

4th INFANTRY DIVISION
DECISIVE ACTION ROTATION
NTC 13-02
SENIOR LEADER OBSERVATIONS



16 NOV 2012



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4th INFANTRY DIVISION AND FORT CARSON
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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFYB-CG

16 NOVEMBER 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: NTC 13-02 Decisive Action Observations for Senior Leaders

1. Context. As our Army transitions towards Decisive Action operations, we must simultaneously consider both our approaches to Commander driven, bottom up refined training programs as well as the institutional and programmatic changes that must take place in order to enable us to meet our objectives for Army 2020. For the first time, our leaders are routinely training to employ a modular force against a high end/near peer hybrid threat in an asymmetrical environment. While tactical lessons learned are important, enabling this shift to effectively occur near simultaneously among our institutions weighs just as heavily. Strategic documents such as the newly published Army Training Strategy (dtd 3 OCT 12) have already begun to enable this shift.

2. From 22 OCT – 16 NOV 2012, 1/4 ABCT executed the second ABCT decisive action operation rotation against a high end/near peer threat at the National Training Center. In support of this exercise, the 4th Infantry Division deployed a Division TAC to serve as the higher level C2 node, re-blue ourselves in the Division level aspects of Decisive Action operations, and formulate TTPs and Division level processes in order to enable us to effectively conduct these types of operations above the Brigade level. These are our observations.

3. The observations included within this paper should at least be considered by all levels of our force as we execute this transition. There are aspects of modularity which have enabled us to achieve amazing results since 2005. However, there are some weaknesses within our modular forces and current institutional construct that we must compensate for as we execute this shift. Those adjustments may be the result of force structure changes years from now, immediate alteration of training methodologies, or simply refining current TTPs.

4. The Division welcomes comments regarding these observations and hopes that future readers will consider them as they prepare their forces to execute Decisive Action operations.

5. POC for further information is the LTC Simmering (DIV G3) at 719-503-0300 (DSN = 737) or michael.j.simmering.mil@mail.mil.


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NTC 13-02 Senior Leader Observations

Section I: Mission Command

1. Observation #1 - Putting it all Together: This proved the most challenging aspect of Decisive Action operations for BCT & BN level CDRs throughout the rotation. Our Army has placed emphasis on Mission Command systems over the last decade, providing BCTs with large amounts of equipment inside their command posts. Our Commanders wrestled with how to use these systems in a Decisive Action environment and maintain good mission command over their formation in this environment? Do you need a TAC at the BN level? BDE level? How do you structure your Mobile Command Groups at echelon to maintain control of the formation with the systems that you've been given? What are the redundant means of communication that our CDRs use across a larger battlespace? When the TOC jumps, who specifically performs all backup functions for the BDE? The "art" of putting it all together is something that we need to focus on as we move forward.

Applicability: All BN, BCT, and DIV Level Leaders

2. Observation #2 – Mission Command on the Move (1 of 2): If we are truly an offensively oriented formation capable of conducting combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations, then our MC structures must enable this focus. At the BCT level, MC on the move capabilities are lacking in comparison to Force XXI capabilities. Most notably, we have weighted BCT level Command Posts with complicated, not readily mobile equipment that moving a TOC requires 24 hours of stand down operations for a fully trained unit. While we emphasize the integration of our MC systems into operations, Battalions and Brigades have no capability to use these systems while conducting offensive operations over extended distances under their current MTOE configuration. In the 2003 attack in Iraq, V Corps saw this gap and utilized C2V's for command vehicles for the Corps TAC. While production on these network integrated vehicles was discontinued, in the following 9 years we have not rectified this shortcoming. As a result, our BCTs are forced to integrate complicated static networks that do not enable true mission command on the move. Our DIV and Corps level HQ's have no offensive C2 capability other than aviation platforms. As we look towards the next generation of C2 platforms, the Army requires a C2 on-the-move solution that enables the BCT and BN staff to utilize networked platforms during offensive operations.

Applicability: DA, FORSCOM, TRADOC, FCCO G3 FID.

3. Observation #3 – Mission Command on the Move (2 of 2): FBCB2 shortages among EPLRs equipped formations - Because of the use of EPLRS based systems over the last several years without an associated production capability to replace losses, EPLRS based ABCTs are facing a shortage of MCOTM systems such as FBCB2. Currently, 4th ID faces a shortage of nearly 200 systems across 3 x ABCTs. The lack of MTOE FBCB2 equipment degrades the unit's ability to maintain situational awareness when conducting wide area security operations over extended distances. Additionally, these EPLRS based formations have not kept procurement pace with the remaining 80% of the Army which is BFT equipped. When our

forces come together on the battlefield from different "modular" formations, interoperability issues naturally come to light. We must consider examining the plan for maintaining an adequate MCOTM capability until the next generation of equipment is fielded. Increased pace of retrograde operations from OIF/OEF may be a potential solution to fix the near term problem.

