The Operational Art of Counterinsurgency:
A Handbook for Instructors and Advanced Practitioners of Irregular Warfare

Second Edition

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Introduction

This hand book is primarily the Cliffs Notes for counterinsurgency and is meant to serve as a guide for experienced practioners. It contains outlines and key points.

When I put this together I made the assumption, that those that would read this would have already read the doctrinal manuals, would know the doctrine, and would have experienced at least one tour as a practioner, with experience in a truly integrated operating environment by working with the locals, law enforcement, International, government and non-government organizations and agencies.

The knowledge of the past is a prerequisite for understanding the present

This document is the second edition. It contains 16 Parts, an Annex and a Reading List. It also includes social media lessons learned from the Arab Spring and Occupy. Digital technology and Social Media has been a key influence and will continue to impact law enforcement, security operations, interventions and humanitarian assistance. Digital technology and social media are merely the tools that speed the process of social movements and conflict.

1. **Doctrinal Insurgency Fundamentals (FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency).**

This chapter synthesizes and summarizes key historical and doctrinal elements. You should have a copy of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency as references. Both these manuals are very good, look at them carefully and look at every page. Look at the suggested additional readings, read the foreword, the introduction and notes and then use Google Scholar or Wikipedia to link it with other open source material.

The key doctrinal elements you will need to reference from FM 3-24 is in Chapter 1, Chapter 3 and Appendix B. The entire Chapter 3 needs to be read with intent, but specifically look at paragraph 3-61 and the discussion on "Social Capital" your Homework:
- Use Google, Google Scholar and Wikipedia to find all the open source material you can on *Social Capital* and then link it with the fundamentals of insurgency, counterinsurgency and stability operations.

From 3-24.2 look at and read with intent Appendix A.

You must first and foremost understand the war in which you are about to embark…. Clausewitz.

Understanding the insurgent and the motives of the insurgency is the critical first step. *There are elaborate preparation models that can be used such as the IPB process, the ASCOPE-PMESII Matrix* and TCAPF, but even these methods rely on the "basics" and the basics are:
- What is the root cause?
- To what extent does the insurgent have internal support (physical, moral, economical, political, social, informational, etc, etc)
- To what extent does the insurgent have external support (physical, moral, economical, political, social, informational, etc, etc)
- What is the Insurgent Narrative, ideology and story? How is this appealing to the local and international audience?
- What is their level of will and commitment?
- What are the weapons and tactics?
- What is the operational environment and surrounding areas of influence?

What type of Approach do they use? Protracted, urban, identity, conspiratorial, a composite of these approaches? (See Annex A, FM 3-24)

How does the insurgent mobilize the means to support and sustain the insurgency? Using the acronym PMESII, ask these as a series of questions; Where and what is the political persuasion, coercion, abuses; military persuasion, coercion, abuses, etc.
- Persuasion
- Coercion
- Abuses, and reaction to abuses
- Foreign Support
- Crime
- All of the above

- Who are and what are the elements of the insurgency? (leaders, combatants, cadre, supporters, auxiliaries and mass bass

Insurgency's are also shaped by the dynamics and is also connected to your basic planning framework. The basic planning framework is outlined in the two paragraphs above and those bullets of understanding the basics and mobilizing the means. These dynamics are:
- Leadership
- Objectives
- Ideology and Narrative
- Environment and Geography
- External Support
- Sanctuary
- Timing
- Phases

2. **Successful Practices and Convergence of Trends**.

- Emphasize Intelligence
- Focus the operational design on the population'
- Establish and expand your secure area's
- Isolate the insurgent from his internal and external support
- Conduct continuous information operations
- I/O linked to ALL ACTIONS AND OPERATIONS
- Put the Host Nation in the Lead
- Train and build capacity with the host Nation
- Embed quality advisors
- Seek unity of effort; not to be confused with unity of command, unify effort of all the players, actors, agencies in your AO. Leverage each other's strengths and weaknesses

3. **Back to the Future:** some commonalities with past insurgencies/counterinsurgencies and today's environment

- Political Nature defies Codification
- Difficult to understand the relationship between political and military action
- Fundamental Social Reengineering
- Public critical of operations
- Divide and Conquer Strategy: Allegiance not readily apparent
- Leniency Regarded as Weakness
- Small Wars: Domestic Life not threatened
- Good deeds insufficient to counteract collateral damage

Why the past is important and an elaboration on "Back to the Future"

Here is my mini-lecture or seminar on this topic……We have failed to recognize our past as important to understanding the present and the future. There is a broader

historical context that must be explored, because this historical context is woven into the narrative and ideology of the insurgents.

Right wrong or indifferent, the broad historical context must be studied and understood. A good example is to read the peasant versions of insurgency in: *The prose of Counterinsurgency by Ranajit Guha   Also reading US history of the period 1848 thru 1863 on Bloody Kansas gives a US Perspective. German History of 1848 and the Weimar Rebellions is another perspective.*

Second: History, strategic history, has a way of surprising us. No need to elaborate here. This is one of those items that's needs to be an informal and casual professional development discussion over food and coffee. Example: After the declaration of the end of hostilities in Iraq, how did that suddenly turn into an insurgency?

Thirdly: insurrection, small wars, rebellions, and interventions must also be recognized for what they are not. They are not war. They are conflict, along the spectrum of conflict, that starts with Sit-in's and Peace Marches on the left of the Spectrum that proceeds right to insurgency, or farther to the right along the spectrum to total war. Although they might lead to war, these are "social movements. " There are political, economic and other grievances when not addressed that become change through the end of a barrel of a gun.

No body of counterinsurgency theory existed prior to WW II.

The USMC Small Wars Manual, first published in 1935, was based on the work of C.E Callwell, *Small wars: their principles and practice.*

For historians the difficulty is with continuity in the past. Seemingly, on closer study of the past, revolutions, small wars, and insurrections, seem to be more an episode than a war, and Governments and militaries have treated these small wars and stability operations as annoying distractions.

 Even strategy, treated as an idea with a continuous history is interesting, and results of success seem to be more plausible than definitive, while failure becomes an object lesson in what not to do. On the other hand, the careless use of history will mislead you terribly, especially when we attempt to seek historical connections where none may exist. This is going to spark serious uproar but in the interest of academic discourse I offer that our slow response to getting it right in Afghanistan and Iraq was a result of also seeking historical connections where none exist. For instance rather than focusing on Malaya and Vietnam we should have studied British Colonial example from 1837 to 1900 and we could have also used the Portuguese examples from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea.[i]

In the classic, "*The Prose of Counterinsurgency,*" the agency, or change for resistance comes in two simultaneous forms.

While resistance for the "elites" and politicians is often legalistic in its nature, "subaltern" resistance is often violent, and while elites may simultaneously promote both legalistic and violent approaches uncovering the history, culture and "trace" of the resistance is ideologically distorting and partial if we only rely on the "official" versions.[ii]

History, ideology and Culture mold ones approach to counterinsurgency. Hence, sometimes we have a tendency to miss the overarching political, social, psychological, and religious elements that make revolution possible. Taking a note from Political Geography, Culture sits in places and the defense of a place or an insurgency is a social movement.

Case in point; the first question that is asked in the TCAPF is: Have there been population changes in your village in the last year?   Culture and land equal identity. Placelessness (no land to own, IDP;s) and culture threatens my roots, my culture, my identity and the fear that it will be displaced or lost.[iii] This all feeds the Narrative for the insurgent.

History does not determine destiny but it does have a powerful predisposition. History is tied to culture and both provide the narrative. See *the Country Report, Afghanistan Master Narrative* for examples of these interdependencies'. Here are two examples from that source.

Narrative Title and Audience Segment	Condensed Master Narrative	Core Narrative Themes
The Great Game *Broadly held across segments*	For centuries, foreigners brought violence, instability, and corruption as they fought over Afghanistan's prized location. The Americans are just the latest in a long series of foreign powers trying to control Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan has always been and will always be unconquerable, protected by warriors defending the homeland and the faith. Afghans must remain committed to their independence, and should not place their trust in foreigners who will inevitably leave.	Occupation, Pride, Independence, Resistance & Struggle, Nationalism, Inevitability
Preserving Local Rule *Pashtun Nationalists, Tajik Nationalists, Turkic Nationalists, Hazara Nationalists*	For hundreds of years, local and tribal leaders have provided peace and stability to the Afghan people, guided by their own laws and customs. When power-hungry rulers have tried to steal authority from the tribe or village, these rulers have brought instability and violence to the country. Today, the Kabul government is trying to rule from afar, ignoring the authority of local leaders. Afghans should take control over their own destiny by remaining loyal to their local leaders and customs.	Tradition, Independence, Order & Continuity, Authenticity, Power & Control

The basic doctrinal conundrum centers on the relative role of political, social, and military action. Understanding the Narratives in play in the operating environment is crucial to planning. No planning occurs until you begin with what your counter-narrative

is, and then all planning and tactical actions proceeds around that counter-narrative or message.

4. **Insurgency Fundamentals (Gramsci).** [iv]

1783-1900   India, 110 known rebellions in 117 years

1837-1900   Queen Victoria's small wars: 233 interventions, 75 in the East India Company.

