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PACIFIC PATHWAYS

LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES

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Pacific Pathways

Newsletter

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Foreword

This newsletter contains key leader interviews and articles that reflect on the innovation that United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) has named Pacific Pathways. Readers of this newsletter should study and be inspired by what USARPAC, joint and international partners, and the logistics enterprise have undertaken and accomplished.

The principles behind Pacific Pathways operations are simple. The U.S. Army is a member of a joint and multinational team. Presence matters, especially west of the International Date Line where U.S. allies, partners, and adversaries reside, and where U.S. interests take effect. The U.S. Army must move in the 21st century as it did during deployments at the end of the 19th century, which began its expeditionary tradition, principally by surface movement over great distances. Every day is practice and every operation provides the benefits of reconnaissance, rehearsals, and relationships that yield true readiness to deploy and operate in a time of crisis.

Pacific Pathways made it possible for us to truly train as if we are going to fight. To train innovatively, we must use the framework and funding of existing security cooperation exercises and tie them together in time and geography to create an extended operation for a single, tailored force that also challenges every echelon of the command. Staff development; exercising the concepts of mission command over extended distances; leader development from squad leader to theater Army commander; and the increasing participation of the joint team, multinational partners, U.S. Embassies, Department of Defense, and Department of State are all indications of the leverage attained through this operational approach.

As you read about Pacific Pathways from the perspectives of the newsletter's contributors, consider how this operational practice of tailoring formations into a task force smaller than a full brigade combat team and enabled with key capabilities not part of the current brigade combat team design makes a continuous operational cycle of planning, resourcing, preparing, training, validating, configuring, assembling, deploying, sustaining, moving, retrieving, and recovering. The operations in the Pacific transformed the way USARPAC operates from top to bottom, and changed the way the U.S. Army is seen within United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the region. These operations are now part of the "brand" of USARPAC.

Imagine the challenge of creating a single training event consisting of a command post exercise; field training exercises in a live, virtual, and construction set of environments involving multiple echelons of the command; and with a master event list that will stimulate all echelons simultaneously. How would this be scheduled into an already full operational tempo for the U.S. Army? Now, stretch the duration of the exercise to run continuously with a concentrated period of nine to ten months a year. How much would this cost? How would other missions requiring

these echelons be accomplished? The method that is inherent in the design of Pacific Pathways operations vaults over all these challenges and turns everyday operations into a scenario, with a self-generating master event list, and a cost-effective exercise to build readiness.

It is my honor to have been part of this innovation. The true credit goes to those Soldiers who shared their experiences in this newsletter. As with all actions done by the U.S. Army, design matters, but, at the end of the day, success or failure is determined by our units and their leaders and Soldiers. In the case of U.S. Army Pacific Pathways operations, our units have done something impressive and worthy of review. May this newsletter inspire you, just as these Soldiers were inspired, and guide you in the future to make greater contributions.



VINCENT K. BROOKS
General, U.S. Army
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Pacific Pathways Newsletter

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Introduction

Pacific Pathways: Regional Comprehensive Engagement and Echeloned Readiness

This newsletter is the final document of a series consisting of three initial impression reports (IIRs) documenting Pacific Pathways 15. Chapter 1 discusses positive outcomes and challenges from the Pacific Pathways exercises. Chapter 2 consists of key leader interviews with those involved in planning and conducting Pacific Pathways. The remaining chapters consist of first-person articles focusing on subjects related to Pacific Pathways 15 or, as in the case of the article by MG Patrick D. Sargent and LTC Merbin Carattini, articles illustrating persistent engagement in the Pacific theater.

"*We intend to put into motion a pathway of activity (for the Army) into multiple countries for extended periods of time, linking a series of events and exercises on a variety of topics.*"

— GEN Vincent K. Brooks, Commander, United States Army Pacific

U.S. military theater engagement programs seek to reassure allies, partners, and other nations that the U.S. is committed to regional security and stability. The U.S. Army in general has conducted bilateral tactical training events and cooperative staff exercises to build partnerships and enhance military cooperation with other militaries in the Pacific region. These regional engagements have demonstrated to ambitious regional actors that the U.S. has the military capability and will to dissuade conflict and, where necessary, assist with natural disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. In the past, U.S. military engagement in the Pacific has been through independent exercises to accomplish the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) commander's theater engagement plan in support of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) commander's strategic goals and objectives.

In 2014, GEN Vincent K. Brooks, USARPAC Commander, established Pacific Pathways, the name for an improved operational concept that links these once individually executed activities throughout the Pacific region into a single operation under a corps-level headquarters. As a result, the USARPAC commander has gained flexibility in supporting the USPACOM commander's engagement strategy and reduced response times in the event of a regional crises.

Pacific Pathways sets in motion for extended periods of time a brigade (-) worth of capability with a significant level of mission command from corps through battalion in theater. This pays great dividends to the U.S. Army's readiness beyond a combat training center (CTC) rotation. This operational concept better achieves military goals and objectives in supporting key U.S. interests of freedom of navigation and free trade. As stated by GEN Brooks at a press engagement at the 2013 Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting and Exposition in Washington, D.C., 21 OCT 2013:

> For decades, the Army and its sister Services have been an enabler for economic growth and prosperity in the region, which includes the world's three largest economies — the U.S., China, and Japan — as well as the top 10 emerging economies.

This ability to project and sustain a presence forward demonstrates a political willingness to ensure stability. Further, strengthening these relationships opens the probability of greater cooperation in the future as Pacific Pathways matures and becomes a routine activity.

Although the Pacific Pathways concept is still being operationalized, 2014 was the proof of principle, and 2015 was the first complete yearlong employment; it has shown great promise. The partnering between the U.S. and its allies and partners has been the focus. The future is ripe for building partnership capacity between the U.S. and multinational armies through exercises in the region. Wider participation and cooperation will create a stronger and more stable Pacific region. Significant to the end-state vision of Pacific Pathways is the deeper trust and confidence that can grow from this interaction, leading to greater prosperity instead of uncertainty and conflict. Applying the lessons from 2014, Pacific Pathways 15 (see Figure 1) further operationalized and expanded exercises within the Pacific theater by putting regionally aligned and assigned forces in motion for extended periods of time. Pacific Pathways 15 utilized post-CTC rotation units from the 25th Infantry Division (25ID) and United States Army Alaska (USARAK) as the basic task force building blocks and then integrated components of the total force — Army National Guard and Reserve enablers; joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners; and unified action partners — to support USARPAC's "set-the-theater" objectives.



Figure 1. Pacific Pathways 15

Pacific Pathways 15 transformed nine separate theater security cooperation plan exercises into one campaign consisting of Cobra Gold in Thailand, Foal Eagle in the Republic of Korea, Balikatan in the Philippines, Hamel in Australia, Garuda Shield in Indonesia, Keris Strike in Malaysia, Khaan Quest in Mongolia, port operations with the Republic of Korea, and Orient Shield with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force. Each deployed task force provided continuity and unity of a strategic message during its three-month deployment, and an additional

capability and flexibility to the USPACOM commander to respond to contingencies within theater. Pacific allies and partners are the bedrock of peace and security in the USPACOM area of responsibility. Additionally, U.S. defense cooperation with new and emerging partners continues to expand.

Pacific Pathways 16 is underway. As has been the trend, each Pacific Pathways operation builds on the next; however, each one is unique. For 2016, there are several new initiatives that are expanding participation and further projecting capability into the region. Pacific Pathways 16-01 (see Figure 2) for the first time utilized units from the 7th Infantry Division (7ID) from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, which was task-organized with elements from 25ID Aviation.



Figure 2. Pacific Pathways 16-01



Figure 3. Pacific Pathways 16-02

Pacific Pathways 16-02 (see Figure 3) established a mission command node forward in theater in the Philippines to coordinate all the activities of Pacific Pathways 16-02 and 16- 03. In addition, the mission command node partnered with the Philippine army on a series of subject matter expert engagements with the purpose of building a mission command capability within theater. In past Pacific Pathways operations, primary means of mission command over and above the executing unit was done from Hawaii, Japan, or Korea. Therefore, this is a projection of a U.S. capability into a sub-region of the theater where there is no permanent U.S. basing.



Figure 4. Pacific Pathways 16-03

In 2016, Pacific Pathways expands the overall concept by bringing Pacific allies and partners to the U.S. in a so-called reverse Pathways (see Figure 4). Tiger Balm, the bilateral exercise with Malaysia, will occur in Hawaii with an element of 25ID. Rising Thunder, the bilateral exercise with Japan, will bring Japanese army forces to the Yakima Training Center in Yakima, WA, with elements of 7ID. Canadian forces will train with U.S. forces during Arctic Anvil in Fairbanks, AK. Finally, U.S. forces will still deploy to Japan and conduct the allied bilateral exercise Orient Shield.

Chapter 1

Positive Outcomes and Challenges

Pacific Pathways may be a new approach to doing business in the Pacific, but it is not unlike past Army methodologies. There are recent historical examples that validate Pacific Pathways as a proven way and means to achieve U.S. strategic goals and objectives.

Consider the U.S. European approach post-World War II. The U.S. realized the importance of maintaining a presence along with a level of readiness in Europe to ensure peace and stability. In addition to this forward presence and continued engagement, some stateside units were then "war-traced" or, in today's language, "regionally aligned" to the European theater with prepositioned equipment sets known as Prepositioning of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS). Likewise, Unites States Army Pacific (USARPAC), through Pacific Pathways, seeks to emplace "activity sets" of equipment at key locations within the Pacific theater.

In addition, unit leadership conducted on-the-ground reconnaissance to gain an understanding of the operational environment and terrain. Comprehensive rehearsals with allies in the form of a maneuver exercise (Return of Forces to Germany) were conducted every two years from 1969 through 1993. Home-station training was centered on the mission essential task lists (METLs) needed to conduct the European mission as staffs honed their understanding of the operational environment through command post exercises and visits with partnered units in theater. This training exercised the complete system at echelon, assisting units in understanding where they would be employed, whom they would operate with, and how they would operate on actual terrain. The resulting echeloned readiness comprised rehearsals, reconnaissance, and relationships.

Further, the training ensured Soldiers and units were METL trained and confident with doctrine and equipment. They also understood the area of operations they would operate in (i.e., terrain, infrastructure, people, and allies). Finally, integration and interoperability with allies and partners significantly enhanced the U.S. Army's ability to deliver on its collective security obligations. In the end, the U.S. and its allies demonstrated that they were capable and willing to deliver on this obligation. The strategy imposed kept Europe in Phase 0, winning the Cold War.

The ends, ways, and means behind Pacific Pathways are similar in principle, but not necessarily in nature, to the U.S. experience in Europe up until 1993. For example, there is not an overarching security treaty, as with NATO. There are separate security arrangements with five individual treaty states: South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. There is also the standardization agreement with the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies Program, but these agreements do not carry the same weight as the NATO treaty. Consequently, this challenges the U.S. Army's engagement strategy.

The Pacific area of operations is vast with significant maritime terrain and numerous islands, creating challenges to power projection and operational maneuver of a ground force. The U.S. lacks permanent basing and status of forces agreements in many of the subregions of the Pacific. The U.S. must move its equipment by strategic sealift. The diversity of the nations in the region and their individual competing economic requirements and internal political issues often create challenges vastly different from NATO. In the absence of a U.S. presence and engagement in the region, there are limited partnering options for counties such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Burma, or Taiwan. Further, lack of U.S. engagement would risk isolating

the United States' traditional partners in the region, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. Therefore, Army forces deployed during Pacific Pathways are a vital joint force component to maintaining stability and security in the Pacific.

Pacific Pathways is producing a clear and steady increase in the readiness of Army forces and the joint team, an increase that would be cost prohibitive if all the readiness benefits that Pacific Pathways provides were pursued through separate activities. Pacific Pathways is focused on building readiness with respect to the unique skill sets USARPAC requires: to employ and sustain land forces over vast distances at all command levels. Pacific Pathways also improves USARPAC's ability to shape the theater both substantively and as a strong symbol of U.S. foreign policy priorities. The U.S. is creating a demand for new foreign partners to participate in Pacific Pathways, improving the scope and quality of partner engagements and extending U.S. land force presence and persistence west of the international date line. U.S. Army forces and the joint team are becoming better postured through a more innovative execution of already existing exercises to support United States Pacific Command's (USPACOM's) strategic priorities.

Positive Outcomes

Strengthening Mission Command

Since 2013, USARPAC evolved from a three-star to a four-star headquarters to better support the national objectives associated with strategic rebalancing. This command restructuring provided a greater ability for USARPAC, the Army component of USPACOM, to influence these strategic objectives and support USPACOM. Along with the four-star commander, the chief of staff went from a colonel to a major general and the assistant chief of staff went from a colonel to a brigadier general. USARPAC also gained a U.S. two-star deputy commander and an Australian two-star deputy commander. As a result, USARPAC became a much more capable headquarters, which is important when dealing with other countries in the region. Pacific Pathways is a direct example of USARPAC's restructuring, because it would have been more difficult to get such a program off the ground under a three-star headquarters in USPACOM.

One significant outcome for the Army in the Pacific rebalancing was aligning I Corps to USPACOM, with operational control to USARPAC and administrative control remaining with United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). While I Corps receives funding from FORSCOM, it is assigned to the Pacific theater. The 25th Infantry Division (25ID) was assigned to USPACOM and attached to USARPAC. USARPAC operationally controlled 25ID to I Corps. The 25ID-I Corps mission command relationship freed USARPAC command and staff to focus more strategically in the Pacific and on its core mission of setting the theater. However, the 25ID commanding general remained in a dual-hatted role as the senior Army commander in Hawaii under USARPAC and the 25ID commanding general under the I Corps commanding general. The USARPAC commanding general's intent has been clear: I Corps provides operational-level mission command. In addition, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team and Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Alaska remain under United States Army Alaska (USARAK) for training oversight. When they are operationally employed, they are under the control of I Corps. In the future, if the 7th Infantry Division (7ID) becomes more operational, its regional alignment is expected to be in the Pacific. This will have a significant positive impact on Pacific Pathways and the overall ability of USARPAC to meet rebalancing objectives. Although the alignment of I Corps generated challenges, the overall realignment represented a positive evolution, improving USARPAC's ability to set the theater in Phase 0.

I Corps was instrumental in the effort to operationalize Pacific Pathways. Although a division headquarters has planning capabilities, it is still a tactical unit. On the other hand, I Corps is designed for the type of operational-level planning and execution required to synchronize the elements that conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). It also provides a command and control node to synchronize the current operation and, if required, to act on crisis. Significant to I Corps' ability is the addition of the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) aligned to I Corps.

The U.S. Army has fixed mission command nodes on the periphery of the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR): USARPAC and 25ID in Hawaii; United States Forces Korea, Eighth United States Army (8th Army), and 2nd Infantry Division in Korea; United States Army, Japan (USARJ) and I Corps (forward) in Japan; and I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and USARAK in Alaska. Pacific Pathways allows the U.S. Army to place a brigade combat team-level command forward for a short period within the subregions of the Pacific where there are no fixed U.S. bases. Starting with Pacific Pathways 16-02, the U.S. deployed a mission command node in the Philippines for a longer duration with a general officer to command and control the activities of the remainder of Pacific Pathways 16. The ability to have the agreements to deploy such a command post forward would not have occurred without Pacific Pathways.

Building Readiness

USARPAC's objectives were to improve and sustain readiness, shape the environment through increased engagement, and enhance the ability of land forces to support the USPACOM theater campaign plan using existing exercises and funds. This reconstruction of the exercise program, with more robust linkages to readiness, required an innovative operational method. Pacific Pathways is this approach. This operation purposefully employs and challenges units with the highest level of readiness. Pacific Pathways requires units to sustain this readiness for periods as long as 10 months, exercises higher headquarters with requirements not replicated at other training venues, and supports USPACOM's theater security objectives through engagements with allied and partner nations. Pacific Pathways builds this readiness at multiple echelons and demonstrates in a tangible, meaningful way the U.S. commitment to the region through a series of army-to-army, joint, bilateral, and multilateral exercises. Readiness has a unique meaning in the Pacific theater, where Army forces must utilize multimodal transportation and communications systems and specialized skill sets and exercise strong synchronized leadership at all levels of command to employ and sustain forces at distances spanning half the globe. This type of readiness is complementary to and is not replicated by Army and joint combat training centers (CTCs).

Strategic Readiness. Pacific Pathways creates the opportunity for USPACOM, USARPAC, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to develop and conduct multi-year plans for persistent and complex employment and sustainment of land forces. This resulted in better synchronization of theater plans among USPACOM's Service components and the employment of otherwise idle strategic lift assets that enhanced strategic readiness.

Operational Readiness. Pacific Pathways creates the opportunity to establish joint task forces (JTFs) to command, control, and sustain land forces. Pacific Pathways accommodates certification of these JTFs, which are presented with complex, real-world challenges. For example, Pacific Pathways provided a much more realistic certification for units participating in

this year's Talisman Saber exercise in Australia.

Tactical Readiness. Pacific Pathways extends and enhances tactical readiness as Army units complete CTC and home-station training and then deploy for a three-month operation in three countries. The benefits for readiness are multidimensional, from working interoperability issues with partners, to performing basic unit tasks, to command and control at all echelons.

To measure this increased readiness, I Corps developed a "Pathways Readiness Model" (see Figure 1-1). The Pacific Pathways readiness model concept is a multi-echelon report that enables I Corps to build readiness. It outlines operational objectives and metrics for evaluating success. Brigade combat teams provide an initial report prior to deployment, outlining training linkage during Pacific Pathways to METL development. They also provide an events menu matrix conducted during transition phases that contributes to METL development. Subsequent reports after each Pacific Pathways activity validate or update training realities, which provide qualitative assessments on relationship-building and lessons learned. Brigade combat team reports also include home-station units. The major subordinate command headquarters includes Pacific Pathways task force (TF) assessments and the Army force headquarters (ARFOR) in theater, and augments the multi-echelon report with an assessment of the traditional unit readiness there or in theater, based on the training conducted. I Corps provides operational assessment, based on trends over time, assessing Pacific Pathways holistically against stated combatant commander strategic plan (CCSP) and combatant commander strategic operation (CCSO) objectives.



Figure 1-1. Pathways Readiness Model

Positive Readiness Indicators

Mission Command. Distributing and decentralizing mission command across three exercise locations and home station improved the command and staffs at the echelons of corps, division, brigade, and battalion.

Partnership. Integration and interoperability occurred at the lowest levels. From a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational perspective, integrating with host-nation forces and interoperating with multiple country teams and embassies cannot be replicated at training venues in any other setting. During Pacific Pathways, integration and interoperability are real.

Leadership. Leaders faced continuing challenges requiring innovative and adaptive leadership in unfamiliar and austere environments. Those involved had to perform at least one level higher than their current grade to ensure the success of the unit, starting with rear detachment commanders operating at the battalion and brigade command level, down to junior leaders performing tasks normally associated with higher ranks when deployed forward to meet mission success. Deployed units experienced a morale boost, especially among junior Soldiers, as Pacific Pathways was their first or only deployment. Pacific Pathways has been a great retention tool. The 25ID commander stated that the leadership development resulting from Pacific Pathways, particularly the tactical and operational problem solving, made the missions successful. These execution problem sets cannot be readily simulated or re-created at a home station or at a CTC due to the dynamic environment in which a Pacific Pathways force operates.

Extended Employment. The Pacific Pathways force built readiness through multiple iterations of RSOI and port operations, increasing knowledge of the area of operations and speed through repetition. For example, at the beginning of Pacific Pathways, port preparation of the aviation TF lasted 18 hours. By the time it arrived at the final exercise, the unit had learned how to reduce the operational timeline from 12 to 6 hours. In addition, working with the country teams, embassies, and host nations to facilitate RSOI activities developed new skill sets at the division, brigade combat team, and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) echelons.

Shape and Set the Theater

Pacific Pathways reinforced U.S. commitment to its treaty allies and other regional partners, reinforced partner incentives for multilateral cooperation, and helped USPACOM set the theater. In only three years, USARPAC moved from short, small-scale deployments of reserve forces to large active duty formations that conduct sophisticated interoperability and capacity-building activities. As a mechanism to shape the theater, Pacific Pathways is becoming a seminal event in the view of key U.S. partners because they recognize the additional training benefits that come with increased exercise capacity, complexity, and scale. For these partners, participation is becoming a point of prestige. This interest represents leverage on the dollar as measured in regional influence. Japan, for example, requested USARPAC to redesign Pacific Pathways for fiscal year 2017 to enable its participation.

As a mechanism to set the theater, Pacific Pathways is delivering big returns. For example, demonstrations of U.S. helicopter capabilities during Pacific Pathways in fiscal year 2014 helped persuade Indonesia to consummate an $850 million foreign military sales contract. Malaysia may follow suit, in which case future Pacific Pathways exercises will focus on development of these

new capabilities. Pacific Pathways also allows USARPAC to help set the theater by extending the presence of Army forces west of the international date line for more than 75 percent of the year, avoiding any additional need for forward basing in support of theater contingencies.

Setting the theater is one of Pacific Pathways' greatest values. Linking several of these exercises together into a coherent operation allows I Corps specifically to extend mission command through a division headquarters in theater and across the international date line in real time and within an active theater of operations. From a sustainment perspective, the 593rd ESC (as well as the 19th ESC on the Korean peninsula) is able to rehearse multiple iterations of RSOI and sea and aerial port of debarkation openings and closings. The 593rd ESC also can provide logistics throughout the theater, giving it significant understanding of the area of operations in terms of port capabilities, host-nation infrastructure, and medical and hospital capabilities. All of this builds a picture of the theater, which I Corps did not have before and obtained through Pacific Pathways. This logistical situational awareness is a significant part of setting the theater in Phase 0.

Conducting multiple iterations of mission command and sea and aerial port mobility; employing units and equipment in and out of multiple countries; gaining detailed understanding of the Pacific theater time, space, and terrain; and working with diverse partner nations achieves an operational-level readiness that cannot be gained in a CTC rotation.

Pacific Pathways has been characterized as the ability for all units involved at multiple echelons and across all the warfighting functions to rehearse repetitively all the required deployment activities involving RSOI over an extended period of three to four months, dealing with the fog and friction in time and space within the Pacific theater. It is not uncommon for units conducting or supporting Pacific Pathways to conduct strategic sea and airlift activities from the continental U.S. (CONUS) or Hawaii and into Mongolia, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Australia, or Korea as many as seven or eight iterations. This also includes the supporting sustainment elements of 593rd ESC, mission command elements of I Corps and divisions, USARAK, USARJ, SDDC, and 8th Army. In addition, as units are employed in theater, leaders and Soldiers gain an understanding of the operational environment — seaports and airports, host-nation road and rail networks, the nuances of different terrain, and the extended distances and time zones in the Pacific — in essence, a constant reconnaissance in cooperation with U.S. partners and allies of the Pacific. Finally, continued interaction that builds relationships with host-nation militaries is important because it facilitates access into and out of the subregions of the AOR through potential status of forces agreements that the U.S. may not have had before. When looking holistically at Pacific Pathways as a means to rehearse, conduct reconnaissance, and build relationships, repetitively stressing all the warfighting systems across several echelons, the Army gains the ability to truly operate in the Pacific AOR, which it had not been able to do for quite some time.

Challenges

Operationalizing Pacific Pathways

Synchronizing the joint exercise life cycle (JELC) of individual country-focused exercises with the Pacific Pathways concept is a challenge. The Pacific AOR is a vast and diverse region of 36 sovereign nations comprising 50 percent of the world's population, several of the world's largest economies and militaries, and 3,000 separate languages. Each nation has its own set of political-military interests, goals, and objectives. Several of these nations are allies with the U.S. through mutual defense agreements.

Building a consensus within the region and gaining true multilateral collaboration are significant endeavors that will take time. USARPAC staff noted that the largest challenge is aligning JELC conferences with host nations and participating U.S. Army units to enable operational planning. One potential solution is to develop a Pacific Pathways planning conference that encapsulates strategic campaign planning and operational development prior to the execution of each Pacific Pathways campaign. As Pacific Pathways becomes known throughout the region — and there has been increasing interest by regional partners in joining Pacific Pathways — a planning conference may be possible. A conference should have all participants establish desired end states, training objectives, theater security cooperation plan requirements, and force structures for that Pacific Pathways campaign. Holding the conference prior to the start of JELC cycles would ensure unity of effort and understanding for future planning inclusive to all JELC events. Additionally, the conference should deconflict JELC events between exercises to allow continuity while planning the operation, reducing friction on subordinate units.

The planning challenge is exacerbated by a funding structure that does not support an operation. Current funding is allocated incrementally by and to individual exercises. When adding the numerous country-specific planning conferences, which define and refine training goals and objectives versus the planning horizons and time requirements needed for an operation, there are unintended consequences. Timeliness is the main issue. Loading vessels and moving a force across maritime terrain with the right resources becomes a challenge if the resources and funding are not provided up front. For example, there are situations where the USARPAC information operations assistant chief of staff (G-7) gives exercise requirements that can affect the ability of the USARPAC logistics assistant chief of staff (G-4) to transport, or the ability of the USARPAC financial management assistant chief of staff (G-8) to use funding for the next exercise. Although orders are always published, the issue of coordination, synchronization, and timeliness of resources is challenging to the overall planning of a Pacific Pathways campaign. There is a need to align or redesign funding, which will resource an operation rather than individual exercises.

Sustainment

Pacific Pathways remains challenging for sustainers in all functional areas. Some issues remained constant throughout the series of exercises, such as the challenge with Class IX repair parts that persisted in 2015. Constant communication through synchronization meetings and rehearsal of concept drills were key to improving overall support to these exercises. Sustainment in the Pacific theater is a challenge for a variety of reasons, but mainly the distances, coordination across time zones and the international date line, and absence of formal alliances or status of forces agreements with some nations often slow the flow of logistics. Further, multiple countries' various entry requirements and the austerity of the theater complicate the sustainment of a Pacific Pathways force.

Class IX support and shipment of parts during Pacific Pathways remain a challenge. Initial challenges resulted from misunderstanding between the tactical and strategic sustainment-level responsibilities on how repair parts requisitions would be actioned and shipped. Consequently, during Pacific Pathways 15-01, there was only one commercial shipment (FedEx). Throughout subregions in the Pacific, flowing parts and logistics into counties is slowed by customs requirements. On several occasions, units deployed to their next exercise before parts were cleared to enter the country. In some cases, equipment arriving to the next exercise was non-mission capable or degraded. On the Korean peninsula, Pacific Pathways units received Class IX support from the 302nd Supply Support Activity (SSA). However, because Global Combat Support System-Army does not check local SSAs for referrals, the status of a part would show as back-ordered, even if it was on hand in Korea.

The original concept required units to complete walk-through paperwork and obtain funding from the G-8. The part was then resourced from either Schofield Barracks, HI, during Pacific Pathways 15-01 and 15-02; Fort Wainwright, AK, during Pacific Pathways 15-03; or within the USPACOM AOR if the part was identified outside the unit's home station. Units from Schofield Barracks were not aware they had to obtain parts and bring them to the 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) for customs weight and dimensional data to ship them forward. This process increased the lead time and became complicated by customs requirements. The process for receiving parts had a significant impact on Stryker operational readiness rates in 15-01 and again in 15-03. Another complication was the limited number of Strykers in theater, which had an effect on parts availability. Korea did have a low density of the Stryker Chemical variant, but did not have the infantry carrier vehicle or mobile gun system variants requiring turret and remotely turreted weapon system maintenance and parts.

Although shipment of parts remains a challenge, it has been addressed and is improving. The 593rd ESC embedded its ARFOR logistics representative in the operation to serve as the conduit for logistical issues. The 593rd ESC manages the funding code to transport critical Class IX during Pacific Pathways and served as the logistical integrator and responsible agent for Class IX repair parts management for Pacific Pathways. In addition, at the brigade combat team level, weekly maintenance meetings were instituted by the TF in order to review the parts status documentation with attendance by strategic enablers (Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], Army Materiel Command [AMC], 593rd ESC, and 8th TSC). These actions are improving the effort to identify parts issues and maintain better visibility of units' operational readiness rates during the deployment.

Coordination and synchronization of the enterprise partners within the Pacific AOR are challenging. However, these planning activities are making a positive impact on logistics and partnership building. Prior to Pacific Pathways, individually managed and executed exercises did not challenge or engage the entire Pacific sustainment structure. Pacific Pathways became a positive forcing mechanism requiring the entire sustainment "enterprise" to operate together to strategically move a brigade combat team (-) by sea and air, perform multiple RSOIs, and provide continuous sustainment for three 90-day periods per year. The 593rd ESC conducts a logistics rehearsal of concept drill prior to each iteration of Pacific Pathways and holds a weekly synchronization meeting, bringing together elements such as SDDC, 8th TSC, 599th Transportation Brigade, 836th and 837th Transportation Battalions, 402nd and 404th Army Field Support Brigades, AMC, DLA , DLA-Energy, I Corps, 25ID, 7ID, and USARAK.

Pacific Pathways sustainment overly relies on contracting, including "exercise-oriented" logistics through contracts and host-nation support. Host-nation support can have a positive impact on relationship building and the local economy. The Pacific Pathways sustainment concept of support uses a blend of tactical logistics (classes of supply deployed by the executing unit), contracting, and host-nation support (acquisition and cross-servicing agreement/multinational logistics support operation). Although most life support sustainment functions are contracted through the host nation, a shift to deploying or prepositioning a "life support activity" to set low-density capabilities, such as bath, shower, laundry, and water purification units, could improve expeditionary sustainment and setting the theater.

Chapter 2

Key Leader Interviews

LTG Kenneth R. Dahl, Commanding General, U.S. Army Installation Management Command (At the time of this interview, LTG Dahl was Deputy Commanding General, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA)

1. Can you provide your views on Pacific Pathways?

When I arrived in July of 2013, there was no Pacific Pathways. I have had the advantage of watching this concept unfold and evolve since the beginning. Some of my thoughts on this concept come from a different perspective. When GEN Brooks arrived at the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) headquarters, which has traditionally been a three-star billet (Army Service component command [ASCC] for United States Pacific Command [USPACOM]), the position was raised to a four-star headquarters. As a four-star headquarters and relatively equal to USPACOM, but still a component command, GEN Brooks had to look more strategically and focus on the political-civil-military aspects of the theater rather than operational. As a result, a gap emerged specifically at the three-star-level command where Army operational planning takes place.

As USARPAC was elevated to a four-star headquarters, I Corps still exercised direct oversight over several brigade-sized units (i.e., aviation, sustainment, two Stryker brigade combat teams [SBCTs] and medical). However, with the establishment of the 7th Infantry Division (7ID) and the realignment of the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), these divisional headquarters allowed I Corps to close the gap created by USARPAC and fulfill the role as a true three-star operational planning headquarters. This restructure or alignment has been an evolution for the better. Without it, I Corps could not have effectively provided the needed mission command support to USARPAC, and ultimately Pacific Pathways.

When GEN Brooks arrived at USARPAC, he wanted to put some teeth back into the headquarters, not just simply because USARPAC was a new four-star headquarters, but also to legitimatize the U.S. strategic shift. It has been characterized as a "rebalancing" of the U.S. to the Pacific. The USARPAC commander wanted to do this within the first year of his tenure and physically demonstrate a new approach to engage in theater while providing the USPACOM commander with additional options to respond to crisis. GEN Brooks' vision was to "put in motion a pathway of activities for the Army into multiple countries for extended periods of time, linking a series of events and exercises on a variety of topics," which has become Pacific Pathways. This concept was not without some risk. First, it was not necessarily a recognized Army-funded program, and, second, under the constraints of sequestration, Army resources were shrinking. Sequestration forced the Army to identify seven brigade combat teams (BCTs) as the minimal number of fully ready units needed to meet operational requirements. Known as the "2+2+2+1" or the "lucky 7," these BCTs were fully resourced by the Department of the Army to include a combat training center (CTC) rotation. Four of these BCTs were available to USARPAC. In addition, to mitigate the cost, Pathways needed to use the existing exercises already planned and resourced. The result was using the earmarked-ready BCTs, one for the proof of principle in 14-01, and two along three planned Pathways in 2015 against the existing exercises and executing the Pacific Pathways concept.

From concept to execution, there have been some friction points. First, the "dateline rhetoric" initially used by the USARPAC commander describing Army forces on a boat in theater was not well-received by the Marines, who traditionally provide the crisis response force in USPACOM. Second, initial planning by the USARPAC staff left out 7ID and, for the most part, the I Corps staff, resulting in the USARPAC staff conducting most of the course of action (COA) development, forces allocation recommendations, and attending the majority of the planning conferences. I Corps now emerging as the operational-level headquarters for USARPAC should have been the planning staff recommending COAs, etc. Although this was an issue in Pathways 14, during the planning for Pacific Pathways 2015, I Corps has taken the lead as the operational headquarters and the 25th Infantry Division (25ID) for tactical planning. This is one of the advantages coming from Pacific Pathways. The I Corps staff applies mission command both up to an ASCC and down to division rehearsing parallel planning through execution multiple times within its theater of operations. Prior to Pacific Pathways or in a corps warfighters, I Corps was able to rehearse to this level of mission command.

Second, one of the values GEN Brooks wanted to get out of Pacific Pathways, and thus an objective, was the ability to project Army combat power across the dateline. While Pacific Pathways did provide an Army force in theater for an extended period of time, the reality was it fell short of the intended objective. Because these exercises and their stated goals and objectives are planned years out, with sovereign countries requiring state-to-state department-negotiated bilateral agreements, the mechanism to change what was already agreed was not in place. In addition, to truly project Army combat power in the Pacific region, there would need to be agreements negotiated which would allow the forward prepositioning of contingency stocks. However, during Pacific Pathways 15-01, having Army forces deployed forward paid some dividends. An operational detachment A team was able to assess some of what occurred in Nepal after the earthquake, and thus provided insight for the USPACOM commander to better respond. As Pacific Pathways matures, deployed Army forces can be an enabling force for the Marine contingency response force or form the core for humanitarian or disaster response.

2. How does Pacific Pathways help set the theater?

The single greatest value has been setting the theater: Phase 0, shape the environment. These exercises were discrete events prior to Pacific Pathways, but now as we link several of these exercises together into coherent operations, we have the ability to shape the environment through activities conducted on an ongoing, routine basis to assure or solidify friendly relationships and alliances. One important aspect is I Corps' ability to execute mission command through a two-star headquarters. At corps, we have been able to conduct real-time mission command and operational maneuver (i.e., planning, preparing, and executing in a real theater, over extended periods, three months per Pathway, over time and space). The Pacific theater is vast. We have also been able to rehearse transitioning mission command from I Corps to United States Army Alaska (USARAK) to United States Army, Japan (USARJ) (I Corps forward) to Eighth United States Army (8th Army) in Korea, and even between the Marines and back to I Corps. This is significant because we have not been able to truly rehearse this in the past, and the ability to seamlessly conduct mission command throughout the Pacific is key to setting the theater.

From a sustainment perspective, we have been able to rehearse multiple iterations of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); sea and aerial port opening and closings; and provide logistics throughout the theater, which has allowed the 593rd ESC significant understanding of the area of operations (AO) (i.e., port capabilities, nuances of host-nation infrastructure, medical and hospital capabilities, etc.). All of this has helped to build a picture of the theater, which I Corps did not have before. During execution, the corps has had to establish a 24/7-capable current operations cell and conduct battle tracking, issue orders and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), conduct running estimates and assessments, and conduct mission command down to its subordinate divisions and up to its higher headquarters, USARPAC. Significant to this has been exercising the transition of mission command authorities as the operations progressing in theater to I Corps forward (USARJ) to 8th Army in Korea. Before Pacific Pathways, we were not able to exercise mission command at this level or echelon.

3. Current operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of Pacific Pathways is moving to three operations per year. What is the optimum sustainable OPTEMPO for Pacific Pathways?

Currently, we have three Pathways planned for 2015. Executing three Pathways a year may be too much. One or two a year may be more sustainable, because they are expensive. When you look at what you get, executing a third iteration seems to have diminishing returns. What I mean by that is twofold. First, while we gain more than we ever have in the past by the activities of the corps in setting the theater, we are still only engaging with a small part of a BCT, the BCT main command post, and a battalion task force comprising two companies or less. So, two iterations a year suffice to exercise the corps at echelon. Second, at the moment, I do not see where Pacific Pathways has increased engagement with the countries involved, because we are doing the same with these countries that we have in the past. So, from the countries' perspective, nothing has changed. They see or gain no real benefit from Pacific Pathways. In the future, this is where Pacific Pathways can evolve into something different.

Another point in reference to OPTEMPO is readiness. I do not think that a unit on Pacific Pathways has to have completed a CTC rotation first, because a full-up BCT in essence doesn't execute a Pathways. What deploys is a division tactical command post, brigade tactical command post, and a battalion task force of two companies or less with enablers. You can ready these units at home station and attain the required level of readiness without requiring a CTC up front. The BCT can then attend a CTC after executing a Pathways. Currently, requiring a BCT to go to a CTC prior has forced the unit to redeploy from their CTC and deploy straight to Pacific Pathways, out-loading equipment to ships without any pause, when, in fact, the equipment needs some maintenance first. To some degree, this degrades a unit's equipment readiness posture. The point is, a BCT can execute a Pacific Pathways one year and a CTC rotation the next or vice versa, but it is not optimal to execute both in the same year.

4. What is the message to the senior Army leaders and others on Pacific Pathways in support of USARPAC?

The initial "dateline" rhetoric is still resonating at the Department of the Army and in joint circles. We need to change this. One disparaging indicator that the concept is still misunderstood, even within the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR), was lack of Army initiatives within the Pacific, which were hardly discussed in the USPACOM commander's posture statement. So, we need to improve our message because the initial rhetoric does not accurately describe Pacific

Pathways. The Army is in no way attempting to replace the Marines as the crisis response force in the Pacific. What Pacific Pathways is really about is setting the theater in Phase 0, building echeloned readiness, which includes exercising real-time mission command over time and space and building a comprehensive understanding of the AO and host-nation partners to ultimately shape and facilitate Army operational maneuver.

5. Can you discuss the operational design of Pacific Pathways and what needs to be improved as this evolves? How should the Army integrate this into the regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept?

To truly operationalize Pacific Pathways, there has to be a shift in how these exercises are planned and resourced. Currently, the joint exercise life cycle (JELC) for each exercise consists of an initial, mid, and final planning conference for each individual exercise. To operationalize Pathways planning, there needs to be a single operational planning conference (OPC) that discusses all of the Pathways exercises, linking goals, objectives, RSOI, sustainment, theater communication, etc., into one coherent operation. In order to achieve this, an OPC for Pathways would need to occur 18 to 24 months prior to the series of exercise planning conferences. Finally, overall planning responsibility for Pathways should move from G-7 (exercises) to G-3 (operations).

Going back to what was said earlier about how the engagements with counties in theater have not really changed, here is where we can improve the operational design of Pacific Pathways as it matures. So where do we go from here? One idea coined by GEN Brooks is "persistent engagement." The idea is after a unit has completed one of the exercises along the path or even between paths, there is time between the end of one and the beginning of the other — sometimes as much as three to five weeks. What can we accomplish with the time between exercises? One discussion has been centered on small echelon engagements at a relative low cost with the forces in country and along the path waiting to deploy to the next country. For example, have subject matter expert engagements (SMEEs) that train partners on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), engage in medical training, squad- and platoon-level tactical training, troop leading procedures, radio communications training, etc. In some respects, it falls into the task of foreign internal defense, but it keeps the U.S. persistently engaged in theater. These smaller, routine in-theater activities with partner nations (i.e., "persistent engagements") have to be part of the overall operational design of a Pacific Pathways.

To some degree, the setting of the theater with Pacific Pathways is similar to what we did in Europe with the yearly Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, except that each Pathway is different. REFORGERs were mission rehearsals against a single-focused threat. In 2015, we had three Pathways planned using a BCT as the core force and providing support to multiple nations in a variety of topics and activities within combined arms maneuver and wide area security. However, from a practical view, three Pathways each year is not sustainable. Maybe two with persistent engagements, as described above, is a better model. Also, we should look at employing multifunctional brigades in future Pathways, and engineers, medical, military police, etc. First, multifunctional brigades may provide a greater benefit for the types of engagements countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, or Mongolia require. Second, when U.S. combat troops are deployed in theater to a specific country, it means things to its neighbors. U.S. combat power can put countries in sensitive positions with one another. A U.S. medical, aviation, or engineer unit doesn't necessarily create the same concern.

MG Charles A. Flynn, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways?

The readiness we build at home station and through a CTC rotation is an extremely important foundation for Pacific Pathways. It is important because we take our most ready force and invest it into the region. We do this for several reasons. First, you want your most capable force forward in the event of a crisis. Second, even though it is not the full-up brigade, the remainder of the brigade is back at home station training and preparing and can seamlessly transition to its parent headquarters, thus ensuring unity of command and unity of effort in the event of some crisis. Third, and probably the most important for our partners, is that we are taking our most prepared and ready force and we are sharing our highest level of training with our partners. End result: We both benefit. Both Armies share best practices to the point where we are learning to solve problems as teams.

As a byproduct of Pacific Pathways, our efforts through partnerships increase readiness. Military-to-military partnering builds confidence in our allies. So, in the event of a crisis, they are more capable of solving their own challenges and, if required, they ask the U.S. for assistance. This, to me, is fundamental to everything we are doing in Pacific Pathways. All of our other efforts — setting the theater, sustainment, employing command and control nodes, the application of tactical actions and training — are all tactical activities that occur to build relationships, to build trust, and to form teams to share best practices, becoming more interoperable and multinational. At the end of the day, when we redeploy and nobody is there, what we really want our regional partners to do is say that the U.S. Army provided us with a once-in-a-lifetime leader development and training experience. Furthermore, they now have friends, allies, and comrades that they can ask questions of and rely on, because the U.S. is viewed as a reliable and credible partner. This develops a trust level that enables training and discipline to the force; it builds a degree of professionalism within the Pacific not seen before. I think this is an important example and expression of the U.S. security investment.

Let me say it in a different way. For instance, there might be a diplomatic crises, political crisis, economic crisis, information crisis, cyberattacks, but the relationships built by soldier-to-soldier, military-to-military, army-to-army will open doors that may otherwise be closed. We know the value of the International Military Education And Training (IMET) program. For example, when someone comes to one of our schools, they are influenced by their year at Fort Leavenworth or Fort Benning, etc. Their family gets a better understanding of the culture in the U.S. and they develop friends and relationships that they can rely on. I think that a broader extension of that is what we are doing on Pacific Pathways. We are doing a form of education, training, and leader development by creating a shared experience with our partners that we do not want them to forget. We want them to feel a sense of pride and purpose in training together. This was not the case 15 years ago. The last time I was in Hawaii, I was a major. We did not operationalize Pathways, but we did do Balikatans, Cobra Golds, and Orient Shields. Pathways doesn't just give you a discrete country experience; it provides a greater regional experience. Another aspect specific to today, which is different than in the past, is technology. Today, there are Facebook accounts, cellphones, and email. Relationships are constantly being developed in cyberspace, which we want to foster and encourage. These relationships are happening at every level — junior officers, warrant officers, and sergeants — and, as these young leaders progress in their careers, so will the soldiers of the partnered nations. Who knows where that will lead in the future? Let me give you an example. The lieutenant colonel who runs the Thai Aviation

Center of Excellence went to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. He approached me while in Thailand and said in perfect English, "I am committed to making sure my country can fly using the aviation assets the U.S. and the Thai military use. We need to operate together. I am committed to making this aviation program work because I am indebted to the U.S. for what it did for me and my family while we were at Fort Leavenworth." He spoke great English and possessed unique qualities for the job. This is just one of the powerful aspects of how Pacific Pathways builds relationships.

2. What is the future of Pacific Pathways?

Pacific Pathways is a vehicle for lasting change in the Pacific. It will have great impacts on the future Army, specifically the use of communications and watercraft, how the Army does mission command over extended areas, and maritime interoperability as a part of regional engagements. Pacific Pathways also has a significant impact on the Army's goal to ensure we have innovative and adaptive leaders at all levels.

Pacific Pathways provided training events and situations where our leaders have to deal with a wide range of changing conditions outside of the home-station comfort zone in austere environments, often with limited resources. This really builds the type of leadership we want in the Army. Pacific Pathways also has the potential to inform the Army as to what future changes or adjustments need to be made in support of the Army operating concept. Over the last 15 years, the Army has essentially been on an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process back and forth to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). However, Pacific Pathways is really challenging our leaders and systems every day with different problem sets that the Army has not experienced since the 40s and 50s.

We are trying to achieve success in Phase 0 by shaping and influencing in order to avoid an escalation and crisis. Pacific Pathways is a mechanism for achieving those goals. The innovative approach of Pacific Pathways is the elaborate relationships built on trust and camaraderie that could not be exercised through independent missions. It also ensures that the Army has depth and is engaged in the Pacific theater and contributes more precisely to the joint force as the principal land component element of USPACOM; in summary, it provides more options for the USPACOM commander.

Finally, Pacific Pathways is a coherent force deployed in a continuous Phase 0 shaping operation that rehearses our forces. It provides our leaders repetitions that test their warfighting skills. This is our goal. We must invest in Phase 0 activities to achieve the rebalance of efforts in the Pacific. Operationalizing these previous individual exercises into Pacific Pathways is an efficient use of resources while simultaneously building readiness to be an effective and formidable force of choice in the Pacific.

MG Todd B. McCaffrey, Commanding General, First Army Division East, Fort Knox, KY (At the time of this interview, MG McCaffrey was Chief of Staff and later Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI)

1. Can you describe what you have learned about shaping the security environment in USARPAC and how Pacific Pathways is shaping the Pacific AOR?

Pacific Pathways links three existing exercises into a cohesive operation that allows us to achieve a desired strategic effect. The key piece is that those three subordinate exercises are existing exercises we have conducted for some period of time and, in some cases, for many years. Each Pathway links a series of different exercises. By linking these together as a single operation, planned by I Corps at the operational level, we gained readiness outcomes, which we would not get in a single executed event. As the commanding general of USARPAC talks, we gain an effect in the region that is in support of USPACOM's theater campaign plan that shapes the area of operation. Further, Pacific Pathways provides a force in motion within the region for an extended period of time (90 to 120 days). While crisis response is not the primary reason for Pacific Pathways, it does provide another option for the USPACOM commander in the event of a crisis. I want to emphasize this key piece that, as we design what goes on a path, crisis response doesn't drive the task organizations. What does drive the specific unit and its associated enablers is what is required by the theater goals and objectives for each specific country. However, what is out there does become readily available to USPACOM. The USARPAC commander very carefully picks the location of the exercises and how they link together in each path. It has not been by accident that the first several Pathways have been weighted toward Southeast Asia, because it's an area where there is no basing. We have a variety of partner nations, treaty allies, some with political challenges, and it is important that the U.S. remains engaged. A U.S. presence sends a message to the region that helps shape the land domain and lets our partners and others know that the U.S. is committed. Pacific Pathways is a big part of the rebalancing effort. In each exercise, there is still a focus on individual countries, but there is an operational focus. I Corps has been instrumental in planning and providing the operational-level linkage in Pacific Pathways.

The Pacific Pathways model is an application of regionally aligned and assigned forces that fits this theater. In addition, moving forces by vessel is a challenge and unique to the Pacific AO. However, in my personal view, this model has a lot of applicability in other theaters as well — I think what is being done in Europe with Atlantic Resolve — and the strategic goal and objective have similarities with Pacific Pathways. My sensing is that over time, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) will put in place a similar model that fits its theater, based on its particular strategic outcomes, but the Pacific Pathways model is sound and useful for the Army in other theaters, as well.

2. From a theater security cooperation and exercise design perspective, where does Pacific Pathways need to go?

I think the question is not necessarily where it needs to go, but where it can go. USARPAC has been fortunate to be better resourced in the last few years, and this has allowed us to do things with exercises we have not been able to do in the past. With Pacific Pathways, there is a significant gain in readiness and strategic impact by having forces forward. Where we do not have a forward presence (i.e., basing), having this capability forward 90 to 120 days, spaced out

over the course of a year, essentially provides a presence forward in theater all the time with minimal gaps. The future of where Pacific Pathways needs to go is to continue on the track to provide a land force capability forward on a routine basis and not tied to an Army-only view. In the end, USARPAC's Pacific Pathways affords the USPACOM commander with options.

One of the challenges is operational-level mission command. The alignment of I Corps provides superb capability at this level and, while you could do this through a division headquarters, the corps is really designed for that level of planning and command and control. The I Corps staff has grown, and the USARPAC linkages are getting better with each Pacific Pathways. In reality, Pacific Pathways 15 is the first real implementation, while Pacific Pathways 14 was in essence the proof of principle. While there are continued planning challenges, Pacific Pathways continues to evolve. However, I Corps required planning timelines, which encompass unit deployment lists for shipping of equipment. The required sustainment support and synchronization of all classes of supply and support are somewhat to the left of the JELC. The challenge is to align the two, and that requires some synchronization between USARPAC and I Corps as we try to bring into line the operational-level planning requirements with the current JELC. The challenge, of course, is that the JELC is actually a bilateral agreement between our partner nations. We just cannot change it unilaterally. We have to go back and negotiate adjustments with these individual partner nations. I think over time as Pacific Pathways matures, the Pacific Pathways brand will be recognized by our regional partners. Consequently, as they see our increased involvement and commitment, we will have nations wanting to be part of Pacific Pathways on a yearly basis. In some cases, we are seeing that now. Pacific Pathways is beginning to mean something positive within the region.

The other thing a Pacific Pathways does, and GEN Brooks has been very clear on this concept, is "say-show-sell." We are not in the foreign military sales (FMS) business, but we have capabilities. So, we are in the business of talking about the capabilities we have. Pacific Pathways provides the opportunity to showcase these capabilities. A partner nation then can make decisions on their own, if this is something they might want. One example often referred to in 2014-15 is the Indonesians were leaning towards an FMS case for AH-64 Echo models. We then used a Pacific Pathways to bring some AH-64 Echo models into Indonesia on Garuda Shield and Keris Strike in Malaysia and showcased this capability. The AH-64s were purchased. I am not sure if it was directly related to the above Pacific Pathways, but it certainly did not hurt.

Because of the way we move around on a Pathway, contracting a vessel or with military sealift, we can take capabilities into the theater for an extended period of time. In the previous exercise construct — a single exercise out and back, limited in time — the funding restricted the deployment to very narrow requirements, reducing U.S. impact and influence. While everything is driven by the negotiated exercises during a Pacific Pathways, the difference is that we have a vessel that stays in theater. This provides opportunities to say-show-sell a variety of U.S. capabilities. However, that is not the principal reason for a Pacific Pathways. Being able to showcase our capabilities can have an effect on moving the region toward closer cooperation and possibly shrinking the interoperability gaps.

3. What do Army forces conducting Pacific partnership bring to the theater that the Marine forces do not, and how is USARPAC achieving a unity of effort with the other Service component commands through operationalizing these individual exercises?

Initially, there may have been some misconceptions, but regionally we do not view Pacific Pathways as Marine versus Army. Pathways was never designed or capable of replicating a special purpose Marine air-ground task force or Marine expeditionary unit, and it is not an amphibious capability to be employed from over the horizon. The Army has moved by boat in the Pacific since 1898, and this is really a continuation of that. Moving by vessel is just how it has to be done in the Pacific theater. Through the joint theater land component commander, we collaborate and coordinate with the Marines, and we actually have a security cooperation working group so we do not duplicate efforts. Army and Marine capabilities are complementary. Pacific Pathways is an effective way of conducting Army operations to employ the land component efforts by both the Army and Marines.

When you look specifically at what the Army adds to the theater, I think it can be expressed like this: First, the Pacific theater has a significant maritime aspect to it. While there are often discussions leaning toward the maritime and air domain confrontations, the reality is that you shape the theater on land. The Army's significant contribution is directly tied to shaping the land domain, and, in cooperation with the Marine Corps, the Army exercises, engages, and shapes the land domain directly. The Army shapes by exploring areas of interoperability; by its sheer presence, sets the conditions that in crisis, you could call on friends and allies to be part of a cooperative effort. Second, Pacific Pathways ensures USARPAC's ability to posture in theater. Setting the theater is a core competency for a theater army, and what that means is the concept of forces, footprints, and agreements. In some cases, setting the theater is where we place forces where they are physically located, based, or have presence. A good example of this is Korea. In some cases, footprints are important; for example, prepositioned stocks, activities sets, mission command nodes, and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance platforms, which expedite the theater army's ability to become operational and employ tactical forces in areas where we are not permanently based. However, what may be more important than the first two aspects of setting the theater are agreements — agreements to be able to operate or engage with a partner nation. In many cases, these agreements are essential to future basing forces and positioning footprints in theater (for example, a country that is not currently on a Pathway). We are working very hard to form an agreement with Vietnam. We are exploring the idea of positioning an activity set into Vietnam. We have to engage them at the pace they are willing to operate at, but they are interested. So, that's a footprint based on an agreement, which does not include any forces on the ground. This is an important piece of posturing and setting the theater, which ultimately shapes the region. Pacific Pathways facilitates such activities. If needed, USARPAC can respond and provide options to the USPACOM commander. Again, the more presence we can have in the region, the more countries like Vietnam gain confidence that the U.S. is committed and will more likely be willing to enter into agreements like the example above.

4. Describe the Pacific Pathways linkages to the USPACOM commander's goals and objectives.

For the past three years, the evolution of USARPAC going to a four-star headquarters to support the national objectives associated with this idea of strategic rebalancing has provided more ability to influence these strategic objectives and support USPACOM. The chief of staff went from an O-6 to a major general, and the G-3 went from an O-6 to a brigadier general. We gained a U.S. two-star deputy commander and an Australian deputy two-star. This headquarters is much more capable than it was a few years ago, and that is important when dealing with other countries in the region. We are able to affect more.

As a restructured four-star headquarters, albeit smaller through such programs as Pacific Pathways, the USARPAC commanding general is able to set and engage the Pacific theater more effectively. Fostering relationships through Pacific Pathways, we can better gain the agreements needed to position activity sets (medical, engineering, port opening, etc.), rather than prepositioned war stocks, which might be more appropriate in Europe.

5. How do you think Pacific Pathways could mature in the future?

Pacific Pathways will continue to be operationalized. USARPAC, along with I Corps, is moving closer to doing this with each iteration. That being said, here in the Pacific we don't have a formal alliance like in Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is an association, but not an alliance per se, and has a very limited cooperative security component to it. So, bilateral arrangements are important. Even if we want to move to any kind of multilateral exercise, it would have to be accomplished by, through, and with these bilateral agreements.

Pathways is not solely bilateral, but tends to focus on current bilateral exercises. In the future, Pacific Pathways does have the potential to move beyond just linking a series of bilateral exercises to possibly developing into multilateral events. To some degree, Cobra Gold and Balikatan have some multilateral elements about them. GEN Brooks has been very clear that an exercise is an invitation by a sovereign nation to participate in something on their soil. So, it is really an exercise of sovereignty. For a bilateral exercise to go to a multilateral one, it has to be done at the host nation's pace. This is why being routinely engaged and building relationships are important, because this allows the U.S. to move that process along; but, in the end, the host nation sets the pace of change.

One of the significant outcomes of the rebalancing was assigning I Corps to USPACOM, operational control (OPCON) to USARPAC and administrative control (ADCON) to United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). While they receive funding from FORSCOM, they are assigned out here. The 25ID is assigned to USPACOM and attached to USARPAC. We own the 25ID, but we have operationally controlled them to I Corps. So, the 25ID's boss is the I Corps commanding general. However, the 25ID commanding general does have two hats. He is the senior Army commander in Hawaii, and when he is wearing that hat, the 25ID commanding general falls under USARPAC. As the 25ID commanding general, he is under the I Corps commanding general. The I Corps owns the operational capability, and GEN Brooks is very clear that he wants the I Corps to provide that operational-level mission command.

The SBCT and airborne BCT in Alaska, while for training purposes, are under USARAK; when they are operationally employed, they are under the control of I Corps. In many cases, it is the same for 25ID. In the future, as the 7ID becomes more operational, its regional alignment will be toward the Pacific, and that will have an impact on Pacific Pathways and the overall ability of USARPAC to meet the rebalancing objectives. With the alignment of I Corps, which occurred in 2014, there are some growing pains, but this is good and will help to mature Pacific Pathways and USARPAC's ability to set this theater firmly in Phase 0.

6. What is the message to the senior Army leadership on Pacific Pathways in support of USARPAC?

I think what the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is doing here will help to inform senior Army leaders. First and foremost, Pacific Pathways is not an attempt by the Army to supplant the Marine Corps mission. Pathways really is just an application of regionally aligned and assigned forces with outcomes that are beneficial at the tactical level for sustainment readiness. In addition, we are attaining operational readiness and, as a component of rebalancing, Pacific Pathways achieves the kind of strategic effects we want.

Some senior leaders have raised the question whether Pacific Pathways was a consumer of readiness. The question is how to define "consumption of readiness." It might be where a unit deploys and returns in worse shape than it left. Equipment was non-mission capable. There were no lessons learned or observations made where the unit was unable to apply and get better, or failed to gain some better insight into itself, the operational environment, or better understand the threat. However, because of the operations construct of Pacific Pathways and the sustainment foundation that have to be developed for it, we are finding that units are returning with their equipment readiness equal to or better than when they left. This is one of the indicators that Pacific Pathways is not a readiness consumer, but a readiness generator. We know we are getting operational readiness simply by planning and transporting Army units by sea and airlift in and out of ports in the region multiple times. This is a significant readiness generator when we apply it to our ability to respond, receive, stage, onward move, and integrate a significant force package. Pathways allows the building and retention of this knowledge. From a holistic view, Pacific Pathways not only maintains and generates the hard equipment readiness that is very visible and quantifiable, but it also builds readiness in understanding the Pacific and all of its different environments, terrain, infrastructure, culture, interoperability through reconnaissance, and relationship building. This has a positive outcome in future crises. Finally, the rehearsals units execute during a path up three or more movements in a 90-day period are extremely beneficial.

MG Bryan P. Fenton, Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (At the time of this interview, MG Fenton was Deputy Commanding General, Operations, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI)

1. Can you describe what you have learned about shaping the environment in USARPAC and how Pacific Pathways is shaping the Pacific AOR?

First, I've learned that staying in Phase 0 is an immensely important strategic goal and a key effort for us here in the Pacific. To stay in Phase 0, we need to spend a lot of energy/effort in "shaping the environment" via having a forward presence or positioning in order to respond quicker to crisis, be it humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) or decisive action. Having a U.S. Army forward presence or, as we like to say, "more faces in more places with less bases," puts us in a better position to gain the initiative earlier if we need to. Our Pacific Pathways operations help us build relationships with partners in the AOR; help us conduct rehearsals that we might not otherwise achieve (i.e., loading a Military Sealift Command [MSC] vessel with 700 or more pieces of equipment, 50 personnel, then floating that equipment/personnel thousands of miles and many time zones away and offloading it in a partner nation), learning how to move equipment (i.e., flying aircraft throughout the partner nation in a manner similar to what we may do with them in an operation in the AOR), learning what frequency you need to operate on in that country, learning the peculiarities of the terrain, and gaining situational awareness of the region that we don't get unless we are present in the environment.

Being forward in theater on a routine basis also causes our competitors to think differently about their actions and about escalation as their first option. Shaping and setting the environment give the U.S. and our partners the option to choose between de-escalation and escalation in a situation that might be moving toward Phase 2 or Phase 3.

Let me explain. First, shaping the environment is about being present in it and having the option to either escalate or de-escalate a situation. If you're not present in the environment, you cannot understand that, nor can you position assets on any given day that would be "normal" to the environment. For instance, having a fueling spot for a ship, or some Apache helicopters sitting in a certain country. Training on a leg of Pacific Pathways can provide options for the USPACOM commander, especially in event of unforeseen crisis. So, if a crisis does occur, these assets can now be used as part of the response options. For example, in an effort to respond to an HA/DR crisis, you could use the Apaches to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); protection; rescue; etc. In a situation where you needed to de-escalate tensions in an AOR, you could potentially withdraw the Apaches, signaling to a hostile actor (adversary) that you are not interested in a higher-level conflict and want to ease the tensions. In a situation that called for an escalatory mode, you could bolster what is already forward via bringing in more Apaches, or flying them in a manner to deter further hostile acts by this adversary.

Without being routinely in theater — back to the "more faces in more places with less bases" concept — you immediately limit your and the geographic combatant commander (GCC) options and capabilities. In a crisis without a forward presence, you limit your options, have to react from a cold start, and don't have a de-escalation option right away. Therefore, the only option you have might appear to escalate a crisis and possibly send the wrong message to the adversary, prompting a counter-response. In this theater, there are potential adversaries that use escalation as the means to de-escalate. The challenge in such an environment, where there is not a lot of mutual trust, is that you risk such actions as being misread. There is, however, less risk of being misread when you have an asset forward that you can remove in an effort to de-escalate the

situation. Bottom line: Being forward in theater gives you more options. If we do not have a Phase 0 posture mindset, we will miss a large part of what is needed for the Phase 2 and Phase 3 fight, if it comes.

Second, Phase 0 is where we want to stay. The minute it starts to go in another direction we have to work hard to get back to Phase 0. I assess you can only understand how to do that if you are constantly in the Phase 0 environment or in the region. Pacific Pathways is one of the ways that allows us to shape, be in the region, and set the theater while posturing assets in the "neighborhood" to keep us in Phase 0. Further, it provides us with all kinds of benefits like I mentioned before. We gain a better understanding of our theater. A potential adversary sees us out in the Pacific or the region and may think or act differently, possibly behaving better, which is what we want. Our partners and allies know us better. Our partners see a tangible assurance that we are committed and reliable. With respect to our Soldiers, they gain a situational understanding of the environment in the event they have to be employed in a humanitarian or a decisive action operation. For the greater Army, we are fulfilling the combatant commander's requirements in Phase 0 — theater security cooperation, applying readiness — while building more readiness and sustaining that readiness for a longer period of time in support of the Army and the GCC.

2. From the theater security cooperation exercise design perspective, where do you want Pacific Pathways to go?

I think a design perspective has already been set by GEN Brooks, and we will continue in that direction. In the big picture, the direction is continued innovation and incorporation of several "buckets" of ideas. The first "bucket" is what does the USPACOM commander need us to do? Where does he need us to be? He may need us to move forces quickly and marshal in certain locations while understanding the environment and having the trust and confidence of our partners in the region. The second "bucket" is what other joint concepts does the Department of Defense want us to be working on? They may be expeditionary logistics in an austere environment, distributed mission command, etc. The third "bucket" is what does the Army need from us with regard to the Army operating concept and the associated warfighting challenges? How can we assist in building adaptive leaders, developing an Army capable of operating in austere locations with its core competencies, etc. The fourth "bucket" is GEN Brooks' requirements, his vision and priorities for the Pacific as the Army component commander in support of the USPACOM commander, and using Pacific Pathways to shape and achieve those goals. So, this is where the operational design of Pacific Pathways is headed.