Applicability: OSD, DA G8, DA G4, FORSCOM G4, FCCO G4

4. Observation #4 – Mission Command Systems Validation Prior to Operations: The Mission Command validation exercise at NTC is a great 'shake down' to prepare units to utilize their mission command systems in combat. However, it is also an exercise in detailed planning that we cannot overstate. For example, validation for AFATDS is critical, but the timing of that validation is the difference between executing calibration for your FA systems on RSOI 3 or RSOI 4. The SEQUENCING of systems through IA validation is just as important as getting everything in place on RSOI 1. Young Brigade staff officers find this timing challenging to plan out because they do not necessarily understand how these pieces all fit together to achieve a system of systems capability. Small challenges such as the fact that our command post platforms 'on board' generators do not provide adequate power to support both TOC BCCS server stacks and Disaster Recovery (DR) stacks presented challenges. For 1BCT, they had the opportunity to execute a BCT level WFX just prior to the rotation which allowed them to plan their MC validation exercise in detail – yet they still made these small errors that cost them time. Future rotational units will not have the luxury of BCT WFXs conducted by MCTP to pre-validate their MC systems, yet the need to fully exercise all MC systems multiple times prior to arrival in theater is still required. For our next rotation (NTC 13-08), the Division will assist 2BCT with their home station Mission Command training by helping resource a home station WFX event out of hide. This is all about getting back to the ability of Commanders to prepare their units for combat by utilizing home station resources. We believe that we can continue to do so at Fort Carson, and NTC has demonstrated to us that home station WFXs/CPXs should remain a prerequisite for a CTC rotation and resourced as part of the CATS for a BCT. Resourcing these home station events through the existing Mission Training Complex resources is the near term challenge for Senior Commanders.

Applicability: All DIV, BCT, & BN Commanders & Staffs

5. Observation #5: Tracking of Enabler Units: While the DIV pushed for fidelity involving 1BCT actions, the Division did not track all the enabler units participating in the NTC 13-02 rotation. Given the modular nature of our forces, we often forget about the smaller F/MF units that show up to the rotation from a myriad of other installations. NTC 13-02 involves Soldiers from Fort Carson, Fort Riley, Fort Hood, as well as many other installations. Planning of an NTC rotation with these enablers while simultaneously executing their home station training plan is difficult for a BCT. 1ABCT knew of units participating in their rotation, but did not necessarily have visibility of their status and deployment actions. Numerous enabler units would arrive at various transportation nodes and then request movement support to the NTC. Additionally, as early as one month prior to the rotation, the actual structure of units participating in the rotation was changing. Where the BCT expected a Company, a platoon (+) would arrive. Where the BCT expected certain CSS assets to be available, their BSB now picked up those requirements.

This injected a series of un-forecasted movement requirements and unnecessary friction on the BCT. This is the same challenge that we can easily see involving currently templated real world missions such as GRF, C2CRE, and DCRF as our Army moves forward. More specifically, in order to arrive in theater with a combat capable force, units must be able to coordinate with those that they will receive in theater to better understand their requirements during RSOI. This coordination can only be accomplished through the early identification of those units and a series of updates and planning activities among all participants with the Division serving as the driving force. In the future, the Division will work to ensure the inclusion of enabler units in any planning session. Additionally, we will work to provide access to the extent possible to any unit we control participating in another Division's exercise. This is truly the only way we can work together as a team to get the job done. Having just completed the ASRC, we know that other Divisions, such as the 82nd, have this concern as they look at their requirements for the future.