On a sliding scale of conflict, insurgency is the violent portion of any social movement. (Also refer back to Part 1, second paragraph.) If we view insurgency as a social movement that seeks political, economic, and military change, then all the indicators are, and have been, clearly there. Social movements usually begin with protests, demonstrations, harsh rhetoric, and when they don't achieve what they seek, then change is sought from the end of a barrel of a gun. A Contemporary example includes the Occupy Movement. Although, some elements that posed as Occupy attempted to hijack the movement through violence, taken together they illustrate not just the factions within a faction, but the escalation of violence along a scale or spectrum of non violence to total war.

Each insurgency is unique and although there are many similarities, the root cause can usually be traced to political, economic, and, or military change. Another example is the so-called Arab Spring.

Histories tend to exclude the insurgent as a subject of that history: your ASCOPE/PMESII Crosswalk will only address the superficial aspects if you are not careful in your analysis.

Here are some examples of social and economic elements linked to culture and identity that can become friction points that lead to violence.

Landlords as Money Lenders?   Rent of some kind, to include transit rents for nomads. Rent can be in kind and not just cash. "Identity or distance is expressed in differentials of wealth, status and culture."

Terrorism is an organized form of violence that includes the concept of collective liability. Collective liability means that a group or members of the offenders group or social category are held accountable for the offenders conduct. [v]

This relationship of dominance-subordination is a political relationship.   First attempts to work within the system usually fall on attempts at Justice thru the police and or courts; absent that the problems escalate to…….. Demonstrations? Riots? Car bombs? Etc.

Despite the fact, that their concept of power may not rise above localism, sectarianism, and ethnicity does not take away the fact that it is still all a problem of political character but defines the quality of the politics by specifying its limits and limitations.

What are the pillars of politics for your AO? (think strategy deficit and the link to operational design and tactics: ..a failure to perceive war/conflict and politics as a unity which war/conflict is fused with political considerations that include social and religious dimensions [vi]

Your starting point: take the Rebel-Peasants awareness of his world view as he sees it and his will to change that view as your point of departure. This is the interdependency in Master Narrative, Counter-Narrative and your plans and actions. This now becomes your silent weapon in your *Spatial Terra and your figurative and literal War of Position*: *The primacy of the elements of media, perception and ideology must be linked and messaged with your operational design.*

These are Brigadier ZaZai's, Afghan National Army, 13 COIN Principles in 2009 [vii]

- **The people are the center of gravity. The people's center of gravity is their religion and culture.**
- **COIN must be balanced between kinetic and non-kinetic action.**
- **Engage the local population in the local population.**
- ***Execute small achievable essential needs* for great enduring effects. The people know what they need.**
- **All non-kinetic actions must shape or support kinetic actions. *They must be sustainable, provide security, or endear the people toward our position.* This will lead to the destruction of the enemy.**
- **PREP- Protect, Respect and Empower the People.**
- **Own the Night.**
- **Do not clear if you cannot hold.**
- **Do not hold if you are not prepared to build.**
- ***Build using the stakeholders of the community.***
- **Provide the essential needs first, for Southern Afghanistan.**
- **Listen first. Inform first.**
- **Public affairs and Information operations must work together in order to inform, exploit and mitigate.**

The COIN the war at the tactical and operational level is the war within the war to gain "position" and legitimacy in each of these elements[viii]

Here is the British formula for its approach in the 1800'S: `Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pushtun, and honor the Baloch.[ix] These principles are still recited by Afghans today. In essence, history and culture has a long memory .

Here are the elements of the war within the war. These elements pertain to the overall counterinsurgency effort, as well as, to each area of responsibility a unit is engaged in. This is why every interaction, every tactical action, must be dealt with skillfully and with decentralization. Von Moltkes original intent for "Auftragstactic", or Mission Command works best in SFAT, Stability Operations, and COIN.

- **Legitimacy**
- **Shooting war**
- **Isolation of internal support**
- **Isolation of External Support**
- **Popular Support**
- **National Will to Stay the Course**
- **Intelligence and Information war**
- **Unity of Effort**

Gaining legitimacy is both an historical principle and a contemporary principle
Six potential indicators of legitimacy might include:

- The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats).
- Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the population that you are there to protect and serve.
- A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes.
- A culturally and locally acceptable level of corruption.
- A culturally and locally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development.
- A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.

5. **Intelligence and Planning**
There are four basic steps.
- Define your operational environment
- Describe the operational environment (step 1. Understand the Local Environment. Of critical importance is to identify "root cause" and to remember that a grievance or complaint is not necessarily a root cause of instability
- Evaluate it
- Determine courses of action.

1. Understand the Local Environment

ASCOPE/PMESII → i. Understand the Operating Environment
↓
Focus Analyses → ii. Understand the Cultural Environment
→ iii. Identify Causes of Instability & Stability
TCAPF Data → iv. Integrate Local Perceptions and Grievances

2. Design Program, Implement, Measure

Tactical Stability Matrix → i. Decide Which Cause to Address
→ ii. Decide What Measures of Effect to Use
→ iii. Design and Implement the Program
Monthly Stability Assessments → iv. Measure the Effect

Vignettes and Supporting Notes.

Vignette; A SSG Squad leader from 2-2 SBCT….I was able to negotiate effectively with the Afghans because I had what they needed/wanted and we both knew this. Unfortunately I was not able to effectively build trust because I was not able to follow through due to lack of support from higher HQ's[x] This is a great example of not having complete "Auftragstactic" or Mission Command. A key leadership principle and key COIN principles were violated here.
*1. If I have the responsibility, then I must have the authority and resources. From a population centric COIN point of view this NCO did not have what he needed to be able to achieve "Social Capital" Think Buying a car and although you have developed a great relationship with the salesman, your business partner or spouse does not support the negotiations process and the deal breaks down.*

A SGT from 2-2 SBCT describing his impressions of how cultural considerations conflicted with mission demand…. We were not allowed to talk to women, or search them or enter certain residences without supervision from the ANA and ANP. The ANP would not search any car with a female in it. Although, frustrating from a soldier's point of view, this is a great example of considerations that must be planned for when integrating a comprehensive and integrated approach.

A PL from 2-2 SBCT ….I demanded results….everything was a slow process of quid pro quo. I delivered on a promise when they delivered on a promise. They had to earn my trust of them as much as I had to earn theirs. This is an excellent example of what truly a population-centric approach could begin to look like. It is also a good example of how that social capital is built.

*A 10th Mountain PL comment…..*Our Company Commander was pretty biased against the local population, enemy or otherwise, and tended to pass this on to his subordinates. Mostly his was not helpful especially on combined and joint missions. Leaders and leaders attitudes are key. If you cant disengage from the attitude, then you need to find the right leader that is up to the task and replace this level of toxic leader. This Commanders attitude was fatal to the mission, and only builds a succession and accumulation of incidents in which a Green-on-Blue incident could develop or you lose the entire village because of how you treated certain people.

Visualizing the Process

6. **ARFORGEN Reflections.**

90% of mistakes reflected poor understanding of COIN

New training requirement…the tactical event with strategic consequences

Everything….everything is a Shaping Operation or contributes to shaping an operation…shaping never stops; shaping begins before the clearing operations begin.

Shaping is Influence Operations.

Training Needs To Include Interagency Involvement during ARFORGEN

Each Tactical Event has, and accumulates, a collection of consequences that include impacting the Strategic level. See the last vignette above of a Commanders attitude.

aAll training should focus on the Tactical Event with Strategic Consequences

Historical Vignette: the tactical event with Strategic Consequences. The Mumbai Attacks in 2008[vi]
1. *Choice of targets; all Western Hotels*
2. *Insurgents used two and three man teams, there were a total of four teams*
3. *All targets were high visibility for the economic and political clientele they served*
4. *Hostages taken had a specific value*
5. *Insurgents used multiple simultaneous engagements*
6. *Insurgents knew the target areas well, implying a high level of knowledge and rehearsal*
7. *Insurgents force protection came from using cell phones, and the fact that they never stopped moving. it was difficult to pin point their location long enough to fix them in one place*
8. *Economic impact; World Cricket Matches moved to South Africa*
9. *Soci0-Political Impact: Created increasing tensions between India and Pakistan*
10. *Pakistan redeploys troops from FATA and NWTA to Indian border*
11. *Taliban enjoys approximately one year of respite to train and equip because of troop redeployments out of FATA and NWTA*

*There is no such thing as impartial governance or humanitarian assistance. In this environment, every time you help someone, you hurt someone else.……*General Rupert Smith

What we are asking the Squads, Sections, Platoons, Company's and Battalions to do….
- Navigate the internecine Politics
- Identify potential supporters
- Identify spoilers and detractors
- Maintain neutrality from power brokers
- Fight the enemy

- Protect the population
- Make friends
- Keep the friends you have
- Integrate your actions with others outside your chain of command and span of control
- Recognize that money is power and that everything is quid pro quo, nothing is free and you give nothing away unless you get something in return. Build the trust and credibility slowly by delivering on your promise as the local delivers on his. Start small and successively "test" the relationship in the beginning. He will be testing you as well in everything you say and do.

