NEWSLETTER

Decisive Action Training Environment at the JRTC, Volume XI

Lessons and Best Practices

Decisive Action Training Environment at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Volume XI

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Foreword

The shift to a decisive action training environment (DATE) challenges the sustainment warfighting function (WfF) in a manner that few sustainers have seen before. "Fighting a moving fight instead of fighting the move" describes the challenge a DATE presents to the movement and maneuver and mission command WfFs. For the sustainment WfF, this challenge becomes "sustaining the moving fight while moving the sustainment capacity." This newsletter examines that challenge in detail. We hope the information in this newsletter will provide you with the realization that DATE sustainment means the sustainer must be three mental steps ahead of the maneuver leader to successfully support a DATE operation.

Plan for the expected and anticipate the unexpected.

Sustainment must be integral to a unit's planning, whether discussing troop leading procedures (TLPs) at the company level or the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) at the battalion and brigade levels. This support must be targeted to also support the commander's intent. Most importantly, targeting must plan for expected operations and anticipate the unforeseen. Signal Soldiers have long adhered to the idea of a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plan. DATE has forced the recognition that a PACE plan for a joint forcible entry will prove inadequate for a brigade combat team attack. The PACE plan must reflect the phase of an operation. Sustainment planning and targeting, as part of TLP or the MDMP, must consider PACE by phase of an operation. Otherwise, the sustainment effort will at best only react to events.

Sustainment procedures and processes must be instinctual.

Commanders and staff organizations, as well as operations, grow larger and more complex as Soldiers move up in echelon. The single most important connective factor inside a platoon headquarters, which is the same as inside a brigade combat team, is the standard operating procedure (SOP). SOPs give leaders and Soldiers a common approach to common events while providing the flexibility to meet the uncommon. A unit that possesses and has practiced its SOPs and associated battle drills has the greatest chance of maintaining the initiative. Sustainers must develop, practice, and refine SOPs and associated battle drills from platoon through brigade levels.

Complexity has its own quality.

Older Soldiers know that quantity has its own quality; a less capable but numerically superior force uses numbers to match a more capable but smaller force. The same holds true for complexity, and DATE is a deliberately complex environment. Medical planning and evacuation

in a stability or counterinsurgency environment allow for medical capabilities to overmatch expected casualties. Fighting a near-peer, hybrid enemy in the DATE requires significant adjustments in medical planning and operations. Maneuver and health service support units must plan and rehearse adjustments well before initial contact with the enemy.

Paul P. Reese
COL, AR
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned

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Center for Army Lessons Learned	
Director	COL Paul P. Reese
CALL Analyst	Douglas E. Willis
CALL Liaison Officer to the Joint Readiness Training Center	Thomas P. Odom

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Chapter 1

Company-Level Military Decisionmaking Process in a Troop Leading Procedure Design

CPT Veronica D. Jordan, CPT Erika A. Broussard, CW2 Michael S. Risner, and SFC Devon C. Brown

Company commanders seldom have time to complete troop leading procedures (TLPs) in a decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation. More often than not, commanders are afforded only enough time to receive and execute the mission — sometimes viewed as an indicator of tactical flexibility. This interpretation holds some truth. Company leaders are flexible. They are able to react to any mission. However, is flexibility being confused with reactive leadership? Are leaders being conditioned to accept reactive leadership as the norm when Army doctrine expects them to be proactive?

Observations from various observer-coach/trainers at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) during DATE rotations show a disconcerting trend: company command teams typically complete a rotation without executing TLPs. How are key personnel in the company-level orders process identified, and how are their roles and responsibilities defined?

Use Troop Leading Procedures or the Military Decisionmaking Process? That Is the Question

Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, dedicates Chapter 10 to TLPs. Chapter 10 opens with:

> Troop leading procedures provide small-unit leaders with a framework for planning and preparing for operations. Leaders of company and smaller units use troop leading procedures to develop plans and orders. This chapter describes the eight steps of troop leading procedures and their relationship to the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). While this chapter explains troop leading procedures from a ground-maneuver perspective, it applies to all types of small units.[1]

Chapter 10 amplifies this opening statement with a comparison between MDMP and TLPs; TLPs are further described in Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process*:

> Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and adequately preparing their units for an operation.[2]

In describing TLPs, FM 6-0 makes it clear that TLPs place the responsibility for planning on the commander or small-unit leader.[3] MDMP places responsibility on commanders and staffs. However, a commander or small-unit leader should not do all planning alone. Indeed, the critical difference between MDMP and TLPs is that MDMP is staffed for success and TLPs are done with available resources in a limited amount of time.

Who Conducts Troop Leading Procedures? Everyone Available

As a commander builds a team to conduct TLPs, who is involved? In a battalion setting, the commander allows the staff to organize, war-game, and produce courses of action (COAs). At company or small-unit levels, the responsibility of planning falls on the company commander or small-unit leader. So, whom does the company commander use? The answer is everyone available and, certainly, anyone he chooses. The company commander's selections are different from those of a battalion commander because at the company level, all the selectees have other jobs.

Using a field maintenance company as an example, the executive officer (XO), platoon leaders, maintenance control officer, maintenance technician, first sergeant (1SG), orderly room clerks, and platoon sergeants all play a significant role. The commander focuses on future operations that leave these key personnel to conduct TLPs for immediate missions. Even with time constraints, the company "staff" is able to develop one COA. The mission then will go to one of the platoons. Once the decision is made as to which platoon will be involved, the platoon sergeant, platoon leader, and warrant officer, if applicable, along with the XO and 1SG, become the staff. The commander then can focus on future operations.

The Art of Parallel Planning

Using its entire staff, the company can conduct TLPs even with limited time. In the battalion, MDMP starts with receipt of mission and mission analysis. While these steps are in motion, the company receives the mission as an initial warning order (WARNORD) and then issues the initial company WARNORD. Next, the platoon receives the mission as a WARNORD. Once the company staff has a second WARNORD from battalion, it drafts a tentative plan, begins movement, and dispatches reconnaissance.

Anticipate With Backward Planning

In order for the company staff to work properly, the commander must continuously anticipate future operations. In other words, the commander leads future operations and the company staff leads current operations. The company staff uses the commander's vision to drive backward planning for future events. Battalion staff uses running estimates and the common operational picture to receive updates on the battalion. It is imperative that the running estimates remain current, so that when placed in a decisive action environment with limited planning time, the staff can use as much of the previously analyzed information and products from earlier decisions as possible. The company staff uses data from past training and trends for company TLPs.

Mitigating Pitfalls

The leaders and Soldiers who understand the characteristics of effective planning are the ones who succeed at planning. The lack of company-level planning can affect the higher unit's mission. This lack of planning can stem from:

- Attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future.

- Planning in too much detail.

- Using planning as a scripting process.

- Applying planning techniques inflexibly.

Attempting to Forecast and Dictate Events Too Far Into the Future

A chemical company receives a WARNORD too soon. This WARNORD is not absolute. It should be as complete as possible because any changes to it or the full operation order (OPORD) gives the company less time to conduct full TLPs. The one-third, two-thirds rule cannot be applied. Believing a plan can control the future is a skewed concept because of potential changes and unknowns. When it comes to implementing plans, a dangerous assumption can be made that there is a way to control the future. Any efforts made in this regard predictably fail. "Planning attempts to shape the future, yet war is an intrinsically chaotic phenomenon that denies precise, positive control over events."[4]

Planning in Too Much Detail

Delaying planning to gain detailed information can cause life-threatening delays at the company level. Chance cannot be planned out of life or war; only the effects can be mitigated. When putting together a lengthy plan, details can become ignored. It is best to remember not to plan in detail because plans will change. Too much of the wrong type of analysis leads to skewed conclusions and is of little help in addressing problems.

Using Planning as a Scripting Process

Planners who use scripted planning spend so much time on details and precision that they forget the time needed to actually plan their specific taskings. Companies are looking for a clearly defined, measurable task and purpose to execute decisively. "Clearly, if the orders are too detailed, the important things are lost among the unimportant things."[5]

Applying Planning Techniques Inflexibly

Being inflexible when planning is a fault that gives the company a "TLPs-equal-go" mentality. When a battalion gives the brigade operation order (OPORD) to the company, it takes away predictability along with flexibility. The company has to dissect an OPORD issued two levels up. The battalion should give the company as little to do as possible in planning. Companies should have enough time to complete their planning prior to mission execution. Issues do not get better with time.

When mitigating common pitfalls, ensure the right personnel are designated and involved in the planning process. In the end, investing time and effort in the planning process should improve the performance of the organization, resulting in a plan that is 90 percent effective.

Conclusion

As stated earlier, the critical difference between MDMP and TLPs is that MDMP is staffed for success and TLPs must be done with available resources and limited time. At the company level, everyone can be a part of a successful TLPs process. Parallel planning and backward planning conducted by the company staff can result in a tentative plan that can be put into motion. Lastly, with the mitigation of any pitfalls, the assigned personnel have the time and resources to complete the company TLPs.

Endnotes

1. Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations,* 05 MAY 2014, page 10-1.

2. Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process,* 17 MAY 2012, paragraph 35.

3. FM 6-0, paragraph 10-1.

4. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, *Planning*, 21 JUL 1997, page 22.

