



# **“HOW WE ADVISE”**

## **AN AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY KANDAK**

**AUGUST 2012**  
**TEAM RENEGADE**



## **Acknowledgements**

### **Bravo Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 502<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault)**

Commander: Captain Adam J. Dortona

Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge: Sergeant First Class Stewart C. Goodman

Executive Officer / Operations Officer (X3): Captain James A. Nardelli

Personnel Officer (S-1): First Lieutenant John J. Adams

Medic: Corporal Jonathan F. Adams

Intelligence Officer (S-2): Second Lieutenant Parker W. Propst

Company Advisor / Assistant Operations Officer (A/S-3): First Lieutenant Michael L. Hamilton

Company Advisor: Staff Sergeant Daniel K. Burns

Fire Support Officer (FSO): First Lieutenant Eric D. Waxman

Logistics Officer (S-4): First Lieutenant Mark A. Patton

Communications Officer (S-6): First Lieutenant Andrew R. McDaniel

Communications Non-Commissioned Officer (S-6 NCOIC): Corporal Craig A. Loveland



## Foreword

If you're reading this, chances are you've been assigned to serve in some type of advisory role at the kandak level or lower in Afghanistan. This book is by no means the 'be all end all' of advising and it shouldn't be viewed as such. It is rather, *a way* and can help new teams understand what being on an SFAT looks like from inception through execution. Everyone's experience will be unique much like the individual kandaks you'll be required to mentor. However, here are a few common denominators that many organizations have identified as key to being successful in this role. This book will expand upon some of those and allow the reader to see how the principles of the JRTC Advisor Academy come to being while deployed downrange in Afghanistan.

Understanding the context in which my team came into this role is important when trying to digest the contents of this book. We are actually in a rifle company from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne. Our key leaders were selected to fulfill the SFAT requirement while the rest of the unit continued home station training and day to day CONUS operations. It was a tough pill to swallow to give up my company, and likewise for my platoon leaders to sacrifice their positions. After a few weeks of notification of the mission however, everyone rallied behind the cause and executed. The Army constantly asks us to look at causes that are bigger than any one individual; this case is no different. Egos needed to be cast aside and were without too much issue; a true testament to the flexibility and the selflessness of our force. That being said, it has to be understood that some people are harder than others to sell the mission to. These men need additional mentoring and massaging in order to fully accept the task, so be prepared for that.

We have been at this mentoring thing for awhile in Afghanistan. For those that have deployed before, how many of you received an inadequate RIP and had to 'reinvent the wheel' when all of the systems and solutions were already handled by the prior unit but not effectively communicated? How much time and effort have we spent on deployments just getting basic things right in the beginning because knowledge was not passed on? An AAR is only effective if you *read it*. Therefore I implore you to dig into these pages and take out some key lessons learned so you can hit the ground running or at least walking in theater; your crawl phase should be in CONUS. This war has been going on for a very long time and I feel very passionately about the effective transfer of information from one unit to the next so no time is needlessly wasted. Let me be clear that we received an outstanding RIP from a 3-61 CAV SFAT upon our arrival and we aim to continue the trend when we hand over the reins to the 1/101 advisory element.

There are sections in this book that you can flip to that will give you a snapshot of what each staff section on the team went through from JRTC through deployment. Hopefully our experiences will be of value. Just remember a few basic things when entering the world of advising (all of these points are expanded on in the text):

1. **Don't trust any Afghans:** Insider threat is no joke. Present yourselves as hard targets. Not only will your enhanced discipline increase your survivability, it will set conditions

for the Afghan Soldiers to want to emulate you. You must *always* show them what right looks *and* acts like.

2. **Treat all with dignity and respect:** Just because you shouldn't trust them doesn't mean you should judge the entire racial group and treat them as subhuman. Most of them are patriots and effective Soldiers who hunger to learn.
3. **Be brilliant at the basics:** How good can you advise if you get easily beaten in combat next to your inexperienced counterpart? Don't let your small unit tactics atrophy while advising. Make time for physical training, marksmanship training, medical training, and tactical rehearsals. Also, if you don't have an Alamo plan, make one and rehearse it.
4. **Learn the language:** Basic language skills offer instant rapport with your counterparts.
5. **Saying 'NO' is more important than you know:** You're not doing any favors by presenting yourselves as an easy button for the ANA. Your job is to advise and prevent catastrophic failure by providing the ANA with enablers if needed. Let them struggle a bit. You'll be amazed how quickly they find ways to solve their problems. At the end of the day whatever they are doing needs to be 'Afghan sustainable'. Everything you do and every piece of advice you give needs to have that sustainability piece in mind.
6. **Have patience:** This can't be overstated. Change will not occur overnight. Pick your priorities in the areas you want to effect change and measure success in weeks and months, not days.
7. **BSO/BSI Relationships:** Developing a productive, friendly, and mutually supportive relationship with them is just as important as dealing with your Afghan counterparts. Personality issues, lack of coordination, and planning in a vacuum will grind to a halt all of the good advising things you are trying to do. Remember, your CC line on emails will be extremely long since there are so many agencies that need the information you provide.
8. **Capture everything!:** Want to stay in Afghanistan longer as a nation? Then don't record a single thing you do and let the next unit just 'figure it out'. Capture both your triumphs and failures. Use storyboards, OPSUMS, Blue 1s, formal AARs etc to build the story of what you have done in theater. Have a superb knowledge management SOP to keep track of the mass amount of information you will compile and be prepared to summarize your experiences to enhance the RIP process. This point cannot be overstated.

ADAM J. DORTONA  
CPT, IN  
Commanding

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (1)**

### **FOREWORD (2-3)**

### **CHAPTER 1: The Role of an X3 and An Overview to Security Force Advising (6-38)**

- I. Task Organization (pg. 6)
- II. Transition (pg. 12)
- III. Home Station Training (pg. 16)
- IV. JRTC (pg. 19)
- V. First 100-Days (pg. 24)

### **CHAPTER 2: The S1 Advisor (39-46)**

- I. Task Organization (pg. 39)
- II. Home Station Training (pg. 39)
- III. JRTC (pg. 42)
- IV. Deployment (pg. 44)

### **CHAPTER 3: The S2 Advisor (47- 52)**

- I. Home Station Training (pg. 47)
- II. JRTC (pg. 47)
- III. Deployment (pg. 49)

### **CHAPTER 4: The A/S3 and Company Advisor (53-63)**

- I. Introduction (pg. 53)
- II. Task Organization (pg. 53)
- III. Home Station Training (pg. 54)
- IV. JRTC (pg. 54)
- V. Deployment (pg. 56)

### **CHAPTER 5: The S4 Advisor (64-80)**

- I. Task Organization (pg. 64)
- II. Home Station Training (pg. 65)
- III. Joint Readiness Training Center JRTC (pg. 66)
- IV. Deployment (pg. 67)

**CHAPTER 6: The S6 Advisor (81- 87)**

- I. Task Organization (pg. 81)
- II. Home Station Training (pg. 81)
- III. JRTC (pg. 83)
- IV. Deployment (pg. 83)
- V. Point of Contact (POC) for local national linguist LNL (pg. 86)

**CHAPTER 7: The FSO Advisor (88-94)**

- I. Introduction (pg. 88)
- II. Task Organization (pg. 88)
- III. Home Station Training (pg. 88)
- IV. JRTC (pg. 90)
- V. Deployment (pg. 90)

**CHAPTER 8: The Team NCOIC (95-102)**

- I. Introduction (pg. 95)
- II. Task Org (pg. 95)
- III. Senior NCO position (pg. 96)
- IV. JRTC (pg. 96)
- V. Deployment (pg. 97)

**CHAPTER 9: The Team Medic (103-105)**

- I. Introduction (pg. 103)
- II. Home Station Training (pg. 103)
- III. Deployment (pg. 103)

**GLOSSARY (106-108)**

## **Chapter 1: The Role of the X3 and an Overview to Security Force Advising**

### **I. Task Organization**

Security force assistance (SFA) is defined in the *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance* "as unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." The following sections concentrate on how SFA applies at the Afghan National Army (ANA) kandak level. There are plenty of resources in the Army describing "big picture" SFA; however, there is a concerning lack of resources for advising an ANA kandak. More specifically, this section describes what the security force assistance team executive officer / operations officer does in day to day operations, focusing heavily on team internal tasks and to what extent the ANA are advised. In the end, SFA facilitates unity of effort across Afghan national security force organizations.

Selecting the right people for the right job on the security force advisory team (SFAT) is a critical task, paramount to ensure the success of the team. Putting the "smartest" people in the toughest job is not necessarily the right answer. In some cases, putting the smartest people in the least demanding jobs can be even more effective as it then provides the ability to use them as a multi-tool to cover down on any other position. Utilize the S1 and S6 advisors to cover down on intelligence, maintenance, operations, and other jobs as needed. Having that capability greatly increased the team's effectiveness throughout the pre-deployment training and the deployment itself. Of course, there are some jobs that must be manned by extremely capable officers and NCOs, such as the company (toulay) advisor role. In this team, the company advisor doubled as the assistant S3 to assist in advising and coordinating for operations (really a battalion chief of operations type of role).

The brigade combat team (BCT) selected for this mission divided companies and battalions into "teams" and then named them as such which will be seen in this book. "Team Strike" was referred to as the Strike Brigade of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, "Team Falcon" was referred to as the second infantry battalion, and "Team Renegade" was referred to as Renegade Company. The majority of the organizations did not deploy to Afghanistan and were referred to as either the normal organization name, such as B/2-502 Infantry Company, or Renegade Company Campbell.

### **Organization of tactical patrols:**

The team executive officer / operations officer (X3) is responsible for the command and control of the formation during tactical operations, acting as a quasi squad leader. The SFAT commander is the only individual with one job, which is conducting the key leader engagement (KLE) and working with his counterpart. By controlling the formation in tactical situations it allows the team commander to properly advise and concentrate on the decisive operation (the

KLE). This holds true for the planning through the execution of the tactical operation. While this held truer during the pre-deployment training at home station and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), it still may be applied during deployment when a battle space owner (BSO) and/or battle space integrator (BSI) is not present to provide security for the SFAT. This requires the X3 to get back to the basics, taking off the battalion operations officer hat, and relearning small unit tactics at the squad level. Maneuvering a squad of mostly officers requires going back to the lessons learned at Ranger school where the squad leader is responsible for leading a patrol of a large variety of Soldiers with different skill sets. Using the fire support officer as a forward observer, keeping the medic with the team non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), and using the other non-commissioned officers (NCO) to help ensure the alpha and bravo team leaders are going through all of the right steps. Put the right people in the right job in the team operating as an infantry squad, and then train on those jobs. Repetitions are everything.

### **Alternates:**

Train alternates in almost every mission essential functional area. Things happen and events occur that require the shifting of personnel anywhere from task organization through the deployment. Additionally, team members will have to travel to different locations for meetings or other training events. Every Soldier needs to have the basic mentality of knowing the job of the person two levels up and one level down. There were countless times that team members were required to fill other jobs due to either one being over tasked or having to travel for a meeting. After all of the training, teams will need to have a cohesive unit in place to include alternates. As much as the team may want to bring the alternates, since they were as much a part of the team as anyone else, the force cap may prevent it. However, the alternates have to stand ready through the entire deployment in the event of an injury or emergency requiring someone on the team to return to the United States.

### **Assigning staff positions:**

Team Renegade's S-1 (personnel officer) advisor was a multi-tool that was used in every area on the team. This first lieutenant was responsible for Soldier readiness program (SRP) packets, officer record briefs (ORB), enlisted record briefs (ERB), non-commissioned officer evaluation reports (NCOER), officer evaluation reports (OER), awards, personnel status report (PERSTAT), and all of the other jobs that typically fall under an S-1 and/or training room. He also covered down on every other area in the staff including the S-2, S-3, and S-4. Having the ability to flex a bright officer who is not afraid to get a little dirty to find the answer and get things done was an immeasurable asset which the team used consistently. Additionally, typical Afghan units tend to have problems with their PERSTAT, absent without leave (AWOL) records, promotion procedures, and overall administrative actions. To fix these problems, the S-1 needs to be willing and able to place himself at the source of the problems to advise the Afghan S-1 how to fix the issue. This individual needs to be an exceedingly proactive officer, something a young infantry lieutenant should be more than capable of doing.



