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SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER

CIED Bulletin XIII

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

Introduction

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) plays a significant role in collecting and analyzing the data collected from the counter improvised explosive device (CIED) community. The resulting products from CALL's collection and analysis are published electronically and hardcopy for the CIED community as a CIED bulletin. The CIED community uses these bulletins to help Soldiers prepare for the CIED fight. This bulletin assists the CIED community with articles as a direct result of CALL's data analysis of current CIED issues.

The first article covers Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) at the company level and below. Normally in military tactical operations, IPB occurs at the brigade and battalion level. Brigade and battalion S-2 sections are resourced with IPB intelligence-gathering capabilities, a modified table of organization and equipment, and staffed with intelligence-trained Soldiers necessary to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) intelligence information generally flows in the opposite direction. Companies, platoons, and squads operating on the ground must gather and determine the significance of intelligence usually without the assistance, analysis, and filtering of higher-level intelligence staff support.

The second article describes how Soldiers, who operate and succeed on the battlefield, must first "see" the battlefield. Intelligence is the knowledge about the enemy, which allows units to plan and execute missions in order to defeat the enemy. IPB is a method of obtaining information through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding that allows commanders and Soldiers to "see" the battlefield. IPB reduces uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. This includes CIED operations.

The third article discusses Field Manual Interim (FMI) 2-01.301 (Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 31 March 2009), which describes IPB, its use in directing the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations. Commanders and staff must become intimately involved in the IPB process. The battlefield environment is continuously changing and commanders and their staff must stay up-to-date at all times. If properly used, the IPB process provides a road map to success in anticipating the enemy's course of action. The IPB process is similar to a child playing with a connect-the-dots game; each question in the IPB process represents a number. The more questions you answer the more lines you connect, thus creating an image. This image becomes the common operational picture and enables the commander to focus his/her efforts towards the enemy's weakness and avoid their strengths.

The fourth article discusses the role of the Company Intelligence Support Team in the IPB and its time-saving use in mission planning by assisting patrol leaders and other mission members as a one-stop shop for information and intelligence.

The fifth article provides insight into the NATO Interface Unit visits to several coalition-delivered Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) CIED training courses; it has become apparent that these courses should use Afghan methods to resolve Afghan issues. Unfortunately, coalition forces have used Western standards and technologies alone in an attempt to solve Afghan problems. After more than 11 years and countless military operations, we are only now starting to pay attention to our Afghan counterparts. Analysis of the techniques used by Afghan soldiers and police officers to reduce IEDs indicates that there are alternate methods. Observing our Afghan counterparts and trying to understand why they do things the way they do, provides

a greater appreciation of Afghan cultural norms. Understanding how Afghan soldiers and police officers currently reduce IEDs in the field also may provide a glimpse into the future when an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is no longer responsible for security.

The sixth article describes Regional Command North, Afghanistan. When Soldiers in Afghanistan use the term "partnership," they are referring to combined operations with the ANSF. In an environment that often involves multiple branches of our military with multiple coalition members and various elements of the ANSF, effective collaboration requires deft relationship management and cultural sensitivity.

The seventh article describes the 515th Engineer Company (Sapper) deployment in support of OEF in late-February and mid-March 2011. Within weeks of arriving at forward operating base (FOB) Ghazni, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, the 515th was partnered with the Route Clearance Company/3rd Brigade/203rd Corps/Afghan National Army (RCC/3/203rd ANA), who arrived at FOB Vulcan, approximately two miles north of FOB Ghazni, straight from its validation training in Kabul.

The eighth article is about U.S. and Afghan Army engineers: "bridging" the gap. Engineers have a reputation for being the designated catch-all problem solvers of the military. Integrating multiple unique elements into operations is not a new concept for this branch that folds the variety of professionals within the broad vertical construction, horizontal construction, and route clearance categories into its ranks.

The ninth article also is about U.S. and Afghan Army engineers leading the way, hand-in-hand, as combat engineers who hunt for the dangerous obstacles most others seek to avoid. They spend years in CIED training and often attend additional courses to become certified to operate cutting-edge detection equipment or work with explosives. When the 420th RCC, a U.S. Army Reserve unit out of Pittsburgh, PA, received activation orders in support of OEF, many of the of its Soldiers were excited to finally put all of that training to good use.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield at the Company Level and Below

James McAfee

Normally in military tactical operations, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) occurs at the brigade and battalion level. Brigade and battalion S-2 sections are resourced with IPB and intelligence-gathering capabilities, a modified table of organization and equipment, and staffed with intelligence-trained Soldiers necessary to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) intelligence information generally flows in the opposite direction. Companies, platoons, and squads operating in the operational environment (OE) – commonly call the "battle space" – must gather and determine the significance of intelligence usually without the assistance, analysis, and filtering of higher-level intelligence staff support. This small unit intelligence allows the company to maintain situational awareness and possibly even experience brief periods of situational understanding and information superiority as it conducts daily activities such as mounted or dismounted patrols, engagements, route clearance patrols, and combat logistics patrols.

This article discusses equipment, intelligence and IPB or environment, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) available for the company, platoon, and squad.

The Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST)

The CoIST is designed to support collection and management of a company commander's intelligence requirements to aid in gaining situational understanding in the company area of operations (AO). CoISTs are a critical asset at the company and below, to understand their AO. The CoIST can provide likely locations of improvised explosive device (IED) vulnerable areas/vulnerable points; do terrain analysis; understand and inform Soldiers on insurgent TTP; and collect, manage and provide honesty traces to the squad or platoon leader. More CoIST information is included in the Center for Army Lessons Learned handbook, No. 10-20, Company Intelligence Support Team, and CoIST portions of the two operational unit standing operating procedures (SOP) linked in the references section at the end of this chapter.

The CoIST develops comprehensive situational awareness products to accurately depict the OE focused at the platoon and squad level. The products portray the threat, friendly forces, population, and terrain displaying historical data and trends as well as what can be expected using significant acts (SIGACTs) and the enemy's most likely course of action (MLCOA). CoIST processes must include the following:

- Enemy MLCOA.
- OE concerns that include situational understanding, governance, partnering, and local economic development.
- Assisting the company commander, platoon leader, and squad or patrol leaders in developing prioritized objectives based on enemy vulnerabilities.
- Assistance with developing specific task and purpose to successfully support the commander's end state.

Equipment

Digital cameras and photographs are outstanding surveillance and recording tools for patrols. A patrol armed with a digital camera can bring back dozens of photos providing detailed data and additional information and insight.

Although it is not as easy to carry as a digital camera, a video camera can record exactly what happened during significant events witnessed by Soldiers. Instead of relying solely on a verbal debrief, a patrol can now show exactly what happened, and review each event in sequence. This data can also be easily passed on in its original format, allowing the analysts at the battalion, brigade, or division level to see everything just as the Soldiers on the ground saw them.

Figure 1-1. Raven, small, portable, short-range unmanned aircraft system.

The Raven is an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that is small and can be transported easily in three small cases that fit into a ruck sack. The Raven crew can bring it with them and operate wherever the patrol goes. The Raven has three different cameras that attach to the platform: an electrical optical camera that sends data either through a nose camera or a side camera, an infrared (IR) camera, and a side-mounted IR camera. The IR technology is still too big to fit into the nose section of the platform. The camera does not have a zoom feature and is unable to lock onto a target, but provides enough resolution to show someone carrying a weapon. The Raven has about 45 to 60 minutes of flight time on one battery. The kit comes with spare batteries and a charger that plugs into a military wheeled vehicle. This enables the operator to land the Raven, pop in a spare battery, and get it back in the air. The Raven can be launched in just minutes by hand into the air like a model airplane. It lands itself by auto-piloting to a near hover and dropping to the ground without needing landing gear or carefully prepared landing strips. Since it is launched and recovered in this manner, it does not require elaborate support facilities and is well suited for a squad or platoon. Its automated features and Global Positioning System (GPS) technology also makes it simple to operate and it requires no specialty skilled operators or in-depth flight training.

Figure 1-2. PUMA, small, portable, long-range UAS.

The Puma UAS has a longer range and more speed than the Raven. While heavier, it is still man-transportable and can operate in conditions that can be difficult for other UASs. The Puma is capable of operating in nearly any terrain or environmental condition making it well-suited as a surveillance platform to aid route clearance platoons and to counter improvised explosive devices. It gives a squad or platoon "eyes in the sky" surveillance and raw imagery over a wide area.



Figure 1-3. The BETSS-C system provides 360-degree day and night coverage.

Base Expeditionary Targeting Surveillance Systems-Combined (BETSS-C) provides reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) for force protection, CIED, and counter insurgence capabilities for 360-degree day and night coverage on named or target areas of interest and other key areas. There are several BETSS-C system designs. The Rapid Aerostat Initial Development (RAID) or Cerberus-Mobil Surveillance System, or Cerberus Scout (a dismounted version) is best suited for company and below operations.

Figure 1-4. The RAID system is best suited for company and below operations.

The Persistant Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) is a lighter-than-air system with payloads of less than 200 pounds. It is sized for FOBs (footprint/altitude), and also can be used for surveillance of IED hot spots. It is a government-owned, contractor-operated system.

Figure 1-5. The PTDS is tethered with multi-mission sensors.

The Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) is a tethered aerostat-based system. The PTDS is equipped with multi-mission sensors to provide long endurance intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan.



Figure 1-6. The TIGR utilizes Google® Earth-like Web interface.

Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) is a web-based solution that empowers users to collect, share and analyze data using a Google® Earth-like interface backed by network distribution that is a successful supplement to the tactical network challenges. It was developed in line with what dismounted users in small units needed to increase combat effectiveness. TIGR was specifically designed to provide information collection and sharing to dismounted users in small units performing critical missions. It complements systems being used at the operations center or higher headquarters by sharing information near-seamlessly with other command and control, intelligence and information systems used by higher commands.

The Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) is a secure internet host site that contains an engagement tool for tracking three types of entities — people, facilities, and organizations. These three entities are known as spheres of influence that can influence a region or population.

Figure 1-7. The BAT-A system that collect biometric characteristics on persons of interest.

Biometric Automated Toolset-Army (BAT-A) is a three-tiered multimodal biometric collection system that collects and compares unique, individual biometric characteristics to enroll, identify, and track persons of interest; and build digital dossiers on the individuals. The kit consists of a camera, iris and fingerprint scanners, and a laptop. It stores the collected data at a central server located on a secure network. Operational uses of the BATS are anti-terrorism/force protection, local employee screening, detention management, civil affairs, base access, humanitarian assistance, population control, counter intelligence, and high-value target identification, which is crucial in counter IED (CIED) operations to attack the network.

Figure 1-8. The HIIDE System.

The handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDE) system is a tactical, lightweight (2 lb. 3 oz.) multimodal biometric apparatus that collects and compares fingerprints, iris images, and facial photos against an internal biometric database. This allows positive identification of individuals encountered on the battlefield. Biometric data from the BAT network also can be uploaded and downloaded to the HIIDE. A biometric database of up to 10,000 individuals can be downloaded. The HIIDE provides Soldiers an efficient means to identify, verify, and access biometric information.

Figure 1-9. The SEEK II system.

The Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit II (SEEK II) is a portable, ruggedized system designed to collect and identify biometrics. It has the ability to capture forensic-quality fingerprints; rapidly dual scans the iris, and to capture facial features. Additional features include the following:

- Smart battery technology.
- Modular lightweight load carrying equipment (MOLLE) soft case.
- Weighs 3.6 pounds.
- Two USB connections and one Ethernet port.
- Capture voice samples.
- Stores 500,000 records.
- Internal GPS.

Microsoft internet relay chat (mIRC) is freeware developed by Windows used throughout to pass information immediately between all branches and units. Many times, monitoring mIRC is done more than monitoring radios. The result of mIRC is immediate and everyone logged on receives the message along with who sent it.

Products

Honesty Trace

An honesty trace is a map plotted with actual routes taken by previous mounted or dismounted patrols. Soldiers keep an accurate account of where patrols have traveled. Honesty traces record which crossing points patrols gravitate toward, what stretches of land have been traversed and the contours followed, and choke points patrols tend to repeatedly navigate. They indicate vulnerable points (VP) where IED sweeps should occur, where to employ snipers, and when to consider changing routes. Honesty traces are an effective tool for dismounted route planning.

There are two ways to construct honesty tracers for dismounted patrols: manual (acetate and grease pencil) and use of a global positioning satellite (GPS) device. The CALL CIED Bulletin X, No. 12-09 (see link in References) contains a chapter titled, "Fool the Enemy by Using Honesty Traces," detailing best practices for manual, GPS, and Blue Force Tracker TTPs for producing honesty traces.

Transformative Applications (Trans Apps)

Trans Apps is one of the newest tools available to Soldiers in the field. Trans Apps is a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developed program that is similar to "Apps" available on standard civilian cell phones. Trans Apps function either connected or disconnected to a network with a PRC 117G, PRC 152, or commercial cell phones. See figure 1-10 for currently available apps.

Figure 1-10. Available Trans Apps

TransHeat (one of the new Trans Apps) assists Soldiers in constructing honesty traces. It analyzes historical GPX traces to discover patterns of movement and location. It creates a heat map to show high-traffic areas. Soldiers can manage these GPX traces and push them onto a PANTHR device. Heat map will display over standard map imagery.

Palantir

Palantir is commercially developed software that provides CIED network analysts with a collaborative link analysis tool. Palantir is used for identifying patterns and relationships between entities and events (IED threats), and assists with advanced document analysis and information discovery. Palantir enables Soldiers to sort through reams of data, visualize critical connections,

and find answers to complex problems. Palantir, depending on the unit, is found at company, battalion, and brigade.

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device (JIEDDO) Dismounted CIED smartbook, version 2.0 recently released, is one of the initiatives of the JIEDDO Dismounted Working Group. Some key statements from the smartbook are below. The complete smartbook is posted to the CALL Army Professional forums website at the following link: (CAC log-in required) https://forums.army.mil/SECURE/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1880661&lang=en-US.

The key to the success of dismounted operations requires a thorough threat assessment of your AO. If you think like an insurgent when conducting dismounted patrols, it will aid you in making critical decisions when moving across the battlefield. For a threat to be viable, there must be intent, capability, and a suitable location, in terms of time and space, for an offensive action to take place.

The ability to patrol dismounted requires a significant amount of planning. The rehearsal of individual and collective tasks contributes to a successful dismounted patrol. There are several phases that must be addressed prior to conducting dismounted operations:

- Conduct basic map reconnaissance.
- Analyze all previous patrol routes and integrate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets into your mission.
- Gather the latest intelligence reports from your S-2, so you can make an assessment of the types of threats you can encounter on patrol.

Prior to any dismounted patrol, the patrol leader should contact the unit CoIST/Company Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC-U.S. Marine Corps intelligence company-level enabler) to receive the specific information requirements (SIRs), updates on key personnel, groups, events, threats, significant activity, and updated biometric data for HIIDE/SEEK II. Additionally, CoIST/CLIC can provide previous honesty trace data.

IPB Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Empower the CoIST by choosing the right Soldiers who will take the tasking seriously. If possible, the CoIST needs four to six Soldiers, but a minimum of two.

When the CoIST requests ISR assets, it should request a capability and not an asset. For example a request could be, “A company requests full-motion video,” not “I need a Shadow/Predator”. If the CoIST requests an asset and that particular asset is not available, the CoIST will not receive any support. If the CoIST requests a capability (such as IR or full-motion video), it will get support from whatever asset is available with that capability. Additionally, units should include a task and purpose and how/when the information needs to be collected. All ISR requests will be sent up to the battalion, consolidated, and if necessary, requested from brigade. The CoIST needs to be as specific as possible when explaining why it needs a particular capability. The demand for ISR assets is extremely high, and the CoIST needs to be able to convince higher headquarters the request is a priority and all other organic assets have been exhausted.

CoIST products for accurately understanding the OE:

- 30-60-90 day significant activities overlays.
- Doctrinal and situational templates.
- Insurgent MLCOA.
- Named areas of interst (NAIs) to confirm or deny insurgent MLCOA.
- Recommendations on prioritized objectives that focus on insurgent critical vulnerabilities.

Static surveillance systems are not used in an offensive manner. They are best used for early warning or continuous observation of NAIs. An UAS compliment important static surveillance from a different direction to gain maximum coverage and exploitation of a danger area or NAI.

Platoon and squad small patrols begin patrol or clearance operations with a special map product marked with:

- Historical IED and other ambush or attack locations.
- Pre-planned—
    - Primary and alternate routes for the patrol (both out bound and return).
    - Rally points.
    - MEDEVAC/CASEVAC helicopter landing zone locations.
    - Rest halts.

NOTE: Do not set patterns by overusing previous route and halt locations. The enemy constantly observes friendly operations and TTPs to target our TTPs and patterns.

For squad or platoon troop leading procedures, a terrain analysis is critical. The analysis needs to cover known danger areas using available imagery along with historic and CoSIT resources, plus the identification of known danger areas and NAIs.

Train and cross-train by exchanges between battalion S-2 analysts and CoIST members to develop—

- Intelligence skills.
- Awareness of each other’s responsibilities.
- An understanding for the importance of information dissemination.

Locate the CoIST in the company command post, isolated from operations, but within easy access. Also, establish within the CoIST, an area for platoon or squad leadership planning and offer a one-stop-shop of IPB.

Based on battalion and higher priority information requirements (PIR), attempt to find the information gaps to develop specific information requirements (SIR). Some examples below include the following:

- What don't you know about lethal and non-lethal targets?
- What information will complete the higher targeting process?
- What information do you need to find?
- During the debrief, tell the commander and CoIST what the enemy can and might do. Continuously re-evaluate and update SIRs.

The CoIST pre-mission brief should include the last 24-hour of significant activities; current assessments of danger areas, key personalities, groups, events and threats; be on the look-out list; and what the patrol needs to collect and why that is important.

- The patrol leader assigns responsibility to collect SIRs to specific patrol members.
- Develop SIRs for ANSF partners. They have the ability to gather superior atmospherics.

Patrol Debriefs

- Debriefs are in a relaxed place; the debrief is not an AAR or critique; and "no rank."
- Every patrol member participates.
- CoIST facilitates the debrief.
- Do not ask leading questions or accept yes or no answers.
- Cover what happened from the patrol from start to finish in chronological order.

Honesty Trace

- Go over all patrol movements, planned and actual in detail.
- Plot GPS map tracks to accurately capture the route for overlay on Google Earth.
- Identify friendly patterns before the enemy can exploit them.
- Look for friendly actions that drive enemy actions.

Report and distribute information continuously to adjacent units and higher headquarters.

Company commander or CoIST-led debriefs, BATS, HIIDE, and SEEK uploads, and honesty trace information is vital immediately after the patrol is conducted in order to capture important patrol information.

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)

CIED Operations Integration Center (COIC)

In support of all Combatant Commands, the JIEDDO COIC harnesses, masses, and fuses information, analysis, technology, interagency collaboration, and training support to enable more precise attacks to defeat networks that employ IEDs. COIC is prepared to provide analytical support and enemy network information to other US Government organizations and coalition partners.

COIC also provides an avenue for strategic reach back to collaborative, fused, multi-source information and knowledge resources across critical Department of Defense (DOD), government, industry, academic organizations and agencies. Through COIC's fused intelligence products, formerly highly classified intelligence is now available at the secret level, making it accessible to warfighters at the tactical level.

The link below provides information for COIC pre-deployment training curriculum and contact information:

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/16142396

Patrol Debrief

Debrief the company commander and CoIST no later than one hour after a patrol or according to unit standing operating procedure (SOP). Submit the debrief report to the battalion S-2 within four hours or SOP guidelines. Submit sworn statements/administrative requirements within 24 hours or per SOP requirements.

The patrol debrief should include the following information/elements:

- Specifics on who, what, when, where, why, and how.
- Photos or sketches.
- Answers to SIRs and other information requirements.
- Actionable intelligence.
- Provide the patrol Honesty Trace to the unit (CoIST/CLIC).
- Detailed information on enemy contact.
- Any promises made as a result of the engagement?
- Noteworthy observations (propaganda, graffiti, etc.).
- Download HIIDE/SEEK II data into the Biometrics Automated Toolset.

- Changes in atmospherics. Atmospherics comprise an assessment tool used by leaders to gain a greater understanding of the overall dynamics of the community. Elements of atmospherics include changes detected in the following:
    - People's attitudes toward coalition forces.
    - Local infrastructure.
    - Civil leadership.
    - Local organization.
    - Civil institutions.
- Potential informant and tactical human intelligence team sources. Events frequently occur during a patrol that will require more documentation than may be submitted in a simple post-patrol debrief or report. The post-patrol report should contain, at a minimum, a list of those events and the documentation requirements, serving as a reminder to both patrol leaders and staff sections of pending administrative actions.

Conclusion

Company and below formation using intelligence assets and equipment in a combined, coordinated fashion improves situational awareness and gains tactical advantage.

References

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CoIST SOP, 2nd BCT, 34th Infantry Division https://www.jllis.mil/ARMY/index.cfm?disp=cdrview.cfm&doit=view&cdrid=21007.

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12-09 CALL CIED Bulletin X, https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6886.

Counter Improvised Explosive Device Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Doctrine and Other Stuff

Soldiers, to operate and succeed on the battlefield, must first see the battlefield. Intelligence is knowledge about the enemy, which allows units to plan and execute missions in order to defeat the enemy. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a method of obtaining information through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding that allows commanders and Soldiers to see the battlefield. IBP reduces uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. This includes counter improvised explosive device (CIED) operations. Soldiers conducting and applying IPB prior to any CIED operations, enables the better understanding of the CIED threat and provides a way to plan for countermeasures. This article provides the beginner some of the basics of IPB and where to obtain further information.

IPB Doctrine

Doctrine, as defined by Field Manual (FM) 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, is the "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application." The Army publishes doctrine in Army doctrine publications (ADP), Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP), FMs, and Army Techniques Publications (ATP). IPB doctrine that supports CIED operations is found in the below publications:

- ATTP 2-91.4, *Intelligence Support to Counter-Improvised Explosive Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures:* Volume I (Unclassified), 1 July 2011.