5. Vego, Milan N. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice,* 20 SEP 2007, page 64.

Chapter 2

Command Post Battle Drills:
Refining Battle Drills to Support Civil Operations

CPT Daniel Reep and SSG Joseph Plummer, Task Force Fires Logistics Team, Sustainment Task Force, Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group

Battle drills are the cornerstone of successful command post (CP) operations and can be easily tailored to specific mission sets as part of a unit's standard operating procedures (SOPs). Units regularly deploy to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) eager to assume any combat mission with well-prepared and freshly printed tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs) available to assist young battle captains at the helm of CP operations. Usually junior officers, these battle captains rely on the depth of their unit TACSOP as well as the experience of the battalion staff to manage reports and execute battle drills as events occur.

Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, describes battle drills as a set of procedures within the CP that allow the battle captain and staff to react to a variety of situations. These battle drills should be tailored to the unit's mission and "should be defined in its SOPs and rehearsed during training and operations."[1] During rotation 15-05, while supporting a defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) scenario, the combat service support battalion (CSSB) translated its CP battle drills from its existing combat-focused TACSOP into relevant battle drills tailored to the unit's DSCA mission. The CSSB refined its battle drills in four logical steps by gathering requisite CP and DSCA publications and resources, developing the unit's standard battle drills, refining the unit's battle drills for its current DSCA mission, and implementing its battle drills within the CP and among key staff and subordinate elements.

Command Post Battle Drill Resources

The following Army publications contain information that can assist staff officers in developing standard battle drills relevant to most missions:

- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 05 MAY 2014

- Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 MAY 2012

- Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, 23 AUG 2012

- Army Training Network (ATN), *Command Post Handbook*, March 2013

Additionally, the following publications are tailored specifically to assist planning in a DSCA environment:

- ADRP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 18 JUN 2015

- Army Techniques Publication 3-28.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, 25 SEP 2015

- Defense Support of Civil Authorities Handbook Graphic Training Aid 90-01-021, *Liaison Officer Toolkit*, 30 JUL 2010

- Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 11-07, *Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook*, 30 DEC 2010

With these resources, battle captains are empowered to develop CP battle drills to streamline reporting within the tactical operations center and maintain knowledge management among key staff members. Additionally, battle captains are able to translate existing "combat" battle drills into "civil support" battle drills to ensure the CP is effectively tailored to DSCA missions.

Developing Battle Drills for Command Post Operations

FM 6-0 states:

> Standardization increases efficiency and eases CP personnel training. Commanders develop detailed SOPs for all aspects of CP operations. Standard CP layouts, battle drills, and reporting procedures increase efficiency. Units follow and revise SOPs throughout training. Units constantly reinforce standardization using SOPs to make many processes routine. Staffs then effectively execute them in demanding, stressful operations.[2]

To develop a standard set of battle drills, battle captains must consider the unit commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and ensure each CCIR has a relevant battle drill associated with it so information is quickly reported through the CP as these critical events unfold. In addition, battle drills must be relevant to the unit's capability and mission. When the CSSB headquarters arrived at the JRTC to perform a headquarters mission, the unit quickly utilized its existing TACSOP and CCIR list to develop a baseline battle drill book, which the battle captain could reference during daily operations. The support battalion quickly noted that many battle drills are relevant to almost any mission, such as receiving a report of a missing sensitive item. The battle captain also observed that although many combat-related battle drills were not relevant to the unit's DSCA mission, such as troops in contact or injuries related to hostile action, the battle drills could be tailored to reflect realistic situations that could evolve from stateside operations in support of civil operations. Thorough lists of typical battle drills can be found in FM 6-0, paragraph 1-51, as well as within the ATN, *Command Post Handbook*, Chapter 5.

Refining Battle Drills During Civil Support Missions

DSCA missions require military personnel to operate much differently stateside than they normally would in a combat environment, specifically in how they interact with local populations, civil support agencies, and media. CP staff must become experts on federal laws and disaster response and be able to rewrite battle drill procedures with minimal impact on daily CP operations. A best practice seen during JRTC rotations is for the operations staff to conduct rehearsals during each shift, analyzing select combat-related battle drills and discussing how the staff could change these drills to reflect the DSCA environment. The unit also should consider how its subordinate logistical elements operate to ensure the CP battle drills focus on realistic events that may occur. The largest impacts on battle drill development during DSCA missions are legal requirements to which units are accustomed.

Implementing Battle Drills

Once battle drills are developed and refined, the battle captain and primary staff must implement the battle drills into daily CP operations and ensure the procedures are readily available and easy to understand. A battle drill "battle book" should be kept at the battle captain's desk to ensure anyone in the CP can quickly reference battle drill events as they occur. Subordinate units must keep copies of the CP battle drills at the company level, and mission command systems must be established to communicate battle drill information from the bottom up. In a DSCA scenario, mission command is likely to involve the use of civilian networks, and it is imperative that CPs train with and integrate civilian communication systems into their reporting procedures prior to undertaking DSCA missions.

Conclusion

Units must carefully consider battle drill development and refinement to ensure streamlined and successful CP operations during civil support operations. Many battle drills normally used in combat environments can be tailored to civil support missions, given a creative staff and leaders who are able refine their battle drill products through rehearsals. Training for DSCA starts at the lowest individual level. (Online and residential DSCA courses can be found at http://www. arnorth.army.mil/dsca.) When possible, units preparing for DSCA missions should contact relevant civilian authorities such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Red Cross and incorporate these agencies into their training exercises, even if these agencies can provide only a single liaison or distance guidance. Early communication with civilian agencies can mitigate the challenges associated with CP integration of civilian communication platforms, verbiage, and operations. At the end of the DSCA training cycle, units should set up a repository of information to provide a continuity of information for use in follow-on professional development training. Additionally, units undertaking DSCA missions should attend annual conferences hosted by FEMA and various disaster relief organizations.

Endnotes

1. FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 05 MAY 2014, paragraph 1-51.

2. FM 6-0, paragraph 1-18.

Chapter 3

The Challenges of Planning Health Service Support in a Decisive Action Training Environment

CPT Thomas Collins, Task Force Sustainment

Since 2013, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has held at least 10 decisive action training environment (DATE) rotations. This article addresses health service support (HSS) planning trends that have been common to these rotations. These trends are not specific to medical planners, but are found throughout all warfighting functions. Also discussed in this chapter are the challenges the brigade faced with developing and synchronizing its HSS plan due to a lack of planning and rehearsal before the start of operations.

After 12 years of conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, primarily from forward operating bases and against an enemy that presented a more passive threat, HSS planners became comfortable with a mature HSS structure that initially changed little and then only in small increments. HSS planners were not challenged to continually adapt to a changing operational environment (OE).

DATE rotations were the opposite: The constant in DATE rotations since 2013 is that each one is different. This characteristic is deliberate. DATE rotations present a hybrid threat that reflects potential adversaries the Army may face in the future. The threats include guerrilla, insurgent, criminal, and near-peer conventional forces. The rotation involves an OE requiring a detailed and synchronized HSS plan that is constantly changing based on the maneuver plan.

HSS Planning Is a Team Effort

"The brigade surgeon section medical planner should include the brigade support medical company (BSMC) commander, executive officer (XO), brigade personnel staff officer, brigade XO, medical platoon leaders, forward support medical platoon leader, the brigade support battalion medical plans and operations officer, and the brigade aviation element company commander (if available) in the planning process."[1] One of the keys to success in any operation is having the right people involved in the planning process. Although having every stakeholder involved in the development of the HSS plan may not be possible due to the dispersion of units, planners should stress the use of all available mission command systems.

Learn Along the Way

Prior to the joint forcible entry, the surgeon cell was unable to assemble key medical leaders to participate in developing the HSS plan. As a result, medical assets were not properly echeloned into the joint operations area (JOA), causing gaps in medical capabilities. Some battalions did not bring their treatment teams, including physician assistants, on the air assault or ground assault convoys. Therefore, the Role 2 care was not established until D+3. These gaps in capabilities may have been prevented if the medical leaders in the brigade were able to come together and develop the HSS plan.

Adjust Accordingly to Succeed

Prior to the brigade's final attack, the surgeon cell conducted hasty HSS planning with the brigade XO, BSMC commander, support operations (SPO) medical operations officer, and brigade support battalion SPO. As a result, the BSMC pushed evacuation assets forward with security to infantry battalion forward aid stations, which were able to facilitate casualty backhaul to Role 2 care. These actions proved that even hasty planning and coordination with those involved in executing HSS operations can improve support and increase shared understanding in the brigade.

HSS Is a Combined Arms Operation

A major point of friction was that synchronization was not achieved. The overall evacuation process was not well understood, and additional training was needed across the board. When creating, planning, writing, and staffing all plans, the writer cannot do it in a vacuum. The HSS plan must be staffed at all levels before publication.

A Static Common Operational Picture is *Not* a Common Operating Picture

A static common operational picture (COP) is not a COP at all. This was observed during the operation as the brigade transitioned to the defense. The brigade surgeon cell was prevented from consolidating plans to create an HSS COP. An accurate HSS COP creates a shared understanding among the brigade of the location and capabilities of roles of care, ambulance exchange points, and the overall evacuation plan from POI to Role 2.