Intelligence officers tend to be extremely intellectual individuals capable of complex thought and looking at a problem set from the enemy's perspective. Infantry officers need to be able to do the same sort of analysis on a more basic level when developing their plans at the platoon and company level. Team commanders need to identify their "book smart" individuals capable of in depth self-study in intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This individual also needs to apply for a top secret security clearance so he can discuss possible enabling assets with battle space owners and battle space integrators. Pick a driven officer who is smart and driven enough to conduct the massive amount of self study required to be an effective S-2 advisor.

Company advisors need to have the ability to multi-task along multiple lines of efforts, act as a conduit of information between Afghan National Security Forces, coalition forces, and other advisors. They are the key to shadow tracking information down to the lower levels of an Afghan National Army (ANA) kandak including repair parts and maintenance statuses. The company advisor also needs to be able to function in the role of an assistant operations officer to facilitate proper visibility over the ANA's patrol schedule. The company advisor will be used to help develop a concept of the operation (CONOP) to provide higher headquarters and get enablers in extremis support of ANA operations. They often cross staff section lines at the Afghan company level to facilitate the flow of information and enable the shadow tracking of multiple higher headquarters' information requirements.

Choosing the SFAT's S-4 is a delicate process as for most infantry officers, they do not enjoy dealing with property. For a new second lieutenant, it is a steep learning curve to soak up knowledge on what a supply sergeant and battalion S-4's jobs are. What the person chosen for this job has to possess is an enhanced capacity to learn and willingness to do the self-study on the job. If the officer does not have the desire, will, or motivation to do the research on a topic most would avoid, then the SFAT will struggle with property through the entire train-up and deployment. The S-4 also needs to have the capacity to have increased attention to detail ability to forecast logistics based off of operational needs.

Assigning the role of a communications officer (S-6) was believed to be an essential position during the original task organization of a team and throughout the team's training process due to the lack of a communications specialist. Several weeks before deployment the team was assigned a signal corps specialist (25U); which provided the team with enhanced communications capabilities. At that point the team should have reassigned the S-6 advisor to become the ANA maintenance officer advisor. Although this could have created a rank issue with as a corporal would have advised an Afghan officer; it would have provided better economy of effort among the team. Maintenance and logistics were what Afghans struggled with the most and more advisors to cover down on those positions could have facilitated more progress. The Team Renegade S-6 did an outstanding job advising the ANA. However, it was not as essential of a position as the maintenance officer advisor position was with a limited number of personnel authorized to deploy to Afghanistan.

Although not all of the positions were discussed in this section, they were all equally important. Commanders matched personalities and capabilities with the correct position to ensure economy of effort. The task organization was not “finger drilled” and each position was chosen for a purpose. All of the commanders sat down with each other and ensured the right people were chosen for the right positions.

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Select the right people for the right job. Do not stack the deck and place people where the perceived “key positions” are. Put some of the team’s high performing officers in low demand areas to allow the flexibility to plus up other areas when needed.
- The X3 is the squad leader during tactical operations to allow the company commander freedom of maneuver for advising and conduct the key leader engagement.
- Retrain the team on small unit tactics and develop standard operating procedures (SOP).
- Train alternates with the team and integrate them into the formation.

**How Team Renegade was task organized:**





## Task Organization / Duty Descriptions Tactical Operations Center



Team S-2 (Intel Officer):  
Parker Propst  
2LT, IN  
"Renegade 2"

- IPB
- ENY COAs during patrols
- Physical Security
- Arms Room Officer
- MOE/MOP
- Insider threat / CI

Team FSO (Fire Support Officer):  
Eric Waxman  
1LT, FA  
"Renegade 40"

- Fires planning
- AGI
- Develop KDK IDF training plan
- Coordinates with BSO for enabler integration into ANSF operations

Company Advisor:  
Mike Hamilton  
1LT, IN  
"Renegade 3"

- Assistant Operations Officer
- Coordinates between BSO and ANSF
- Assist in planning, coordinating, and executing training
- Assist in asset synchronization



Figure 1-2



## Task Organization / Duty Descriptions Administrative Logistics Operations Center



Team S-1 (Personnel Officer):  
John Adams  
1LT, IN  
"Renegade 1"

- Manages MEDOPs
- PERSTAT
- Awards
- PAO
- Multi-tool, able to cover down on any position at any time.
- Advisor to ANA S1 and assist in preventing corruption in ANSF pay process

Team S-4 (Logistics Officer):  
Mark Patton  
1LT, IN  
"Renegade 4"

- Oversees FOO
- Assists in CSDP
- COR
- PR&C
- All ordering
- Assists in Maintenance
- In charge of ALOC
- Advisor to ANA S4

Team S-6 (Communications Officer):  
Andrew McDaniel  
1LT, IN  
"Renegade 28"

- Manages Communication Equipment
- Responsible for facilitating commander with ability to command and control formation
- Establishes and maintains communication with higher, lower, and adjacent units
- Advisor to ANA S6




Figure 1-3



### A Better Way To Task Organize a SFAT:

Instead of deploying part of an infantry company to become a security force advisory team, another option to consider is to deploy the entire company divided into two efforts. Give the company commander an X3 to run the SFAT staff (since an executive officer is in charge of a battalion staff anyway) and use the company executive officer (XO) to take care of the daily functions of the company. The company would be responsible as the battle space integrator (BSI) and the SFAT would be in charge of advising. This task organization would allow the SFAT the freedom to concentrate on advising while the company itself took charge of supporting the team for security, administrative actions, and logistics. The company commander still advises the kandak commander and company first sergeant takes on the advising role of the kandak command sergeant major. Move the platoon leaders to the SFAT and put the platoon sergeants in charge of the platoons. Since the SFAT still has to coordinate with and work through the BSI, deploying an organic company causes less administrative and logistical issues to work through. During deployment, the team S4 spent a large amount of his time working completely on team internal supply issues. However, if a company deployed organically there would be a company XO and supply sergeant to take care of all of those issues. This would also free up the team S1 to focus on advising while the training room takes care of the team's administrative actions (see figure 1-5).



## II. Transition

Transitioning from the battalion chief of operations to a security force advisory team (SFAT) executive officer and operations officer (X3) is not as difficult as one would expect. On the operations side of the job; the experience, knowledge, and tools are already in place. The executive officer job is slightly more difficult although still not unmanageable. The main job of the XO is to manage the staff; having previous experience in current operations where the synchronization of the entire staff is required, it makes being the “X3” a lot less frightening. All it takes is a little extra cross-talk with the actual battalion staff to learn in more depth what their jobs are. Learning what “wrong” and “right” look like is a key task in order to properly train a staff working outside of their functional areas. The difficult part of being an XO is learning how to manage property, the budget, and logistics. X3s need to flatten the organization through meetings and a presentable product to share information across the formation. However, caution needs to be applied to ensure the team is not overloaded with too many redundant meetings.. A daily synchronization meeting and/or battalion update brief (BUB) is usually enough to ensure everyone is on the same page. If an X3 has previous staff experience the transition to an SFAT will be relatively seamless.

### **Implement systems:**

Developing systems to track information and key tasks can save the team a lot of headache, even if it is a simple quad chart or excel document. An X3 without systems to manage information is an X3 who will fail. The inability to track requests for information (RFI), tasks, training, property, movement times, personnel, fragmentary orders (FRAGO), and other information will cause the daily flow of the team to be extremely unpredictable. Develop the proper systems to track information and tasks as early on as possible.

### **Command atmosphere:**

Getting the team's mind right to accept their new roles as advisors is a transition task in itself. Taking infantry platoon leaders and putting them into non-infantry staff roles is a leadership challenge all will have to overcome. Infantry officers right out of Ranger school are usually hard charging lieutenants who are ready to get out there and lead Soldiers into combat. However, the atmosphere must be set up front that being on a SFAT is not the same role as being a typical infantry platoon leader. What it does require is for officers to think "outside of the box" and learn a job he has never been trained for. If that young second or first lieutenant is not proactive at learning his role, he has to be replaced. Being culturally sensitive, having the ability to learn a new job, and keeping an open mind for new ideas is what a team commander should look for.

### **Attention to detail:**

Due to the fact that officers are working far outside of the functional area they were trained in requires an X3 to get down into the weeds a lot more, especially in logistics. Not doing so will undoubtedly lead to the team experiencing some growing pains. Small deficiencies such as missing items and incorrectly logged serial numbers may occur. Although it may not be catastrophic, it will consume important time away from advising and other tasks. This is a perfect example of where the X3 and his staff must have proper systems in place. Without a Soldier with the expertise of a supply technician, it requires a group effort to ensure property is handled properly. Just like when a squad leader conducts pre-combat checks (PCC) and pre-combat inspections (PCI) he has a checklist next to him, the X3 needs a similar tool. Create a check list with each task that must be accomplished along with the sub-tasks showing when it needs to be completed and who needs to complete it. Synchronize the check-lists that have suspense dates with the daily battle rhythm and calendar to identify friction points and show the way ahead in time and space. The X3 then needs to place himself at those friction points that were identified to ensure the details are not missed.

### **Utilize the non-commissioned officers:**

Utilize the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) on the team for as much as possible. Putting NCOs with the young lieutenants to ensure a sanity check is done on everything they are

doing can be a life saver. Using NCOs correctly so they are also present at friction points and giving important tasks that must be accomplished with them to execute will ensure a smooth transition from planning to execution. However, some NCOs can also struggle with the transition of not taking that team, squad, or platoon into combat. Getting them into the mind-set that they are now here to support a quasi battalion staff and help manage multiple taskings while supervising the tactical training can be a tough mindset to get across. That is why it is extremely important that during task organization of the team, the right NCOs are selected. Once those NCOs are chosen, establish the right command atmosphere among the team so everyone understands their new roles on the team and the NCOs are utilized properly.



### **Use the team as a staff:**



An infantry company turned into a SFAT is neither a battalion staff nor a company; it is a mixture of everything. If team leaders and X3s attempt to treat the organization as simply one or the other it will fail. The team has to accomplish training room type tasks however those tasks can be accomplished by the S1. The team has property that would normally be handled by the HHC XO however, now has to be managed by the team S4 and X3. Do not resist the change to either or; combine what works and what applies from each set and mix it into something manageable by the team.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Choose an X3 who has staff experience, preferably in operations.
- Select the right officer for the right job. Do not treat filling each position like throwing darts at a dart board. Be selective and treat each position as an honor to be selected.
- Use the NCOs in as many areas as possible on the team, especially when it comes time to execute a task.
- Every staff needs systems; create those systems for the team and create them early (see figures 1-6, 1-7).
- Create the right atmosphere upfront of what an SFAT is. Officers need to accept that they are no longer infantry platoon leaders, company commanders, or traditional company executive officers.
- If someone on the team has a negative attitude towards the mission, then replace them. A staff sergeant who wants to do the job of a captain is better suited than a captain who has no desire to do the job assigned.
- The X3 needs to learn what right and wrong look like. Start learning a little bit about every staff section before the team's staff does.

**Tools:**

	B/2-502 IN TM Renegade	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO TEAM RENEGADE BUB	As of 06 AUG 12	
Purpose:		Chair: Proponent: Attendees		
Inputs / Outputs:		Agenda: > Weather > SIGACTS Last 24 > INTSUM Next 24 (AO & AI) > S2 > Last 24 Patrols > Next 24 Patrols > S3 > S1 > MEDIC > S4 > S6 > Team Maintenance Status > Five Day Schedule > Task Tracker		
				Figure 1-6

	B/2-502 IN TM Renegade	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Task Tracker	As of 06 AUG 12	
<b>TM RENEGADE TASK TRACKER</b>				
AS OF DTG	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; width: 100%;"> <span style="background-color: red; color: white; padding: 2px;">NOT STARTED</span> <span style="background-color: orange; color: white; padding: 2px;">WORKING</span> <span style="background-color: green; color: white; padding: 2px;">COMPLETE</span> </div>			
S1				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
S2				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
S3				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
S4				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
S6				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
FSO				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
MEDIC				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
RNU				
TASK	DATE ASSIGNED	DUE DATE	STATUS	REMARKS
				Figure 1-7



### III. Home Station Training

The training prior to JRTC and deployment focused heavily on small unit tasks and drills; even more specifically on medical training. The team conducted a situational training exercise (STX) lane which included react to improvised explosive devices (IED), react to small arms fire, mounted movement, dismounted movement, deliberate clearance of several named areas of interest (NAI), conduct of a key leader engagement, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). This training was the first fully resourced training event planned and coordinated by battalion that the team conducted. Conducting these events on a regular basis built esprit de corps within the team. Unfortunately this was the only exercise of this type the team had the opportunity to execute prior to JRTC. This was due in large part to the time from the formation of the team until deployment to Afghanistan being four and a half months. SFATs were forced to develop an essential training list and execute it to the best of their abilities. The team also conducted heavy weapons familiarization ranges, small arms zero/qualification ranges, and a stress shoot. Individual training often prevented the whole team from being present at any training event and even got in the way of any training period such as: common remotely operated weapon system (CROWS), counter remote controlled improvised explosive device warfare (CREW), combined information data network exchange (CIDNE), biometric automated toolset / handheld interagency identity detection equipment (BATS/HIDES), counter IED (C-IED), electronic warfare officer (EWO), drivers training, etc. Consolidate the individual training and minimize it as much as possible. Although it is important, time must be set aside for the team to build together and train as a staff. Time must also be set aside for the team to get more training repetitions on critical training events, especially those that were staff centric. Home station training was extremely valuable; however, needs to be expanded to cover more collective training areas to include staff.

#### **Train the staff:**

Team Renegade had very few opportunities to train as an actual staff, so all training had to be coordinated and executed within the team. Accomplishing tasks that would normally be done by a training room in a traditional company was completed by the team's staff, providing additional training. The team S1 covered down on the Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) packets, ORBs, NCOERs, awards, etc. The team S4 acted as the unit supply sergeant and assisted the X3 in some areas that would normally be taken care of by the company XO, but not necessarily done by a battalion XO. As stated earlier, accepting the fact that the SFAT was neither a battalion staff nor a company was principal to figuring out where the team fits into operations. Mixing and matching different aspects of both was, in all reality what has to be done. Finding time to train the organization as a staff and influence the higher headquarters to provide the blocks of instructions was paramount to the team's success.

### **Train as a squad:**

Fire-team LFXs, stress shoots, an intense physical training program, Eagle First Responder (similar to the Army's Combat Life Saver), insider threat, escape and evasion, battle drills, team live fire exercises, and Soldier level tasks and drills were some of the key focus areas for the team during training outside of JRTC. Although each area was extremely important as the team must be prepared for any situation when operating as a small advisory unit in an isolated environment, one key task that was hand waved over was training on the military decision making process (MDMP) and staff training as a whole. Other than a two hour block of instruction, the first time the team really had the opportunity to train on MDMP was in JRTC; and even then the team only got through the mission analysis portion. The next opportunity the team had was during the actual deployment to Afghanistan, which although it was extremely successful and far above expectations, it was a fairly rocky road for the three day process. Conducting MDMP was extremely valuable to the ANA as it developed critical tasks and presented the commander with multiple options to conduct operations. Targeting multiple areas during the train-up, rather than focusing on a few specific areas was extremely important. The team needed to be multi-faceted and prepared for any contingency.

### **Train the team:**


Do not wait for someone else to train the team; the top three in charge of the SFAT (team commander, NCOIC, and X3) need to take the initiative to use every opportunity to train the organization. Assigning specific tasks in a logical order to fit within each of the staff sections is an opportunity not to be passed up. Have each of the staff officers teach a class on their job to the rest of the team to both train other members how to cover down on his job and to show the top three that he has actually learned his job. Turn weekly foot marches into a tactical movement with an enemy situation template and scheme of maneuver that each of the staff sections can have a part of. If the top three wait for someone else to train the team then the deployment readiness of the organization will diminish.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Train on a variety of tasks; don't place too much focus on one or two training areas.
- Ask higher headquarters to develop a mission essential task list (METL) for the team. Train on the collective critical task list as a guideline to ensure the proper events are trained on.
- A SFAT must train as a staff and a squad since they will operate as both. In order to advise a staff, the team needs to know what a staff does. SFATs will be required to conduct patrols and therefore must also be proficient on small unit tactics.

- Plan training events within the team. Do not wait to be told by higher headquarters what to train on. Be proactive with the training program.

**Tools:**





have deployed to a country or region before does not mean they know everything about a culture. The language training was valuable although should probably not be taught by someone who speaks limited broken English. The Team Renegade Soldiers caught on quickly though, and truly embraced learning the language. Owning the task of learning the language went a long way with the role players the team met during force on force and during the deployment to Afghanistan. Team members became good enough at the language to even begin correcting the cultural advisors when they would translate something wrong. Every training event the team went to emphasized the importance of insider threat in Afghanistan. The threat held true to the warnings during the deployment however, it was covered far too much. There were three classes in five days during the advising academy, two classes at Fort Campbell, one class in Kyrgyzstan, and another once the team arrived in Afghanistan, all covering insider threat. The team understood the threat was real and important however, it did not need to be covered in seven separate classes. The “advisor academy,” held during the team’s first week in “Tiger Land” at JRTC, was probably the most valuable training the team received during the entire rotation as it laid the foundation for what an SFAT’s role is.

#### **MDMP:**

Following the “advisor academy,” Team Renegade moved into “the box” for force on force. Prior to this the team had the opportunity to conduct the military decision making process (MDMP) one time which was done in the barracks after the advisor academy had ended for the day. MDMP focused on developing a way ahead for the kandak the team was falling in on and used the commander’s unit assessment tool (CUAT) as the source for information to conduct mission analysis. The team wanted to go into the box with a plan in place to develop the organization and hit the ground running. In a perfect situation this plan may have worked. However, the U.S. Soldiers pretending to be Afghans that the team fell in on did not match up anywhere close to the CUAT. At the time the team thought this was insignificant training but it later proved to be what can happen during an actual deployment as the team encountered it upon arrival to Afghanistan. The team only got through the mission analysis step of MDMP but it was still extremely valuable training as it gave a base knowledge to the team on the conduct of MDMP. The team did not touch the subject again until the deployment to Afghanistan.

#### **Packing:**

Team Renegade did a phenomenal job of packing property for JRTC in a way that made sense. The team belly loaded laptops, printers, paper, class IV supplies, class II supplies, and other odds and ends onto the bus that took them to Fort Polk, Louisiana. This allowed the team to begin developing tools while in the advising academy and build products that higher headquarters was already requiring. The team had enough equipment to support multiple teams and accomplish the reporting requirements as not everyone had the same capabilities during the first week of JRTC. The team also filled out detailed Department of Defense form (DD) 1750s attached to each piece of equipment to ensure property was not mixed up with other teams during

transit. Copies were given to Renegade Company (rear) to ensure they also had situational awareness of what the team brought with them. During the entire rotation the team never had any issues or wants in regards to supplies. The team packed light, but smart.

### **Force on force:**

The force on force rotation training focused heavily on small unit tactics including: convoy operations, raid, mounted react to contact, dismounted react to contact, react to IED, MASCAL, duty status whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN), tactical site exploitation (TSE), humanitarian assistance, key leader engagements, and shura security. Twice during force on force, the team was even called for quick reaction force (QRF) missions. Although all of these battle drills are important for teams to know, far too much time was spent on these. During force on force the team did more combat advising than staff advising; it could be argued the SFATs needed more training on advising a staff than tactics. The team was only able to conduct TLPs using the five paragraph operations order (OPORD) format rather than conducting any MDMP whatsoever. Team Renegade excelled during all operations clearing through multiple objectives and taking zero simulated casualties. The most significant benefit of conducting so many tactical operations was the ability to learn the relationship between a BSI and SFAT. In the beginning of the rotation the SFAT concentrated heavily on advising the BSI to ensure they incorporate ANA in all of their operations, as the BSI was conducting unpartnered patrols throughout the area of operations including night ambushes. The team soon learned the SFAT concept was very new to the Army, and the BSI did not know how to utilize that type of organization. In response, Team Renegade built a capabilities brief defining what the definition and duties and responsibilities of an SFAT were. This product proved to be useful all the way through the end of the deployment to Afghanistan. Once the BSI began incorporating the ANA into their patrols, the ANA steadily began to become more independent. The team was then forced to advise the ANA to incorporate the BSI in their operations and flow of information. The SFAT acted largely as a conduit of information and it is also where the role of the company advisor finally came into fruition. The company advisors acted as the link between the BSI and ANA during the planning and execution of operations. These were all valuable lessons learned throughout the force on force. The team was able to refine the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and pre-combat checks and inspections (PCC/PCI). However, there was far too much emphasis on small unit tactics.

Team Renegade was able to accomplish some staff training during force on force. It was the first time the team conducted a battle update brief (BUB). The goal of the BUB was for it to be ANA led and SFAT advised. This brief gave the ANA commander situational awareness of his staff and the opportunity to issue guidance on future operations. The team also established a combined battle rhythm which synchronized the ANA, BSI, and SFAT meetings in time and space to establish unity of effort across multiple ANSF and CF organizations. All of the team staff also had to train privates and specialist role players how to be an S1, S2, S4, and S6. These US infantry Soldiers had no prior experience on what these staff sections duties and responsibilities were. Although this was not the exact level of ANA staff in reality, it still

provided valuable experience to the team on best practices to advise an inefficient staff. Unfortunately, this was the extent of the staff training Team Renegade received during force on force.



All-in-all, JRTC was an extremely valuable learning experience for Team Renegade. The most valuable training was the advisor academy as it provided the base knowledge of what an SFAT was. It provided a practical knowledge base for all Soldiers on an SFAT and in the future could even be used to train BSIs what the duties and responsibilities of an SFAT are. Making the most of the training rotation and using the time to build the team, rather than writing it off as just another JRTC training rotation, increased the overall proficiency of the team. JRTC was possibly the most important building block for Team Renegade in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan.



### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- The advisor academy is one of the most useful and practical classes the team will receive during the entire train-up. Take detailed notes and put into practice the lessons that are taught during the blocks of instruction.
- Make the best of the time the team has at JRTC. Use that time to train what the top three identifies as the tasks they believe the team is deficient on. The team has unlimited time to train and make the most of all of it.
- Do not forget to train as a staff. It is easy to get caught up in small unit tactics but even during those types of operations, the team can divide up tasks to staff based off of the basic five paragraph OPORD format.
- Sell the team to the BSI and teach them what an SFAT is. Unless the team sells themselves to the BSI they will be brushed over as a hindrance to the operation rather than the force multiplier that it is.
- Use the time to refine TTPs, small unit tactics, duties and responsibilities, cultural awareness, learn the language, and build esprit de corps among the team. Do not waste the training opportunity.
- Build a capabilities brief to layout what an SFAT is. Capture all lessons learned and apply them to the team's operations.

