DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 201st BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE
JOINT BASE LEWIS-MCCHORD, WASHINGTON 98433-5000

REPLY TO THE
ATTENTION OF:

AFZH-BFSB-CDR

15 May 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Army Force Generation Lessons Learned

1. This paper on training the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion at the Joint Readiness Training Center is the first in a series of forthcoming papers detailing our experiences, lessons learned, and where appropriate, our recommendations for training a Battlefield Surveillance Brigade. These papers will serve as "book ends" to our Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Symposium which we hosted in March 2011 following our deployment to Iraq and conclusion of the ARFORGEN reset.

2. The details to drive a healthy dialogue are in the paper authored by the Commander, 109th Military Intelligence Battalion (TF DISRUPTER). In particular, the requirement for a review of intelligence related Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations available at home station and the combat training centers is note worthy. In the same vein, a discussion about the funding model used to train the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and its Military Intelligence Battalion(s) is desirable given the projections for fiscal austerity - more to follow on the topic of resourcing in future papers.

3. This and all the forthcoming papers are intended to provide bottom up feedback to improve our ability to train our units assigned to the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade. In effect, widening a conversation about our Battlefield Surveillance Brigades and how best to organize and train these types of brigades, and its assigned and attached units, that conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection operations.

4. Please contact our brigade S3, MAJ Brandon Smith, with questions or to engage on this topic. Gryphon 3 can be reached via email at thomas.smith3@us.army.mil or 253-477-2921.

WITH COURAGE AND VISION!

PAUL R. NORWOOD
COL, MI
Commanding

TEAM -
we owe our partners at JRTC a big thank you for the tremendous training opportunity.
LTC Woodall and the Disrupter Battalion have given us all a great start point for this discussion.
VR.
COL Pave Norwood

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Training a Tactical Intelligence Battalion at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)



109th Military Intelligence Battalion HUMINT Collection Team (HCT) Soldier at the JRTC

Recommendations and lessons learned from the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion's JRTC Rotation 12-05

109TH Military Intelligence Battalion
201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade
United States Army

April 10, 2012

SEEK AND DISRUPT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The First Intelligence Battalion Trained at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

The 109th Military Intelligence Battalion, 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) was trained as part of historic rotation 12-05 from 5 – 29 March 2012. This was the largest rotation ever planned and executed, and it entailed other key rotational units consisting of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum; 1st Squadron, 6th Air Cavalry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley; and 48 Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) led by the 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, Fort Campbell. Not only was this the first rotation of its type and the largest in the history of the JRTC, it was also the first rotation designed to train a tactical Military Intelligence Battalion. Training a tactical military intelligence battalion at the JRTC was challenging for the trainers and staff at Fort Polk, and the successful outcome of the rotation is a testament to the hard work by the JRTC Operations Group and all the planners involved in the effort.

What Did We Learn?

Our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) offer world class training. The challenge for military intelligence units derives from the fact that the JRTC is not designed to facilitate collective certification or assessment for our intelligence units. Any certification or intelligence skills' evaluation must be done at home station or at Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM) FOUNDRY sites. Often, this entails validating intelligence Soldiers' training separately from maneuver elements. It is imperative to train as we fight, and the 109th MI Battalion was fortunate to receive the opportunity to lead the way for an intelligence battalion to be trained at the JRTC. As the first intelligence battalion to deploy as a rotational unit, the mission command and maneuver integration training were key focus areas for 109th MI Battalion's training. Coming out of the rotation, the JRTC facilitated invaluable training in the following areas:

Robust intelligence stimulation will help to facilitate Commanders' understanding of the capabilities and employment of our intelligence Soldiers and their equipment.

- Mission Command
- Maneuver Integration
- Deployment/ Redeployment Activities

Lessons learned in each of these areas highlight that additional resources should be provided to assist with collective intelligence tasks not just for the JRTC, it highlights a shortfall in Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) for use at home station when training our intelligence collection tasks. This underscores a larger issue in the Army. We have TADSS for every Maneuver, Fires and Effects function, but very few for intelligence. This is critical when the closest available equipment to the CTCs or home station may be located 7000 miles away in theater.

