Maneuver Center Bulletin

One Force, One Fight

GREETINGS FROM THE MANEUVER CENTER OF EXCELLENCE!

This is the first issue of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Bulletin. Published quarterly, the bulletin summarizes MCoE initiatives and programs of interest to the force. In this issue, the Director of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), COL Emmett Schaill, discusses doctrine revisions that will ensure that our maneuver force consolidates lessons from the last 12 years of war and develops a shared idea of how we intend to conduct combined arms, and air-ground operations in future armed conflict. Also, he describes the draft Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS) intended to communicate clearly how our Army will develop essential maneuver leader competencies from corporal to colonel.

CSM Carabello and I hope that this bulletin sparks discussion on issues critical to the combat effectiveness of the maneuver force. Each article will include the primary point of contact and how you might participate. We need your criticisms and suggestions. We are proud of the great work that DOTD is doing and grateful for your advice and assistance.

-----*MG H. R. McMaster*

DOCTRINE AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING

Building upon the strong foundation of the recently published Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRPs - http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/ADRP_1.html), the MCoE Doctrine and Collective Training Division (DCTD) is revising all Brigade Combat Teams and below maneuver manuals as part of Doctrine 2015 initiative. We are determined to institutionalize critical lessons learned and best practices garnered from the past 12 years of conflict. These manuals will be important because they will be the foundation maneuver doctrine for fighting and winning across the range of military operations, as well as shape maneuver force training methodology for years to come. Because doctrine is really what the majority of the force believes it is, we are developing our doctrine in a way that will foster participation and understanding.

The MCoE doctrine writing teams are collaborating with the operational Army, the combat training centers, academia, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, sister services, and multinational and interagency partners. The MCoE participates in operational force umbrella weeks, CTC rotations and AARs, and warfighter forums (ABCT, IBCT, SBCT communities of interest) to capture appropriate observations, insights, and lessons learned (OILs) for inclusion in maneuver manuals. Participation in these events informs doctrine revision efforts and provides a venue for dissemination of draft manuals for review. Draft manuals can be found at the MCoE doctrine link https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/mcoedoctrine (formation specific manuals are within subordinate branch web pages (ABCT, SBCT, IBCT, and Reconnaissance and Security).

Based on feedback received, emphasis in the new manuals is on the following:

a. **Reconnaissance and Security Operations.** Expanded emphasis includes the following: (1) focusing on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security operations; (2) stressing reconnaissance organizations' need for the capability to develop the situation through stealth as well as fight for information, and gain and maintain contact with elusive enemy forces often in close proximity to civilian populations; (3)

initiating reconnaissance early in the operations process to answer commander's priority information requirements and gather information concerns such as the enemy strength, disposition, and intent.; (4) reconnaissance and security operations are combined arms operations, which include the integration of air-ground, fires, engineers, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) assets, intelligence assets, and joint capabilities; (5) task organizing reconnaissance and collection teams, and integrating collection specialties such as signal intelligence, human intelligence, electronic warfare, counterintelligence, manned and unmanned aerial platforms, long-range surveillance teams, and scouts; (6) maintaining the ability to conduct long-duration security operations in order to shape the operational environment and consolidate gains.

     b. **Combined Arms Air-Ground Operations.** The MCoE, in collaboration with the Fires Center of Excellence, Aviation Center of Excellence, and Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, continues developing air-ground and combined arms integration content for inclusion in Doctrine 2015 manuals. Topics we are revising include: (1) conducting air-ground reconnaissance and security operations; (2) employing aviation as a reconnaissance, security and maneuver element; (3) unmanned aerial system (UAS) employment and counter-UAS; (4) manned and unmanned teaming for ground and air; (5) systems and common operational picture integration; (6) functional co-location and organization of staff elements (by echelon); (7) synchronization and training staff functions; (8) joint airspace and fires procedures; (9) air and fires asset roles, missions and training; and (10) air and missile defense.

     c. **Shaping the Operational Environment and Consolidating Gains**. This new chapter focuses on capturing those activities and operations necessary to shape conditions, deter adversaries, influence relevant actors, and consolidate gains to achieve political goals consistent with vital national interests such as: (1) understanding the operational environment (political, social, economic, and local dynamics); (2) understanding the importance of human interaction and adaptation (individual/group interests); (3) understanding the influential actors; (4) understanding the dynamics of conflict (nature of conflict, enemy strategy, impact on operations, and emerging opportunities); (5) knowing *what we need to do* (such as, conduct long-duration area security operations, influence behaviors, provide military support to governance, development, and rule of law, work "by, with, and through" our partners and indigenous forces, establish and maintain unity of effort across joint, interagency, inter-government, and multinational [JIIM] partners, adapt operations as the situation develops out of action or contact, and manage security transitions); (6) knowing *how we do it* (such as, build knowledge, understanding, and proficiency within the force, through partnership activities [FID, SFA]), conventional force and special operation force interdependence, perform essential stability tasks through inform and influence activities (such as, media engagements, negotiations, anticorruption activities and countering the insider threat); (7) assessing the operational environment (such as, stability frameworks, use of the company intelligence support team [COIST], human terrain teams [HTTs], patrol leader reports, security force advise and assist teams [SFAATs]).