7. **Application…an "how to"**

When training and working with your counterparts …. Plan and prioritize your training based on your operational needs and requirements. Difficult to always learn a language, so use hand and arm signals and practice them constantly; TRADOC and Culture Center have not caught up with Operational need so develop your own pointy-talky cards for specific mission sets that you need some language capability at the tactical level. Your counterpart might know some hand and arm signals but be sure you train and arrange what they mean before you go out on a joint patrol/mission.

Tailor your training to how your counterpart thinks. In the Middle East and Afghanistan. Metaphors and analogy work best. But you must also know which ones to use in the context of culture. One that is universal? Use a wedding as a basis for training to plan and coordinate a large action. Also chess and checkers for planning and strategy.

Treat your counterparts like they were your own squad, platoon or company. The respect you build will be exponential and the payoffs and dividends in intelligence will be greater

Sometimes you have to learn to ask the right questions. Ask a question several different ways.

Always explain why and what you are doing.

In COIN, John Steinbeck said it best "The Mind is the final weapon"

This is so cliché, but still needs to be said: learning basic introductions and key phrases in the native language will build immediate credibility and respect. Practice a word or cultural item every day. Exchange something funny or witty; everyone loves humour

Put the COIST Team to work. They can make a personality matrix or link matrix of all the players in your AO to include cell phone numbers.

Record everything and then place that info into some kind of file format. Even if it's a plain notebook of paper go back and file it, categorize it and read it again. Review your journal and matrix weekly, go back several weeks

Harness the effectiveness of those NGO'S, GO's, and other people in your AO that are effective. Trade with them, develop them (as in Social Capital), and integrate them. If you don't know, or are not sure, ask your counterpart and the locals who they trust.

When conducting a KLE don't get into a rush, take everything else off your plate for the day, even several days, and focus on your KLE. You will need to make several visits but some of the basics are:

1. Introduce yourself and why you are there
2. Ask about the area and try and get details about the local area
3. Compliment them on several things such as: the people here are friendly, this village is so nice; even if it's not true, But, compliment them like you mean it
4. Find commonality and always reinforce the authority and respect of the local leaders , movers, shakers and influencers
5. Identify the risk to them and how it is a benefit
6. Be aware that the locals may not be immediately forthright. Either they are fearful or someone is listening to the conversation, or both
7. Establish in mind that you have or will help them to help themselves improve the area and eliminate the threat, but you do not have an open checkbook and do not promise anything unless you know beyond a doubt that you can deliver; also, it must be a quid pro quo. In essence, I help you and how do you help me. Nothing is free and everything has a price and must be negotiated

Operational Vignette:

"A more tangible psychological victory occurred while we were conducting a TCP in support of a big operation on a road leading into Taliban country; a group of villages with no CF or regular ANSF presence. We had taken significant contact from one area on multiple occasions and had always had our vehicles nearby maneuvering to support. The enemy had also observed the pattern in other units of never straying far from the trucks.

The enemy tactics clearly reflected their intent to bait our dismounted element with harassing fire, then fall back to the most likely flank where our vehicles could support, and initiate a complex ambush while our elements were divided. I also knew that they would decisively engage the ANP by themselves, because the ANP were predictable, would most likely be out-gunned, and not have enough men to maneuver.

After discussing ideas with a couple of my NCOs, the first thing we tried was conducting a leave-behind with three guys, including a sniper, sitting behind the ANP truck while the ANP squad continued their TCP. Our trucks drove away towards the FOB making the ANP look very vulnerable, an easy target for the enemy. Sure enough, they attacked what they thought was a soft target, and were not ready for accurate fire from an M14 and M203 grenades coming from behind the ANP truck.

Although not decisive, that was our first psychological victory due to the casualties we inflicted. The next time the ANP got attacked, we responded with the trucks to reinforce them similar to previous times, but on the way, we dropped off a team size element with a sniper and two ANP with a radio scanner to maneuver 1k in a bold flank to set up a long-range ambush.

Like we expected, the enemy remained focused on our trucks and continued to maneuver forward and mass their force of about 20 fighters. From his position, nearly 700m to the enemy's flank, my sniper quickly identified an insurgent commander with a hand-held radio emplacing and directing the fighters. His team was also listening to their conversations and plans on the ICOM scanner that we gave the ANP.

When the Taliban commander suddenly fell backwards with a gaping hole in his chest, gasping his last few breaths into the radio, the entire enemy force quickly realized they had fallen into our trap and the unthinkable had just happened; their only option was to run. From that moment on, we were never again decisively engaged from that town. We had established a reputation of being unpredictable and aggressive, leaving the enemy constantly watching their back and avoiding fights.

About a week later, we were patrolling in the area again and took harassing fire. We pushed through hoping to find some bodies, and then observed a man over-watching our movement.

As my grenadier was about to engage him, he initiated an IED 20 meters from me and my lead team. Because we came from an unlikely direction, we saw him first and made him panic and initiate too early. That was the closest they got to us, and the trigger-man escaped through a barrage of fire and grenades, giving him second thoughts about attempting that again. In the end, the enemy wasted a lot of ammunition, weapons, IED materials, and lost about 20 fighters while achieving essentially zero effects on us.

The insurgents like to have a predictable result from their attacks and usually will not commit to something when they don't have confidence of achieving that result. We established a reputation from the start, and they knew who we were versus the other units in the AO. Our ability to stay ahead in the loop kept them on their toes, always wondering what would hit them next.

If they simply perceive that you own the terrain, you have effectively denied it.

Integrating training, planning and operations with your counterparts was also crucial to establishing several elements of the war within the war.

Once you have denied the enemy the use of both the population and terrain you have won; but, only in your immediate block/district/area and only until tomorrow. You have to win again each day and you have to build local capacity while you do. Remember you are only creating positional space until they can do it all on their own and that will take a while."

8. **Reconstruction and Development: Shape, Clear, Hold and Build (SCHB), Comprehensive / Integrated Approach.**[xii]

Vignette…Marjah….despite good progress securing objectives residents remain hesitant to engage coalition forces for fear of retribution as unarmed groups intimidated local residents/leaders and even participated in crop harvest to monitor activity; renovating bazaars, schools, clinics, is insufficient to persuade them that afghan and coalition forces can provide for there well being better than the insurgents can.

Reconstruction and Development have little value in the absence of security.

Comprehensively clearing terrain is a slow and methodical process; removing the social networks and contacts requires months of work and close interaction/immersion.

Shape-Clear-Hold and Build can only be enabled by ANSF, Coalition and NGO Partners working in unity of effort. This is crucial to winning the war within the war and this must be done each new day.

What is the difference between a development project and a stability project? How do you know this?

Is the existing governance functioning? Is it viewed as predatory or legitimate? Does it appear to represent the interest of key power brokers or the population?

Will the inability to meet expectations' give the impression of failure? Have you set your expectations/goals to high?

9. **CCIR/PIR/EEIR and Design Questions.**

All Design and Planning must begin with "What is my I/O Message?" or as stated above, What is the narrative, what is my counter-narrative or message?

How do I Leverage unity of effort and weaknesses of partners operating in my Operating Environment?

What percentage of Troops is off the FOB, immersed in training partners, and engaging the population through partners?

Where is the continuity over time: OEF 6 to OEF 16?

What is the difference between a development project and a stability project? How do you know this?

Does the project achieve an effect? What kind of effect? Has it been red-teamed/gamed for 2nd, 3rd and 4rth order effect? Does this effect include gaming social dynamics and socio-cultural intelligence?

Are cross cultural skills incorporated into operational and tactical design process?

10. **Thoughts, Questions, and Remarks on Measures of Effectiveness.**

Since Clausewitz promulgated his principles of war, Western militaries have increasingly done two things; focus on the absolute management of violence and to draw a finite line between the military, and politics. Additionally, soft skills in the areas of economics, finance, diplomacy and politics unrelated to the management of violence are neither expected nor rewarded. Therefore these skills must be co-opted from existing sources.

Although measures of effectiveness might be strictly attributed to an "urban" environment, on closer inspection this is untrue. Power brokers at the local level are intrinsically linked to power brokers at, with, and through the district, provincial and national level in one way shape or form.

By way of example: Agricultural production in Afghanistan consists of five elements: Land, water, seed, animal, or mechanical power and human labor. Theoretically, anyone that contributes to these elements is entitled to 1/5 of the resulting crop/profit. Land and water are usually linked together which then means a 2/5's entitlement. With this in mind, consider the following bullets.

"How does the rural merchant gain access to social, political and economic resources?"

1. Amount of absentee land ownership

2. Savings in the Bank

3. Difference between licit and illicit economic growth

4. Craft and cottage industry (carpets, jewelry, pottery, agri-business Micro level

5. Money re-invested back into farms

6. Generators, to charge cell phones

7. Refined Oil smuggling: Is Diesel Oil dyed and what color? China, red for non-taxed and blue for taxed. Some types of non-taxed and dyed oil is designated for a specific industry

8. some oil is of inferior quality based on type of oil and refining, this oil is dyed as "non-taxed" smuggled in and then redyed a different color and sold as quality fuel oil

9. Access to finance and credit at the local level

10. Are local agri-sellers indentured/ tied to credit obligations

11. Commodity Prices at the District/Provincial/Regional Level (Brick, wood, oil, Rice, Wheat, Cost of Bread, Goats

12. Cost of fodder,

13. Who controls storage of agri-crop?

14. Price controls at the local area? How and why? (credit? Regulated? Controlled?)

15. Local inflation levels

16. What is the local expectation of local, district, provincial and or capital control of markets and policy?

17. Car Prices, Used Car prices;

18. Amounts and type of Aid in both dollars and items given/donated to rural areas

19. Currency exchange rates

20. Urban measures are tied to power brokers which restrict /regulate local markets; these players are tied to a political party.