Whether at home station or a CTC, the Army requires capabilities to train its tactical intelligence collection integrated with maneuver forces. Robust intelligence stimulation will help to facilitate Commanders' understanding of the capabilities and employment of our intelligence Soldiers and their equipment while driving the operations of maneuver units. This rotation increased intelligence collection asset availability by nearly 500% and also afforded numerous opportunities to partner Company Teams and Operational Management Teams with Task Force S2s and their Company Intelligence Support Teams (COISTs). These marriages helped earn those COISTs high recognition at the final Brigade AAR. Maneuver company commanders and platoon leaders learned about the employment of Low-Level Voice Intercept (LLVI), HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs), and Multifunctional Teams (MfTs)—capabilities that most had never worked with directly. In combat, platoons and companies will not receive as many intelligence assets as they did on this rotation. The added value from the robust partnership comes from our intelligence Soldiers and their maneuver counterparts learning the tactics, techniques and procedures needed to accomplish the mission and gain confidence not only in their individual skills, but also in their systems being employed.

What is the Next Critical Step?

FORSCOM should continue to rotate our tactical intelligence battalions through the JRTC. First, there is value added to partnering a battalion of intelligence expertise with a BCT. This creates a unique training opportunity for the Brigade S2, Battalion S2s and the COISTs. Next, it provides unparalleled intelligence Soldier interaction with maneuver elements at all echelons. The Army must stimulate and replicate how we fight in combat to provide an accurate assessment of what we can expect from our intelligence Soldiers while effectively integrating our operations with the other warfighting functions. Collective intelligence training for tactical intelligence companies assigned to BCTs should also be reviewed. If intelligence replication is limited, we miss training opportunities---- and maneuver commanders may conclude training without true assessments of capabilities and expectations of intelligence teams, and the ability to integrate intelligence seamlessly into their operations.



Multifunctional Team Sergeant Directing Actions on the Objective at the JRTC Rotation 12-05

Recommended Resources for the Joint Readiness Training Center

Now is the time to improve intelligence training capabilities at the CTCs. The following recommendations should be resourced at the JRTC:

- **Signal Generation Equipment.** Create more robust, versatile and complex environments to replicate battlefield conditions and current technologies.
- **Counterintelligence Improvements.** Address and train the insider threat, improve screening scenarios, and provide scenarios to train source validation. Close Access Target Reconnaissance (CATR) integration improvements will help facilitate better integration into operations.
- **HUMINT Scenarios and Support Improvements.** Create robust Master Scenario Events Lists (MSELs) for role players with clearances and use role players that possess source operations experience.
- **Exploitation.** Exploitation stimulation and replication needs additional resources and scenario augmentation. This is critical for Commanders to understand the importance of exploitation and interrogation. Moreover, field detention site operations must be improved, especially military police, maneuver unit detainee processing and intelligence enabler integration to increase the speed of exploitation.

Way Forward for the 109TH Military Intelligence Battalion (TF Disrupter)

The 109th Military Intelligence Battalion (TF Disrupter) was fortunate to receive the opportunity to deploy to the JRTC as a rotational battalion. This helped the battalion prepare for operations in Afghanistan and serves as a tribute to the professionalism and expertise of those involved with this rotation and the JRTC.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the training value of sending an intelligence battalion to the JRTC and to provide recommendations for improving resource allocation for collective intelligence training. It is essential that Commanders understand the emerging array of tactical intelligence capabilities available to support their units. This will also help to inform future rotational planners, as they will likely continue to see the inclusion of BfSBs and tactical intelligence battalions as rotational units to the CTCs. The first section of this analysis will highlight the key training opportunities the JRTC provided for the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion, specifically Maneuver Integration, Mission Command and Deployment/Redeployment training. The second section will focus on recommendations for resources that will help to facilitate collective intelligence training while also educating maneuver commanders on the spectrum of enablers and integration nuances associated with those systems. Finally, we must posture for the future and spiral the latest stimulation commensurate with the threat environment. Providing these resources now will also improve how we train the intelligence companies in our BCTs while enabling an environment to successfully train a BfSB.

Providing these resources now will also improve how we train the intelligence companies in our BCTs while enabling the robust environment needed to successfully train a BfSB.

