

TCM ABCT Trip Report (May, 2016)

SUBJECT: TCM ABCT Visit to a Combat Training Center (CTC)

PURPOSE: Visit ABCT training to document observations, insights and lessons learned in support of DOTMLPF-P Integration efforts. This report does not specify a unit or CTC rotation. The intent is to inform stakeholders of persistent observations in order to improve ABCT performance and inform capabilities development efforts.

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1. EAS Fleet Draw:

a. Units are improving on bringing required items to ensure the EAS fleet vehicles are combat ready. The EAS fleet vehicles do not come equipped with all Additional Authorized List (AAL) items, certain installation kits, and all equipment necessary to maximize success. For this rotation items not issued included: SKU and installation kits, water cans, vehicle and equipment TMs, range flags, picket pounders, wire gloves, camo nets, a few DAGR cables/antennas, VS17 panels, TOW bars, HUB batteries for radios, CLS bags, etc.

b. During a previous rotation in 2015, our team observed the majority of Bradleys had unserviceable track pads. These vehicles also did not possess the BII to perform maintenance on this new T161 track. This issue has been resolved. During this training exercise, 100% of the Bradley crews interviewed possessed the necessary BII to maintain the T161 track. All T161 track our team observed was serviceable.

c. ~20% of Bradleys observed still had the legacy T157i track (need more research as to why).

d. In 2015, units drew vehicles without radios installed. This caused delays during the draw and on some vehicle installation kits and cables were missing. In 2016 during EAS draw, vehicles had radios already mounted. This process improved the unit's ability to draw more rapidly and ensured that all cables were properly installed and available for the equipment. This also increased the unit's ability to test mission command equipment during the draw.

e. BFTs were 53/56 operational at draw, which is a vast improvement. According to the BFT FSR, this was possible due to effectively manning his team with enough manpower to support the mission.

Recommendations: Units develop a checklist of all items that are mission essential for different vehicle types (AAL, etc.). Identify what is not issued by the EAS prior to deploying, and bring shortages from homestation. End items need to be on hand during the draw for operators to PMCS equipment, i.e. BFIST SKU, LLDR, DAGR, SKL, etc.

2. T161 Track Performance:

a. In 2015, Bradley crews reported performance issues with T161 track regarding dash speed and negotiation of medium slopes in the terrain of Hohenfels. In 2016, our team observed Bradleys sliding sideways down muddy slopes, and vehicle track spinned excessively in grass and slippery flat terrain. T161 dash speed and stopping performance seemed degraded in comparison to T157i track. All T161 track we observed in 2015 was unserviceable.

b. In 2016, unit crew-members did not report the same challenges with the track as the previous unit. Based upon this observation, we believe unserviceable T161 track pads were a major factor in reduced performance. The performance of unserviceable track observed can pose increased risk for accidents to occur.

c. When track was replaced the entire track was replaced. Track shoes have a 6,000-mile service life and track pads have a 1,700-mile service life. The Army can save ~400% by replacing pads at required intervals vice the entire track. The T161 track also requires unique torque requirements at certain mileage.

Recommendations:

Retain stock of sufficient track in theatre to meet EAS fleet requirements.

In order for the track to be torqued and replaced at the proper intervals mileage needs to be tracked, and operators must ensure they inspect the track pads and shoes IAW the TM.

3. Reference Material for Operator Level Maintenance & Doctrine

a. The unit possessed technical manuals (TMs) for operator level preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS) but in many cases did not have TMs on hand for other equipment (CBRN, radios & mission command equipment, weapons, NVDs, etc). This prevented operators from being able to reference steps for PMCS and operating/troubleshooting procedures. This same observation is common among AC ABCTs observed in the past six months. Although units receive TMs when new equipment is fielded, most observed are not replenishing stock once manuals become unserviceable.

b. 50% of Bradley crews interviewed possessed -10 hull manuals. Most crews interviewed did not possess -10 turret manuals but were issued -40 manuals for the turret. No crews interviewed were issued TMs for any end items, i.e. radios, DAGR, etc.

c. Although small unit leaders expressed the lack of TMs is having negative impacts for their ability to maintain all equipment no one interviewed knew the process to acquire printed TMs for the unit. Over 30 units have expressed similar issues to our analysis team since 2012.