Operate on Operation Orders

The Army operates off of operation orders; HSS planners are not exempt. Dedicating security to ground evacuation platforms often causes delays; synchronizing the HSS plan across the brigade makes it simpler and avoids delays. In order to receive reports from battalions, brigade surgeon cells should utilize the orders process to require brigade approval for battalion-level HSS plans and have them briefed prior to the battalion commander's backbrief to the brigade commander. This process allows the surgeon cell to ensure the individual battalion HSS plans fit into the overall HSS concept of support and shift assets accordingly.

Rehearse and Rehearse Again

"Rehearsals are the commander's tool to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the commander's intent and the concept of operations. They allow commanders and staffs to identify shortcomings in the plan not previously recognized."[2] One venue that is underutilized for creating a shared understanding and synchronization of the HSS plan is the rehearsal (combined arms or sustainment).

Rock the Rock Drill

Rehearsals are an opportunity to practice and deconflict key actions of an operation and give a visual representation to those responsible for execution. They also provide the "big picture," allowing leaders to see their adjacent units on a graphical representation. During some rotations, the HSS plan was not briefed in great detail during either the combined arms rehearsal or the sustainment rehearsal.

Take the Stage and Deliver

The sustainment rehearsal was conducted in a dark area amid generator noise, making it difficult for those present to listen and observe. When given the opportunity to brief, medical planners simply briefed that they would push forward Role 1 care and did not cover tentative locations, assets, capabilities, or details of the evacuation plan. Vignettes were not used to show the evacuation plan or the submission of the 9-line medical evacuation request.

Do Not Make Common Assumptions

The goal of a rehearsal is common understanding; if everyone walks away with common assumptions instead, those individuals executing and supporting the operation will lack a clear understanding of their roles in patient treatment and evacuation. Medical planners should brief their HSS plan both during the combined arms rehearsal and during the sustainment rehearsal to ensure that key leaders have a shared understanding. At a minimum, planners should cover capabilities, the number of patients they can expect to treat, when they will need to be resupplied, their triggers for moving locations, and their plan for evacuating casualties from casualty collection points to Role 1 care.

Conclusion

These JRTC rotations have illustrated the challenges medical operators face in developing HSS plans for decisive action. By supporting maneuver forces constantly moving across the JOA, planners can synchronize their individual efforts with their adjacent units so all plans are supporting the brigade's mission. This effort will require planners to collaborate, share plans, and conduct in-depth rehearsals that create shared understanding across the brigade. Taking these actions can ultimately lead to a synchronized HSS plan that saves lives on the battlefield and enables the maneuver forces to accomplish the mission.

Endnotes

1. Army Techniques Publication 4-02.2, *Medical Evacuation*, 12 AUG 2014, paragraph 5-42.

2. Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 05 MAY 2014, paragraph 12-2.

Chapter 4

Administrative and Logistics Operations Center

CPT Andrew Hines and SFC Charmarlina Brazile,
Task Force Engineer Sustainment Team, Sustainment Task Force,
Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group

Company A, brigade engineer battalion (BEB), submits a morning logistics status (LOGSTAT) reporting it is currently holding 400 gallons of water, unverified, putting the company at its storage capacity. An hour later, headquarters platoon checks Company A's water supply level and realizes it is at 20 gallons. The Company A executive officer sends a request to the battalion logistics staff officer (S-4) for an emergency resupply of water. The distribution platoon from the forward support company is currently on a logistics package (LOGPAC) en route to Company A, BEB, to resupply the company with meals ready to eat and ammunition, but not water, based on the morning LOGSTAT submission. Because of inaccurate LOGSTAT reporting, the distribution platoon was unable to provide the maneuver element with water in the time required and, in turn, had to perform an additional LOGPAC to resupply the company.

Commanders and leaders receive continuous feedback to identify unit training deficiencies during rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). This training ultimately improves the Army and prepares the force for future operations. JRTC continues to serve as an advocate for Army transformation, leading change in developing and integrating emerging organizations, technologies, and doctrine.

Since 2003, JRTC and the other combat training centers primarily focused on mission rehearsal exercises to train units for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. After 2005, the mission rehearsal exercises focused on stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This long-term focus meant that a new generation of Soldiers had only limited experience in unified land operations, especially decisive action (DA) operations. Some units today struggle with field craft and other DA tasks. COIN is not the common fault in these issues; rather, the sustained stability and COIN operations in mature theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that units enjoyed a wealth of sustainment resources typically not afforded units arriving to immature theaters. Rotations at JRTC replicate an immature theater through the decisive action training environment (DATE) and joint forcible entry design. Through DATE, Army units seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy while operating in a bare-base environment.

DATE rotations at JRTC occur in phases, beginning with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); then joint forcible entry; followed by defensive operations; and then offensive operations. Sustainment typically addresses critical actions essential to the success of DA operations. Units arriving at JRTC will not have the luxury of conducting a relief in place/transfer of authority with an existing element. DATE rotations provide units the unique experience of operating in an immature theater of operations. Therefore, units must come to JRTC with established systems, processes, and a basic understanding that there is extremely limited military infrastructure available to enhance their operations.

The purpose of RSOI is to establish the desired combat power while setting conditions within the operational environment. The effectiveness of the RSOI operation depends on the ability of the administrative and logistics operations center (ALOC) to track and articulate the task force's level of operational readiness prior to executing onward movement. As the initial step in introducing combat power, reception can determine success or failure of the RSOI operation. Both the personnel staff officer (S-1) and S-4 play a critical role by ensuring the task force synchronizes its equipment, supplies, and capabilities flow, essentially getting the right equipment to the right place at the right time.

The combat trains command post (CTCP) is commonly used to synchronize sustainment efforts in the task force. The ALOC, along with the S-1 and S-4, the medical officer (MEDO), and an element of the forward support company, constitute the CTCP. The CTCP enhances overall personnel services, health service support, field services, maintenance, and distribution through collaborative planning and sustainment integration. The CTCP is the coordination center for sustainment requirements for the task force. The S-1 coordinates with the MEDO to provide medical support to units conducting operations. Additionally, the S-1 collaborates with the MEDO to track casualties seamlessly and accurately. Furthermore, the S-1 develops the casualty estimates, driving the medical and logistic requirements to support task force operations.

The CTCP performs the following functions:

- Plans and coordinates sustainment for tactical operations

- Serves as alternate for the main command post (CP)

- Prepares to shift support if the main effort changes

- Reports to the main CP any change in the ability of the sustainment system to support the operation

- Maintains LOGSTAT reports on all organic, attached, combat, and sustainment units operating within the task force

- Aggregates the reported logistics data to report to higher headquarters

- Ensures accountability of all assigned or attached task force personnel

- Coordinates the evacuation of casualties, equipment, and enemy prisoners of war

The CTCP also monitors the current tactical situation on the command net to assume its function as the alternate main CP. The CTCP leaders continuously update tactical situation maps and charts based on information gathered from various sources.

Within every organization, regardless of rank, it is essential to appoint an officer in charge. The S-4 usually assumes this role within the ALOC/CTCP under the watch of the battalion executive officer. The S-4 directs ALOC/CTCP operations according to the following basic principles of sustainment:

- Integration

- Anticipation

- Responsiveness

- Simplicity

- Economy

- Survivability

- Continuity

- Improvisation

The S-4 fully maximizes sustainment capabilities to extend the logistical operational reach and endurance of the task force. The S-4 is responsible for operations, movement, and security of the combat trains. The S-4 continually assesses the situation, anticipates the needs of units, and prepares to push support forward. The S-4's anticipation of logistic requirements is key to successfully supporting the maneuver unit's desired momentum. The task force ALOC/CTCP anticipates the Warfighter's needs by analyzing LOGSTAT and personnel status (PERSTAT) to develop running estimates. The daily LOGSTAT enables the S-4 to determine consumption rates, on-hand quantities, and unit requests. The S-4 then can determine what to provide the units based on the priority of support and availability of supply. Accurate and timely submission of the LOGSTAT is imperative for mission success. Through these submissions, the S-4 can aggregate and report accurate numbers to the brigade support battalion, which, in turn, projects resupply quantities for the supported task force. Consider the opening vignette: A bad LOGSTAT can have negative rippling effects. The maneuver unit did not receive the water needed without a second LOGPAC. Soldiers unnecessarily went without water; other Soldiers went without sleep because the distribution platoon was unable to establish a proper work-rest cycle. The situation could have been worse; Soldiers assumed unnecessary risk due to additional movements in a combat environment.

Common Sustainment Challenges

The challenges described below are observations from JRTC rotations in 2015.

Shifting to a Field Mindset

Battalion sustainment cells sometimes lack the necessary confidence to operate in an austere environment because of inadequate training at home station. For an ALOC, operating in a tactical environment differs from performing daily duties in garrison, where the S-1 and S-4 independently handle tasks ranging from administrative actions to budget management. Because of limited staff integration in garrison, units may struggle to work as a cohesive team when deployed to a tactical environment such as JRTC. In this setting, the ALOC's primary focus is to track casualties and forecast logistical requirements and personnel replacements. It is essential for the ALOC to synchronize its efforts toward projected mission requirements, ensuring sustainment conditions are set for the task force.