  ATTP 2-91.4 is published in two volumes; volume I is unclassified, volume II is classified. This ATTP outlines a detailed analytical approach using intelligence disciplines and processes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to assess and predict enemy IED operations. It supports CIED operations and provides information to assist analysts in developing an understanding of the IED threat and CIED requirements. This manual is a companion manual to Training Circular (TC) 2-91.701.

  Volume I covers tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) related to intelligence methods that Soldiers could apply against the range of IED threats. Volume I chapters and appendixes include the following:

  - Chapter 1, IEDs in the Operational Environment, describes IEDs in the operational environment, discussing IEDs across the spectrum of conflict, outlining the framework and common lexicon to address the IED threat worldwide, and articulating the CIED missions and tasks that intelligence supports.

  - Chapter 2, The Enemy IED Threat Model, describes the IED threat model in a step-by-step breakdown of enemy IED activities that intelligence analysts and intelligence discipline collectors focus on to analyze IED TTP and identify enemy critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities for CIED attack and defeat.

- Chapter 3, TTPs for Intelligence Support to CIED Planning and Operations, provides a detailed TTP to analyze specific IED threats in a conflict and provide intelligence that answers the commander's requirements to attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force.

- Appendix A, CIED Lexicon and Examples, discusses the fundamentals of CIED operations addressed in chapter 1 and includes a discussion of the CIED community's common lexicon and categorization of IEDs.

- Appendix B, The CIED Community, discusses the CIED community and its deployment and employment. It also describes the missions and capabilities of CIED units, levels of exploitation, and the overall enablers of technical intelligence.

- ATTP 2-91.4A, *Intelligence Support to Counter-Improvised Explosive Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures:* Volume II (Classified), 1 July 2011.

Volume II of ATTP 2-91.4 contains appendixes C and D. These appendixes cover classified products and examples.

- Appendix C, CIED Enablers and Product Examples, provides examples of the current CIED community capabilities.

- Appendix D, Intelligence Support to CIED Products and Examples, provides examples of the CIED capabilities of the current intelligence disciplines.

ATTP 2-91.4, Volume II, is not available through normal Army Publishing Directorate procedures. Soldiers can submit a request for information (RFI) to the Center for Army Lessons Learned at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/mission.asp for download instructions. Also, Appendices C and D are located on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

- Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN) Web page. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) website can be accessed from the link on the Active Military Intelligence Doctrine page of IKN-S (under Resources). Department of the Army Intelligence Information Services maintains a portal with intelligence discipline portals allowing access to intelligence products by discipline at http://dadpm.inscom.army.smil.mil.

- ATTP 2-91.6, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Site Exploitation,* December 2010.

ATTP 2-91.6 provides doctrinal guidance concerning intelligence support to site exploitation (SE). This ATTP contains detailed information on how intelligence Soldiers support SE during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and IPB. It uses the intelligence processes to describe the various intelligence activities and tasks that support SE activities. It also provides information that allows an S2 to use SE intelligence to support operations. ATTP 2-91.6 chapters and appendixes cover the following:

- Chapter 1, Fundamentals of Site Exploitation, defines SE in the operational environment. It lists enabling capabilities and organization that support SE. It also describes SE in MDMP.
- Chapter 2, Intelligence Support to SE, uses the intelligence process to provide a framework for intelligence support to SE.
- Chapter 3, Leveraging Intelligence and Information Support to SE, provide the Soldier a sufficient understanding of the type of information outside organizations provides to SE.
- Chapter 4, Illustrative Example Intelligence Support to SE, list the characteristics and examples of a sensitive site and discusses detailed intelligence support to SE operations.
- Appendix A, Target Folders, describes target folders and detainee packets used in SE operations.
- Appendix B, Items of Potential Intelligence Value, is a list of items Soldiers may find during SE that would be of potential intelligence value.
- Appendix C, Specialized Support Assets to SE, list outside organizations that provide specialize support to SE.
- Appendix D, Search Activities, provides Soldiers techniques to follow during SE.
- Appendix E, Forensics, is a partial list of various forensic specialties that support SE.

• FM 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace,* October 2009.

FM 2-01.3 describes the fundamentals of IPB. It describes IPB, its use in directing the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations. Chapters are organized by the four steps of IPB. FM 2.01.3 chapters and appendixes cover the following:

- Chapter 1, IPB and Decisionmaking, defines IPB and discusses how commanders and staff use it to support decision making and operations.
- Chapter 2 (Step 1), Define the Operational Environment, lists and discusses the steps needed to define operational environment.
- Chapter 3 (Step 2), Describe Environmental Effects on Operations, lists and describes the steps used by Soldiers to describe environmental effects.
- Chapter 4 (Step 3), Evaluate the Threat, describes characteristic of the threat and lists those steps that assist in evaluating the threat.

- Chapter 5 (Step 4), Determine Threat Courses of Action, provides information on how to determine threat courses of action.
- Chapter 6, IPB for Offensive and Defensive Operations, is a discussion of different IPB methods for offensive and defensive operations.
- Chapter 7, Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations, describes stability and civil support operations and discusses IPB for each.
- Appendix A, Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process, discusses the targeting process of decide, detect, deliver, and assess and how IPB supports this process.
- Appendix B, Operational Themes: IPB Considerations using Selected Examples of Military Operations, describes how IPB is used in counterdrug operations, multinational training events and exercises, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, support to insurgency, and combating terrorism.
- Appendix C, Counterinsurgencies and IPB, is a short discussion of insurgencies and how to apply IPB.
- Appendix D, Geospatial-Intelligence Support to IPB, describes geospatial intelligence available to support the IPB process.

• TC 2-19.13, *Aerial Exploitation Battalion and Aerial Reconnaissance Battalion Intelligence Operations,* May 2010.

TC 2-19.13 provides doctrine for intelligence organizations, officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers in modular units and ISR planners on the proper use of aerial exploitation battalion (AEB) and aerial reconnaissance battalion (ARB) assets. It describes those battalions' organization; history; mission and support sets; and tactics, techniques, and procedures for efficient use of these assets in full spectrum operations. TC 2-19.4 chapters and appendixes cover the following:

- Chapter 1, Battalion Fundamentals, explains how the aerial battalions are organized and where they fit into the intelligence collection plan.
- Chapter 2, Planning and Preparing Collection Operations, discusses the five-step process of collection and flight operations.
- Chapter 3, Executing Operations, discusses the execution stages of mission start, mission execution, and post-mission recovery that constitute the execution of aerial exploitation battalion and aerial reconnaissance battalion (AEB/ARB) collection operations.
- Chapter 4, Task Force (TF) Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN), explains the mission and organization of this TF ODIN.

- TC 2-19.63, *Company Intelligence Support Team,* November 2010.

TC 2-19.63 provides the doctrinal foundation for the company intelligence support team (CoIST). Its scope is intelligence support to company operations to support higher echelon missions. This publication outlines intelligence responsibilities for situation and target development and provides examples of products to assist the CoIST in accomplishing its mission. TC 2-19.63 has three chapters and three appendixes:

  - Chapter 1 focuses on the organization, personnel requirements, and tasks for CoISTs. This chapter also discusses the general duties of CoIST members.

  - Chapter 2 details CoIST support to situational development by describing methodology for the CoIST to collect, analyze, input, and display information and intelligence.

  - Chapter 3 focuses on CoIST support to target development by describing methods to accurately collate and analyze information for target packages using the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) and find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) methodologies.

  - Appendix A discusses the information contained in patrol briefs, debriefs, and reports. It also contains samples of forms associated with them.

  - Appendix B is a list of intelligence resources.

  - Appendix C is a list of CoIST intelligence targeting considerations.

- TC 2-91.701, *Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations,* March 2007.

TC 2-91.701 provides guidance for commanders and staff concerning fundamental principles for countering threat IED operations, as it pertains to support from the intelligence community. It is based on existing doctrine and lessons learned from recent combat operations. This TC also outlines the critical roles and responsibilities of analysts when dealing with CIED operations. TC 2-91.701 chapters and appendixes cover the following:

  - Chapter 1, Fundamentals, provides an overview of the OE concept, the definition of complex environment, and the baseline rationale for why and how IEDs are employed.

  - Chapter 2, Analysis, covers the different types of analysis and the various analytical techniques and tools available.

  - Chapter 3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield to CIED, is a discussion of how IPB is applied to CIED.

  - Chapter 4, Organizations Involved in Counter-IED Operations, lists the various organizations with the CIED community.

- Chapter 5, IED Reporting and Databasing, discusses in detail IED reporting procedures and database management.

- Appendix A, Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT).

- CALL Products: CALL, located at Fort Leavenworth, KS, rapidly collects, analyzes, disseminates, and archives best practices, TTPs, and operational records. This is done to facilitate rapid adaptation initiatives and conduct focused knowledge sharing and transfer that informs the Army and enables operationally based decisionmaking, integration, and innovation throughout the Army. Below are some CALL products that will assist in understanding IPB and how it is used to support CIED.

    - CALL is task organized by functions and executes its mission under four divisions that are responsible for specified core competencies supporting the Army Lessons Learned Program (AL2P). Outlined below is the division-function alignment with many activities occurring simultaneously:

        * **Collection Division.** Focus is on planning, organizing, coordinating, and conducting indirect and direct collection operations worldwide and to gather and archive observations, summaries, and reports to support lessons and issues identification and development.

        * **Decisive Action Division (with subordinate tactical, operational, and strategic branches).** Focus is on conducting collection, analysis, and dissemination of observations, lessons, and best practices.

        * **Dissemination Division.** Focus is on disseminating lessons learned products, both in print and digital forms, to support decision making.

        * **Unified Action Division.** Focus is on identifying and facilitating lessons and assisting in managing the AL2P.

    - Handbook 10-61, *Tactical Leader Handbook,* dated September 2010. The Tactical Leader Handbook provides ground maneuver commanders, staffs and Soldiers with current and vitally important information. It demonstrates how to leverage Joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and attack systems during mission planning, preparation, and execution of military operations. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6253&tag=29.

    - Handbook 10-20, *Company Intelligence Support Team,* dated January 2010. This handbook assists company commanders and CoIST team members in conducting intelligence operations at unit level. Key concepts covered in this publication include: CoIST mission and purpose, CoIST organization, CoIST systems and tools, CoIST battle rhythm, integration of CoIST operations at platoon through brigade level, CoIST targeting, and Tactical Ground Reporting System (TiGR) debriefing techniques. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=5891&tag=29.

- News from the Front (NFTF): Aerial ISR-Getting it Right, dated April 2012. Commanders have an interest in ensuring efficiency in supporting unit IPB requirements. This article provides a review of new aerial-ISR best practices, which could make all the difference between great success and satisfactory performance. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6943&tag=29.

- CIED Bulletin 11-28, *Attack the Network (AtN),* dated May 2011. Attack the Network (AtN) operations is an operational framework of actions required by Army commanders and staff to defeat adaptive networked threats. The articles in this bulletin provide best practices on how to conduct AtN. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6648&tag=29.

- Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) smartcard, dated April 2011. This step by step guide is designed to help Soldiers complete a quality biometric collection enrollment using the (HIIDE) device. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6623&tag=29.

Outside Organizations

Soldiers, in order to conduct IPB for CIED, require information from various sources. CIED organizations outside the unit are a valuable source for this information. The following is a list of organizations that provide CIED analysis and information.