Update from ADP → On 1 July 2016 APD released a new version of their website. The update includes a new search function to enable the user to search by keyword or reference #. This update removed several previous capabilities that were very useful for the user including a search by Series (TC, ATTP, FM, etc.) and a search by Branch (Armor, Infantry, etc.). TCM ABCT expressed this concern to APD and they intend to reintegrate that capability in a future enhancement. TCM ABCT was invited to serve in APD requirements sessions as a user community representative for their FY 17 project, migrating Point & Click into Armypubs. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions for APD regarding this new update please send inquiries to email usarmy.pentagon.hqda.mbx.apd-subscription-manager@mail.mil.

Recommendations -

ABCTs -

Maintain Hard Copy References. Unit publication officers order printed TMs and doctrine from the APD Point and Click Ordering System at <https://dol.hqda.pentagon.mil/ptclick/index.aspx>.

Access Digital Manuals: Official websites for units to access digital doctrine and TMs are:

U.S. Army Official Web site <http://armypubs.army.mil>
Army Publishing Directorate <http://www.apd.army.mil>
AMC LOGSA <https://www.logsa.army.mil/etms/online.cfm>
Central Army Registry <http://www.adtdl.army.mil/>
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers <http://www.usace.army.mil>
TSG and MEDCOM <http://www.armymedicine.army.mil>
DOD Forms Management Program
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm>

Services/Command Maintenance: Include PMCS of all equipment in during scheduled services and command maintenance Mondays that requires operators to perform maintenance by the book. i.e. dedicate one command maintenance Monday a month to completing 5988-Es on mission command equipment, etc. Ensure Services SOPs include all unit equipment.

Publication Directorates - Continue to address ways to provide references to the point of need in the appropriate format (paper, digital, etc.) Feedback suggests platoon level

units require printed versus digital references in order to train Soldiers and maintain equipment.

Institutional Course Managers - Consider revising professional military course (PME) lesson plans for the existing training management class to incorporate processes to access digital manuals and to order printed manuals. Provide a list or CD containing the most current doctrine relevant to the branch or MOS of the student.


4. Navigation:

a. The unit experienced challenges with navigation that resulted in loss of mission command. When the Squadron Main CP jumped around 2200 it moved to the reverse side of a hill top, masking LOS communications with the troops. The S6 did not use a LOS tool to identify if the new location would have communication and the quartering party did not raise an OE-254 to check to see if communications was available before bringing in the main body to the new Main CP. The S6 was not a member of the quartering party. The unit could not regain communication until later the next day when they relocated. The result was a non-functional CP focused solely on attaining communication versus battle tracking, etc. Two close call fratricides occurred during this time and contributing circumstances included lack of situational awareness.

b. The squadron issued ~10 compasses per platoon. This is an improvement from previous observations where in some cases troops and companies only had a few or no compasses at all.

c. The unit possessed small 11 x 17 maps of the local training area, but does not possess the capability to produce 1/50:000 scale maps for all required operators down to vehicle/team level. Should a near peer threat compromise satellites this challenge could pose problems to navigation.

d. CDID T&AO surveyed units in the past year (A, I and S) and the statistics related to compasses available in units are:



Recommendations -

ABCTs -

Conduct land navigation training IAW TC 3-25.26.

Increase proficiency through repetitive opportunities for Soldiers to earn their EIB, EFMB and EIA.

Order enough compasses to equip at least one per team/vehicle.

Train with analog/digital land navigation systems (map, compass, DAGR, JCR, etc.).

Include maps and compasses in packing lists, predeployment inspections, and PCCs/PCIs.

Identify capabilities for internal reproduction of analog maps to enable mission command in satellite denied environments.

Incorporate a degraded scenario during a homestation FTX to train analog skills. Exercise PACE across the formation (Mission Command, Navigation, Range Estimation, etc.)

In order to reduce the risk of loss of digital navigation capabilities units need to install COMSEC in their DAGRs. To enable automatic DAGR COMSEC updates via satellite follow the instructions found in the April 2016 of PS Magazine at <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-273771>. Over-the-air key distribution (OTAD), limits the requirement to key COMSEC to only once per year. The OTAD software release is part of MWO 11-5820-1172-23-1. Units can get a copy of the MWO and the software at the PNT website <https://www.pmpnt.army.mil>

For strategies to improve land navigation proficiency, recommend institutional course developers and unit leaders review the Infantry Magazine article *The Lost Art of Dismounted Land Navigation*, OCT-DEC 15 at [http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2015/OCT-DEC/pdf/4\)%20Vickery%20-%20Land%20Nav.pdf](http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2015/OCT-DEC/pdf/4)%20Vickery%20-%20Land%20Nav.pdf)

EIB USAIS Pamphlet 350-6, MAY 16 - <http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/eib/content/pdf/USAIS350-6.pdf?24MAY2016v2>

EIB Resources Page - <http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/eib/Resources.html>

EIA Resource Page - <http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/OCOA/Excellence%20in%20Armor.htm>

D3SOE JLLIS site - <https://www.jllis.mil/apps/index.cfm?do=cops.view&copid=1038>

TRADOC Center of Excellence –

Continue to address institutional strategies to increase land navigation proficiency.