     These topics are not all inclusive; additional manual revision efforts include expanded discussion of the threat in the operational environment; countering weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)/CBRN; fires planning and integration; company-level sustainment and command post operations; information collection; mission command; forcible entry operations; and urban operations. By continuing to build enduring relations with our partners, and creating an environment of collaboration, the MCoE doctrine team ensures the right content (best practices, lessons learned, and the best from previous manuals) is captured in our manuals and that these manuals continue to be of the highest quality.

     d. **Weapons and Gunnery Training Strategies.** The MCoE currently is standardizing training strategies for weapons and systems (small arms, maneuver, and mortar). These strategies will increase training effectiveness and proficiency while operating within resource authorizations.   Each strategy

includes the use of simulations in support of home station training and combined arms integration within training exercises that support a unit's mission-essential task list (METL).

Direct fire gunnery training strategies, will update live fire prerequisites, standardize the use of simulations, establish training gates, and refine qualification criteria. Authors are consolidating multiple training publications into a single gunnery manual for maneuver platforms (such as, Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, Mobile Gun System, Armored Security Vehicles, and unstabilized platforms). The Direct Fire Gunnery manual will be ready for review in the Fall.

The Army's rifle marksmanship strategy will redefine rifle qualification standards, develop realistic target scenarios, identify critical training gaps, and recommend targetry improvements. This strategy includes a *Combat Shooter* initiative, an improved Army Standard Marksmanship Program. Highlights include clear and concise training regimens for close quarters marksmanship, combat field fire, and known distance marksmanship training. Like the gunnery training strategy, the rifle marksmanship strategy will include increased use of improved simulations and the redistribution of ammunition resources. The *Combat Shooter* initiative: (1) proposes required training and certification for the 11-, 12-, and 19-series MOSs; (2) increases the effectiveness of training for all M4/M16 carriers; (3) focuses on what is expected of all types of firers; (4) maximizes existing training ammunition – *requires no increase to current ammunition authorizations*; (5) increases training rigor and individual/unit proficiency throughout the maneuver force; and (6) identifies current and future simulations and range requirements.

These efforts require the force's full participation. During the study and review periods, the MCoE will send survey questions to tailor programs to the user needs. Feedback from all levels will ensure that these strategies and programs improve the combat effectiveness of our Army.
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MANEUVER LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The MCoE is developing a Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS) to train and educate agile and adaptive maneuver leaders who can lead Soldiers and accomplish the mission, while confronting complex environments and adaptive enemies.

a. Purpose. The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) and unit commanders develop maneuver leaders in a deliberate, continuous, and progressive life-long process that synthesizes the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes gained through training, education, and experience in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. Through this life-long process, maneuver leaders develop competencies necessary to expand their perspectives beyond the tactical and operational levels to include the development of strategic leadership ability. Broadening assignments–experiences and education in different organizational cultures and environments–encourage developing the capability to learn, and contribute outside one's own perspective level of understanding for the betterment of the officer and the maneuver force. The MLDS provides the vision and guidance for developing maneuver leaders across the force. This includes professional military education and functional training for officers and noncommissioned officers at the MCoE; maneuver leader development through training and experience within the operating force at home station, combat training centers, and while deployed; and in maneuver leaders' individual self-development efforts throughout their careers.

b. Context.

(1) The MLDS is based on proven leader development processes contained in the Army Capstone Concept, the Army Leaning Concept, the Army Leader Development Strategy, the Army Training Strategy,

and the Home Station Training Master Plan. The MLDS serves as a single document to guide planning, execution, and resourcing of leader development across the maneuver force. The MLDS synchronizes actions, focuses efforts, fosters common understanding, and supports the maneuver force as it continues to meet future leader development challenges. It informs leader development implementation plans and provides detailed guidance for maneuver commanders and leaders of Infantry, Armor, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, Battlefield Surveillance Brigades (BfSBs), and other maneuver units and activities involved in planning, executing, and resourcing leader development in the maneuver force.

      (2) The MCoE is soliciting advice from across the force and will send MLDS drafts for comment. Additionally, the MLDS drafts will be discussed in warfighting forums and other relevant venues. The key to implementing the strategy will be similar to our doctrine efforts that our entire force "owns" the strategy.

c. Developing Maneuver Leaders to Fight, Lead, and Win Against Adaptive Enemies in the Operational Environment.

      (1) As the Army and TRADOC G2 observe that the future operational environment will be characterized by increased speed and density of human interactions enabled by technology, enemies and adversaries are likely to conduct offensive cyber operations, to disseminate disinformation to deceive commanders, or to discredit our operations through propaganda. Threat intelligence and surveillance capabilities, frequent use of technical countermeasures along with long-range precision munitions, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and satellite capabilities, and their willingness to employ terror weapons enable our enemies and adversaries to seize the initiative on occasion for limited periods at selected locations on the battlefield (BCT 2020).