MANEUVER INTEGRATION (Army Tactical Task 2.1)

Tactical intelligence capabilities must be integrated seamlessly with maneuver units. The cavalry squadron that is organic to the BfSB is a great maneuver partner for intelligence and operations integration--- the cavalry squadron not only serves as another ground based asset to train with, but also as another asset to conduct intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and surveillance at the lowest level. The squadron was crucial for the certification of 109th MI Battalion's sister battalion, the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM). By virtue of the BfSB's organization, the organic cavalry squadron (3-38 CAV) possesses a better working knowledge of intelligence capabilities due to



Low Level Voice Intercept Team Members Described by Task Force Commanders as "Game Changers"

the robust intelligence structure available for collaboration locally. However, training at home station must be balanced among other resource priorities and constraints. Training at our CTCs leverages the full support and capabilities of FORSCOM; CTCs ensure we get the right forces, right observer controllers/trainers, and best resources allocated to execute world class training. The 109th MI Battalion's rotation provided a unique training opportunity to partner with a BCT, an air cavalry squadron, and 48 SFAATs, a force mix that cannot be replicated easily at JBLM without extensive resources and support. There is no better place than a CTC such as the JRTC to allow for multiple opportunities to work with maneuver units, integrate into their planning processes, and support mission execution. This rotation facilitated partnerships with units that the 109th MI Battalion did not have a habitual relationship with, and this provided better training and a situation closer to what the battalion will encounter in combat.

There is no better place than a CTC such as the JRTC to allow for multiple opportunities to work with maneuver units, integrate into their planning processes, and support mission execution.

TEAM INTEGRATION (Army Tactical Task 2.3)

Multifunctional Teams (MfTs) provide great capabilities that can easily be tailored to support maneuver forces. These teams provide pre-mission planning, on the objective support and follow-on exploitation in support of units' intelligence requirements. Specifically, MfTs enable maneuver elements by providing SIGINT Terminal Guidance (STG), Direction Finding (DF), tactical site exploitation (TSE), tactical questioning (TQ), field interrogations, and biometric and forensic collection. Training an MfT is challenging due to the multiple intelligence disciplines contained on each team and the expectations required of the team to deliver results for supported units. Collective training must be completed at home-station or through other training venues, such as FOUNDRY, that specialize in collective intelligence training. The 109th MI Battalion took advantage of all of these opportunities to include the great training at Camp Draper, Utah, for Low-Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) teams, and the premier training facilities for collective intelligence training at Camp Bullis, Texas. It is crucial that MfTs train on collective intelligence skills and then work with maneuver forces, organic company, and intelligence battalion headquarters in order to understand reporting procedures and requirements. 109th MI Battalion's MfTs at the JRTC received multiple opportunities to work maneuver integration through involvement in the Situational Training Exercise (STX) lanes and missions conducted during Force on Force (FoF). 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain was an exceptional IBCT partner to work with, as it helped to facilitate intelligence teams' training on capabilities briefings, mission planning, mission rehearsals, mission execution, follow-on exploitation and reporting. A separate article focusing on lessons learned from capabilities briefings is captured in a separate white paper.

HUMINT Collection Teams (HCT) and LLVI teams offer their own unique challenges to maneuver integration. HCTs did receive invaluable integration opportunities during the FoF phase of JRTC, where they were pushed out to JCOPs and operated with maneuver companies. Prior to FoF there was little focus on HCT integration during the Pre-Rotational Training phase or the STX phase. HCTs operated in populated areas where solicitation, source meets, and key leader engagements took place. Having more time to work out force protection considerations, meet timelines, and engage with the local populace incorporating maneuver elements into HCT's STX lanes would be beneficial for both elements to gain a better understanding of how to communicate and plan missions together. 109th MI Battalion's HCTs were also capable of conducting target exploitation with females, as well as serve in other female engagement operations. The HCTs were found to be best suited to support Commanders at all levels, providing valuable atmospherics that are not likely to be collected on a raid or through a lethal operation.

LLVI teams were one of the most sought after enablers during the rotation. Platoon level and company level leaders gained experience and an understanding of LLVI teams' capabilities for both defensive and offensive operations. LLVI teams were described by one Task Force Commander as "Game Changers". This highlights the training benefit for maneuver forces of introducing an intelligence battalion to rotations--- the ability for platoon and company level leaders to receive and integrate intelligence assets. While we may have spoiled some leaders into expecting and wanting the enablers all the time, the employment and results these teams provided have left an enduring mark on these young maneuver leaders.

LLVI teams were described by one Task Force Commander as "Game Changers".

