

24 July 2012

## INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Increased Focus on CIED Fundamentals

1. Purpose. To provide combat leaders and training organizations information for focusing CIED pre-deployment training and execution efforts in order to reduce casualties in combat operations.

2. Key Points. **IEDs continue to be the number 1 killer of U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.** Just over 52% of combat deaths in OEF are attributed to IEDs, a percentage that peaked at 60% in 2009. This paper highlights key contributors to IED casualties and provides recommendations for doctrinal areas of focus.

- CIED training and execution must focus on the basics and doctrine
  - **Prioritize and resource training to effectively deal with IEDs because they continue to be the #1 killer on the battlefield.**
  - Focus on Hand Held Detectors (HHDs) and CREW at Bn and Co levels.
  - Training must follow our war fighting doctrine and reinforce individual and collective standards
  - Doctrine and standards (individual and collective training standards) must be known, taught, rehearsed, and enforced.
  - Discipline is essential. Discipline in preparation and execution (IPB, OPORD, rehearsals, intelligence updates, ISR, fire support plan, MEDEVAC plan, debrief, etc...).
- Four key areas have been identified to focus on in order to mitigate IED casualties:
  - Resourcing and making pre-deployment training opportunities in combined arms and employing all CIED enablers a priority so that all know the standards
  - IPB process needs to consider the IED threat for all missions – mounted and dismounted.
  - All combat patrols need to apply the basics of combined arms, combat patrolling, and route clearance doctrine in combat operations. Applying our current doctrine and TTPs for combined arms assured mobility operations and combined arms breaching works.
  - Maneuver forces at Bn and BCT/Regt level must take the lead to ensure all CA operations are synchronized and coordinated across Regt/BCT AOs – to include providing enabler units with the combat support required to effectively execute their assigned mission in support of the BCT (i.e. ISR, Rotary wing, fixed wing, FA support, etc...).

3. Discussion on Training

- There is no requirement to levy additional training tasks on units. Commanders prioritize the training in accordance with the mission and the threat. Training CIED, applying combined arms doctrine to CIED, combat lifesaver, and MEDEVAC must continue to be the top priorities for ground commanders.
- Commanders and staffs at the Brigade and Battalion level need to understand all of the CIED enablers and equipment (EOD, RCP, CREW, COIC, ORSA, ODIN, Copperhead, Goldie, Minehound, Gizmo, Wolfhound, etc...). The CEHP Course at Ft Leonard Wood provides this.
- Current research shows low attendance rates at CIED schools. (Enclosure 1)
  - Greater than 25% vacancy average at Fort Leonard Wood CIED schools
    - Lack of funding for Army Reserves a contributing factor
  - Greater than 60% vacancy average at National Guard CIED schools
    - Lack of funding for ARNG a significant contributing factor
- Pre-deployment training frequently does not include CIED training with:
  - CREW, HHDs, and other CIED enablers and equipment.
  - The security element of the combat force accompanying the route clearance patrol
  - Intelligence briefings/scenarios, IPB, and ISR
  - Combined arms
- In-theater training opportunities not being maximized
  - CJTF Paladin provides a mandatory 5-hour POI for JRSOI. It also offers a 3-hour optional CIED training session at JRSOI for inbound units that is mission tailored. Since October 2011, this optional training has been requested once.

## UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- CJTF Paladin also provides a wide range of equipment, mission, and area specific training for units upon request. Many are available for advanced training during JRSOI.
- Exception is 34-day JRSOI for RCPs; this is a regimented system, but does not include CA AMO.

4. Discussion on Combat Operations. Trends instead of specific incidents are captured below in order to keep this document unclassified and available for distribution to operating forces as widely as possible.

- A study of RC(E), RC(S), and RC(SW) indicates that routes are not being deliberately planned with intelligence support. Specifically, intelligence analysis and trends are not briefed to the unit conducting the patrol. (See all vignettes contained in enclosure 2, especially Vignette #5)
  - Per TF Empire EHCC, “Despite a significant amount of ISR coverage of IED engagement areas, the products of these systems do not reach RCPs [and patrols] to support pre-mission planning or dynamic updates during operations.”
- Units are not developing a keen awareness of the Ground Signs and Visual Indicators commonly associated with IEDs until 30+ days into the deployment. Ground Sign Awareness is key for CIED, especially for dismounted patrols. See Vignette #6 contained in enclosure 2.
  - Apply the 10 principles of CIED: Offensive Mindset, Situational Awareness, Pattern Avoidance, 3-D 360° security, Maintain Standoff, Maintain Tactical Dispersion, Use Armor Protection, Employ CREW, Use CIED Technology, and Do the basics well.
  - Learn to think like an insurgent. If it looks like a good ambush or IED area, it is.
  - When IEDs are confirmed, assume secondaries; clear out non-essential personnel
- TF Empire EHCC noted that route clearance operations are routinely not integrated into the targeting process and ISR support is not integrated; this applies to dismounts too. (See Vignettes #1-#5)
  - Certain systems are very advantageous for the detection of IEDs and when sequenced in advance of combat patrols, increase the ability to identify the device and increase the opportunities for exploitation.
  - Certain systems aide in identifying triggermen or forcing them off initiation systems
  - Most ISR platforms can identify enemy emplacing IEDs.
- Route Clearance Patrols are routinely clearing roads, but are not integrated into the overall scheme of maneuver for follow on movements. (See Vignettes #1, #3, and #4)
  - Frequently RCPs are clearing to maintain a presence rather than clear with a deliberate purpose. Over watch of cleared areas would reduce strain and maintenance on RCPs.
  - Units not following or integrated with RCPs; not staying in sight of RCPs.
- The enemy routinely back lays IEDs if the route/path is not over watched. (See Vignettes #1 and #3)

5. Recommendations.

- Encourage units to attend schools early in their pre-deployment training cycle so that the doctrine and TTPs can be applied throughout training.
  - Active Duty funded MTTs or attendance of a CTC rotation can assist in filling the CA gap for ARNG.
- Follow doctrine methodically in training in order to train like we fight and fight like we train. Advocate a return to the basics. ATTP 3-90.4, FM 3-90.119, and the CALL hand books are great resources. Contact CJTF Paladin to get current insurgent TTPs for the assigned AO.
- Make the additional 3-hours of CIED training at JRSOI mandatory for all units in order to ensure leaders at all levels understand the importance of CIED enablers and CA AMO.
- Reinforce units incorporating IPB, intelligence scenarios, mission briefs, ISR, route reconnaissance, fire support planning, and rehearsals into training. Use notional security elements, notional ISR, and notional combined arms if none are available.
- Focus on IPB, ISR, combined arms; include integrated RCPs for mounted movements.
- Units establish a weekly CIED working group to focus on synchronizing and coordinating CA support to enabler units moving around the battlefield and within respective RC/BCT/Bn battle space. This working group should include intel personnel and respective enabler units moving through or in the AOR. Maneuver BCTs/Bns should ensure RCP requirements are vested and provided with CA operational support during this weekly CIED working group.

Prepared by V Corps G7 and CJTF Paladin CJ3

UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY