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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION
APR 4 2013

SUBJECT: Operations Security (OPSEC) Guidance for Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (IEDD)

1. References. See Annex A (encl 1).

2. Purpose. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) continue to be a significant threat and source of casualties to coalition forces in the current fight and will remain our adversaries' weapon of choice for the foreseeable future. In accordance with Army Regulation 530-1 , protection of sensitive information is vital to our success in accomplishing the Army's mission. This memorandum prescribes OPSEC guidance for C-IED and IEDD products.

3. Guidance.

a. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 7(F) cannot be used to withhold an entire category of records, such as all documents pertaining to C-IED and IEDD products. The FOIA requires that each record responsive to a FOIA request be reviewed for releasability, and such determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis after a FOIA request is received and responsive records are gathered. Accordingly, all unclassified records pertaining to C-IED and IEDD products will be appropriately marked at a minimum with the following language:

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)

This document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 7(F).

b. For Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater guidance, refer to the OEF and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) Security Classification Guide (SCG), dated 28 March 2002.

c. Disclosure of all C-IED/IEDD information, products, dealing with foreign governments, international organizations and non-U.S. personnel, must be cleared through the appropriate OPSEC and Foreign Disclosure Office.

d. Organization OPSEC and Foreign Disclosure Officers will review all C-IED/IEDD articles, speeches, briefs, papers, photographs, brochures, advertisements, displays, and presentations, and other releasable materials for critical information items in Annex B (encl 2) of this memorandum.

e. United States Army personnel, to include military, civilians, and contractors, will not comment on enemy IED tactics, techniques and procedures or friendly C-IED/IEDD initiatives to unauthorized individuals without appropriate clearance and official need to know. United States Army personnel will restrict their comments on C-IED and IEDD threats to talking points in Annex C (encl 3) of this memorandum and Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, dated 24 April 2006, subject: Policy on Discussion of IEDs and IED-Defeat Efforts in Open Sources.

f. Requests for information from media sources must be strictly routed through appropriate public affairs channels. For Public Affairs Guidance refer to Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Public Affairs Guidance, dated 5 May 2006, subject: Public Affairs Guidance on IED Defeat.

4. The points of contact for this memorandum are COL Daniel Chartier, at comm: (703) 697-4916, or email: daniel.m.chartier.mil@mail.mil, or alternate LTC Peter Koch, at comm: (703) 692-6953, or email: peter.j.koch2.mil@mail.mil.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

William J. Troy
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
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Annex A

References:

1. Army Regulation 530-1 , Department of the Army Operations Security, 19 April 2007.
2. Operation Enduring Freedom and ONE SCG, dated 28 March 2002.
3. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, dated 24 April 2006, subject: Policy on Discussion of IEDs and IED-Defeat Efforts in Open Sources.
4. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Public Affairs Guidance on IED Defeat, 5 May 2006.
5. Army Regulation 190-12 Military Working Dogs program, 4 June 2007.

Annex B

C-IED/IEDD Critical Information List:

1. United States and Coalition Forces C-IED/IEDD Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), technologies, organizational initiatives, operational procedures and analysis of capabilities and vulnerabilities.
2. Enemy IED TTPs, technologies, organizational initiatives, operational procedures and analysis of capabilities and vulnerabilities.
3. Specific C-IED/IEDD System Information, i.e., design, development, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
4. Specific exploitation TTPs.
5. Photos of or information about vehicles or equipment that have been damaged by an IED.
6. Photos of or information about recovered components of an IED.
7. Weapons systems or equipment vulnerabilities. This category also includes the link between vulnerabilities and resulting wound patterns. Materials must not include:
 - a. Specific links between defined wounding methods/device and the resulting wound patterns;
 - b. Specific links between injuries sustained while wearing defined Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and the resulting wound patterns;
 - c. Specific links between injuries sustained while in defined vehicles and the resulting wound patterns;
 - d. Specific ballistic agents and the resulting failure of PPE or vehicles.

Annex C

CIED/IEDD Media Talking Points:

1. The defeat of the IED threat is a top priority for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).
2. The HQDA is devoting significant resources (equipment, personnel, military working dogs, tactics, training, and procedures) to defeating IEDs.
3. The HQDA is working with the Department of Defense, JIEDDO, and ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs to develop integrated solutions that have a holistic approach to defeating IEDs.
4. The IED issue is a complicated one, and no single solution exists to defeat IEDs.
 - a. Training is paramount. The best sensor and weapon on the battlefield is a well-trained, situationally aware Soldier.
 - b. Killing or capturing bomb makers and disrupting or eliminating their networks is vital.
 - c. Providing troops on the battlefield with effective, innovative technology enables the fight.
5. Our strategy includes four components:
 - a. Defeat the Device
 - b. Attack the Network
 - c. Adapt the Force

d. Governance and Strategic Communications