21. Lease lengths ? trapped by no tenure which in turn means no micro, or medium to long term investment?

22. Price Margins at the street level

23. Prevalence of Co-op's

24. Time delays from point of sale to point of delivery

25. Wage-labor basis points (piece work, day labor, carpet making, weaving,

26. Grape negotiation prices and contracts in August and amount renegotiation by packers/shippers,)

27. Buying and then reselling at the local level as a coping strategy

28. Smuggling rates as an indicator of poor security or good security/risk

29. Are local/small/agri sellers locked into a specific contact for sale?

30. Imports, (costs of tariffs, taxes, permits,) how much is informal how much is formal

31. Exports (costs of tariffs, taxes, permits,) how much is informal how much is formal?

32. Numbers of conflicts resolved at the district level

33. Have the trade routes changed? Why?

34. What is the farm to market routes? Have they changed? Why

35. Shipping/driving cost as a reflection of the perception of security. (what does it cost local farmer or transport carrier to move goods? to move a 20 foot container? A 40 foot container? What does insurance cost and from who is it purchased?

36. What are the contacts/sources of trade in Diaspora communities (Carpets, Agri-business and Machinery)

37. What are the consumption rates for fuel, oil, wood and commodities

38. Savings? How much and where?

39. What are the Afghans Buying? (change Afghans to your Host Nation of Choice)

40. Scrap metal, where and how salvaged?

41. Number of Weddings at Traditional times of the Year? Eid?   Spring?

42. How many HVT's apprehended using non-lethal means?

43. How many snipers captured during exhilarations?

44. How many tips/walk in's received?

45. How are players tied to a political party?

46. Amount and types of inventory for local vendors; inventory reflects economy and growth and includes: wheel barrows and plastic or metal fabricated tanks for water/oil/fuel

47. Wool weavers: North Afghanistan; Do the carpet weavers own the loom or get it from the carpet trader?   What type of carpet wash do they use; Tea, antique, traditional? Where does the merchant hold his contract; with buyers? Or are they independents? Is there a carpet inventory?

48. Economic elements: raw material exploitation, what is gov't role in imports? What are the local economic expectations? where is the economic parity, or lack of economic parity? What COIN fundamental does this relate to? Refer back to the chart on Visualizing the process.

49. What are consumption patterns of oil, gas, bricks, lumber, rice, wheat? What are sustenance commodities and who are the brokers? What players are marginalized?

50. Markets as social arrangement; how are they connected? Don't just look for what is disconnected; look for what is similar and common.

51. Shipping costs as an MOE. (GO's and NGO's can give you "their" shipping costs) Why? In addition to the certain amount of margin/profit inherent in any business transaction the perceived level of risk of shipping products from point A to Point B will

also drive up the cost. Additionally, commercial carriers will also increase the "risk insurance". So in essence the cost of shipping is increased by a minimum of two factors; the amount of risk that the carrier will assume and the additional cost of insurance. Factoring in illegal checkpoints and graft along the way is usually included in the normal cost of doing business, unless, the security situation is becoming or has become untenable or the amount of corruption and other actors getting involved has also changed the cost of the "baseline". Lastly, no customer is created equal and my cost will always be different from your cost based on many factors.

52. When measuring security in economic terms what are the Afghans spending their money on? Is there an increase in luxury items? Used cars? Name Brands and fashion items? If they are concerned about security, and thinking of leaving the country, they will rethink household spending and savings.

53. If we consider that inflation has either stabilized, or even decreased, then why are certain commodities in the area still expensive? Bricks, Wood for Construction, Rice, Oil, etc? what does this look like for districts? For provinces? For a specific RC and then a region?

54. Have the shipping lanes and LOC changed for "Farm to Market" or from "Producer to Exporter"

55. When considering that we may be measuring a "free market" economy in an Afghan environment, this is in some degree counter-intuitive to the Afghans that have leaned toward "services in kind". Yes, money is transacted but the economy of Afghanistan is more informal and based towards something that resembles "in kind" in order to avoid taxation, and regulation from the Central Government. This keeps revenue and profit at the Provincial and District Levels. Consider how "taxes", "stamps" and "permits" are regulated at the Provincial/District level.

56. GDP and employment figures are usually "lagging indicators" of momentum and not "leading indicators" of gaining momentum in perceived index of improvements in security the elements of PMESII

57. If GDP has improved, then why has this not yet benefited the average Afghan? if polls are correct, 42% of afghans are below poverty lines and another 20% are just slightly above. Does this mean that 62% of the population is *"vulnerable"* to insurgent exploitation strictly for economic reasons?

58. What is the cost of Gasoline and heating oil? What commodities have had a price change and why? This is related to both the formal and informal markets and perceptions of security, and not just on the basis of supply and demand, or market growth and scarcity. Is this cost a result of who the provider is? What are these costs for districts, along major LOC's, minor LOC's, provinces and then regions.

59. Who are the economic powerhouses in your area and how are they tied to political people of importance? If you follow the money, you know you will follow the politics and control from the centers of power back to the villages and clans (Access to

finance, debt levels and conflict at the local level is an indicator of who is indentured by who).

11. **Other Non-Lethal/Lethal Targeting measures**

A grievance is not necessarily instability. Instability are conditions that undermine

1. Freedom of Movement

2. Typical Activities

3. Triangulation Technology to fix a cell phone/transmission

4. Sniper Exfiltration routes

5. Sigacts (# found, # reported # Exploded) # reported over time as an MOE

6. Sigacts, who fires first as a measure of control of area; a political statement

7. A grievance is not necessarily instability

8. Instability are conditions that undermine

12. Police Training: a "How To" vignette

What does counterinsurgency and stability operations have in common with SFA? It requires building internal capacity of the police forces. Building this capacity in its police force, as well as other Afghan institutions, enable the international community to assist the government of Afghanistan to exercise and extend its authority and influence which in turn shape the conditions for effective governance and reconstruction and development.

Building this capacity is a key component in providing security and stability, and ultimately affects multiple lines of effort and operation. These are all crucial for the present, and for considering the exit strategy.

The professionalism of law enforcement institutions and the building of this capacity are directly attributed to the advisors influence and the training strategies and tactics the trainers use. Trainers must have cultural understanding; be tactically proficient; understand intra-department, inter-agency and , inter-department operations; and build lasting relationships and competence in core, secondary and tertiary skills.

A few years ago we were required to stand up the Operational Coordination Centers. These were localized centers at the Regional and Provincial level that were designed to coordinate security activities. Our mission was to teach the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) the coordination process, communications, operations and intelligence, and to synchronize this with the National Command Center; the ANA, the ANP, the ABP, the NDS and the Coalition..

Because different coalition partners and organizations were responsible for sections of subordinate OCC's that reported to each region, everyone had to be trained simultaneously in American doctrine as this was the basis for how the OCC would organize, train and execute its mission.

A key component of this entire process was to integrate intelligence collection and analysis with mission analysis. In essence we were teaching IPB and MDMP for COIN in a Joint and Combined setting and also expected our Afghan counterparts to develop an appropriate course of action with the right mix of capability based on available assets and agencies in the operating environment. If they did not have the assets or capabilities immediately under control they had to request them from an inter/intra-agency element or from next higher headquarters, even if it meant all the way to the National Command Authority.

After a period of training a series of individual basic, intermediate and advanced tasks we organized a STX to exercise and train collective tasks. In different training scenarios we asked our counterparts to react to a variety of representative activities; IED's, ambushes, night letters, natural disasters, and different types of criminal activities.

When we began this process, we conducted multiple MTT's to each region to implement this program that culminated in a 3 day Situational Training Exercise that tested and re-enforced all the previous individual training. The initial basic organization called for a combined task organization of officers and NCOs from the ANA, ANP, NDS, and ABP.

The OCC would operate on a 24/7 basis and this combined team would each provide staff members that would function in the equivalent of an S1, S2, S3, S4 and S6. This team would be responsible for lateral communication as well as communication and reporting up to the National Command Center and down to the Provinces. A Region could have as many as 9 or 10 Provinces that reported to them and the training and STX reflected this dynamic.

Assigned mentors were crucial during this entire process. They developed personal relationships with there counterpart and they established lateral networks with other mentors and agencies. Mentors were also instrumental in talking and walking through course of action development with their counterpart as this demonstrated unity of understanding and execution of doctrine. Although some coalition elements were not familiar with US doctrine, there were enough similarities' in the processes that learning was quick. The difficult aspect of translating the acronyms and definitions of military doctrine was remedied by the use of a military terms dictionary in English and Dari that had been produced by the Afghan National Army Doctrine Division.

Seemingly simple tasks such as posting unit graphics to a map, submitting a situation report and using brevity codes and proper RTO procedures seemed to create mayhem and chaos on a huge level. In some cases situational training exercises came to a complete standstill as we "re-cocked" or "re-set" player units to adapt to these organizational differences. Sometimes we jointly created new TTP templates, SOP's or reporting procedures' to handle an seemingly insurmountable inter/intra-agency challenge.