Counter Insurgency IED Targeting (CITP) Program

The role of the CITP analyst will be to provide subject matter expertise and analysis in the areas of improvised explosive devices (IED) and IED networks to the operational commander.

- The CITP analyst uses various collection methods to include biometrics, signal intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and through the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) to assist in comprehensive targeting of insurgent networks and facilitation operations.

- Analysts works closely with HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs), Cryptology Support Elements, CIED Chiefs, Multifunction Teams (MFTs) and law enforcement professions (LEP) to produce the most timely and accurate and robust product possible.

CIED Integration Center (COIC)

This JIEDDO funded organization leverages existing information and provides strategic capabilities supporting offensive operations against IED networks. COIC provides the following the Soldier:

- Serves war-fighter efforts to focus attacks on enemy IED networks and create vital common operational pictures.

- Provides global connectivity to tools and products for exploitation that are the focus of the warfighter.

- Answers request for support (RFS) by providing a tailored product that incorporates intelligence and information from outside agencies (National Ground Intelligence NGIC, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Combative Command (COCOM) J2s, etc) in direct support of the warfighter.

Operations Research & System Analysis (ORSA)

ORSA analysts are experts in data collection, processing and advanced statistical analysis to indentify anomalies, trends and facilitate predictive analysis.

- ORSA analysts provide an analytically derived, empirically supported basis for decisions regarding options to minimize the impact of IEDs.
- ORSA capabilities reside at brigade, division, corps and theater level.
- ORSA ability to integrate with other analysis is their key to success.

Electronics Warfare Officer (EWO)

EWOs are responsible for all military actions involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. EWOs advise commanders in electronic warfare practices. Three subdivisions of EWO duties are electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). EWO tasks include:

- Collect the latest electronic warfare TTPs and intelligence from theater.
- Analyze communication links within networks and produces plans to deny, disrupt, degrade or exploit them and control the electromagnetic spectrum.

Law Enforcement Professional (LEP)

The role of the LEP is to provide investigative analysis, methodology, and practices to assist commanders in identifying, monitoring, penetrating, and suppressing criminal networks. They are the commander's law enforcement subject matter expert for host-nation law enforcement policies and procedures. LEPs are assigned to either the S2 or the S3 section and work jointly on intelligence related matters and operations. LEPs perform the following tasks:

- Commander's law enforcement subject matter expert (SME) for host-nation law enforcement (LE) policies and procedures. LEPs can be assigned to both the S-2 and S-3 shops, working jointly on intelligence related matters and operations.
- Work with other government agencies (OGA) to identify, track, and disrupt criminal networks funding and freedom of movement.
- Identify and contest host-nation government corruption while working within

the framework of their laws to assist with building a justice system and empower successful rule of law sanctions.

- LEPs are a conduit for information flow and coordination of all LEP assets within an operational theater.

Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC)

Responsible for the technical forensic intelligence recovered from IEDs, bomb making equipment, and IED incidents in order to highlight trends, indentify IED cells, prosecute insurgents and improve coalition force protection, equipment and TTPs.

- Will serve as the CEXC team analyst for the CIED support element (CSE).
- Provides analysis of exploited evidence into the brigade combat team (BCT) targeting process.
- Develops Flash Reports for new IEDs and enemy TTPs.
- Develops and facilitates training of other allied/host-nation forces in the proper and safe recovery of forensic evidence and the reporting/sharing of information relating to IED incidents in their specific regions.
- Operational control (OPCON) to CJTF Paladin has OPCON and JTF Paladin East and South has tactical control (TACON) over CEXC.

Joint Expeditionary Team (JET)

Advises and mentors units from a platoon to division level on various aspects of the CIED fight.

- Provides the warfighter with an comprehensive analysis of enemy TTP's specific to region and AO.
- Provides commanders and battle staff training and support to development of tactical level CIED training with an up-to-date threat focus, both predeployment and in theater.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Subject matter expert on all matters of threat weapons and devices. Support all levels of governmental authority by reducing or eliminating explosive and CBRNE hazards that threaten personnel, operations, installations, property and/or material.

- Render safe or dispose of explosive hazards.
- Conduct level 1 weapons technical inspection (WTI) exploitation.
- Provide training for deploying units to educate on the latest enemy IED TTPs and EOD integration.

- Focal point for all issues concerning IED devices.
- Expert on all components, exploitation components (levels 1 and 2), and techniques for Defeating the Device (DtD) and AtN.

Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell (EHCC)

The EHCC mission is to enable the land component commander to attack the network by helping to predict, track, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards which affect force application, focused logistics, protection, and operational environment awareness.

- Assist in the development of the common operating picture (COP) and provide informational and situational understanding on explosives hazards to all coalition forces.
- EHCC supports CIED efforts throughout the theater and Combined Joint Operating Area (CJOA) with technical advice, TTPs, and specific training for Route Clearance Units.

IPB Training Tasks

Soldiers conducting CIED IPB, especially those assigned to a CoIST, need training. Below is a partial list of individual tasks that will prepare Soldiers:

- 052-192-3262, Prepare for an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Prior to Movement.
- 150-718-5315, Establish the Common Operational Picture.
- 551-751-3402, Plan Mounted/Dismounted Movement of Personnel and Equipment.
- 052-703-9113, Plan for the Integration of C-IED Assets in a COIN Environment.
- 150-718-6717, Plan for Possible Improvised Explosive Device Threats.
- 05-2-3092, Prepare for a Suspected Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)/Person-Borne IED (PBIED) Attack Against A Static Position.
- 05-6-1006, Plan for Counter-IED (C-IED) Operations.
- 150-718-2300, Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
- 171-133-5317, Plan Unit Movement at Company Level.
- 71-8-2210, Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Battalion-Corps).
- 34-6-2034, Perform Intelligence Analysis.
- 71-8-2300, Perform Information Collection (Battalion-Corps).
- 71-8-2311, Develop Information Requirements (Battalion-Corps).

- 71-8-2410, Provide Intelligence Support to Targeting (Battalion-Corps).
- 71-8-5113, Develop Commander's Critical Information Requirements (Battalion-Corps).
- 71-8-7647, Conduct Social Network Analysis (Brigade-Corps).
- 171-620-0080, Process Tactical Information At Company-Troop Level.
- 301-192-6003, Prepare Request for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations.
- 301-192-6001, Apply Predictive Analysis to Support Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations.
- 34-5-0472, Provide Intelligence Support Team Input to Targeting (Battalion-Brigade).
- 17-2-9400, Conduct Site Exploitation (Platoon-Company).
- 17-6-1007, Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance (Battalion-Brigade).

Prior to deployment Soldiers will need additional preparation in CIED IPB. The Army offers many short prep courses for Soldiers. Below is a list of these courses that assist in preparing Soldiers in conducting CIED IPB. This list is taken from the DCIED CIED training catalog dated 22 October 2012.

- Pre-mobilization training: Prior to deployment Soldiers need to prepare to conduct IPB. The following is a list of training courses available for all Soldiers. The list is taken from the Forces Command (FORSCOM) CIED Training Catolog dated 22 October 2012.
- Cultural Orientation Training–ISLET: This training is an easy-to-navigate, on-line training course on Afghan culture.
- ISR TOPOFF MTT Multi-Service/Joint Training: This mobile training team course provides intelligence Soldiers a finial refresher on theater ISR capabilities.
- HIIDE Operator Course: The four hour HIIDE operator course provides Soldiers the skills and knowledge necessary to operate the HIIDE. This training focuses on the collection of three primary biometric modalities (iris, fingerprints, face) as well as the identification of wanted individuals via collected biometrics that are stored and recorded in the HIIDE database.
- HIIDE Operator w/ BAT Overview: This eight hour course provides same training as the HIIDE Operator and provides an overview of the BAT and how the BAT and HIIDE interface.

- Basic Biometrics User Course: The Basic Biometrics Course provides Soldiers the skills and knowledge necessary to operate the BAT system. This training focuses on the collection and processing of biometric and biographical information to support identity superiority, force protection and human terrain mapping.

- Axis-Pro® Software Training: This course teaches non-military intelligence Soldiers how to use Axis-Pro® multi-intelligence analysis toolset. Base capabilities taught include link, temporal, pattern and geospatial analysis tools, net centric alarm and alerts, automated entity and relationship extraction from text documents, and an integrated web portal for information searching and sharing.

- Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE): CIDNE is a CENTCOM directed reporting tool within the ITO/ATO. CIDNE is also designated as the conduit for all C-IED and HUMINT related reporting. This course teaches the Soldiers how to use this system.

- Company Intel Support Team (CoIST): The CoIST course teaches non military intelligence Soldiers how to develop intelligence requirements, conduct patrol pre and post briefs, COIN targeting, IPB orientation, pattern and link analysis and ISR synchronization.

- Engineer Company Intelligence Support Team (E-CoIST) Course: The E-CoIST course trains Soldiers to develop and employ a CoIST that focuses on countering explosives hazards as part of the Defeat the Device line of effort, with an emphasis on route clearance and other counter-IED operations as currently conducted in theater.

- Distributed Common Ground Systems-Army (DCGS-A): This course provides operators and supervisors the skills necessary to use DCGS-A tools. Students with MOS training and DCGS-A NET can receive/process space, airborne, ground and maritime ISR sensor data, control select Army and joint sensor systems, plan and conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities for sensor information, and direct /distribute relevant threat, non-aligned and environmental information to other intelligence users. Students must have a MI MOS to attend.

- Base Expeditionary Targeting Surveillance System-Combined (BETSS-C): Soldiers receive training on the following five surveillance sub-systems:

    - Rapid Deployment Integrated Surveillance System (RDISS) - CCTV cameras; Pan, Tilt, Zoom (PTZ) cameras; Mid-Range Thermal Imager (MRTI).

    - Force Protection Suite (FPS) - Cameras similar to those in RDISS; motion and acoustic sensors; Long Range Thermal Imager (LRTI).

    - Cerberus - Self-contained, trailer-mounted system; daylight and IR cameras; ARSS GSR.

- Cerberus Scout – Dismounted version of Cerberus.
- Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) Tower – 80 feet or 107 feet tower system; employs 360-degree sensor package; Star Safire III FLIR.

Conclusion

The CIED IPB is complex by its nature and is not a cookie cutter process. Each CoIST and S-2 shop needs to get their IPB head in the game long before showing up in the Afghan theater of operations. That means identifying soonest, their area of operations. Then, using all classified and unclassified means to know their enemy and their networks; IED, suppliers, emplacement and ambush TTPs. Establish communications with the unit you are replacing and get a read on to their current operations. Homework in this phase of your road to war will pay off in better mission accomplishment and Soldiers' lives saved.

The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Process

(**Note:** Joint Publication 2-0 and other emerging joint doctrine uses the term "intelligence preparation of the operational environment [IPOE]." However, because the joint doctrine is not approved at this time, the U.S. Army will keep the title "intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB]" to describe the process to analyze the operational environment and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. Field Manual Interim [FMI] 2-01.301)

FMI 2-01.301 describes IPB, its use in directing the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations. Commanders and staff must become intimately involved in the IPB process. The battlefield environment is continuously changing and commanders and their staff must stay up-to-date at all times. If properly used, the IPB process provides a road map to success in anticipating the enemy's course of action (COA). The IPB process is similar to a child playing with a connect-the-dots game; each question in the IPB process represents a number. The more questions you answer, the more lines you connect, thus creating an "image." This image becomes the common operational picture (COP) and will enables the commander to focus his/her efforts on the enemy's weakness(es) and avoid their strength(s).