Assess D3SOE content in POIs and ensure Soldiers receive the right individual and leader training associated with analog and digital navigation skills. Ensure effective content resides in OES, WOES, NCOES, OSUT, BOLC, ILE, USASMA, BSNCO, SDMGC, and SSD.

TCMs/CDID – Participate in the Army Lesson Learned Forum (ALLF) to continue to address strategies to improve capabilities in D3SOE environments. Continue to identify BCT capabilities to maintain and produce adequate maps during D3SOE. Research Army capabilities to support theatre entrance requirements for analog mission command products.

Based upon the Degraded Space Mitigation Strategy from 2013 it has been our belief there may be limitations regarding mass printing of maps for units. Multiple sections in the report address potential issues, i.e. "*The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has announced its intent to reduce/eliminate reproduction of hardcopy maps; degraded conditions will create a surge requirement for hardcopy maps that may exceed current production capabilities and logistical planning factors. NGA has announced its intent to reduce/eliminate reproduction of hardcopy maps. This mitigation requires the capability to produce and/or reproduce maps in bulk quantities. Tactical Geospatial Engineers do not have this capability.*"

During visits to ABCTs, S2s have articulated knowledge and confidence in ordering maps for local training areas and ranges, but have expressed concern over whether or not they would be able to acquire enough maps thru ordering to equip every vehicle and team across the BDE, especially for an ABCT working off several map sheets on the offense. BCTs currently possess map production capabilities with plotters, however, not of the magnitude to provide maps across the BCT. The capability is more limited to imagery, etc.

Update: TCM-ABCT contacted the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Inventory Branch Chief and clarified the current situation regarding U.S. map print production capabilities. After the Combined Arms Center (CAC) published the Degraded Space Mitigation Strategy in 2013, the NGA did cease printing maps for units. In 2014, the DLA took the lead on printing maps for the U.S. military. Following this update, there are no foreseen challenges with providing printed maps of worldwide locations to Army and Joint forces in mass on short notice. The DLA possesses the capability to provide mass printing at locations in the U.S. and continental United States (OCONUS), with more robust and increased printing efficiency. One example: They recently provided 12,000 maps in only nine hours. DLA distributes a monthly newsletter that contains ordering processes and tips for customers. We will follow-up with DLA and share the newsletter to help educate the force on this capability.

5. COMSEC:

a. Operators and staff interviewed were not aware that the DAGR can be filled with COMSEC to retain position, navigation and timing (PNT).

b. Most troops possessed three SKLs for filling COMSEC in radios and DAGRs. One troop only had a single serviceable SKL and this resulted in a 3-hour delay during a mission.

Recommendations:

Assign a primary and alternate COMSEC (SKL) operator for each platoon along with a thorough PMCS during draw, and/or predeployment.

Enable automatic DAGR COMSEC updates via satellite by following the instructions found in the April 2016 of PS Magazine. Over-the-air key distribution (OTAD), limits the requirement to key COMSEC to only once per year. The OTAD software was released under MWO 11-5820-1172-23-1. Units can get a copy of the MWO and the software at the PNT website <https://www.pmpnt.army.mil>

6. HF:

a. The unit did not employ HF capabilities and had challenges with BLOS communications as a result. Reduced operator and staff knowledge of HF was the most frequent reason communicated during interviews. HF proficiency has been a persistent observation since 2012. Although our team has observed some improvement in a few units, there has not been observable improvement for the majority of units. ARC has introduced HF familiarization; however, RSLC remains the best training venue for HF. Cyber Soldiers do not receive training on HF in the institution. Few Soldiers assigned to ABCTs attend RSLC; ABCT scouts more often attend ARC.

Recommendations:

Armor School review ways to increase HF in POIs.

Cyber Center of Excellence reconsider HF training in the institution.