For instance, you may see a Pacific Pathways that is fires, log, and distributed mission command centric. In such a Pacific Pathways, we want to make sure we understand the joint fires piece in theater and concentrate on a concept that has a series of fires exercises in various countries that would want to participate. The jointness comes in where we would work with U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF) and U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLEET). For the Army, we would look to meet our warfighting challenges in adaptive leadership. For example, this could look like a platoon leader or platoon sergeant in a foreign sovereign country, working with regional partners and the associated U.S. Embassy country teams on different terrain and gaining a situational understanding of subregions of the theater. We can't replicate this anywhere else. As we go forward, part of the design would be to incorporate mission command rehearsals with a BCT focused toward a possible noncombatant evacuation scenario, or humanitarian relief in an austere environment with a multinational partner army. The operational design goal of future Pacific Pathways is to weave the elements of the all these "buckets" throughout that yearlong effort.

3. What does the Army executing Pacific Pathways bring to theater that the Marines do not?

I think the real question is how does Pacific Pathways complement what is already happening in this theater. This is really a question for USPACOM to answer as they view us through their theater campaign plan, but I assess the Army is a key component for the USPACOM commander to consider when weighing goals, objectives, and options within the theater campaign plan. He does this by leveraging some of the Army's unique capabilities and theater relationships. Further, the Army complements all the other components and parts of the joint team with unique skills and capabilities we bring to assist other joint force elements in working to achieve the goals and objectives they've been given and developed. Integration is always on the forefront in the joint arena, because we know we will never fight alone, especially in the Pacific. USARPAC works every day with Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), PACAF, PACFLEET, and Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) to make sure that the Army's pieces are value added, unified, and improving every day.

4. What is the message senior Army leadership should take away from Pacific Pathways?

The take-away that the senior Army leadership should get from Pacific Pathways is that this is a multidimensional, value-added effort, and it's not only us saying this, it's senior Department of Defense (DOD) leaders, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), our partners in the region via requesting more of these to come to their countries, and USPACOM codified the demand signal for Pacific Pathways in their recent theater campaign order.

We know we are building, sustaining, and applying in support of USPACOM commander multi-echeloned readiness, from the repetitions of mission command at BCT through corps, from the squad leader conducting troop-leading procedures over and over in austere environments with foreign Armies in three different countries, to the battalion and brigade commanders executing mission command between three to five countries, over seven time zones and with 500 to 600 pieces of equipment in an interagency, international, joint environment. As a complement to a CTC experience, this readiness is being built in theater where we may have to conduct real-time contingency operations, humanitarian in nature or decisive action. The other "win" is that Pacific Pathways continues to provide an opportunity for experimentation and innovation. We call our AOR the "Pacific learning laboratory." This affords USARPAC the opportunities to inform and assist the Army with actual operational data and lessons learned as the Army lays out future concepts and Force 2025. We look forward to doing this in Army Warfighting Assessment 17 that will occur during Pacific Pathways 16-02 and 16-03. So, I would ask the leadership to view Pacific Pathways through these two prisms: one, building and sustaining readiness at echelon via a routine presence forward and positioned to respond, should we be called on in any spectrum of operations here in the Pacific; and two, Pacific Pathways provides an opportunity to innovate and experiment in support of Army, USPACOM, and DOD's goals and objectives.

MG Kurt J. Ryan, Commanding General, Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (At the time of this interview MG Ryan was Commanding General of the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA)

1. From a senior leader perspective, how does Pacific Pathways prepare the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) for future contingency missions in the region?

Fundamentally, it's all about practicing what you may have to execute in the future. It's about preparing for contingencies and having the capacity to be called in the middle of the night to operate in any combatant command, austere environments, or to potentially open a theater in a permissive or semipermissive environment, all of which gives us presence in any theater during Phase 0 and Phase 1. In the case of the Pacific, there are 26 separate nations that we have an opportunity to work with on interoperability, building relationships, and enduring partnerships.

The Marines continue to maintain a presence throughout the Pacific, as has the Army for over 115 years. They have developed and maintained strong relationships with countries like the Philippines, Australia, and others. Their support and partnership with the Philippine Marines over the years was formed through an aggressive and continuous exercise program, and showing a presence through joint operations, which fosters strong partnerships in a time of crisis that pays large dividends because the relationships are already built.

An example that highlights such a strong relationship occurred in November 2013 when I was notified by my corps commander, LTG Robert Brown, asking me to deploy to the Philippines immediately to plug into a joint task force (JTF), the corps forming around the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa, Japan. I would serve in a capacity to advise the JTF Commander, LTG Wissler, on Army support and help shape the humanitarian relief operations in support of the super typhoon Haiyan that had recently struck the Philippine archipelago. Typhoon Haiyan caused significant damage to a swath nearly 100 miles wide across the central islands, killing an estimated 6,300 people, and placed more than two million people in need of aid. The Philippine government requested support from the international community, and the U.S. responded immediately with unique rescue capabilities that only reside in defense capabilities. The JTF formed rapidly, and U.S. forces acted fast.

Having just assumed command of a newly formed ESC, I had not considered this mission set (HA/DR) in my planning considerations as I built a training strategy to certify the new command in missions across the range of military operations. What I learned in the Philippines was the need to build and forge relationships and trust, develop rapidly deployable, modular mission command capabilities — such that the Marines maintain and had forged with the Philippine Marines throughout the years — making rapid response and an ability to plug into a host nation that is much easier when crisis occurs.

We operated as a JTF for 18 days providing rescue and relief support to the host nation until disestablishment and redeployment. That's what Pacific Pathways does for I Corps and the 593rd ESC in support of these force projection and theater engagement missions. It provides us a training opportunity to practice a capability to respond very quickly to different locations, because of trusted relationships we build with other nations in the region. Pacific Pathways is another tool in a series of exercises that helps set the theater and build the logistics network.

2. Describe how supporting Pacific Pathways is different from other types of operations.

I fundamentally don't think it is different. This is our future. Pathways should build on components of military operations: an ability to alert, marshal, project power, and then close on a joint AO and conduct joint RSOI operations. It practices all the fundamentals in the force projection operations and the joint force, including the Army as a land component or corps of a JTF headquarters, allowing us to get in multiple practice repetitions. So, when called for real-world response, our forces understand and are comfortable with the complexities associated with these mission sets.

It also gets us something that we frankly are somewhat unpracticed at, and that's force projection into places that we as a military are not very familiar with. Because we have lost these valuable skill sets, having only deployed to and from Afghanistan and Iraq over the years, a mature theater, deploying units typically only needed to deploy personnel, individual weapons, some special equipment, and their personal gear. The equipment — rolling stock, communication platforms, large-caliber weapons, and ammunition — was already prepositioned for units to fall in on.

Pacific Pathways puts us back in an expeditionary force projection mindset: a need for units to plan or prepare to bring everything with them — all their kit in motor pools; arms rooms; and nuclear, biological, and chemical rooms — in order for them to not only survive, but fight and win to complete their assigned mission. When you look at the time-distance factors associated with operating in the Pacific — a true tyranny of distance — it makes going back to home station to get items you forgot nearly impossible. For expeditionary operations, a unit will operate for some period of time with the equipment and supplies they deploy with. That is the essence of expeditionary operations for a theater opening force.

From a planning perspective, you have to really think through everything. You need to ask yourself how do you operate in a very complex environment that could include austere environments such as jungle, desert, or extreme cold in Arctic conditions? How will you operate in a place like the Ukraine or North Korea, or the jungles of Malaysia? So, as a leader we really have to look at how we prepare forces across a range of complex environments, the breadth and depth of a range of military operations: offense, defense, support to civil authorities, HA/DR. We made a lot of mistakes in the first series of Pacific Pathways, but practice makes perfect and at each turn we learn and grow and develop leaders in this very important business. Pathways is our future in the Indo-Asia-Pacific AOR.

3. How did you synchronize the efforts of enterprise partners such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Army Materiel Command (AMC), and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)?

Initially, it was challenging. It took me a little while to assume my role as an ESC commanding general in support of the corps, because I felt like maybe I was doing theater work better suited for other headquarters to synchronize and coordinate. In later Pathways, we found the right balance and developed a synergy between the 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), the 593rd ESC, and all the strategic partners who are instrumental to success in projection and long-term sustainment (AMC, DLA, SDDC, etc.).

The TSC maintains the capability and responsibility to set the theater through mission command, and coordinating authority with all supporting organizations, enabling sustainment success across the combatant command (COCOM), including our joint partners. For example, the TSC coordinated with I Corps, the operational headquarters for Pathways, many of the sustainment requirements for Pathways by shaping delivery of key commodities, including aviation-grade fuel, into a series of host nations along the Pathway by their coordinating link with DLA.

As for sea vessels, USARPAC partnered with the TSC and I Corps to develop the right requirement for movement requirements along the Pathway to ensure the right type of ship (sourced by United States Transportation Command [USTRANSCOM]) supported the operational requirement. A Pathway is an operation, and requires more ship capabilities (onboard mission command, ability to access less-capable ports, etc.) than your standard port-to-port delivery of "household goods." A Pathway puts Army forces aboard a vessel and operating on land west of the international date line, allowing options for the COCOM commander to divert exercising forces to emergency operations. The flexibility of the Military Sealift Command ships greatly increased the agility and flexibility of movement and potential maneuver.

I use the example of an MSC vessel that was executing a Pathway (Hawaii, Japan, Thailand, Korea, Philippines) as an example of our nation's ability to respond fast to emergencies. One of the MSC Pathways vessels was picking up joint forces (Marines) on Okinawa, then, when departing Okinawa, struck a reef off the coast and took on water, requiring transfer (ship-to-shore) of the Pathways equipment and Soldiers back to the beaches of Okinawa. It forced us to stress our strategic capabilities, to rapidly dispatch a similar and capable MSC vessel to Japan, reload the cargo, and continue to sail on the Pathway. It forced employment of tactical boats (landing craft utilities) to shuttle materiel from ship to shore. Obviously, this was not planned, but quick response by many averted disaster and turned it into a huge success.

Then, there was the task of coordinating with AMC to rapidly assess and repair some of the equipment that was water damaged from the ship grounding. Logisticians quickly mobilized to solve this problem, synchronizing this repair-and-replace effort through a series of working groups between I Corps, the USARPAC assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4), TSC, ESC, DLA, AMC, and SDDC brigade. All of these organizations came to the table and worked together to solve tough problems. They also spent a good portion of their time anticipating problems and working through those solution sets.

4. What specific sustainment challenges were incurred once units arrived at locations throughout the Pacific? How can these challenges be mitigated in the future?

The first challenge is simply the tyranny of distance, the time factor to get stuff from our national and unit support bases to the point of need; for instance, if you got to Malaysia and a Stryker vehicle was identified with a maintenance problem that required repair parts from a unit's home-station supply support activity (SSA) or the national supply base. Materiel managers would have to make hard choices and decide the best way to ship the part to the Pathway country before it potentially completed the host-nation exercise and started onward movement to the next nation. So, you would have to anticipate where to ship the part, as the unit may only be on ground in a particular host nation for two weeks, and the part may take up to four weeks to arrive via multiple shipment means.

The second challenge complicating sustainment support was the rules associated with each host nation's customs procedures. Managers had to work hard to navigate through every country's different custom rules and procedures. Failing to work this out in advance could lead to some items being held in quarantine for up to six months. Using country teams and support of U.S. Embassy personnel was key to helping us get things into each host nation.

The third sustainment challenge was fuel, especially aviation-grade fuel, critical to ensuring our rotary-wing assets would fly safely. Some host nations had adequate contracted fuel that met our stringent military specifications, while others did not, which became problematic. We got smarter on this from the experiences we gained with the first Pathways. DLA-Energy proved invaluable to helping us contract for and navigate this critical commodity.

The fourth item I would highlight is operational contract support (OCS). Advance party contracting is key to operational success following arrival of the ground force into the host nation. Contracts were worked with advance teams 30 to 45 days out of arrival of the force. These teams would deploy ahead of the training forces to set up all the necessary contracts for food, water, fuel, transportation support, and so much more. The OCS teams would continue to operate forward, jumping their capability all along the Pathway from nation to nation as they set conditions for the ground force negotiating the Pathway.

And lastly, another important aspect of Pacific Pathways worth highlighting is SDDC's understanding of port capabilities along the Pathway. Their analysis of ports throughout the AOR is critical to success and ensuring we could deliver the force to the series of exercises. Their in-depth knowledge of port depths, loading and unloading capabilities, and other vital technical host-nation data ensured we picked the right vessel and right port to embark and debark the joint force. During just one Pacific Pathways, we visited six separate ports, and the MSC vessel had to be able to enter all six ports over a several-month operating period.

5. How can future Pacific Pathways exercises be improved from a sustainment perspective?

In future exercises, sustainment formations will be embedded in every Pathway exercise. We are actually going to take elements of sustainment formations and try to build a Pathway in 2017 that includes dental, veterinarian services, preventive medicine, and water production. In 2015, in a four-month joint exercise called Pacific Partnership, we nearly achieved that goal with joint medical teams, including Army dental, preventive medicine, and other specialty services operating across the Pacific. A joint high-speed vessel enabled our medical team to sail to 22 different ports in the South Pacific. We trained host-nation medical providers and treated persons in all of those different places, helping build that capacity and develop those relationships I highlighted early in this interview, growing trust and goodwill in so many places we may find forces operating. So, when the next crisis occurs, either real world or in a training exercise, we have built enduring relationships across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

6. How is the development of an early entry command post (EECP) going to impact the readiness of the 593rd ESC?

The EECP developed by the leaders of the 593rd is the crown jewel of an ESC. We worked very hard to resource and build this capability. We built a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) capability, manned with 12 to 15 personnel, that is rapidly deployable within 24 hours of notification. When called, the HAST goes forward to conduct assessments on key infrastructure in order to identify troop and relief supply requirements to potentially respond militarily to provide HA/DR. The team's equipment includes two high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), one tent, a Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) for computer connectivity, and a tactical satellite phone. The HAST is followed by the EECP. The EECP consists of 73 ESC and enabling command personnel and is capable of deployment on two C-17 aircraft. The mission command headquarters is self-sufficient for about two weeks to include necessary pre-rigged 463-L pallets of Classes I, II, III(P) (packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants), IV, V, and critical Class IX. We built 76 prepackaged pallets of all classes of supply to support up to an 800-Soldier task force. We built this as a corps package to rapidly support a short-notice deployment. The pallets can move to a departure airfield, rail upload, or seaport in eight hours following notification. The EECP is the 73-man element that can sustain operations for a period of time and support a corps, the Army Force (ARFOR), JTF, or other mission command-equivalent headquarters. The last element of deployable mission command developed by the ESC is the main command post, including a fully functioning administrative and logistics operations center (ALOC). The main command post/ALOC requires significant lift support and would likely follow the EECP to a maturing theater and accommodate the entire 300-personnel (PAX) headquarters with enabling command plugs (AMC, DLA, SDDC, joint partners, etc.). Lastly, the ESC developed a life-support package of tents and other critical equipment to rapidly build an austere camp for 300 personnel, until follow-on forces or logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) arrives to build more permanent life-support capabilities. The mission command is modular, scalable, and tailorable to support a range of operations.

7. Can you address the expeditionary readiness of units participating in Pacific Pathways? Were supply accountability, Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information Management System transportation data, and maintenance readiness acceptable?

The emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) and operational readiness survey exercises and inspections that ensure high levels of preparedness for rapid outload had atrophied. We just stopped doing them with the same frequency that we did before the wars. Units seldom practiced these force projection skills because they were deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan in a vicious Army force generation (ARFORGEN) cycle into a counterinsurgency environment that had matured basing, equipment, and supply systems past expeditionary conditions. Skills like supply accountability, transportation management, maintenance readiness — these systems somewhat atrophied.

What we have been working on in the Pacific is a "fight tonight" mentality and capability, projecting force on short notice to any environment. Our operating forces are, generally, continental United States (CONUS)-based. If we can't rapidly alert, marshal, and project these forces, we will not be relevant to the combatant commander as a premier land force. Having a modular expeditionary force capable of rapid deployment gives the corps another arrow in the quiver: audible, no-huddle plays in the corps' playbook of capabilities. So, everyone is trying to get after this. I am confident that within two to three years we will get much of these

skills developed. It's all about repetition, running the plays over and over again. We've got to develop our young leaders — officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) — to violently execute these force projection tasks (i.e., training lieutenants and sergeants who know how to build their company's unit deployment list). How to build and sustain high levels of readiness, people, equipment, training? When a company gets a level II EDRE alert, they are competent to rapidly alert and marshal their force to head to a departure node (rail, road, sea, or air) and be responsive to the combatant commander. If we can't get out of our motor pools in a rapid, organized way, how will we ever be capable of projecting force past our shores? This business is about relevance. Thirteen years of persistent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan have eroded our skills associated with expeditionary operations, but I am an eternal optimist and know we will grow this capability and be ready to alert, marshal, deploy, survive, fight, and win. That's what our nation expects, and we will be that force once again.

BG Gary M. Brito, Commanding General, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk, LA (At the time of this interview, BG Brito was Deputy Commanding General, Support, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI)

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways?

Pacific Pathways is a very important strategic endeavor. The Pacific theater is a vast AO and encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the waters off the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India. There are few regions as culturally, socially, economically, and geopolitically diverse as the Asia-Pacific. The region is home to more than 50 percent of the world's population, 3,000 different languages, several of the world's largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties. The Pacific region includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation. Pacific Pathways is vital to achieving many of our national military objectives.

I feel fortunate in that prior to this assignment, I served in the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) working Force 2025 development and working with the Army Operating Concept and the Army Warfighting Challenges. Much of what Pacific Pathways executes is discussed in the Army Operations Center and can serve as a "laboratory" to help further develop the Army Warfighting Challenges.

2. How does the division's participation in Pacific Pathways help its higher headquarters set the theater or shape the security environment?

The relationships, liaison, partnership, and planning conferences, both for exercises or smaller operations, provide a constant footprint in the theater. In that respect, we clearly help the higher headquarters by maintaining important relationships, consistent presence, and forward-deployment mission command.

3. How does Pacific Pathways build readiness?

Let me give you an example. Let's say a battalion or brigade is going to a CTC rotation. We make sure they are medically ready, equipment is inspected, and there is a focused home-station training plan that has been executed. For a Pacific Pathways, you execute these same preparations and more. Many stages of RSOI are executed numerous times. While deployed, the unit must maintain its equipment, training levels, and RSOI skill sets throughout. We can't afford to have broken stuff or unfit Soldiers. Pacific Pathways allows the division to rehearse its mission multiple times.

4. Can you discuss and describe the division-level, military-to-military engagement during Pacific Pathways?

Both division and brigade-level, military-to-military engagements occurred. This included U.S. to partnered country and U.S. to U.S. These engagements facilitated daily operations and planning. Of note, the preceding months included numerous planning events often involving U.S. and partnered-nation staffs.

5. Can you discuss and describe interoperability issues associated with Pacific Pathways?

To begin: communications. How do we talk with our partners? Always a concern. This challenge is planned for early on, but nonetheless can be a challenge on the ground. It is fair to say that tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); language; and culture each contribute to interoperability challenges, as well. The tyranny of distance made it difficult to establish early and consistent communications with the rear headquarters and other units across the deployed AOR.

6. Can you discuss and describe 25ID's operational challenges associated with Pacific Pathways?

If I had to pick one, balancing our requirements to execute a safe, effective, and efficient Pacific Pathways with everything else going on. We have humanitarian assistance teams and response forces training routinely, in addition to numerous exercises and local training. It is definitely doable, but a challenge nonetheless. I would add that each country has different entry and customs procedures and other dynamics that require a lot of staff energy.

7. What needs to improve as Pacific Pathways evolves over the next few years?

The after action reviews (AARs) have highlighted that operationalizing all Pathway events and not approaching each as a separate exercise would improve overall execution. Each of these are about a 90-day operation with three major countries in the region. We need to nest the JELC events with training objectives.

BG Brian E. Alvin, Deputy Commanding General (Army Reserve), United States Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI

1. How does Pacific Pathways affect the Army Reserve? What are the challenges in the Reserve forces' support to Pacific Pathways?

Pacific Pathways is an excellent opportunity for the Army Reserve as a key force enabler to stretch its legs, show our capabilities, and be that valued member of the total force. Pathways, just by the virtue of an extended presence in the Pacific region, will take advantage of a new Reserve funding program called 12-304-Bravo. Under this funding, it will allow Reserve forces to mobilize and engage in and support FORSCOM requirements, which involve greater than a 30-day deployment. Right now, the program is new and we have not seen a lot of usage, but I expect it will increase in the future. This funding is a perfect marriage with Pacific Pathways, because when you have a six- to nine-month Pathways where each iteration is a 60- to 90-day deployment, instead of having to redeploy back to home station after our traditional 29 days of Reserve annual training, we can remain with that BCT the entire time. I see this as an exciting program and I hope to see it grow over the next few years. In the interim, the challenges in Reserve force support is that it always returned to the bottom line of man days and resourcing. Twenty-nine days is kind of our limit, in some cases less if we have to move resources around to fund longer exercises like Pacific Pathways. For example, if we have an engineer unit supporting a Pathways of its 29 days with deployment and redeployment, in reality, maximum could be 25 days in the box, and then that unit would have to be replaced by another. This isn't necessarily a bad solution, but it does impact the continuity with the supported BCT. So, one can see the advantages of coupling 12-304-Bravo Reserve funding to support Pacific Pathways. Now, when I say 29 days, we have used some cost-sharing arrangements between USARPAC and United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) to keep our units engaged for slightly longer periods of time. This is not always possible, because everyone has budget constraints. USARPAC has been a great partner. For example, they pay our travel and per diem in theater, and the Reserve Component picks up the Reserve Personnel, Army appropriation. At the end of the day, this is great training and a great opportunity to be part of the total force. We never run out of Army Reserve Soldiers who are willing to get out here and train. We run out of money long before that occurs.

2. What are the challenges associated with the RAF concept and the Army Reserve support to Pacific Pathways? How should this be adjusted for the future?

For the Reserves, RAF is still a new and evolving concept. One of my jobs here as the Deputy Commanding General, Army Reserve, as chartered by LTG Jeffrey Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve, is to build those relationships between RAF formations and the ASCC, in this case USARPAC. We are really starting to make gains and build some momentum with, for example, the 200th Military Police (MP) Command, MG Churn; 412th Engineer Command, MG Thompson; and the new commander for the 807th Medical Command, MG Dyer. We want to continue to build on these relationships. In my opinion, it starts at the top and then it can work downward from there with staff beginning to work together and look for ways to increase the support and solidify these relationships.

3. How should Active Component and Reserve Component mission command structure and relationships in the Pacific AOR evolve to better effect Pacific Pathways now and in the future?

In my view right now, this has been working pretty well. There is no real need to change the command structure because what the Reserve command or enterprise has set up is fairly new. I have been assigned out here for about eight months and the team I am leading here is new. I think for right now, as it relates to Pacific Pathways, it is all still new. In addition, the first iteration of Pathways was in 2014, but it goes back to relationships. We have this entire enterprise here in Oahu and back to CONUS that can support formations and deployments and are excited about it and are training for the Pacific region. Then here at USARPAC I have a team: myself as the Army Reserve engagement cell director and 16 others. Eight of these folks are embedded and integrated with their counterparts here as total force partners. For example, I have a civil affairs planner, medical planner, MP planner, and other enabler staff planners working side by side. My MP planner is assigned to the 200th MP Command with duty out here in Hawaii. So, this is the model. The benefit of this is they do things such as analyze operation plans, looking for gaps in supporting plans, so we can better identify and match the right enabler, its capability, and the specific unit needed to support USARPAC. We know our Reserve unit capabilities and can then recommend to our counterparts the right force. In turn, my personnel also share time. For example, my personnel will spend half their time here, and then the other half back at their command. This is a great arrangement because the experience gained here is taken back and really helps the aligned Reserve command when they receive requirements to understand what is needed, because they have personnel with on-the-ground experience per se. Even I am assigned to USARC with duty in Hawaii. GEN Brooks is a big supporter of the total force. Consequently, the Army Reserve structure holds a significant amount of the total force enablers: medical, engineers, and MP. We have to be operationally ready to provide the right enabler when we are called on.

4. Current OPTEMPO of Pacific Pathways is moving to three operations per year. What is the optimum sustainable OPTEMPO for Pacific Pathways?

OPTEMPO is always a challenge for the citizen Soldier, and then it's really not. There are always enough Solders. Resources (i.e., funding) are always the issue, but if you give the Soldier enough time to plan and prepare for a mission, we always have enough Soldiers and can meet the mission. A lot of the needed training can and does occur at home station. When you view what needs to be done in preparations versus the idea of OPTEMPO, a lot can be done during their battle assemblies. Right now, we might have one unit go to a CTC rotation with, for example, a unit earmarked for a Pacific Pathways, and then have another unit actually deploy on the Pacific Pathways. The model we are trying to get to — and the 12-304-Bravo funding will support this — is the Reserve unit deploys with the Active unit starting with the CTC and then also to Pacific Pathways. However, in order to do this, it takes planning. We know what Pathways units are going to next year, giving them plenty of notice. The new funding code requires units to be secured two years out. So again, the unit has ample time to prepare. Right now, we are planning for 2017. It might go like this: We have identified a laundry and bath unit and require them for 270 days beginning with Pacific Pathways 18-01. The planners start working together on this two years out, using their reachback to a CONUS unit, and start attending the conferences. This is

done with annual training dollars, but then the unit gets mobilized and meets the supported unit at a CTC and is attached to them for the duration of the mission. This is the envisioned model and most likely an acceptable OPTEMPO. For the Reserves, the OPTEMPO is not really an issue because per each Pacific Pathways, we have several of the same type units (engineers, medical, etc.) from which we can task so the same unit isn't constantly deployed.

BG Carl Turenne, Canadian Army, Deputy Commanding General (Operations), I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA

1. How does Pacific Pathways set the theater?

In my opinion, this is the biggest strength of the Pacific Pathways concept. Pacific Pathways is an operation that enabled us to activate tasks and functions that you do not see exercised unless you participate in a large-scale operation like the ones seen at the National Training Center (NTC). Pacific Pathways allowed us to exercise our ability to request a ship from the USTRANSCOM and forced us to exercise our enablers from the 8th TSC. It also allowed USARPAC to understand its capabilities and limitations, while setting the theater for operations.

Throughout this process, we needed to conduct reconnaissance of the seaports of debarkation (SPODs) and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) throughout the Pacific AOR, and ensure they were fully capable of receiving our equipment. Simultaneously, we needed to ensure medical facilities in our partnered nations were properly equipped and able to treat our Soldiers if an issue did come about. All of this allowed both I Corps and USARPAC the opportunity to understand the Pacific AOR, set the theater, and mitigate any areas of concern prior to the operation taking place. We were able to conduct time-distance analysis throughout the Pacific, which then fed into our decision matrix and ultimately led to the synchronization of assets across the Pacific Pathway operation.

As a result of the aforementioned, we were able to build readiness. We were now able to build readiness through the deployment process of a specific organization. This process of readiness began with the loading of personnel and equipment down at the ports, ensuring all personnel who participated in Pacific Pathways had conducted a true Soldier readiness processing, to include passports and visas, and then to deploy conducting multiple RSOI. This type of readiness cannot be replicated in a CTC rotation; it can only be executed in a real-world exercise. The readiness that Pacific Pathways builds is not similar to, nor can it replicate, the type of readiness a unit receives from a CTC rotation. However, it allows an organization the opportunity to work in a joint interagency and multinational (JIM) environment with multiple interagency and multinational forces. This type of real-world experience gave our organization multiple repetitions in a JIM environment. We were able to build readiness at certain echelons. In other words, the organizations that participated in Pacific Pathways gained a better understanding of the Pacific theater. Pacific Pathways built the foundation for a unit to operate in the Pacific, which enabled them to see the friction points that may arise during an exercise or contingency with a particular partnered nation. Their understanding of the terrain, environment, and political influences grew expeditiously.

2. Where does the planning JELC process need to go and what does the OPTEMPO need to be for Pacific Pathways?

Currently, we are well behind the JELC timeline. In order for Pacific Pathways to be executed properly, we need to get ahead of the JELC. The optimal moment would be the time before the JELC event, before the first leg in a Pacific Pathways. To get ahead of the JELC, we need to operationalize Pathways well in advance of the JELC. Currently, we are on a path of collision by forcing so many Pathways inside the JELC. We need to resist the temptation of doing three Pacific Pathways per year in order to set the theater. We could set the theater with one to two Pathways. The first one would be the proof of principle, and the second iteration we would take the lessons learned and apply them to that operation. We still need to keep the individual JELC conferences, because we need to ensure that we get "buy-in" from the participating countries. We cannot solely focus on our wants and needs. We must ensure our partnered nations feel as though Pacific Pathways is fundamentally a good thing for both parties involved. To ensure all those considerations are met, we may need to consider making Pathways an 18- to 24-month process. This would allow for a proper planning timeline, and, ultimately, would make the operation as a whole more effective.

3. How does Pacific Pathways differentiate from the Marine mission in the Pacific? What is the appropriate force structure for Pacific Pathways? Has there been friction between I Corps and USARPAC?

Our narrative has been inaccurate, which in part has caused friction with the Marines. Our initial narrative was that of another contingency force for USPACOM commander in the Pacific AOR. This could have been misconstrued as infringing on the Marine mission in the Pacific AOR. Pacific Pathways is not a contingent force similar to Marines. Pacific Pathways sets the theater, building readiness at echelon, and brings all enablers together to function under the umbrella of a large-scale operation.

In relation to force structure, it is clear that we want to use RAF for Pacific Pathways. The real question should be is that the appropriate tool/organization to be used in the Pacific AOR? Would a multifunctional brigade be better equipped to assist our partnered nations in Pacific AOR? In order to be completely effective in the region, we need to use the most appropriate force required and not solely incorporate the BCTs for missions in the Pacific.

Friction between the two headquarters is not the way I see it. We are currently redefining the mission command relationship of I Corps to USARPAC. I Corps is becoming the operational headquarters in the Pacific AOR, to USARPAC, the ASCC in the Pacific AOR. Fifteen months ago, none of this existed. We had to build this infrastructure and knowledge from the ground up. Pacific Pathways is a remarkable concept that builds both headquarters and staff readiness toward the Pacific theater.

COL Donn H. Hill, Commander, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, United States Army Alaska, Fort Wainwright, AK

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways and what were the advantages and disadvantages?

I thought it was a beneficial exercise having three distinct pieces with a small platoon-sized deployment to Khaan Quest, Mongolia. Initial feedback: very small, low cost to the brigade, high payoff. (This feedback came from the Soldiers who went on the mission primarily because the mission put them in a situation to plan an operation that was peacekeeping in nature, which we do not traditionally train as part of our mission essential task list [METL].) It really expanded their horizons to the different type of scenarios they might be thrust into and their ability to work with a wide range of nations. Overall, it was a great experience for our Soldiers who participated.

Second part of Pacific Pathways 15-03 (Orient Shield): significantly larger contingent squadron (-). The task force consisted of: squadron headquarters (-), troop (+), forward support company, artillery platoon, anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) platoon, Mobile Gun System (MGS) platoon, and we incorporated the brigade headquarters (-) — all the staff primaries from the brigade staff, minus the brigade executive officer. This provided an incredible environment for multi-echelon training, from the Soldiers' ability to train with their counterpart and learn about their weapon systems to include their tactics for conducting ground warfare. The brigade headquarters was able to conduct the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) with the 6th Mechanized Division Staff of the Japanese army. However, due to the Title IX of the Japanese Constitution, it was not a doctrinally combined headquarters, but we pushed that envelope with the Japanese army in order to achieve a combined headquarters. Overall, both parties were satisfied by the combination of the two headquarters and agreed it was a benefit for both organizations. Our partners were willing collaborators for pushing the envelope in order to achieve a combined headquarters.