**Tools:**

- Capabilities Brief Summarized Example

	
<p><b>Purpose:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ To provide information on the Capabilities, Limitations, and Constraints of a Security Force Advise and Assist Team.</li> <li>➢ Information on Team members</li> <li>➢ Task Organization</li> <li>➢ Background of training</li> </ul>	<p><b>Chair:</b> CPT Dortona (Renegade 6)</p> <p><b>Proponent:</b> CPT Nardelli (Renegade 8)</p> <p><b>Attendees:</b> Battle Space Integrators</p>
<p><b>Inputs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Combat Power</li> <li>➢ C2 Relationship Chart</li> <li>➢ Commander's Intent</li> <li>➢ Operational Limitations</li> <li>➢ CJTF Constraints</li> <li>➢ Team Renegade's Training Path</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Integration of <u>BSO INTO ANSF</u> operations</li> <li>➢ Synchronization and sharing of information by, with, and through all ANSF</li> <li>➢ Clear understanding of TM Renegade role and capabilities in advising</li> </ul>	<p><b>Agenda:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Task Organization</li> <li>➢ Combat Power</li> <li>➢ C2 Relationship Chart</li> <li>➢ Mission Statement</li> <li>➢ Commander's Intent</li> <li>➢ Operational Limitations</li> <li>➢ CJTF Constraints</li> <li>➢ Team Renegade's Training Path</li> </ul>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">Figure 1-10</div>	

	<h2>SFA Terms/ Definitions</h2> 
<p><b>Security Force Advise/Assist Team (SFAAT).</b> An SFAAT is a team of advisors formed by a BCT out of organic personnel to deploy in support of a CJTF Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission. SFAATs are OPCON to the CJTF and TACON to a subordinate BCT as appropriate when the CJTF allocates an SFAAT to advise a Foreign Security Force (FSF) within a subordinate BCT's battle space. SFAATs primarily conduct the "advise" task of the BSO's SFA mission. SFAATs comprise of 8-18 men who are led by LTC's, MAJ's or CPT's, often commanders from the originating organizations. SFAATs do not perform normal BCT LNO duties but do provide a vital link between BSO's and the ANSF. SFAATs are not part of supported BSO staff but do work closely with BSO staffs.</p> <p><b>OPCON</b> is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Organizing and employing commands and forces.</li> <li>▪ Assigning tasks.</li> <li>▪ Designating objectives.</li> <li>▪ Giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish missions.</li> </ul> <p><b>TACON</b> is inherent in OPCON. It may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistical support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive .</p> <p><b>ADCN</b> is direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organization in respect to administration and support, including control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.</p>	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">Figure 1-11</div>	



## V. First 100-Days

The first 100-days of the deployment are the most critical as it sets the condition for the remainder of the deployment. The X3 will have an enormous amount of work to do in regards to advising two ANA field grade officers and establishing the SFAT staff. Other than overseeing property accountability and the movement of equipment and personnel to the team's outstation, the X3 needs to quickly develop a combined battle rhythm that depicts ANSF events, BSI meetings and reporting requirements, SFAT higher headquarters meetings and reporting requirements, and any team internal meetings that will be necessary to synchronize the efforts across the team. Develop a good relationship with the BSI as soon as the team gets on ground as the two units will have to work closely together in order to accomplish the mission. All coalition force units need to present a unified front when dealing with ANA and higher headquarters, any rifts among units will create unnecessary turbulence that can be easily avoidable. The X3 needs to identify who else needs to know information and then ensure it is shared across the formation (See Figure 1-6). Also, establish the standard for products and build a format that is nested with the higher headquarters. After the standard is set, the standard must be enforced throughout the team. If conditions are not set properly upon the team's arrival to Afghanistan, the team will struggle to establish standards and build relationships with other units during the deployment.

### **Battle space owners and battle space integrators:**

To explain the deployment in more detail, the clarification of the difference between a Battle Space Owner (BSO) and a Battle Space Integrator (BSI) is necessary. A BSO is a CF unit and is responsible for the security of the area of operations (AO) and typically applicable when units are partnered with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Responsibility for an AO then transfers to ANSF where that CF unit on ground becomes a BSI and exists to support ANSF in extremis situations and integrate enablers. The terms battle space integrator and battle space owner are not synonymous and should not be used as such. Simply put, the differentiating characteristic is the transition of CF from a supported to a supporting role.

### **A country in transition:**

Afghanistan is currently in a period of transition and units are conducting as Lieutenant General Terry put it a "withdrawal under pressure with detachments left in contact." ISAF is transitioning control of areas of operation to ANSF. SFATs are in Afghanistan for that exact purpose; to ensure to proper transition of security for the country to Afghans. These advisory teams have the principal role in ensuring the proper transition takes place and conditions are set for Afghanistan's success. Take a personal vested interest in the country's success so the U.S. does not have to send more Soldiers into harm's way because the area once again became a safe haven for terrorism. Own the order and own the mission given to the team by higher headquarters. Facilitate the proper transition of the country to Afghan control. Remember that

Afghans do not have to conduct operations the way CFs do; they just have to do it good enough to sustain operations and succeed.

### **First interactions:**

The first interactions with the SFATs counterparts were largely focused on personal subjects related to families, personal experiences, sports, etc. Conversations weren't particularly deep and did not include talk about business. Team Renegade's advisors did an outstanding job of building good rapport with their counterparts during first interactions. The X3's experience was interesting as the kandak XO, MAJ Amman, tested his limits with him, calling the SFAT his "new bag of money." The X3 spoke very clearly with the kandak XO ensuring everyone in the room understood that the purpose of the team was not to provide the kandak with money, but rather to help the ANA work within their own sustainable system. The relationship between the X3 and the kandak XO was fairly rocky in the beginning as limitations were tested. As the X3 would talk with MAJ Amman about less business related topics, he would continually want to talk about his desire for the U.S. to invade Pakistan, remove former mujahedeen from the government, his distaste for certain ethnic groups, and desire for a visa to move to the U.S. due to the perceived impending failure of the government of Afghanistan. MAJ Amman neither meant any harm in his statements nor realized the significance of what he was saying. He would also complain about the kandak commander (who was actually extremely technically and tactically proficient on top of being a phenomenal leader) about some decisions that were made. The X3 continually tried to steer MAJ Amman away from these topics as they are not areas an advisor should discuss with his counterpart. After some coaching, MAJ Amman was eventually able to move past his qualms with areas above his influence and the two were able to discuss business. Once proper rapport was established between the two counterparts, MAJ Amman did a phenomenal job improving the organization. It was important to understand not rush to business when meeting their counterparts. Time had to be taken to get to know them and allow them to get to know their advisors in order to develop a trustworthy relationship.

### **Relief in place:**

During the first week on ground, Team Renegade began conducting their relief in place (RIP) with Team 33. The team received the existing battle rhythm, previous CUAT, meet and greet sessions with the ANA and BSI, information on past operations, and schedule for future operations. The RIP process with Team 33 was fairly quick and Team Renegade took the right seat within three days of the entire team being on ground, much quicker than the RIP schedule had originally laid out. The X3 developed a standard slide format nested with the higher headquarters and distributed it to the entire team. Of course there were changes to the format as the deployment progressed; however, when units were isolated and separated from the rest of the formation their professionalism was often judged by higher based off of the products they built and quality/clarity of the reports they shared. Having a standard ensured the professionalism was upheld throughout the team. The battle rhythm was also a living and breathing schedule that

needed to be updated constantly and had to be accurate. Teams had to “feed the beast” and if a team was notorious for missing meetings or being late on reports then it would cause a microscope to be put on the team in a negative way; maintaining an accurate battle rhythm was an easy way to avoid this.

### **Flattening the organization:**

Team Renegade had each staff section develop line of coordination charts which depicted everyone they had to coordinate with (See Figure 1-6). The team was in a unique situation where the ANA kandak they were advising was attached to another brigade requiring all logistical and administrative issues to flow through the parent organization and all tactical information to flow through the brigade they were attached to. This document served as a visual representation and a checklist to ensure all appropriate organizations had situational awareness of the reality on the ground. The line of coordination chart also facilitated the “man-up drill” for when someone was out on an operation conducting combat advising or at another location to pick-up supplies. It showed who reports needed to be sent to and who else needed situational awareness of the contents of the report. When combined with the battle rhythm, it required very little briefing to the person covering down as to the five “Ws” of when reports were due. All of the line of coordination charts were then brought into the team’s overall chart comparable to what platoons do with a sector sketch. This product provided the carbon copy (CC) line for the commander of who all needed situational awareness on the reports he submitted. It was extremely important to CC everyone possible on reports to flatten the organization and make it less difficult for higher headquarters to find information. On very few occasions did Team Renegade’s higher headquarters have to ping the team for information as it was constantly shared with all applicable organizations. The information was also put on the team’s portal to serve as a lasting reference for other organizations to look for information.

### **Implement and enforce systems:**

There are a lot of tasks floating throughout the SFAT that can be difficult to manage if the proper systems are not put in place. The SFAT X3 needs to develop a task tracker in order to keep situational awareness of the status of tasks and who is working on the assigned tasks (See Figure 1-7). This document can be maintained and distributed daily to the team and discussed at the morning BUB. The tracker can also serve as a little jab at officer’s egos as their laundry is put out there for everyone to see and also allow staff sections who were under tasked at the time to assist others in the completion of their tasks. Having tools such as this again provides more methods to flatten the organization and develop unity of effort within the team.

### **Property:**

Property must be managed and supervised properly in order to prevent a lot of time being taken away from advising ANA counterparts and directed towards team internal issues. Identify the transfer of property as a friction point, and place key personnel at that location to avoid the

headache of having to go back and correct problems. These issues caused a lot of headache for Team Renegade throughout the first 100-days of the deployment.

Accountability of sensitive items and physical security of the team's arms, ammunition, and equipment (AA&E) is a deliberate operation that needs to be planned out, recorded, implemented, and supervised. Create a deployment physical security standard operating procedure (SOP) which triple secures all sensitive items and ammunition, as well as establishes unaccompanied access rosters. Units will never be able to secure property the same way it is done in the United States due to limited available resources. However, that does not alleviate the responsibility of improving the foxhole. Cipher locks can be used to secure the command post, then the X3's office can be secured with a padlock, and then the weapons and communication cage can go inside the office. Assign a key controller for all keys and locks.

### **Relationships:**

During pre-deployment training, developing and maintaining relationships with Afghans is a huge focal point. What is often not discussed is the importance of developing a good working relationship with the BSI. Presenting issues to Afghan counterparts and higher headquarters is most effective when sister organizations show a united front. Share information and discuss possible plans of action to solve issues with other organizations to make a stronger argument of why the "team's way" is the best way to solve issues. Unity of effort will go a long way to ensuring good relationships are maintained and the deployment goes by smoothly.

Team Renegade encountered multiple issues that would not have been able to be solved without good relationships being pre-established. FOB Connolly had multiple insider threat reports from numerous sources that required force protection to be increased and patterns changed. Enablers were required from the BSI to build supplementary fighting positions, improve barriers, and layer the security within the base. If the relationship with the BSI was not already in place there likely would have been a lot of push back from the BSI as happened with the occasional unit in Regional Command - East (RC-E).

### **Force protection:**

Force protection for a SFAT is an enormous concern. There may be multiple insider threats within the ANA. This risk can be mitigated by reducing exposure time with the ANA. The ANA leadership understand the need for increased force protection measures and if a good relationship is in place, will even help protect the team through intelligence and security elements to guard their own Soldiers. At the end of the day do not trust any Afghan; however, it is okay to lean on some that can be relied on. Layer the security through multiple entry control points (ECP) that provide access to the team's location. Ensure the team develops an Alamo plan to safe guard the immediate area against threats that have already entered the base. Once the plan is in place, put it on paper and rehearse it with all CF on the forward operating base (FOB) or combat outpost (COP). Constantly change patterns and TTPs and present a hard target to thwart

any threat the team may not be aware of. These best practices kept the team safe throughout the deployment and successfully countered planned green on blue attacks.

Whenever the need to conduct a key leader engagement on the ANA side of the FOB/COP arose, the team ensured the conditions were set. Team Renegade traveled in large groups with “guardian angels” whose sole reason for being present at the KLE was to guard those key leaders. The SFAT developed standing concept slides which displayed where guardian angels, key leaders, and recorders would be located in a meeting location as well as sectors of fire (see Figure 1-17). These concepts were rehearsed and briefed prior to each engagement on their side of the FOB. It was treated as a patrol with rehearsals and a patrol brief to ensure everyone present understood their jobs, including the BSI security element that travelled with the team.

### **Let the ANA learn:**

Coalition forces naturally want to take control of the situation and issue orders to accomplish the mission quickly and to the U.S. standard. Advisors need to be able to take a step back and let the ANSF fail as a learning point. It is like a parent watching their child try to ride a bike without training wheels for the first time. The parent is there to make sure the bike does not roll out into the street but needs to let the child fall every once and a while so they learn. If advisors are too hands on the ANA will never learn on their own. Advise them and then let them make their decision; do not give them orders. Some Afghans will insist their advisors just tell them what to do and give them the right answer. Others will even attempt to tell the advisors to just do it for them. However, there are a select few that truly want to accomplish tasks themselves without coalition involvement; realizing the impending departure of CF from Afghanistan. The key is to pick out the negative and positive influencers within the organization and utilize them appropriately. A subject information packet (SIP) can be produced on any ANSF leader or Soldier showing whether they are a negative or a positive influence. The SIP lays out reports on the individual, their sphere of influence, human network, and courses of action of what should be done with the individual. It is a great tool that has produced results in the past to either get individuals removed from their position, removed from the ANSF, moved to another unit, or even promoted. These reports can remove negative influences from the organization and promote those who were worthy.