ABCTs seek additional opportunities to train the trainer on HF at homestation, and support attendance to RSLC IAW the Recon Career Timeline. Issue 5988E-s for all mission command equipment and require operators to conduct PMCS. Issue TMs for all equipment. Add HF operations to TACSOPs and TOCSOPs.

7. UAS Operations: The Shadow was constantly in flight; however, the unit flew no Ravens. This observation is common for the majority of units since 2012; although most do deploy the Raven, very few maximize the capability and flight hours. The major

barrier reported is lack of trainers and operators, followed by strict or long clearance procedures for pre-planned ROZ missions.

Recommendations:

Units increase the number of trained UAS operators by sending Soldiers to the Small UAS Raven Master Trainer Course at Fort Benning, GA. Master trainers have the ability to conduct train-the-trainer activities to increase the number of qualified UAS operators. Information is available at the Fort Benning web page at <http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/197th/229/SUASMT/>

Units seek opportunities to incorporate Ravens into the Information Collection Plan.

8. Rehearsals:

a. The squadron had the most effective rehearsals our team has observed since 2012. The key to success was the staff created a large quality sand table and the unit had the right audience for each type of rehearsal. The sand table kit was very effective in providing the materials for the Soldiers to build a large-scale (20x60 meters) terrain model representative of the mission. The squadron structured their order and rehearsals by phases which allowed leaders to best understand the mission and break it down to a manageable level.

(1) During the Fires rehearsal the S2 and S3 briefed their portions followed by the FSO and the Troops FSOs. Each element briefed TTLODAC. Mortars were not discussed in the Fires rehearsal.

(2) During the Support rehearsal the S1, S2, S3, S4, XO, CSM and 1SGs were present. The rehearsal started the same as the Fires where the S2/S3 briefed the enemy situation and mission. Each staff section and Troop 1SG followed briefing their portion by phases of the operation.

(3) During the Combined Arms Rehearsal, the staff and troops had maximum participation. The squadron commander managed the rehearsal and inserted friction points to exercise enable the staff's conduct of the rapid decision synchronization process (RDSP).

9. Armor Defeat Capability for ABCT Scouts:

a. The squadron encountered near peer threats in the operational environment that demonstrated the absolute need to retain armor defeating capabilities within the squadron. On every mission, the armor threat posed the greatest challenge for the unit. Had the unit maximized the capability of assigned assets they would have had greater success fighting for reconnaissance. The squadron only manned four Bradleys per platoon IOT have some dismounted capability. The squadron did not have an Armor company assigned for the training exercise.

(1) The unit did not have any Javelins, but did have AT4s. This may be a TADDS or contract support constraint based on previous feedback; needs more research.

(2) Scout platoons did not develop engagement areas when assigned the tasks to screen. Bradleys most often occupied hasty positions with short distance observation (100 meters), in areas where they could have easily positioned to observe areas 500-1000 meters. When crews operated in this way OPFOR tanks traversed spider trails and defeated the unit one vehicle at a time. If the platoon would have used turning obstacles to deny the enemy use of trails they would have been able to use the TOW missile to engage tanks. The MILES XXI and CVTESS both require the crew to track the missile flight for 15 seconds before the kill laser fires. The real-world TOW missile also requires vehicle crews to make decisions to fire based upon whether or not the target has no obstructions within the site reticle, i.e. it takes the TOW2B Aero 21 seconds to travel 3,750 meters. Most of the engagements we observed enemy tanks remained exposed only for a few seconds as they had unrestricted movement. The arming distance of the TOW is also 65 meters. In extremely restrictive and vegetated terrain the unit must force the enemy in EAs that enable them to engage with the TOW.

Note: JMRC restricted all BLUFOR ATWESS following accidents that occurred in 1st quarter, FY 16, so the unit was firing in dry fire mode.

10. CP Operations:

a. The unit CP performed very well during the planning phase. Although this training exercise was the first time the unit staff has operated as a team the CP was laid out effectively. The unit displayed a common operating picture that pulled together all relevant icons from the staff, both in analog (Printed map with magnet icons) and digital (CPOF) modes.

b. During the execution phase CP operations need improvement. Focus areas include: assignment of duties to all CP members (especially enlisted), assignment of Battle NCOs, updating of analog/digital COP after changes occur, and providing options for the commander. This trend improved throughout the rotation. Analog products looked great but not well populated when changes occur. Reporting of battle drills (attention in the TOC) great, but actions following the battle drill need improvement; i.e. what actions Soldiers and NCOs take from each section, etc.

c. One of the first units to ever display the Shadow on the OSVRT.

d. Commanders often positioned their command posts (CPs) in locations where they could not obtain communications with their higher headquarters. Although the intent was to conceal their CPs in restrictive and wooded terrain, the unit sacrificed mission command. On other occasions units located where that provided both communications and concealment but they only had one way in and out of the CP location. If the unit had to relocate rapidly it would have been very difficult.