      (2) To defeat continually adapting and evolving threats, commanders and leaders must learn and apply effective mission command. They must drive the operations process through their activities to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. Effective mission command requires expertise in using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders to confront complex environments and adaptive enemies. Commanders and leaders must link purposeful and simultaneous execution of both combined arms maneuver and security over wide areas to achieve the commander's intent and desired end state.

      (3) Towards this end, agile and adaptive leaders are essential to the successful execution of combined arms operations. Employing combined arms teams demands a working knowledge of the environment and an understanding of the geopolitical, cultural, linguistic, technical, and tactical factors that impact operations (Army Capstone Concept, 2012). They must function alongside a diverse set of national, multinational, and indigenous partners. The operational environment "demands that we develop leaders who understand the context of the factors influencing the military situation, act within that understanding, continually assess and adapt those actions based on the interactions and circumstances of the enemy and environment, consolidate tactical and operational opportunities into strategic aims, and be able to effectively transition from one form of operations to another. We seek to develop leaders who will thrive in this environment" (CGSC ALDS Information Paper, Nov 2009).
***Primary POC: LTC Shane N. Duncanson, Chief, TDD, 706-545-6138, shane.n.duncanson.mil@mail.mil***

MCoE RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Book:
Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Armies From Ancient Times to Present by Max Boot

The end of the American and British involvement in Iraq and the drawdown of NATO troops in Afghanistan in accordance with a predetermined transition timeline led some commentators to view these conflicts as aberrations. Both involved protracted fighting against insurgents, terrorists, and guerrillas, and critics have sometimes presented them as optional wars of a kind that western militaries may choose to avoid in the future. Under financial constraints, U.S. and European armed forces have justified cuts in troop strength largely by assuming that advances in technology will compensate for reductions in manpower, ensuring security at a relatively low cost. *Invisible Armies* is important because it exposes the flawed basis for such arguments. Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of two previous books on related topics, examines guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present day, concluding that 'it is a form of combat that has been immanent in all cultures, at all times, whenever one side was too weak to face another in open battle." (p. 557)

     In the introduction, Boot presents themes that help the reader engage the material critically and make connections across the brief narrative histories. These are consistent with 12 enduring lessons from the broad history of guerrilla warfare that appear at the end of the book. The first 4 of these lessons are that guerrilla warfare and insurgencies are: ubiquitous and important throughout history; the universal war of the weak; both underestimated and overestimated; and increasingly successful since 1945 (although guerrillas and insurgents still lose most of the time). The remaining 8 are that:

- The increasing importance of public opinion is the most crucial recent development in guerrilla warfare.
- Conventional tactics do not work against unconventional enemies.
- Inflicting mass terror has rarely been successful for counterinsurgents.
- Population-centric counterinsurgency is often successful but entails hard fighting.
- Establishing legitimacy is vital for any successful insurgency or counterinsurgency.
- Insurgencies are long-lasting and attempts at quick victories backfire.
- Guerrillas are most effective when operating with conventional military forces. Technology has been less important in guerrilla war than in conventional war.

Boot qualifies the last point with the observation that technology's effect on guerrilla warfare may be increasing. He highlights the importance of communications technology, as well as increasing access to weapons of mass destruction that could lead to guerrilla warfare taking on "an importance not countenanced in five thousand years of world history." (p. 557). Mr. Boot recently visited the MCoE and delivered a compelling lecture to Maneuver Leaders (Hyperlink)

     As Sir Michael Howard observed, we should study war in width, depth, and context. *Invisible Armies* is certainly a valuable text for studying guerrilla warfare in width. It is also valuable because it places recent

and ongoing conflicts in historical context. Indeed, what we learn from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may become as important as the outcomes of those conflicts. This book will help Maneuver Leaders better understand the history of guerrilla warfare, the nature of contemporary conflicts, and the challenges to international security that lie ahead.

Articles:

"The Force of Tomorrow" by General Raymond Odierno
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/04/the_force_of_tomorrow

"Armor: Key to the Future Fight (Mobility, protection and precision firepower are a winning combination)" by COL David Haight, COL Paul Laughlin, and CPT Kyle Bergner
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2013/03/12884447

(UK)" Are We a Learning Organisation? Preparing to Meet the Challenges of the Adaptable Force?"
By Gerry Long
https://www.tjomo.com/article/18/Are_we_a_learning_organisation_Preparing_to_meet_the_Challenge_of_the_Adaptable_Force/

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	USAIS Homepage		http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/infantry.htm
	Infantry Magazine		https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/content/2012.htm
	The Bugler		http://www.infantryassn.com/pages/bugler.html

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Upcoming Bulletins:

June – Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate
September - Directorate of Training and Noncommissioned Officer Academy
December – Maneuver Center of Excellence Update

April-May Calendar Events:

10 April – Industry Day
12 – 15 April – Best Ranger Competition
22 – 25 April – MCoE/IMCOM SE Region