

DIRECTORATE FOR COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES



DCIED is the nucleus for TRADOC's ability to deliver **resource-informed, outcomes-based, and integration-focused** CIED solutions to the Army.

Useful Links:

- [Army Training Network](#)
- [Center for Army Lessons Learned\(CALL\)](#)
- [DCIED AKO Website](#)
- [Defense Language Institute](#)
- [FORSCOM Pre-Deployment Training Guidance](#)
- [Joint IED Defeat Organization](#)
- [IEDES FAQ](#)
- [MilGaming](#)
- [Rapid Transit](#)
- [ROC-IED Web Version](#)
- [TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity \(TRISA\)](#)
- [USCENTCOM Training Guidance](#)

Home Station Training Lane Bulletin (HSTL)

July 2012 Issue 22


▶▶▶ Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK) II



The DoD biometric community recently selected the SEEK II as the next generation biometric handheld device. It is already in use by the Navy and Special Operations in the CENTCOM AOR. The ruggedized device captures fingerprints along with iris and facial images for enrollment into the military Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS). The

onboard watch list allows for rapid comparison of enrollee data. The SEEK II can capture photos for evidence collection, has a screen that is readable in bright sunlight, and comes with a Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment (MOLLE) soft case. The entire product summary and additional documents can be viewed at the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) website or on DCIED's AKO [website](#).





▶▶▶ MINEHOUND Military Battery Adapter

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An important instruction guide has been developed for the MINEHOUND Military Battery Adapter- (POWERHOUND). This guide should be used along with the Minehound VMR2, Dual Sensor Mine Detector Operation Manual dated December 2010. Safety considerations, warnings, system components and installation procedures are contained in the guide.

[Click on image to view the Powerhound instructon guide.](#)



*Important Project Manager Close Combat Systems (PM CSS)/Project Manager Countermine and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (PM CM-EOD) Minehound Battery Contact Message

PMCCS/PM CM-EOD developed an important operator’s message detailing instructions on how to PMCS the Minehound to correct a power deficiency. Proper PMCS checks will ensure the system is operating at peak performance.

Check battery contacts for dirt or corrosion



Clean contacts with a #2 pencil eraser. Use canned air (if available) and a clean cloth to wipe the contacts. Do not use sandpaper or abrasive material (it will reduce the thickness of the contact metal). This could lessen the contact tension between the battery and the Minehound.

Inspect battery contacts on the Minehound body


Look for pitting and signs of arcing from poor battery contact. Contacts are spring loaded and you should be able to depress the ball and see it move. Dirt and debris in the spring housing can affect the tension on the battery contact, thus causing power failure. Inspect the ball and spring for movement and clean contacts with pencil eraser. Remove any remaining dirt/dust with clean cloth or canned air. **Do not use any lubricant on contacts!**



Battery Contacts



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▶▶▶ JIEDDO OPFOR Playbook (Version 2)

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JIEDDO recently released Version 2 of the OPFOR playbook. It assists commanders, units, and trainers with CIED training setup. The playbook contains technical categorizations (components) of IEDs, indicators and warnings, scenarios to assist with OPFOR training lane setup, HME lab setup, and cache setup. It is a good tool for baseline CIED training at all levels to include basic enemy IED related TTPs, but is not all inclusive. You can access the playbook at the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) website or click on the images below.

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

JIEDDO

Army Center of Excellence

OPFOR Playbook

Version 2
13 JUN 2012

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Complex Attack CWIED Targeting Vehicle

PLAY M5

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

Event	Grid	CBI
Task to support Command Wire Attack		1 Lane OIC/NOIC
Contact OPFOR Support		1 OPFOR OIC/NOIC
Coordinate for TNG IED support		Designated POC
Conduct Command Wire attack against vehicle traveling on Route.		7 x OPFOR Soldiers 1x driving lane 300m long 3m-10m wide.
-IED detonation is initiator for complex attack		1x 500m Roll of Alternator Wire 2x 5 gallon size container 1x Power source (Motorcycle Battery) most commonly used