Applicability: All CTC Rotational Forces; All Multi-Unit Contingency Missions

6. Observation #6 - Rotational Design: Properly resourced in terms of OPTEMPO mileage, we can train units to CO/TM level proficiency at home station and enable the BCTs to focus on mastery and repetition of tasks at the BN/BCT level upon arrival at the NTC. Our current approach of executing CO/TM STX prior to BCT level force on force operations detracts from the ability of units to focus on mastery and repetition of tasks at the BCT and BN level, and places an un-needed OPTEMPO requirement on rotating formations. For example, at one point, TF 1-66 staff was preparing for their BN level LFX, writing a JCATS execution order, and receiving CPX injects that related to force on force simultaneously – as they rotated their units out of CO/TM STX. This amount of activity causes unneeded friction. Planning to achieve CO/TM level proficiency at home station and execute 14 days of force on force operations (including BN/BCT live fire operations) is a better model for achieving BCT level decisive action proficiency. By achieving CO/TM level proficiency at home station, BCTs & BNs will be trained to a higher standard upon the completion of a CTC rotation

Applicability: All BCT CDR and Senior Leader Trainers

7. Observation #7 – How the Army Fights: Since the advent of the modular force, our Army has been engaged in operations without truly understanding the intricacies of employing the modular force as a whole against a high end/hybrid threat in an immature theater. The ability of a Division to employ multi-functional/functional BDEs with multiple modular BCTs has not been tested by the force in a decisive action environment. Other than TRAC experiments which resulted in the creation of the modular force, the “warfighting” aspect of our DIV HQ’s has not been tested in anything other than an MRX in preparation for the next deployment. This has resulted in an atrophy of skills among the Division staff and a general lack of TTPs among formations. It has also resulted in a DIV staff structure that typically requires a large JMD and contracted support base when activated. As another example, our Division commonly lacks any form of a Decisive Operations TACSOP – a point we did our best to rectify during NTC 13-02 and one that we will improve upon as we move forward. In order to identify gaps in the current force, we should build upon the opportunities presented by future WFX forums as a venue to put

our forces in a true near/peer hybrid threat environment to better develop current TTPs and shape future force structure decisions.

Applicability: All Division Level Leaders

8. Observation #8 – Targeting vs MDMP: Our last ten years of COIN operations have resulted in the rapid adaptation of Doctrine from basic MDMP, to Effects Based Operations, to Operational Design. Now, as we transition our forces to decisive action operations, units need to be able to produce succinct orders in a timely manner that integrates all War Fighting functions effectively. While the migration away from effects based operations places us more in the doctrinal “center” of the continuum, we witnessed an inability to quickly integrate and synchronize all warfighting functions quickly. One field artillery officer described the challenges as follows

“When I was commissioned in the Field Artillery in April 2000, the mission of the Field Artillery was to destroy, neutralize and suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket and missile fire and to integrate all fire support assets into combined arms operations. Over the past decade, with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many Field Artillery Officers have increasingly spent more time conducting non-lethal operations than lethal operations. Company FSOs are quite often used as the Company S2 while the Fire Support NCOs are given the responsibility to provide for lethal fires. The situation is not any better at the Battalion and Brigade level. It has gotten to the point where everything a unit wants to accomplish, to include FOB closures, is placed in the targeting process and therefore falls under the FECC to track. The increased burden has stunted the professional development of many Field Artillery Officers.”

Institutionally, we need to look at migrating our decision making leader development initiatives towards the MDMP process and look towards sustaining our network based COIN targeting methodologies in order to enable our formations to more rapidly plan operations, execute orders, and focus young leaders. Task/Purpose/Endstate – intent based orders at the tactical level will become increasingly important as we migrate towards Decisive Action operations.

Applicability: All Senior Trainers, TRADOC.

9. Observation #9 - Communication and Reporting Procedures: One of the most interesting aspects of the fight was that it is very evident that our Commanders and young leaders are used to operating in a COIN environment where decentralized operations were the norm and operations were controlled at lower echelons. As a byproduct of this fight, we now have young leaders, full of energy that do not necessarily see how their actions are critical to the overall success of the BDE operating on a compressed timeline. Reporting changes in combat power, completion of EA Development procedures, 10 digit grids for battle positions, final sighted in grids for obstacles, etc are all critical to ensuring that the entire BCT plan is executed correctly. These leaders know how to do their job and they know how to refine a plan once it gets down to their level – bottom up refinement reporting IOT allow the CDR to see himself is something that we will need to improve upon over time.

Applicability: All CTC Rotation Units and Division HICONS

Section II: Intelligence

1. Observation #10 – Intelligence Training & Preparation: We have a some work to do with regards to preparing our intel Soldiers for this environment. The MC systems that we have are truly designed for a COIN fight. For example, DCGS-A is a COIN centric intelligence system that lacks the tools/capability to operate in DATE, specifically against a conventional threat. We need to develop the tools/capability resident in DCGS-A that allow Battalion and BCT S2s to process, produce and disseminate intelligence ISO decisive action. We need to re-examine the capability of Battalion and BCT S2s to produce SITEmps, EVENTTEMPs, correlate, plan and track ISR, battle track, visualize conventional threat and disseminate to all MCS systems to include FBCB2/BFT in a digital environment. They know COIN and networks. Intelligence operations in a decisive action environment are foreign to them, but will improve with future repetitions.