Mentor adaptability, creativity and the relationship he had with his counterparts determined the speed, receptiveness, frequency and level of competence in which the Afghan Police also learned and adapted.

In some cases it was a simple process of correctly translating and conveying the meaning of current doctrinal acronyms. Sometimes we had to mentor civilian police trainers on US doctrine, processes and equipment.   In some cases we had to simultaneously train US and Coalition members on the same IPB or MDMP process to level set knowledge on what we expected our Afghan partners to be able to demonstrate after 10 days of solid training.

Each partner and organization brought a unique perspective on how to manage, track, disseminate, and plot information in the OCC and our challenge was to attempt to integrate these perspectives while adhering to the spirit and intent of the program of instruction and yet maintain doctrinal balance to the TTP's.

In essence our function was to facilitate, mentor, train and operationalize – not just our police counterparts – but coalition and other GO's as well in order to meet our end state goal of standing up an "operational and capable OCC".
Although our essential critical training mission was to train the police and stand up the OCC, we quickly discovered that we were building essential relationships for future operations and training and mentoring the challenge of "strategy and response" across multiple diverse elements that spoke a diversity of languages and had varying degrees of experience in this process.

One approach we discovered to the challenge of understanding was to use analogies that cross cut culture.   For example, in one situation we had a staff element that seemed unable to get through the MDMP in order to develop courses of action for the commander. In this case we called a tactical pause in the training and reset the coalition and host nation actors with a planning analogy that everyone understood; how do you plan for a wedding and what is the time line for that plan. In this case we asked our 'elder' and experienced Afghan Police partners if they could share the experience of a wedding with us. We spent the afternoon dissecting his experience and how each element related to the MDMP in order to arrive at courses of action. The process was enlightening for all of us as we received a cultural education yet tied it to required training objectives which were critical to standing up the operations center.

SFA mission and training success is directly related to a host of soft and hard variables: cultural awareness, ability to merge cultural understanding, perceptions of credibility, impressions of your competence in interacting with others, asking the right questions, effectively working with an interpreter, adaptability and creativity, as well as your tactical and technical knowledge and experience

The mission of training police capacity is not new to the US Army; we have a long history of training and assistance missions. Although arguably most will say that this is historically a SOF mission, the US Army has been performing this mission in Afghanistan since at least 2005.

The mission has evolved over time and the creation of the Advise and Assist Brigades is recognition of the distinct importance of the capacity building mission in SFA. Tied to the importance and direct success of this mission is the skill and ability that the trainers bring and demonstrate.

13. A Theoretical Comparison of COIN Doctrine

The following comparisons of convergence and divergence are taken from the historical lessons learned during the counterinsurgency era of 1947 to 1975

It is a comparison of British, French and Portuguese doctrinal lessons learned in Algeria, Yemen, Aden, Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, Angola and Cyprus.

Does current US doctrine reflect a National style/Approach?
Does Current Doctrine Emulate other Doctrine?
What is the delta between doctrine and approach/style?

National Styles of Doctrine/Approach Methodology?

French	Heavily Militaristic; Total Counter Revolutionary Warfare; Propaganda; Highly Bureaucratic; Military Rejection of Missions Not Seen As Purely Military; COIN Doctrine Exclusively Military; COIN Doctrine Developed by Military, Highly Adaptive
British	Minimum Force / Hearts and Minds; Gradual Devolution of Power to Local Elites; Balance of Power; Military Rejection of Missions Not Seen As Purely Military; British COIN Doctrine Was legally Given Civilian Status; COIN Doctrine Driven by Civilians, Developed by Military
Portuguese	Minimalist Resource; Self-Reliance/Self Sufficiency; Psycho-social Action Approach; Emulation of British and French approach; COIN Doctrine developed by the Administration

American

USMC (40's) ⟶ 60's ⟶ 9-11

Convergence Trends in the Counterinsurgency Era (1947 to 1975)
- Communist Ideology
- Use of Propaganda
- Exploitation of grievance's
- Subversive in nature
- Geopolitically aligned with Peking or Moscow (State Sanctioned/Supported)
- Politically Savvy
- Highly Mobile
- Clandestine
- Belief in possibility of preventing revolution
- Creation of Special Forces
- Unity of effort
- Identification of power with control
- International system selectively galvanized to influence outcome
- Real agenda hidden behind a Nationalistic cause
- Effects gauged operationally
- Army Centric approach (expertise and knowledge base, based on National Approach)

Convergence Trends Modern (Post 9-11)
- Religious based Ideology
- Subversive in nature
- Ideology geopolitically dispersed (The Maghreb, The Levant, The Fertile Crescent, The Golden Crescent)
- Diverse interpretations of Ideology
- Politically savvy
- Globally supported
- Varying degrees of State sanction if any
- Exploitation of grievance's
- Use of Propaganda
- Development of theoretical models to deal with asymmetric conflicts
- International system has a larger influential role sooner
- Real agenda hidden by exploitation of grievances and religion

Doctrinal convergence across the both Era's
- Politics has primacy (at least theoretically also tied to national approach)
- Insurgents want ideological/political change
- Politics as pragmatism or mandate
- Interagency Approach
- Economic Aid programs

- Coordinated civil-military response
- Unity of command
- Change forced by coercion, intimidation, terror, direct action, subversion, propoganda
- Decapitation Strategies (vs isolation of popular support)
- Search for Effects
- COIN is Army Centric (theoretical base of expertise)
- Material power asymmetries
- Institutional resource requirements
- Culturally determined identities
- Intelligence Driven (strengths and weaknesses of self and enemy)
- Propaganda/Information Ops
- Mechanisms to control the population
- Protect local population
- Why the imbalance in power is not a good predictor of COIN outcomes
- Underlining the balance of the Threat and perceived enemy notions
- Recognition of the asymmetry of wills
- Doctrine developed *centrally* or *in loco* never fully institutionalized
- Lasting doctrinal change tied to immediacy of perception of threat Conventional vs COIN)

Doctrinal Divergence across the Era's

- Type of Political Strategy (Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, (What is the Purpose of the new State)
- Use of Special Forces seen as a highly militarized approach
- Use of Special Forces seen as a highly integrated approach
- Intelligence within the Civilian Branch or Military Branch
- Intelligence Branch seen/viewed as a tool of oppression
- Counter-gangs of "turned insurgents"
- Resistance to militarized approach requires higher degree of flexibility and coordination
- Lack of precision in targeting propaganda
- Fundamental overhaul in policy, organization, doctrine and approach to deal with a "weak" enemy
- Willpower and Interest is highly transitory and tied to political/military success
- Use of Draconian Control/Techniques
- Modern doctrine specifies security and stability operations have primacy

American Enhancements ?

- Creation of an "Effects Cell" in the Plans and Operations Staff
- Contractors on the Battlefield?
- FET's HTT, ADT, PRT's ?

Locus of Convergent Failure
- Failure to recognize that there are cycles to Strategic History
- A National style?   Over reliance on that style?
- Inability to Adapt
- Rethinking the Principle of War

COIN and the War Within the War

1. **Legitimacy**
2. **Shooting war**
3. **Isolation of internal support**
4. **Isolation of External Support**
5. **Popular Support**
6. **National Will to Stay the Course**
7. **Intelligence and Information war**
8. **Unity of Effort**

Assumptions of Future COIN

1. **State on State**
2. **Intra-state**
3. **International order based on state-centric system**
4. **Insurgency is vehicle for political change**
5. **Intervention based on formal treaty, informal alliance, friendships, requests**
6. **Modern Coin is Global? (Mutually supporting and simultaneously coordinated conflicts organized around loosely defined ideologues involving state and rogue actors employing all manner and techniques of unrestricted warfare?)**
7. **engaging in marriages of convenience to achieve objectives**

14. Counterinsurgency Leaders Course Historical Clift Notes
(This section is not meant to be comprehensive)

1. Roots of Insurgency:
   a. The first documented reference to guerrilla warfare appears to have been *Anastas* a Hittite parchment dating from the Fifteenth Century BC. Biblical references, although maybe only appropriate for a western audience include the Old Testament Book of Daniel, and the two books of the Maccabees in the Apocrypha.
   b. Classical sources include Polybius, Plutarch, Tacitus, Arian and Herodotus

The common features of these early insurgent activities include a degree of popular support, operating in difficult terrain, possessed a knowledge of the area that the counterinsurgent did not and they were more mobile than their opponent

    c. In the Eighteenth century European Armies appreciated the use of guerrilla tactics in support of conventional units and created irregular units. The Habsburgs created Croat and Magyar Light Infantry that were very successful in the Seven Years War, 1756-1763; in response the Prussians created *Freibataillone, or Volunteer Battalions,* in which North America became another testing ground.

    d. The destruction of General Braddock's force on the Monongahela in 1755 is an example of Regulars *inability to adapt to local conditions*

    e. Partisan units operated on both during the American Revolution; for the British; Patrick Ferguson and LTC Barnatse "Bloody" Tarleton; for the Americans, Andrew Pickens, Francis "Swamp Fox" Marion, and Thomas Sumter; some authors consider LTC Tarleton as an example of the use of *"inappropriate force"*

