "en route stops" for additional preparation or an orders process required.

Service-retained regionally aligned is not the same as allocated. With aligned forces the direct liaison authorization does not apply. When requesting support from regionally aligned RAF, USARAF must submit an RFF through FORSCOM for approval. The RFF (and funding authority) is subject to the means test of FOSCOM priorities, and can take up to 180 days or more to fill, or disapproved outright.

3.2. (Mission Command) Observation: The RAF concept in its first year has provided a readily available sourcing solution for USARAF in supporting AFRICOM's theater security cooperation (TSC) missions.

Discussion: Non-TSC missions require USARAF to adhere to the RFF or GENADMIN process, with RAF units the recommended sourcing solution depending on the type of mission needed. Once granted the authority, the ASCC can employ the RAF for non-TSC missions.

What the RAF provides to USARAF is a dedicated resource that they, the ASCC, can use directly to support missions from AFRICOM and the Department of State (DOS). The RAF unit is proving to be a very flexible sourcing solution that reduces the time needed to put forces in theater. The ready availability of the RAF makes the Army a viable player in support of the AFRICOM mission.

The designation of an allocated RAF allows the USARAF staff to coordinate directly with the 1ID staff and the RAF brigade. This is the primary factor in reducing the time to get boots on the ground. Service-retained RAF fails to provide this benefit.

The 1ID RAF brigade liaison officer (LNO) collocates with the USARAF staff. This LNO facilitates communication with the brigade in preparing for missions. The brigade LNO monitors the ASCC for potential or planned missions and gives early warning to the brigade on the skill sets needed as well as the duration and any unique mission parameters.

This allows the RAF brigade to de-conflict home station requirements that compete with potential deployments in support of the ASCC. History has shown that emergent missions as well as planned missions can be turned "on" and "off" with little to no notice, so the LNO must exercise care when passing potential requirements and changes to the division. This way the brigades' higher headquarters can judge or at least recognize subsequent changes may still occur.

3.3. Observation: Mission planning for RAF in the African theater requires a collaborative effort between USARAF, the division, AFRICOM, DOS, and the RAF brigade for mission success.

Discussion: USARAF develops a concept for each requirement identified, and these are placed on the ASCC annual task order. With regard to missions and tasks for the RAF, requirements may originate with the country team, AFRICOM, DOS, or the USARAF commander. Missions are planned a year out, but coordination through AFRICOM and then FORSCOM can compress this timeline.

Approval of the annual task order by the ASCC commander and FORSCOM validates these requirements. Any RAF requirements that are not on the task order are sent to AFRICOM for approval. In AFRICOM, the RAF mission list is dynamic, with missions being dropped and new ones added. USARAF negotiates these changes with FORSCOM.

USARAF is responsible for the identifying mission parameters and communicating these to the RAF brigade. USARAF uses General Administrative (GENADMIN) messages when: (a) missions are added to the annual plan, (b) significant changes to approved annual plan missions occur, or (c) there are cancellations of planned missions.

The RAF brigade combat team provides most of what USARAF needs to support AFRICOM. However, the RAF lacks many of the unique enablers required for some AFRICOM mission. The RAF must be able to deploy and operate (often in small teams) in an austere environment. This often requires forces and/or capabilities that are outside of the RAF brigade. USARAF uses an RFF to request forces either from the service retained, CCMD aligned forces or other non-allocated forces that FORSCOM designates.,

Passports and Visas

Every deployable Soldier in the RAF needs an official passport. Planners must keep in mind that Soldiers supporting AFRICOM routinely travel in a TDY status to countries with which the US has no Status of Forces Agreement. They cannot move around Africa on a set of NATO orders and an identification card. Military ID cards will not supplant a country's requirement for a passport with a valid visa.

Additional Planning Considerations for USARAF RAF

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) units are presently heavily engaged, so RAF units are picking up missions that only SOF teams filled before. In AFRICOM, this is a favorable alternative. For example, experienced maintenance NCOs from the brigade are just as capable of teaching basic maintenance operations to conventional partner nation mechanics as SOF maintenance personnel are.