Applicability: Army COEs (TRADOC), DA G-2, and FCCO S-2/G-2s

2. Observation #11 - ColIST in Decisive Action: The COIST was an ad hoc solution to support the intelligence needs of small units conducting stability operations/COIN. The Army formalized COIST in its force structure based on its performance and effectiveness during stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Doctrine, TTPs and training are inherently COIN centric and have not evolved to address the employment of COIST in decisive action. As a result, units/companies are challenged with how to effectively employ COIST ISO decisive action operations. Based on Decisive Action CTC lessons learned we need to re-examine and revalidate the requirement for COIST in the Army force structure and re-examine and revise COIST doctrine, TTPs and training to address its employment in decisive action.

Applicability: Army COEs (TRADOC) and FCCO S-2/G-2s

3. Observation #12 – BLUFOR Capability to Combat Emerging Threats: The Army Training Strategy states our “complex global environment involves operations among human populations, decentralized and networked enemy organizations, an adversarial information environment, and true asymmetries stemming from unpredictable and unexpected enemy uses of weapons, tactics, and motivations. Cyberspace and space are emerging as areas of operations for nation states, their surrogates and criminals alike, all of which pose significant threats to our Nation, our forces and the infrastructure which supports them.” The OPFOR employed at CTCs replicate predominately conventional threats provided with matching capabilities across all Warfighting functions to include UAV capability, Rotary Wing Capability, Fixed Wing Capability, Frequency Hop Jamming Capability, GPS Jamming capability, cyber attack capability, and a myriad of accepted asymmetrical threat capabilities (IEDs, insurgents, high end AT systems, etc). However, modular BCTs were never designed to combat this myriad of threats simultaneously. For example, they possess no surface to air capability, rely on the USAF to achieve Air Superiority to combat enemy fixed wing capabilities, have no capability resident within their formation to combat enemy jamming capabilities, and are

equipped with a wheeled vehicle fleet that is incapable of withstanding attacks generated by asymmetrical threats on the battlefield (IEDs, AT Attacks, etc). For NTC 13-08 and 2ABCT, we must do a better job of gauging OPFOR capabilities in order to truly enable a decisive action training focus for our formations. We must steer OPFOR capabilities commensurate with LIKELY enemy threats in order to enable training focus for our BCTs. If we wish for our BCTs to defeat an enemy equipped with ALL of these capabilities, then we need to re-examine the capabilities resident within our BCTs.

Applicability: All Senior Trainers, FORSCOM, TRADOC

4. Observation #13 – Employment of DCGS-A in Decisive Action: DCGS-A is a COIN centric intelligence system that lacks the tools/capability to operate in DATE, specifically against a conventional threats. We must look to develop tools/capability resident in DCGS-A that allow Battalion and BCT S2s to process, produce and disseminate intelligence ISO decisive action. Provide Battalion and BCT S2s automated tools/capability to produce SITEMPs, EVENTTEMPs, correlate, plan and track ISR, battle track, visualize conventional threat and disseminate to all MCS systems to include FBCB2/BFT.

Applicability: TRADOC and FCCO S-2/G-2s

5. Observation #14 – Employment of the MICO in decisive action: BCT MI leaders and Soldiers lack the experience and knowledge to effectively employ the MICO in decisive action. We should re-examine the level of emphasis, applied to training our intelligence Soldiers, NCOs, Warrants and Officers in the conduct of intelligence synchronization, operations, analysis in support of decisive action, both in the Institutional and Operational Training Domains

Applicability: TRADOC and FCCO S-2/G-2's

6. Observation #15 - UAV Planning: Our UAV platoons are full of combat experience; however, for the most part that experience was found on mature runways in theater and a static environment. What do we do when the UAV platoon needs to move? How long does it take them to jump? What are the runway specifications required if a BCT needs to conduct improvements to a runway in order to allow the UAVs to take off and land safely? What is the priority of engineering assets, which are already limited, when the BCT must move a UAV platoon and conduct runway improvements prior to flying again? How does this affect the BDE's survivability plan as they dig in a defense? All of these are questions that our BDEs have not had to wrestle with over the last decade. Now – in decisive action, the answers to these questions become critical to enabling a BCT plan and allowing them to integrate their UAV platforms into their operations. The fact of the matter is that the UAV platoon is an extremely important enabler for a BCT. Enabling that platoon to operate effectively in a non-mature theater is a BCT level fight – not something that can be assumed.