At the Soldier/individual level, we focused our efforts at the functional level, which included marksmanship, small unit tactical engagements, and gunnery-centric events. Then, we moved into the bilateral exercise, which consisted of a force-on-force exercise where 1st SBCT was part of the task organization. We used the cavalry squad in a reconnaissance role for the Japanese infantry unit that we were partnered with for the force-on-force exercise. The exercise occurred over a three-day period, and allowed us to work together at a much higher, collective level. As a result, we both had similar experiences during the exercise due in part that the Japanese have relatively similar doctrine to our military. Overall, the exercise was very educational for the entire brigade, both culturally and working hand in hand with our partnered nations. They were not nearly as digital as our military; they relied more on analog systems. They also are not a modular force. They would be considered a legacy force: a brigade made up of traditional three infantry battalions without all the enablers that we have in our brigades. Again, this exercise was very enlightening and we were able to learn a lot about each other as a result.

They were very interested in mission command. So, we spent a lot of time conducting leader development programs and desk-side briefs on the topic. They also took a significant interest in our Stryker fleet, particularly the MGS variant, since they are purchasing a vehicle similar in nature to the MGS. They were interested in the employment of the MGS. As a result, we gave our partners several capabilities briefs on the MGS. They were also interested in our digital capabilities. However, we did see some limitations in our capabilities due to the thick vegetation that we encountered at the local training areas. They were also interested in the M777 howitzer, due to the digital capabilities it brought to the fight. During the individual training period, we

were able to train their observers to use the digital call-for-fire process and use the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3); it was the first time it had ever been done in their military. They do not possess a digital howitzer. However, they were extremely effective at conducting fire missions. Their use of artillery can be considered very old school. During the exercise, they conducted two-hour preparatory fires as opposed to precision, accuracy, and timeliness of fires. We learned about their fire process and that they are not joint at the tactical level, specifically the involvement of close air support.

The other thing that we learned early on that did not get fixed was the logistical challenges. Early on, we talked to 2/25 SBCT and learned that, as a Stryker formation, we are tied to the mother ship in respect to logistics. There is no prepositioned equipment in the Pacific for a Stryker fleet. We started off thinking we were going to have a logistical chain, a supply chain through USARPAC, 593rd ESC that would enable us to get our spare parts required in order to maintain our fleet properly during the duration of Pacific Pathways 15-03. Instead, we relied on the model of just-in-time logistics for our rotation, and that just did not work for a variety of reasons. It failed miserably. The way we addressed the issue was our rear detachment back at Fort Wainwright was using FedEx to mail repair parts to the organizations forward in the Pacific, and it proved to be ineffective. We did, however, learn a great deal from the rotation, specifically in the logistical realm. The only true issue dealt with the similar issues arising during two separate Pacific Pathways rotations. Both 2/25 SBCT and 1st SBCT learned the same lessons from the same problems. There is no reason to have to rehash lessons that have already been identified previously. That is unacceptable. We attributed the problem to the stovepiping of the logistical structures across the Army; it is compounded by us being a separate brigade that is not in the 25ID. The 25ID Sustainment Brigade has nothing to do with us. Also, during our rotation, we did not have a two-star operational command overseeing the exercise. We worked with the USARJ command, and the commander of USARJ was concerned with his ability to support us during the exercise. His organization did everything they could in Japan to support my organization, but there were gaps beyond USARJ's control that should have been anticipated. That still caused friction. My operational readiness rate is still going to be low until my equipment returns from the port. It was an expensive price to pay that could have and should have been anticipated. We spoke to other brigades that had participated in Pacific Pathways, and we were aware of the difficulties along the logistical chain. During the final in-progress review, we felt as though we had all the pieces in place to be successful. Unfortunately, those challenges still could not be overtaken during our rotation. We were never able to get ahead of the issue, which made it difficult throughout the entire rotation to maintain the fleet. We did have an in-depth historical analysis. However, when we put our fleet on the vessel for a month, the fleet began to deteriorate due to lack of constant care. We were also familiar with this scenario, due in part to our previous CTC rotation and the long distance our fleet must travel out of Alaska.

My brigade headquarters (-) with the staff primaries moved to Korea and received the order from the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) for their warfighter exercise (WfX). The WfX was a training opportunity that was presented to us, and we took the opportunity to further enhance our ability to conduct mission analysis with the staff primaries. Simultaneously to that event taking place, we sent the squadron (-) to the Hoguk exercise, which is led by the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). It was a great training opportunity that was not originally part of the Pacific Pathways rotation. However, all parties involved were satisfied by our participation and met the commander's intent. We were able to conduct engagements with ROKA. Once all elements arrived in Korea from Japan, we began the process of deliberate planning in preparation for the 2ID WfX. The squadron went to Rodriguez Range and conducted weapon qualification on all weapon systems and conducted live-fire exercises (LFX) up to the section level.

The 2ID WfX was a huge payoff for the brigade staff. We were able to take our lessons learned from Orient Shield, apply them to a full-up digital construct with U.S. forces, and test our ability to conduct a thorough mission analysis while participating in the 2ID WfX. We were able to refine our planning standard operating procedures (SOPs) and implement the new SOPs after we had received the division order. Subsequent to the initial order, 2ID did not have a lot of follow-on missions for the brigade. We used the opportunity to plan against real-world scenarios, which gave us an additional four attempts to conduct MDMP cycles. As a result, we were really able to improve our overall ability to implement the planning SOP. This was truly beneficial for staff as a whole. We were also able to refine our knowledge management SOP, due to the multiple repetitions we engaged in during the WfX. We were able to build up the staff and ensure the new staff was familiar with my command philosophy. The multiple repetitions enabled my staff to learn from their mistakes immediately and apply those lessons learned to other real-world scenarios. Pacific Pathways gave us an opportunity to continuously exercise the MDMP cycle. The WfX did enable us to become familiar with additional enablers and enhance our ability to employ those assets to include assets above brigade enablers. Again, it was a great opportunity for all the warfighting functions (WfFs) to get exercised, since sometimes home-station training proves to be difficult when exercising all elements involved in the WfFs. Our brigade usually does not work with a division staff. However, during the WfX, we were able to work with a full-up division staff, adjacent units at the brigade level, and multinational forces. The CTC rotation could not replicate this type of real-world interaction, nor could home-station training replicate this type of training. Pacific Pathways truly afforded the brigade a great opportunity to exercise its capabilities in realistic scenarios, which would be difficult to replicate anywhere else.

From a cultural point of view, we had a three-day weekend as a result of a Korean holiday. So, we were able to take in the culture of Korea and allow our Soldiers to have a little fun during the rotation. We were able to do a brigade staff ride for all sergeants first class (E-7s) and above for the Gloucester Hill battle. My staff was able to reach out to author Andy Salmon who wrote "*To the Last Round*," which depicted the battle, and, since he now resides in Seoul, Korea, he was able to lead the staff ride. We were able to spend the entire day with him learning about the battle. It was by far the best staff ride I had participated in pertaining to this battle. The three-day weekend gave the brigade a great opportunity to fully appreciate Korea and the intricacies of having to fight on the peninsula.

Upon completion of WfX, the brigade headquarters redeployed to Alaska, while the squadron remained to conduct the Hoguk exercise. During Hoguk, the squadron was the first American off-peninsula unit to participate in a traditionally pure ROKA exercise, and was able to conduct multiple reconnaissance missions in a decisive action environment. They were also able to participate in a river-crossing operation. It truly was a fabulous opportunity for the squadron to participate in that type of training, which could not be replicated at home-station training. The squadron was able to integrate its Raven into all the reconnaissance operations. ROKA was truly impressed by that capability. The squadron was able to push one cavalry platoon in front of a ROKA rifle company. Those platoons were able to truly get at their mission set of reconnaissance by incorporating terrain and real road networks into their reconnaissance plans. That type of training truly cannot be replicated, not even at the CTCs. This experience truly was different from a CTC rotation.

Overall, Pacific Pathways absolutely benefited my organization as a whole. The only cost was the maintenance aspects of Pacific Pathways, but that's the cost of doing business in the Army. We learned the limitations of our equipment as a result of our deployment.

2. How did Pacific Pathways affect the brigade's readiness overall?

It improved it vastly. Specific to the squadron, as I discussed earlier, it was not the entire squadron, obviously, but that squadron staff got multiple repetitions to include jumping the tactical operations center (TOC). As a result, they were able to get that operation down significantly to a point where they could jump the TOC in their sleep. Hugely beneficial in the repetitions, the brigade was able to exercise its systems, equipment, and personnel.

COL Scott W. Kelly (At the time off this interview, COL Kelly was Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI)

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways?

For my brigade specifically, we had about an eight-month train-up to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and had that CTC experience before we deployed to Pacific Pathways. I use the analogy that JRTC got us doing graduate-level warfighting and Pacific Pathways got us doing Ph.D. level. It is because of the complexity of what the BCT, and, specifically, the BCT staff is asked to do. One of the hardest parts about JRTC is simply deploying there, building combat power, then getting the chaos organized. During Pacific Pathways, we had to do that essentially five times with transitions often overlapping. While we were still executing operations in Australia (Hamel), we were already having to deploy and conduct RSOI to Indonesia, and reverse RSOI out of Australia. The staff and command has to still be in the close fight, but have the foresight to be posturing for the next.

Pacific Pathways has several benefits. At the Soldier level, they love going on Pacific Pathways. This is why they joined: to deploy to different places and have these experiences. It is invaluable and it has a positive influence on my reenlistment rate among my units that execute Pacific Pathways. Six percent of my formation right now has not deployed at all. We keep talking about how the Army has all this Iraq and Afghanistan combat experience, but the truth of the matter is that fades fast and is draining out of our formations quickly. Conversely, Pacific Pathways is providing the training experiences that will allow us to maintain that fighting edge. What comes to mind, as I reflect on Pacific Pathways, is a squad or platoon of Soldiers walking through a local town in Indonesia getting the flavor of what that looks like. It is good for American Soldiers to recognize that there is a good portion of the world that does not necessarily know where tomorrow's meal is coming from. Getting Soldiers exposed to the different cultures is irreplaceable. The other piece of Pacific Pathways is helping us recognize at that level that other armies really do have something to offer. They are professional military soldiers with unique skills and experiences, as in jungle operations, which, for us, was a steep learning curve. Another aspect is working beside another professional formation like the Australian Army. It was humbling because they were very proficient, and this enabled my units to see where we needed to improve. Finally, the training value is immense. Each Pathways is very unique. The experience I received as a BCT commander in Australia was another CTC-like experience during Hamel. For my battalion task force, it was JRTC all over again. It was a phenomenal exercise.

At the staff level, specifically mission command, we were challenged and able to hone our MDMP skills. My staff had to work through the complexity of deploying and conducting RSOI to a foreign country and integrate with an allied army, which was another excellent training and

leader development experience. My staff had to deal with bringing Army watercraft into port and be involved with the diplomatic clearance of the same. Deploying to JRTC, we would never have to deal with this coordination. However, during a Pacific Pathways, these are the realities of the problem sets. My staff received incredible experience in dealing with embassy country teams, and we got a lot more exposure to interagency coordination. Also, the multinational experience working with the partner force in their country was invaluable.

Another benefit is working with the theater-level assets. For instance, working with the SDDC teams at each port and, during each RSOI, raising our METL deploy readiness level. We became very proficient working with these enablers multiple times during a 90-day deployment. Most BCT executive officers have not had to work with a theater port operation team or have an Army watercraft tactically controlled by the unit. These are small little nuggets of experience, but in terms of developing leaders and the intellectual problems associated with it, are all great training experiences.

At the strategic level, reassuring allies and deterring any threat that might be out there was very tangible to the BCT. For example, while we were in Malaysia, simultaneously, there was a Chinese exercise going on in the south of the country. Dialog with my counterparts about their country concerns helped to reassure them, and we gained a better insight into what is going on regionally, as well. There are huge returns as a result of this relationship building.

Finally, for the brigade, specifically during Hamel in Australia, their vast training areas enabled us to conduct BCT maneuver alongside an allied brigade under a combined JTF headquarters. It was excellent training, the kind I have never experienced before. The richness of that experience for me, being able to coordinate with another brigade commander and a higher headquarters against a live opposing force, was a step above what we got at JRTC.

Home-station benefits: I had 5th Battalion back here at Schofield Barracks, and, while the BCT staff was forward, we received an order to send a company to Guam and a company team to do a combined arms live fire in the Philippines. The richness of that situation, coupled with the complexities of being forward in theater executing and transitioning to another country, compounded by the time difference of seven hours between us and my units in Hawaii, was a stressor. Yet, it was a great training experience in distributing mission command, the MDMP, battle rhythm, and coordination.

2. How does Pacific Pathways affect the brigade's readiness?

The Army's readiness measure is the unit status report (USR), along with rating my METL tasks. You are either ready or you are not. Not everything executed in a Pacific Pathways fits in my USR or in my METL tasks. Much of what we do on Pacific Pathways — the partnering, customs, and coordination with country teams to purifying of water — doesn't cross over to my METL tasks. These tasks, however, are essential to operating in the Pacific theater, Phase 0.

We came out of JRTC at a high readiness level. Pacific Pathways took our readiness to another level because of the complexity and variety of problems we were challenged with. I can point to squad and platoon live fires. These are translatable to my METL, but when you look at the overall BCT readiness, these activities are important but different. For BCT readiness, I focus

on mission command and command-staff planning functions. Pacific Pathways gave us another repetition of a leader training program (LTP). My staff turned another 10 MDMPs throughout Pacific Pathways. Five were operational problems in decisive action during Hamel in Australia, and the other half were associated with real-world movement and RSOI from country to country and in country missions.

The two BCT readiness tasks I look at are mission command and deploy the force. During Pacific Pathways, we deployed 20 percent of the BCT. While we did not deploy the entire brigade, the coordination, MDMP, planning, and integration of the enablers are the same for the staff. The staff exercised its METL tasks multiple times. As a result, we improved in those two areas well beyond what we accomplished at JRTC.

During the train-up to JRTC, I made the decision to take risks and focus my training exclusively on decisive action and combined arms maneuver, and not so much on stability operations. This translated great for Hamel, but then as a staff, we treated the remainder of the Pacific Pathways like an LTP and focused on humanitarian assistance, domestic response, and peacekeeping operations. Pacific Pathways was extremely beneficial in that it allowed me to focus on my stability tasks. For example, Malaysia offered me peacekeeping operations and Indonesia offered me HA/DR for my BCT staff. What I was able to do was train during Pacific Pathways on the METL tasks I took risks on for my train-up to JRTC. I was able to work with regional partners in theater, gaining insights that I could not get at a CTC. For example, my counterpart, a brigadier general in the Malaysian army, had actually served in multiple U.N. peacekeeping missions. From his experience and knowledge, my staff and I benefited in the areas of managing negotiations and U.N.-type organizations and media engagements he had done in Africa, Lebanon, etc. Another example is the first time we planned an HA/DR. My intelligence staff officer (S-2) briefed the threat focusing mainly on people. He never discussed flooding, starvation, disease, or mass casualty events because he did not realize these are the threats in a humanitarian disaster. What we learned with the exposure to these and other missions in theater, and in cooperation with our host-nation partners, were invaluable. As a result, we received a much broader understanding of stability operations.

On average, most BCT commanders and staffs get one turn at a CTC rotation. Between JRTC and Pacific Pathways, I was able to deploy and fight my BCT in two decisive action operations and deploy to two other countries to train on multiple stability operations. This repetition in austere and multiple environments stressed my unit, but was a key element to building readiness, leadership, and my staff.

3. Is the current Pacific Pathways 60- to 90-day deployment model the right OPTEMPO?

A 90-day deployment model is about right. Much less than that and you are not getting the deployment "flavor." Over 120 days, you start to get diminishing returns. The rhythm of a Pacific Pathways, where you train hard, then break and go back and train hard, is also good. Perhaps more than the duration is the timing and sequencing. Essentially, from January to September 2015, certain individuals in the BCT were going "100 miles per hour." January was where we really started collective training. We deployed to JRTC for LTP for three weeks, returned, and immediately went into BCT ex-evaluation for two-plus weeks. From BCT ex-evaluations, we immediately started out-load from Hawaii for JRTC. After out-load, there was a week breather, and then we deployed to JRTC. Three weeks out of JRTC, we are on a plane and deploying on Pacific Pathways. This was not optimal. The reason it is not optimal is the equipment. Everything

that went to JRTC could not go to Pacific Pathways. We physically could not make it back in time to get it out-loaded, and some of this is the "tyranny of time and space" with Hawaii. The turnaround time between these major events would be better spread out to allow for equipment return and a maintenance period. For example, from index of a CTC to the out-load for a Pacific Pathways, 60 days would be good. Our timeline was three weeks, and then we were deployed on our first leg in Australia, fighting the fight in Hamel. At that time, our equipment from JRTC still had not arrived back in Hawaii. What we had to do was borrow equipment from the division and other brigades to meet our equipment requirements and our mission command capabilities.

A benefit from the OPTEMPO of a Pacific Pathway is the time between transitions. After Hamel and before we deployed to the next country, we were afforded a three-week period, which allowed for some excellent training time. This was a significant readiness builder. At the battalion level, they were able to take their JRTC and Hamel lessons and really work on improving their squads and platoons. At the BCT level, we turned another repetition of an LTP. We paid to fly in the JRTC LTP coaches and turn another LTP, which focused on HA/DR and peacekeeping operations. This was very constructive, because coming out of JRTC and with a summer rotation, I lost some staff leaders. I bring this up because part of the benefit is that there is time between the end of one leg and the beginning of another to do some good training, which, in turn, builds and extends readiness in some areas. You almost want to build these training times between each transition.

4. Can you discuss your military-to-military engagements with the host nation and the challenges?

The military-to-military interaction is what Pacific Pathways is all about. Each country is different in the type of agreements, arrangements, and relationships we have with them. Pacific Pathways allows U.S. forces to engage, not just one country's military, but several in one deployment.

With Australia, we have a long and enduring relationship and the interaction was great. The dialog and interoperability from my perspective was a moot point. I found it easier to operate with the Australians than it was when I deployed to JRTC and had to operate with the enabler, which met me at JRTC. These U.S. Army units came with varying software and other levels of equipment, which provided some interoperability challenges. The positive side was when I deployed to Australia, we had some of the same interoperability challenges, which allowed the BCT to comfortably work with the Australians.

Each of the other partner nations were great to work with. We did experience some cultural friction points. The challenge you have automatically is language. There are slang words that we do not normally understand. There were equipment interoperability issues we struggled with. For example, in Malaysia, we had set up a training network for the peacekeeping exercise, which was not the norm for my counterpart. They just use radios and maps. We use a rather complex training network. We pay contractors to employ and run it and it doesn't mean anything to them. Many of our partner nations in the Pacific are analog. When they pack up and deploy on a peacekeeping mission, the network training system that replicates stuff for us, they don't use or have. From a military sales-type, show-and-tell demonstration, this is good. However, if we are trying to improve their training, then, in many cases, we have to return to analog ourselves in order to be interoperable.

Another aspect of military-to-military interactions, which did not apply to our Australian allies, is that you may not always get a cohesive unit or staff as a partner. In Indonesia, for example, their brigade staff was made up of 20 different units' individuals and augmented to replicate a brigade staff. They wanted to migrate the training experience back broadly to their force. My point is, in some cases, you are improving individuals and it is just an aspect of the military-to-military engagement you have to be aware of.

Mr. Mike Fuller, Director of the Mission Support Element, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways?

The Pacific Pathways concept was born when GEN Brooks took command of USARPAC in 2013. He took existing exercises in the Pacific and linked them together under the umbrella of Pacific Pathways. His concept consisted of an Army unit forward, if the date line is capable of responding to contingent operations in the Pacific AOR. This concept would allow the USPACOM commander another force capable of responding to HA/DR in the region. Pacific Pathways was focused around an Army BCT with aviation forces assigned for support, designed to build the capacity of partnered nations. However, the Marines did not see the benefit of Pacific Pathways. They felt as though the Army was attempting to infringe on their mission in the Pacific AOR.

An issue arises with the cost of Pacific Pathways. Conducting each exercise separately would cost roughly $4 to $5 million. When these same exercises fell under the umbrella of Pacific Pathways, the cost for the first iteration moved upward to $26 million. Subsequent iterations of Pacific Pathways have average costs ranging from $13 to $15 million. This increased cost was largely associated with resourcing cargo ships to transport equipment and the opening/closing of ports. Currently, the cost for a CONUS CTC rotation is $15 million, specifically an SBCT conducting training at the NTC from Joint Base Lewis-McChord. That one brigade, upon completion of that NTC rotation, would be elevated to a training readiness level of T1. There is no doubt that Pacific Pathways builds training readiness for units participating. However, units participating in Pacific Pathways generally include a division command post, a brigade command post, and about a battalion task force worth of Soldiers versus the entire BCT with enablers. To date, the metrics that illustrate readiness through the lenses of Pacific Pathways are evolving. However, it certainly trains unique skill sets associated with deployment, logistical support, mission command, and increasing cultural and environmental awareness of the partnered nation.

Consequently, some have asked, "Is the investment of OPTEMPO dollars providing a tangible return on investment for the force?" As the Army moves toward Army Operating Concept 2025, we expect to see small units operating in geographically dispersed locations with a mission command node separated (i.e., a distributed mission command node). In 2016, there will be a forward mission command node in the Philippines. Most likely in future Pacific Pathways, this ability will be expanded, so we can move the node around in theater.

Initial phases of Pacific Pathways were tied to units that had recently completed a CTC rotation and had a training readiness level of T1. Those units were then required, upon completion of that rotation, to put their equipment on rail-load to come back from the CTC in time to get to a port in preparation for Pacific Pathways. The challenge has been trying to allow for proper refit,

which did not occur, nor did it allow for proper maintenance of that equipment to take place. It also added additional stress to the unit because they could no longer merely focus on the CTC, but rather they had to simultaneously focus on both the CTC rotation and Pacific Pathways and the nine or so JELC events associated with the three different exercises captured under the Pacific Pathways umbrella. This added stress directly caused friction and may have hindered that unit's ability to maintain that type of balanced OPTEMPO needed to gain the training benefit of both deployments. One recommendation was to separate the two events over a two-year period. This would enable the designated brigade, earmarked for a Pacific Pathways, an opportunity to solely focus on one event during the fiscal year, which will alleviate the stress of the increased OPTEMPO.

Finally, we need to be aware of the changing environment in the Pacific both at the political and strategic level. We need to ensure that desired outcome of each exercise is fully integrated with the goals of ambassadors and country teams, USPACOM, and USARPAC, and that they accommodate the partnered nation's goals. Once a plan is developed, we need to develop mechanisms to enable flexibility and agility in order to accommodate the ever-changing environment of the Pacific AOR.

COL Mark A. Paget (At the time of this interview, COL Paget was Deputy Commanding Officer of the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA)

1. From a senior leader perspective, how does Pacific Pathways prepare the 593rd ESC for future contingency missions in the region?

We are the only ESC assigned to USPACOM [outside Korea], which makes us a very unique organization. We are focused west towards the 8th TSC and USARPAC across the entire USPACOM AOR. When we talk about the Pathways specifically, I remember very clearly when GEN Brooks explained it to us and he called it the three R's: relationships, reconnaissance, and readiness. These were the three things he felt the 593rd ESC should do when out in the AO, to build relationships with our partners across the Pacific. When we go to a new port in a country for an exercise, we are doing a little reconnaissance by seeing new things and helping to better understand our partners. Through all of this activity and training, we are building readiness, and that's what this is all about, building readiness.

The 593rd provides the operational bridge from the tactical, strategic, logistical enterprise. If you think about the 593rd, we are bridging the gap between that task force logistics staff officer (S-4) and strategic partners like DLA, SDDC, AMC, and the whole host of field service representatives on the ground providing direct support to the warfighter. We provide operational reach to the 8th TSC to enable the I Corps to execute their missions all across the Pacific. We continue to provide continuous support from our sustainment operations center with commodity managers responsible for supplies getting to exercise participants all across the Pacific.

2. Describe how supporting Pacific Pathways is different from other types of operations.

Each iteration of a Pacific Pathways is different due to changing conditions and environments. Something we do as an ESC is maintain readiness, so that we can deploy on a moment's notice to anywhere in the world. Look at what we did over the last year and a half in terms of our road to certification. The 593rd participated in the United States Forces Korea (USFK) exercise Key Resolve while located in Hawaii, followed by a defense support of civil authorities exercise in Alaska, and then integrated with the Active and Reserve Component forces at Fort Hunter Liggett, CA. We went from a tropical climate, to an Artic climate, to a desert climate in California. Building on that, when we participated in Pathways, we changed the venues for our training. Whenever you change the conditions or the complexity of an operation, we enhance our readiness. We need to develop adaptive, agile, logistics leaders that can operate in any environment. You know it's really great when a young captain or warrant officer steps off a plane in a country anywhere across the Pacific for the first time, and within 72 hours they are up on communications, meeting people, making connections, and conducting coordination. They are making logistics happen under varying and changing conditions and environments.

3. How did you synchronize the efforts of enterprise partners such as DLA, AMC, 599th Transportation Brigade, and SDDC?

There is no substitution to over-communicating. One way we leveraged our partners is by communicating on a regular basis. Communications is key to everything we do through weekly conference calls, video telephone conferences, Adobe Connect, travel to initial planning conferences, and mid-term and final planning conferences. We also try to make sure our planners are truly vested in these operations and build in an opportunity for them to excel. One example is our deputy chief of staff, plans (G-5), LTC Doug Bell, who was the lead planner for Talisman Saber for over a year, culminating when he was appointed as the deputy director for the combined logistics group in Australia. Not only was he the G-5 for the ESC, he was also able to carry the project from start to finish and execute the plan. I think it is so important for planners today to become "road warriors" by giving them an opportunity to participate in some of the exercises they helped plan.

4. What specific sustainment challenges were incurred once units arrived at locations throughout the Pacific? How can these challenges be mitigated in the future?

As an organization, we learned that we need to participate much earlier in the JELC. We have to template not just 12 months out, but need to look 18 to 24 months out. By working closely with USARPAC, USPACOM, and getting at the front side of the JELC helps us to leverage our Reserve Component partners as we participate in more exercises across the Pacific. We want to include our partners, but there are longer lead times to get them resourced. In order to get resourced with Reserve Component units, we have to generate those requirements in the Joint Training Master Schedule (JTMS) about 18 months in advance, so that they can have predictability in their training cycle to participate in these exercises.

5. How can future Pacific Pathways exercises be improved from a sustainment perspective?

From my perspective, we have maintained an accurate logistics common operating picture. We have been able to anticipate problems before they happen and we haven't had a single warfighter go without any commodity (fuel, ammunition, supplies) during any of the exercises. For example, when you look at the magnificent work that was done in concert with everyone after the ship that ran aground off the coast of Japan, it was amazing to see how everyone came together to work through the issues, coming up with COAs that were supportable and enabled Pacific Pathways to continue on.

6. How is the development of an EECP going to impact the readiness of the 593rd ESC?

The EECP is a magnet for readiness in the ESC. Our EECP layout and operations have been developed, refined, and codified in our tactical SOP through a series of exercises that culminated in ESC certification during Yama Sakura 67. We continue to sustain readiness as we train and use it in exercises like Yudh Abyas with the Indian Army. Regardless of the geographic location of an exercise and planning under the assumption, no hard-stand facilities will be available. We have 70 professionals who can deploy and establish EECP operations anywhere in the world within 96 hours.

COL Ross Davidson, G-3, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways and the overall advantages and disadvantages of the operation?

The initial challenge is sustaining readiness. To date, we are building readiness through a variety of exercises to include CTC rotations, home-station training, and Pacific Pathways operations. I Corps is continuing to operationalize its headquarters, and planning Pacific Pathways has been instrumental in helping the corps do this. In addition, we have been assisting USARPAC set the theater and build partnerships with its allies. In assisting USARPAC in setting the theater, we had to establish nodes for sustainment that would logistically support elements forward. The current model approach for USARPAC and USPACOM was a series of discrete joint exercises with partnered nations with goals and objectives agreed on during the JELC. I Corps has taken that model and now turned those discrete exercises into one flowing operation. Operationalizing these exercises under Pacific Pathways has generated the need for an echeloned mission command structure from the brigade to corps, and distributed throughout the Pacific theater. The execution is conducted at the brigade level. The division, either 25ID or 7ID, provides a forward command node. For Pacific Pathways 16-02, 25ID will provide, for the first time, that forward command node in the Philippines.

Pacific Pathways has become a forcing function, which has enabled all players to work their systems in a real theater of operations, rather than just conducting computer-simulated exercises. Pacific Pathways integrates multiple echelons. For example, 8th TSC is empowered to provide theater-level sustainment across the Pacific AOR. They now test their capabilities with supply flow, port authority, port opening, and coordination with the host nation routinely through Pacific Pathways. Along with that, all the subordinate elements — 593rd ESC, supporting SDDC, AMC, and a whole host of supporting agencies — do the same. Simultaneously, the signal command

for USARPAC could truly see themselves and see if their capabilities were able to connect the network throughout the entire Pacific AOR. Without this approach of operationalizing the exercise, Pacific Pathways would merely be discrete exercises. Pacific Pathways allows brigades the opportunity to conduct mission command in a variety of countries and environments. With this capability forward, it provided the USARPAC commander with more capability to engage our partners and respond to crisis in the Pacific theater.

Pacific Pathways helps to sustain and, in some cases, increase readiness. BCTs can use Pacific Pathways to increase their overall readiness by building upon their home-station training (CTC rotations) even when there is turnover in key personnel within the organization. The mission command and sustainment WfFs benefit significantly, because these systems are worked very hard during a Pacific Pathways. Ultimately, Pacific Pathways will not only increase readiness, it can extend it. It will build readiness through mission command, tactical activities, and repetitive deployment activities in RSOI. Beyond the WfFs is building readiness through a shared understanding of the operational environment and fostering better relations with our partnered nations.

Pacific Pathways has the potential to achieve the larger goal of bringing all the partnered nations in the Pacific together and operating in a similar framework. If contingent operations take place, we can communicate and operate more effectively. There are friction points with Pacific Pathways, but it also forces us to coordinate solutions with a wide range of agencies and host-nation armies, which we have not had to do before. GEN Brooks' vision is a Pacific Pathways that involves a collaborative effort with multinational forces for a common effort. I Corps now has to understand the military-to-military needs for each country we will work with and how to leverage those capabilities in the event of a humanitarian or operational crisis. Operationalizing I Corps has enabled us to build systems and SOPs critical for the corps to perform combined joint task force and coalition forces land component commander operations in the Pacific theater. Pacific Pathways forced I Corps to evolve into a more capable headquarters.

2. What is the current OPTEMPO for Pacific Pathways and is that the best solution for the way forward?

To date, we are conducting three Pacific Pathways per year. Ultimately, that may be too many exercises. The first Pacific Pathways was a baseline and the second Pacific Pathways in fiscal year 2015 is where we are applying the lessons learned. As Pacific Pathways matures, we will need to find the proper operational balance and funding. Will it be two or three iterations per year? We just need to let the process evolve.

