JOINT EXPEDITIONARY TEAM
CIED Advisory Mission Summary (CAMSUM)

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JOINT EXPEDITIONARY TEAM
CIED Advisory Mission Summary

Volume 2, Issue 30

(U) EVERY PATROL IS A DELIBERATE COMBAT PATROL

(U//FOUO) All too often the labels "presence patrol," "battlefield circulation," or "Key Leader Engagement" are interpreted as being something less than a deliberate combat patrol. In total, there are more of these types of patrols than the so called combat patrols. Unfortunately, some units don't see the need to equip themselves or train to mitigate the IED threat. Every unit that operates outside the wire must anticipate and prepare for the enemy's most dangerous course of action.

(U//FOUO) Insurgents prey on what they perceive as soft targets. They execute attacks at the time and place of their choosing and against the units that appear least likely to respond violently. Over time, the insurgent networks develop a good understanding of a unit's preparedness and, more importantly, a unit's aggressiveness and willingness to fight. Sadly we continue to observe mounted elements that never discuss or rehearse contact drills. Detailed threat analysis, historic IED engagement areas, and IED clearance procedures are often omitted or glossed over during patrol briefings.

(U//FOUO) One graphic example involved a unit that was very active outside the wire. Although not designated a maneuver element, this unit spent every day running the roads and interacting with the local populace. In a one week period the unit never conducted training or rehearsals, did not equip themselves with CIED tools, and never checked their vehicle or dismounted CREW systems. In fact the CREW systems threat loadsets had not been checked since TOA. Prior to one patrol, the JET cautioned about settling into an "Observer Controller" attitude towards patrols; a Staff Sergeant replied "that's what we are."

(U//FOUO) Every patrol in Afghanistan is a deliberate combat patrol. Planning, reconnaissance, security, and control measures have to be a part of each movement. Patrol briefs should discuss specific threat areas, and the immediate actions appropriate in those areas. Pre-Combat Checks (PCC) and Pre-combat Inspections (PCI) must be accomplished without fail. Every patrol that leaves the wire has the potential to be involved in a SAF or IED incident. When it does occur, the units that rehearse, conduct PCCs and PCIs, and prepare for all contingencies will be successful.

(U) INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO INTEGRATING THE G-BOSS

(U//FOUO) During a recent embed, JET observed a smart approach to integrating Ground Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS) into the unit's daily battle rhythm. This mobile sensor has a pan and tilt camera that can be integrated into the unit's sensor network.

(U//FOUO) The unit had its team members man the G-BOSS during same time slot every day. The operators became very familiar with the local patterns of life for their period of watch. Tower guards reported all sightings to the G-BOSS operator. He in turn was able to scrutinize the area with the system's enhanced optics. This is a excellent TTP that should be passed on to every site using the G-Boss. The team's employment of this system was impressive.

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(U) DESIGNATED IED DETECTION TEAMS

(U//FOUO) JET observed one unit that has formed IED Detection Teams. These teams support both mounted and dismounted operations. The unit dedicated three Soldiers to each team. The Soldiers were carefully selected and thoroughly trained on all of the unit's C-IED equipment. The unit also developed specific TTPs to counter the IED threats unique to their area of operations. The area specific TTPs coupled with CIED SMEs and a layered use of CIED enablers has resulted in an increased number of IED finds. This CIED model is very comprehensive and worthy of consideration.

(U//FOUO) The IED Detection Team training included:

- Threat devices and switches

- Ground sign awareness and terrain analysis

- 1 + 1 IED confirmation process

- Integration and layering of CIED enablers (CREW, ISR, Canines)

- Historical engagement area research and data mining programs

- Operation and integration of Hand Held Detectors and CREW equipment

(U//FOUO) The most common approach to addressing the IED threat is to train as many soldiers as possible to a loosely undefined standard. The alternative is to train fewer personnel to a stricter standard. These subject matter experts then provide opportune training to the rest of the unit. Every Soldier should be trained to a "Level 1" CIED skill set and standard, however training and integrating a dedicated IED detection team into unit operations is a more effective way to mitigate the IED threat.