Applicability: All CTC Rotational Units

Section III: Movement and Maneuver

1. Observation #15 - Synchronization of Warfighting Functions to Enable Maneuver:

While we were impressed with the ability of our young leaders to employ each enabler on the battlefield, the primary challenge was the synchronization and integration of enablers to mass the effects of these systems at a decisive point on the battlefield in a compressed timeframe. Our young leaders are being presented with problem sets they have not encountered previously. For example, they know how to call for fire...calling for fire against a moving enemy is harder. Priorities for fires, employment of FASCAM, integration of CAS, Radar Management are just a few other examples of identified weaknesses. We will get better as these particular TTP's are "re-learned" by the force; however, focus on these areas should become a point of emphasis for the future...at least in the near term.

Applicability: FCCO Leader Development Programs, TRADOC


2. Observation #16 – Training Support Services Programming: The training demands levied by 1ABCT in preparation for NTC were relatively light in the fact that they involved us preparing only 1ABCT for operations. 2ABCT was deployed and subsequently executing reset operations. 3 ABCT was deployed in support of their SFAT mission. 4IBCT was deployed in support of OEF. Over the last ten years, training support services readily available in 1999 have been decremented to account for the COIN training required for OEF/OIF. Simple resources such as "MILES Contact Teams" & "Range Control" Support have been slowly downsized due to multiple BCTs not being at home station and an decreased demand on combined arms maneuver training. As more units at home station begin to focus on decisive action (deploying less often), the demand on these services has began to surpass supply creating BMM challenges for installations. In 2009, the total BMM for FCCO (to account for IMCOM shortages) was 31 Soldiers. In 2012, BMM (accounting for IMCOM shortages) has increased to 460 Soldiers due to resourcing constraints faced by training support services and other IMCOM provided capabilities. Institutionally, we must re-examine the level of training support services provided to each installation. When re-examining, we must ensure to account for not only past demand on training support services, but also we must project future demands by accounting for more BCTs being at home station.

Applicability: IMCOM, DA, Installation Senior Commanders

3. Observation #17 – Strategy vs Resources: Our current FY 13 strategies and resourcing levels do not match in order to enable multiple units to achieve decisive action proficiency. Specifically, habitual underfunding of OPTEMPO mileage (based upon decreased demand over the last ten years) is creating a challenge in FY 13. Below are the FORSCOM FY 13 allocations

FORSCOM STRATEGY AND FUNDING FOR FY 13 OPTEMPO MILES			
VEHICLE	FORSCOM STRATEGY	FORSCOM FUNDING	HISTORICAL FY12 FUNDED
M1	622	336	601
M2	707	382	708
M3	713	385	717

This current mis-match between OPTEMPO resourcing will likely be overcome by adjustments in OCO funding and other means in FY 13. However, for FY 14 and beyond, these funding levels imply a return to tiered readiness – not all BCT's achieving decisive action proficiency. Under the 24 month ARFORGEN model, we calculated the following OPTEMPO requirements based upon the FORSCOM model.



In order to achieve the levels of proficiency, this gap b/w strategy and resources should be addressed in order to achieve the readiness levels required by the force during the next POM cycle. As the Division carries forward into FY 13 and FY 14, this is an area that we must closely monitor if we are, as an installation, going to maintain 'trained and ready' forces prepared to deploy to meet COCOM requirements.

Applicability: FORSCOM, DA, FCCO G8, FCCO G3

4. Observation #18: Engineer Survivability Assets in Modular BCTs: The current Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is required to be able to DEFEND against a "near peer" force. This is exemplified at the CTC's during the Force on Force (FoF) period of the training cycle. In training, units are expected/tasked to conduct an Area Defense denying the opposing force access to terrain/key cities. Inherent in the defense is the establishment of an engagement area where the friendly forces disrupt and destroy the enemy in order to attrit the force to a point that

defense can transition to offense, and further engage and destroy the enemy force. FM 3-0 details successful defense characteristics as "disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security (ADRP 3-90 pg 4-1, Line 4-3)." In an effort to enhance security for friendly forces, a current best practice is the establishment of survivability/fighting positions from which the friendly forces can be protected from enemy effects, but also engage the enemy through direct or indirect fires. The current organization of the ABCT does not contain the necessary engineering equipment or trained operators organic to its force structure to successfully defend against a near-peer enemy nor is it included in the approved force list for CTC rotations to allow for the ABCT to train and be evaluated effectively.