To better facilitate training and planning, we need to consider a synchronization conference that lines up the JELC timeline with an operational timeline. This will facilitate a total force integration that will bring together all the key players to identify all the friction points and, consequently, allow for full cooperation toward the desired end state of Pacific Pathways. This conference needs to occur 18 to 24 months out and allow for proper dissemination of orders and tasks. Nesting the JELC timeline properly will prevent stovepiping and provide for a horizontal integration of all parties involved in Pacific Pathways.

COL Robert Reynolds, G-3/G-5, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways?

Pacific Pathways is an opportunity to operationalize our exercises in the Pacific. The big takeaway is ensuring we shape the exercises properly, so we are able to mold our partners and that we are mutually supportive for both participating units. Previously, we only did discrete exercises with partnered nations, but the exercises were not tied to anything else. Now, we are lashing all those exercises together and forming a Pacific Pathways operation. In order to accomplish this type of construct, we need to ensure we shaped the battlefield properly. We did this by encompassing all the Pacific Pathways together with a clear overarching intent, which resulted in our end state being met. This operation improved our overall readiness for participating units and enabled a division headquarters to have oversight, while exercising mission command for a particular Pacific Pathways.

Throughout this process, we identified gaps. One of those gaps dealt specifically with the communication network in the Pacific AOR. It was difficult to establish a satellite link, resulting in units being unable to communicate with higher headquarters in a timely manner. Other challenges that we encountered initially during Pacific Pathways stemmed from the lack of written orders and not having the right level of participation from the corps during the planning process. These difficulties were the result of not having the right planners involved in all the initial planning conferences, main planning conferences, and final planning conferences. Our intent in the current operations cell was to establish a proper mission command relationship that would enhance the planning process. In the future, proper personnel involvement needs to take place, and this should improve the orders process. Consequently, I Corps now provides recommendations to the USARPAC commander on which units best meet the mission requirements. Through this process we can easily facilitate the commander's intent and ensure it is met. Corps involvement increased rapidly after the initial Pacific Pathways operation in 2014. However, there are still friction points, specifically the titling authority for funding (i.e., FORSCOM money cannot be used for USARPAC exercises).

2. What is the optimal operational design for Pacific Pathways?

Currently, there is no true OPTEMPO established due in part to outside competing requirements. Based on demands, the force needs to be flexible in order to execute the mission in the Pacific AOR. We need to ensure that we utilize the total force when building the force structure for Pacific Pathways. These forces should include National Guard and Reserve forces, because they may meet the mission requirements better than a BCT. Currently, the one requirement for Pacific Pathways is that the participating unit has a C1 level of readiness. Now the question arises, does the entire brigade need to be C1 or can the designated Pacific Pathway units and headquarters be C1? With that being said, is it possible to use a single entity, a battalion, with a C1 level of readiness and task-organize to the brigade headquarters that also has a C1 level of readiness?

COL Robert O'Brien IV, Garrison Commander, Fort Detrick, MD (At the time of this interview, COL O'Brien was Chief of Operations, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA)

1. Can you provide your views on Pacific Pathways? Overall, what have been the advantages and disadvantages as it relates to I Corps and RAF?

For decades, the U.S. Army has been in the Pacific conducting a series of individual exercises. What we have done and what Pacific Pathways does is take these individual exercises and operationalize them into a single regional operation. In Pathways 14, we conducted the proof of principle, executing one Pathway where we operationalized three of these single exercises. Now, in Pacific Pathways 15, we are operationalizing nine exercises in Thailand, Korea, Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Japan, and back to Korea along three Pathways engaging the entire Pacific region over a 10-month period.

Pacific Pathways has gained the Army better resource efficiencies and effectiveness as opposed to executing the single discrete deployments. For example, out-loading one unit and deploying that unit along a path that conducts operations with several Pacific countries saves in cost and increases that unit's readiness. In addition, Pacific Pathways demonstrates the Army's ability to operate for an extended period throughout the Pacific region, building trust with our allies and friends.

There has been some misunderstanding on what Pacific Pathways is. It has generally been accepted that the U.S. Marines represent an expeditionary force or capability. So, why is the Army doing this? The historical fact is the Army has deployed and operated throughout the Pacific AOR since the turn of the century. Pacific Pathways is simply a new way of doing what the Army has already done: deploying and engaging with other armies throughout the region. Pacific Pathways allows the Army to train multi-echelon in a realistic environment. From an operational perspective, we have been able to develop orders and execute planning and battle tracking in a real-time deployment scenario for extended periods, dealing with real operational issues. Pacific Pathways requires all levels of mission command, from corps to battalion, to take an operational view, providing the Army with great opportunities over and above just training in single events or command post exercises.

Instead of creating single discrete training events, Pacific Pathways allows the Army to rehearse operational and tactical maneuver in real time, against real mission sets. Brigade combat teams engage in military-to-military exercises along each leg of a Pathway with the allies and partners we may have to work with in times of crisis. As a result, unit readiness goes beyond the CTC readiness.

Pacific Pathways, in some respects, can extend a unit's C1 readiness rating. How can Pathways contribute to sustaining a unit's C1 rating beyond the normal allowance? As the unit completes its CTC rotation and then deploys on Pacific Pathways, the echeloned readiness it gains in terms of distributed mission command, multiple iterations of RSOI in different countries, and with various allied armies over an additional 90 days of employmen significantly build on unit readiness. Developing the right metrics to capture that support, the unit's METL can be applied to the unit status report extending its C1 rating. We need to figure out these readiness metrics. Another model using Pacific Pathways is to reapply the idea of maintaining units within a band of excellence rather than ramping them up from an almost new unit and culminating in a CTC rotation. Prior to Pacific Pathways 15, 25ID initiated a home-station training plan, which concluded in Lighting Forge. If we can get back to a home-station training model, where

units reduce the peak and valleys and maintain a level of METL proficiency within a "band of excellence," then, deploy-on-a-Pacific Pathway units may have the ability to maintain a C1 readiness in the off-cycle year of a CTC rotation. This could be another method to ensure or extend readiness.

2. Can you discuss the operational design of Pacific Pathways and what needs to be improved as this evolves? Regional alignment and forces available: Is this the right mix?

First, there is always room for improvement. One area is how to link the activities of Pacific Pathways to how the Army calculates the readiness of units. We must determine a readiness metric and link these into how the Army understands and calculates readiness. Army readiness is linked to CTC rotations. When a unit completes one, it is at a C1 readiness rating. However, a unit conducting and completing one of the operational deployments of Pacific Pathways has gained significant experience by rehearsing its METL, not just once, but several times. With Pacific Pathways, there is an echeloned level of readiness that the CTCs cannot provide. During Pacific Pathways, units: (1) execute their METL tasks and employ their equipment over an extended period of, generally, 90 days, gaining better understanding of mission and trust in their equipment; (2) by deploying into a real theater, in and out of ports and several host nations repeatedly, units gain an understanding of the environment they will have to operate in during times of crisis; and (3) operating with a variety of host-nation armies, leaders gain an understating of the interoperability or compatibility challenges required, thus building trust with these allies and partner nations. Pacific Pathways could be viewed as an event that extends a unit's C1 rating and could, in fact, with the right metrics, be another means to achieve a C1 rating. One example of how to view readiness metrics differently in the Pacific AOR is in equipment availability. By current standards, to maintain a C1 rating, equipment has to be available within 72 hours. Therefore, when a unit executing Pacific Pathways has its equipment loaded on boat, it takes a hit in readiness. But the reality is, a unit in the Pacific AOR with its equipment already uploaded on a boat may, in fact, have an increased readiness because it is more responsive to a crisis.

As readiness applies to the Pacific AOR, different metrics may need to be developed based on such nuances as maritime terrain. On average, a unit that executes a Pacific Pathways has moved around the Pacific and packed and unpacked its equipment eight times. This rehearses operational maneuver and increases readiness. Right now, Pacific Pathways is not a DOD resourced operation. However, the Army should look at linking this to the Army Enterprise System and readiness for funding and resourcing. The operational design of Pacific Pathways not only is a new way of how we are executing small-scale exercises, but it also integrates the warfighting and rehearses wide area security and combined arms maneuver.

Pacific Pathways illustrates a maturing of the Army's regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept. An example of echeloned readiness and Army forces positioned to respond to crisis while executing a Pacific Pathways was the Nepal earthquake during Pathways 15-01. While the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force was the lead for Department of Defense response to Nepal, there was a need for more rotary-wing assets. Hence, the Army, with 25ID units deployed to the Philippines at the time (Balikatan) during Pacific Pathways 15-01, was capable of providing Blackhawk helicopters, along with Army units from Alaska providing CH 47s. Army forces being forward in theater provided the USPACOM commander with flexible, capable, and responsive options to the crisis. For the Army, this demonstrates the success of RAF, Pacific Pathways, and echeloned Army readiness.

Again, as we talk echeloned readiness, Pacific Pathways provides leaders, units, and headquarters with a comprehensive understanding of the Pacific operational environment that discrete, independent exercises cannot gain. For example, During Pacific Pathways 14, Orient Shield 14, the original port into Japan was not capable of berthing the ship carrying the unit's equipment. It had to be redirected to an alternate port capable of docking the ship. However, that port's offloading area was not optimal for unloading helicopters. This kind of information or base of knowledge captured was key for planning Pathways 15. But more importantly, the reconnaissance gained of the Pacific terrain increases the readiness because there is deeper understanding of the Pacific environment and the capabilities of host-nation infrastructure.

Regional alignment: Right now, the 34th, located in Minnesota and Iowa, and 35th, located in Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma, are aligned with I Corps. As we look to subsequent Pacific Pathways and the Army's RAF concept, it makes sense to look at aligning Guard units from California, Washington, Oregon, and Guam with I Corps. In addition, we are not fully committed to building the Pacific Pathways force around maneuver BCTs. As far as operational design, it might be more beneficial to expand a Pacific Pathways force to include multi-functional brigades (i.e., engineer, medical, etc.). BCTs provide high-impact events such as live-fire maneuver and air assaults, and these tend to be very exciting. The potential for employing a multifunctional brigade may, along some legs of the Pacific Pathways, provide engagements that better enhance host-nation stability.

3. Can you discuss the planning challenges associated with Pacific Pathways and the integration of external enablers from the Guard and Reserve, if any, and contingency planning or branches and sequels for possible transition to real crisis?

The Guard and Reserve forces provide enablers that are not always in the Active force. We need to do a better job planning for and defining what we need from the Guard and Reserve and what these enabling forces must accomplish and be prepared to do. These forces must be identified early, and, to the extent possible, integrated into the unit they will support for predeployment training, etc. It is a must that they understand the tasks required and the environment and conditions they must perform them in. For example, we had a medical unit arrive with out-of-date medical equipment and expired Class VIII. This could have been avoided.

Contingency planning: While Pacific Pathways 14 was a proof of principle, there wasn't a significant effort toward contingency planning. We did gain some invaluable experience, which was applied to the proceeding Pacific Pathways 15 legs. During Pacific Pathways 15-01, we had one ship run aground. We lost some equipment, but, more importantly, we had to deal with an unexpected consequence of operating in the Pacific AOR, how to recover equipment, trans-load to another boat, assess lost capability, and continue operations. This was something we did not plan for or even imagine. As a result, we did lose some communications gear to water damage and, on the fly, had to reconfigure our communications set up (Joint Network Node [JNN]) to a smaller communications capability. The point being, this is a reality of the environment and another example where Pacific Pathways enhances our training and readiness.

In Pacific Pathways 15-01, there was more thought given to contingency planning than in 2014. We made the assumption that it would be probable if we were employed, that it would be in the immediate footprint of where we were deployed; for example, if we were in the Philippines, then, with that area and possibly, Indonesia and Malaysia. However, as we evaluate ways to employ units on a Pacific Pathways in support of USARPAC, there are still some joint challenges within USPACOM. However, as this program matures, it will be considered as a viable contingency force.

LTC Neal Mayo, Commander, 1/27 Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI

1. What is your view on Pacific Pathways?

Pacific Pathways was an incredible experience in a number of ways. First and foremost, it allowed us the opportunity to build partnerships and generate readiness — our top two priorities — and we were given the opportunity to focus on those priorities for the entire 90-day deployment, undistracted by other priorities. Sometimes, we were more focused on partnerships, and, in other cases, we were more focused on generating our own readiness in an effort to be prepared for future contingencies. It was an enormous learning experience, and, due to a lot of the stressors associated with the deployment and the OPTEMPO associated with it, it provided a great opportunity for us as an organization to learn about ourselves and identify a number of things, which, quite frankly, we did not do very well. Once we identified those shortfalls, it allowed us, through the repetition which Pacific Pathways provides, to address them and improve greatly. We still have a lot of work to do, but we're a much more ready unit as a result of this experience.

2. How does Pacific Pathways affect battalion readiness?

We've put a lot of effort into defining readiness, describing it in concrete and very objective ways. We also recognize there is an aspect of readiness that is very difficult to quantify. I will try to do a little bit of both, providing some empirical data on how we generated readiness using our METL as a framework, but also attempting to provide some anecdotal evidence on how additional readiness was gained with respect to leader development.

Using our METL as a framework, we gained readiness in four of our six mission essential tasks (METs) and improved greatly in the other two tasks. I will focus on the aforementioned four tasks where the unit gained significant readiness: Perform Tactical Actions Associated with Force Projection and Deployment, Conduct Mission Command, Conduct Offensive Operations, and Provide Logistics Support.

Perform Tactical Actions Associated with Force Projection and Deployment (Army Tactical Task [ART] 1.1): Over the course of Pacific Pathways 15-01, we moved our equipment a total of seven times, representing the movement of over 1,100 pieces of equipment. When you get those kinds of repetitions, you are afforded the opportunity to get really good at a task. I'm not suggesting we're perfect at this MET, but the readiness gained by doing this as many times as we have has made us extremely capable. The opportunities and the repetition which Pacific Pathways provides has made the unit better at moving ourselves then we were three months ago. Most

of this was through strategic sealift, but we also were required to use inland line haul and unit convoy. As a side note, the contingency response force (CRF) framework really set the stage for the readiness we gained during Pacific Pathways. Last August 2014, our battalion assumed CRF-4, which serves as the division's out-load battalion. The institutional knowledge we gained while serving as the CRF-4 fed the force projection and deployment activities process, which carried over into Pacific Pathways. That framework provided the training, which we needed to execute RSOI throughout Pacific Pathways. In addition to the repetition, Pacific Pathways serves as an in-theater rehearsal, entering and exiting multiple countries, many quite austere. This quality of Pacific Pathways is unique and not provided at a CTC. In addition, this experience translates to contingency readiness, setting the theater, and understanding the environment. And while this framework certainly applies to the Pacific AOR, this model can be applied to any theater.

On a related note, transitions are challenging. We were given the opportunity to conduct four major transitions over the course of the deployment, from Oahu to Thailand, Thailand to Korea, Korea to the Philippines, and then back to Oahu. I remember CALL's "First 100 Days" publications as they attempted to provide clarity and predictability to units as they transitioned into OIF and OEF. While we didn't necessarily have the benefit of this type of document, it was a great opportunity to experience three transitions and the stressors associated with each. While it was certainly painful at times, we got so much better and returned a much more ready organization as a result.

Conduct Mission Command (ART 5.0): Transitioning to the second MET, Pacific Pathways provided an opportunity to practice expeditionary mission command over extended distances. On multiple occasions, we conducted simultaneous operations in three separate geographic locations. For example, during Foal Eagle (Korea), we conducted bilateral training at Story Live-Fire Complex while simultaneously executing crew gunnery at Chipori Range about an hour and a half away. At a third and fourth location, we were conducting convoy operations, moving our equipment from Story Live-Fire Complex to Rodriguez Live-Fire Complex. These three simultaneous activities were a great stressor on our mission command nodes, and required oversight at each location. To effect this, we had our main command post (tactical operations center [TOC]) in one location and split our tactical command post (TAC) between the other two locations. My command sergeant major (CSM) and I were at Story Live-Fire Complex with the TOC, leading and managing the bilateral training, while our operations staff officer (S-3) with the TAC (-) was leading crew gunnery. Simultaneously, our battalion executive officer (XO) was managing the movement of equipment from Story Live-Fire Complex to Rodriquez Live-Fire Complex, where the battalion operations sergeant major was with the TAC (-) receiving the equipment. The battalion was forced to stretch its mission command capabilities, which, in turn, forced the battalion to rely on its junior leaders, both officer and NCO, in some cases, a pay grade or two above their current position. Unlike home-station training or even at a CTC rotation, Pacific Pathways stresses the battalion to maximize its mission command structures and, more importantly, its leaders. In addition to the three or four mission command nodes, we often employed during Pacific Pathways, our last one, the rear-detachment of about 300 Soldiers, manned by one of our senior captains. The single most critical factor to our success in executing mission command was the fact that junior leaders across the battalion stepped up. For example, while the S-3 was executing crew gunnery at Chipori, one of our junior captains, one year removed from the Maneuver Captain's Career Course, was executing S-3 duties overseeing the bilateral training.

Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1): Due to the significant number of repetitions we received, both during partnered and unilateral operations, we gained significant readiness when it came to this MET. All companies conducted squad LFXs, an especially challenging platoon LFX at Rodriguez Live-Fire Complex, and two of our three rifle companies were given the opportunity to participate in exercise-ending combined arms capabilities exercises.

Provide Logistics Support (ART 4.1): Our sustainment systems also received a significant workout. The field trains command post, combat trains command post, and combat trains were significantly stretched, as well. Not only was the FSC supporting the battalion in three widely dispersed locations, they were simultaneously pulling classes of supplies from four locations: Camp Casey, Camp Hovey, Camp Stanley, and Camp Red Cloud, and conducting maintenance operations, as well. It's hard to replicate these types of challenging environments in other training venues.

3. How does Pacific Pathways develop leaders?

Throughout Pacific Pathways, leaders were given the opportunity to operate at a significantly larger scope of responsibility than they normally would have been. I'll offer a couple examples: a staff sergeant, our ammo NCO, and a captain, our battalion S-4. Normally, the NCO receives ammo requests and processes them on a 581, picks the ammo up, delivers it to a training event, and turns it in — pretty straight-forward. However, during Pacific Pathways, he made the ammo requests, but then he flew to Japan where he interfaced with theater-level ammo agencies, coordinating all aspects of ammo support for each operation to include out-load, movement, and customs. He then placed the ammo on the United States Naval Ship (USNS) *Kojak*, which happened to run aground. He then went back and re-coordinated to have that ammo cross-loaded onto strategic airlift so that it would make it to Thailand in time for the operation. He then flew from Japan to Korea and coordinated ammunition for our operations there. He then flew back to Japan, where he coordinated for ammo to be placed on sealift for Operation Balikitan in the Philippines. He then flew to the Philippines where he received it and distributed it for the exercise. In the end, he flew back to Japan and turned in the remaining ammo and residue. This scope of responsibility is significant and made this junior NCO and his team better.

Second, the captain served as the battalion S-4 during Pacific Pathways. To provide some insight into his background leading up to Pacific Pathways, he served as a rifle platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne Division, deploying to Iraq, and then served as the Pathfinder Company XO while deployed in Afghanistan. During the Cobra Gold AAR, he stood up and said that his Pacific Pathways experience had been the most challenging one in the Army, one that had generated more leader development than any other opportunity he had experienced to date.

While these examples might be anecdotal, they provide insight into what Pacific Pathways is doing to provide leaders with very diverse and challenging experiences. No doubt, these experiences are building adaptive and innovative leaders more prepared to face future challenges in the Army.

4. What predeployment training did you do to prepare for Pacific Pathways?

Our battalion served as the CRF-4 leading up to Pacific Pathways, and as we were transitioning out of CRF-4, we initiated out-load for Pacific Pathways. Bottom line: CRF-4 was the perfect train-up.

We did conduct a "Pacific Pathways University," which focused on understanding the operational environment. Our division's leadership participated by providing the strategic overview, which helped leaders across the battalion understand the USARPAC commander through the BCT commander's intent, as well as linkages to the Army's Operating Concept, which was extremely helpful. As Pacific Pathways matures, we should sustain this kind of academic preparation, but we could do better in terms of bringing in some of the expertise that special forces organizations — rich in theater-specific experience — can provide. Future predeployment training should also include tailored instruction to the audience to take into account rank and experience levels.

LTC Kevin J. Williams, Commander, 2/27 Infantry Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways?

Up front, I will say what a great vehicle for training readiness, and part of the mission, the partnership piece. I really looked at it as a vehicle of maintaining and improving my readiness. Initially, I looked at the Pathway concept and agreed with the operationalizing of the exercise. When I talk Pathways, I am talking specifically in the context of a large maneuver headquarters battalion and brigade participating in those individual exercises as an overall operation. In that light, the Pathways was extremely positive for the task force. I think to caveat that, though, we almost had a perfect road to war, if you will, leading up to this Pathways. We just came off of a JRTC rotation, a decisive action rotation (DATE). So, imagine a whole year before that. We approached such that we were deploying to somewhere. That mindset was unique, but the timing for us was almost perfect, except for a few friction points on top. We hit Pathways at the highest level of readiness. What Pathways did for us is it took us to the next level in certain categories. After coming out of Pacific Pathways and doing our internal AARs, the kind of repetitions I got on mission command, not only deploying four to five times to different countries, but running plans, current operations for an extended period of time, as you would do when you are deployed in a combat theater. You cannot get that repetition without doing something like this, and we were able to do that. Not only that, our Pathways, with the Hamel piece, was another CTC for my organization.

Kind of going back, Pathways was very positive. Now, we have all these lessons learned from JRTC. We were able to go to JRTC followed by a Pacific Pathways, and we were able to continue to work on things like mission command as a group and improve our ability. We were able to work in the lessons learned from JRTC, so it was all fresh, and incorporated them into our Pathway. That is why our timeline was so unique. We were very fortunate and 1/27 Infantry was very fortunate to have the ability to go on this type of mission. All Pathways are very different, but our experience significantly improved a couple of my battalions' METs; for example, conduct mission command was a significant improvement, as well as conduct tactical deployment and redeployment activities, and expeditionary sustainment. Here, we have a logistics support vessel

(LSV) that we had to load for all three missions, and every mission was something different — into immature environments, SPODs, and APODs, no SOFA — and to deal with that friction. We were doing plans and future plans at each stop. With Hamel, we were fighting a current operation fight, and I got plans looking at the next deployment to the next leg of the Pathway with total different requirements for the mission. You cannot re-create that kind of rigor, and not only that, it gives the unit and the Soldiers a focus, a great mission focus. We were training to get to a certain level of readiness and going somewhere to execute at a high level of readiness.

When I am talking those two METs — mission command, tactical deployment/redeployment — I am talking multiple repetitions, to include advanced echelon (ADVON), RSOI, deployment, and APOD and SPOD operations. We also had to conduct intermediate staging base (ISB) operations. With Hamel, there was a well-established ISB, but we went to two other locations where we had to create our own ISB. We also conducted RSOI operations a total of five times. Sustainment of the battalion: four completely different environments using contracting and deconflicting that internal support. We go to Australia and what you got was pretty robust sustainment, but we were still sustaining ourselves through my forward support company (FSC). All those enabler packages and you had to think through that problem. We were also given constraints on the ship; I could not bring everything. There is no backstop and there was no mail coming in. What we could get on ships is all we had for the duration of the Pathway. These are not well-developed theaters. What I mean by that is going to Iraq or Afghanistan in any given day, you have an incredible sustainment package. If you need it, you can find it in those theaters of operation. Here, if you did not pack it or if it is not available on the economy, you are not getting it. When you talk expeditionary deployment activities (expeditionary sustainment) we could have only gotten that through a Pacific Pathway. Otherwise, it is only done on paper and is only done in theory. Pathways allowed us to actually work the problem and bring back lessons learned, which not only help this organization, but will help the Army as a whole. Pathways is very similar to a DATE rotation; there is good symmetry there, so very positive on the Pathway for my organization.

2. How does Pacific Pathways affect battalion readiness?

It was a very unique challenge, maintaining or elevating your readiness. Coming out of JRTC, the Army expects us to be ready for a certain amount of time. There have been personnel who mentioned that half our organization was deployed to a Pathway, while the other half stayed in the rear. My rear element was still conducting reset operations from JRTC and individual training. The two companies I had in the rear, there was no degradation to their readiness, because they were still on a glide slope to conduct individual training. Those elements that were forward, we were able to make significant gains in mission command. If you want to sustain a battalion's level of readiness, it starts with the battalion staff and their ability to conduct the MDMP, and the staff functions over distributed space and time. Not only did we execute the Pathway, the battalion staff conducted that mission command, MDMP, and TOC operations.

Simultaneously to being forward, we were also able to run the battalion remnants in the rear, and we were also able to deploy another company forward to Guam in support of another mission. The point being, we entered Pathways at a high level of readiness. By doing Pathways, it really took my organization to the next level of readiness. The example I would give to support this opinion would be Hamel. Hamel for the Australians is that mission-ready brigade getting ready to assume the fight. We were able to arrive within 24 hours, receive an order, enter the training

area within 48 hours, and conduct decisive action operations. Just that extra 15 to 30 days at Hamel gave us additional repetitions that were incredible. I had two rifle companies, an FSC, and part of my headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) with me during Hamel and Pathways 15-02. End result: If you want to get battalion readiness, you have to send a battalion-like package in order to improve overall readiness and get the required repetitions. By us being centralized and located there, we were able to continue operations. If I had only sent a company forward, we would have not gotten the tactical repetition required to build a battalion's readiness. The repetitions pushed us toward the graduate level of MDMP.

Pathways truly benefited my organization. In order to improve readiness, you are going to get more bang for your buck by sending a ready unit that just completed a CTC rotation. If I had not conducted a CTC rotation, my battalion headquarters would not have been mature or vested like we were after our JRTC rotation. It could have led to my organization being overwhelmed by the scenario that Hamel presented. We still would have met the end state, but what I was able to provide the Australians was a battalion that was fully mission capable within 24 hours of arriving at the exercise. I was able to do that in part to my staff being prepared as a result of their CTC rotation and conducting multiple repetitions on mission command and MDMP (for example, a rapid decision-making process). We get an order and within 12 hours, we are turning the required materials in order to participate in a partnered combined arms rehearsal. We did not struggle at the beginning of the operation, enabling us to get more quality repetitions. End result: We looked at JRTC as part of this Pathway. I learned things about the formation I did not learn while we were at JRTC as a result of the Pathway. It was due in part to the expeditionary environment we were operating in. The 90 days of TOC operations distributed over time and space improved my battalion headquarters and increased our overall readiness. We were able to seize opportunities presented by Pathways and really get after quality training.

Readiness for offense and defense: My METL, no degradation to that, and, at points during Pathways, we were able to conduct repetitions focused on METL tasks. In Australia for another 20 days, we were able to get multiple repetitions conducting offensive and defensive operations. We were able to maintain the "T" rating from battalion down to the company level. There were areas that were degraded due to Pathways. The two companies in the rear are not participating in those additional offense and defense repetitions, but they are on their glide path back in the rear. I cannot stress enough that Hamel was not equivalent to JRTC, but what it allowed us to do was get multiple repetitions of fighting the battalion. I was able to fight the battalion on four other offense and defensive missions. If you want a battalion to gain readiness, you need to send a battalion with enough enablers under them in order to exercise the systems properly. Otherwise, you are not getting the bang for the buck. This is where you have to balance the commander's intent in order to achieve the goals that are outlined in each Pathway. The mission command and deployment activities are always being tested as a result of a Pathway, but there are times when you are trying to assist your partnered nation by improving their readiness. However, there are times when you are just trying to improve partnership solely.

If you only sent a platoon, they would participate in the training but would not be able to analyze the scenario like a battalion headquarters could. A battalion headquarters allows a Pathway to build and grow during the exercise, rather than just remain a simple field training exercise (FTX). For example, in Indonesia, there was an FTX that had troop-leading procedures, a raid, and an urban operation lane. Once we got on the ground, we understood that this exercise was about partnership capability. This is what they can afford to do. By seeing that as a mature headquarters, we were able to look at the raid and say, "OK, I can get every platoon I have out here with enablers through this lane." I am going to run it, I am going to evaluate it, and I'm

going to lead the AAR. In that way, I am still building and maintaining readiness. One of the biggest lessons learned for my higher headquarters is, if you want this to go at echelon, that mission command analysis and planning have to be done at echelon early, just like you would do a D-180 planning conference for JRTC. That is one of the biggest lessons learned, because I was not brought into the planning process early enough. I sent a captain and an S-4 during my JRTC rotation to the final planning conference. I am glad that we did, but I think we can get better at that process of Pacific Pathways. If you get my vote as a battalion commander early, instead of someone just building a construct, I, as the battalion commander, can say, "Hey, here are training objectives we should execute during the Pathway." This will allow you, by Pathway event, to know when to focus on offense during one leg and defense on another leg of the Pathway. Then, you operationalize the Pathway. I think we were able to do that in a short period of time after arriving at each leg of the operation. Pathways really gives you readiness at the deployment and mission command METs, and, of course, the partnership aspect is extremely important, as well. Just getting our foot in the door and the amount of relationship-building you can do with a battalion-level headquarters versus a platoon.

I briefed Hamel-level AAR comments to the Australian Army. I partnered Indonesia and Malaysia with a battalion headquarters and they were able to witness how we conducted mission command. Every time the partnered nation came away with lessons, they can incorporate them into their organizations. If you are talking about partnership building — relationships and partner readiness — every leg of the operation, we were able to accomplish that task. Just having a foot in the door gave my organization contact information for every command team that we were partnered with during our Pathway, and that builds a lasting relationship that goes beyond my tactical framework. These countries that participate in Pathways, this is a huge investment for them and for us. Having almost the mirror image formation with them pays great dividends.

Now, Malaysia: I was reduced to a rifle company and it was jungle operations. We were still able to put the battalion headquarters into effect and run mission command, while the company got after the jungle operations training. I can honestly say that this was probably the first time a company has maneuvered in a jungle for four to five days and has lessons to share with JRTC. We were able to gain a lot of readiness for the theater that we can push back to JRTC.

In all three countries, we were able to get young lieutenants and sergeants interacting with a different nation, working through interpreters. That skill was incredible to see for junior leadership. We also integrated at the lowest level. In other words, you have platoon leaders pitching orders to a mixed platoon, which was incredible. Pathways allowed us to gain readiness at that level of partnership, because wherever we go next, we will be working with a partnered nation, and Pathways is a conduit that allowed our young leaders to learn those skills. This then led to interoperability and gave us the understanding of what we bring to the table and what our partnered nation is capable of bringing to the fight. We will be able to leverage that information later as a result of Pathways.

What does a general predeployment site survey (PDSS) checklist need to look like? Not for what we use for going to Afghanistan; that is pretty easy. I'm going to a nation that does not have a SOFA. What are the questions that need to be asked about passports? Customs? How do you store weapons? How do you bring weapons? How do you bring weapons in and out of country? If units anywhere in the Army are in the Army response force (ARF) or internal contingency response force (CRF), these are questions we have not asked in a while, these expeditionary questions. We've got to be able to do that. This is the line we have to get back to. It becomes the old division-ready brigade. What is the ex-checklist? Now, some of this, we have it. However,

the last 13 years, we have been spoon-fed the answers. We have this reset structure and right now I am doing reset for my battalion. I do not have contractors for that. My organization has to do that. We would not have gotten to that point had we not participated in Pacific Pathways. I am just getting stuff off of ships right now due to the Pathway mission we just completed. I have to reset the equipment, and I would not have had to go through that if my organization had not participated in Pathways.