(U//FOUO) Requesting additional training is a very simple process. CJTF Paladin's J7 has an online training request form: **http://paladin.coic-afghan.coic.smil.mil/j7/Lists/Training%20Request/NewRequest.aspx**

(U) MODIFYING CIED TOOLS TO MEET REQUIREMENTS

(U//FOUO) The best CIED ideas almost always originate at the war fighter level. The individuals nearest to the fight have an on-the-ground perspective that isn't obvious to a mechanical engineer living 7,000 miles away. JET came across another great example of field ingenuity during a recent embed.

(U//FOUO) An innovative EOD tech designed a rake for his team's small robot. This simple sickle and wood attachment allows the team to remotely uncover command wires, command pull kite strings, and pressure plates while at the same time maintaining all important standoff.

(U//FOUO) Just like the countless other good ideas born out of necessity, the robot rake fills a CIED gap. JETs are always looking for intelligent CIED TTPs and this definitely falls into that category.

(U) EXPLOIT INSURGENT MISTAKES: INFORMATION OPERATIONS BATTLE DRILLS

(U//FOUO) During a recent CIED patrol, JET observed the results of two insurgent attacks against local nationals. In the first incident a local national was severely beaten. So much so his unhealed wounds showed indications of gangrene. In the second, insurgent fighters attacked an ANSF check point and in the process wounded a 13 year old boy. After receiving immediate care from a US medic, the two injured Afghans were transported to a local clinic for follow-on care. While tragic, if managed correctly, these two incidents are tremendous Information Operations (IO) opportunities that Coalition Forces (CF) should never let slip away. However, CF must act swiftly and in a calculated way to maximize the IO impact. Units need preplanned IO messages postured for rapid release.

(U//FOUO) After enduring eleven years of US-led fighting, Afghans are practically immune to clumsy CF talking points. Units must balance message timeliness with higher command guidance and Afghan acceptance of another CF message. An off-topic or poorly targeted message can be worse than no message at all. If the Afghan police are seen as corrupt will the locals believe what they put out? Who is best positioned to spread credible talking points? Each AO is different and each has its formal and informal leaders. Would a graphic picture be better to convey a thought or concept? Enlisting the help of respected ANSF partners and other persons of positive influence helps to spread the message as effectively as possible.

(U//FOUO) Sadly, CIVCAS is a part of combat operations. However the overwhelming majority of these incidents can be directly tied to the insurgency. Their callous disregard for Afghan life must be highlighted at every opportunity. Appropriate CIVCAS messages must be on hand and ready for immediate release. It's almost impossible to sway public opinion after the insurgency has spread their version of an incident. Getting the CF message out fast, often, and in a well thought out way is the key to winning the IO war.

(U) BOLO BOOKS—A SUCCESS STORY

(U//FOUO) Throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Be On the Look Out (BOLO) identification cards have been instrumental in helping units identify and capture targets. Units often bundle them into BOLO books that are easily distributed to their maneuver elements. Unfortunately, not all units choose to exploit this resource.

(U//FOUO) JET recently accompanied a unit who, during preparation for patrol, learned that a Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) target was in the vicinity of the patrol's planned objective. Prior to departure the unit ensured that they had the most current BOLO book. The patrol identified and captured the JPEL Target during the operation. Without a current book, its highly unlikely that the patrol would have recognized and captured this INS. The detainee's removal from the battlefield resulted in a reduction in attacks and IED events.

(U//FOUO) Every unit should take advantage of this very useful tool. It helps to strip away the insurgent's anonymity and severely restricts his ability to move undetected through the population.

(U//FOUO) CJTF Paladin publishes BOLO cards in English, Pashtu, and Dari. The information is unclassified and is releasable to all ANSF partners. To search and download BOLOs by name, region, or BIAR number check out the CJTF Paladin ACME portal: **http://paladin.coic-afghan.coic.smil.mil/tex/default.aspx**

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(U) A CIED TOOL: EMPLOYMENT OF THE DOK-ING MV-4B

(U//FOUO) While traditionally a Combat Engineer mine clearing asset, the DOK-ING MV-4B is rapidly becoming a favorite tool when moving in an IED environment. Whether leading patrols with its roller or grinding up roads, trails, and walls with its flail, the DOK-ING is finding a place in the CIED fight.