When we look at the future BCT structure we should consider including additional horizontal construction assets (the D7/D9 Dozer in particular). The requirements necessary to emplace a Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) are 35xM2/M3/M7 Defensive Positions and 29xM1 Defensive Positions. At a minimum of a single hull defilade fighting position for each vehicle (a total of 54) a single Horizontal Company Platoon's Earth Moving (EM) Section of 5 Dozers (D7) would require 35 available real hours (ref. FM 5-34, Table 8-5) of operation to emplace the 54 required positions. To create the same number of Turret Defilade Positions, the same EM section would require 87 real hours (extrapolated from FM 5-34, Table 8-5) to emplace 1xCAB with only 1xFighting Position. These numbers are high, but acceptable. However, each ABCT has two CABs, so the time to emplace the ABCTs two CABs is double with only this limited allocation of EM combat power. This time requirement severely limits the capability of the maneuver commander and as such, inhibits the completion of the mission. We must re-gear our Engineer assets available in an ABCT in order to afford the maneuver commander the freedom to effectively conduct an area defense.

Applicability: FORSCOM, TRADOC, DA, All BCT and Division Commanders

Section IV: Fires and Effects

1. Observation #19 - Integration of Fires: Overall, our training plan allowed us to provide accurate fires during the CTC rotation; however, integration of fires and massing of effects to support the combined arms team proved challenging at times. The challenges were evident for several reasons, but most critically was the lack of mission command planning (see Section #1). Turning CFZs on and off to protect our forces, radar management, timely fires in support of the maneuver formation, integration of CAS, timely delivery of FASCAM targets are all areas that proved challenging as we executed CAM and WAS operations due to the extended array of forces throughout the battle field. As we look towards future rotations, one possible training solution to address this specific shortcoming would be the execution of a Brigade Fires Coordination Exercise including BDE FSO, BDE BAE elements, FA BN Mission Command nodes, and Company Command elements along with a JTAC in support. This type of exercise would specifically ensure that our commanders and staffs at echelon understood the integration and employment of fires in a timely manner to support the maneuver formations on the ground. Simply based upon our home station training plan, our Companies were generally proficient in

the delivery of direct fires – “lethal in live fire and MILES” as OPS GRP put it; however, the integration of this critical battlefield enabler was noted as an area that requires improvement.

Applicability: All CTC Rotational Units & Division HICON elements

2. Observation #20 – Air Space Management: Airspace management has always been complicated at the NTC, and quite honestly, this is a skill that has atrophied over the years in a decisive action environment. Our attached air force personnel were tied to TTPs that were indicative of a mature theater, and un-polished in terms of true airspace management planning that must be accomplished at the BCT level. During the first mission, the airspace management plan was not integrated throughout the plan. This greatly improved during the second mission due to the involvement of the BAE. In the future, in an environment where Air Superiority is not a given and a mature theater is not certain, both our BAEs and JTACs must be specifically trained to enable a flexible airspace management process that allows us to employ these enablers quickly and effectively.

Applicability: All CTC Rotational Units & Division HICON elements

Section V: Protection

1. Observation #21 - CBRNE Preparedness: We have within our formation a lack of preparedness for CBRN threats we may encounter in a hybrid/near peer threat environment. Units have reported shortages of complete NBC masks, filters and associated protection equipment. Due to a decreased demand over the last ten years, formations are typically short M9 paper and M256 kits. Because we have changed the way that we issue/control these items within the force, several Soldiers do not have training JLIST (no longer centrally issued at CIF for training purposes). This atrophy of material solutions is the result of ten years not truly focusing on training our forces under all conditions. While we can't detract from the overall objective of training our forces to conduct decisive action operations, we must do a better job of equipping our forces for this training environment and ultimately (if asked) to fight a threat that has CBRNE capabilities.

Applicability: FORSCOM, All CTC Rotational Units, All Senior Commanders/Staffs

Observation #22 – Cyber Attacks: This is an area that is specified in the Army training strategy, but we haven't really figured out how to train this task appropriately at home station. CTC wrestles with how to inject these types of tasks into the rotation while simultaneously emphasizing the employment of MC systems. We've got some work to do here as an Army. What capabilities should a BCT have? How will this impact the span of control for BCT CDRs/Staffs?