Practicing Tactical Knowledge Management in a Decisive Action Training Environment

Logistics information management is the pillar of Warfighter sustainment. ALOCs tend to be at a disadvantage when they do not employ their modified table of organization and equipment, such as the Combat Service Support Automated Information Systems Interface and VSAT (very small aperture terminal), in a deployed environment. These systems allow the ALOC to transition from analog to digitally improved logistics functions and systems. Digital capabilities allow

sustainment principal officers (such as the S-1, S-4, and MEDO) to influence a commander's tactical thinking. The commander then can adjust the way the formation fights through essential decision points that may involve critical personnel shortages, primary and alternate supply routes, maintenance, the medical concept of support, and the buildup or degradation of combat power.

Within the ALOC, the Army Battle Command System and sub-systems such as the Sustainment System Mission Command (SSMC) and Command Post of the Future can shape operations. It is critical that ALOCs utilize these systems to develop the logistics common operational picture (COP) and forecast sustainment requirements. ALOCs often do not employ these systems. When they do, they have a limited number of trained and proficient operators.

Sustainment Best Practices

ALOCs/CTCPs that follow the principles of sustainment at JRTC enjoy greater success.

The Principles of Integration, Anticipation, and Responsiveness

A logistics COP must reflect a maneuver world. Portray the logistics COP with both personnel and casualty estimates derived from analysis from intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Include overlays that depict tactical mission graphics and control measure for sustainment. The ALOC/CTCP must integrate these sustainment operational graphics into the operations process.

Embed a medical representative as a liaison under the CTCP model for streamlined, accurate, and updated patient and casualty reporting with the S-1.

Integrate an element from the forward support company (FSC) with the CTCP. The FSC team can provide more responsiveness and flexibility by positioning supplies and capabilities forward on the battlefield.

Combine PERSTATs as planning factors for Class I and V supply requirements and consumption rates.

Incorporate the movement and transportation of remains with distribution assets within the FSC (dependent on mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]) into the mortuary affairs plan with planning consideration outputs of the battalion medical concept of support.

Simplicity

Use the Joint Capabilities Release tracking system, Blue Force Tracking, and SSMC with the Logistics Reporting Tool to standardize logistical reporting to higher headquarters. Publish a clearly defined Sustainment Annex F and concept of support and establish ALOC battle rhythms (logistics synchronization) meetings and personnel and logistical reporting timelines.

Conclusion

In closing, units regularly deploy to JRTC eager to assume any combat mission presented to them, but they sometimes lack the tactical experience to operate in a field environment. Units experience similar preventable friction points within the ALOC/CTCP. They need to establish

standard operating procedures, battle drills, and battle rhythms to enhance their effectiveness, streamline sustainment operations, and ultimately achieve shared understanding across the cell. Additionally, units can experience a higher rate of success by ensuring they are properly equipped and trained on all sustainment-relevant command systems and sub-systems. Finally, ALOCs/CTCPs must clearly define roles and responsibilities. Defined roles and responsibilities ensure that information is properly received and analyzed by the appropriate personnel who produce refined running estimates and ultimately keep the Warfighter adequately supported for the duration of the operation.

Doctrinal Publications

- Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, *Sustainment*, 31 JUL 2012

- Field Manual (FM) 3-21.20, *The Infantry Battalion*, 13 DEC 2006

- FM 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team*, 08 OCT 2015

- FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 05 MAY 2014

- FM 4-95, *Logistics Operations*, 01 APR 2014

Chapter 5

Two-Minute Battle Drill

MAJ Allen Tapley, MAJ Charles Roosa, and MSG Edwin Clouse, Task Force Sustainment

At one point in his or her career, every logistician has stepped into a position just before a major training exercise, command post exercise, or combat training center rotation. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, outlines the staff's responsibilities and what it must do for the commander.[1] As leaders, we struggle to find systems for our staff sections that will ensure staff synchronization. Shared understanding forces staffs to update running estimates on a regular basis. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, shared understanding is part of the philosophy of mission command, which balances the art of command with the science of control. ADP 6.0 defines the science of control as "systems and procedures used to improve the commander's understanding and support accomplishing missions."[2] Subordinate companies suffer when staff officers get the science of control wrong. Every company commander and first sergeant knows the frustration of getting five different staff officers calling during any given day, asking for the same information that companies already provide to one staff officer on a daily basis. What systems can be put in place to ensure that the staff sections cross talk? Is there a system that is also a forcing function to get staff sections to update running estimates?

The answer is yes. Commander's update briefs (CUBs), battle update briefs (BUBs), and shift-change briefs are used to share information and synchronize understanding. These briefs are generally battle rhythm events. As such, it is known — in theory — when they will occur. What about times between CUBs and BUBs? At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), a two-minute drill is continuously coached with staff sections, and it works. Try it!

The two-minute drill (the term is based on a football analogy) is basically a mini-CUB. The two-minute drill allows staff sections to quickly inform the commander, executive officer (XO), command sergeant major, or a distinguished visitor of any pertinent information of a specific date and time. Each staff group provides its own piece of information. When the information is put together, it provides understanding for the commander by creating a common operational picture (COP) in a short amount of time. This snap requirement forces staff sections to maintain updated running estimates so they can brief at any time deemed sufficient. Having staff sections maintain their running estimates also helps improve efficiencies when conducting mission analysis during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

What makes up the two-minute drill? It depends on what the battalion commander wants to know, but, typically, it consists of the following factors, with briefers, in the following order:

- Intelligence officer (S-2)

    ○ Enemy significant activities and their effects on the battalion

    ○ Enemy effects on logistics

    ○ Current weather and any weather activities that could affect the brigade sustainment battalion (BSB) operations or mission

- Operations officer (S-3)

  - Current friendly forces significant activities

  - Route status

  - Current mission status (current and upcoming convoys)

- Adjutant (S-1)

  - The number of personnel currently on the ground at every location for the BSB (forward support companies and forward logistics element, if deployed)

  - Any wounded or killed in action packets that have been completed or are being worked on

- Supply officer (S-4)

  - BSB combat power with current status update with estimated shipping dates or estimated completion dates

  - Current logistics status for the battalion

- Communications officer (S-6)

  - Current status of communication

  - Current battalion primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications to higher command

  - Current battalion PACE to subordinate command

  - Current PACE to convoy

  - If deployed, the forward logistics element PACE

- Support operations officer (SPO)

  - Logistics COP

  - Brigade combat power change

The order is important because operations are based on intelligence. After current operations are briefed, personnel and equipment are next. Communications are important and tie everything together. The SPO briefs the current logistical posture for the brigade and provides updates on resupply. At JRTC, this order was found to work best. However, it can be modified to best suit the organization.

Why is a two-minute drill important for developing an effective common operational picture?

First, it takes a forcing function to make staff sections update their running estimates. The majority of the information used comes from running estimates. Does this mean that running estimates have to be updated every hour on the hour? Absolutely not. It means that running estimates will be updated when necessary, based on occurring events in the area of operations.

Second, staff sections tend to put information near the analog map board with "as of" dates, making it easier to brief in the event a two-minute drill is called.

Third, it takes a forcing function to update the analog map board, creating the analog common operating picture that matches the digital COP.

Fourth, it promotes cross talk among the staff sections.

Fifth, the two-minute drill instills confidence in staff sections and creates a COP for everyone on the staff. As a result, the commander can trust that staff members are competent and understand their roles and responsibilities. It is also an outstanding tool for the battalion XO to use as a forcing function to ensure the staff sections are updating their running estimates.

In conclusion, a well-run staff will continuously update its running estimates. The challenge has always been ensuring that staff sections update their running estimates. Staff officers must understand that their main purpose is to give the commander the right information at the right time so the commander can make sound decisions. As Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, states, "staffs support the commander in understanding situations, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress by providing timely and relevant information and analysis."[3] This concept enables leaders to create forcing functions that are used to ensure that running estimates are updated. The two-minute drill can serve as a forcing function that brings many other benefits.

Endnotes

1. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 MAY 2012, paragraphs 3-14 through 3-35.

2. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 MAY 2012, paragraph 32.

3. Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 05 MAY 2014, paragraph 3-57.

Chapter 6

Managing External and Internal Support Requirements

CPT Eric Shockley

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Brigade support battalion (BSB) staffs, along with company- and battalion-level leaders, constantly must mentally separate the BSB's brigade combat team (BCT) sustainment requirements from internal BSB logistics requirements. BSBs that fail to make this distinction have difficulty executing day-to-day internal battalion operations while supporting the BCT. This statement is based on observations of unit rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA.

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-90, *Brigade Support Battalion*, breaks the BSB staff's sustainment personnel into two sections: "Sustain I" for the BSB S-1 and S-4 and "Sustain II" for the support operations (SPO) staff. [1]

One example of this separation is the battalion S-4's responsibility for BSB transportation. ATP 4-90 states that the BSB S-4 "coordinates the strategic and operational deployment of the BSB, as well as the request for movement through controlled routes," and "assists in developing unit movement plans for the BSB." [2]

Sustainment company commanders must know which of their assets are for internal use and which assets are dedicated to BCT-level support, such as the light medium tactical vehicles in a light truck platoon. Company commanders and their executive officers (XOs) must then work with the battalion S-4 to coordinate movement of additional unit equipment.

They must also work with the SPO and battalion S-3 to ensure that the company's projected buildup of combat power is nested with the battalion's planned buildup of combat power. Because BSB units operate throughout a BCT's area of operations, the BSB S-3 section is also responsible for ensuring that subordinate unit movements are coordinated with adjacent battalion BCT-level operations within an area of operations.