The JRTC's Blackbird Field Support Representative (FSR) provided scenarios that stimulated the robust Close Access Target Reconnaissance (CATR) capabilities of the battalion. These capabilities were not only used in support of the provided scenarios but also on all MFT missions and numerous counterintelligence operations. The utility of CATR capabilities can also be applied to augment and enhance the intelligence collection efforts of the battalion's human intelligence collection teams. Moreover, CATR capabilities can be used independently as a passive means of intelligence collection. For both lethal and non-lethal engagements, the training highlighted key uses for this collection capability in support of a myriad of non-lethal missions that traditionally may not be considered collection or direct intelligence support. While this is still a nascent technology for inclusion in scenarios at the JRTC, CATR capabilities are in use in theater and should be further incorporated into scenario development. It is critical that the role players providing support to these operations possess the requisite clearances for the associated tradecraft used to employ these technologies.

The JRTC replicates signals for SIGINT training; unfortunately, the replication is not to the robust degree necessary to properly train all of the collection assets in the tactical intelligence battalion. The 109th MI Battalion was able to leverage the SIGINT Terminal Guidance (STG)

capabilities and limited analysis of the MfTs against the scenario, but the full range of capabilities and systems could not be fully replicated at JRTC. This will be further addressed in the analysis and recommendations submitted below.

MISSION COMMAND (Army Tactical Task 5.0)

For the 109th MI Battalion's staff and commanders, having the opportunity to exercise mission command was critical to prepare for combat operations. At the JRTC, operations were conducted over multiple networks in a training environment that involved simulated Afghan partners, Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams and maneuver elements. No other training outside the JRTC could have replicated and trained the battalion's command posts on mission command equivalent to Rotation 12-05. This was the most robust opportunity the battalion had to train on Task Group 1 (Execute the Operations Process) under the battalion's mission essential task conduct mission command. This is not to diminish other training opportunities, but the JRTC offered an exceptional opportunity to work mission command at multiple levels and allowed for the battalion's staff and commanders to understand how mission command works for an intelligence battalion in a general support-reinforcing role. This environment helped to simulate decentralized company operations and team level operations partnered throughout the battle space with various maneuver units.

For the 109th MI Battalion's staff and commanders, having the opportunity to exercise Mission Command was critical to prepare for combat operations.

The Battalion Main Command Post (MCP) was afforded multiple opportunities to exercise mission command through the management of personnel and teams during Pre-Rotational Training (PRT), STX lanes, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and FoF. The battalion staff was able to refine standard operating procedures, battle drills, reporting systems and support structures to support subordinate units' missions and allow the Battalion Commander to make timely decisions. The Battalion MCP benefited greatly from the JRTC exercise. The experience enabled the battalion's leadership to identify strengths and weaknesses and to incorporate lessons learned in preparation for real world operations in Afghanistan. Reporting systems for communication PACE plans and digital/data PACE plans for the battalion's systems were refined, and training was critical for enhancing the unit's reporting of collected information. The JRTC replicated digital reporting channels and networks effectively, and the battalion was able to work through the challenges of maintaining those systems in a decentralized environment. This also highlighted the challenges and necessary mission command support relationships needed when the battalion deploys separately from the BfSB; the 109th MI Battalion was heavily reliant on the supported unit's communications systems in order to be fully mission capable. The designers of the BfSB's Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) did not consider the possibility of entire battalions operating independently of the Brigade's Headquarters. This created equipment and systems challenges

requiring Brigade and Division support. Specifically, the communication architecture and information flow was never designed to be separated from the BfSB. With the robust networks needed for operations and the associated server support for networks ranging from Non-secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) to Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), integration with the Brigade S6 and Division G6 were essential to ensure the battalion could accomplish its mission. Greater rigor needs to be placed on units to use combat communication systems. The fiber network at the JRTC is great to get units running quickly but eliminates the training friction associated with establishing and running the same networks using organic equipment. Closer examination highlights that there is a general lack of organic communications equipment at the company level—one of the key reasons the fiber lines exist at the JRTC. The majority of a company's communication equipment requires line of sight to operate effectively, which is not conducive to decentralized operations. Even with antennas and power amplification, many of the small COPs that the teams operated from during FoF were unable to communicate with their company or battalion command elements using conventional radios. The companies were heavily reliant on a limited number of VSAT systems, GRRIPs, and BFTs when the fiber lines were inoperable. Equipping the companies with additional satellite communications systems at the team level and BFT TOC kits at the company headquarters will greatly enhance communications.