Applicability: FORSCOM, All CTC Rotational Units, All Senior Commanders/Staffs

3. Observation #23 – Air Defense Planning and Integration Capabilities of the Modular Force: BCTs are manned with a small Air and Missile Defense Cell capable of coordinating airspace and providing early warning to the force. However, after 11 years of COIN/Asymmetric

Warfare we have begun to lose the capability to integrate air defense units into tactical operations. While most young AMD officers have a strong background in EAD (Patriot) operations, very few have any background in Forward Area Air Defense weapon systems. This gap causes problem for the BCT as the AMD officer is not capable of providing subject matter expertise to the command. Simple concepts like mass, mix, defense depth, weighted coverage have been ignored for 10 years, and more technical concepts like understanding the capabilities of enemy aircraft and how that effects their attack profiles (therefore effecting the concept of air defense coverage) could soon become a lost art. BCT Commanders and senior leaders have little or no experience with FAAD units, preventing them from providing clear guidance IAW current AMD doctrine. When BCTs are asked to integrate Avengers and Sentinel Radars into their Operations, they have to re-learn lessons from 10 years ago. Because our modular forces rely on the notion that Air superiority will be achieved by the USAF prior to commencing ground operations, this ADA training has been slowly degrading. Our focus towards Decisive Action operations has begun to reveal gaps in our Leader Development models. Our recommendation would be to re-energize the ADAM course and require ADA Soldiers assigned to a Division or BCT to attend the course in order to more effectively train BCT units to integrate ADA assets. Additionally, the defense of our forces against air threats must become a future focus area for Leader Development Programs.

Applicability: FORSCOM, All CTC Rotational Units, All Senior Commanders/Staffs

Section VI: Sustainment

1. Observation #24: - MMC Capability: Material Management Capabilities at the Division level no longer exists when the Modular Force did away with the Division Material Management Center (DMMC). ADP 4-0 has material management as a function under the overall concept of Distribution Management. ADRP 4-0 states Distribution Management includes the management of transportation and movement control, warehousing, inventory control, order administration, site and location analysis, packaging, data processing, accountability for equipment (materiel management), people, and communications. The TSC/ESC Distribution Management Center (DMC) is the organization that executes this function. The current DIV Sustainment Cell does not does provide for the Distribution Management function and must rely on a TSC/ESC for detailed material management and Sustainment Brigade execution to assist the DIV Sustainment Cell in this function. Therefore, as Divisions conduct Decisive Actions, the Division's Sustainment Cell is limited in it's capabilities to provide detailed information on Distribution Management (Material Management) without relying on the ESC/TSC is simultaneously trying to balance all theater requirements. Lastly, in a CONUS/garrison environment, there is little to no Distribution Management support provided by a TSC/ESC to a Division. All Distribution Management is worked directly with FORSCOM, ASC or AMC. We are not training our Division Sustainment Staffs to work thru Distribution Management like will be required to in Decisive Action. As a modular force we must require Distribution Management to occur between TSC/ESC and Divisions to build the systems and SOPs that are expected to work in combat.

Applicability: ASC, FORSCOM, All Senior Commanders/Staffs

2. Observation #25 – ASLs within BCTs: We need to examine modifying the Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL) in our ABCT SSAs to support Decisive Action operates after years of limited demands on critical CL IX that supports our armored fleet. The Army Sustainment Command (ASC) owns all SSAs in the Army. The ASC uses a mix of demand supported, command directed and program directed formulas to fill our Authorized Stockage List (ASL) in our SSAs. The 4ID has been executing limited DA training over the past five years and the number of demand support lines that support M1, M2/M3, M113 FOV and M109 have correspondingly reduced due to the lack of unit demands for these parts. As our ASLs in our SSAs have reduced in size due to the lack of demand for armor vehicle CL IX parts, ASC moved this CL IX to higher level of storage locations (wholesale/depots etc.). Likewise, the demand for this CL IX has led to suppliers manufacturing less of these parts. The Army's distribution management doctrine relies on the movement of this CL IX rapidly from the wholesale/depot level to the demanding unit. As 4ID continues to train more ABCTs simultaneously in decisive action, ASC must support 4ID requests to modify our ASLs prior to the demand of this CL IX being added to the ASL by normal demand analysis. The 1ABCT NTC and train up activities provide a realistic demand analysis of what critical CL IX should be stocked at the ABCT BSB SSA. This CL IX analysis will be used to modify the 2ABCT and 3ABCT ASLs that currently have had little armored vehicle maneuver/training that would created the demands for these parts. The ASC must allow the 4ID to execute the SSA analysis and modify the ASLs prior to the demands so units are trained and not awaiting CL IX to arrive from the wholesale level.