### **Organizing the command post:**

The SFAT command post (CP) was organized, set up, and managed by the X3. Team Renegade divided the CP into two main sections: the administrative and logistics operations center (ALOC) and tactical operations center (TOC). The ALOC included the S1, S4, and S6 advisors and the TOC included the company advisors, FSO, and the S2. Neither section operated in the traditional sense as a normal infantry battalion would however, it ensured the proper flow of information between operational teams. The CP had desks with dividers to separate each work

station, maps on the wall for planning, white boards, and a conference room table with a projector. The conference room table supported the morning meetings and briefs to very important people (VIP) who would visit the team. The CP contained two walled off offices for the commander and the X3. The commander's office facilitated his work space as well as a sofa and chai table to hold meetings with the kandak commander or other important ANSF leadership. The team NCOIC was in the main room with the staff to ensure discipline, professionalism, enforce tasks, and ensure standards were upheld. The CP worked and was fairly efficient for the space Team Renegade had in a wooden B-hut. The biggest problem the team had was limited connectivity due to an overloaded SNAP terminal that supported a TOC, three SFATs, three platoons, a troop headquarters, human intelligence collection team, and an aid station. Team Renegade was able to work through the issues listed above and took what resources were available to make the best of it. This process had to be controlled and supervised by the X3 to ensure it was done properly.

### **Combat advising:**

Advisors had to assume risk with their Afghan counterparts on the battlefield in order gain an accurate assessment of their capabilities and facilitate the ability to advise in tactical situations. Team Renegade conducted combat advising in two distinct methods. The first was if an advisor's counterpart went out in sector on an operation then the advisor would more often than not go with him. Kandak sized operations were most often the missions that would be advised by a combat advisor team (CAT) of usually three to five SFAT Soldiers. Team Renegade also divided up western Nangarhar by district to subject matter experts (SME) on the team who would specialize in what there was to know about their AO. This enabled the team commander to become more educated on his AO and properly advise the kandak commander based on the physical and human terrain. The X3 went out on all of the smaller missions with the CATs to ensure it was executed safely and productively. It served as a great way to develop the officers' patrolling and advisory skills in areas outside of their assigned staff section. Combat advising showed Team Renegade some of the kandak's shortfalls at the platoon level and coordination issues between them and the BSI. These issues would have gone unnoticed without sending out combat advising teams. Overall, the CAT concept assisted in building rapport with the ANA counterparts by assuming risk on the battlefield.

Although Team Renegade did conduct some combat advising, it still was not their focus. The S1 and S4 advisor did not need to patrol in order to advise how to collect personnel numbers or fill out a MOD 14 form. When Afghanistan was in its partnering phase, the concentration was on developing ANSF at the squad and platoon level. SFATs need to concentrate on developing the kandak staff through systems and developing Afghan sustainable solutions. As stated above, some patrolling with counterparts is necessary and comes with the territory of being an infantry kandak advisor. However, keep patrolling to a minimum and concentrate on building the kandak staff and leadership. When Team Renegade conducted combat advising on patrols and operations, there was a noticeable improvement in the rapport between them and their kandak.

The ANA respected that the SFAT shared risk with them and provided an opportunity for the two organizations to further the mutual respect they had for one another.

### **MDMP:**

Team Renegade conducted a full MDMP once in theater in preparation for 3/1/201 Infantry Kandak's RIP with 1/4/201 Infantry Kandak; a new unit just added to the ANA formation. This was the first time the team conducted a full MDMP. Once the team received a warning order (WARNO) from brigade the team gathered all the necessary tools, existing products, and issued the order to the team. The staff conducted mission analysis and build their staff estimates to gather all of the facts, assumptions, resources required, resources available, and specified/implied/essential tasks. The X3 then divided the team into two operational planning teams to work on three courses of action that were distinguishable by the date the relief in place (RIP) / transition of authority (TOA) would occur (corps and brigade had yet to decide the timeline of the operation). This was the team's method to influence brigade around the preferred course of action to ensure the timeline was not accelerated too much. Once the staff was divided up into two operational planning teams with the knowledge base and experience divided evenly among the them, they began their course of action development. The team conducted each of these steps multiple times to ensure they were correct before the war game. During the war game the X3 set up a doctrinal war game room with all of the appropriate tools including: decision support matrix shells, maps, staff estimates, operational synchronization matrix, the proposed problem statement, proposed mission statement, course of action evaluation criteria, and a review of what had been completed so far. The S2 wore the "red hat" and the A/S3 wore the blue hat to allow the X3 to oversee the war game. The team developed additional PIRs and war gamed the proposed courses of action. Once the war game was complete the team refined their courses of action and completed their slides for the course of action comparison. The team stopped the MDMP after course of action comparison as the team then had enough information to advise their ANA counterparts. The event provided outstanding situational awareness for the team commander and a knowledge base how to advise the ANA to proceed with an effective RIP. It also provided good training for the Team Renegade officers for future staff positions once their platoon leader time at Fort Campbell was complete.

### **Knowledge management:**

The team will make a large number of products, receive various reports, and maintain multiple trackers. Establishing a way to maintain and record all of the knowledge and lessons learned needs to be established and maintained. Develop a way to track the information and reports so information does not get lost on someone's computer and recent documents do not get confused with outdated files.

Team Renegade developed a knowledge management SOP which included a file naming convention. The naming convention included what unit and sub-unit made the document, what

the document was, when it was made, and whether or not it was the final product. This ensured there were not three files called "kandak status brief version 11". It also assisted in delineating where certain documents came from so if questions needed to be asked, the request for information (RFI) could be sent to the originator of the file.

**Do not sweat the small stuff:**

Advising kandak leadership was often frustrating due in large part to the amount of meetings they were required to attend at their brigade headquarters located at a different FOB. This made accessibility to the leadership extraordinarily difficult as they would occasionally leave daily for a week straight. Or, if leadership was not at the brigade headquarters they would go on leave almost every other week. The kandak executive officer left for four days a week for the first two months Team Renegade was attempting to advise their new counterparts. This made any progress excessively difficult due to the kandak's systemic maintenance issues advisors were attempting to help the ANA correct.

Accept the fact that the ANA will go on leave to see their families and or have meetings in brigade often. When the leadership is collocated on the base, make the most of the time and ensure time is made to continue to build rapport and advise the kandak in different ways to continue to improve themselves. Do not get openly frustrated with the ANA and just work through the differences between U.S. and Afghan culture.

**Continue team training:**

SFATs cannot stop their team internal training during the deployment. Small unit tactics, basic and advanced rifle marksmanship, cultural, language, and professional development training must continue at all times to ensure the team continues to present itself as a hard target and for the professional development of the team. Skills Soldiers learn are extremely perishable and must be retrained on in order to maintain proficiency. Repetitions are crucial to maintaining an organization's combat readiness.

Team Renegade made their best efforts to go to the range on a weekly basis to continue to hone their rifle marksmanship. The team also held leader professional development classes on a variety of topics including: tactics, air assault operations, counseling, officer record briefs / enlisted record briefs, and air to ground integration. The team also trained on the proper clearing procedures for weapon systems to mitigate the risk of negligent discharges while carrying weapons that were amber, and sometimes red, on CF bases. The training also serves as a welcome break from the day to day staff works and brings the Soldiers back to their infantry roots.

Log the training completed with the attendance roster, the program of instruction, and a memorandum stating what the training covered to ensure training management has proper



oversight. In the case of a negligent discharge it will show that the team conducted proper mitigation measures to prevent the incident. Conduct team training and conduct it often.

### **Fighting complacency:**

Complacent attitudes are hard to avoid in any unit on a deployment. Continue to reset the team's attitudes and remind them that the threat is real. Update the team on the tactical situation (especially the insider threat) and provide vignettes to serve as an example of what can happen if complacency takes over. Continue to find holes in the teams security, change up the battle rhythm to avoid setting patterns, and maybe even give the team some time off. As soon as a team becomes complacent is when the enemy will exploit the opportunity to interdict them. Fight complacency and continue to take a look internally to identify issues.

### **Field ordering officials:**

Teams did not necessarily need to establish field ordering officials (FOO) to sustain the organization while deployed. Traditionally, FOO money was drawn in the past to get money for Afghans and purchase items for U.S. personnel. Team Renegade did not use any of the money for either themselves or the Afghans. The team was able to be sustained through the Army supply system and did not make any purchases for the Afghans, as it violated what the team believed was the way ahead for the kandak. It was the team's opinion that buying items for the Afghans was a step backward rather than a step forward, even if the ANA had a strong need for the supplies. Team Renegade let the ANA work their system whenever they asked for something, and they were able to figure it out every time. They just needed to be put in the situation where they had no other choice but to work their system. Sometimes the best advice was to just say "no" to the ANA; it ensured the team was not their "easy button". The team was not overly concerned about a loss of rapport it could have caused as they eventually accepted the fact and got over it.

### **Very important person (VIP) visits:**

Due to the nature of the SFAT mission, it had visibility through the highest levels in Afghanistan both inside and outside the unit's chain of command. SFATs did not have to go out of their way to way to prepare for very important person (VIP) visits if they always had updated presentations on hand to show the individuals. Team Renegade used a modified form of a operational and intelligence (O&I) brief to show VIPs the current status of the advised kandak, called a kandak status brief. This brief showed the enemy situation template (SITE MP), kandak's common operating picture (COP), information on kandak leadership and staff, CUAT development way ahead, and story boards. VIPs were also provided with a visitor's packet containing all of the information stated above along with the most recent CUA slide, line of coordination charts, and other applicable information on the kandak. The SFAT mission was considered the main effort in Operation Enduring Freedom and therefore VIP visits would occur often.

Story boards were an effective way of showing what an SFAT and their kandak were accomplishing when geographically separated from higher headquarters advisors (see Figure 1-15,16). After any significant training event, Team Renegade created a story board to share the lessons learned across the formation. Whether it was a training event, kandak operation, non-commissioned officer professional development class, a toulay conducting troop leading procedures, or maintenance; a story board was created to ensure information was effectively passed through the chain of command. The story boards were unclassified products whenever possible to ensure the information can be shared with as many organizations as possible. They showed the Afghans in the lead, successes were the Afghans' and failures were the SFAT's. Afghans thoroughly enjoyed seeing their pictures showing off what they had accomplished; story boards the team created were translated to enable them to be shared with other ANSF organizations.

The team should not have to go out of the way to accommodate the VIP visits. The presentations should be updated regularly and information kept as current as possible. Updating these presentations can be a battle rhythm event to ensure the team was prepared to portray the great things the advised kandak was accomplishing as well as what they still needed to improve on. Ensure the brief does not portray the kandak as being better than they really are; however, do not be scared to highlight their successes in terms of "Afghan sustainable" or "Afghan right."

### **Reports:**

SFATs are required to send up daily reports on the status of their advised ANSF unit, called a "blue one." This report provides an update to brigade and corps advisory teams along pre-established lines of effort. These reports are extremely important to providing lessons learned with other SFATs and ensuring situational awareness of what the organizations accomplish on a day to day basis.

Other reports SFATs are required to send include weekly CUA slides which show the previous week's assessment and priorities, following week's priorities, ANA common operating picture, and maintenance status. It gives SFAT commanders the opportunity to provide an update on kandak and team commanders' priorities to the BSI commander. The CUA can also be used as an internal tool to ensure the team maintains its focus on their weekly priorities and are properly shadow tracking the ANA's mission readiness. Other staff sections have their own reports due as well, but they do not necessarily pass through the X3. However, track these reports through and ensure the staff sends them up accurately and on time.


### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**


- Develop product formats upfront that are nested under the higher headquarters formats. Distribute the formats to the team and enforce their use. This will prevent a lot of headaches of having to correct products before they get submitted higher.