Allocated RAF allows quick turn on certain TSC missions: Train and Equip, ACOTA (a DOS-funded [Title 22] program that supports TSC activities for certain African countries). All benefit from the responsiveness that having a RAF provides to the ASCC.

USARAF staff sees a practicality in keeping the RAF brigade rotation within the same Army division. They cite the upcoming relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) between 4/1

ABCT and 2/1 ABCT as functioning with greater efficiency because they are both located at Fort Riley and can readily pass information and experiences between sister brigades.

USARAF staff also stated the practicality of RAF Soldiers stabilized within the brigade for the length of time the brigade is allocated. Doing so allows for the same Soldiers to establish and maintain continuity throughout mission planning, preparation, and execution. Since many African cultures value the longevity of personal relationships, minimizing personnel changes in the RAF mission element enhances mission success and some theater objectives.

With that said, the USARAF staff understands the challenge this would be for the Army's human resource managers. In the future, it may be practical to tag Soldiers and NCOs or junior officers with a specific country experience.

USARAF would like to be able to reach into the institutional Army to obtain capabilities that do not exist in a RAF, particularly in a brigade or division. The example given was "developing logistic [sustainment] capabilities" for a [foreign] army is outside the mandate for a RAF brigade. USARAF staff planners rule-of-thumb is that when it is an operating force mission (e.g., multi-national company live fire training or basic rifle marksmanship training which is conducted by the operating units on a annual or semi-annual basis), they should tap the RAF for the mission. If the mission requires setting up a command and general staff college for example, then the institutional force should be tapped.

Also, USARAF sees a need to expand the RAF to include higher-echelon enablers such as are found in the institutional Army (TRADOC, CASCOM, etc.). These enablers provide some specialized capabilities not found elsewhere and provide their own staff to assist the ASCC with planning and execution (similar to the brigade staff).

3.4. Observation: USARAF is using the RAF division to fill some gaps in their intelligence capabilities.

Discussion: A brigade combat team does not have national-level intelligence training or systems. In the case of USARAF, the G2 also lacks that capability. USARAF has used an informal relationship with the 1ID to assist in filling the gaps in intelligence (HUMIT, IMINT, CI, etc.). USARAF and 1ID coordinate intelligence information via shared databases and weekly video teleconferences. USARAF has a good relationship, but some capabilities remain mismatched. The 1ID must balance this relationship with the division's other global commitments. USARAF would like the Service Retained Regionally Aligned Division (1ID) formally tasked to provide intelligence reach back when required.

3.5. Observation: Movement and maneuver (mission execution) is different in AFRICOM.

Discussion: USARAF is quick to point out that operations on the African continent are very different from recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where much is centered on the forward operating base (FOB), and all the support systems are inherent to the FOB. From their OEF and OIF/OND experience, RAF units had become accustomed to having a large support tail in place.

This is not the case in Africa, which is four times larger than the continental United States (48 states) and has 54 separate countries with complicated political, cultural, and military relationships. Units deploying forces must plan for how these small teams will operate and

be supported in an austere environment, often geographically isolated from any fixed Army infrastructure.

In some places in Africa, MEDEVAC could take 24 or more hours, a significant departure from the "Golden Hour" standard the SECDEF mandated for OEF and OND in 2009. Leaders uncomfortable with this difference must adjust their mindsets until the realities change. DOS has plans on how to treat and evacuate American citizens through the embassy in every country. DOD checks with DOS and determine if their plan will meet DOD needs.

3.6. Observation: Signal support to the RAF mission is difficult and demands a significant amount of planning.

Discussion: USARAF provides only limited signal support to the many small units deployed by the RAF. The limited technical footprint (satellite [SATCOM], Iridium phone, cellular phone, etc.) on the continent affects the overall communication plan. The availability of services depends on the mission location and requirements. The overall size of Africa puts further strain on the communications infrastructure, and there may not always be assets and coverage available due to the resource limitations.

The USARAF experience is there are additional challenges with certain types of missions. There were two examples discussed. One is when the RAF is working with other NATO countries (particularly the French) and must use a NATO-specific network. The other is when the RAF is working with one of the African Union's regional organizations, which require the use of another unique form of network.