Applicability: ASC, FORSCOM, All Senior Commanders

3. Observation #26 - Setting the Conditions at Homestation: Prior to movement to theater, the Division and the BCT conducted a series of rock drills and planning sessions that allowed us to plan and refine, in detail, our actions upon arrival. Critical movement coordination and planning (ADAGC, railhead, linehaul) was done for all elements. These meetings were divided into FCCO deployment, RSOI and REGEN/Redeployment. The situational awareness and coordination accomplished at these meetings was instrumental in the successful deployment of all FCCO units. This effort, in turn, allowed us to effectively move the BCT to the NTC with little friction. Detailed planning of our equipment reception processes at YERMO, the receipt of vehicles from APS, as well as the early establishment of accounts led to the BCT shutting down equipment reception operations by RSOI Day 2, over 85% of the unit's MILES installed by the end of Day 2, the complete combat power build of nearly 2/3 of the BCT by Day 3, and the establishment of all required theater supply accounts by Day 1. The BCT's overall success during RSOI demonstrated to us, that our approach to RSOI as an independent operation is something that we must sustain. This is true for any deployment. In order to ensure the successful arrival of all personnel and equipment to an area of operations, many units will only look at the fight. Taking a step backwards and looking at getting the force to the fight is just as important to ensure the BCT arrives fully intact prepared to execute operations on time.

Applicability: FORSCOM, All CTC Rotational Units, All Senior Commanders

4. Observation #27 - Division Level RSOI Surge Package: While the Team did a great job of tracking the reception and movement of containers and equipment, the subsequent linking of up personnel with their equipment presented a unique challenge for the BCT alone. RSOI is a build that we have all executed in theater over the last ten years; however, we executed this build of combat power with an established theater level overhead that provided systems we merely fell in on. As our Army transitions towards Decisive Action operations, we must anticipate that we will go into these operations relatively "blind" on many occasions. It is essential that the Division provide the overhead to "link in" with the theater in all areas associated with building combat power. Our Division RSOI "surge force" brought forward many critical individuals that enabled us to overcome unexpected challenges; however, this was not something that we had planned until about a month ago. In the future, an RSOI surge package of G1, G4, G8, G3(Master Gunner) and other critical RSOI enabling personnel should be considered vital regardless of the deployment. While we all want to get the G2 and G3 into the fight sooner rather than later, without Division level personnel dedicated solely towards the build of combat power, it is likely that we will not be capable of executing without un-necessary friction. For a BCT, the stand alone build of combat power is too demanding with today's force given the requirements levied on them. Our approach of surging personnel forward for RSOI operations is a "sustain."

Applicability: FORSCOM, All CTC Rotational Units, All Senior Commanders/Staffs

5. Observation #28 – Mechanic Capability within BSB Formations: ABCT Brigade Support Battalions have no M1, M2/M3 and M109 assigned mechanics for reinforcing field maintenance support to ABCT Forward Support Companies. Current organizational manning has zero 91A, 91M and 91P maintainers assigned to the ABCT BSB Field Maintenance Company. The BSB maintains a M88A2 for armored recovery capabilities, but only M113 FOV mechanics (91H) are assigned. Current doctrine is for the BSB CDR to weight the field maintenance effort by pulling 91A, 91M and 91P from subordinate FSCs to weight the main effort or support the maintenance effort. This doctrine is flawed when we look at the distances and areas ABCT CABs, ARS and Fires BNs are assigned in a decisive action environment. This weighting of the maintenance effort may not be possible or timely due to this change. If a M1, M2/M3 and M109 become Non-Mission Capable (NMC) for an extended period of time (over 72hrs), the FSC cannot evacuate the NMC equipment to the BSB; there is no maintenance capability resident in the BSB. Under AOE, the Forward Support Battalion Maintenance Company maintained M1, M2, M109 and M9 ACE maintenance capabilities. This allowed for maintenance evacuation of NMC armored vehicles to occur during decisive operations. We need to examine the possibility of placing M1, M2 and M109 assigned mechanics to the BSB Maintenance Company recovery section to enable the BSB CDR to push these mechanics forward to the main effort or allow FSC to evacuate NMC equipment to the BSB when required.

Applicability: TRADOC, All CTC Rotational Units, All Senior Commanders/Staffs