The IPB process must be a systematic and continuous method as the enemy continues to change their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to counter friendly force TTP. Who adapts the fastest wins. Commanders and staff must continually evaluate the operational variables in an operational environment in the fight against improvised explosive device (IED) detonations.

Four Steps of the IPB Process

- Define the battlefield area.
- Describe the battlefield's effects.
- Evaluate the threat.
- Develop enemy courses of action.



Figure 3-1. IPB process

STEP ONE: DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD AREA

Step one provides the focus for the remaining steps of the process by narrowing in on the areas and characteristics of the battlefield that will influence the unit's mission.

Define the Area of Operations

The area of operations (AO) is a geographical area, including the airspace, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear boundaries, assigned to a commander in which he has responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.(JP 1-02) Higher headquarters bases the size of the AO on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available - time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC).

Define the Area of Influence and Area of Interest

The area of influence (AOI) is a geographic area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command and control (JP 3-16). The AOI is an area that includes terrain inside and outside the AO. The AOI can also be determined by both the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3.

The AOI is a geographical area from which information and intelligence are acquired to execute successful tactical operations and to plan for future operations. It includes any threat forces or characteristics of the battlefield environment that will significantly influence accomplishment of the command's mission. Other areas of concern to the commander, including the AOI, are areas adjacent thereto and extending into enemy territory and/or occupied by enemy forces that may impact on the objectives of current or planned operations or jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

Define the Operational Environment (OE)

The OE (formerly known as the "battlespace") has components determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and dominate the enemy. It includes areas beyond the AO and the OE varies over time according to how the commander positions assets. It depends on the command's ability to both acquire and engage targets using its own assets or those of other commands on its behalf. (FM 3-01.16) Because the definition of the OE is based on the capabilities of the friendly unit to affect activities outside of the assigned AO, it might be significantly different from the AOI. While determining the limits of the AO, AOI, and OE, the military analyst begins to collect data on the relevant aspects of his area of responsibility (AOR), which consists of the AO, AOI, and the OE combined. This material includes such items as maps, geological surveys, demographic information, key leader profiles, and historical accounts of activities in the area.

Gather Available Intelligence and Identify Intelligence Gaps

By collecting and reviewing intelligence, the analyst is able to identify critical information gaps and begin to work with the commander to develop a list of relevant questions, referred to as the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).



Figure 3-2. Identify available intelligence to develop CCIRs.

STEP TWO: DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD'S EFFECTS

The second step of the IPB process requires the analyst to demonstrate how the weather, terrain, and other characteristics of the battlefield can affect both friendly and enemy operations. The intent of this step is to allow the commander to quickly choose and exploit the terrain that best supports the unit's mission.

For friendly units to be best able to exploit the terrain, IPB step two involves two tasks.

- The first task is to identify the military aspects of the operational area: What exists in the area that can influence a mission?
- The second task describes how the identified features will affect a unit's operation in the area.

These two tasks are categorized into OCOKA factors: observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach.

Weather can directly affect operations by degrading the capabilities of the Soldiers, weapons, and some equipment. These conditions can be exploited by either side to provide tactical or operational advantage.

"Other characteristics" can consist of such factors as population demographics, rules of engagement, and international regulations. These military/civil factors can have significant effects on the operation. Intelligence on how the living conditions have changed as a result of the operation and how members of the population are dealing with these changes are examples of

the kind of intelligence that can be derived from demographic information. This intelligence can then be used to better predict how the demographic conditions can affect military operations.

Overall, step two helps paint the picture of what conditions the unit could face and helps the intelligence analyst identify areas and times of potential operational superiority that the friendly force might exploit.



Figure 3-3. Battlefield effects.

STEP THREE: EVALUATE THE THREAT

Evaluating the threat develops a profile of the enemy. The purpose of this step is to develop threat models that accurately portray how the enemy operates. The analyst seeks to determine enemy composition, strength, disposition, tactics, goals, and vulnerabilities.

Intelligence analysts are required to identify threat force structure, available weapons, key leaders, key influential personnel, and TTPs. Using historical information on how the known enemy generally employs his tactics, intelligence analysts are then able to create templates that portray how the enemy might operate in the AO.

Incorporating terrain, population, manmade objects, and the psychology of threat and friendly forces, the analyst seeks to uncover all aspects of the environment that pose a threat to successful completion of the mission. Regardless of threat, the evaluation must include a thorough investigation of how it can directly and indirectly affect the friendly unit and its success in accomplishing the assigned mission.



Figure 3-4. Threat models identify enemy capabilities.

STEP FOUR: DEVELOP ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

Step four of the IPB process incorporates the first three steps into a picture of how the enemy will attempt to achieve its goals. Upon completion of the analysis, the resulting products are templates depicting predicted enemy behavior throughout the AO. A list of all potential adversary COAs (most likely and most dangerous) should be developed during this step.

Named areas of interest (NAIs) are associated with each template. The enemy's NAIs are designated points that will help confirm or deny a particular enemy COA.

Also included as part of the overall enemy COA development is the identification of high-payoff targets (HPT) and high-value targets (HVT). HPT are targets the loss of which by the threat will contribute to the success of the friendly force COA. HVT are assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of a specific COA. Targeting these assets is critical to the successful accomplishment of the friendly mission.



Figure 3-5. Developing enemy COAs.

Conclusion

The defeat of IEDs requires a combined effort at all levels and the coordinated use of all CIED enablers. IPB gives Soldiers a tool in which to understand insurgents and their IED construction and emplacement techniques. Soldiers and leaders at all levels must understand and use IPB. This is especially true for Soldiers manning the company intelligence support teams (CoISTs). These Soldiers are typically inexperienced in IPB and need training prior to deployment. The proper application of IPB by the CoISTs (where the rubber meets the road) will greatly enhance the individual Soldier's ability to defeat IEDs.

Note: Due to the classification and distribution restriction of FMI 2-01.301, a more and complete Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) operations can be found at HTTP://call.army.smil.mil, "Connecting the Dots – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)."

The Role of the Company Intelligence Support Team in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) presents a continuing challenge for the company intelligence support team (CoIST). The CoIST develops comprehensive situational awareness products that accurately depict the operational environment for use at the tactical level focused on the platoon and squad level.

- Tactical-level problem solving starts with accurately portraying and understanding the threat, friendly forces, population and terrain. This is done in manner that shows historical data and trends as well as what can be anticipated in the near future using significant activities (SIGACTs) and the enemy's most likely course of action (MLCOA). Any process used by the CoIST must facilitate the following:

- Portray the insurgents' MLCOA and other lines of operation (LOOs) concerns (i.e., situational understanding, governance, partnering, and economic development).

- Assist the commander, platoon leaders, and squad/patrol leaders in developing prioritized objectives based on insurgent vulnerabilities.

- Assist leaders in developing specific tasks/purposes oriented toward achieving the commander's end state for each LOO.

Listed below are some the products the CoIST can develop to assist company personnel in accurately understanding the operational environment:

- Build 30-60-90 day SIGACTs overlay.

- Refine doctrinal templates.

- Develop a situational template.

- Develop insurgent MLCOAs.

- Develop named areas of interest (NAIs) to confirm/deny insurgents MLCOAs.

- Recommend prioritized objectives focused on insurgent critical vulnerabilities.

As a reminder, the CoIST is optional. Forces Command (FORSCOM), however, has directed that each Battle Command Training Strategy (BCTS) and units with a security force mission will have an operational CoIST prior to arriving in the Afghan Theater of Operations (ATO). What follows is the directive for CONUS Army units deploying to the ATO regarding CoIST operations and is extracted from FORSCOM Message, DTG: 051242ZJUL1305 SUBJ/US ARMY FORCES COMMAND PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF COMBATANT COMMANDS:

ANNEX B: REQUIRED MISSION SPECIFIC TRAINING WITHIN DEPLOYING FORMATIONS.

7.C(1) THE COIST IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE COMPANY COMMAND POST PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (COP), COMMON INTELLIGENCE PICTURE (CIP), SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (SA), LIMITED LETHAL AND NONLETHAL TARGETING SUPPORT, ATTACK THE NETWORK (ATN), AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT TASKS/MISSIONS. UNITS WITH A MTOE AUTHORIZATION ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE A DESIGNATED AND TRAINED COIST AT THE COMPANY LEVEL PRIOR TO A CTC ROTATION AND DEPLOYMENT TO SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AT THE COMPANY LEVEL. IT IS HIGHLY RECOMMENDED FOR ALL OTHER UNITS DEPLOYING TO AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT THAT WOULD REQUIRE AN ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY AT THE COMPANY LEVEL.

7.C(2) COMMANDERS WILL IDENTIFY 4-6 NON-MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (NON-MI) MOS SOLDIERS AT THE COMPANY LEVEL EARLY IN THE ARFORGEN CYCLE TO SERVE AS THEIR COIST, AUGMENTED BY ONE 35F NCO FROM THE BATTALION AS PER THE MTOE. UNITS WITHOUT THE 35F AUTHORIZATION ON THEIR MTOE MUST ASSIGN AN ADDITIONAL NCO FROM WITHIN THEIR UNIT TO SERVE AS THE NCOIC. SOLDIERS SERVING ON A COIST MUST BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A SECRET CLEARANCE. IT IS RECOMMENDED TO INITIATE THIS PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7.C(3) FORSCOM HAS DESIGNATED THE CI2C AT EACH INSTALLATION AS THE PRIMARY FORSCOM PROVIDER FOR ALL COIST TRAINING AND TRAINING PLANNING SUPPORT. THE CI2C PROVIDES A LEADER BRIEF TO FAMILIARIZE COMMANDERS AND STAFF ON COIST MANNING, OPERATIONS AND FUNCTIONS. THE COMPLETE COIST TRAINING COURSE CONSISTS OF 40 HOURS, BROKEN DOWN INTO ELEVEN MODULES, DESIGNED TO TRAIN THE TEAM ON THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE, INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (IPOE), ANALYSIS FUNDAMENTALS, ANALYSIS PRODUCTS, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS, INFORMATION COLLECTION MANAGEMENT, SITE EXPLOITATION INTEGRATION, AND TACTICAL QUESTIONING. THE CI2C HAS THE ABILITY TO TAILOR THE COURSE TO THE MISSION REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMANDER AND HIS/HER TRAINING STRATEGY. ADDITIONALLY, THE CI2C PROVIDES SUPPORT TO COIST PERSONNEL SELECTION, COLLECTIVE TRAINING, MULTI-ECHELON TRAINING EVENTS AT HOME STATIONS, COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT OF THEIR COIST AND TRAINING PLANNING. ALL COIST INDIVIDUAL, SUSTAINMENT AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING CAN BE PROVIDED USING ANALOG MEANS AND IS LOCATION DEPENDENT WHERE ASSETS ARE AVAILABLE, BY DIGITAL MEANS, USING TACTICAL GROUND REPORTING SYSTEM (TIGR), USING ANALYSIS AND EXPLOITATION OF INFORMATION SOURCES PROFESSIONAL (AXIS PRO) AND OPERATING ONE STATION REMOTE VIDEO TERMINAL (OSRVT).