For my examples below, I should clarify that a troop is a unit equivalent in size to a company or battery; a squadron is equivalent to a battalion; and a regiment is equivalent to a BCT. Within a regiment, the BSB element is known as the regimental support squadron (RSS).

Learning the Hard Way

As an RSS S-4 in an armored cavalry regiment at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, I learned the hard way the importance of separating BCT and internal BSB operations. As my RSS prepared to move into the training area, I assumed (incorrectly) that the SPO transportation cell would handle the squadron's movement requirements.

I quickly learned that was not the case and subsequently spent a long day identifying requirements and marrying loads to trailers and flat racks. I also had to synchronize the squadron's movement with the SPO transportation officer in charge in conjunction with the rest of the regiment's movement into the training area.

Applying Lessons

I took this lesson with me as I took command of the regimental supply and transportation troop that had a distribution mission. I tried to get my leaders to understand our troop's split roles, which were our internal troop operations and external regimental support missions.

The transportation troop owned and operated the only heavy equipment transporters (HETs) in our regiment, so the prevailing thought within our troop was that we could use them whenever we needed to transport our own equipment to external locations. I had to explain that this line of thinking was incorrect.

As the commander, I was responsible for the maintenance and accountability of the HETs, along with providing trained and ready crews to operate them, but I did not have the authority to task those HETs. I explained to my team that the proper way to use the HETs for internal transportation requirements was for me or my troop XO to submit a request to the RSS S-4. The S-4 would then submit the request to the SPO transportation cell.

SPO transportation would call down to my truck master to verify availability of assets. After confirming availability and balancing any competing requirements, SPO transportation would notify the squadron S-4 of the approval, and the S-4 would in turn tell me or my XO. SPO transportation would also pass the mission over to the squadron S-3 so that a mission order could be issued to my unit to execute the task. This may seem like a roundabout way of doing things, but it was the right process to ensure that the authorized person released the HETs (a regimental asset).

Applying Doctrine

ATP 4-90 states, "S-3 plans and operations officers plan tactical troop movements, including route selection, priority of movement, timing, security, bivouacking, quartering, staging, and preparing movement orders."[3] BSB S-4 personnel must adhere to this same process as they work to evacuate equipment and move supplies within the BSB, since a company commander could receive competing missions from the S-3, S-4, and even the SPO.

Discipline among the staff in routing missions to the units can help prevent overcommitting the unit and forcing a company commander to try to figure out mission priority.

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) can help with this process as long as the battalion's tactical SOP is nested with the SPO section's external support SOP. The external support SOP must identify which assets are common user land transportation (CULT) assets so that the BSB S-4 and company-level leaders will not dedicate those assets for internal missions.

The CULT concept can also be applied to the use of the bulk fuel and water in the distribution company, the employment of wreckers from the maintenance company, and the management of medical evacuation platforms within the medical company.

Brigade Support Battalion Rehearsals

A contributing factor to the inability to separate the two support areas is often observed during JRTC rotations when BSBs do not have a battalion-level rehearsal (incorporating movement and occupation) but instead incorporate battalion internal operations into the BCT sustainment

rehearsal. This quickly leads to confusion on the objective or in the assembly area when the quartering party arrives at the brigade support area (BSA) site and fails to execute quartering party tasks.

When the rest of the BSB arrives at the BSA, no plan is in place to receive and emplace units. This leads to conflicting priorities of work and misplaced units. Other effects include lapses in security and an unbalanced work/rest cycle while units attempt to occupy their areas and conduct support missions.

A BSB must execute a separate rehearsal of its occupation plan to synchronize actions among its companies. This will allow BSBs to perform their initial BSA occupation tasks that are similar to any battalion-sized unit occupying an assembly area.

Security, field hygiene, communication, work/rest plans, and preparing to receive follow-on forces are generic tasks that BSBs must be able to execute like any other battalion if they hope to successfully execute their sustainment mission. One technique that units can use to achieve success is to develop SOPs that identify the support process and make the distinction between BSB occupation rehearsals and BCT sustainment rehearsals.

Developing and using SOPs can be a technique to streamline BSA establishment. As unit leaders prioritize available training time, they should maximize training events by incorporating SOPs to the maximum extent and conducting a thorough validation and revision of the SOPs. ATP 4-90 emphasizes this concept, stating, "The most successful units follow and revise SOPs throughout training and mission execution."[4]

Brigade Support Battalion S-4

BSB S-4s cannot assume that supply requirements will be lumped in with the SPO section's logistics status tracking. The S-4 must analyze logistics requirements internal to the BSB using company input on expected fuel consumption and supply requirements for the headquarters and companies.

The S-4 must work directly with the BSB S-3 (and typically the headquarters and headquarters company commander) to identify the Class IV (construction/barrier materials) requirements to properly secure the BSA. These requirements must then be submitted to the BCT S-4 and SPO in order to coordinate resupply.

Sustainment leaders who can maintain the mental separation between BSB operations and BCT sustainment will have a better chance of success with less confusion and wasted effort. Units that fail to maintain this separation will struggle to establish operations and sustain the BCT, especially in an austere operational environment.

Endnotes

1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-90, *Brigade Support Battalion,* 02 APR 2014, paragraph 2-12.

2. ATP 4-90, paragraph 2-16.

3. ATP 4-90, paragraph 2-22.

4. ATP 4-90, paragraph 8-21.

Chapter 7

Why Sustainers Should Care About the Targeting Process

MAJ Steven T. Smith

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In the Army, there exists a misconception that the targeting process is applicable only to fires, movement and maneuver, and military intelligence activities. This fallacy leads sustainment units and their company-level leaders to disregard their relevance to the targeting process, and many of them do not know how to leverage it to increase Soldier survivability.

Observer-coach/trainers noticed these shortfalls at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, where two trends emerged: most sustainers did not understand how to participate in the targeting process, and sustainers did not always clearly understand their relevance to targeting working groups. Both trends occurred because sustainers did not know how the targeting process integrates sustainment problem sets into the big picture.

The purpose of this article is to help both the sustainment community and company-level leaders understand how to leverage the targeting process to increase survivability of Soldiers.

Targeting and Sustainment

Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines targeting as "the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them considering both operational requirements and capabilities." In other words, the targeting process provides an effective method for aligning capabilities against targets, both lethal and nonlethal.

Chapter 1 of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 4-0, *Sustainment*, describes the eight principles of sustainment as fundamental for the sustainment community's capabilities to maintain combat power, enable strategic and operational reach, and provide commanders with operational endurance. One of the principles the publication describes is survivability — the capability of military forces to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.

Survivability is especially relevant to units performing tactical convoy operations. The targeting process can help the sustainment community and company-level leaders focus their efforts toward survivability.

Participating in Targeting

At the brigade combat team level, both the battalion and brigade S-4s can use the targeting process much like they already use the logistics synchronization meeting. Focusing on the principle of sustainment survivability, battalion and brigade S-4s can participate in targeting working groups at their respective levels in order to align mobility or counter-mobility protection assets either to a forward support company or to brigade support battalion logistics convoys. (See Figure 7-1, next page.)

Sample Targeting List With Sustainment Highlights

Current Operations | **Future Operations**

Date-Time Group	16 FEB	17 FEB	18 FEB	19 FEB	20 FEB	21 FEB	22 FEB	23 FEB
S-2	RT ZINC 0900-1000 IED emplacement windows; 1500-1600 IED emplacement window vicinity Turani and Dara Lam							
	RT GOLD 0800-1100 IED with small arms attacks vicinity check point 10A; 1400-1500 IED with mortars vicinity check point 13B							
	A/DACG 0600-0800 Enemy mortar fire; 1700-1900 Enemy mortar fire							
	BSA 0530-0630 Enemy mortar fire; 1700-1900 Enemy mortar fire; Enemy recon of BSA; 1230-1400 BOLO vicinity WHT FORD observed							
RCP	RCP 1 RT ZINC start point BSA 0730; Arrive Turani on or about start point Dara Lam 1545							
	RCP 2 RT GOLD start point BSA 0700; Arrive 10A on or about 0730 start point 13B 1430							
BSA	0430 Stand to until complete; 1630 until complete stand to							
A/BSB	T: LOGPAC P: SPT 4/25 SP 1300	T: LOGPAC P: SPT 3/25 SP 1130	T: Sling P: SPT Recon / T: LOGPAC P: SPT 4/25 SP 1300	T: LOGPAC P: SPT 3/25 SP 1130	T: Sling P: SPT Recon / T: LOGPAC P: SPT 4/25 SP TBD	T: Sling P: SPT Recon		
B/BSB	T: SPT A CO P: LOGPAC SP 1300	T: SPT A CO P: LOGPAC SP 1130	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP 1300	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP 1130	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP TBD			
C/BSB	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP 1300	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP 1130	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP 1300	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP 1130	T: SPT A Co P: LOGPAC SP TBD			
UAV	T: Recon P: GOLD/13B 1330-1430	T: Recon Turani 1100-1200	T: Recon P: GOLD/13B 1330-1430	T: Recon Turani 1100-1200	T: Recon P: GOLD/13B TBD			
AWT/AVN	T: SPT CNVY GOLD/13B 1315 & 1415	T: SPT CNVY Turani 1115	T: SPT CNVY GOLD/13B 1315 & 1415	T: SPT CNVY Turani 1115	T: SPT CNVY GOLD/13B TBD			
S-3 and Staff	Battle track current mission 16 FEB / Finalize coordination for 17 FEB missions / Issue order for 18 FEB mission / Conduct targeting covering 16-23 FEB							
SPO Staff	Finalize coordination for 18-19 FEB missions / Provide S-3 staff details in targeting meeting for missions 19 FEB and forward / Conduct targeting covering 16-23 FEB							

LEGEND

A/DACG	arrival/departure airfield control group	recon	reconnaissance
AVN	aviation	RT	route
AWT	aerial weapons team	S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
BSA	brigade support area	S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
BSB	brigade support battalion	SP	start point
CNVY	convoy	SPO	support operations officer
Co	company	SPT	support
IED	improvised explosive device	T	task
LOGPAC	logistics package	TBD	to be determined
P	purpose	UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
RCP	route clearance patrol		

Figure 7-1. An example of a targeting list with sustainment highlights.