Early Treatises penned from the North American experience include: Treatise on the Small War (1790) and The Partisan in War or the Use of a Corp of Light Troops for an Army (1789); written by Johann von Ewald and Andreas Emmerich, two Hessian officers that fought with the British Army[xiii]

"Deeply ingrained in traditional societies, the government is viewed traditionally as an opponent rather than as a collaborator" (tax collector, war-maker, oppressor) and according to an old Burmese proverb *"the four things that cannot be trusted are thieves, the boughs of a tree, women and rulers"* [xiv]

2. Americans as Insurgents:
    a. American Revolution, Boston 1775; South Carolina 1780, Civil War
    b. Samuel and John Adams as terrorists and architects of the Boston Massacre and I/O Campaign; Foreign and Seditious Acts of 1789 (Early Patriot Acts?
    c. Civil War; General Order 100, Order 11 and the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus; (Sherman's March, Jim Lanes "Red Legs", Quantrill, Morgan,

3. Americans as Counterinsurgents[xv]
    a. Frontier West, Philippines, Cuba Vietnam
    b. Frontier west characteristic of "local defense, retaliatory raids, punitive expeditions, and complete subjugation
    c. Philippines; Leonard Wood and Arthur McArthur developed American "Progressive" Imperialism with schools, roads, SWEAT-MS. Involvement was brief and very unpopular; only the Vietnam war would become as controversial
    d. Trends in these "Formative Years before Vietnam include; the search for an effective local leader; tension between soldiers and civilians, difficulty in sustaining local and international support and the challenge of understanding the local operating environment
    e. Military deployment occurred when total civil order broke down, tactical success lost and not easily instutionalized

4. Irregular Warfare
    a. Queen Victoria's Small Wars. 1837-1900
        i. 233 expeditions, interventions and small wars; 75 of these interventions, expeditions and small wars were conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan, (Balouchistan, Punjab, Sind, Waziristan, FATA and Frontier Territories)
        ii. The Correlates of War Data Set; an analytical data set, 146-2001 US involved in 218 incidents, this translates to 3.9 incidents a year[xvi]

15. Historical Vignettes for Instructors

Prologue

The Opium war, although not covered as a vignette to support the COIN modules serves as a wider lesson in diplomacy, politics and how free trade prerogatives lead to war. Although conflict and violence are usually viewed as the most visible signs of relations gone awry, it is ultimately the use of customs, taxes, tariffs and import/export restrictions as a weapon that pave the way to conflict.

Present U.S. military actions are inconsistent with that fundamental of counterinsurgency which establishes winning popular allegiance as the ultimate goal. While conceptually recognizing the total problem in our literature, Americans appear to draw back from its complexity in practice and gravitate toward a faulty premise for its resolution—military destruction…[xvii]

Altering the set of beliefs oriented toward high-intensity warfare will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education. It will require significant reorientation of the services both mentally and materially. If correct, this paper casts doubt on the military's ability to truly be a "full-spectrum force," because attempting to optimize for the full spectrum of conflict may produce a force that is not particularly good at any one aspect of that spectrum.[xviii]

In every year since WWII at least one insurgency has been underway in the less developed areas. The current list of on going small wars, USMC Counterinsurgency Center of Excellence, lists 66 small wars; data analysis in Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2008 lists 302 episodes of armed conflict, of which 27 are considered "on-going" this is 4.9 interventions each year for 62 years.[xix]

Every Year since 1990, there is an average of 25 internal conflicts. [xx]

The past does not supply us with rules, but it does alert us to important issues and dynamics. The past can never be a substitute for knowledge of the current challenge, but it can help us understand that challenge."[xxi]….

a. American Revolution and The Paradox of Strategy

Source: *Counterinsurgency and the Global war on Terror, Military Culture and Irregular War,* Robert M. Cassidy

After the failed defense of New York in 1776 and Brandywine Creek in 1777 (Philadelphia), General George Washington adapted "Fabian" tactics , this strategy developed by Fabius Maximus, was more than just evading battle to save time; it is also a calculated effort to affect "morale"; morale of both the public and the military.

Current al-Qaeda strategy is based on the same principles and assumptions. To overcome military superiority, they evade direct battle and attempt to inflict the maximum amount of causalities. This attrition erodes popular support and increases the likelihood of political opposition to the conflict.   Like the American Revolution, the goal is total eviction of a superior military force. Eroding Political support and popular support becomes the locus of the strategy; the tactics used are those of the war of the flea, intimidation, coercion and subversion.

b. Malaya – The Learning Contest

Sources: Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Ed, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian; *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl*
(see also: Occasional Papers from CSI Press, Ft Leavenworth; OP 25 A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare :BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901–1902; OP 24, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902

The British counterinsurgency in Malaya began as a disorganized manner with neither side really prepared. Public outrage over the murder of three British Planters caused the government to declare a "State of Emergency". The insurgency then grew in intensity over the next three years. The government's initial reaction was primarily reflex in nature and all threats were

perceived as military threats that required a military response. In essence "more troops using the wrong strategy simply mean more alienation, more insurgents and the inevitable call for more troops"; Thompson noted "When the Strategy is wrong doubling the effort only squares the error.

The "Emergency", was a culturally diverse group of 5 major tribes. Although not as socially complex as Afghanistan, success in the emergency would require these entities to coalesce in order for the society to function normally. As in past small wars, the authorities did not immediately recognize it as an insurgency and this led to a number of missteps that initially created problems as the authorities attempted to treat this as a police action. In 1950 the "Briggs Plan" was introduced which also included a number of radical ideas such as relocating ethnic Chinese squatters and a substantial strengthening of the administration; Templers toughest challenge was to convince all agencies and organizations that no matter how far removed they thought they were from the fight, the "Emergency" had to be their first concern. Malaya is highlighted as a case study in successful COIN and is of course infamous for the concept of "hearts and minds", however; it is little recognized as a "learning contest" in which the British won. Additionally, the British overcame organizational inertia by appointing a single representative, which to some degree reduced procrastination, infighting, and improved interagency coordination.

Some general lessons can be learned from Malaya:

- The Administration, police and military should be coordinated under a single individual
- No matter how far removed from the fight, COIN is the first priority for everyone.
- Public opinion drives military and political events
- Not all threats are a military threat nor always require a military response
- Intelligence gathering and collection should be consolidated under a single individual.
- Late recognition of an insurgency is costly
- Large scale operations should be discouraged
- Emphasis on routine police work should continue
- Troops must be trained for COIN

c. On Insurgent Leadership, Ideology and Narrative

Source: Imperial Hubris, Mchael Scheurer*; The Third Option, An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations,* Theodore Shackley

During the Cold War era and the proxy wars of "National Liberation", The Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow accepted more than a 1000 foreign students a year. The faculty consisted of intelligence officers whose principle function was to screen candidates for supporters of Soviet Interests and its Dean was a High Ranking Staff Intelligence Officer. In Popular History, Illich Ramirez, a.k.a Carlos the Assassin and immortalized in the movie "The day of the Jackal" was recruited from this university. Likewise, some Madrassa's serve the same function and propaganda and subversion can be easily be placed in the curriculum in "International Relations" religion and any number of other subjects.

When thinking of the amount of time required to organize a insurgency think of how and when these insurgent organizations first became noticed as a threat. For example, Sinn Fein was first established as a political organization in 1916, and although the rebellion was subdued in the

1920's, it was still a powerful political organization that was able to garner internal and external support. Although the Rebellion may have been thought to have been initially repressed, the British eventually fought a 30 year insurgency.

d. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Minimalist Approach to COIN (Driving Innovation?)

Sources: *Counterinsurgency in Africa, the Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974,* John P. Cann; *Modern African Wars, Angola and Mozambique, 1961-1974*, Peter Abbott and Manuel R. Rodrigues; *Defense Policy and low-Intensity Conflict; the Development of Britains "Small Wars" Doctrine during the 1950's*, Bruce Hoffmann and Jennifer Taw, RAND

Background
From 1961 to 1974 the Portuguese conducted three simultaneous counterinsurgency operations; Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. At the time, Portugal was one of the least wealthiest countries by most standards of economic measure. In its principal campaign, Luanda, the capital of Angola is 7,300 air km's from Lisbon, Guinea is approximately 3,400 air km's and Mozambique is 10,300 air kms. For comparison, Malaya is 9,300 air km.s from London and French Indochina was 10,600 air km's from Paris. Britain would be the only other country to fight three simultaneous counterinsurgencies; Malaya - 1948 to 1960, Kenya - 1952-1956, Cyprus - 1954-1983

In addition to the logistical challenges of distance, Angola is over 1.2million square km's or roughly the combined size of France, Italy and Spain. Mozambique, the second largest covers an area just over 780,000 square km's and Guinea, a coastal tropical tidewater covers an area just over 36,000 square km's or roughly the size of Switzerland; tidal action actually covers about 20% of the land mass of guinea and reduced the area above tidal marks to roughly 28,000 square km's. Generally, rough terrain, geographical area's that are distinct, tropical climates and long borders with other countries also contributed to the challenges.