7.C(4) TIGR, AXIS PRO AND OSRVT TRAINING IS RECOMMENDED BUT NOT REQUIRED BEFORE ATTENDING THE 40 HOUR BLOCK OF INSTRUCTION. CONTACT CI2C FOR ASSISTANCE WITH COORDINATION FOR THIS TRAINING AT EACH INSTALLATION.

7.C(5) COMMANDERS WILL DESIGNATE ONE COIST MEMBER AS THE BIOMETRIC OPERATIONS SPECIALIST (BOS). TRAINING CONSISTS OF INSTRUCTOR LED BIOMETRICS TRAIN THE TRAINER (T3) TRAINING CONDUCTED BY THE CI2C FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION VISIT THE FORSCOM CI2C KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PORTAL HTTP: WWW.FORSCOM.ARMY.MIL/CI2C/ OR CONTACT (910)570-6218.

Conclusion

The CoIST is a time-saving source of pertinent information for use in mission planning. The CoIST assists patrol leaders and other mission members as a one-stop shop for information and intelligence for maintaining comprehensive situational awareness of the local area as well as providing critical analysis before conducting operations in an unfamiliar area. They also assist leaders in developing specifics and purposes oriented toward achieving the commander's end state for each line of operation.

Somewhere Between a $5 Can of Diesel and a $36,000 Robot: Afghan-Style Counter Improvised Explosive Device Training

COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team Special Report

Having visited several coalition-delivered ANSF counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training courses in Afghanistan, it has become apparent that these courses should use Afghan methods to resolve Afghan issues. Mistakenly, coalition forces have used Western standards and technologies in an attempt to solve Afghan problems. After more than 11 years and countless military operations we are only now starting to pay attention to our Afghan counterparts. Analysis of the techniques used by Afghan soldiers and police officers to reduce IEDs indicates that there are alternate methods. Observing our Afghan counterparts and trying to understand why they do the things the way they do, gives us a greater appreciation of Afghan cultural norms. Understanding how Afghan soldiers and police officers currently reduce IEDs in the field may provide a glimpse into the future when ISAF is no longer responsible for security.

Figure 5-1. CIED training course in Afghanistan

The following vignette highlights the issue. An ISAF Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team partnered with an ANA EOD team participated in a joint operation in support of ANA attempts to increase freedom of movement. Having successfully discovered a command wire IED (CWIED) the EOD team disposed of the IED main charge under the mentorship of ISAF EOD Team. Although the ANSF EOD team was trained at the National EOD School and was fully manned and equipped with high-tech Western EOD tools, they elected to use an Afghan-style procedure to reduce the IED. The $40k EOD-9 bomb suit and the $36k MMP-30 robot were not used. Instead, the ANSF EOD team used a crude pick to locate the command wire and a simple blow-in-place (BIP) technique to destroy the IED main charge. Other anecdotal reporting has shown that the ANA and ANP are responding to IEDs regardless of the level of training they have received. Reports of ANSF soldiers firing weapons at IEDs or pouring diesel on the main charge in an effort to destroy IEDs are not uncommon. With T.E. Lawrence's quote in mind – "It is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly, than to do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way, and our time here is short"[1] – we should consider how Afghan soldiers and police officers will act when ISAF departs.

Our aim should not be to make the ANA or ANP conform to our standards; but instead improve their own capabilities. Understand how they will react to events and ensure that they are better prepared and safer; but we must understand that this may not be to our exacting standards. With careful consideration, the ANSF EOD solution may lie somewhere between a $5 can of diesel and a $36k robot.

Figure 5-2. Training ANSF EOD team member at the National EOD School

Reports and statistics indicate that well over 70 percent of IED finds are accomplished with the human eye. Following the discovery of an IED or signs that indicate an IED may be present, Hand-Held Metal Detectors (HHMDs) are often employed to confirm and isolate the vulnerable point. Afghan soldiers and police officers are extremely good at understanding their environment and recognizing what is right and what is not right when on patrol. Afghans possess cultural and environmental awareness advantage over ISAF. Understanding what Afghans do well and allowing them to utilize these strengths, to create Afghan solutions, represents a more durable concept for ANSF development than proving them with high-tech equipment that they may not want to use. Technology based solutions are expensive, complex, and maintenance intensive. Training and skills are required above technological solutions, if sustainability is a factor in the development of ANSF capabilities.

During the Explosive Hazardous Reduction Course (EHRC), ISAF instructors employed practical (non-standard) training methods to teach ANSF students core EOD skills. ISAF instructors used non-traditional training methods to teach burn time calculations for time-fuse. Math calculations are used to determine burn time for time-fuse is a distinctly Western approach and not necessary or practical for the average Afghan. Considering the low literacy and innumeracy levels in Afghanistan and the fact that many ANSF soldiers do not own a watch, an innovative method to calculate burn time is required. During the EHRC, Afghan students use a standard length of time-fuse to get approximate burn times for firing systems. The technique of utilizing a standard length of time-fuse without calculating burn time is practical, efficient, and Afghan sustainable. These non-traditional training methods are a product of increased cultural awareness and a better understanding of the operational environment.

Figure 5-3. An ISAF instructor employs nonstandard training methods to teach ANSF students core EOD skills.

Afghan soldiers work well with their hands, speak the local language, and understand the operational environment far better than ISAF forces ever will. Allowing Afghans to use their strengths and developing Afghan-specific solutions to address Afghan-specific issues represents a more sustainable training model and is better suited for ANSF. Sharing chai with ANSF commanders while listening to their ideas represents a necessary first step towards fully comprehending what ANSF will look like during transition and post-2014. Understanding how the ANSF will act and then assisting them to develop the skills required will require time and innovative approaches. As ISAF completes transition of lead security with ANSF and assumes a larger supporting role across the battlespace, novel approaches are needed to deliver realistic Afghan solutions for existing Afghan problems.

Endnote

1. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom,* 1918.

Operation Enduring Freedom: Partnership 101

2LT Brittany Ramos

REGIONAL COMMAND NORTH (RC-N), Afghanistan – When Soldiers in Afghanistan use the term "partnership," they are referring to combined operations with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In an environment that often involves multiple branches of our military with multiple coalition members and various elements of the ANSF; effective collaboration requires deft relationship management and cultural sensitivity.

The 841st Engineer Battalion out of Miami, Fla., hit the ground in RC-N, Afghanistan, in March 2012, with little appreciation for how vital partnering would be to their mission success. Their predecessors informed them they should plan to dedicate up to 24 Soldiers — in six Engineer Training Teams — to support this effort.

Initially focusing their efforts along four main lines of effort — combat effects, construction effects, partnership effects, and strategic communications — they recalled their previous brigade commander's guidance that "Success means you are doing less at the end of your tour because the Afghans are doing more."

As Task Force Hurricane completes its successful and challenging tour of service, it is sharing a few key lessons it has learned:

Respect Given is Respect Earned

It was immediately apparent that Afghan soldiers do things very differently than their American counterparts. Despite high illiteracy rates and a generally isolated culture and lack in knowledge of current, international affairs, Afghans place great value on hospitality and relationships. Soldiers, who mistake simplicity for a lack of intelligence, gravely underestimate the value of their contribution and fail to take advantage of establishing effective relationships necessary to transition security responsibilities to the ANSF. Early mistakes are difficult to recover from and require enormous effort, time and resources.

While it is important to be vigilant in a complex operating environment, where non-uniformed insurgents and illegal combatants blend easily with the populace and security forces, it is easy to cast suspicious eyes upon ANSF partners. Not only can signs of distrust or contempt foster a reluctance to help and work together, but they can and have also resulted in violence. In the end, success depends entirely upon trust.

Effective Relationships

When a bridge in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by flooding, Task Force Hurricane sent a construction platoon and combat security team to the ford site, led by a captain of Latin-American descent. This captain identified similarities between his and Afghan culture, which reflected in the intimacy of his engagement when speaking with local leaders, where he warmly called them friends; used both hands during greetings; maintained eye contact; and didn't rush or try to control them. Instead, he was engaged and listened.

The task force commander was slightly taken aback, when he visited a few weeks later and was greeted with polite resistance from the same local leaders, "Where is the captain? He is our friend. We want to speak with him."

This powerful example best captures simple techniques which can build and improve relationships to meet operational objectives. The elders were not negatively predisposed to the commander and he did nothing wrong, but they trusted what they had discussed with the captain.

Go Native

As demonstrated, many times the success of a relationship is in its genius. While western cultures readily embrace technology to improve the speed and effectiveness of communications, few Afghans place the same value. In fact, those Afghans, who actually have e-mail, rarely check it – preferring instead regular, face-to-face interaction.

When Task Force Hurricane's Engineer Development Teams began training the ANSF, they employed traditional techniques using PowerPoint presentations, but soon realized the ANA Soldiers made little progress. When they shifted to a hands-on style of training and practice, the progress and interaction was dramatic as the Afghan Soldiers challenged their trainers to try and stump them. Afghans are well known for being handy and resourceful, when given the resources and opportunity.

Patience

Those who may be more inclined to rush conversations, meetings and force results are at a disadvantage in maintaining flexibility to adapt to the challenges in the short-term in order to achieve objectives. A bridge over an irrigation canal was recently destroyed by an improvised explosive device. Even though it would have taken Task Force Hurricane only two hours to repair, they allowed their partnered ANA Engineers to lead in the planning and preparation, which took more than twelve hours. The objective is an independent ANSF capable of conducting independent operations and allowing them to gain confidence and expertise by doing-it-themselves, proved to be a valuable and enduring lesson.

Adapt

When in Afghanistan, do as the Afghans. One can spot those leaders, savvy in Counter-Insurgency Operations doctrine, sitting cross-legged on the floor and eating with their hands as guests. Simple gestures deliver huge returns in partnering. In many circumstances, sharing tea may facilitate a meeting or discussion more so than long or drawn-out logical arguments. The Task Force Hurricane commander was initially uncomfortable when his ANA counterpart held his hand while they toured a construction site, but it reflected the growth in their relationship to be founded on friendship and trust which bridged their differences.

The greatest lesson that Task Force Hurricane can pass on to the units and missions which will follow, is a continued commitment to get to know Afghans as people and trusted and capable partners.

Afghan Partnership at the Company Level: Lessons Learned from an Embedded Training Team

CPT Jeffrey D. Nichols, 1LT Daniel B. Powell, and SGT Anthony L. Bollin

(Reprinted with permission from *Engineer*, September–December 2012.)

Background

The 515th Engineer Company (Sapper) deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in late-February and mid-March 2011. Within weeks of arriving at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Ghazni, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, the 515th was partnered with the Route Clearance Company/3rd Brigade/203rd Corps/Afghan National Army (RCC/3/203rd ANA), who arrived at FOB Vulcan, approximately two miles north of FOB Ghazni, straight from its validation training in Kabul.

FOB Vulcan was not adequately prepared to receive the RCC due to a lack of communication between the RCC's American trainers in Kabul, the 3/203rd ANA, and the Polish Battle Space Owner. The collocated 3/203rd ANA was not prepared to provide housing, heat, or power to the RCC, which caused problems with temperatures dropping below freezing at night. As a result, for the first few months of the partnership two Second Lieutenants waiting to take over as Platoon Leaders (PLs) in the 515th were forced to focus on these issues rather than having the RCC conduct missions.