DEPLOYMENT/ REDEPLOYMENT CERTIFICATION (Army Tactical Task 71-8-1120)

The training opportunities provided by the JRTC enabled the 109th MI Battalion to certify its ability to deploy and redeploy to a theater of operations. Tactical intelligence collection battalions normally deploy as part of brigade-sized elements, so this deployment helped to establish and refine battalion level deployment systems and procedures. Most importantly, the unit's deploying leaders understand and know the standards expected to conduct successful deployment/ redeployment activities. This was a critical part of validating and certifying our processes. The JRTC Rotation 12-05 also provided the opportunity to establish, exercise and validate Rear Detachment SOPs and activities (Army Tactical Task 71-8-1121). In terms of rotation timing, the 109th MI Battalion recommends conducting rotations prior to final load-out operations for combat. Therefore, ending the CTC rotation 2-3 months prior to theater arrival would be optimal. Careful planning and preparations enabled the 109th MI Battalion to conduct load-out for JRTC and combat simultaneously.

This was a critical part of validating and certifying our processes.

WHAT RESOURCES ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE TRAINING?

The JRTC provided unparalleled opportunities for facilitating maneuver integration, mission command, deployment/redeployment certification and collective combat skills training for a

tactical military intelligence battalion. This was JRTC at its best. However, challenges continue with respect to providing comprehensive collective intelligence training. Unfortunately, CTCs are not properly resourced to meet the specific intelligence training objectives for modern tactical military intelligence units. This should not be surprising, given that the baseline intelligence training audience has historically been MI Companies consisting of three HCTs, one OMT, one Counterintelligence Agent and the Prophet Control from a BCT. Given the resource challenges and rapidly changing technologies associated with our intelligence operations, are we structured to provide the right training to our intelligence companies? Perhaps a model involving Division G2s or rotating intelligence battalions through the CTCs may help focus attention on improving training.

Adding the multitude of collection teams that an intelligence battalion brings to the rotational construct greatly stresses the existing intelligence training resources of a CTC. Lessons learned by the 109th MI Battalion from JRTC Rotation 12-05 highlight the deficiencies of the current CTC intelligence training architecture. Immediate investments must be made to improve capabilities to conduct intelligence training that is relevant to all warfighting functions and that replicates current capabilities. This is especially true of intelligence architecture updates; the CTCs need to keep up with the pace of technological change so that advances in intelligence collection technologies can be fully trained and assessed, whether the training is for a BCT military intelligence company or a tactical intelligence battalion. The planning for BCT and lower echelon military intelligence training can no longer be an afterthought, as the rotation demonstrated the critical capabilities that modern intelligence professionals bring to the fight. The following discipline-specific recommendations are meant to shed light on the subject of intelligence training at the CTCs in order to better posture the future force for mission success in Unified Land Operations.

EXPLOITATION ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Army Tactical Task 2.3- Task Groups 1, 2 and 3)

Properly training Soldiers to gain confidence in their intelligence skills and intelligence equipment requires the correct stimulation and replication. These resources can be expensive and are currently limited to specific locations in the Army. As an example, the specialized collective exploitation and HUMINT training conducted by the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion at Camp Bullis, TX cost approximately $250,000. At this training venue, we were able to fully utilize the latest exploitation equipment and utilize more



Multifunctional Team on the Objective Conducting Tactical Site Exploitation

robust networks simulating how our Soldiers use this equipment and report the data collected. There are no training venues available that can stimulate and replicate operations with our most advanced equipment such as the SEEK II and Vigilant Pursuit while providing full support for maneuver integration. This underscores a larger issue in the Army. We have Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) for every Maneuver, Fires and Effects function, but very few for intelligence. This is critical when the closest available equipment to the CTCs or home station may be located 7000 miles away in theater. Whether at home station or a CTC, the Army requires capabilities to train its tactical intelligence collection integrated with maneuver forces.