The Beginning
On 15 March 1961, 5000 insurgents crossed the border at multiple points along a 300 km strip and proceeded to create mayhem and chaos. The leader of the insurgent group, Holden Roberto had been encouraged by insurgent success in the Belgian Congo, where terrorism and violence delivered independence. Still today, casualty reports are conflicted but it is estimated that the first week of fighting killed between 300-500 Whites and between 6000 and 25,000 Blacks

Portuguese troops in Angola at the time numbered approximately 6,500; 1,500 Portuguese and 5,000 locally recruited. The troops were spread across Angola and unprepared for an insurgency. It took the Portuguese military two months to inject sufficient troops to begin operations and another month before they achieved their first operational success.

Portugal was primarily committed to NATO and most of its troops were in Europe. Its total Armed forces numbered 79,000 with the Army accounting for 58,000; by the end of the year 1961, Portugal had moved over 40,000 troops to its three colonies.

Portugal faced an intimidating array of insurgent organizations and to the extent that they could mend relations with each other they represented a formidable force. However Insurgent leadership changed hands three times in the first year frustrating insurgent attempts at consolidation. Despite insurgent internal dissent, they effectively fielded approximately 27,000 insurgents over the three theaters of operation.

If a countries GDP is an indicator of its ability to generate wealth and tax to support a war, Portuguese economic weakness calls into question its ability to resource a war. On the eve of war, Portuguese GDP was only 2.5 Billion dollars. Portugal would address these issues by spreading the burden for war across its colonies and it limited the tempo of operations to constrain resources. By including the GDP of its colonies, total GDP would amount to 4.6 Billon dollars; this would significantly impact its ability to wage a counterinsurgency.

On Doctrine and Training
The Portuguese way of war had the benefit of British, French and US Experience and they developed their policies accordingly. The uniqueness of the Portuguese way of war was in the understanding of the struggle, adaptation to it at the theater level and successfully converting national strategy to COIN tactics.

With few resources and an Army untrained to fight COIN, they made the following adjustments:

- Complete reorientation of the conventional force to a COIN force
- Indigenous recruiting that the colonies shouldered the lions share of the manpower requirements
- A shift of training and tactics to small unit tactics to match insurgent tactics and to also keep the optempo low
- Implementation of economic and social development programs that raised the standard of living which pre-empted insurgent propaganda and tactics
- Extensive Psyops and IO campaign.

Geo-political, Portuguese, and Colonial events between the mid 1950's and 1960 created a sensitivity to COIN in the Portuguese Administration as it watched events in Palestine, Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, Cyprus, Algeria, Indochina, and a host of other areas. During this period a number of officers were trained in COIN in the US, Britain and France and the Portuguese General Staff began to write a COIN Doctrine in 1960. This doctrine would mirror the British experience and its principles.

The Portuguese identified the social dimension of COIN as the key to retaining its and oriented doctrine and soldier training to reflect this. They decided that civil-military collaboration indispensible to COIN and trained people for their respective functions and tasks with this in mind. Decision making and problem solving was conducted at the lowest possible level, at the local commissions, those that had the most direct contact with the population.

The doctrine writers included all elements of national power and additionally divided the social dimension of doctrine into two parts; the army's support of civil programs and the promotion of the activities through psyops.

The military was about to embark on implementing new psychosocial programs in which soldiers provided not only protection from insurgents, but manpower to build schools, teach in those schools, drill wells, and initiate basic medical, health and sanitation services'

This doctrinal approach was viewed as a foreign concept and practice for regular soldiers who viewed his primary duties as one of killing the enemy; as a result a completely new training approach was taken In which soldiers were trained that it was vital to success that that they be aware of, trained in, and participate in civil-military measures and collaboration. Portuguese doctrinal development was a reflection of its sensitivity to its colonies, their vulnerability, and to its role in their defense. They had extensive experience in the African theater and knew the terrain and populations well

The studied numerous British, French and American experiences, theory and perspective and they proceeded to write a doctrine that drew heavily on the synthesis of this experience and the knowledge of its colonies. Portuguese methodology sought avoid the lengthy and extensive problems they had studied in the contemporary British, French and American experience in which troops arrived in theater not knowing what COIN or the environment was all about The doctrine was refined over time but was still very appropriate to its means and the circumstances of Africa. The basic tenets remained valid throughout the campaigns and influenced and guided war efforts.

Organization for COIN
Initially, each Theater had a Commander in Chief. In turn, commanders of each Province were both Provincial Governors and Commanders of a military region. This was a reflection of both doctrine and the realization that winning the hearts and minds was as much about socioeconomic development as it was about military affairs.

As the situation evolved, the Portuguese also used the French grid system or the *quadrillage,* and the overall command structure changed to reflect a growing need for pacification. The new structure was now organized into Military Regions, Territorial Commands and Zone Intervention Commanders.

Zone Intervention Commanders, in essence Battalion Commands, were responsible for direct military action, security and intervention. Zones were further subdivided into sectors.

They constantly refined and rethought organizational structures to best suit the needs of the operating environment and wrestled with the proper methods of civil-military integration. During the war they considered and used:
- Parallel civil-military structures
- A single military structure
- Mixed structure of civilian and military units and organizations.

In Guine they used a unipolar structure in which a single person was responsible for both civil and military operations. In the other two theaters a bipolar structure was used for political or psychological reasons or as a concession to civil government. In this case, coordination was achieved through Provincial Defense Councils which integrated the duties of the governor

general and the commanders in chief. Although the Portuguese system resembled the British system as established in Malaya by LTG Briggs, Director of Operations for Malaya, the Portuguese used both committees and agency liaison; The largest impediment to coordination however was the structural rigidity within each respective system (civil system and the military system).Never the less, each promoted ways to find solutions to local problems at the lowest possible level.

Organization for COIN
Portuguese Battalions were organized into three infantry companies; each company consisted of three infantry platoons plus a support platoon for a total of 120 men. The combat support company consisted of a recon/intelligence platoon, an engineer platoon, an signal platoon, and a maintenance platoon. Additionally, they developed a number of special units depending on the skills needed in a theater of operation; these units consisted of Commando's, Marine Commando's, Paratroop Units and Special Hunter Teams. The Portuguese had completely restructured the entire armed forces from top to bottom to adapt to the type of war it was fighting; this is in stark contrast to American, French or British methods employed during the same period. Additionally, they shifted the burden for manpower to each of the colonies, this served to reduce the political blowback to sensitivity to casualties, it broadened the source of manpower by by including the colonies, it reduced the cost of fielding troops and it increased the level of sustainability, lastly, it kept the conflict subdued subdued and the optempo low by moving conscription/recruitment and casualties away from Portugal

Training for COIN
The education and Training of troops was lifted from the British experience and addressed four interrelated issues:
- Understanding Insurgency fundamentals, subversion and insurgent political doctrine – how force is employed to achieve political ends and how political considerations affect force
- Integration of civil-military operations to achieve a single aim
- Development of planning and leadership skills in the context of COIN
- Tactics for COIN
- Extensive and ongoing training in local culture and language

Reconstruction and Development
The Portuguese, like the Romans, seemed to subscribe to the adage that the end of subversion depends on the morale of the population and good roads and averaged 1,400km's of tar highway a year for six years and built over 45,000kms of highway throughout all the theaters of operation. Additionally, Portuguese medical treatment and outreach programs, similar to MEDCAP, reached such a high reputation that patients would illegally cross borders from other countries to receive care. These paitients would not be rejected and in the case of maternity care also received follow up appointments. Another illustration includes the area of education; at the beginning of the insurgency in 1961 in Angola approximately 100,000 students attended school taught by over 2,800 teachers. By the end of the 1969/1970 school year there were over 400,000 students and over 10,000 trained and certified local teachers.

Conclusions:

Although a number of lessons have been parsed throughout this vignette, some macro lessons deserve summarizing. Although the military coup in 1972 brought operations to a halt, the insurgent situations in the Colonies had essentially been won. The focus on developing indigenous capacity and a low optempo was a function of constrained resources', technology and political balance. Central to this achievement was the recognition that the role of the military in COIN was to buy time to match the guerrilla concept of a protracted war, a strategy that dictated a long-haul approach and kept costs low and manageable. They provided tangible alternatives to insurgent promises which include redressing grievances supported by a psyops and IO campaign that promoted benefits. Additionally, soldiers went into the COIN environment from the beginning knowing how victory was to be achieved through training and education focused exclusively on the operating environment and the timely development of COIN doctrine. Every aspect of organization for war and deployment was based on the British premise of minimal force. They emphasized tactical flexibility and made decisions to local solutions at the lowest levels. Lastly, the complete reorganization of the entire armed forces to a COIN force was a radical departure from anything that had been done before

e. Chechyna: Shaping, Clear, Hold: How Intelligence Drives Operations (Overcoming Technological Superiority ?)

Source: *Counterinsurgency and the Global war on Terror, Military Culture and Irregular War*, Robert M. Cassidy;
Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000, Lessons from Urban Combat, Olga Oliker, RAND

Russian Doctrine called for bypassing well defended cities and had the Russians believed that Grozny was well defended they, in all probability, would have not have entered the city. The Russians believed and had briefed their units that they should not expect a fight - they expected minimal resistance - a repeat of Prague in 1968 in which civilians would flee in panic at the sight of Russian Tanks.