Recommendations:

Units conduct quartering parties to identify if CP locations provide force protection and mission command. Prior to occupation of the main body the unit conducts communications checks with higher headquarters to ensure the location is suitable.

TCM-ABCT identify if sample CP scripts exist that units can utilize to train battle drills during homestation TOCEX/STAFFEX, etc.

11. SSP Requirement for the ABCT: The commander expressed that he is a fan of the 6x36 formation, but due to manning shortages he could only man four Bradleys per platoon in order to have any dismounts. The most dismount scouts any troop had was twelve (A TRP). A Troop was assigned the main effort on the majority if not all of the missions. With twelve dismounts the unit was ill equipped to handle the operational environment. Under the SSP each troop should have 36 Soldiers available for dismount operations (3 X 6 man squads/plt). If Alpha Troop had 36 Soldiers they would have been equipped to handle the hybrid threat they encountered when dealing with local populace in urban environments. Additionally, with so few dismounts the unit had no choice but to position their dismounts as local security for the Bradleys. The wooded terrain at JMRC posed an increased need for local security that reduced the squadron's capability to effectively screen, recon, or secure the area of operations for every mission assigned. Six man squads each led by a staff sergeant are required for Bradley sections and scout squads to operate as a team when executing missions in the ABCT.

12. Camouflage: The unit demonstrated the best camouflage our team has observed since 2012. Almost every vehicle across the squadron emplaced camouflage nets, to include the squadron CP. More vehicles have been painted woodland green, but some are painted in desert colors. The squadron CSM expressed the need for Soldiers to camouflage but only if they were on an OP where the need existed.

13. CTCP:

a. The unit S4, 1SG, and XO were located at the CTCP, with the XO in charge. The unit S4 operated logistics out of the CTCP with digital and analog products.

b. Radio operators used hand mikes, however, there were no external speakers. This led to Soldiers being overwhelmed, i.e. hand mike in one hand, pushing map pins with the other hand, etc.

c. The CTCP was unable to serve as the alternate command post when the Main CP jumped and lost communications.

d. Shift change briefs were not effective as replacements did not express that they understood what had occurred before their shift, or demonstrate situational awareness.

e. According to OC/Ts this CTCP was better than most, but needs improvement.

f. The S1 tracker did not match the medic casualty tracker. An improved analog system would serve as an effective solution.

14. AA Procedures: Trends are indicating that units are improving on AA procedures, however, the actions that occur after occupation need improvement.

a. Units are establishing security more often, but need improvement at night.

b. The command climate seems to be the driving force to enforcing security and discipline, i.e. Consequences if caught sleeping or not pulling security, etc.

c. Quarters party procedures are occurring, however they are incomplete. Major areas that are common across the formation include CBRN, assignment of initial positions, patrols, and OPs.

d. The unit acknowledges they need to work on an SOP for AA procedures that includes priorities of work for the first 30 minutes, hour, etc.

e. This is one of the few units we have observed that has conducted a stand to (0500 hours).

15. CBRN:

a. CBRN activities during quarters party occupation and continued monitoring needs improvement.

b. The unit expressed challenges with enough CBRN material (M8, M9, etc).

c. Soldiers demonstrated confusion over when to wear their masks. i.e. in the city a commander and a few Soldiers were the only ones wearing masks.

d. Some units occupied the AA in MOPP 4 and also conducted unmasking procedures.

e. Some leaders continue to utilize improper CBRN doctrinal terminology, i.e. demasking procedures vice unmasking procedures. This has been very common amongst most units observed over the past few years.

16. PCC/PCI:

a. Soldiers were often observed with no water on their person. ~30% of Soldiers observed were carrying camel-baks. Some Soldiers carried water bottles in their cargo pocket. A few carried a canteen. ~50% had no water at all on some missions.

b. Some dismounted OPs did not have spare batteries and this caused challenges with communication.

c. Squads were sometimes unprepared when they dismounted from vehicles; missing masks, weapons, water, went back for gear. Eye pro ~50%.

d. Unit needs improvement on PCCs/PCIs based upon different missions; missing items at OP; identified the need for special equipment during AAR for urban environment/stability operations.