These vanguard intelligence collection systems represent the future of pursuit and exploitation technologies and are areas where the force needs to invest resources and training. The inability to train and demonstrate the full capabilities of these systems to maneuver units was a missed opportunity during the JRTC Rotation 12-05. However, there is currently no location in CONUS that can effectively stimulate, replicate, and bring the maneuver integration and mission command systems together in one venue. The JRTC should be the first to bring this synergy together. Bringing exploitation stimulation and replication together with maneuver integration will result in advocacy and understanding of these capabilities. Moreover, the limited interrogation training and limited support for the associated detention-centric processes makes training venues like Camp Bullis and FOUNDRY invaluable. The CELLEX, computer forensics and battlefield forensics are not replicated effectively into the scenario in order to educate maneuver leaders and help collective intelligence training. A key limiting factor here may be the duration of the FoF exercise, but with STX lane integration, these topics can be easily addressed in scenario development. We must maximize the exploitation we pull off the objective and from detainees— not only will this intelligence drive operations, but it will provide a more robust HUMINT capability to answer commanders' PIRs.



First Ever Pursuit and Exploitation System (VIGILANT PURSUIT) Employment at the JRTC

Field detention site (FDS) operations must be improved at the JRTC. The integration and expertise required to conduct proper exploitation must be a key training objective at the JRTC. This process can develop and deliver the best human intelligence on the battlefield, but is a delicate process that requires synergy and careful attention to detail for successful operations. Integration involves military police and

staff elements at the BCT, the detaining Task Force unit, and exploitation personnel to include interrogators and MfTs. At the JRTC, once a detainee arrived to the FDS, the exploitation time was limited to 24 hours, which entailed two personnel to play one role (alternating shifts). With the best interrogators, role players exhausted their roles and rapidly began providing personal information not related to the scenario to pass the time. More emphasis should be placed on understanding the requirements and expectations for detainee packets and evidentiary thresholds, along with associated rules, regulations and timelines associated with processing detainees. There are many agencies, contractors, and equities involved with detention operations--- we must focus and improve training and educating for our maneuver commanders to ensure successful operations in combat.

Connectivity is critical for exploitation operations. Utilizing the full resources of INSCOM and interagency partners can speed the time to exploit information while building an understanding of data movement, networks, response times and the expected feedback from national level agencies. Communications are critical and VIGILANT PURSUIT offers the most robust communications platform on the move--- where we can move all knowledge and situational understanding to the tip of the spear. This also exponentially increases sensor to shooter timeliness while providing real time visualization for the Commander.

HUMINT ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Army Tactical Task 2.3) (Task Group 2: Perform Information Collection 71-8-2300)

Human Intelligence Collection Teams (HCTs) must be able to train on Military Source Operations that incorporate the use of all approach techniques and tradecraft at the CTCs. They must also be able to receive performance feedback from the notional Division J2X. For this to happen in a live training environment, sources and interpreters must possess at a minimum secret clearances and tradecraft training in order for the teams to gain maximum training value. At the JRTC, the majority of the interpreters used were not cleared and the sources were not knowledgeable on HUMINT techniques and did not possess a deep enough background about the scenario. HUMINT training with dedicated role players is expensive but necessary. There are huge advantages and economies of scale to be considered in bringing professional HUMINT role players to JRTC. CTCs must plan robust HUMINT master scenario events lists (MSELs) and resource them accordingly. This will go a long way in improving the training on HUMINT collection and interrogation operations. The most important training audience for building the intelligence architecture is maneuver commanders. Educating and enabling commanders to properly utilize HUMINT collection assets and conduct proper interrogation operations will exponentially improve HUMINT collection and bring a better return on investment for the resources than the current allocation.

The 109th MI Battalion deployed to the JRTC with its organic Global Rapid Response Information Package (GRRIP). Operationally, an intelligence battalion must have a Primary, Alternate, Contingent, and Emergency (PACE) plan for communications. More importantly, intelligence must establish the same model for data. Gaining an understanding of leveraging data networks via SATCOM, GRRIP, FM, BFT, or TACSAT is essential for supporting maneuver forces. The 109th MI Battalion was able to provide situational awareness and reporting capabilities at all times during the exercise—a key enabler for COISTs that did not receive a priority for communications support. Throughout the exercise, teams were able to utilize the secure Blue Force Tracker (BFT) platform. This system was a key enabler in areas where communication capabilities were diminished. Teams utilized the system to transmit reports to their OMTs, thus facilitating rapid dissemination and processing. The latest BFTs are not yet fielded to Afghanistan, but are value added for future contingency operations. The rotation also provided a unique opportunity for partnered unit S6s to train alongside intelligence Soldiers to achieve the symbiotic relationship needed to establish and maintain communications to accomplish the mission.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Army Tactical Task 6.11.3)