Software in the RAF's C2 systems doesn't always match what USARAF is using. The brigade must choose between being in synch with USARAF systems or with its parent division headquarters. The USARAF G-6 communicates bi-weekly with the BCT S-6 and 1ID G-6 to coordinate support and resolve C2 issues.

Regarding equipment, most of the brigade's communication equipment is not well adapted for use on the African continent. Once in a country, with only its organic signal equipment, the brigade element has difficulty executing mission command and cannot reach across the continent. USARAF G-6 is working a Mission Essential Equipment List (MEEL) to support communication systems that would enable RAF units to talk in the AO.

The signal assets organic to the brigade are not the type needed to communicate with RAF mission elements operating in Africa. What is required is a "fly away" capability for communicating over long distances and between widely dispersed teams. Support can come from the host nation directly, or through the DOS/DOD. USARAF, in conjunction with Space Command, is exploring innovative communications options that may address some of the issues.

3.7. Observation: Proficiency in the brigade Mission Essential Task List (METL) and Army Decisive Action (DA) core competencies is the best preparation for USARAF RAF.

Discussion: Before a brigade assumes its role as the RAF, the Soldiers and leaders must be proficient in their METL tasks and DA. Soldiers and units supporting AFRICOM must be well trained in their combat skills. (There are African partner nation soldiers that have as much combat experience as a typical U.S. Army Soldier.) USARAF also feels that completing

a standard Combat Training Center DA rotation prior to beginning RAF is the optimum preparatory training for the brigade.

3.8. Observation: Extensive Language, Regional Expertise, Culture (LREC) training for the brigade is not required; however, this does not remove the need for some basics.

Discussion: USARAF did not see a significant requirement for extensive LREC training. The challenge arises from the fact that the African continent has so many languages and cultures that a unit cannot learn the combined French, Arabic, Swahili, and hundreds of other languages. Additionally, teams deployed in support of USARAF are usually comprised of between five and 12 Soldiers, and are in the country for an average of between three days and two weeks per engagement. Aspiring to high LREC proficiencies does not appear to be significantly impactful.

However, once the RAF mission element has a pinpoint assignment, it does require a modest amount of cultural training. A small amount of cultural awareness can go a long way toward building positive influence with locals, and ignorance can do a lot of damage, even in a short visit. The cultural training at a minimum must address how our Soldiers show respect to African partner nation military and civilian personnel.

USARAF believes the requirement for allocated RAF Soldiers to be trained in working with an interpreter is of great benefit. The interpreter training should focus on allowing the interpreter time to deliver the message to a wide range of audiences, including people who have little to no formal education. Soldiers should also learn to avoid slang and acronyms, which are generally untranslatable to the partner nation training audience.

USARAF staff members suggested that HRC consider aligning talent consistent with the RAF rotation schedule. In the future, HRC would look across its personnel pool, find Soldiers with language or life experience in a targeted region, and assign them to the appropriate RAF unit.

3.9. Observation: Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS)

Discussion: The Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) is the Department of Defense system of record, and the USARAF staff is pushing for all RAF TSC missions supporting AFRICOM to be entered in TSCMIS. TSCMIS provides information to the RAF units (who, what, where, when, why) and includes “concept sheets.” It is a repository of missions completed and provides a reference for planning future missions. TSCMIS allows access to similar or previous missions conducted that can assist planners with planning the next event.

3.10. Observation: The level of sustainment USARAF can provide the RAF is limited, both in terms of enablers and with regard to their capability for in-depth planning.

Discussion: The RAF is a limited capability and does not come with all the enablers that the USARAF requires in support to AFRICOM missions. (Signal and logistics were mentioned as two problem areas.) USARAF sees a need for a planning headquarters lower than the ASCC level that can assist with the planning and preparation of the enabler forces prior to deployment to the continent.

Medical support and evacuation in AFRICOM is heavily dependent on civilian organizations for their sustainment distribution system. USARAF relies on contract support for even minor items. A concept the USARAF staff may eventually explore is positioning one or two very competent medical personnel in a local facility with adequate communications for 90–120 days to provide medical support for RAF personnel.