(U//FOUO) Designed for remote operation, the MV-4B is a 6.1 ton tracked vehicle capable of detonating or destroying antipersonnel mines in its path. This CIED asset is suitable for mine clearing in urban areas, fields, bushes, canal banks, and muddy areas. Its hand-held remote control feature allows the operator to remain outside the range of exploding mines during the clearing process. The MV-4B is designed to survive mine blasts. However, it is not the 'silver bullet' solution to IED mitigation.

(U//FOUO) The MV-4B will never replace intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Warfighters are still required to study the history of attacks in their area of operation, know the vulnerable areas and points along their routes, and understand how to mitigate the Red TTPs that are popular on those routes. Additionally, employing a MV-4B does not alleviate a patrol of the responsibility to proof routes with hand held detectors (HHD). The DOK-ING MV-4B is simply another device that must be integrated into the overall CIED effort.

(U//FOUO) Uneven and restrictive terrain can be challenging to both operator and machine. As with any roller equipped vehicle, applied pressure is not always uniform across the roller's surface. Units can never assume that the terrain is 100% cleared and safe. Another constraint inherent to all remotely controlled devices is the line-of-sight requirement. Units must be prepared to sweep behind the DOK-ING with their HHDs. Jamming devices are also a concern. Any equipment that operates wirelessly is subject to interference. Of course, none of this should be a surprise to the MV-4B operators. During rehearsals and pre-mission planning a simple CREW interoperability test will reveal incompatibility distances.

DOK-ING MV-4B with roller

U//FOUO

16/10/2012

DOK-ING MV-4B with flail

U//FOUO

17/10/2012

(U) A CIED TOOL: EMPLOYMENT OF THE DOK-ING MV-4B

(U//FOUO) During a CIED advisory mission in support of an infantry unit, JETs had the opportunity to see an MV-4B in action. The unit used a MV-4B in its mine roller configuration to clear into an abandoned village. The main road was well used and consisted of 8 to 12 inches of powdery moon dust. The roller pushed the dust into a wave and only penetrated to the hardened surface at the high points along the route. The uneven coverage required that Soldiers move behind the device and clear a secondary path using the VMR-2 Minehound Hand Held Detector (HHD). After moving 400 meters, the unit steered the DOK-ING off the main road and into the village where they used it to breach a mud wall. It is important to note that prior to completing the wall breach, the DOK-ING shut down because of over-heating. Summer temperatures may become a planning factor.

(U//FOUO) After clearing a path into the village with the MV-4B and then sweeping behind it with a HHD, ANA discovered two Victim Operated IEDs. It appears that the Coalition Soldiers may have become overconfident in the DOK-ING's abilities to disrupt IEDs and failed to identify a vulnerable point along their path. The DOK-ING is just one of many CIED tools and it must be layered with all available CIED enablers to ensure the lane is 100% clear of IEDs.

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JIEDDO JKnIFE — https://jknife.jieddo.smil.mil/Pages/JKnIFE.aspx

(U//FOUO) As directed by the JIEDDO, the Joint Expeditionary Team (JET) supports all echelons of U.S. Forces, interagency and U.S. coalition partners to train, advise, observe, analyze and to collect and disseminate tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), lessons learned, and best practices to mitigate the IED threat utilizing material and non-material solutions, and enhance C-IED operations, initiatives and strategies. The JET will operate within JIEDDO's lines of operation (LOOs) CONUS and OCONUS to include operational embeds and C-IED Advisory Missions (CAMs) - JET CONOP dtd 10 MAR 2010

JIEDDO's Lines of Operation (LOOs)

Attack the Network

Activities aimed at finding and eliminating negative influencers, e.g. IED cell leaders, bomb makers, financiers, and their supply sources prior to assembling and emplacing IEDs.

Defeat the Device

Solutions that can detect IEDs, neutralize them prior to detonation, or mitigate the effects of detonation at the point of attack.

Train the Force

The Joint Expeditionary Team participates in all pre– and post-deployment training events and exercises in an effort to bring currency and relevant observations directly from the theater of operation to units and individual leaders who are preparing for and/or performing combat operations.