- Ensure a proper RIP is conducted with the previous SFAT. Gather all of the tools, systems, information, and schedules they used to track information. Get their opinions on the different members of the staff.
- Do not start meetings off with all business. Ensure the proper amount of time is spent on developing rapport with the team's counterparts. Do not expect Afghans to take advice from someone they do not know.
- Develop the team's battle rhythm as soon as it arrives on ground. Not doing so will cause reports to be missed and the wrong first impression being conveyed higher. Once it is developed, properly maintain and update it as the situation changes.
- Make a line of coordination chart to show who all needs to be coordinated with throughout the AO. Include contact information on the chart to provide others with the proper information they need if they need to cover down on another position.
- Communicate with everyone and share products across the formation. With so many organizations working towards the same goal, they often have the habit of planning in a vacuum. Always ask who else needs to know information and then share it.
- Develop and maintain a good relationship with other SFATs and the BSI. They will all rely on each other. When issues arise, come together to develop a solution and present it to higher on a united front.
- Maintain a proper knowledge management SOP within the team to ensure information does not get lost.
- Identify the ANA that can be relied on and continue to develop them, but never trust them. Also, identify the ANA leaders who cannot be relied on and are a negative influence. Build subject information packets on all types of leaders to gain the desired effects with them. These packets will also serve as a good product to handover to the next SFAT for continuity purposes.
- Have increased attention to detail with the team's property and ensure all serial numbers are recorded properly. Safeguard the property and ensure physical security of all sensitive items is maintained at all times.
- Ensure the X3 takes the lead on properly organizing the team CP into a layout that works. Use what works for the team but ensure it is not finger drilled. Properly setting up the CP will ensure information flows fluidly throughout the team.
- Develop systems in the team to track information, such as a task tracker. There are a lot of tasks to accomplish on a day to day basis. If those tasks are not properly tracked and enforced then they will start falling through the cracks.
- Concentrate on force protection and never take anything for granted. Just because the team may be on a base it does not mean everyone is safe. The insider threat is real and always lurking around the corner. Be paranoid as it can keep the team alive.
- When necessary, do not be scared of MDMP. It provides outstanding situational awareness and simple solutions to complex problems.

- Combat advising teams are necessary but should be the exception rather than the rule. Only go out when the job takes the team on operations or when it is needed to gain situational awareness of the AO.
- Never stop training the team. Ensure the ANA see the team conduct battle drills and rifle marksmanship to present a harder target and act as a deterrent to green on blue attacks. Log the training and ensure proper training management is supervised by the X3 and NCOIC.
- Kandak leadership leaves often either for vacation or for meetings at their brigade headquarters. Make the most of the time they are located on the same FOB and do not get openly frustrated when they leave.
- Always be prepared for visits from VIPs. Due to the high level of visibility the SFAT mission has, VIPs like to get person to person updates from the kandak level teams. The team should not have to go out of their way in order to prepare for these briefs; keep running documents prepared that portray the kandak's status.
- Create story boards to share lessons learned and best practices across all ANSF organization and advisory teams.

**Tools:**





## Combat Power

SHOOT									
M4	13/0	M249	1/0	M240	1/0	M203	2/0	M320	6/0
M2	1/0	MK19	1/0	M851	12/0	M3	12/0	VIPR	1/0
PVS-14	13/0	PEQ-15	13/0	ACOG	12/0	M68	1/0	MOD-93	3/0

MOVE									
M-ATV	0/0	MAXPRO	0/0	M1151	0/0	TRAILER	0/0	LMTV	0/0
GATOR	0/0								

COMMUNICATE									
ASIP	6/0	MBITR	0/0	LMR	13/0	MBITR HAND MIC		ASIP HAND MIC	
PELTOR	5/0	LONG-WHIP		MBITR ANT		SPEAKER		NIPR COMP	
SIPR COMP		CXI COMP		NIPR PRNT	1/0	SIPR PRNT	1/0	CXI PRNT	1/0
NIPR PH	1	SIPR PH		CXI PH		117G	0/0	HARRIS	0/0
OE-254	2/0								

**CURRENT TOTAL STRENGTH:**  
12 x Deployed  
4 x Alternates at FTCKY

**SHORT:** 1 x DARI CC-LOC  
1 x Generator Mechanic

Notes:

**KEY:**  
FMC / # NMC


Figure 1-14



Figure 1-15



Figure 1-16



## CHAPTER 2: THE S1 ADVISOR

### I. Task Organization

Team Renegade was organized originally into a 14 man team, with two alternates. The primary branch for team members was infantry due to the fact that the team was from an infantry brigade combat team retasked for this mission. The other military occupational specialties included in the original task organization contained a medic (68W), the communications specialist (25U), a fires section of a 13F and a 13A, and a mechanic. However, the taskings changed early on removing the mechanic from all the teams across the brigade. For training, Team Renegade maintained a 14 man team, including during the Joint Readiness Training Center rotation. Once the team returned from JRTC, the numbers were cut from 14 to 12 personnel, reducing the number of 11B qualified junior enlisted Soldiers. The final team was comprised of nine infantrymen, one fire support officer, one signal specialist, and one combat medic.

### II. Home Station Training

The challenges for Team Renegade began with the transition from company commander, assistant operations officer, or rifle platoon leader to combat advisor. Advising had always been associated with Special Forces or senior Army leadership. But now, that title would apply to captains, lieutenants, and noncommissioned officers. One of the first challenges was the expectation management of the job to be done overseas. When 2-502 Infantry Regiment Battalion received the change of mission for the Second Brigade Combat Team, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault), all manner of rumors started flying around the footprint about where and what Strike Force Soldiers would be doing. The best practice during this time was the leadership focusing on what was known and developing a training path to best prepare the Soldiers for an unknown type of deployment. Every team member was trying to learn their piece within the battalion construct. For an S1, the future advisor should go to the S1 office and simply ask questions. Do not wait for a sit down class on how to complete all the administrative tasks of a battalion, because time may not allow for it. The battalion S1 section may not think to provide a class. Whatever position a Soldier fills as an advisor, they should ask questions early and often.

As the S1 advisor discovered, asking questions of the battalion staff as issues arose became the most effective form of learning. This facilitated hands-on classes and on the job training which over time taught him most of what he needed to know. The S1 advisor had to track down answers about changing officer and enlisted record briefs, updating the personnel electronic records management system, and generating orders. The advisor used his questions as a form of class and gained a better understanding of his responsibilities once the questions were



answered. The personnel assigned to the battalion S1 section learned more about their section while trying to find the answers to the advisors' questions.

Team Renegade's training heavily emphasized small unit tactics, ensuring that every member of the team was proficient with their basic skill level one tasks. Though advising in Afghanistan may not take the advisor on patrols often, the threat is always present and the training focused on survivability in any situation; whether out on patrol or in a key leader engagement (KLE). All of Team Strike was put on an extremely condensed training cycle; incorporating marksmanship, physical training, online courses, tactics training, a JRTC Rotation, block leave, and a live fire certification in the span of four and a half months. In addition to all the training, the S1 had to make and maintain trackers. These trackers would allow for swift access to key information. The training and staff education left little time to delve into each staff position, resulting in several infantry lieutenants still learning their roles up to the day they left for deployment.

Another challenge that Team Renegade faced was developing the right task organization and adjusting each member's duties and responsibilities. An advisor may have had a specific background, but would likely be filling a role outside of his training; so cross training should be encouraged. The team was very adept at attacking the problem before them, but it became evident that without dedicated staff assistants, the team would have to function as each other's assistants. This proved to be a strength for the team as they continued down their training path towards and through deployment.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Do not wait for anything. Being an advisor should be synonymous with being pro-active.
- Make trackers. The earlier all of the team's information is gathered (social security numbers, dates of rank, blood types, spouse information, etc) the easier it will be later to send information higher when it is required.
- Be flexible. The mission and location will change a hundred times and rumors will fly. Stay focused on what is known and adjust as facts are communicated to the team.
- Taking care of Soldiers is the priority for all S1s and teams.
- Do not get mad. Learn the importance of every role in the organization and how they are used to accomplish the mission.





Once Team Renegade completed the advisor academy, they moved into the training area for situational training exercises (STX) and a force on force exercise. Once in the training area, or “box,” the focus shifted back to the tactical capabilities of the team ensuring they could handle themselves in complex enemy engagements. Team Renegade conducted STX lanes that encompassed a tactical convoy, a joint operation with host nation forces, and a joint raid with Afghan National Army (ANA) forces. When the STX lanes were complete, the force on force portion began which included interactions with Afghan nationals and U.S. Soldiers role-playing as their counterparts. This forced the advisors to use the interpreter they had assigned to them and develop an interpreter management program. In addition to the role players serving as the kandak staff, a platoon from Fort Polk served as the Soldiers from the kandak; giving credibility and manpower to the operations they would undertake during the exercise. Once force on force began, the focus was advising the ANA on Afghan-led operations, not on U.S. forces driving out ready to fight in independent operations. The key take-away from the force on force portion was that the advisors and Coalition Forces were not the decisive operation, but rather the ANA were. Their successes were the ANA’s and their failures were the advisors’.

The time in the box was also the time to learn the advisory role, as tasks would emerge and advisors dealt with short suspense targets all the time. Advising the ANA and providing for the team on issues like casualty assistance, mortuary affairs, finance issues, awards, and awards for civilians was nothing short of daunting. However, the S1 advisor overcame these problems through asking questions of the battalion S1 and the battle space owner (BSO) S1 at Fort Polk. With issues rising and requiring immediate reconciliation, the advisor could not wait for any type of class for S1 related issues. The ANA were going to ask questions about their own system and JRTC afforded a great opportunity to learn the basics of their system to better advise them.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Do not get fooled by the tactical portion. Running around and making the training area safe from the opposing force is great, but that is not the primary mission. Focus on advising and ask questions.
- Stay focused. It is easy to get caught up in the training rules and what the opposing forces are allowed to do, just keep in mind that there are no rules for insurgent forces in Afghanistan.
- Take full advantage of the teachers. Team Renegade had a Special Forces captain teach most of the classes and that was a great resource from which to pull best practices.
- Read what is available on Afghan personnel functions. They do not have a field manual for personnel functions and as a result they don’t have awards or developed forms. However, the advisor should read about their perstat procedures.
- If the S1 thinks it works here, it may work there. The advisor should save every product made and take with them on deployment. It may prove itself to be useful.

#### IV. Deployment

Pre-deployment preparation was a difficult time for the S1 advisor, not because of task overload but due to the complexity and importance of the tasks. During this time, there were a few things the S1 needed to track. He made sure that the team was proactive about finishing their Soldier readiness processing (SRP) packets. The SRP packets served as tickets to deployment and it was his responsibility to ensure that every required piece of information is in there. From checklists to orders; family care plans to storage agreements; it was the S1's job to make certain the team was ready to walk onto the plane.

The S1 also tracked all of the team's administrative requirements, including finances and counseling packets. He checked all the rules and regulations governing deployments entitlements. However, issues presented themselves early and the advisor was able to contact the finance offices at Fort Campbell and forward operating base (FOB) Fenty to get them resolved. The S1 also needed to track all of the team's counseling packets. With enough forethought, the he could have packed all this paperwork away in the container. However, he instead chose the more difficult route and hand carried all the counseling packets. These packets were very important as the leadership conducted regular counseling and were able to consolidate all the information in the packets. Every Soldier had a packet and all pertinent information was filed in them. Similar to trackers made earlier, the counseling packets served as an easy way to access information on all of the team's Soldiers.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Track Soldiers. Deployment is a huge S4 function, but the S1 tracks the actual warfighter. The unit liaisons will do most of the muscle movements, but it is the responsibility of the S1 to maintain an accurate personnel status report (PERSTAT) at all times.
- Keep personal information close. The S1 may not be carrying S2 materials, but the S1 carries all the personal information about the team. Guard it.
- If in doubt, bring it. If something, whether it is a tracker or a book or folder, might be useful ensure it is brought with the team.