Maintenance of nonstandard equipment is problematic. An example was given of maintaining Mercedes trucks, but this statement could be broadly applied to trucks, tanks, aircraft, or artillery pieces. Setting up a maintenance program is one thing, but some African partner armies have been unable to consistently perform maintenance on the equipment they currently own, and they need help. USARAF expressed concern that without appropriate enablers, it would be difficult to most effectively assist in the area of maintenance.

Above all, the USARAF staff lacks the depth required to conduct the detailed planning to the level required when supporting multiple widely dispersed missions on the continent or missions that require a higher level of headquarters beyond the RAF brigade and/or division. USARAF recommends that in the future, an Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) or Theater Support Command level headquarters be allocated (or assigned) to provide a planning headquarters that provides the logistics reach back USARAF lacks. The designated support commands would directly support USARAF with the needed material, equipment, technical expertise, and personnel for missions in the AFRICOM operational area. The USARAF G-4 and G-5 are working a formal request through Department of the Army and FORSCOM.

3.11. Observation: USARAF uses multiple authorities and funding programs to support RAF in AFRICOM.

Discussion: One staff member contrasted the OEF/OND funding practices with the USARAF realities, commenting, “Africa funding is nothing like Afghanistan or Iraq, where the availability of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) money presented no real fiscal constraint to operations.” Still, there were no fully planned RAF activities that were curtailed due to the non-availability of funds.

USARAF, with a small organic budget (about $40 million in FY 2012), answers the demand for Theater activities available under either Title 22 or NDAA (e.g. §1206) Theater Security Cooperation authorities and funding. These funds are less foreseeable (they are not programmed by USARAF) and not very fungible in their execution, as each case comes with a set of specific instructions on how funds may be used. The Title 22 dollar amounts, once approved by DOD, DOS, and the Congress, may not be augmented with Army Operation and Maintenance (OMA) funding.

From USARAF’s perspective, the term “RAF cost” is a misnomer. There are no material “RAF costs” to the ASCC, but because the significant increase in the level of Army activity in Africa corresponded with the introduction of the RAF as a sourcing solution, the total costs for activities in Africa were often wrongly attributed to the RAF itself. In fact, the allocated RAF concept reduces funding timelines because the authorities to obligate the funds are conveyed to the command along with the funds.

For that reason, RAF is a dedicated, efficient sourcing solution that has driven USARAF costs down. USARAF staff comment: “We’ve stumbled upon the most efficient process.”

In AFRICOM, there are more events planned than get executed, but no mission has been cut due to lack of fund quantity. The prevailing challenge with these activities becomes the ASCC's ability to obligate the funds before they expire at the end of the fiscal year, when the funds often arrive within 30 days of that date.

3.11. Observation: Foreign weapons training presents a unique challenge for conventional forces.

Discussion: Some missions require the U.S. Soldiers to train the host nation military audience on foreign weapons. It is difficult for conventional Army units to get access to foreign weapons and ammunition for self training prior to deploying. USARAF's experience with training of foreign weapons has relied heavily on cooperation with the Special Forces community (they are the only military organization authorized to purchase foreign ammunition at this time). In the case of the brigade currently supporting USARAF, teams of Special Forces Soldiers from Fort Carson went to Fort Riley, bringing their own foreign weapons. USARAF stated that NGIC maintains foreign equipment and weapons as well as instructors that could train the trainer. While USARAF's suggestion that USSOCOM and NGIC might be sources of foreign weapons and equipment training, those options have not yet been shown to be viable.

4. USARAF RAF Assessments Process: The USARAF staff acknowledged it does not yet have a fully workable measure of effectiveness (MOE) criteria. A prominent means used to evaluate a mission's effectiveness has been the mission element's AARs and trip reports. Annual assessments involved the fairly cumbersome task of analyzing many post-event narratives and making educated staff judgments about aggregate effectiveness across the spectrum of regions, countries, and goals. In the past, there was a problem aligning AFRICOM and USARAF objectives, an issue to which the staff has contributed significant attention. The USARAF staff is in the midst of developing more end state-driven assessments, with an eye toward generating more quantifiable results.

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