Company-level leaders typically rely on a battalion or brigade S-2 to provide analyses that predict enemy activity over both time and space. However, the missing link for convoy commanders is aligning protection assets to increase Soldier survivability. The targeting working group does not always align all friendly protection assets, such as unmanned aerial systems, close air support, air weapons teams, and scout weapon teams, with ground assets, such as forward support company and brigade support battalion logistics convoys.

The working group is a prime opportunity for the battalion or brigade S-4 to request those assets to provide survivability protection and thus increase the commander's operational momentum in an immature environment. Once a battalion or brigade S-4 aligns an asset with a logistics convoy, the start point times become more urgent than when no predictive analysis is done.

Company-level leaders also can apply the targeting methods to everyday events. For instance, most company-level leaders conduct a daily or weekly troop-to-task coordination to align Soldiers and resources with taskings assigned by the battalion S-3 staff. This coordination is essentially an internal targeting working group.

Company-level leaders can expand the simple troop-to-task method by applying the targeting process to request aerial protection assets or ground protection assets (such as route clearance packages and military police convoy security platforms). By planning with this level of detail, leaders can better ensure their Soldiers are protected as they traverse an area of operations.

Sustainers in Working Groups

Sustainment leaders rarely participate in targeting working groups. This is largely because they are inexperienced or lack understanding of the process. The limiting factor that no one clearly understands or can demonstrate is how sustainment drives maneuver efforts. This is unfortunate because sustainment leaders' lack of participation may drastically reduce how they protect their force in order to ensure the commander's operational reach and endurance.

S-4s are not the only sustainers who play a vital role in the targeting process. Battalion medical officers and brigade surgeons also play critical roles. For example, the brigade surgeon can participate in nonlethal effects working groups in order to provide a different perspective on nonlethal targeting. The medical officers can also work with organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, Doctors Without Borders, the World Health Organization, and the American Red Cross.

The targeting process can assist both company-level leaders and sustainment units to increase operational reach and survivability by mapping out both friendly and enemy key events over space and time. The targeting process enables sustainment leaders to effectively protect the force, thus satisfying the sustainment principle of survivability in order to promote combat power, enable strategic and operational reach, and provide commanders with operational endurance.

Chapter 8

Four Keys to Forward Support Company Success
at the Joint Readiness Training Center

CPT Daniel W. Ludwig

Reprinted with permission from *Army Sustainment,* September-October 2015

Forward support companies should consider these training and procedure recommendations to prepare for a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. Observer-coach/trainers at JRTC at Fort Polk, LA, noted over a two-year period some common trends within brigade support battalions (BSBs). From these observations, they identified four tips that will help forward support companies (FSCs) succeed during their JRTC rotations and improve their overall readiness. These tips are low impact but yield tremendous results at JRTC and on the battlefield.

Figure 8-1. A captain tells his team how he wants his command post set up at JRTC at Fort Polk, LA. (Photo by CPT Daniel W. Ludwig)

1. Update and Distribute a Standard Operating Procedure

Come to JRTC with a current standard operating procedure (SOP). All the subsequent keys to success start with a current published and distributed SOP.

Most units come to JRTC without a published SOP to follow. If a unit is fortunate enough to have one, the SOP is usually out of date. In addition, an FSC that does have an SOP usually has only one copy. That single copy may be sitting on a desk collecting dust in the commander's office at home station. Often, the individual Soldiers in the unit either do not know it exists or have never seen it, much less read it.

Review the battalion tactical SOP. Appoint a junior officer and noncommissioned officer to update, publish, and distribute a company SOP using the battalion tactical SOP as a guide. This will give you a standard to adhere to and build on as you develop junior leaders. The time spent will pay high dividends when you deploy to JRTC because it will improve the unit's overall readiness.

Ask for a sample SOP. At JRTC, the operations group has a wealth of proven products that have been amassed over time. You should use your battalion products first, but if you are still struggling to find a good place to start, contact the operations group. The observer coach/trainers at Fort Polk are more than willing to help you be successful with your rotation and future operations. All you have to do is ask.

Once you have your SOP in the hands of all your Soldiers, use it. Make it mandatory knowledge, and enforce its use in all aspects of your training.

2. Train on Preparing for a Tactical Convoy

Most units are not trained in mission essential task list (METL) Task 55–2–4002, Prepare for Tactical Convoy. This results in a long list of subsequent failures that have catastrophic second- and third-order effects during convoy operations.

Train on precombat checks and inspections and troop leading procedures (TLPs). Soldiers and leaders struggle with precombat checks and inspections and TLPs in general. Correct these shortfalls with a current SOP that standardizes the use of TLPs when preparing a unit for a tactical convoy.

Requiring that the following TLPs be followed leads to the FSC getting a "go" on the performance measures at JRTC:

- Commander reviews the warning order and begins to make a tentative plan to conduct the mission.

- Reconnaissance party conducts route reconnaissance.

- Unit prepares personnel, vehicles, and equipment for movement.

- Element leaders organize convoy elements for movement.

- Unit prepares to cross the start point by designating the prescribed time in the operation order.

Give practice briefs. In addition to having a standard in the unit SOP for how to prepare for a tactical convoy and training on this task during leader's time training, have your unit give convoy briefs before every movement.

It can be as simple as conducting a brief when your unit picks up ammunition for a range. Pick a leader, and have him brief according to your SOP standard. Practice as often as possible whenever your FSC conducts any kind of mission involving movement. This repetition will make leaders more familiar with the briefing process and what they need to cover in order to be successful in future operations.

Make sure your leaders are conducting backbriefs. At a minimum, every Soldier should be able to brief the route, checkpoints, and all of the battle drills associated with conducting a tactical convoy.

3. Train on Convoy Defense

METL Task 55-2-4006 deals with convoy defense. Most Soldiers do not know their convoy battle drills, and many units have not rehearsed or practiced them prior to coming to JRTC. This results in catastrophic losses for both personnel and equipment when the opposing force attacks the rotational training unit along the routes.

Include standard battle drills in the tactical SOP. The SOP should clearly outline what the battle drills are and what actions are to be taken for each one. The individual and collective tasks associated with convoy operations are quite extensive. Therefore, once you have a clear SOP, you may want to establish a separate SOP strictly for convoys.

You must allocate a great deal of your quarterly training time to building proficiency. Have multiple repetitions that build on previous training and ultimately lead to a culminating training exercise.

Run convoy situational training exercises and live fires. Schedule a convoy situational training exercise lane or convoy live fire for the end of the quarter before coming to JRTC. Training for this starts at the beginning of the quarter and ties in with the training for preparing a unit for a tactical convoy.

When using the crawl, walk, run method and task, conditions, and standards associated with conducting a tactical convoy, use every movement as an opportunity to train on your battle drills. Pick one drill, brief it in the convoy brief, conduct the movement, and then simulate reacting to one of the battle drills. After the mission, conduct an after action review, identify the friction points in your reactions to that drill, and refine your SOP.

Do this in conjunction with your leader's time training, and build each week upon the last. Ultimately, you should be working toward a convoy live fire or situational training exercise lane that has all the battle drills emplaced along the route.

Figure 8-2. A lieutenant gives a convoy brief prior to a mission at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA. (Photo by CPT Daniel W. Ludwig)

4. Train on Command Post Setup and Operation

METL Task 63-2-4012 is establish and operate a command post (CP). Units are coming to JRTC with the guidance that they are going to be austere while operating in the box. They mistake "small footprint" and "austere" to mean they cannot have power to run their digital systems. However, the Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) is crucial to being successful at JRTC and in other austere environments.

BCS3 is tracked and reported higher when units are not using it. The trend is that units either have BCS3 at JRTC but are not using it or they are not bringing it at all.

Units that do come with BCS3 often do not have the current updates, and as a result, cannot use the system effectively. Furthermore, units seldom have trained personnel proficient in using the system.

Have both analog and digital trackers. Another common trend is that FSCs are not physically setting up their CPs to standard. Often, units are not familiar with the tasks associated with setting up a CP. In addition to digital systems, a successful FSC CP will have analog trackers. You should still be able to track commodities in the event you lose power.