#### **Establishing the CP and Advising:**

After waiting in Manas and Bagram for a few days, Team Renegade arrived at Jalalabad Air Field and officially entered Regional Command-East. While there, the S1 met with various staff sections to gather information and establish a relationship with the BSO. The visits provided the S1 with information about the BSO's standard operating procedures (SOPs) for various administrative tasks, including: awards, financial aid, chaplain services, and drawing funds for the ANA. The meetings also allowed the S1 to have face-to-face interactions with some of the people with whom he would be working. By the time he left for Forward Operating

Base (FOB) Connolly, the S1 had an initial understanding of how he would perform his duties on deployment and who he would contact if he needed assistance.

Moving to FOB Connolly was a piecemeal endeavor for Team Renegade, which meant the S1 had to link up with the unit liaisons every day, to ensure the perstat was accurate. Once the whole team was at Connolly, perstat became a battle rhythm event. With the billets and command post manned, the team was able to start the relief in place (RIP) with the SFAT from the battle space integrator (BSI), who had been working at the FOB. Team Renegade had to make the RIP very deliberate, because they were a 12 man team covering down on eight people/staff sections. The outgoing team at the FOB was a three man team from 4/4ID who had been working with the ANA, the Afghan border police (ABP), and the Afghan uniformed police (AUP). So there were three full teams trying to RIP with three individuals. As a result, it took a little while for all the sections to get over to meet their counterparts.

### **First encounter:**

Meeting with the ANA was supposed to start as polite and friendly as possible. Team Renegade benefitted from the language training at JRTC as it facilitated friendly discourse. As instructed at JRTC, the team all started with small talk and let the ANA initiate any talk of business if they wanted. The first meeting was just a meet and greet, focused on exchanging names and basic information. Large changes did not occur overnight and the advisor did not expect them. There was time after the first meeting to discuss some of the objectives the ANA and the advisor wanted to achieve based off of the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) rating.

### **Reoccurring tasks:**

There should be some measure of ability for any S1 shop, since there are a few tasks it has to accomplish on a daily basis. The ANA S1 was always able to accurately report the personnel status to brigade headquarters and the advisor only had to shadow track. One shortcoming for this task was the ability of the toulay clerk. The S1 section was only as good as the information they were given, so the advisor invested some time into the toulay clerks. The clerks served as the primary reporting agent for personnel because they performed the daily headcount.

### **Setting the conditions:**

When interacting with the ANA S1, the advisor had to be sure not to promise anything. The Afghan National Security Forces have a supply system in place, but they have been living off of Coalition Forces for so long that it was much simpler for them to ask for a lot and ask often. As in any S1 shop, office supplies were in high demand and they viewed Americans like the Office Depot easy button. Press it and the acetate, printer paper, printers, and ball point pens

would appear. After recognizing a trend across the entire kandak, every advisor adopted the policy of saying “no” and they stopped asking for things after a few meetings.

### **ANA awards:**

As mentioned before, the advisor needs to set realistic goals for them self and the ANA as well as understand that every goal is going to take a long time to achieve. Where the U.S. Army is able to function along multiple lines of effort, the Afghans are not necessarily going to be able or even want to function like that. Team Renegade worked with a fairly robust kandak S1 section with an officer in charge (OIC) that was very good at tracking people and maintaining records. However, for all their good work, they had no way of officially rewarding anyone. Every type of award or promotion was driven from the top down from brigade. The advisor was able to nudge and whisper, and after mentioning awards time and time again, the S1 advisor finally got through and the ANA devised a way to reward Soldiers’ performances: get them extra pay. Though not a superficial award like a medal, it turned out to be an effective way of getting Afghan Soldiers to do their jobs and do them well. The pay reward system was semi-sustainable, however, as they had to have the money in order to give it as a reward. The advisor pushed other methods of awarding performance once it had been identified as an area to be improved. ANA Soldiers were willing to work hard for a certificate, so the advisor reminded the S1 that the kandak was capable of making awards and giving them out whenever the kandak commander saw fit.

### **Conclusion:**

Overall, the S1 advisor was able to achieve some results through continued pressure on the OIC and non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). There were very few areas to improve and, due to their proficiency, the ANA S1 section was more than willing to maintain their current level of performance. Fortunately for the advisor, he was able to establish rapport and start to affect change within the section. His best practices stemmed from gaining the trust of the ANA S1 and presenting a person who was approachable and willing to listen to their ideas, while guiding them with his own.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Make friends. Every stop is an opportunity to meet people and make friends who can assist later.
- Learn to say “no”. The fact is that they are going to ask for stuff. Say “no” every time.
- Take the time to develop realistic objectives. Advisors are going to want to get on the ground and make a huge difference every day and every meeting. This will not happen. Find the key tasks that need to be improved and work on those.
- Being an advisor is about being patient. Working with the Afghans can be infuriating, but the advisor should always maintain a professional attitude.

## CHAPTER 3: THE S2 ADVISOR

### I. Home Station Training

There was virtually no structured training on intelligence operations at the battalion level. There were only three formal training sessions held with the S-2 section over the course of four months. While these sessions attempted to touch on the full array of intelligence operations that a security force advisor team (SFAT) might encounter, there was far too much information to be covered in such a short time. This was also due to the fact that the guidance on the role of an intelligence advisor was still extremely vague at this point. This resulted in a brief snap shot of many different topics without time to truly gain an understanding of any of them. Much of the training that the Team Renegade S-2 would receive prior to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation would come from intelligence manuals and self study.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Focus on learning the broad concepts of the position. Do not get caught too far in the weeds as there is a vast amount of information. The battle space owner (BSO) or battle space integrator (BSI) will have an S-2 section that advisors can utilize for support.
- Be proactive and dig into the manuals that reference the position early.
- Use this time to figure out how the position adapts to being on a small team. It will be different than the standard doctrinal position.

### II. JRTC

The first portion of Team Renegade's JRTC experience would take place at the "Advisor Academy", lasting about ten days. This consisted of power point classes on a wide variety of topics ranging from cultural awareness/language training, to the task organization of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Although the subjects covered in the classes contained good information in general, the S-2 learned little about advising an Afghan intelligence officer. In between these classes were mock key leader engagement (KLE) sessions with Afghan national role players. These sessions were valuable experiences, giving team members a chance to interact with Afghans and practice the use of an interpreter.

Following the advisor academy, the team proceeded into the "box" for squad tactical exercises (STX). These lanes would test the team's ability to operate as a small unit as well as introduce the task of executing partnered operations with Afghan National Army (ANA) (portrayed by U.S. Soldiers). This would segue into the culminating force on force exercise,



allowing Team Renegade to act as advisors. This exercise provided valuable experiences on multiple levels. One of these experiences included working with an Afghan S-2 counterpart. The role-player, who was among only a handful of Afghan-nationals participating in the exercise, had no intelligence background. This created a difficult but valuable experience in the “box” for the S-2 as it forced the advisor to learn how to teach, coach, and mentor a foreign security force staff.

Despite challenges the S-2 would encounter, the training would provide new understandings as well. One challenge was that the Afghan S-2 did not have much of a work ethic. He had to be forced by his advisor to do any tasks regarding intelligence. This created a difficult situation for the advisor to train his counterpart on performing intelligence operations, much less fulfill the goal of the ANA conducting them independently. Another challenge of this training was the fact that the team members were supposed to be acting as advisors for a battalion level staff. However, there were only a platoon’s worth of Soldiers to role play an Afghan kandak. This prevented the team from experiencing the complex array of issues that a true kandak would provide. However, the training did provide an understanding of how a combined tactical operations center (CTOC) would run, both through digital and analog methods.

The S-2 was also able to get a feel for how to coordinate with a BSO’s S-2 section. During the force on force rotation, The SFATs had to coordinate with a BSO provided by 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. The S-2 advisor received a thorough understanding on how the BSO’s S-2 section operated. Every experience the S-2 had interacting with the BSO was positive. The brigade S-2 section, co-located on Team Renegade’s forward operating base (FOB), was extremely helpful with any requests the team S-2 had for them.

The exercise concluded with an extensive after action review (AAR) which provided lessons learned. During the AAR, the S-2 learned that although his personal experience with the BSO was positive, major information gaps had still occurred between the SFATs and the BSO. These gaps would require increased coordination in the future on the sides of both the BSO and SFATs. An example of this was a green on blue threat that had been inserted into the exercise. The BSO had swiftly disseminated this information throughout its formation. However, the vast majority of the SFATs, including Team Renegade, had failed to receive this threat report. This lesson learned highlighted the challenge and importance of establishing and maintaining effective communication channels between an already established BSO and incoming SFATs.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Take full advantage of any opportunity that is provided to practice adapting to cultural differences. This will help make the transition into advising ANA Soldiers as smooth as possible on deployment.
- Establish a good working relationship with the BSO as soon as possible. Use them to facilitate the team's intelligence efforts. The BSO's S-2 section will often do just as much to support a SFAT intelligence request as one from its subordinate units.
- Establish an effective method of cross communication with the BSO. This is vital to ensuring important information does not fall through the gaps.

### III. Deployment:

When the team arrived at Bagram Airfield (BAF), they spent a few days executing various training requirements including roll over vehicle training and counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) training. Upon leaving BAF and arriving at Jalalabad Airfield (JAF), the S-2 linked in with the BSO fusion cell at the brigade level to seek out requests for information (RFI). After ten days of training at JAF, the team moved to FOB Connolly in western Nangahar Province to assume its advisory mission.

The team had deployed a month behind its brigade advisor team, and had a large intelligence gap to fill in as little time as possible. This involved substantial coordination for the team S-2. Co-located on the FOB were two other SFATs consisting of a team for the Afghan border police (ABP) and a team for the Afghan uniformed police (AUP). A human intelligence collection team (HCT) and a company intelligence support team (COIST) for Apache Troop, 3-61 CAV, 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, the battle space owning unit (soon to be battle space integrator) were also present on the FOB. The challenge with these meetings was to develop a cooperative relationship with the agencies involved.

### **First encounter:**

The first interaction with the kandak S-2 did not occur for some time. It consisted of a brief introduction and a simple hand-shake, contrary to the introductions experienced at JRTC. The next encounter would be a day later, viewing the combined arms rehearsal (CAR) the ANA had for an upcoming operation. This would be the advisor's first chance to assess the intelligence section of the kandak, and his expectations were high. Contrary to what he had heard about ANSF intelligence officers at JRTC, the three-man advisor team that was at FOB Connolly prior to Team Renegade had rated the S-2 as independent and considered him an expert as his job. Granted, this rating was on the scale of "Afghan Right", a metric that had been adopted by the entire team by this point and was the focus of the advisor mission. The assistant

S-2 (A/S-2) gave the intelligence portion of the mission briefing and, at least in rudimentary form, hit on every topic of an enemy situation brief that a U.S. S-2 would highlight. This included weather, terrain, and expected enemy courses of action. After his first interaction with the S-2, the advisor's initial assessment of the Afghan intelligence section for the kandak was "Afghan Right".

### **Advising:**

Despite having a counterpart assessed as "Afghan Right," difficulties would still arise for the intelligence advisor. Due to the team's limited resources, the team prioritized the staff sections that needed the most advising and training. These limitations included the number of interpreters, security personnel available, and the most limiting factor of all; time. The top priority went to the S-4 as the kandak's maintenance and sustainment was in dire need of improvement. The training of the kandak's special weapons sections was a close second on this list. The intelligence section was prioritized low as they were already competent to an acceptable level. This made it difficult for the intelligence advisor to find times to meet with his counterpart. Further complicating the issue was the tendency of the kandak staff positions to frequently travel to FOB Gamberi (the ANA brigade headquarters). This occurred for extended periods of time in order for the ANA to coordinate with their brigade leadership. The only way the team members usually found out about these trips was when they would walk down to the Afghan side of the FOB to meet with their counterparts. Upon arrival they would be informed that their counterpart was gone. These issues would be unforeseen difficulties for the advisor.

The S-2 had at least one time a week he was guaranteed to be able to meet with someone from the kandak S-2 section. The various intelligence community representatives had created a combined ANSF synchronization meeting that occurred every Monday. This meeting involved a representative from the ANA, AUP, ABP, the national directorate of security (NDS), Apache Troop COIST, and the advisors from each SFAT. These meetings would begin as a way for each of the representatives from the ANSF to give Apache Troop the information they had gathered. Most of this was gathered from civilian sources through the ANSF. The ANSF would also use these meetings as a means to ask coalition forces for more support, be it through intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities or acting on the intelligence they provided. This was not the direction coalition forces were heading as coalition efforts constantly influenced the ANSF to take the lead in all operations or, optimally, run operations independently. As the weeks progressed, advisors were able to slowly influence the ANSF into using the meetings as a means of ensuring communication between each other. Thus the advisor was able to make good use of this once a week interaction with his counterpart.