5 Gallon Container - can use acid, fuel, oil or water containers.

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HME OVERVIEW

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

- Most home made explosives can be made from chemicals or constituents found in the home, work place or purchased locally without raising suspicion
- Most HMEs will be a mixture of oxidizer and fuel
- A combination of materials and equipment strongly indicate HME production
- Most materials have specific characteristics associated with them (small, color, texture)

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
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Types of Caches

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

- Strategic:** Supply point, normally away from the engagement areas on deserted roads and lanes
 - Operational: Usually found away from target location, but inside area of operations
 - On the outskirts of town from a planned incident.
 - Where the IED or item is put together.
 - Used as a distribution point
 - Tactical:** Found in close proximity of target location.
 - Contains:
 - resources for a specific event
 - Information
 - Small Arms

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
▶ ▶ ▶ Threat TTPs

Mounted attacks

- ◆ Enemy continues to use RCIEDs, CWIEDs and VOIEDs; varies by RC
- ◆ Insurgents target sharp turns on mountainsides
- ◆ Check culverts for missing denial systems or evidence of tampering
- ◆ Enemy employs trigger offset from main charge adapted to tire/track width and roller stand off. Victim operated devices are often weapon of choice
- ◆ Low metallic VOIED pressure plates used to avoid detection
- ◆ Freshly disturbed soil along roadway shoulders are potential indicator tunneling underneath road to place IEDs
- ◆ HME and UBE in a Yellow Palm Oil Container (YPOC) are common. Plastic containers are plentiful, easy to transport and conceal
- ◆ Lamp wire, twin flex wire or copper coated enamel wire may be laid 500-800 meters to the trigger point
- ◆ Command wire may be submerged in low water crossings/canals or laid through structure walls
- ◆ Aiming markers are usually emplaced
- ◆ Enemy may use dual initiation devices– i.e., VOIED/RCIED, Pressure Plate/Tripwire
- ◆ Enemy may place IEDs in alternate/bypass routes

Dismounted attacks

- ◆ Enemy frequently reuses past IED attack sites
- ◆ Footpaths, crossing areas, compound entrances, and doorways are likely placement locations
- ◆ Majority of IEDs are 5-25lbs HME in YPOC jugs, DFCs, and pressure cookers
- ◆ Expect secondary and tertiary devices
- ◆ Suspect predictive crossing areas i.e. break in qalat walls
- ◆ Watch for IEDs hidden in compound walls with concealed triggers
- ◆ Indirect fire and small arms fire indicate strong hold
- ◆ Unsecured road repair projects may be used to conceal IEDs
- ◆ Enemy may place IEDs around caches, targeting evidence collection operations
- ◆ Canalized path with no other available approach or egress is likely placement area



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▶▶▶ CIED Doctrinal Products

NUMBER	TITLE (Select title to start download)	DATE
STP 3-CIED-SM-TG,	Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for Counter Improvised Explosive Device	Dec 2011
JP 3-15.1	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations	Jan 2012
FM 3-34.210	Explosive Hazard Operations	Mar 2007
FM 3-90.119	Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations, 21 Sept 2007/Chg 1	Aug 2008
ATTP 2-91.4	Intelligence Support to Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices TTP Volume 1	Jul 2011
ATTP 2-91.6,	TTP for Intelligence Support to Site Exploitation	Dec 2010
ATTP 3-90.4	Combined Arms Mobility Operations	Aug 2011
ATTP 3-90.15	Site Exploitation Operations	Jul 2010
ATTP 4-32	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations	Dec 2011
ATTP 4-32.2	UXO MTTP for Unexploded Ordnance	Sep 2011
TC 2-91.701	Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations	Mar 2007
TC 3-90.119	U.S. Army Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Training	Jun 2009
TC 3-34.14	AN/PSS-14 Training Program	Oct 2011

DCIED HSTL Team


Mr. Don Karcher, Operational Training, donald.j.karcher2.civ@mail.mil

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
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Home Station Training Lane Locations



Aligned with the Regional Collective Training Capability

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