Russian shaping operations, or phase I, began in Nov of 1994 and they allocated a total of eight days in which to prepare and secure forward locations to support the main effort, achieve electronic warfare dominance and air superiority. Three days were allocated for Phase II, essentially a double envelopment in which units would envelop the city from five directions while simultaneously carrying out reconnaissance, protecting lines of communication, and securing the remainder of the Republic. Phase III, the actual assault on the city, was allocated four days in which to conduct the attack on the city simultaneously from the North and the South; secure the Presidential Palace and conduct sensitive site exploitation of the radio stations, television stations and other key government facilities and buildings.

Although the Russian Air Force had little difficulty in obtaining dominance, the actual maneuver time table began to slip. Maneuver units should have been in position by 7 Dec in order to initiate Phase II of the operation. they were 12 days late and units did not begin mobilizing for movement until 11 Dec. Additionally, they encountered unforeseen resistance from the public as they moved to tactical assembly areas; units were not in place until 26 Dec. throughout this period the city was never really sealed and as refugees poured out of the city, freedom fighters infiltrated in with relative ease.

When Russian Forces attacked Grozny on 31 Dec 1994, they were technologically superior to the Chechens. The Russians entered the city with 230 Tanks, 454 APC's, 388 pieces of artillery

and a sense of invulnerability and invincibility. The Russians expected that the operation would be nothing more than a show of force. The Chechens however had been prepared and turned every street, window, and block into an ambush advantage.

Chechen tactics include interposing themselves between two friendly units, firing at a unit and then exfiltrating out; the result was then a blue on blue confrontation. Additionally, the Chechens knew their environment and had drilled for urban combat. The rebels also employed non-standard squad configurations and tailored squads for missions, learning the lessons of past urban combat, the Chechens developed support cells that supported the squads; these support cells consisted of aid and litter teams, snipers, medics and ammo bearers.   Other tactics included:

- Allowing the Russian units to enter an area which would then be sealed from behind.
- The use of "hugging" tactics to neutralize the effect of artillery, mortar and close support.
- Sniper dirty tricks included wounding a soldier, then also wounding the aid and litter team
- Bobby trapping dead Russian Soldiers

The entire Chechen Operation reflects poor planning and extremely poor intelligence which led to the expectation that there would be minimal resistance; additionally reconnaissance was sloppy and did not really begin in earnest until military operations were already well underway. Regrettably, Russian Commanders did not adequately use their own reconnaissance assets and relied extensively on higher Hq's ISR capabilities. Planning also disregarded the experience of Chechen Loyalists, which included a number of Russian soldiers that had made attacks on the city in August, September and October of the same year.

There are many other lessons learned from this urban encounter such as lack of coordination, fratricide and untrained troops; the major lesson is a clear lack of understanding of the operating environment which in turn drove faulty planning and operations.

Annex A

Doctrinal Approach 1

Protracted Popular War Strategy
## Mao Zedong's Theory of Protracted Warfare

The protracted popular war strategy is based on Mao Zedong's theory of protracted popular war. This strategy is broken down into three distinct phases—latent or incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. Each phase builds upon the previous phase, and continues activities from the previous phases.

Indoctrination Of political and Military cadre

Infiltrate Government organizations

Wear down HN & CF Resources

Attacks on Government Infrastructure

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Op OBJ
Op OBJ
Op OBJ
Op OBJ
Op OBJ
Op OBJ

Strategic Objective

Build up of Unarmed auxiliary

Latent or Insipid (Strategic Defensive)

Guerrilla Warefare (Strategic Stalemate)

War of movement (Strategic Counteroffensive)

Doctrinal Approach 2

Identity Focused Strategy
## Mobilizes Support Based on Common Identity.

• The identity-focused strategy mobilizes support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. In this strategy, legitimacy and popular support are tied to their identity and, often, no effort is made to garner popular support outside their identity.

Doctrinal Approach 3

Conspiratorial Strategy
## Subvert the Government from within.

- The conspiratorial strategy attempts to subvert the government from within and often involves a few leaders and a militant cadre. Although subversive activities may take place in other strategies, particularly in the protracted popular war or urban strategies, conspiratorial strategies often attempt to have its illegal political party become a legitimate political party, enter the government legitimately and then take control of the government.

Doctrinal Approach 4

Urban Strategy
## Leverage HN Government Over-reaction to INS Activities.

In the urban strategy, the insurgents attack government targets with the intention of causing government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the government's repressive measures to enrage the people so they will rise up, support the insurgency and overthrow the government.

Public Acts of Terror

Focus Propaganda on Government Brutality

Op OBJ

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Op OBJ

Op OBJ

Strategic Objective

Public Acts Of Terror

Solict Government Over-reaction

Cause Public Uprising

Doctrinal Approach 5

Military Focused Strategy
Military Actions Creating Conditions Needed for Success

The military-focused strategy believes that military action can create the conditions needed for success. Military-focused insurgents often believe that a small group of guerrillas operating in an area where grievances exist can eventually gather enough support to achieve their aims.

Attacks on HN security Forces

Attacks on HN Govt

No Long Term Building of a Political Base

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Op OBJ
Op OBJ

Op OBJ

Strategic Objective

Gain Popular Support

Use of other Strategies

Doctrinal Approach Afghanistan?

Afghanistan Composite Approach

Regroup & Re-Establish Base	Remove CF Threat	Solidify Internal Support	Strategic Counteroffensive
2002-June 2005	July 2005 - Current	Current - ?	??

Move political base to Pakistan

Discredit GIRoA

Retake control of central gov't

Refit forces

Wear down CF forces

Shadow gov'ts become de facto

Defeat GIRoA forces

P M E S I I

Op OBJ

Strategic Objective

Maintain drug financing

Identity-based strategy

Regain social status

Effective Information Operations Throughout

Attacks on Gov't infra. & dev.

1. **Reading List**

   The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Stathis N. Kalyvas

   Heavens Command, Jan Morris

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Douglas S.Blaufarb

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Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

The Uncivil War, Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865, Robert R. Mackey

The American Way of War, A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy,
Russell F. Weigley

Counterinsurgency in Africa,The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974, John P. Cann

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The Father of us All, War and History, Victor Davis Hanson

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U.S. Counterinsurgency Methods and the Global War on Terror, Terry Tucker

*Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan; How different units adated to local
conditions;* Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, Jim Gavrilis, CNA Strategic Studies Division

*War by Other Means, Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for
Counterinsurgency*, RAND, David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV

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Victory has a Thousand Fathers, Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, RAND,
Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clark, Beth Grill

Selected Subaltern Studies, Ranajit Guha, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Non-State Threats and Future Wars, Ed, Robert J. Bunker

Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century, US
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Ed, Harry R.Yarger

Prolonged Wars, A Post-Nuclear Challenge, Ed, Dr. Karl P. Magyar, Dr. Constantine P.
Danopoulos

[i] Some examples to study include: Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961 to 1974, John P. Cann; see also: Heavens Command, an Imperial Progress, Jan Morris and Pax Britannica: the Climax of Empire, Jan Morris for a contrary view, or a so called peasants view see: Selected Subaltern Studies by Ranajit Guha. Also by Ranajit Guha is a classic called the Prose of Counterinsurgency.

[ii] Ranajit Guha is a classic called the Prose of Counterinsurgency; Elite according to Guha is "Foreign Elite, and Indigenous Elite such as feudal magnates, industrial and mercantile magnates and upper levels of bureaucracy.

[iii] Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization, Arturo Escobar, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Political Geography, 20, (2001), pp 139-174

[iv] Elementary Aspects ofpeasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Ranjit Guha

[v] USAWC Guide to Strategy to National security Issue, Vol I Theory of War and Strategy, P98

[vi] Ibid p98

[vii] ZaZai 13 COIN Principles were part of the COIN Training Center program of instruction. ZaZai was an Afghan National Army Corp Commander

[viii] Max Manwarring

[ix] Honor the Baluch page 1

[x] Taken from an actual language and culture survey administered by DLIFLC during the 2-2 SBCT Umbrella Week

[xi] The Lessons of Mumbai, RAND, internet accessed 22 OCT 2010 http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP249/

[xii] Marjah's Lessons For Kandahar, Jeffrey Dressler, Institute for the Study of War, July 9, 2010

[xiii] For the notes from 1a to 1e and comments in between see; *Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750, Ian F.W.Beckett;* see also *War in The Shadows, Vol 1,* Robert B. Asprey

[xiv] *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New myths and Old Realities, Charles Wolf Jr. 1965*

[xv] *Frontier Regulars: The US Army and the Indian 1866-1891*, Robert Utley; The *Spanish American War*, Russell Alger ; *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian; *A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines 1901-1902,* Occasional Paper 25; *Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines 1899-1902*; Timothy K. Deady.

[xvi] Correlates of War, and CSP Global Conflict Trends, *Measuring Systemic Peace.*

[xvii] U.S. Department of the Army, *A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN)*, March 1966, p. 53.

[xviii] *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence*, RAND, 2008, p vii

[xix] Tucker, independent research; Correlates of War Data Set, (Militarized Interstate Disputes, v3.10; http://correlatesofwar.org.); *Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2008,* May 2009, Center for Systemic Peace; *Controlling Small Wars*, Charles Wolfe, RAND, 1968

[xx] *Uppsula Conflict Data Project*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

[xxi] *Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, Lynn, John A., PhD. *Military Review,* July–August 2005, 22–27.