The trend is that analog trackers are not being created or implemented. The result is that the FSC cannot track what the forward units have, what their rates of consumption are, or when they will need resupply. This causes reactive, as opposed to predictive, logistics and leads to no-notice missions for emergency resupply when a forward unit goes black.

Create a tactical SOP. Start with the unit SOP. Create an annex or chapter on how you will set up your CP, who will man what, what you are going to track, and how you are going to track it.

Start sending Soldiers to training to become proficient on BCS3. Also, take the system out and make sure you have the latest software. Furthermore, dedicate a few days each quarter to setting up your CP and running your daily operations from it. This will allow you to identify friction points and correct them before coming to JRTC.

By understanding these keys to success, planning your training accordingly, and implementing these recommendations, you will improve your FSC's overall readiness. Taking these steps should help your unit excel at JRTC and be successful in future operations.

Chapter 9

Integrating the Support Operations Medical Section Into Brigade Combat Team Medical Planning and Operations

CPT Clarence L. Ketterer

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The support operations (SPO) medical section is integral to synchronizing the brigade combat team's (BCT's) concept of medical support. Unfortunately, many BCTs deploy to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, without filling these critical positions. Or they fill these positions with inexperienced junior officers or noncommissioned officers who are unfamiliar with how their roles and responsibilities fit into the BCT's Army Health System (AHS) plan.

This problem is compounded by the fact that many logisticians in the brigade support battalion (BSB), to include the SPO and the operations staff officer (S-3), do not clearly understand how the medical teams are integrated. This article describes the roles and responsibilities of the essential medical staff members and explains how the BCT can integrate the medical team into the planning and operations process.

Roles and Responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of and the relationships among the BCT surgeon cell, the SPO medical section, and the battalion medical operations officer are very similar in nature to those of the BCT logistics staff officer (S-4), the SPO, and the battalion S-4s. (See Figure 9-1, next page.)

BCT surgeon cell. Like the BCT S-4 is responsible for developing the sustainment plan, the BCT surgeon is responsible for developing the AHS plan and determining the requirements necessary to support it.

The BCT surgeon cell is not designed or manned to manage the transition of the AHS plan from future operations to current operations. By properly staffing and employing the SPO medical section, the BCT surgeon cell can hand off the AHS plan for execution so that it can continue its designed function — planning for the future.

If the SPO medical section is not utilized properly, the BCT surgeon cell may attempt to manage the future-to-current-operations transitions and quickly become overwhelmed.

SPO medical section. The SPO medical section synchronizes the BSB's medical capabilities against the BCT requirements and coordinates support with echelons-above-brigade medical units, such as forward surgical teams, medical logistics companies, and blood platoons, to support BCT requirements that cannot be filled internally.

Because it is part of the planning process and has medical asset visibility throughout the BCT, the SPO medical section is responsible for providing medical operations guidance and reports to the BSB commander.

Roles and Responsiblities

Future Operations

Brigade Medical Planner
- Produces BCT orders for HSS.
- Provides input for medical IPB.
- Establishes medical reporting requirements.
- Tracks patients.
- Recommends medical reporting requirements.
- Determines BCT FHP requirements.
- Determines EAB requirements for BSB SPO MEDO.
- Works with the BCT S-1 to determine casualty estimates.
- Coordinates with air MEDEVAC assets.
- Publishes orders through the BCT S-3.
- Coordinates medical budget with the BCT S-4.

Brigade Surgeon
- Acts as senior adviser to the BCT commander for HSS.
- Responsible for the BCT FHP plan.
- Prioritizes MEDEVAC requests.
- Supervises technical training for medical personnel in the BCT.
- Acts as senior adviser to BCT providers and medical support personnel.
- Coordinates PROFIS.
- Recommends MEDEVAC policies and procedures.
- Ensures compliance with the MEDROE.
- Develops policies, protocols, and procedures for medical and dental treatment.

Future/Current Operations

BSB SPO Operations Officer
- Performs medical IPB for BSB.
- Synchronizes HSS in BCT.
- Acts as BCT point of contact for HSS.
- Coordinates ancillary services and assessments.
- Receives and consolidates BCT medical statistics.
- Communicates with battalion MEDOs and EAB assets.
- Monitors BCT HSS via mission command systems.
- Coordinates BCT taskings for the BSMC.
- Coordinates and tracks PM missions and assessments.
- Coordinates EAB requirements.
- Conducts the BCT MEDSYNCH.
- Publishes orders through the BSB S-3.

BSB SPO Medical Logistics Officer
- Inherently links to the BMSO.
- Determines the Class VIII (medical materiel) ASL, packing lists, and emergency push packs.
- Projects BCT Class VIII.
- Recommends budget guidance.
- Tracks BCT critical Class VIII and MED equipment maintenance.
- Acts as BCT MC4 point of contact.
- Coordinates all Class VIII movement requests.
- Plans for use of captured Class VIII and MED equipment.
- Coordinates RMW disposal.
- Coordinates MED maintenance for EAB enablers attached to the BCT.
- Conducts the BCT MEDSYNCH.

Current Operations

Battalion or Task Force MEDO
- Produces battalion MED annex to orders.
- Determines and synchronizes HSS.
- Coordinates Class VIII and BCT MED support.
- Communicates with the BCT MEDO and SPO MED section.
- Coordinates patient evacuation from company command posts to Role 1 facility.
- Establishes the Role 1 command post.
- Tracks patients and medical reporting for the battalion.
- Publishes orders through the battalion S-3.

Battalion Surgeon
- Advises the commander on the health of the command.
- Supervises technical training for medical personnel.
- Determines BAS manning and workload requirements.
- Ensures compliance with the MEDROE.
- Ensures medical personnel comply with treatment policies, protocols, and procedures.
- Develops the treatment area layout.

BSMC Commander
- Synchronizes Role II support with the BCT HSS plan.
- Integrates EAB MED assets into the BSMC footprint.
- Supports MEDEVAC and ancillary support requests.
- Orders, receives, and distributes Class VIII and provides MED maintenance for the BCT.

BMSO
- Manages BCT Class VIII ASL and warehouse.
- Supervises BCT MED maintenance.
- Orders BCT Class VIII using DCAM.
- Develops and stores Class VIII push packages.
- Coordinates Class VIII delivery with BSB SPO MEDLOG.
- Collects BCT RMW.

Legend

ASL	authorized stockage list	EAB	echelon above brigade	MEDLOG	medical logistics officer
BAS	battalion aid station	FHP	force health protection	MEDO	medical operations officer
BCT	brigade combat team	HSS	health service support	MEDROE	medical rules of engagement
BMSO	brigade medical supply officer	IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield		
BSB	brigade support battalion	MC4	medical communications for combat casualty care	MEDSYNCH	medical synchronization
BSMC	brigade support medical company			PM	preventive medicine
DCAM	Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support Customer Assistance Module	MED	medical	PROFIS	Professional Filler System
				RMW	regulated medical waste
				S-1	personnel staff officer
				S-3	operations staff officer
				S-4	logistics staff officer
				SPO	support operations

Figure 9-1. This table describes the roles and responsibilities of the medical staff in the brigade combat team.

Army Techniques Publication 4-90, *Brigade Support Battalion*, Chapter 2, describes SPO section roles and responsibilities that should fall to or include the SPO medical section.[1]

BSMC. The SPO medical section manages the brigade support medical company (BSMC) in the same manner that the SPO manages the distribution and maintenance companies in the BSB. The company receives taskings from the BSB S-3 through the orders process to support requirements that are generated from the SPO medical section as part of the BCT's AHS plan.

The SPO medical section synchronizes the movement of the BSMC's additional enablers, such as dental, preventive medicine, medical maintenance, and physical therapy, with the subordinate battalions as a part of the BCT's AHS plan.

The BSMC, like the distribution company, also serves as the supply support activity for Class VIII (medical materiel). The brigade medical supply officer resides in the BSMC but is aligned with the SPO section and acts as the Class VIII commodity manager, filling requirements generated by the SPO medical logistics officer. Field Manual 4-02.1, *Army Medical Logistics*, Appendix E, discusses the roles and responsibilities of the SPO medical logistics officer and the brigade medical supply officer in greater detail.[2, 3]

Medical Evacuation

The SPO medical section is essential to effective and well-synchronized medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Although most Soldiers see the MEDEVAC process as a current operations fight, it is actually a deliberate process that should employ the rapid military decisionmaking process.

MEDEVAC starts as a future operation and is handed off to current operations. The critical link in this process is the SPO medical section, which is crucial to synchronizing MEDEVAC support requirements.

As seen in Figure 9-2 (next page), the BSMC has limited mission command systems that may not be able to maintain situational awareness of current operations throughout the BCT. Because mission authority for MEDEVAC generally resides at the BCT, requests are submitted by the battalion to the BCT surgeon cell. The BCT surgeon cell then prioritizes the MEDEVAC requests and informs the SPO medical section of support requirements needed from the BSMC, such as ground evacuation assets, Class VIII, and security.

The SPO medical section then informs the BSMC of the requirements and synchronizes the movement of assets. Once patients arrive, the SPO medical section coordinates the evacuation of patients to higher roles of care.

Although most sustainment is meant to be predictive and many of the medical sustainment functions are, the medical team across the BCT is one of the only sustainment functions that routinely supports emergency requests.