The counterintelligence (CI) function was not well integrated within the operational environment at JRTC. The current CI scenarios did not offer much depth and was rapidly exhausted by a few focused CI agents. The OPFOR Commander at the final AAR stated he never made an attempt to infiltrate security forces or get on the FOBs. This is an immediate area that must be fixed as Coalition Forces begin to transition security posture to an Afghan-led environment. The current operational environment in OEF-- where green-on-blue attacks and inside-the-wire threats are a key concern-- necessitates an immediate change in the way CI training is integrated within the CTC environment. Robust CI scenarios and integration of those scenarios into the maneuver commanders' concept of operations must be a high priority. The integration of robust CI training scenarios is the best way to make immediate improvements. CTCs must develop scenarios that have more depth and that have dedicated role-players. Also, a responsive Counter Intelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA) at the Division must be able to provide feedback and guidance to the agents on the ground. A well-written scenario that stimulates the CI function and addresses the integration with maneuver unit S2X elements would be a great improvement over what is currently offered.

Robust CI scenarios and integration of those scenarios into the maneuver commanders' concept of operations must be a high priority.

SIGINT ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Army Tactical Task 2.3) (Task Groups 1 (73-8-2221) and 2 (71-8-2300))

SIGINT is the most difficult and resource intensive intelligence function to stimulate at a CTC. A typical BCT MICO has limited SIGINT capabilities both in terms of assets and personnel. This makes it difficult to properly stimulate SIGINT systems at home station; unless a MI company commander is savvy and experienced, he is unlikely to influence his commander to properly resource this training. SIGINT collection and analysis assets need robust stimulation in order for proper training to occur. The JRTC lacked both the signals architecture and a well-developed SIGINT MESL during the recent rotation, making it difficult to stimulate collection assets in a live training environment. The additional assets brought to the table by the 109th MI Battalion—to include three LLVI teams and six STG teams-- nearly overwhelmed a system designed for the BCT's MICO assets. The JRTC and other CTCs must improve the signals environment by dedicating resources to establish a robust signals generator to provide a live signals environment that can be tailored to the scenario. This will enable sufficient stimulation of live collection assets and provide realistic data that can be processed and disseminated into the intelligence databases for use by analysts. The cost to purchase a signal generator capable of a more robust capability than JRTC's current capabilities to stimulate SIGINT Terminal Guidance and the Prophet systems is approximately $2.5 million. This is expensive training but worth it. The advantage to having a live environment is the real time collection capability, processing, and SIGINT de-confliction training provided. More importantly, brigade and battalion commanders see and understand the full capabilities of their systems before deploying into battle. Robust signals intelligence architecture is what the CTCs should build towards in an effort to keep pace with changing technology and tactics, as this will enable maneuver brigades to



Multifunctional Teams on the Objective Providing Time Sensitive Exploitation Support to Finishing Operations

successfully train for SIGINT operations they will be expected to conduct in theater. We also need to challenge and integrate SIGINT analysts' roles in the process.

CONCLUSION

The 109th Military Intelligence Battalion was fortunate to have the opportunity to come to JRTC as a rotational battalion. The Disrupters were able to conduct mission command in a live, fast-paced environment and work through the challenges of integrating with maneuver units while supporting the Commanders' Critical Information Requirements. This left the unit better prepared to conduct real world operations while deployed to Afghanistan, a tribute to the professionalism and expertise of the JRTC's staff. Budgetary constraints are a reality in today's Army, and this reality is not lost on the writers of this paper. However, to ensure that institutional training capabilities of the CTCs are keeping up with the rapid pace of technological changes, the Army must be prepared to invest in a more robust architecture that supports intelligence scenario development and training. At home station, this may require a new approach to intelligence training involving TADSS. Army intelligence professionals do a disservice to maneuver unit commanders and staffs if they cannot execute advertised capabilities during training. Realistic intelligence and maneuver integration prior to deployment is critical to building the confidence of maneuver commanders in intelligence systems and Soldiers and should not be impeded due to scenario and infrastructure constraints. For the JRTC, a proactive investment in intelligence stimulation infrastructure and scenario development will provide immediate value and continue to enable intelligence to drive operations and offer the best intelligence training in the world.

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