By mid-June 2011 the RCC was settled into FOB Vulcan and both of the Second Lieutenants moved back to FOB Ghazni to fill PL positions. During this time the 515th placed a Captain, First Lieutenant, Sergeant, and Specialist at FOB Vulcan to operate as an Embedded Training Team (ETT), dedicated to developing the RCC into an independent unit. From mid-June through early-September 2011 the ETT observed the capabilities of the RCC, assessed what training the RCC needed prior to conducting independent route clearance missions, and developed a plan of action for the remaining eight months of the deployment. This was accomplished by observing the RCC conduct training led by their leadership and execute route clearance missions led by Route Clearance Patrols (RCPs) from the 515th and the 572nd Mobility Augmentation Company. During these partnered missions the RCC integrated its vehicles amongst the RCP's order of march, and when the RCP pushed out dismounts, the RCC dismounted with them. By conducting partnered route clearance missions the RCC was able to observe properly executed route clearance missions, and the ETT was able to assess what the RCC needed to improve upon prior to conducting missions independently.

In early-September 2011 the ETT completed its assessment of the RCC and began to prepare it for independent operations. Upon the redeployment of the 515th in early March 2012, the RCC had conducted 40 independent route clearance missions in support of the Polish Battle Space Owner, Ghazni Agricultural Development Team, various American Infantry units, and the 3/203rd ANA, with an 80-percent find rate.

After seven months of daily partnership with the RCC the 515th ETT concluded that small motivated teams who conduct daily interaction with their Afghan counterparts are the key to success for best preparing the Afghan National Security Forces for their inevitable independent control of Afghanistan. The following is a discussion of their methods to accomplish this end state and their lessons learned.

Logistical and Garrison Operations

With little support from its higher headquarters concerning living conditions, the RCC also struggled getting food, water, and fuel for missions; repair parts and lubricants for vehicle maintenance; filling supply shortages; and getting heaters and fire wood for winter. Typically the RCC was only able to field one of their three platoons because on average only 50 percent of the vehicles were mission capable. The 3/203rd ANA had systems in place to provide all of these services, however they often failed to provide the RCC with adequate support, even after the ETT would address the issue with the senior officers of the 3/203rd ANA. To make matters worse, none of the items requested not already in the inventory of the 3/203rd ANA at FOB Vulcan ever arrived. As a result, the ETT adapted the philosophy that if the RCC had made every effort to obtain resources through the Afghan channels, were not successful due to no fault of their own, and the resources were mission critical, the ETT would work through American channels to provide the requested resources.

Though the ETT and RCC hit tremendous road blocks when it came to acquiring repair parts and lubricants for vehicle maintenance, the biggest challenge the ETT encountered was getting the RCC to correctly conduct preventative maintenance checks and services on vehicles. Most of the Soldiers were illiterate, making translated technical manuals irrelevant. Many of the Soldiers also failed to realize the importance of vehicle maintenance, which challenged both their leadership and the ETT to enforce proper maintenance. Thus, the ETT and the RCC leadership decided to appoint an RCC motor sergeant and several mechanics, and to have a command maintenance day once a week.

The RCC motor sergeant and his mechanics spent four days a week at the 3/203rd ANA workshop, which allowed them to get hands-on maintenance experience and training every day. On command maintenance days the motor sergeant and his team reported to the RCC area to supervise maintenance along with the RCC duty officer and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). Half of this day was devoted to vehicle maintenance and the other half was devoted to weapons maintenance and cleaning.

The ETT fought an uphill battle with RCC NCO development, as well as the development of professional relationships between RCC officers, NCOs, and Soldiers. The officers were well trained and intelligent, but they received little support from their NCOs. The lack of experience and professional education on being NCOs hindered their ability to enforce standards, which resulted in Soldier discipline being one of the biggest challenges the ETT and RCC encountered.

Training

When the ETT completed its assessment in early-September 2011, they came up with a list of training the RCC needed to conduct to be better prepared to execute missions independent of American RCPs. They began by training the RCC on individual tasks such as crew served weapons operation, mine detector operation, and first aid. These classes went smoothly for the ETT, and the RCC picked up on these tasks quickly. However, when it came to training collective tasks such as convoy operations, dismounted patrol procedures, and react to contact, the ETT had a much more difficult time making progress.

After evaluating the difficulties faced while training the RCC on collective tasks, the ETT determined that collective task training was more complex to teach to a large group. Since these classes were more advanced in nature, the RCC did not pick up on these tasks as quickly,

and often had many questions. This overwhelmed the ETT Interpreters, who had to balance translating what the ETT was teaching with what questions the RCC had. As a result, the ETT adopted a "train the trainer" philosophy for teaching the RCC more complex and collective tasks.

The ETT called these training events "Soda Sessions," and held them approximately twice a month. In a typical "Soda Session" the ETT invited the RCC officers and Platoon Sergeants (PSGs) to a classroom on the small Polish/American compound located inside FOB Vulcan, removing the RCC leadership from their Soldiers, which minimized distractions. In the classroom the ETT provided sodas, energy drinks, and snacks, all of which were treats the RCC leadership rarely enjoyed. The RCC leadership routinely offered the ETT chi, naan, and other Afghan foods, so this was a way the ETT could reciprocate their generosity, and provide a small incentive for them to attend.

During a typical "Soda Session" the ETT would teach complex topics such as battle drills or how to improve command climate in a classroom format. On days where collective tasks were discussed, the ETT assisted RCC leadership with developing standard operating procedures, who then trained their own Soldiers through rock drills and "walk throughs." This empowered the RCC leadership, made them look knowledgeable to their Soldiers, and minimized words of instruction lost in translation. Eliminating the use of an Interpreter as an intermediary between instructor and student allowed the ETT to supervise instruction and offer the RCC leadership constructive criticism as necessary.

Conducting "Soda Sessions" with the RCC leadership proved to be extremely successful. Another training method that proved to be successful was awarding RCC Soldiers certificates when they completed specialty training. For example, when a select group of RCC Soldiers were trained on the M2 .50 caliber machine gun, they were given certificates of training. Producing these certificates was relatively easy, went a long way with the RCC Soldiers since Afghans in general cherish certificates, and served as training records for the ETT.

Mission Preparation

The RCC was prepared to operate independently by mid-September 2011, after conducting several route clearance missions alongside American RCPs, and training to correct observed flaws. With this they became in high demand to conduct direct support route clearance missions as well as named operations, freeing the American RCPs to fulfill division requirements.

Ideally the Polish Battle Space Owner would notify the 3/203rd ANA, who would then notify the RCC of a mission. However, when this process was followed, it failed to leave the RCC with enough time to properly prepare for missions; often notifying them well after dinner, of a mission that was scheduled to take place before breakfast the next day. To mitigate this, the ETT played a critical and active role in facilitating the mission notification process for the RCC. The ETT received the mission from the unit located at FOB Ghazni and issued it to the RCC, who would notify the 3/203rd ANA. This was not the ideal process, however it maximized the amount of time the RCC had to prepare for missions.

At first the RCC conducted virtually no mission preparation. However, the ETT worked with the RCC PSGs to develop a standard load plan for every vehicle on mission. This was reinforced through mission briefs the day prior to each mission, as well as pre-combat checks and inspections the day of each mission. The ETT directly supervised and enforced both of these preparations, but as the PSGs progressed, they took the lead and the ETT merely supervised.

The day prior to each mission the RCC PLs briefed the RCC Company Commander (CO) on their mission plans. This allowed the PLs to improve upon their briefings skills, as well as allow the CO to critique their plans. The PLs were accompanied by their PSGs, who briefed the CO on their plans for mission preparation. By encouraging collaboration between the PLs and PSGs, the ETT was able to help strengthen the relationships between the RCC officers and their NCO counterparts.

Mission Execution

On the day of each mission, the RCC PSG conducted pre-combat checks and inspections and the PL briefed the platoon on the mission plan. In order to promote an effective link-up with the supported unit, the ETT always ensured that the RCC was at the link-up site 15 minutes early in the event of any last-minute or unforeseen problems.

Most of the units preferred to speak with Americans, however the ETT felt it was important for the RCC PL and PSG to brief their plan, with the ETT present to relieve any concerns. Once the link-up was complete, the RCC would lead the convoy, followed by the ETT vehicle in the middle, and the supported unit in the rear. Being between the RCC and the supported unit allowed the ETT to best observe the RCC and maximize communication with both units.

Whenever the RCC dismounted, the ETT would send a member with each dismount team to monitor the RCC and make on-the-spot corrections. The ETT found it most effective to address the dismount team leaders rather than the Soldiers. Through this, RCC leaders progressed in identifying and correcting problems and their Soldiers became more responsive.

After each mission the ETT made every effort to conduct an after action review with the RCC PL and PSG, rather than the entire platoon. Additionally, the ETT found that after action reviews tended to be more productive when the CO and First Sergeant were present. This gave them awareness of their platoons' performance and allowed them to make changes and adjustments where necessary. The best after action reviews occurred in a relaxed environment away from the RCC Soldiers, usually in the CO's office or in the PL's room, and after all mission recovery was completed.

Recommendations and Conclusions

For a company level partnership, it is recommended that at a minimum the CO, Executive Officer, First Sergeant, PLs, PSGs, and Motor Sergeant be mentored. Additionally, an ETT should have at least one officer, NCO, mechanic, and Soldier.

The ETT partnership model provides daily interaction while limiting personnel and resource requirements, and can be used at any echelon of command. Daily interaction and supervision enables relationships to be built between the coalition and Afghan partners, and it is these relationships that best promotes development. ETTs can be used during any stage of the development cycle, such as receiving the unit from validation training, assisting unit leaders in conducting complex training, or critiquing missions planned and lead by the partnered unit.

U.S. and Afghan Army Engineers: "Bridging" the Gap

2LT Brittany N. Ramos

Engineers have a reputation for being the designated "catch-all" problem-solvers of the military. Integrating multiple unique elements into operations is not a new concept for this branch that folds the variety of professionals within the broad categories of vertical construction, horizontal construction, and route clearance into its ranks.

Yet, the U.S. Army engineers currently serving in Regional Command North (RC-N), Afghanistan, as part of Task Force Hurricane, have embraced counter-insurgency concepts and established a uniquely holistic approach. By incorporating targeted information operations and fostering a robust partnership with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the engineers have transformed what would otherwise be a patchwork of temporary solutions into projects that have the potential for lasting positive change.

The 18th Engineer Brigade Commander, Col. Paul Paolozzi, set the tone when he addressed the freshly deployed Task Force Hurricane staff stating, "To me, success is not a laundry list of things you have accomplished at the end of your tour. Success means you are doing less at the end of your tour because the Afghans are doing more. You will find it is easier to do it yourself, but that would mean you are failing to accomplish your mission."