Figure 9-2. This chart explains the mission command systems available to and medical reporting responsibilities of each medical element in the brigade combat team.

Mission Command Systems

The battalion and BCT medical planners have access to all of the major mission command systems. However, they do not own those resources, and they may not always be co-located with them.

This is common because the battalion medical planner normally moves among current operations, the battalion administrative and logistics operations center, and the Role 1 command post. In the same way, the BCT surgeon cell needs access both to the BCT administrative and logistics operations center and to BCT current operations to effectively manage the AHS plan.

The SPO medical section is located in the SPO cell, which has access to all of the major mission command systems without having to rely on current operations. This enables the SPO medical section to be responsive across all mission command systems at any time.

Figure 9-2 shows the flow of information between and the roles and responsibilities of the BCT SPO and the battalion medical planners and enablers for medical communications. It also shows the assets available to each section that must be considered when planning how to send and receive information.

Reporting Requirements

The SPO medical section is responsible for gathering and consolidating required reports. These reports are directed by the BCT surgeon cell with significant input from the SPO medical section. The SPO medical section gathers and consolidates the required reports, synchronizes medical support as needed, and works with the SPO and the S-3 section to publish medical support requirements in a tactical order.

Because the SPO medical section is responsible for managing and maintaining the medical common operational picture (MEDCOP), it also is responsible for entering the reported data into the MEDCOP. The MEDCOP should contain the locations of roles of care, Class VIII status, number of patients seen by type, and any other relevant information.

The MEDCOP, maintained in both digital and analog formats, uses the same maps as maneuver and logistics forces and is critical for improving situational awareness for the SPOs and decision-making commanders at all levels. Timely and accurate reports are required for the MEDCOP to be an effective tool.

This article is not designed to be the definitive reference for medical roles and responsibilities. It is each BCT medical team's responsibility to discuss, establish, and publish its roles and responsibilities in the applicable standard operating procedure so that it can be easily understood and followed during operations. Hopefully, this article has helped to explain the importance of the SPO medical section and the ways that it can be integrated into the planning and orders process to support BCT operations.

Endnotes

1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4–90, *Brigade Support Battalion*, 02 APR 2014, paragraphs 2-23 through 2-43.

2. Field Manual 4-02.1, *Army Medical Logistics*, 08 DEC 2009.

3. FM 4-02.1 has been superseded by ATP 4-02.1, *Army Medical Logistics*, 29 OCT 2015.

Chapter 10

Preparing Captains for Decisive Action

CPT Timothy J. Owens

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As combat training centers (CTCs) transition to mostly decisive action training environment scenarios, the Logistics Captains Career Course (LOGC3), formerly known as the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, must also continue to emphasize sustainment planning in a decisive action environment. As a result, graduates of the LOGC3 will be afforded a greater opportunity for success as they enter key developmental positions in operational units.

This article provides sustainment leaders with an in-progress review of how LOGC3 instructors are preparing junior officers for success by providing training based on CTC lessons learned.

Logistics Leader Development Board

The Logistics Leader Development Board recently approved three training objectives for LOGC3 students:

- Design a concept of support enabling unified land operations at the tactical level.

- Manage logistics operations at the tactical level during unified land operations.

- Command logistics companies in support of combined arms maneuver and small-scale movement.

All three of these objectives address company-grade lessons learned at the CTCs. An analysis of the LOGC3 curriculum shows that the instruction, practical exercises, and unique leadership electives all address key CTC observations of company-grade logistics officers.

Joint Readiness Training Center Lessons Learned

Task Force Sustainment at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has long identified trends and key lessons learned from rotational units deployed to Fort Polk, LA, for monthlong training exercises. Recently, units not scheduled to deploy in support of Operation Enduring Freedom have been participating in rotations designed around the decisive action training environment. The Army uses this model to provide a realistic environment to facilitate training objectives using data drawn from operational theaters. The decisive action training scenario is especially challenging for logistics units because they are required to provide sustainment on the move.

Numerous lessons learned have been gleaned from units training at JRTC. These insights are valuable in shaping home-station training and adjusting the LOGC3 curriculum. The lessons learned can be broken down into four categories:

- Roles and responsibilities

- Sustainment rehearsals

- Brigade support battalion (BSB) support operations (SPO) and operations staff officer (S-3) fusion

- Synchronized sustainment

Roles and responsibilities. The first lesson learned is the need to clearly define staff and command roles, responsibilities, and relationships for subordinate or attached units. The following improvements can be made to assist in this effort:

- Officers need to have a better understanding of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP); all too often units conduct an incomplete MDMP with limited guidance.

- Company-grade officers must learn the art of training management.

- The BSB staff must define and understand its roles and responsibilities before this information can be relayed to subordinate and attached units.

Sustainment rehearsals. The second lesson learned focuses on sustainment rehearsals and their undeniable value to the supported elements. During sustainment rehearsals, sustainers need to brief not only sustainment elements but also the maneuver and maneuver support elements so that the supported element understands how its plan will be sustained. It is essential that the Warfighter understands the sustainment plan and that the plan uses the eight principles of sustainment (discussed on pages 14-15) in its design and function. Rehearsals are critical for comprehending the entire plan and establishing how each section and unit fits into the scheme of maneuver and support.

SPO and S-3 fusion. The sustainment community is unique in that it has battalion and brigade S-4 officers focusing on internal logistics, as well as an SPO section focusing on external logistics support. The BSB staff must be synchronized in order to properly support the mission of the Warfighter. It also must have an internal discussion about who is responsible for what. The distinction between future operations and current operations should be delineated, and each section needs to own its piece. All too often, the lines between the BSB SPO and S-3 are blurred, causing confusion and inefficiency.

The art of forecasting and the use of staff running estimates must be emphasized across all levels of the staff in order to be proactive in sustainment instead of reactive. The company needs a knowledge management system in place to capture critical information for the commander to use to make decisions. The company command post must be fused with battalion operations. The fusion at the BSB SPO and S-3 level will trickle down to the company level and allow the company command post to share the SPO and S-3's logistics common operational picture. This sharing of knowledge will allow the company to see itself in time and space and better provide sustainment on the move.

Sustainment synchronization. All sustainment functions must be synchronized vertically and horizontally to provide timely and accurate logistics on the battlefield. Sustainment also needs to be synchronized with brigade operations to ensure seamless transitions and support. Sustainment leaders must maintain situational awareness of brigade and battalion operations. Digital systems can level the playing field by providing all echelons with a common operational picture. However, the BSB and sustainment elements tend to use digital enablers poorly. Developing a quality synchronization matrix appears to be a lost art. Synchronization between the BSB

and the forward support companies (FSCs) needs to occur routinely. This should be part of the sustainment battle rhythm; the FSCs should be acting as part of a deliberate and synchronized sustainment plan. Companies also need to make sure troop leading procedures parallel the MDMP; they are just as important to ensuring mission success. Developing and executing company standard operating procedures (SOPs) are also important. The value of a working SOP is underestimated, and organizations often scramble to conform to a different standard each time they conduct a mission. Having a working SOP mitigates this issue.

LOGC3's Value

LOGC3 continues to refine and update its program of instruction to adequately address lessons learned by company-grade officers. LOGC3 is divided into two phases: the common core phase and the logistics phase. Officers receive 90 hours of mission command and MDMP fundamentals in the common core phase. The logistics phase includes 143 hours of decisive action instruction, including a sustainment overview and functional area training (transportation, ammunition, maintenance, supply, field services, and medical logistics). During the logistics phase, students are evaluated through exercises that apply the fundamentals of sustainment planning and the MDMP.

There are two capstone exercises during the final weeks of the logistics phase. The logistics exercise is a group event that tests the students' ability to apply the MDMP and come up with solutions to sustainment problems in a decisive action scenario. The final project, the individual concept of support, requires students to work alone to create a synchronization matrix and concept of support for an armored brigade combat team on the offense. Students also receive 36 hours of digital enabler instruction, which includes training on key sustainment and mission command systems, such as the Battle Command Sustainment Support System, Command Post of the Future, and Global Combat Support System–Army.

In addition to the standard curriculum, LOGC3 provides leader professional development sessions that address the practical application of some topics discussed during the career course. These sessions involve issues ranging from the company commander and first sergeant relationship to training management and how to succeed as a commander during a combat training center rotation.

The LOGC3 curriculum covers the fundamentals that junior logistics officers should know prior to key developmental assignments. The blocks of instruction also adequately address critical company-grade lessons learned from the Army's CTCs. These lessons and blocks of instruction are posted on the Sustainment Unit One Stop website and are linked to the Forces Command Leader Development Toolbox, providing officers and leaders with key materials at home station once they graduate from LOGC3. The cornerstone of LOGC3 instruction will continue to relay the importance of the principles of mission command and the MDMP. Mission command and employing the MDMP are the main elements of success for completing LOGC3 and for survival at the CTCs. Having officers on a battalion or brigade staff who understand how to apply the MDMP is essential. Officers must also learn how to conduct sustainment rehearsals and briefing techniques to effectively relay their message to subordinates, peers, and supervisors alike.

Persistent emphasis on sustainment in a decisive action environment, mission command, and the MDMP will all be critical for future success. LOGC3 instructors will continue to coordinate with the CTCs on observations and with home-station units on complementing instruction with follow-on training.

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