3. What leader and collective training did you do in order to prepare for Pacific Pathways?

We had a year train-up in preparation for JRTC, everything involved in making platoons lethal and leader development for maneuvering forces. Pathways really caveated off our JRTC rotation. The prep for JRTC is simultaneously happening for Pacific Pathways. Now, the Pathway prep, as far as leader development, country specific, and what to expect while we are conducting our Pathway, we really did not do much. We received a couple of good in-country briefs and people came to Schofield Barracks, which the brigade set up. We did a couple of cultural briefs. So, we spent a week doing that type of information brief, almost as a primer for each country. Do I think that this is enough? Probably. What I do think would be more useful is, early in the planning process, let the battalion that is participating in Pathways have interactions with the partnered armies. Allow us to talk early and often to our counterparts to shape what the exercise objectives will be. That is what caused some of the friction during our rotation. The partnered nation would ask if we had a certain piece of equipment, and, unfortunately, we did not bring that specific piece of gear with us. The same requirements that my leaders undertook to go from Hawaii to Fort Polk were similar to those requirements we encountered during our Pathway (i.e., onward movement and pack out of equipment). The only special stuff goes to country requirements, such as passports. That was something different that our organization had to learn the way forward in order to be successful. It all comes down to being ready for the mission at hand. In my organization, we will now always have passports updated. We did not need to worry about it before. That, of course, is no quick flash to bang, dealing with the State Department. The leader development glide slope to JRTC really kind of met the bill for Pathways, as well. We had enough time at home station in order to conduct METL tasks that would prepare us for JRTC, and likewise prepare us for Pathways. I recommend that a Pathway come after a high level of readiness for a unit. That can be a Lighting Forge, home-station training event, brigade-level exercise, or a CTC rotation in order to prepare them for a Pathway. A key to maintaining a readiness in conjunction with partnership is having an experienced or mature brigade or battalion headquarters. That organization will mitigate risk while trying to enhance the overall training environment. We had a year to train-up for our JRTC rotation, which we used to simultaneously prepare for our Pathways mission.

I had the most experienced command teams in my organization. Each commander had a year's worth of training and a JRTC rotation under their belt, which only enhanced our Pathways mission. However, we lost a lot of middle-level leadership, specifically at the staff sergeant (E-6) level prior to the Pathway. We did not hold up people for Noncommissioned Officer Enhancement Seminar (NCOES). Instead we allowed those individuals to depart and move on with their career path. End result: We had to do the next-man-up drill. I had several E-6s who were acting as platoon sergeants during our rotation in the Pacific. In the future, I would like to see a model where we lock in the unit for Pacific Pathways in order to ensure the personnel are

able to conduct the train-up together and keep the continuity in the organization for Pathways. For example, my S-4 truly carried the day. We made the decision to not take him to JRTC, and, instead, left him in Hawaii to prepare the organization for the Pathways mission, and he went to the FPC in my stead. He provided the continuity for Pathways. He was able to identify the friction points to include the sustainment problems that my organization may encounter during our rotation. The tactical deployment and redeployment, sustainment, and expeditionary planner is extremely important for an effective Pathways.

4. How did you maintain your equipment during your rotation and what were some of the significant challenges that your organization encountered?

We brought significant amounts of rolling stock on our Pacific Pathway rotation. It also was a little problematic, because we really only used the equipment on the first part of the Pathway. Did we have an issue with parts flow during our rotation? Yes, we had an issue with parts flow. We could identify the fault and my HHC commander and battalion S-4 did a brilliant job as far as packaging prescribed load list on the ship prior to it departing for Pacific Pathways. We did not receive any parts forward during our rotation. We were sending up our reports for repair parts, but that circuit was not effective during our rotation. The parts that we requested would often be stopped in customs. Unfortunately, we never received a part from Hawaii due to that factor. If we did not bring it with us, we did not get the repair part required. Can you survive for 90 days? Yes, that is possible, but you need to take a hard look at your maintenance problem before you go on a Pathway in order to be effective. We had the right personnel forward in our FSC, to include generator mechanics. As a result, we really had to look hard at the personnel we took with us during our rotation and ensure they were mission essential. In other words, you had to pick the right people for the rotation. You could not take personnel that did not provide some type of value for the mission. The real question is, how do we set up how we receive equipment? Do we set up permanent mailing addresses that can receive equipment forward? We did not have an Army post office set up for our rotation.

5. What military-to-military engagements and interoperability challenges did you have?

It was all positive. I will start with Hamel to set the stage. Here are some of the big observations. It is not about technical solutions; it is about people. A lot of the countries, we had similar equipment. Without the relationship, we would not be able to talk to each other. We need a joint RSOI period. We need to be together to prep for the exercise and work through the problem set together. It cannot be one-sided; it requires relationships. When we dealt with interoperability, it was all about people and the relationships they built prior to the execution of the FTX. Having liaisons proved to be very important for the success of a Pacific Pathway. Whatever headquarters you were working with, you had to have a liaison officer (LNO) in there that had your interests at heart. That LNO being there assisted with building the proper relationship required to be effective during the Pathway. The LNOs have to come with equipment, so we can work together effectively and communicate with one another. One good example is Hamel, where the Australian Army has the same radio, but we could not talk because they used a different technique for filling their radio. They used a computer (PC-based) method, while we used a simple key loader (SKL) method. Even though we were using the same equipment, we could not communicate with one another. End result, you have to send an LNO with equipment, so you can cross-talk with your counterpart and communicate effectively. Another issue with military-to-military is understanding terms, doctrine, and how your counterpart works through

a problem set. The Australians use our doctrine, but their terms are a little different from our own. That is why that joint RSOI or a planning conference needs to have the right people there so you can work out the friction points prior to the execution of the Pathway. The Australians gave me an Australian radio-telephone operator in order to mitigate that confusion and minimize friction points between our two armies. They gave me a Stryker equivalent vehicle during the exercise, so I was able to use their digital systems in order to see the fight and communicate with my partnered headquarters. Without that support, it would have been extremely difficult to communicate with the Australians, even though we both use the same doctrine and speak the same language. Instead of using Command Post of the Future (CPOF) or Blue Force Tracking (BFT), we went to an analog method of communicating with our partner during the first leg of our Pathway. In Indonesia and Malaysia, it was easy, because they used similar doctrine that the Australians used. The experience of Hamel paid great dividends, because we had already worked through that interoperability and were able to transfer those lessons into the future legs of our Pathway mission. In Indonesia and Malaysia, we had a week of knowledge-sharing built into the plan, so we could eliminate some of those friction points prior to the execution of the mission.

LTC James A. Hayes, Commander, 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, United States Army Alaska, Fort Wainwright, AL

1. What are your views on Pacific Pathways?

My view of Pacific Pathways is overwhelmingly positive. To provide some background information, the 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment (5/1 CAV) had also participated in Yudh Abhyas (YA) in India in September 2014 prior to Pacific Pathways. We were able to take our lessons learned from YA and apply them to Pacific Pathways, which allowed our organization to hit the ground running. YA was a squadron (-) mission at the lower tactical level. There was a brigade command post exercise (CPX) involved, and our squadron staff conducted parallel planning with the brigade staff.

The lessons learned from YA also fed into your NTC rotation in January/February 2015. Following the 18-day decisive action NTC 15-03 rotation, the squadron conducted Arctic Avalanche (AA), a brigade-level training event that incorporated company-level LFXs. Our cavalry troops were nested with the infantry battalions during the execution of AA, as they were during NTC. This completed our train-up leading to the execution of Pacific Pathways. Completing a decisive action rotation at NTC, and then moving into a brigade-level, combined-arms maneuver, live-fire exercise training event enhanced our overall ability to conduct the mission. To ensure our personnel were fully prepared for the mission, we also conducted three separate squadron internal exercises to get the repetitions required prior to Pacific Pathways, incorporating lessons from NTC and AA. The leaders and Soldiers felt confident the organization was prepared to execute Pacific Pathways 15-03.

The initial squadron task force deployed for Pacific Pathways 15-03 consisted of 263 personnel, 25 Strykers of different variant types, nearly 100 additional pieces of rolling stock, and a M777A2 artillery platoon. Pacific Pathways 15-03 was executed in multiple phases surrounding two primary exercises: Orient Shield (OS) in Japan and Hoguk in the Republic of Korea. When we completed Orient Shield and transitioned to Korea, our MGS crews returned to home station and they did not participate in the Korean portion of Pacific Pathways, due to some restrictions on the LFXs. Additionally, weather constraints in Alaska were a consideration for the crews to

return and conduct gunnery prior to severe temperatures becoming a factor. Our final task force conducting operations and participating in the Hoguk exercise in Korea was just under 250 personnel.

In preparation for the 2014 YA exercise, we conducted Leader Development Education for Sustained Piece (LDESP) the week prior to deployment to India. The briefs were helpful, but the timing did not allow us to react properly to the training and incorporate it properly into the execution of YA. For this Pacific Pathways 15-03, we were able to get the online passwords six weeks in advance of the July 2015 LDESP training, with the instruction focused on Japan and Korea occurring well in advance of our deployment. The instructors gave our leadership positive feedback about how the organization was focused and ready to execute the training. I attribute this to the positive perception of the YA mission and genuine interest in the upcoming Pacific Pathways mission.

2. What type of training or planning could you have done prior to Pacific Pathways that would have enhanced the overall success of the operation?

We could have spent more time learning the doctrine of each of our partnered nations. Although each military's doctrine is similar to our own, there are still some different aspects that made it somewhat difficult to understand and created friction during bilateral planning. Just prior to execution of Hoguk, we received a copy of the ROKA terms and graphics and translated it. Our doctrine is very close and it gave us a false sense of security, but when you dig down into the details, our terms were slightly different and resulted in some confusion. If I could have gone back, I would have requested the Japanese and Korean armies' version of our Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols*. I would also have worked to gain a better understanding of how each of their staff plan and execute to enhance the overall effectiveness of the operation. If possible, I would have also attempted to gain during the planning conferences how bilateral planning and rehearsals would be conducted.

3. Is Pacific Pathways consuming or improving readiness?

If you were to put it on a scale, I would suggest that Pacific Pathways builds overall readiness. The one major area that could be considered as consuming readiness is the transit time for your vehicles and equipment. Our equipment and fleet had to go on a boat for a significant amount of time without operators maintaining that equipment. Both Korea and Japan were limited in their ability to provide repair parts for a Stryker-based organization.

The readiness of our organization vastly increased as a result of Pacific Pathways, starting with the movement of our equipment from Fairbanks to the port in Anchorage. The YA mission only consisted of personnel, whereas Pacific Pathways required us to move over 150 pieces of rolling stock. Our organization stood up a full rear detachment and leveraged our Family Readiness Group to support the deployment and refined our SOPs. The deployment allowed our organization to operate in an expeditionary environment and placed our leaders in complex and uncertain situations in a multinational setting. We identified and worked through challenges in every WfF with some incredible lessons shared across the force. Pacific Pathways allowed the organization to take the lessons learned from NTC and apply them to this deployment, which gave us multiple repetitions and increased our ability to conduct mission command in an austere environment. Pacific Pathways also afforded our organization the opportunity to work with

multiple nations and apply the lessons from each exercise to the next. We know that, when we deploy in support of any future contingency operation, we will not have unilateral operations, but, instead, we can expect to be a part of a coalition and execute operations with our partner nations. Pacific Pathways allowed our organization to train and conduct several missions in this manner, while also having our Soldiers and leaders experience different cultures and work through language challenges with a translator.

Pacific Pathways 15-03 exercised and increased readiness across all of Task Force Blackhawk's WfFs and deployment systems. Our leaders were consistently challenged with complex and uncertain situations, while deployed in an expeditionary environment that provided opportunities to train with our joint and National Guard component, all while advancing military-to-military relationships and interoperability with our allies. The gaps identified in the areas of mission command system interoperability, logistical support, and the lack of joint integration are being addressed by Eighth United States Army (8th Army), United States Forces Korea (USFK), and USARPAC, and will only serve to improve future exercises.

Chapter 3

Pacific Pathways: Overcoming the Tyranny of Distance

BG Kurt J. Ryan

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In 1781, GEN George Washington, commander of the Continental Army, used French ships to sail seasoned colonial soldiers and supplies to the Virginia Peninsula. Those soldiers surprised and then defeated the British commander, Lord Charles Cornwallis, at the Battle of Yorktown. Some claim this victory turned the world upside down; sea power combined with the transport of land forces would become key to the young nation's ability to project power worldwide for the next 200 years.

Today, following nearly a decade and a half of having rotational combat forces fighting in the Middle East, a highly experienced and capable Army is mostly back home in the U.S. and training to meet new missions around the world. As outlined in the nation's recent defense strategy, the military has begun to "pivot" or "rebalance" to focus on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Figure 3-1. The CW3 Harold A. Clinger, an Army logistics support vessel, departs Hawaii on 06 JUN 2015, and begins a trans-Pacific voyage in support of Pacific Pathways 15-02. The vessel supported Exercise Talisman Sabre 15 in Australia, Garuda Shield 15 in Indonesia, and Keris Strike 15 in Malaysia. (Photo courtesy of the 545th Transportation Company, 45th Sustainment Brigade, 8th Theater Sustainment Command)

Pacific Pathways

The Army is testing new ways of engaging throughout the Pacific region, which is characterized by vast oceans, a complex grouping of islands, major continents, and large littoral populations encompassing several dozen nations. To get there and operate there, the Army is experimenting with an innovative employment concept known as "Pacific Pathways," or just "Pathways" for short.

The program leverages contract and military sealift married with Army capability packages to operate across the Pacific for two purposes: to strengthen security cooperation and conduct crisis response. Since the Spanish-American War, the Army has had a vested interest in sustaining peace and stability in the Pacific. A necessary element in support of that goal is the continued ability to sustain extensive, long-term, sea-basing operations throughout the region.

A unit deploying under this program is called a Pathway. The first Pathway left the U.S. West Coast in June 2014 with elements of the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA.

It traveled to Indonesia and Malaysia, where U.S. Soldiers participated in back-to-back exercises with Indonesian and Malaysian troops over the course of several weeks. Following these training events, the Pathway sailed to Japan to participate in a bilateral exercise with Japan Self-Defense Forces.

In November, the unit returned to Washington after navigating a five-month, 17,000-mile Pacific journey. During this trip, the unit not only participated in a number of training events, but also remained available in the theater to respond to regional crises, if needed.

The Army conducted three Pacific Pathways deployments in 2015 and participated in multinational exercises in Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Japan. Each deployment consisted of elements of a brigade combat team from the 25th Infantry Division. Two Pathways are scheduled for 2016, and more are planned for 2017.

Although it seems like common sense to string together a group of geographically close but otherwise disparate exercises, Pathways represents a new way of doing business. It saves the Army money by reducing back-and-forth transportation costs for individual engagement exercises.

The Pathways initiative also allows the United States to have a rotational presence in parts of the Pacific where permanent basing may not be possible, thereby providing a quick response capability for humanitarian emergencies or regional crises.

By carefully sequencing training events and using the same ship for different missions (for example, a scheduled rotation of Army forces to Korea and the transfer of military hardware to foreign nations), the Army will save the U.S. government millions of dollars. The three Pathways in 2015 were combined training events that, if implemented in isolation, would have cost taxpayers twice as much to conduct.

The Pacific Pathways program strengthens security cooperation and provides an array of options for the U.S. government to respond to crises in the Pacific region.

Room for Improvement

The Pathways program certainly has areas that can be improved. For example, choosing the right ship is critical to agility and flexibility. Current laws and policy limit access to the most capable and cost-effective vessels — those that are owned by the government and managed by the Military Sealift Command.

When U.S. government vessels are not available, the government prefers contracting U.S. flag commercial ships. When these ships are unavailable, the military must rely on contracting other commercial vessels.

The first problem is that the U.S. Army in the Pacific currently lacks dedicated strategic and operational intratheater assigned sealift. Having dedicated strategic sealift vessels instead of relying on commercial vessels would make the Pathways initiative more effective.

It would allow access to shallower ports, enable multiple loading and unloading options, provide secure communications, offer bunks for more troops, allow for bulk fuel, ammunition, and water storage, and provide maintenance and medical treatment facilities. It would also strengthen the capabilities of the United States Pacific Command.

Second, to increase effective operational capability for units on a Pathways deployment, a tailored array of crisis-response equipment and supplies should be part of the unit's ship manifest. For example, during typhoon season, a Pathways ship could contain humanitarian crisis response equipment and supplies, such as emergency shelter supplies, food, bottled water, and medical kits, in addition to the equipment necessary for the unit's planned military exercises.

To strengthen the ability of any Pathways unit to engage in crisis response, the Army should strengthen expeditionary mission command packages — preferably at the division level — and routinely exercise them during a comprehensive emergency deployment readiness exercise. These command and control elements could be structured and trained to fly on short notice for rapid deployment on a small number of cargo airplanes. Linking this rapidly deployable command and control capability with a Pathways unit could dramatically improve the nation's ability to respond to typhoons, tsunamis, and other crises in the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Figure 3-2. The crew of the CW3 Harold A. Clinger begins a trans-Pacific voyage in support of Pacific Pathways 15-02 on 06 JUN 2015. (Photo courtesy of the 545th Transportation Company, 45th Sustainment Brigade, 8th Theater Sustainment Command)

Criticism of the Program

Despite Pathways' benefits, skeptics have raised questions about the initiative. Some claim it infringes on already well-defined missions executed by the Navy and Marine Corps. Others say that the Pathways program may be a poor allocation of Army resources during a time of shrinking defense budgets.

Still others argue that there are more pressing demands for Army forces around the world in light of emerging threats in Europe and the Middle East. The harshest critics see the program as part of a broader effort by the Army to protect its share of the Pentagon budget.

Rather than competing for resources, the Pathways initiative in fact complements other Services' engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The region is obviously vast, and many crises — whether man-made or natural — occur with little warning.

By placing units on a Pathway for several months, the Army contributes to effectively meeting regional objectives for military-to-military engagement while also providing senior U.S. leaders with flexibility and options for responding to crises across the huge distances in the Pacific.

Learning from and improving on the Pacific Pathways deployments will ensure that future iterations will provide greater value for the military and, more broadly, the entire U.S. U.S. Army forces continue to build security and stability with allies and partners throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

The Pathways initiative represents an opportunity for the U.S. military to achieve that objective more efficiently and more effectively than it has in the past while also providing a greater array of options for the U.S. government to respond to crises across a massive region.

Chapter 4

Integrating Army Medicine in the Indo-Asia-Pacific: A Theater Enabling Command Approach

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

Figure 4-1

Introduction

The Indo-Asia-Pacific area of responsibility is a complex region with strategically significant economic, political, and military dynamics and distinctive challenges and opportunities. Integrating Army medicine through a theater enabling command (TEC) approach ensures that United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) is well-equipped to execute the increasing and complex regional and global health responsibilities in support of the Army Campaign Plan and U.S. national security objectives. The TEC approach facilitates the synchronization of unique capabilities of land domain and joint medical forces, which increase security, enhance stability, and safeguard America's interests in the region while providing access to highly reliable health care to the beneficiary population.

Regional Health Command-Pacific (RHC-P) represents the most critical TEC in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, serving as an instrument of U.S. national power with the responsibility for covering half the globe, inclusive of 36 countries. The area of operations (AO) includes 17 percent of the earth's land mass and 60 percent of the earth's population. The people throughout the region speak 3,000 different languages and observe five of the world's most dominant religions. Economically, the Pacific hosts three of the world's largest and seven of the smallest economies, with over half of the world's gross domestic product, two-thirds of the world's oil, and one-third of the world's shipping being produced within or transiting the area.[1] Additionally, last year "40 percent of global economic growth was attributed to the region."[2] Politically, the citizens of the Indo-Asia-Pacific represent the world's largest democracy, largest communist state, and smallest republic, and suffer under one of the world's most oppressive dictatorships. Five of America's seven mutual defense treaty allies, five declared nuclear nations, and seven of the world's largest ground forces are located within the region.

The complexities of joint and combined military operations, coupled by requirements to provide health care across the spectrum of unified land operations to a wide range of eligible beneficiaries (U.S., joint, multinational, host nation, and civilian), necessitate a theater enabling medical mission command authority located in the Indo-Asia-Pacific that is directly linked to the region's Army Service component command (ASCC). This requirement for a strategic medical organization headquarters that is regionally focused, integrated, and capable of synchronizing the delivery of health services in support of USARPAC and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) drives the Army Health System Enterprise on behalf of United States Army Medical Command (MEDCOM).

RHC-P models the TEC organizational construct as a complex system of systems that is interdependent and interrelated, requiring continual planning, coordination, and synchronization to effectively and efficiently provide for the highest standard of care to ill, injured, or wounded beneficiaries during steady-state operations, and postures the command should transition to hostilities become necessary. The RHC-P commanding general serves as the single U.S. Army medical mission command authority and represents the Army Health System (AHS) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

Army Health Systems Enterprise transformation in the Pacific is more than identifying objectives, creating sub-campaigns, and identifying efforts. Structuring the organization to optimize efficiency and ensure all staff elements are invested in the accomplishment of campaign objectives is equally important. The logic that supports RHC-P to become the TEC, with its headquarters (HQ) under the operational control of USARPAC, directly supports the intent of realigning regional health commands (RHCs) as a desired objective from MEDCOM transformation. This function of aligning the operational capabilities under RHC-P HQ control to USARPAC allows the theater army to access an increased range of medical capabilities that were not centrally located under the legacy U.S. Army Medical Department support models. RHC-P will centrally control 18th MEDCOM (Deployment Support), Public Health Command, and Dental Command, creating a synergistic organization that responds to the theater army in all medical matters.

Theater Enabling Command

As a theater army, USARPAC commands Army forces that enable it to support military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence for USPACOM. Each theater army commands theater-level forces for enabling capabilities (sustainment, signal, medical, military intelligence, and civil affairs) based on specific requirements for its respective AO. These organizations allow a theater army to support Army forces operating in an AO and extend Army support to other Services (ASOS), interagency partners, and multinational forces. At the moment, USARPAC lacks a medical TEC with the sufficient resources to operate effectively in Phase 0. As part of U.S. Army medicine transformation, RHC-P proposes to be the medical TEC to fulfill the aforementioned responsibilities. GEN Brooks' vision for Army medicine in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is to streamline the ability for USARPAC to engage the region and practice mission command arrangements daily and to refine the support relationships for daily health service support throughout the transitions of operational phases.

RHC-P possesses the capabilities and capacity to undertake a whole-of-government approach to leverage joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) resources. RHC-P will serve as a joint enabler that leverages AHS capabilities in support of joint medical requirements. RHC-P fills medical capability requirements for joint, multicomponent (National Guard and Reserve), and multinational missions from within the command and via reachback to MEDCOM for access to specialty and sub-specialty capabilities that do not exist within the Indo-Asia-Pacific AO. RHC-P also provides medical personnel augmentation for Joint Service Health Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program missions and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, such as U.S. Navy Pacific Partnership and U.S. Air Force Pacific Angel missions, USPACOM Cobra Gold and Talisman Saber exercises, U.S. Marine Philippine Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX), and Defense Personnel Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) Accounting Agency recovery missions throughout the AOR and worldwide.

To further delineate RHC-P responsibilities as a TEC, the RHC-P and USARPAC surgeon staffs conducted a holistic examination of USARPAC medical requirements. The result of the examination, aligned with current operations, actions and activities, and future requirements, led to the creation of a framework that outlines RHC-P TEC responsibilities. The RHC-P TEC framework highlights four main areas: crisis response; joint health enabler; global health engagements; and access, quality and safety.

Crisis Response

MEDCOM transformation initiatives empower RHC-P to establish the essential architecture and framework for effectively setting the theater through all phases. A medically set theater identifies capabilities and requirements across the 10 AHS functions and ensures a seamless and unbroken chain of health services from point of injury through definitive care. This process includes synchronization of medical personnel, equipment, infrastructure, and agreements that are postured to meet steady-state and crisis-response requirements from Phase 0 activities through transition to crisis. RHC-P is postured and equipped to synchronize and support Phase 0 shaping initiatives flowing into the region through partners that include United States Agency for International Development (USAID), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), American Red Cross, regional joint stakeholders, and allies. These partnerships create synergy and real-time understanding for synchronizing and supporting USARPAC's Theater Campaign Support Plan sub-campaigns and intermediate objectives.

RHC-P supports the response to the Department of Pandemic Emerging Infectious Disease through collaboration and partnerships with local, state, federal, and international partners and organizations. RHC-P identifies and works with key regional stakeholders, such as embassy staffs, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.N., and U.S. Department of State in support of USARPAC and USPACOM requirements to support crisis response.

Access, Quality, and Safety

RHC-P's primary purpose as an accountable care organization is supporting the warfighter and its beneficiaries. Regardless of operational or generating force, the three most important factors directly linked to medical, dental, and veterinary treatment facilities within the region are access, quality, and safety. Access to care, defined as the ability for beneficiaries to get necessary health services in a timely manner and gain access to periodic health screenings, has a direct impact on the readiness of the force.

With the complexity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, specifically the high propensity for natural disasters and time-sensitive response, access to care is of the utmost importance for RHC-P and directly enhances the readiness by increasing Soldiers available to the ASCC and the geographic combatant command (GCC). RHC-P optimizes health and wellness by providing safe, quality health care utilizing state-of-the-art technology to establish a high reliability organization (HRO). HROs will concentrate on harm prevention and quality initiatives with process improvement plans utilizing Lean Six Sigma, when possible. Through the Army Medical Home model, RHC-P maximizes capabilities, decreases performance variance, and improves primary care manager continuity and access to care while emphasizing behavioral health care in a nonthreatening, stigma-free environment. The continuum of care will encompass every Soldier, Family member, and beneficiary with emphasis on care-in-transition for Service members who have honorably served our nation. RHC-P already utilizes advanced tele-health capabilities and leverages sister Services' medical personnel in enhanced multi-Service markets to optimize health-care delivery. The optimization of access, quality, and safe health care directly impacts the readiness of the Army's most precious resource, the American Soldier. By providing timely and highly reliable health care to the formations in the Pacific, USARPAC and USPACOM are able to employ forces in a high state of health and readiness, which is vital in executing the strategic missions through all phases. Likewise, RHC-P's ability to provide exceptional health care to military Families allows Service members to focus on their mission requirements.

Joint Health Enabler for USPACOM

As a joint health enabler, RHC-P will organize ASOS through the employment and synchronization of AHS capabilities in support of joint medical requirements in support of Globally Integrated Health Services (GIHS). These joint health requirements identified by the GCC allow RHC-P to directly support the seven core GIHS supporting ideas:

- First, integrating joint requirements in medical force development to mitigate threats to health services specifically, and the joint force generally, in contested environments.
- Second, global synchronization of health services that plan, integrate, and sustain medical resources efficiently and quickly on a global scale.

- Third, modular and interoperable medical capabilities that meet a core set of joint standards and requirements while also conforming to Service-specific requirements.
- Fourth, global network of health service nodes that incorporate mission partners and are flexible enough to rapidly mobilize and deploy medical capabilities and resources.
- Fifth, tailored medical forces and operations to reduce lift and sustainment requirements while improving quality of care.
- Sixth, leaders integrating joint medical capabilities that are adaptive, skilled, and can synchronize multiple efforts across multiple domains to ensure unity of health service efforts.
- Seventh, improved performance through the appropriate balance between sustainment of current readiness through health-care delivery in medical beneficiary markets, targeted warfighting clinical education and training, and investment in future capabilities.[3]

Some of the other areas directed by GCC to the RHC-P that directly enhance the joint team include: health information technology; blood; surgery; behavioral health; lab; and maintenance of the Joint Theater Trauma System, the Theater Joint Medical Common Operating Picture, and the Joint Medical Operations Center. Additionally, RHC-P also will be postured and equipped to synchronize and support Phase 0 shaping initiatives flowing into the region through partners such as USAID, American Red Cross, NGOs, regional joint stakeholders, and allies, creating synergy and real-time understanding for synchronizing and supporting USARPAC's Theater Campaign Support Plan sub-campaigns and objectives.

The RHC-P commanding general also serves as the USARPAC command surgeon responsible for all medical support to unified land operations actions and activities. This responsibility allows RHC-P to synchronize medical force structure for the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command in the Pacific. Given that the Army will be a smaller force in the near future, assessing capabilities and capacities of MEDCOM Soldiers and Army civilians will become even more essential to sustaining the Army Profession and mission accomplishment in an uncertain environment. These challenges arguably have an MEDCOM component that invariably enhances how the components of the Human Dimension Concept amplify the results of the Army Operating Concept. RHC-P transformation could spearhead myriad efforts that can put into practice a set of mechanisms that may well help materialize MEDCOM contributions to the wider force. Whether optimizing job performance through talent management in RHC-P's newly acquired organizations, optimizing holistic health fitness through the implementation of the Performance Triad, and maximizing MEDCOM professional development through leader engagements with allies and partners, RHC-P will serve as the MEDCOM laboratory for mechanisms to mitigate the warfighting challenges in support of the Army Operating Concept.

Medical Diplomacy

Through medical diplomacy in support of global health engagements (GHEs), RHC-P opens, deepens, and reinforces partnerships that enhance regional capabilities, limit harmful influences, and share U.S. security costs while assuring USPACOM access and freedom of movement in order to prevent, mitigate, and respond to crisis and prevail in conflict. Health engagement

operations, actions, and activities performed by the medical enterprise in the Pacific assure U.S. allies and partners, promote capacity to lead in peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, enhance military professionalization and interoperability of all participants, open new relationships, and sustain positive Army relationships and access across the region.

These objectives are achieved primarily through military-to-military health engagements, which increase the capacity and capabilities of partner nations' militaries to conduct operations, and actions and activities such as HA/DR and PKO. Moreover, military-to-civilian health engagements support host and partner nations (H/PNs) in developing their capacity to meet health requirements and maintain health security of their population. This includes issues that can only be addressed in concert with other entities outside of the military and across the interagency, H/PN, and international community. These collective engagements simultaneously enhance U.S. military medical interoperability with military and civilian allies and partners, and provide unique training opportunities for U.S. military personnel.

In this regard, health engagements facilitate the development of H/PN capabilities, capacity and interoperability, as well as enhance U.S. Department of Defense personnel training and expertise in global health engagement. RHC-P health engagements are based on H/PN priorities and requirements and synchronized with USARPAC, other Service components, USPACOM, and other U.S. government health-related programs, as well as international organizations, NGOs, and private volunteer organizations, where appropriate. Furthermore, RHC-P health engagements support USPACOM, USARPAC, and MEDCOM strategic objectives. This is achieved through the implementation of three health lines of effort (HLOEs): Army Health System support, Health Service support, and force health protection, based on U.S. Army medicine doctrine (Field Manual 4-02, *Army Health System*, 26 AUG 2013).

The HLOEs and supporting functional areas are leveraged and employed through institutional capacity building; training; conferences; exercises; humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance; humanitarian demining; disaster preparedness and response; international military education and training; operations; personnel exchange programs; senior leader engagements; and other operations, actions, and activities (OAAs) using the RHC-P medical enterprise. RHC-P health engagement OAAs primarily focus on military-to-military engagement. However, most health security threats require a whole-of-government approach and thus often may be most effectively targeted through a military-to-civilian or military-to-military engagement plan. These engagements seek to establish trust and enhance relations within and between these entities, as well as accomplish a well-developed health OAA where permissible. Additionally, health security threats such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and the Ebola virus are often transnational and best addressed through multilateral efforts. RHC-P will strive to work through multilateral organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), expert working groups on military medicine, humanitarian mine action, PKO, and the ASEAN Regional Forum to mitigate these threats.

Summary

The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most fertile ground for an agile, integrated, and engaged medical TEC for health readiness in support of USARPAC, and as a joint medical enabler in support of USPACOM. As the senior MEDCOM representative in the entire Pacific AO, the RHC-P commanding general serves as the single point of accountability for health readiness to the USARPAC commanding general and USPACOM commanding general. The medical TEC concept provides a critical opportunity to advance Army medicine's support role to the land component throughout the theater.