Striving to "do less" is counter-intuitive for American Soldiers who are raised in the "land of opportunity" and raised in the hard-working, "make it happen" U.S. Army culture. Nevertheless, Task Force Hurricane, a conglomeration of active duty, Reserve and National Guard engineer units from across the country, led by the 841st Engineer Battalion from Miami, FL, internalized the guidance and retooled itself to fit the mission. Twelve construction engineers and twelve counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) engineers were divided into a total of six engineer training teams (ETT), each of which was assigned to train an Afghan National Army (ANA) construction or route clearance company. An engineer development cell was formed to manage the ETTs and promote partnership at the battalion and brigade levels. A coalition liaison position was established to ensure coordination and information sharing with German, Norwegian, Swedish, and other coalition battlespace owners while the traditional public affairs officer position was expanded and modified to serve as a strategic communications section capable of overseeing targeted message campaigns geared toward building goodwill and credibility for the Afghan engineers among the Afghan civilians. This bold reorganization left traditional route clearance and construction platoons thinly staffed, but transformed the task force into one that could operate effectively in the irregular, fast paced, learning-based counter-insurgency environment as proven through their various successful, partnered operations.

A distinct problem that U.S. Army engineers and many other International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) face is figuring out how to minimize their perceived presence while conducting operations in 40-ton vehicles fitted with machine guns. In RC-N, where territories are systematically being turned over to Afghan National Security Forces, it is essential to minimize the perception of ISAF presence and simultaneously promote the capabilities and expertise of ANSF. When Task Force Hurricane and the ANA 209th Corps engineers were tasked with designing and constructing a low-water crossing in Faryab Province, where a previously constructed bridge had failed, a central question became how to ensure the ANA engineer capabilities could be made visible to the population through this project, despite ISAF involvement. In this truly partnered endeavor, ANA and U.S. route clearance packages cleared

the construction site and avenues of approach while ANA and U.S. construction platoons implemented the jointly developed low-water crossing plans.

Meanwhile, the Task Force Hurricane, strategic communications section planned and executed a message campaign with the goal of getting Afghan civilians in the area to recognize the ANA engineer involvement the project. With the help of the German Regional Psychological Operations Support Element, flyers were designed and given to the Afghan National Police stationed in the area to distribute and billboards were erected.

The district governor recorded a radio advertisement in support of the project stating, "Dear Elders, brothers and sisters of the peace-loving people from the Ghormach district…to improve the situation at the river crossing, engineers from the 209th Shaheen Corps, together with international forces, are building a preliminary crossing."

Afghan journalists filmed the operation and later a commercial featuring the excellent work by the ANA engineers aired throughout the region. The commercial included endorsement from the district chief of police and local ANA infantry commander who passionately urged the citizens to reject insurgents and support ANSF forces, vowing that "the ANA is ready to help and support the people until the last drop of blood is left in their body."

Interviews of the local civilians consistently thanked the ANA for the improvement that would help facilitate better business, healthcare, and safety for the people and rarely mentioned ISAF. Security and stability operations in Faryab province have now successfully been handed over to ANSF.

A similar operation was conducted in Chimtal District, Balhk Province, when the ANA independently planned to repair a culvert bridge and roadway destroyed by multiple improvised explosive devices placed by insurgents. In this scenario, Task Force Hurricane Route Clearance Package 67, of the 420th Route Clearance Company, Indiana, PA, escorted the ANA construction engineers and their assigned ETT to the repair site and watched the ANA handle the rest. Flyers that depicted insurgents destroying the bridge and ANA engineers repairing it were again provided for ANA Soldiers to distribute. The ANA Soldiers asked for support and explained the operations to villagers in the area as they passed the papers out.

After the reconstruction was complete, Afghan radio correspondents interviewed civilians in the area who stated "the bridge was destroyed by the Taliban and created many problems for us. We are very thankful to the ANA for reconstructing it" and "the Taliban can't fight the government so they are fighting the people. The Taliban shouldn't have destroyed the bridge we use to bring our harvest to market and we are thankful to the ANA for rebuilding it."

In the current environment, where IEDs are replaced within hours of routes being cleared and infrastructure can be destroyed soon after it is repaired, the only hope for lasting positive change lies in capable ANSF and a civilian population that is willing to support them. As ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan approaches, RC-N has already begun to hand over operational control to ANSF and the success or failure that ensues could be an indication of how other regions will fare in the future.

Regardless, Task Force Hurricane engineers have worked harder than ever to do less (for the Afghans) and their flexible model and recent operational success demonstrates there is hope indeed. *Shona ba Shona*, Essayons!

U.S. and Afghan Army Engineers: Leading the Way, Hand in Hand

2LT Brittany N. Ramos

Combat engineers proudly hunt for the dangerous obstacles most others seek to avoid. They spend years in counter improvised explosive device training and often attend additional courses to become certified to operate cutting edge detection equipment or work with explosives. When the 420th Route Clearance Company, a U.S. Army Reserve unit out of Pittsburgh, Pa., received activation orders in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), many of the of its soldiers were excited to finally put all of that training to good use. That excitement came to a sudden halt for Sgt. Douglas Thomas and eleven others when they were informed they would not be joining their platoons on the road, but instead, training Afghan engineers to assume responsibility for that mission.

Even with 19 years of Army Reserve service under his belt, Sgt. Thomas, Clarion, Pa., could find nothing but a few choice words and apprehension in his mind directly after being assigned as a member of one of six Engineer Training Teams (ETTs) in Task Force Hurricane. The Task Force is led by the 841st Engineer Battalion from Miami, Fla. It has taken on a historic role as the last engineer battalion to operate in Regional Command North in support of OEF and singularly is responsible for all construction, all route clearance, forward operating base deconstruction, and Afghan National Army (ANA) engineer training in the 62,607 square-mile region. Task Force Hurricane is partnered with the ANA 209th Corps and three ETTs are assigned to ANA construction companies, while three ETTs are assigned to ANA route clearance companies.

SPC Michael Wilkersonfoy (Foy for short), a 21-year-old combat engineer from Butler, Pa., and a member of ETT 1 with Sgt. Thomas, recalls initially being told, "You guys are going to train these guys; figure it out." With that guidance, and Taliban bounties on their heads for being designated ANA trainers, the team of two junior noncommissioned officers and two specialists traveled to meet with their assigned ANA route clearance company.

"When we arrived, we had no idea of the situation we were walking into; no idea how much training they had received, what equipment they had or even how many soldiers they had," noted Spc. Foy. "We found out, when we met them, that they had been conducting missions, which really consisted of them driving around hoping not to get blown up because they didn't know what they were supposed to be doing."

The team was able to secure ANA brigade leadership support for halting all missions temporarily so the focus could shift to training.

Every day, the team would leave the U.S. security perimeter and walk to the ANA compound to train anywhere from 40 to 120 soldiers.

"At first, they were shy, but eventually the tension eased and we would even tease each other," said Foy. "The Operational Mentor Liaison Team produced a mission essential task list and we started teaching things from it by priority after we ranked them."

They started with basic soldiering tasks like how to assemble and dissemble their weapons systems, first aid techniques, and supply inventory. Along the way, they adjusted their training techniques to be almost solely hands-on instruction and practice, which seemed to work the best.

When certain instructions did not translate well, they were fortunate enough to have a highly experienced foreign language assistant to fill in the gaps lost in translation.

“Sometimes he would just take over the lesson for five to ten minutes because he had heard it so many times in his three years working in training environments. He was able to explain on his own when the troops weren’t grasping our explanation,” said Foy.

They worked their way up to creating fake improvised explosive devices and training lanes to teach the soldiers how to spot indicators. They drilled on the proper use of handheld mine detection equipment and soon they began having mounted practices within the ANA camp perimeter and even sending a couple leaders at a time to ride with 420th’s Route Clearance Package (RCP) 67 who was stationed nearby.

“Every week we assessed their knowledge and continued to make things more challenging when they got cocky,” Foy explained. “We would give them fake missions to conduct around the compound and then just watch and evaluate every step of their planning and mission preparation. They kept high morale despite having no air-conditioning and no latrines or showers.”

All training is conducted outside due to lack of space in the facilities they have at their particular compound. When harsh weather, such as rain would interfere and the ANA troops would start to lose focus, Foy said they taught them the old Army adage, “If it ain’t rainin’, it ain’t trainin’!” With a chuckle, he threw in, “They really liked that phrase and I heard them say it in Dari so many times I actually learned it in their language.”

Sunday through Tuesday, the training day begins at 7:30 a.m. and continues until 6 p.m. with a two-hour lunch and prayer break. Thursday is prayer and religious training day and Friday is a half-day. Saturdays are reserved for cultural awareness and language training (English and Dari). When asked about what kind of dedication to training the soldiers showed, Foy admitted that at first, there was one platoon, in particular, that was uncooperative and nonchalant about training.

“I told them, it is your life you are putting at risk, not mine. So if you don’t want to train, don’t blame anyone but yourselves when your buddies get blown up.”

After that, the team would release the platoon after a full day of training, only to find them huddled together, training for hours more in the evenings. The ANA noncommissioned officers began stepping up and enforcing discipline standards. Dedication and hard work on both sides has certainly paid off.

After a few weeks of training, a group of ANA engineers conducted a pre-approved joint mission with the ANA commandos and, with their embedded ANA Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, cleared three anti-tank mines. Only a month after beginning training with ETT 1, First Platoon found an IED, using the very mine detectors they had trained so diligently with, while on a partnered mission with RCP 67. Sgt. Thomas explained that the ANA was conducting an area sweep of a hill and within minutes returned to him stating they had found a wire. Without thinking much of it, he told them to continue sweeping until they found multiple indicators. Moments later, they returned stating “We find IED.”

Sgt. Thomas followed them to take a look and, sure enough, the ANA had dug out almost an entire pressure plate. They maintained security of the area while a Navy EOD team blew the

bomb in place. Spc. Foy beamed with pride when recalling the event and said it was the most rewarding time of his deployment thus far.

“They executed everything exactly as we had taught them.”

Three months later, that platoon was moved to clear routes in support of a construction project, and successfully found and defeated at least four IEDs in their first week of completely independent operations. As the platoons became more and more proficient, they began helping to train their infantry and heavy equipment counterparts in counter-IED operations. Third Platoon, the latest to join the training, found an IED on their 3rd mission out, while partnered with RCP 67 and has begun successful independent operations in a new province since then. The other platoons have been assigned to other parts of the country and are following suit.

The bond of mutual respect that the ETT members have formed with their trainees is apparent. While some soldiers are irreconcilably uneasy around Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) due to the recent rash of violent incidents between Afghan and coalition forces, Spc Foy consistently referred to his assigned ANA soldiers as “we” and Sgt. Thomas noted, “we have fun, joke, they talk about their families; it will be very difficult to leave.”

Despite their initial disappointment, both stated they are glad they were assigned this mission and are thankful for the experience.

Warm feelings aside, coalition forces are quickly drawing down in the north, making the apparent success and timing of their efforts exceptionally historic. The results will be closely watched as indicators of how well ANSF will take over security and stability operations after 2014.

“If they get the support they need, they will do really well when we are gone. If they don’t, they won’t,” Sgt. Thomas added, referring to logistical and sustainment support.

Whatever happens, these brave ETTs, with little to no training in being trainers, embody the very spirit of the U.S. Army engineers by using what knowledge and resources they do have to work with individuals far beyond their pay grade, and overcome systems and obstacles that have been entrenched for centuries and get the job done. Day after day, they put their lives on the line for the sake of the Afghan people and that is the true spirit of service and dedication that exemplifies the Army Corps of Engineers.

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