17. Graphics:

a. On several occasions, troop commanders passed out graphics from higher with no refinement.

b. Troop commanders often did not deliver refined graphics back up to squadron for the staff to create a consolidated set of common graphics.

c. Troops received one size overlay based on a 1:25,000 map, and platoons had 1:50,000 maps. To transfer analog graphic symbols, squads and platoons “eyeballed” the troop commander’s graphics.

18. Logistics Resupply Point: The unit rehearsed LRP operations during the Support rehearsal. NCOs demonstrated knowledge of LRP operations and referred to an SOP with day and night operations. This is an improvement from what our team has observed in past rotations. NCOs seemed more involved in sustainment than other units we have observed.

19. Fires: Fires capability limited to analog due to the Squadron FSO track lacking a serviceable Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). One Troop BFIST track came with the SKU at the EAS draw; others did not. Usually units need to bring SKUs and end items to make BFISTs and other equipment operational. The Troop FSO could not connect to the FOS with his SKU (believes this was due to FSO AFATDS issue).

20. Batteries: Unit brought some but not enough. ASIP battery shortage limited capability of OPs. Units need to include batteries in predeployment layouts and SOPs. The unit expressed they have ordered batteries and the resupply process seems to be working well.

21. Resupply of CLI & V: Most troops used service station where vehicles return to the 1SG for resupply. One troop used tailgate, not preferred during this screen as it exposed the OPs and left the 1SG to maneuver to each location with no security. One troop that conducted service station too far back (3 terrain features back) took three hours to deliver LOGPAC.

22. CASEVAC: Vehicle marking needs improvement. First Sergeants and medics were unable to differentiate between urgent, priority, etc. Unit leaders recommended a VS17 panel marking TTP and others mentioned they would like to use range flags but none of the vehicles possessed range flags. Unit NCOs said they had not seen range flags in many years, not even at homestation. Interviews suggest that this is a result of units ceasing to use the flags for gunnery. The flags are not for gunnery use alone, but also a means to deliver command and signal as part of the PACE plan. Examples include: platoon leaders can signal changes in formation and direct actions when FM communications are down, units can limit traffic on the net, adjacent platoons and the commander can visually obtain situational awareness, vehicle commanders mark CCPs/vehicles with a red flag for urgent casualties, etc.

a. Stealthy and Deliberate versus Rapid and Forceful: A scout platoon attacked when directed to be stealthy and deliberate; the enemy consisted of 2 x T72, 4 x BMPS and 3 x BRDM. The unit and OC/Ts said with the introduction of Bradleys we must maintain cognizant that they are still Scouts. When the scout platoon was engaged by the enemy they did not displace, but stayed in place.

b. EN for R&S: The squadron often did not utilize the engineers for reconnaissance. With the lack of vehicle (4/6 per PLT) and lack of dismount personnel, ENs could have been more utilized.

c. S2: Multinational S2 representatives briefed terrain analysis in the CP very well. S2 struggling to understand the SITTEMP and how it applies to them; no EVENTEMP coming from BDE; SITTEMP, ICP and NAIs not synched. Needs improvement on knowledge of CONET. Not utilizing all systems (CIDNE).

d. S6: Only one CPOF trained operator in entire CP is in the S6; No PMCS on Mission Command Equipment; Unsure if any EAS platforms come equipped with RETRANS or if unit needed to bring equipment to enable this capability (need more research on this).

e. Only one LMTV on CO/TRP MTOEs restricts transport capabilities: Units concerned over MASCAL ability with only one truck. Rifle COs used to have two. Rifle CO 1SGs expressed same concern in 2015. Hard to conduct garrison or field tasks with one truck. Some 1SGs said they would trade their HMMWV for a LMTV. Very difficult when cant transport Soldiers with ammo, etc. for ranges, CTC missions, etc.

f. LLVI: Not well integrated into ICP. Troops unaware of capability LLVI provides. LLVI not emplaced at ideal locations to accomplish their mission. LLVI and the S2 did not brief their capabilities or mission during the CAR.

g. COIN/Stability: Many new Soldiers need to work on Enter/Clear room, TCPs, etc.

h. New Uniform: Seems to rip easier than the old uniform. Many Soldiers had pants taped together at the crotch and thigh areas.

i. **GRG:** Troop had a GRG that was different than the actual city layout. This caused delays once in the city as they were trying to ID the correct buildings.