The medical TEC transformation will transform Army medicine's RHC-P into the center of gravity for all things related to the Army health enterprise in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. These efforts will significantly improve AHS synchronization, readiness, and support to USARPAC and USPACOM through all phases of operations, enabling land forces contributions and attainment of national objectives in an extremely complex and dynamic region of the world.

Endnotes

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Chapter 5

Partnership

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Partnership. The term has many different meanings in both the civilian and military sectors. In the military, the term "partnership" conjures images of shared road marches, sports competitions, and social calls following major exercises. The Pacific has always been a rather unique theater for the U.S. Army, with a long tradition stretching back to the Spanish American War in the latter part of the 19th century. Yet, throughout major conflicts, the common theme of partnership with our allies in the Pacific has remained steadfast. Partnership for the 715th Military Intelligence Battalion (715th MI BN) is no different. Our regional partners are more important than ever, given the complex terrain of the Pacific. How we approach those partnerships is paramount to our country's success in stemming transnational terrorism, ensuring rival nations follow international law, and ultimately building lasting friendships at the local level. For the intelligence community, specifically Delta Company, 715th MI BN, this is accomplished through encouraging the analyst exchange at the lowest level possible, ensuring equipment is compatible across all partnered militaries, and committing to participation in multinational training exercises to ensure support to the warfighter is compatible.

Analyst exchange is often one of the most overlooked activities at senior levels. Sure, key events that draw up "magnificent" plans are sure to never fail, but it will be the analysts and operators at the lowest level who live through these plans. The exchange between Soldiers across partnered nations must be cultivated by leaders at all levels. Senior leadership must encourage Soldiers to build real friendships and exchange ideas with our partners to establish ground truth on just how that plan was executed. For the 715th MI BN, these relationships are continually fostered with our counterparts in the Australian Defense Force (ADF) and the New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF). The 715th MI BN has continued this investment by providing barracks space for visiting troops or funding U.S. Soldiers to participate in training hosted by U.S. partners. Through our continued participation with these partners, one of the key lessons extracted from these engagements has been communication.

After one of my visits in the summer 2014 to participate in a conference and exercise in England, I quickly learned how different our common language really was. One of my Royal Army warrant officer counterparts made a remark that stuck with me: "Though English may be our common language, we certainly don't speak it commonly." We joked about this throughout the week. He, being a native of Edinburgh, Scotland, and I, a native of Florida, often found ourselves repeating much of what we said to each other in an exercise of clarity. Along with our different accents, the language of our tradecraft differs greatly, as well. Many terms take on different meanings among U.S. partners. Encouraging Soldiers to get past this English language barrier is challenging, but, on occasion, where complete immersion is possible, units must capitalize on the opportunity.

The daily interaction fostered by analyst exchanges enables the exchange of ideas. Although U.S. Army collection teams are structured differently than their counterparts, integrating U.S. Soldiers with their partners has yielded positive results. One such result came from one of our NZDF counterparts, a corporal who provided our company with relevant feedback while we were rewriting our standard operating procedures (SOPs) for one of our collection teams. His

feedback altered the way we conducted emergency destruction procedures for our team, making the procedures far more efficient. Without such an analyst exchange, and his candid feedback with the noncommissioned officers, we would not have thought in that direction.

Intelligence collectors, specifically signals intelligence, are only as relevant as the information they can provide to the warfighter. For collectors to be successful, they must understand myriad information, such as terrain, technology, and whether. This knowledge is only as good as the ability of the equipment and processing the signal into some form of usable information. Gear compatibility is one of the largest challenges we face with our partners. Will our system talk to their system? Can Soldiers operate their equipment? What guidance will the national organizations of each respective country provide their tactical elements? The list is long, but truth in gear compatibility ultimately circles back to encouraging analyst exchanges.

Though the warrant officers of each Service may find opportunities to get out with the Soldiers and use the equipment, this simply does not happen often enough. Our operators by their very nature are the ones who have this responsibility. These Soldiers, enabled by their noncommissioned officers, know whether the black box is better than the green one. Encouraging analyst exchange on an international level helped us get our equipment acquisitions counterparts at the U.S. Department of the Army level to think in a new direction. While participating in an exercise this past July, we were fortunate enough to see our ADF counterparts demonstrate new capabilities using equipment from a U.S. company. Although the irony was not lost on us, the equipment demonstration actually proved useful and, in turn, encouraged us to pursue the same commercial system. The growing pains of compatibility were certainly seen throughout both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and will continue to persist despite our best efforts. Encouraging a “bottom up” voice about these systems and ensuring we cross-train with our counterparts on a regular basis are steps in the right direction.

The adage “train as you fight” is one that is constantly hammered at nearly all levels within our Army. The importance of including and participating in exercises with our partners cannot be overlooked. Joint and multinational exercises, whether they are full-scale movements including every branch of Service or small, localized events, are crucial in enabling both analyst exchanges and achieving gear compatibility. Within the 715th MI BN, we have continued to encourage our partners to attend local training exercises and have reaped the rewards. Our NZDF partners, in particular, have capitalized on the opportunity to train with us in several exercises. They were able to send three of their Soldiers out to participate in a local exercise in March, which provided them with valuable insight into how they would equip, man, and employ a similar collection system. At the completion of the exercise, they were able to walk away with our standards for setup time, how best to employ manning for 24-hour support, and even provided relevant feedback, improving our SOPs.

The experience gained by us and our counterparts in the March exercise paid enormous dividends later that year. We were able to put together a joint team for an Australian-hosted exercise in July. The elements from 715th MI BN and the NZDF were able to collocate for the duration of the Australian exercise and work as a team, splitting the manning requirement for the system and saving each Service a fair amount of money. This exercise led to a simply staggering amount of exchange between both analysts and leaders. Equally as important, we were able to share the same concertina-wire perimeter as our counterparts in the 3rd Radio Battalion, U.S. Marine Corps, further enabling that sharing environment.

Fortunately, the partnering in 2015 did not end in Australia. In September, two of our Soldiers were afforded the opportunity to participate in NZDF's operator certification on the South Island of New Zealand. Our Soldiers had the opportunity to again participate in key operator exchanges, despite being buried waist deep in snow. The relationships they formed with their Kiwi counterparts were absolutely crucial in continuing to foster our Pacific partnership.

The human element, we are told, is the most important part in a relationship. One can easily interchange "partnership" in this statement, as well. Whether it's sharing the "suck in a march up the side of a mountain" or playing a friendly game of "one-touch" rugby with our partners on a wet field on the Gold Coast, the bonds of friendship our Soldiers develop with their counterparts are priceless. It will be their continued exchanges that make each of our respective intelligence organizations better, and their friendships will help ensure our magnificent plans go a bit more magnificently. The biggest lessons learned from Delta Company, 715th MI BN in 2015 were to foster relationships, make new friends, and don't ask Aussies or Kiwis who's better at rugby.

Chapter 6

The Battle Rhythm: A Decisive Mission Command System

MAJ Jason E. Davis, Brigade Executive Officer, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division

> *"Mission command — as a warfighting function — assists commanders in balancing the art of command with the science of control ...."*
> — Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, May 2012
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> *"At every echelon of command, each commander establishes a mission command system — the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations."*
> — Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, May 2012

Mission command is a philosophy, function, and system that enables the commander to apply art to the science of command. After my recent 18 months of staff service at both the battalion and brigade levels, I have come to appreciate just how difficult it is for the staff officer to provide the science so the commander is enabled to apply the art. This statement may seem somewhat obvious to any graduate of the Command and General Staff College, but for me it was not internalized or tangible until I was serving as a brigade executive officer on Pacific Pathways 15-02, consisting of regional engagement exercises with Australia, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

As competing priorities emerged (when everything is a priority), I found myself struggling with three questions: When a unit is holistically operating across five time zones — as some elements train at home station, while others train within multiple and disparate host nations with multiple and disparate foreign partner forces — how do you obtain and maintain shared understanding across the force? Of equal importance, yet often of lesser consideration, how do you ensure that those routine housekeeping functions (e.g., officer evaluation reports [OERs], unit status report [USR], 350-1 training, etc.) are routinely serviced? Lastly, how do you ensure that you are providing your commander with timely and accurate analysis (science) for his application of art to decisions? I learned that an answer to these questions is an often under-valued mission command system that facilitates the warfighting function, and perhaps enables the philosophy: the unit battle rhythm.

The battle rhythm is not simply protecting a time slot, it is producing an "output."

On the surface, a battle rhythm is a rather simple process that informs people of where and when a meeting occurs and consequently protects the "time slot" from other events. That is what I always thought the purpose of a battle rhythm was, to protect the time slot from other events. However, I have found a battle rhythm to be far more. The battle rhythm is not simply protecting the time slot, it is producing an "output," a key piece of information programmed for insertion at a key time in order to provide the staff science to the commander in an accurate and timely manner. For this reason, I have stopped thinking of and referring to battle rhythm events as "meetings." I now call battle rhythm events "collaborative touch points," and I treat them as

points in time and space where individual (warfighting function) experts coalesce to advance the knowledge and position of the collective. The battle rhythm is about designing a framework that deliberately gathers people for a specified purpose, and thus to produce more informed organizational analysis for decisions.

Your battle rhythm is the framework that informs and supports the functions that are vital to your organization's success.

What is the goal of your battle rhythm? What does your "training resource meeting" on Thursdays accomplish? To what ends are you applying your means? Every organization will possess some uniqueness to the framework it builds. However, to address our competing priorities, we needed to ensure routine housekeeping was occurring routinely (e.g., OERs, 350-1 training, etc.) to ensure the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) was being applied to produce staff analysis for select events (e.g., combat training center deployment, company combined arms live-fire exercise, etc.), and to ensure that we were accurately reporting to our higher headquarters (i.e., USR). With this in mind, I was driven to a layered battle rhythm approach.

It may be helpful to conceptualize these layers as "enterprise, organizational, and unit." Each layer is important, as each serves to produce different outputs that ideally compound, complement, and thus build through each layer's application to provide timely and accurate staff analysis for the commander to make decisions.

Enterprise layers are designed to inform up and out from the organization. For example, we have designed our battle rhythm to inform our USR, the one report that caters purely to providing commanders the science they require to apply their art and the system of record for communicating up and out from the organization. We accomplish this through a single brigade-wide touchpoint, the USR brief, scheduled for two hours on the first Tuesday of the month. As the brigade executive officer, this is the one touchpoint on the battle rhythm that I chair.

Organizational layers are designed to inform laterally and within the organization in order to provide the supporting analysis to the enterprise. For example, to provide the staff analysis needed to produce a USR, we require touchpoints four times weekly. The touchpoints cater to four different audiences, with four different warfighting function chairs, and four different agenda outputs. However, these agenda outputs culminate to accurately inform our USR's T, P, S, and R ratings at a specified time each month. The brigade operations officer (S-3) chairs the training readiness review, the brigade personnel officer (S-1) chairs the personnel readiness review, the brigade logistician (S-4) chairs the supply readiness review, and the brigade support operations officer chairs the operational readiness review. Additionally, the organizational layer of our battle rhythm is designed to facilitate the identification of specific events that will require subordinate unit synchronization and, therefore, application within a brigade-level MDMP. Depending on the specific event's level of complexity, the MDMP time requirements are projected, estimated, and overlaid on the existing battle rhythm to ensure the battalions are receiving a brigade-level operation order no later than 14 weeks from execution (often referred to as "planning horizons"). We accomplish this through two additional weekly touchpoints: the short- and long-range training calendar synchronizations respectively scheduled for one hour each on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

Unit layers are designed to inform down and, in turn, receive bottom-up refinement. To ensure accurate information is presented in a timely manner to the organizational-level analysis, primary staff officers must chair unit-level touchpoints within their respective warfighting function with their lateral and horizontal counterparts. For example, to inform the S-4's supply readiness review, four unit touchpoints must occur, each with a different audience mix design derived from their battalion, brigade, and division-level counterparts: the logistics synchronization, mobility synchronization, financial liability investigation for property loss review board, and lateral transfer and turn-in directives review board. Additionally, the unit layer is intended to synchronize ourselves, because life happens and things change inside every day (let alone within a week). We accomplish this synchronization through three primary staff weekly touchpoints: the morning staff synchronizations respectively scheduled for 30 minutes each on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

Digital leadership: Set deliberate venues, audiences, methods of communication, inputs, and outputs for every collaborative touchpoint, then be disciplined enough to conduct them.

Building a basic battle rhythm is truly not difficult once the reasons why it is being built are identified (i.e., USR). Then, nest the touchpoints to inform that end state (the enterprise, organizational, and unit layers). The difficult part is making the battle rhythm work on a global scale, because the U.S. Army is a globally oriented organization. The battle rhythm must facilitate collaborative touchpoints across the globe to provide accurate and timely information to the right people, at the right time, in the right location. Not surprisingly, to provide timely information, one of the key factors considered was the time zone (for example, the one you are in, and the one occupied by your collaborators). To do so, the battle rhythm is built to facilitate global touchpoints — 0900 in Hawaii is 1900 in England, which is 0500 tomorrow for Australia. However, all must be culturally acceptable times for an organization's battle rhythm event.

As a general rule, once a globally conducive battle rhythm has been established, its touchpoints must never be moved or canceled. Time changes or output amendments to the battle rhythm, no matter how common sense they seem at the time, create a lack of trust within the organization. If a touchpoint is a priority, it will never be moved or canceled, because its placement in the nesting of outputs has been deliberately designed to produce timely and accurate information at a specific time and for a specific reason. Our expeditionary nature demands that the venue, audience, method of communication, inputs, and outputs for the nested and layered touchpoints – the battle rhythm — be set in stone.

To facilitate touchpoints, agendas should be carefully crafted. Take into consideration the following factors: venue, audience, method of communication, inputs, and outputs. Most are familiar with a version of this concept by way of a meeting quad chart. However, within an expeditionary organization that is globally dispersed, some particular elements move to the forefront of importance. These elements are referred to as "digital leadership tactics, techniques, and procedures."

Venue selection may seem trivial, but ensuring that the space selected provides the requisite capabilities to achieve the touchpoint's outputs is vital. If your method of communication is a telephone conference call (phone conversation), but you do not have a hub capable of performing the host function for more than one caller, then it is no longer a conference call and is simply a phone call. The same may be said for a video teleconference (VTC). VTC systems are finite and valuable organizational tools (not every element will be afforded one for use). Perhaps the VTC is not the right method of communication for a particular touchpoint. Therefore, a venue

that facilitates a phone conversation is requisite. Obviously, when determining the venue and the method of communication, the target audience is a key driving factor. The intent behind the touchpoint is to bring the right collaborators with their associated inputs into the session to produce the specified outputs that are needed to provide timely and accurate analysis to the commander. However, worthy of equal consideration is the way the chosen medium may silently indicate the importance of the message. An email implies less urgency than a phone call. If the message is important, then schedule a VTC. Within a global-scale culture, well-designed touchpoints will inherently remove inhibitors to the achievement of shared understanding.

When the battle rhythm presents inhibitors, I have found that my tendency is to not attend. Therefore, remove as many inhibitors as possible. One such inhibitor has been addressed in detail (a battle rhythm that is globally conducive and disciplined); the other is your organization must develop a culture of deputies. Expecting the principal to be in every meeting at all times within the expeditionary environment is not feasible. In fact, it is detrimental to your organization, because your processes for achieving shared understanding are defeated as they become dependent on a person, rather than a system. This is a single point of failure, rather than a structure of support. To facilitate, hold your deputies to the same standard as the primary and make it readily known that deputies are not note takers. They speak on behalf of their primary, or they are not a deputy. Granted, individual talent matters. This may be a challenging concept at the battalion level where the options for deputies are few and often inexperienced. Still, it has been found beneficial to consistently strive to build ever more depth within the stock of deputies. With this in mind, it is incumbent upon the primary to properly prepare and synchronize with his deputies. This has the added benefit of further facilitating shared understanding.

There is no longer a forward and a rear, but simply mission command nodes with disparate capabilities.

All of the mission command nodes are interdependent by design. However, due to varying levels of talent and technical capacity each node contains, they come with disparate capabilities. Accounting for each node's disparate capabilities to ensure interoperability and shared understanding is an art. A way is the use of a layered battle rhythm. This system enables mission command as a function to provide the staff science for the commander's art.

A great battle rhythm provides trusted, routinely occurring, collaborative touchpoints for the organization. These touchpoints are well-designed to nest and culminate in the production of timely and accurate information. The battle rhythm must produce outputs and not simply protect a time slot. A battle rhythm must inform and support an organization's success (however that may be defined). It must be layered to inform laterally and horizontally within the organization. It must be anchored by thoughtful digital leadership to remove inhibitors. All of this is because in the fast-paced, globally oriented expeditionary environment, there is no longer a command forward and a command rear. Rather, there is "an arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations." There is a battle rhythm.

Chapter 7

Unit Public Affairs Representative Experiences in Korea During Pacific Pathways 15-03

SGT Michael Roach, 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Pacific Pathways 15-03 was delegated to 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment (5/1 CAV), 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team out of Fort Wainwright, AK, in spring 2015. Approximately 250 personnel from 5/1 CAV made up Task Force (TF) Blackhawk, a self-sustaining unit that would train alongside the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) in Japan before proceeding to South Korea for a second phase of training from late September until 04 NOV 2015.

My involvement as a unit public affairs representative happened as a last-minute addition to the manifest at the request of LTC Hayes, the squadron commander of 5/1 CAV and TF Blackhawk. As a result of being a late addition, my basic understanding of the mission, organization, objective, and schedule of Pacific Pathways was significantly lacking upon my arrival to Japan and Korea. Without having a greater sense of what the task force was trying to achieve from the beginning, I resigned to work more spontaneously than was preferable. After approximately three weeks in Japan, an actual position with a title began to form that was recognized as the squadron public affairs representative or "SPAR." After establishing parameters and objectives for this position, it became integrated into the primary staff, making me responsible for covering unique or important training and crafting a daily storyboard, while detailing information for much more encompassing projects to be initiated upon returning to Fort Wainwright.

The TF's schedule in Korea can be broken down into four primary phases, all of which contained myriad challenges and advantages with respect to covering events, as well as detailing and releasing information. First, TF Blackhawk reconsolidated and recuperated from Orient Shield at Camp Yongsan in Seoul. The TF then proceeded to conduct extensive live-fire training and qualifications at Rodriguez Live-Fire Complex. The third phase of Korea, and perhaps the culminating event for Pacific Pathways 15-03, was the TF's participation in Hoguk, a Republic of Korea (ROK) Army training event that spanned much of South Korea. After the completion of Hoguk came redeployment efforts at Camp Carroll, which marked a close to Pacific Pathways for TF Blackhawk.

After arriving at Camp Yongsan, I was able to purchase a laptop at the local post exchange. Prior to Pacific Pathways, my field experience was that of an 11B (rifle infantryman). Consequently, the equipment and preparations I made for the training rotation were reflective of that. Although I did bring a camera with multiple lenses and a card reader, I declined to bring a computer or a backup hard drive. This resulted in having to beg and borrow computer time on other Soldiers' systems during Orient Shield, which left me with an abundance of digital material spread out over multiple computers with multiple backup discs. Having finally attained a core piece of equipment, I was able to begin consolidating written material and photographs on a single platform.

Additionally, I began work on a feature article that was meant to cover TF Blackhawk's experiences with Orient Shield. However, multiple problems arose with logistics. First, as I was brought on as a member of the primary staff, the article had to meet the guidelines of my superiors, who wanted an all-encompassing look at the TF's operations, which included every

sub-unit and training event. The end state of the article felt somewhat bloated and tedious. As a result, much of the incorporated information lacked universal interest, making the overall article specific to only a small set of people. Additionally, timeliness became a huge issue, as it did with everything I tried to write in Korea. Not only did pieces have to be approved by higher command, but simply getting them sent through email was troublesome. This was partly due to a lack of Internet connectivity at our host site in Camp Yongsan. Although hotspots were available and I was allowed access by multiple staff members, being in the right place at the right time with these staff members was rare.

Logistically, the most challenging part of Camp Yongsan was that the TF members were spread out over multiple locations. It was impossible for me as an individual to cover every aspect of the unit's experiences. Photos from that time became repetitive, being from the same group of Soldiers to whom I was attached. A primary example of an opportunity missed was a leadership tour of a Korean War battlefield, which I was not able to accompany. Although it would have made a great photo and cutline having the primary leadership of the TF at such a historic site, I was not able to document the event. However, I found an excellent alternative. Many Soldiers brought cameras of their own, and I was able to use what they captured as long as they were willing to share their footage. This open-ended invitation remained a great source of material for the remainder of my time in Korea.

Upon arriving at the Rodriguez Live-Fire Complex, it was apparent that the conditions the TF would be training under were incredibly conducive to coverage and publication. I was able to parallel the training schedule of the TF during the day, then return to the tactical operations center and produce a storyboard for that day. Two key factors made this time period extremely fluid. First, attending staff and command-level meetings not only provided necessary information for what events would be conducted throughout current and upcoming training periods, but also provided the appropriate platform to communicate my needs to the group. If I needed transportation, guidance, or support from key members of leadership, these meetings made attaining this support possible. Conversely, these meetings also served as the perfect opportunity for leadership of sub-units to request the SPAR as an asset for events such as promotions. Second, cementing my position on staff made detailed information readily available, as did becoming an asset to the squadron commander, who began bringing me with him on his tour of training highlights. This ensured I was in the right place at the right time to cover the highlights of training without wasting time standing by.

There were multiple highlights during our time at Rodriguez Life-Fire Complex. This included the firing of six live tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireless-guided 2B missiles; a direct fire with three M777A2 towed howitzers; a visit from a brigadier general; and a TF photo shoot to commemorate Pacific Pathways. As I was included in the planning of all of these events as a necessary presence, my position as a unit public affairs representative (UPAR) or SPAR was not only cemented, but, more importantly, it was being used as an actual asset to increase the visibility of the TF's efforts. This was due in part to the combined efforts of the squadron commanding officer (SCO), command sergeant major (CSM), and staff officers. Without their insistence, my position would have severely lacked the necessary traction to cover such a wide area of training.

The third phase of TF Blackhawk's rotation in Korea was its participation in Hoguk, an annual brigade-level ROK Army exercise. TF Blackhawk would be the first U.S. off-peninsula unit to participate in Hoguk. Needless to say, the visibility of the operation was extremely high, which resulted in nearly countless visits from high-ranking U.S. and ROK Army officers, including GEN Brooks, Commanding General of United States Army Pacific Command.

It was at this time that I was informed by the squadron executive officer that the daily storyboards we had been publishing were being sent and looked at by echelons far above our own. Although I had been adhering to a malleable deadline for the storyboards, in combination with staff meetings and covering training, this new level of prominence began to run my daily schedule. On an average day without high-visibility training, the storyboard became my primary focus during preparations for the maneuver phase of Hoguk.

Once maneuvers for Hoguk were underway, I was originally slotted to ride with the CSM, because he had the ability to travel between sub-units of the TF that were participating in various locations of the exercise. Although I would spend the day taking photos and traveling with the CSM, I was able to write and send the storyboard using my laptop, powered by auxiliary outputs from a nearby Stryker and using the hood of a Humvee as a makeshift work desk. I would then email the storyboard to battle captains using the CSM's hotspot.

This worked well until circumstances required me to cover aspects of the exercise that conflicted with the CSM's schedule. For example, when GEN Brooks made his visit, I was the only U.S. Army public affairs asset on the scene and tasked specifically by the SCO to cover the event. Again, timeliness of release became an issue, partly for reasons of simple logistics, meaning that working from the field wasn't exactly conducive to delivering a product quickly. Also, the SCO wanted to review and refine what I had produced, an understandable request considering that I did not have an Army background in public affairs. Rather than delivering a photo and cutline by close of business with a short Web story the next day, it took me almost three weeks to turn the story in to the brigade public affairs.

Hoguk was a 10-day exercise. By the fourth day, I had improved my mobility by gaining access to a transportation motor pool with a driver and GPS. This gave me the ability to travel freely between groups to cover the most notable events of the day. I continued the rest of the training event with this setup.

At the close of the rotation in Korea, perhaps the most valuable lesson I learned became apparent at Camp Carroll while the task force was conducting redeployment efforts for Fort Wainwright. On my hard drive, I had almost 12,000 photos of Pacific Pathways from 11 SEP through 04 NOV, not including photos I received from other Soldiers in the TF. Only a fraction of these photos were actually useful, and sorting through them took almost an entire week after I returned. Additionally, it took too long for me to establish the SPAR/UPAR as an element of the staff and an asset to the rest of the team, resulting in more time lost and the position under-utilized at the outset of the TF's rotation in Korea. The entire event served as an excellent training moment that will hopefully set a future standard for the position.

Chapter 8

Exercise Hamel 2015: Strengthening Intelligence Partnership

CPT George Gurrola, 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, Fort Shafter, HI

As part of the Army's priorities, the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade (MI BDE) advances regional partnerships through the theater security cooperation program. This chapter focuses on my experience as the Exercise Hamel 2015 officer in charge while serving in the 205th MI Battalion, 500th MI BDE, specifically, advancing intelligence interoperability through security cooperation with our regional partners, the 1st Intelligence Battalion (1INT) (Australia).

The mission of the 500th MI BDE was to provide a tailored intelligence team (14 personnel) to serve as observer controllers (OCs), opposing force (OPFOR), and blue force (BLUFOR) from 30 JUN 2014 to 03 AUG 2015 in support of 1INT, 6th BDE, Australian Defense Force (ADF) during Exercise Hamel. It was the first instance in which members of the 205th MI BN, 15th MI BN, and 715th MI BN participated in Australia's Exercise Hamel. Exercise Hamel, similar to our combat training center rotations, is the Australian Army's capstone warfighting exercise. Hamel's exercise area, based out of Townsville, Australia, also included parts along the eastern coast including Atherton. Unlike previous Hamel rotations, the main training objective was to test the 6th BDE's (AUS) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the 3rd Maneuver Combat BDE (MCB). The following were Exercise Hamel 15 training objectives:

- Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence fusion.
- Conduct all-source intelligence analysis.
- Develop and disseminate a common operational picture.
- Utilize enablers to facilitate decision making.



Figure 8-1. Members of the 500th MI BDE and 1INT after Exercise Hamel 2015.

The exercise scenario centered on ADF with U.S. support deploying a stabilizing force in anticipation of deteriorating regional security conditions associated with planned elections within an unstable neighboring country. The permissive deployment supported the host country in securing its more rural areas, which harbor a small but persistent separatist element, and in prepositioning ADF in the region to deter violence in the lead-up to the election. The scenario included an insurgent threat, but also a near-peer conventional threat from a neighboring country, which acted to destabilize security conditions.

On 30 JUN 2015, the 500th MI BDE BLUFOR and OPFOR traveled to Brisbane to integrate prior to exercise execution. This team facilitated deployment requirements and answered requests for information prior to exercise execution. The 1INT embed officer at 205th MI BN ensured the personnel integration was seamless. Upon arrival, the analysts conducted an exchange, successfully establishing a basic understanding of the exercise and 1INT tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Prior to the exercise, I met with the Hamel 25th Infantry Division (25ID) senior representative to discuss administrative control (ADCON) and coordinate for our equipment to be shipped along with their container. (Australia prohibits shipment of body armor and the advanced combat helmet on commercial air.)

From 02-07 JUL, the 500th MI BDE OC team conducted training sessions on OC processes and procedures. Our OC team was under the supervision of the 1INT commander. My intelligence warrant and I observed the all-source cell (ASC), which was the main component of the intelligence warfighting function. Our goal was to observe and report the BDE S-2 section's efficiency in fusing and operationalizing intelligence from the ASC. The ASC included analysts from multiple organizations including the 1INT, U.S. Marine Corps, two 205th MI BN all-source analysts, and Australian interagency elements.

Exercise Hamel began 7 JUL and ended on 29 JUL. The 6th Combat Support BDE enablers, especially the 1INT, performed with distinction during their culminating warfighter exercise. 1INT's five companies provided the maneuver commander with vital intelligence, successfully driving operations. The 3MCB commander and staff often sought out the ASC for their assessments and expertise. It was a great pleasure witnessing the young Soldiers, both U.S. and Australian, mature as teammates and partners throughout the exercise. Several general officers in the ADF commended the 500th MI BDE team for improving operational effectiveness and for its willingness to share TTPs and intelligence lessons learned. All senior Australian officers always made a point to meet and thank U.S. Soldiers for their service and participation in the exercise.

Figure 8-2. CPT Gurrola and an Australian officer exchange gifts after Exercise Hamel 2015.

The exercise served as a catalyst and increased security cooperation between the 205th MI BN and 1INT. Since Exercise Hamel 15, our organizations have strengthened the partnership through participating in numerous exercises including Phoenix Babel and Vigilant Pacific 2015, among others. The relationship also paved the way for the first BN staff-to-staff military decisionmaking process exercise in November 2015. Both 205th MI BN and 1INT continue to support the reciprocal officer exchange and are better postured to respond to contingency operations in the Pacific area of responsibility.

Chapter 9

Exercise Hamel: Global Reach and Strategic Partnership

**LTC Matthew J. Hardman, Commander, 3rd Battalion,
509th Infantry Battalion (Airborne), 4th Brigade Combat Team**

From 06 to 18 JUL 2015, elements from 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, based at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), AK, participated in the biennial Talisman Saber exercise in Australia. The 3rd Battalion, 509th Infantry (3/509 IN) (Airborne [ABN]) joined the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry (3/25 IBCT) and Australian 7th Brigade in Exercise Hamel, the Australian combat training center rotation.

They departed in the perpetual twilight of an Alaskan summer night for a location equally exotic and strategically vital. The 450 paratroopers from Task Force (TF) Spartan (4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division) along with their Australian, Marine, and Air Force partners, set off to conduct an ABN joint forcible entry operation (JFEO) onto Kapyong Drop Zone in Queensland, Australia. The mission required the two Royal Australian Air Force C-17s to land and refuel in Hawaii before linking up with five U.S. Air Force C-17s that conducted an in-flight refuel crossing the Pacific. During the flight, the coalition joint task force (CJTF) provided in-flight updates to the ABN commander on the composition and disposition of enemy forces protecting their objective, Williamson Airfield, and coalition activities. Three hours prior to time on target for the ABN assault, the U.S. and Australian jumpmasters awoke their jumpers, disseminated these updates, and began the process of donning and inspecting parachutes and combat equipment. The C-17s began a rapid descent as the force approached the coast, and, at six minutes out, leveled off at the appropriate jump altitude. At this point, the jumpmasters began to issue commands to their paratroopers. Minutes later, on the morning of 08 JUL 2015, the paratroopers of TF Spartan rapidly assembled and seized initial assault objectives to secure their drop zone as part of the Pacific Pathways Hamel and Talisman Saber exercises.

They then began the next phase of their operation, the seizure of the airfield located 3.72 miles (6 kilometers) to their east. The paratroopers had ruthlessly reduced their loads to the bare essentials: weapons, ammunition, batteries, and minimal comfort items. Additional ammunition — water, rations, and batteries — had been dropped in Container Delivery System (CDS) bundles. Two companies of Spartan paratroopers quickly set out dismounted to isolate their objective by seizing key bridges and intersections 3.72-6.21 miles (6-10 kilometers) away that controlled the avenues of approach to the airfield. Intelligence updates provided by the CJTF indicated that there was only a reinforcement platoon securing the airfield, but there were mounted reserves capable of reinforcing in several hours. The key to defeating enemy reinforcements was close air support and naval gunfire directed by Army joint fire observers, Marine air-naval gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICOs), and Air Force tactical air control parties (TACPs). Once the isolation companies achieved their purpose, two companies attacked to seize the airfield.

Figure 9-1. Paratroopers from TF Spartan conduct an ABN JFEO into Australia after a 16-hour flight and in-flight rig from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK.

With dozens of reporters on the drop zone, it might be tempting to dismiss the operation as a photo opportunity, but it demonstrated strategic reach and tactical capability that should reassure our allies and deter our adversaries. After seizing the airfield, 3/509 IN (ABN) (-) reinforced 3/25 IBCT (-) in support of its mission to secure the Australian 7th Brigade's flank. The battalion had one of its assault command posts (ACPs), two rifle companies, an 81mm mortar section, two scout teams, two engineer squads, a detachment of Marine ANGLICOs, an Air Force TACP, and its medical platoon. It brought no vehicles or digital mission command systems. The assigned mission, as well as several exercise constraints, required an expeditionary mindset, as well as a scaled and tailored force. Additionally, late adjustments to the participation in the follow-on exercise, Hamel, created a great deal of uncertainty about what was "next." All of this provided an extremely realistic experience for the battalion. Both the Talisman Saber and Hamel exercises provided the opportunity to fight in a force-on-force scenario across the Pacific in an austere environment. As Operation Serval — the 2013 French intervention in Mali — demonstrated, ABN forces in conjunction with joint and coalition capabilities provide leaders strategic and tactical flexibility.[1] Additionally, it reinforced much of what Soldiers habitually do to train for operations and provided invaluable lessons learned for incorporation into future training. It also highlighted some of the benefits that come with being at JBER.

Figure 9-2. A paratrooper from 3/509 IN (ABN) secures an initial assault objective in order to enable the buildup of combat power prior to seizing subsequent objectives.

Alaska provides obvious advantages regarding strategic access across the globe, in the Pacific and Arctic in particular.[2] It also offers other advantages. It is a habitually joint environment from training exercises to neighborhoods. In the planning and execution of Talisman Saber, our familiarity with processes, but more importantly cultures, better enabled us to reach mutual training objectives. Specifically, the ABN commander and staff worked with the air mission commander and staff to develop the most optimal in-flight refueling plan in order to meet the obvious aircrew needs while maximizing the time for paratroopers to rest in the aircraft. A spirit and habit of cooperation clearly enabled the dialogue. Additionally, the habitual relationships with Marine ANGLICOs and Air Force TACPs gave us the opportunity to train and rehearse the employment of joint forces. This was critical to TF Spartan's success in the ABN JFEO as well as two subsequent battalion air assaults during Exercise Hamel. These joint partners integrated seamlessly into our team, mitigating the lack of airdropped artillery and enabling us to effectively employ close air and naval gunfire support. Not only did Talisman Saber offer the opportunity to demonstrate and reinforce our historic relationship and interoperability with Australia, it allowed us to the do the same with our joint partners and next-door neighbors.

Equally, our assignment to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) ensures continuous multinational engagement. In any given month, multiple elements from across the brigade are engaged with multinational partners from across the Pacific. Japanese platoons integrated into company live-fire exercises, Mongolian army sergeants attending the Basic Leader Course with U.S. Army noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and ABN operations with Canadians became a regular part of business. These experiences give leaders and paratroopers repetitions at interacting with other militaries and developing, not only the interpersonal skills to make these relationships work, but also thinking through potential technical and tactical friction points. As one platoon leader recently returned from Bangladesh stated, "You get comfortable being

uncomfortable." Talisman Saber provided us the opportunity to do this at a larger level in our training with Australian jumpmasters in the weeks prior to the exercise. During the Hamel portion, we had the opportunity to plan and execute two battalion air assault operations with Australian and New Zealand helicopter crews. Although much of the experience of working with coalition partners was familiar for more senior officers and NCOs due to deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it was eye-opening and educational for more junior leaders.

Finally, Alaska is just a tough place. Living and training in the rugged, austere, and Arctic conditions breed a resilience and resourcefulness that make tough paratroopers. JBER and the Donnelly and Yukon Training Areas offer stunningly beautiful and challenging environments. In the summer, the brigade had elements training at JBER and Donnelly simultaneously, which are separated by over 200 miles (321 kilometers). Austere and expeditionary are intrinsic to training in Alaska. The physical distances in Alaska, coupled with potentially unforgiving conditions (Arctic and mountainous), routinely challenge leaders at all levels to exercise disciplined initiative within intent. Quite literally, squad leaders make life-or-death decisions every day just doing physical training. As we prepared for the unknown in Australia, we relied on the toughness that training in Alaska breeds to get us ready. Our habits and cultural mindset prepared us well for the environmental hazards (water crossings, crocodiles, snakes, and rugged terrain) in the Shoalwater Bay Training Area. Below are some the lessons learned during the preparation and execution of the Talisman Saber and Hamel exercises.

Training Preparation

In a multi-echelon event that integrated battalion and brigade mission command, all of the companies completed combined arms live-fire exercises (CAMLFXs), the first at JBER in nearly a decade. They immediately transitioned into a 72-hour company situational training exercise that included company air movements. They started with deliberate troop leading procedures with a heavy emphasis on operation orders (OPORDs) and precombat checks, inspections, and rehearsals. The scenario split the companies in two alternate landing zones, forcing the companies to conduct an en route linkup prior to conducting a deliberate attack of an enemy position in a built-up area. From there, the companies moved dismounted to conduct a hasty attack based on intelligence gathered on the first objective and into a hasty defense. At the conclusion, they conducted a forced march into a stress shoot. We structured the scenario so that company commanders had to make deliberate decisions regarding Soldier loads with imperfect information about the full scope of their mission and its duration. At the conclusion, paratroopers had minimal sleep, had eaten only two meals ready to eat (MREs), and moved dismounted approximately 37.2 miles (60 kilometers) over rugged terrain in 48 hours. This was our capstone training event to prepare the battalion not only for our uncertain role during the exercise, but for the uncertain missions we could be called on to execute in the Pacific area of responsibility.

Additionally, we conducted an ABN JFEO rehearsal several weeks prior to the exercise in Australia. The week prior, we conducted leader professional development with all jumpmasters and platoon sergeants and above on in-flight rigging procedures. After a classroom presentation and table-top talk, we conducted a walk-through with leaders in aircraft mock-ups. During the rehearsal, we could only jump part of the force, but we prioritized our leaders; our most inexperienced jumpers; and Australian, Marine, and Air Force partners. The rest we staged in constructive chalks at the drop zone in accordance with our scatter plan. Due to aircraft availability constraints, we were unable to do an in-flight rig for the rehearsal, but we executed all of our rigging on the ground as if it were in flight. This cost-effective compromise was invaluable at improving our proficiency and confidence.

As part of the JFEO rehearsal, we performed battalion down to platoon orders and rehearsals. In the battalion combined arms rehearsal (CAR), it became apparent that our graphic control measures needed improvement (greater clarity and standardization of naming conventions) and that our CAR unnecessarily repeated part of the OPORD brief. The JFEO rehearsal was instrumental for the integration of Australian, Marine, and Air Force partners, allowing us to identify their requirements for mission success and to identify subtle differences in the ways we operated, from equipment to procedures in the aircraft, which could create unnecessary friction.

Arriving Ready to Fight

In part of our focus on delivering a force that was capable of continuing to fight and win well after H-hour, we emphasized paratrooper preparation in the final 120 hours prior to the operation. Based on feedback from our medical providers and U.S. Army Natick Soldier Systems Center, we opted not to transition to a reverse cycle. Instead, our physician assistant, a former Ranger platoon sergeant, gave the battalion a class on the physiological considerations of hydration, nutrition, and rest for expeditionary forces. In spite of this period occurring over the 4th of July weekend, our paratroopers abstained from caffeine and alcohol and received the appropriate rest.[3] The day prior to takeoff, we conducted our final issue of batteries, ammunition, and MREs, as well as sustained ABN training. This allowed us to maximize the last night of rest and minimize the activities required prior to loading aircraft. We had two separate lifts, one with two Royal Australian Air Force C-17s that would have a longer flight and land in Hawaii to refuel, and one with five U.S. Air Force C-17s that would conduct an in-flight refuel over the Pacific. They reported for final manifest calls separately in accordance with their own timelines. With everyone's equipment staged under guard the day prior, we were able to minimize the time that paratroopers were sitting around waiting. This approach, although infeasible for a no-notice deployment, it is applicable for short-notice deployments, and, in general, highlighted how thoughtful planning and preparation can optimize paratrooper readiness.

Our food service team did a phenomenal job providing water, sports drinks, and a balanced meal at the departure airfield. Additionally, they ensured the aircraft had water, sports drinks, fruit, and energy bars on the aircraft. Each trooper was issued a First Strike Ration for the flight, as well. There was one very significant shortcoming in our planning and execution: the individual issue of supplies. By issuing supplies by chalk instead of by unit, we did not give company leaders the opportunity to manage the Soldier load by tactical cross load or the opportunity to conduct inspections. A first sergeant (1SG) identified the problem and brought it up to the battalion command sergeant major (CSM). We consolidated by company and addressed the issue, but it was unorganized and time consuming.[4]

Throughout our preparation, we placed considerable emphasis on commanders managing Soldier load with the philosophy that ounces equal pounds and pounds equal weight.[5] During our company situational training exercise and JFEO rehearsal, we replicated the reality of combat loads (ammunition, dummy mortar rounds, training AT4 anti-armor weapon and M18A1 anti-personnel mines, batteries, and water). We forced commanders to make tough decisions about what was essential. We also conducted water resupply from local sources using iodine tablets for purification and made tactical resupply and casualty evacuation with minimal or no vehicles, a constant feature of our training.[6] For the exercise, the CSM and 1SG took the commander's intent and developed a base packing list. We eliminated all external pouches on the modular lightweight load-carrying equipment with the exception of the entrenching-tool carrier on the front center, which is essential to properly secure the single-point release harness. The NCOs

eliminated redundancy in teams, squads, and platoons by consolidating and cross-leveling hygiene items, limiting one E-tool per fire team, and finding a balance between survival and comfort.[7]

The rehearsals and preparation of paratroopers paid off during the 16-hour flight. Across all of the aircraft, each paratrooper had at least one solid REM sleep cycle prior to the in-flight refuel. The jumpmaster teams supervised to ensure jumpers hydrated (paratroopers drank their allotted sports drink and used the bottles to drink water instead of having to break into their equipment for canteens), and ate their First Strike Rations immediately following the in-flight refuel six hours into the flight. At approximately H-minus three hours, the jumpmasters woke everyone up and talked them through the in-flight rigging procedures one more time. Jumpmasters completed their parachute inspections with time to spare. They then conducted a technical inspection and hanging of combat equipment one hour prior to drop time and sat everyone down. This greatly lessened the fatigue on jumpers. The in-depth and repeated rehearsals and jumpmaster control ensured the entire process was methodical and smooth. Based on the C-17-s approach profile — 10,000 feet to 1,000 feet in a very short period — we opted not to have the jumpmasters stand up their chalks until the aircraft leveled off at six minutes.[8] This reduced the fatigue on jumpers and also provided jumpers and jumpmasters with the most stable platform for conducting their most critical final tasks (hooking up, checking static lines, and checking equipment) prior to exiting the aircraft.[9] After 16 hours of flight across the Pacific Ocean, at 1000 hours local time, 400 of 450 paratroopers safely exited over Kapyong Drop Zone, Australia.[10]

Expeditionary Mission Command and Sustainment

Companies rapidly assembled and seized their initial objectives to secure the drop zone. Meanwhile, our small logistical contingent recovered our CDS bundles and began configuring resupply loads (constructive ammunition and water) on litters. The two rifle companies, tasked with seizing the airfield, initiated movement to their assault positions. Based on the scaled force for the operation, the battalion effectively operated one ACP handling the synchronization of the close fight, while the brigade combat team ACP reported to the CJTF. We needed to be more deliberate in maneuvering the battalion ACP to ensure the best communication during the most critical times in the operation. We also found that our COM201 antennas were critical for reliable communication. Reinforcing of our small logistics element with a dismounted heavy weapons platoon paid off in the rapid recovery of CDS bundles and the movement of critical supplies to maintain momentum and security. Finally, our paratroopers were still going strong as darkness fell and we stopped to consolidate and re-organize for follow-on missions.

The battalion's role during Exercise Hamel was largely unknown until that evening. 3/25 IBCT sent a small planning team consisting of their brigade combat team operations staff officer (S-3), intelligence staff officer (S-2), and a planner to brief us at the airfield. Under ponchos and headlamps, they briefed us on our next mission: a battalion air assault to secure the 7th Brigade's right flank. They provided us with a clear task and purpose, graphics, and a timeline. They also did a phenomenal job of enabling the battalion and companies by providing analog products that we could use for planning. With what we had, we were able to issue Warning Order (WARNORD) No. 1 to the companies that night.

The following morning, after cold-load training and an air movement to an intermediate staging base, we conducted the battalion military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and issued an OPORD to the companies. All of our products were analog. We had sent a carbon copy, preformatted OPORD and execution matrix formats to the printers, but did not receive them in time for the exercise. These items were sorely missed. However, our emphasis on providing detailed and complete graphics and an execution matrix to companies paid off, because they were able to quickly develop and disseminate their plans. Over the next seven days, the battalion conducted two air assaults and hasty defenses against a hybrid threat consisting of irregulars and conventional forces with armored capability.

Additional Lessons Learned

- Grow Rangers. Ranger-qualified leaders, on average, are more inured to hardship and privation. They are more willing to expose their units to it in training. They are more confident leading in austere conditions. Their optimism and can-do attitude are contagious.

- Grow jumpmasters. Many hands make light work. More jumpmasters allows for greater informed supervision throughout an ABN operation. Jumpmasters are safer and more confident jumpers, which is contagious.

- Field sanitation. More than 70 percent of the formation had never defecated in a cathole or slit trench. Not only have we been too tied to vehicles and forward operating bases, but we have been too tied to portable toilets. Although embarrassing, humbling, and eye-opening, it was also an experience that let us see (and smell) ourselves and fix it. The issue was corrected during the training event and incorporated in later force-on-force operations. Additionally, it was a point of emphasis with medics and platoon sergeants.

- Night operations. One of the features of training in Alaska is that for half the year, there is very little darkness. Prior to our operations in Australia, we had not been able to operate under night vision goggles (NVGs) for about 90 days. Many of our paratroopers were just not confident moving across rugged terrain under NVGs. Subsequent live-fire and force-on-force exercises gave us the opportunity to do it with a realization of how perishable these skills were. On the other hand, because Alaska is largely dark the other half of the year, platoons began to habitually draw out their NVGs in the morning to conduct dismounted movements with equipment.

- NCOs make a difference. We have a lot of work to do in educating junior NCOs on their duties and responsibilities and developing the habits to accomplish them while tired and under stress in a complex environment. We have phenomenal Soldiers, but the period of prolonged conflict and multiple deployments has eroded many things we took for granted a decade or more ago. Now more than ever, it requires our most senior NCOs to teach and demonstrate by personal example and a willingness to get dirty and to lead, coach, and mentor.

The Talisman Saber and Hamel exercises afford us the opportunity to maintain historic and vital relationships while maintaining and improving interoperability with our multinational partners. These exercises also are critical in demonstrating to U.S. allies, neighbors, and potential adversaries the Army's unique strategic capabilities. Finally, these exercises provide a challenging and realistic environment for units and leaders to develop intangible qualities across the human dimension while simultaneously honing the tactical and technical skills to win.

Endnotes

1. MG Olivier Tramond and LTC Philippe Seigneur, "Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali," Army Magazine, June 2013, pp. 40-43.

2. 1600 hours to Australia, 1300 hours to Nepal, 0830 hours to Japan.

3. During execution, we did not have any heat or fatigue injuries and the battalion rapidly assembled, seized initial assault objectives, and then seized follow-on objectives (3.7 to 6.2 miles [6-10 km] off the drop zone).

4. Mistakes not corrected are lessons unlearned. We did the same things four months later during an ABN JFEO at JBER. This time we were unable to correct it prior to loading aircraft. It resulted in an M240L gunner carrying his entire basic load himself. Overloaded, he had a weak exit and was towed by a leg strap for approximately 15 seconds. Fortunately, he came free (off the drop zone) and had a safe landing without serious injury.

5. It is not so much our packing lists that need to change, but our mindset. We have to prove to ourselves and our paratroopers that we can do it. We have to demonstrate that in 50 F degree weather, they will survive with minimal cold-weather gear as long as we have a few contingency items with the squad or in our contingency bags that can be called forward, if circumstances require. We have to train as we fight. We have to train to take risks, not wanton gambles, but calculated, educated, professional risks. We have to calculate and account for the unseen, hidden risks of overburdening our paratroopers: weak exits, lower extremity injuries, lack of speed and surprise, and a lack of violence on the objective. Do we want to win badly enough that we will drink muddy water treated with iodine tablets and orange-based powder? Do we want to win badly enough that we will share a poncho liner with a few of our closest friends versus the comfort of our own personal sleep system? We can find, fix, and finish our enemy. We can absolutely outwalk, out-hustle, and outfight our enemy, but we cannot handicap ourselves with 30 to 40 pounds more than he is carrying. For two excellent pieces on Soldier load see *The Factors of Soldier's Load*, MAJ Stephen J. Townsend, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1994, and *The Modern Warrior's Combat Load: Dismounted Operations in Afghanistan*, Task Force Devil Combined Arms Assessment Team, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April-May 2003.

6. There is definitely a learning curve with the use of purification tablets. Despite repeated instructions and warnings, we had at least two paratroopers take iodine tablets chased with water from the Eagle River. Giardia and its effects are now legendary in this battalion.

7. We chose bivy sack and poncho liner versus patrol bag, which made for some cold nights in Australia. Temperatures fluctuated between the low 80s F in the day and low 30s F at night.

8. 1SG Jasan Weaver, the primary jumpmaster on the first aircraft, made this recommendation during the air mission brief, reinforcing the value of experienced NCO jumpmasters.

9. CPT Justin Tugman ICCC 4-99 Monograph, "The Seizure of Rio Hato Airfield: Operation Just Cause" and "Infantry in Battle: From Somalia to the Global War on Terror," United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, 2005, pp. 12-13, illustrate the impact of heavy Soldier loads and jumper fatigue on safe ABN operations.

10. One paratrooper broke his femur during landing and 50 other paratroopers were forced to divert due to increasing winds on the drop zone.

Chapter 10

Leader Development and Pacific Pathways

1LT Charlie Phelps, Mortar Platoon Leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1/27 Infantry Battalion

Pacific Pathways 2015 manifested itself as a living, breathing action of the U.S. strategy to rebalance to the Pacific. Our mission consisted of engaging three partnered nations under the framework of existing bilateral training exercises, demonstrating partner capabilities, training as an interoperable force, and projecting land power west of the international date line. Task Force (TF) Warrior (2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division [2/25 SBCT]), under the auspices of the Pacific Pathways framework, conducted Operations Cobra Gold, Foal Eagle, and Balikatan as a continuous operational deployment. Each location exposed Soldiers to a wide variety of new operational environments, unique cultures, and varying capabilities of partnered nations as defined by the warfighting functions.

This chapter describes Pacific Pathways 2015 through the vantage point of the Wolfhound mortar platoon (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1/27 Infantry Battalion). Future units that participate in Pacific Pathways will hopefully be able to take our lessons learned and apply them to their operations in the Pacific area of responsibility. Areas of emphasis in this chapter explore our Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps, risk management, and development of adaptive leaders. In order to assist future units, the provided vignettes and lessons learned illustrate how Pacific Pathways 15-01 enhanced leader development across the formation.

Operation Cobra Gold, Thailand

1st Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment (1/31 IN), King's Guard of the Republic of Thailand army opened its arms to TF Warrior. Upon our arrival, companies of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) accommodated us by moving their Soldiers from the barracks to ensure we had adequate living conditions. They truly placed an emphasis on partnership and relationship building. This became clearly apparent when we embedded our forces both at the dining facility and in physical training formations. We wanted to be seen as a team that was multicultural and not merely a force made of separate entities. Within days of our arrival, the camp in Lopburi Province became home.

The Soldiers of the heavy mortar company of 1/31 IN sought us out within 24 hours of our arrival in order to demonstrate their capabilities with the 120mm mortar towed system. These Soldiers built an entire display that outlined the unique characteristics of the towed 120mm mortar system developed in Thailand. We were eager to have the opportunity to use foreign weaponry and learn how our Thai counterparts tactically employed mortars in support of combat operations. Our Thai counterparts immediately started a discussion on training. It became clear in our first conversation that our Thai partners were eager to learn, share, and develop capabilities. Their desire to train invigorated our formation as we looked to accomplish our preplanned training objectives focused around partnership and interoperability.

Figure 10-1. A U.S. NCO instructs Thai partners on the direct lay technique using RTA 120mm mortar system.

In the first 72 hours, our training objectives and goals were dictated through the "officer channels." Each morning, the lieutenants would conduct a morning synchronization to discuss tactics, techniques, and procedures. During the synchronization meeting, the Thai officers would dictate the training that would occur. The lack of interaction at the NCO and Soldier level was palpable and frustrating. Language and cultural barriers aside, we were missing the true intent and opportunity presented by our partners. Within our platoon, we decided to change the dynamic of the training environment. It was time for the junior leaders to assert themselves and lead the formation. I had made a mistake by allowing myself to ignore my junior leaders' knowledge. Instead, I conducted business in a manner that was solely officer driven. I should have allowed my junior leaders to train the force due to their expertise with the subject matter.

There was an obvious change in the training dynamic the following day. Our partners were wide-eyed as one of our squad leaders explained how U.S. mortar platoons conduct coordinated illumination missions in support of maneuver units and how he had employed those techniques in Afghanistan. My platoon sergeant supervised the certification in accordance with U.S. mortar gunner's exam standards. This led to the first true exchange of ideas. As a result, the flood gate of partnership had been broken, which was not a surprise. Soldiers wanted to interact with their counterparts.

The backbone of the U.S. Army was on full display for our partners. The NCOs were able to relay their combat experiences and technical expertise to the RTA partners. This type of exchange exposed partners to U.S. Army NCOs' ability to plan, lead, and execute training, which marked a serious improvement to the morning routine. Training initiated by a sergeant was more valuable than training initiated by myself. Exporting the NCOs' technical knowledge in the framework of mission command proved to be critical to the training dynamic. Demonstrating the NCOs' responsibility in setting conditions for conducting training was our single greatest success during Operation Cobra Gold. Our overall success was not measured by developing and demonstrating interoperability on foreign weapons systems by decreasing the time required for employing the mortar systems and occupying mortar firing positions, or even by providing mortar support

during operation Cobra Gold 2015. The accomplishments we made in training were surpassed by demonstrating the capabilities of the NCOs that are commonplace in the U.S. Army. In the execution of our training objectives, we successfully exposed the power of devolving leadership and responsibility to the sergeants and staff sergeants of our formations.

Operation Foal Eagle, Republic of Korea

The 90 F degree temperatures and humidity of Thailand gave way to winter conditions in the Republic of Korea as TF Warrior transitioned from Operation Cobra Gold to Operation Foal Eagle. As our convoy of buses drove north from Osan Air Force Base to our assigned training areas, we were struck by the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) presence north of Seoul. Driving north, we encountered numerous ROKA checkpoints, sandbag and concrete fighting positions, chain-link fences topped with concertina wire, and observation posts dotting the mountainous terrain. All of the positions had one thing in common; they were facing north.

As a platoon, we were excited for Operation Foal Eagle. We would now have the opportunity to maneuver our Mortar Carrier Strykers on elaborate live-fire ranges and have access to a significant amount of ammunition. This obviously presented a great training opportunity for my Soldiers. Again, we were aligned with a mortar platoon, which presented an opportunity to build on our previous experiences.

Live-fire training was the sole focus of our ROKA partners. They wanted to adopt our safety procedures and understand our live-fire planning principles. Most importantly, they were eager to conduct a mortar live-fire exercise (LFX). Due to the importance of Operation Foal Eagle, we were given a generous amount of ammunition to facilitate multiple days of LFXs. As a result, we had access to more ammunition than platoons at Schofield Barracks, HI, would see in a year. Our aggressive plan for conducting live-fire training required deliberate risk management and tough decisions in regard to executing bilateral live fires. This training presented an awesome opportunity to generate readiness for ourselves and our partners.

A critical piece for providing mortar support is the calculation of deflections and elevations by the fire direction chief (FDC) and check personnel. Data created by our FDC and check personnel is translated to mortar squads, specifically the M67 sight unit, in order to determine where a mortar round lands. Without being too detailed, fire direction is fundamentally based on math. Implements like the M16 plotting board, Light-weight Handheld Mortar Ballistics Computer (LHMBC), and Mortar Firing Control System (MFCS) apply trigonometry and characteristics of the mortar rounds to generate data for fire missions. In Thailand, our FDCs could sit side by side and conduct fire mission computation. Employment of different equipment (plotting board versus chart, LHMBC versus a programmed graphing calculator) validated the theory and mathematics behind mortar ballistic computation as our FDCs generated fire missions together. Our experiences with our partners in Operation Cobra Gold differed greatly from our experiences in Operation Foal Eagle. The FDCs did not demonstrate interoperability in drills or in training. Our counterparts made it known that the majority of their Soldiers had never conducted live-fire training. Our counterparts utilized a ground-and-track mounted 81mm mortar system. Their cannons were stamped with “U.S. Army” and their mortar systems dated back to the 1970s and 80s. They also incorporated a 4.2-inch trailer-mounted mortar system, which none of my 11Cs (indirect fire infantryman) had experienced. As a result, my NCOs were hesitant to employ the weapon system in live-fire training.

Figure 10-2. A U.S. Soldier is introduced to a Korean mortar carrier.

We found ourselves in a unique situation as our LFX window approached. I doubted our ability to conduct safe bilateral LFX, and it proved difficult to convey these doubts without undermining our partnership. Creation of the necessary deliberate risk-management worksheet became a serious challenge. How could we replicate our bore scope and pullover procedures? How could we avoid a serious injury resulting from a mishandled round? Would our FDC be able to generate data for foreign mortar rounds? What are the surface danger zones for the ROKA track and trailer-mounted mortar systems? These were the type questions being generated by my NCOs, who were then nested in the identification phase of deliberate risk assessment and management. The best conversations we had during Operation Foal Eagle were geared toward designing training that managed and mitigated risk to facilitate LFXs with our partners. Overall, we fired over 900 mortar rounds with a bilateral task organization during Operation Foal Eagle. The risk mitigation measures proved successful and enabled training, which improved our ability to provide accurate, timely, and lethal mortar fire support as a bilateral team.

Operation Balikatan, Philippines

If the freezing temperatures in the Republic of Korea were uncomfortable, the heat and humidity of the Philippines were a slap in the face. Upon our arrival at Fort Magsaysay, we were greeted by an unfamiliar climate and a new training audience. I assumed we would be aligned with mortarmen from our partner nation, similar to our two previous operations. Unfortunately, this assumption proved to be wrong. Instead, we were partnered with artillerymen from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), who had been recently added to Operation Balikatan. They came to us from the island of Mindanao, where they had been stationed at a fire base providing 105mm artillery support for AFP forces battling insurgent groups. Almost immediately upon greeting me, my partner pulled his cellphone from his pocket to show me videos of a fire mission his men had conducted the previous week. My eyebrows remained raised as my counterpart proceeded to explain how they lacked experience with mortar systems, but infantry units would refer to their battery for assistance employing their mortars because “indirect fires are indirect fires.” My counterpart had aspirations to learn U.S. Army tactics, techniques, and procedures to develop his soldiers’ abilities and to also ensure they were capable of instructing AFP soldiers on the employment of the mortar system.

We were put in an ominous situation, not knowing if we had enough time to instruct the AFP in a manner that was consistent with the Sand Hill training or the Mortar Leaders Course. The theme for our bilateral training in the Philippines quickly became adaptability. Training complicated tasks, such as conducting fire direction control and providing mortar support, tactical employment of mortars, and integration of mortars in a ground force tactical plan, stretched our creativity and ability to adapt. As artillerymen, our AFP partners were not strangers to deflections and elevations and were quick to learn fire direction and control procedures.

Our squads rapidly initiated a return to the basics. Instead of conducting digital fire missions in platoon sections tied to combat aviation and mounted maneuver elements — as seen during Operation Foal Eagle — our gunners and assistant gunners instructed our AFP partners on the employment of the mortar system. Adapting to the needs of our partners, our junior Soldiers became the primary instructors by using a field expedient classroom that consisted of easel boards, walls of buildings, and sketches on the ground. They had to demonstrate key tasks related to their role in a mortar squad, and they had to explain the why and how behind every action. Simultaneously, our NCOs were making preparations for the LFX by constructing a terrain model. To enhance the rehearsals even further, the NCOs employed VS-17 signal panels to simulate the impact of rounds resulting from the integration of the mortar systems in conjunction with the forward observers and the FDC to demonstrate the function of the entire indirect fires team. The mortar range on Fort Magsaysay presented an excellent opportunity to train firing using the direct lay method. This method of engagement is basically acquiring the target in the mortar's sight and using math to compute the elevation required to hit the target based on the range to the target. A problem faced by mortar sections and squads deployed by the AFP to Mindanao is their ammunition comes from three sources: Pakistan, Republic of Korea, and Serbia.

Figure 10-3. U.S. Army Soldiers instruct AFP NCOs on fire direction and control.

Each type of round has different ballistic characteristics that change the required elevation reading when firing on targets. During our live-fire training on the AFP 81mm mortar system, several of our NCOs were able to decipher the charge data provided in a box of Serbian 81mm mortar ammunition. They applied their expert knowledge and adapted the given charge data to U.S. firing techniques. The result was an overjoyed AFP mortar squad with an artilleryman who had never fired a mortar round and fired and adjusted 81mm mortar rounds on target. "Adapt and overcome" is a common catchphrase in our Army. Our experience during Operation Balikatan, in a way, validates the saying. We adapted to our partners' needs, were creative in the design of training, and applied the fundamentals of our specific skill set to accomplish our mission of bilateral training.

Conclusion

The movement of TF Warrior across the Pacific to participate in this operational deployment is a remarkable demonstration of regional commitment and projection of power. The greatest gains created by Pacific Pathways 2015 are not necessarily easy to identify in a "mission essential task list crosswalk" or readiness slide format. They are largely intangible and are difficult to define.

The variety and often ambiguous nature of our operating environments forced leaders at all levels to remain flexible and to adapt. During Pacific Pathways, the cornerstone and combat-tested backbone of Army leadership shined. Bilateral training placed the process of risk mitigation and management at higher levels, which forced deliberate decision making and greater scrutiny of exercised controls. Our Soldiers had to demonstrate mastery over their core competencies and technical skills, while training and instructing alongside their peers from other nations' armies. The decisive benefit of the Pacific Pathways concept takes its roots in the benefit of exposing the U.S. Army to environments where leaders at all levels must leap outside their comfort zone and remain there for extended periods of time. It is in this environment where leader development takes place.

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- **Handbooks**
- **Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends Reports**
- **Special Studies**
- ***News From the Front***
- **Training Lessons and Best Practices**
- **Initial Impressions Reports**

COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
Additional Publications and Resources

The CAC home page address is:

http://usacac.army.mil

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.apd.army.mil> or the Central Army Registry (formerly known as the Reimer Digital Library) <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA at <https://atn.army.mil/media/dat/TRISA/trisa.aspx> (CAC login required).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)

CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.

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