### **ANA operational independence:**

The ANSF began to show improvement as organizations coordinated with one another. This was a major challenge at first as the ANSF would not want to go through the process of requesting support from each other. In their minds, it was much easier just to request Coalition Forces (CF) to take care of the problem. A prime example of this revolved around the most prevalent threat in the region: improvised explosive devices (IED). In the first few meetings, the ANSF representatives made it clear that when they provided information on IED emplacement, they expected CF to neutralize them. They also expected CFs to provide route clearance platoons (RCPs) to clear the roads ahead of ANSF vehicles during operations. Instead of granting the requests of the ANSF to provide CF resources, the advisors influenced the ANSF organizations to cooperate with each other to find Afghan solutions. For this example, it was the other organizations coordinating with the ANA to use their route clearance company (RCC) rather than taking the easier way of just asking CF to take care of the problem. It would be a continuous struggle to convince the ANSF of the importance of not remaining reliant on CF resources and instead coordinate with one another.

### **Expectation management:**

The ANA S-2 did not fulfill any of the stereotypes that the advisor had been told to expect. The advisor expected the first meetings to consist of little to no business whatsoever, instead consisting mainly of rapport building and learning personal information about his counterpart. Instead of the long tea drinking sessions the advisor had been told to expect, the ANA S-2 was always ready to jump straight into talking about the information he had gathered instead. The ANA S-2 also never exhibited any of the politeness that advisors had been told was characteristic of the culture. The advisor quickly learned that the stereotypes could be used as initial guidelines in dealing with counterparts but that not every Afghan would fulfill them.

There were many unexpected issues beyond stereo types that had to be overcome. The first of these issues, one that was a struggle for all the team members, was the difference in thought process of the kandak's staff. One example of this occurred during the planning process prior to an operation. The route the ANA wanted to take was a historic engagement area defended with IEDs. Despite this being an enemy engagement area, the ANA used this route often. The advisors mentioned that the ANA might consider taking another route that would loop far out of the way but would likely be completely clear of enemy. The ANA intelligence officer's response to this was that the other way would take a long time to drive on so they did not want to use it. This remained his stance throughout the entire discussion of the issue. The ANA's planning process would be ruled by a single phrase; 'inshallah,' or the English translation 'God willing.' They believed that regardless of how much they prepared or planned, if God

intended for something to happen then it would. The advisors struggled against this type of operational planning throughout their time with the kandak.

The ANA S-2, according to Afghan standards, was very good at what he did. He gathered an adequate amount of information through his civilian sources and was conducted basic intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The problem was that he knew it, and this made it difficult to advise him. He felt he was performing well enough and did not need advice. So while the team S-2 could give him small nudges towards certain things, affecting large change was extremely difficult. An example of one of these small nudges was influencing the ANA S-2 to improve on his plans for briefing the incoming S-2 during a relief in place (RIP) and transition of authority (TOA). Instead of just handing over his sources, he would also give a brief overview of the more dangerous locations in the region. On the other end of the spectrum was an issue the advisor was unsuccessful in influencing him on. This was the creation of priority information requirements (PIRs) to recommend to his commander. These information requirements would drive future operations in the area, but he felt that he was doing his job well enough without these to influence his intelligence operations.

### **Influencing change:**

Overcoming this became as simple as shifting the advisor's focus to his subordinate, the kandak A/S-2. The A/S-2 was extremely receptive to new ideas and to the advising process. He was also the one who was most often present at the intelligence synchronization meetings, making the advisor's meetings with him far more frequent. By focusing his efforts on the A/S-2, the intelligence advisor was still able to influence the intelligence section as a whole. While this was an effective means of exerting influence on the kandak's intelligence operations, it also became a balancing act to ensure the ANA S-2 did not feel that his authority was being undermined. While shifting the focus to the A/S-2 did not become an issue, the possibility of it becoming so was something the advisor felt the need to remain cognizant of.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Pre-deployment training may not match the situation on the ground. Advisors should be prepared to adapt the lessons learned from training to what is encountered.
- Communication with other SFATs is vital when it comes to coordination between ANSF organizations. Establishing a synchronization meeting between these organizations made this task much easier as well.
- When advisors encounter difficulties with their counterparts there is always a solution. This solution may be looking past the designated counterpart and working with one of their subordinates to continue exerting influence over the section.
- Stereotypes are not necessarily all encompassing, use them as a start point but do not expect them to apply universally.

## CHAPTER 4: THE COMPANY ADVISOR AND A/S3

### I. Introduction

This section serves as a lessons learned guide for the company advisor and assistant operations officer (A/S3) of a security force advisory team (SFAT). The role of the A/S3 advisor is a dynamic and multifaceted position which will require the advisor to function outside the normal scope of a conventional battalion assistant operations officer. The main focus for the A/S3 advisor is to assist their counterpart with all planning and training requirements of the kandak. Additionally, the A/S3 advisor functions as a conduit between the Afghan National Army and the coalition force (CF) battle space integrator (BSI); responsible for coordinating enablers, developing a joint operational synchronization matrix (OPSYNC), and sharing internal assets for unilateral missions. As the SFAT will inherently need to participate in full spectrum operations with their counterparts, the A/S3 is also required to execute all team internal planning and facilitate any coordination attributed to the mission. Unique to Team Renegade, both the assistant operations officer and operations non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) assumed the additional role of company advisor. The company advisor was tasked with improving the operational planning capabilities at the toulay level, and ensuring that they were tactically and technically proficient in mission critical tasks. These lessons learned will highlight key TTPs that were effective during Team Renegade's deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom XII.

### II. Task Organization

Operations was delegated to three personnel on the team; the X3, the A/S3, and the S3 NCOIC. The X3 provided oversight for the A/S3 and S3 NCOIC as they fulfilled the advisory role to the kandak's operations staff. As stated above, the A/S3 and S3 NCOIC also assumed the role of Company Advisor. This particular task organization proved successful throughout the deployment, as it effectively dispersed the demanding work load of the team's operational staff.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- The task organization utilized by this team proved successful in regards to operations. If the team is functioning fluidly as a battalion staff, the X3 will not always be able to fulfill the role of both S3 and XO. Utilizing an A/S3 for day to day interaction with the kandak's A/S3 allowed the team to place priority on the operational planning capabilities of their counterpart.
- Utilizing the company advisor as the A/S3 is a logical additional duty to assign, as they will be intimately involved with the operational capabilities of the kandak's lower maneuver units.

- The ANA seemed to respond positively to an officer/NCO advisor partnership as it allowed both entities of the section to be developed simultaneously. This was a substantial sustain in regards to task organization.

### III. Home Station Training

The unit received a warning order (WARNO) for the SFAT mission roughly four months prior to our deployment. Details of the operation remained extremely vague from the time the WARNO was received until the company's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. The battalion immediately detached leaders who had been selected for the mission and divided them into 18-man teams, doing its best to maintain company integrity.

Very little staff specific training was conducted in the months leading up to deployment. The brigade focused primarily on individual and small unit tactics training. Technical proficiency was generated through numerous ranges, situational training exercises, and live fire exercises. Team members were advised to link in with their designated staff sections once a week in order to gain experience functioning at a battalion level. Although the idea seemed sound, the strains associated with having a divided command structure prevented the meetings from occurring as a battle rhythm event. The team also relied heavily on internal means to conduct language training, as the battalion's assets were very limited. The limited training that the team did receive significantly improved their conversational abilities towards their Afghan counterpart later on in the deployment; which in turn was essential in developing rapport.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Placing an emphasis on tactical proficiency was a necessity which gained legitimacy as the team successfully progressed through JRTC and began conducting combat operations in Afghanistan.
- In retrospect, the team should have significantly increased the amount of staff specific training in the months prior to JRTC. Ensuring that the role of the advisor is completely understood will significantly increase the value of training the home station unit can provide.
- If feasible, incorporating daily language training will greatly enhance the abilities of the team as whole. Having a base knowledge of the Afghan's language is vital in rapport building as it displays intellectualism, professionalism, and commitment to the role of an advisor.

### IV. JRTC

Team Renegade began its JRTC rotation three months after the WARNO was disseminated. By this time, the team had been reduced to 16 personnel, still supporting an X3

and two company advisors. The first several weeks of the “Advisor Academy” was geared towards teams functioning as a brigade or higher, proving to be rather irrelevant for the unit’s mission. Although there were several realistic scenarios with Afghan role-players and the language training that was somewhat beneficial, there still was very little S3 specific training. Furthermore, the role of a company advisor remained completely undefined. It was not until the team began its “Force on Force” rotation did the functionality of this duty become apparent. The unit was partnered with a CF platoon who was tasked to facilitate the SFAT mission, mirroring the actual BSO/SFAT relationship that exists in Afghanistan. Almost immediately there became a disconnect between the BSO and ANSF, which often left the SFAT scrambling to deconflict coordination and repair losses in rapport. As the company advisors were often working hand in hand with the maneuvering elements of the kandak, it became evident that they would most easily serve as a conduit between CF and the ANA. Utilizing them as such quickly alleviated the growing tensions between the Americans and the Afghans. Unfortunately, the S3 was yet again underutilized in its advisory capacity throughout the rotation. The S3 role-player displayed no aptitude towards military battalion level operational planning, which forced the maneuvering elements to both plan and execute each mission completely independent of higher influence.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- The rotation placed entirely too much emphasis on conducting kinetic operations rather than developing the team as ANA kandak advisors. Only employ advisors to the field if their counterpart is directly involved in the operation. Whenever possible, influence the ANA to conduct unilateral operations and in only exigent circumstances utilize the BSO for partnered patrolling. In most scenarios, the staff is better served working with their counterparts and battle tracking the maneuver unit from the joint tactical operations center (JTOC).
- JRTC is the ideal location to begin identifying and developing the advisor’s role. It became evident here that company advisors would be used not only to provide mentorship to the toulay commanders, but also deconflict issues between the BSO/BSI and their Afghan counterparts.
- Rapid employment of company advisors is vital in sustaining relationships with the BSO and ANA. It also provided increased situational awareness in regards to the kandak’s operational capabilities at the toulay level.
- As the A/S3, utilize every opportunity to conduct deliberate planning with the ANA counterpart. Although the military decision making process (MDMP) may be impractical based on the Afghan’s aptitude for planning, refining the process at JRTC will undoubtedly improve the team’s performance down range.



## V. Deployment

### **Week 1:**

Roughly two weeks before deployment, the team was reduced to 12 personnel. Although the personnel cut eliminated some critical members of the team, operations remained unscathed. Team Renegade arrived to FOB Connolly on the 14<sup>th</sup> of June, 2012. Upon the team's arrival, major emphasis was placed on establishing a functioning command post (CP). The CP work stations were divided into team sections, providing each with a NIPR, CENTRX, or SIPR line. As A/S3, direct access to CENTRX proved vital as there was a constant need to communicate and transfer data to the BSI over the designated share drive. The CP also contained a planning table and conference room. These two attributes were instrumental in providing a venue for joint meetings and classes with the Afghans. As insider threat levels increased during Ramadan, and BSI personnel became limited, the team frequently had to use the CP to work with their counterpart. Creating a practical and professional setting to conduct these conferences greatly increased the day to day interactions with the Afghans.

### **Company Advising:**

Upon completion of the CP, the operations section immediately attempted to tie in with their counterparts. Unfortunately however, the kandak had been without an S3 for over a year and the A/S3 was on leave. As the kandak commander assumed the full responsibility of operational planning details, and was already being mentored by the team's commander, operations shifted their attention to company advising. While conducting the relief in place (RIP) with the outgoing SFAT, company advisors were told to place major emphasis on the kandak's heavy weapons toulay, as they contained the majority of the kandak's combat power. The heavy weapons toulay at the time appeared to be the most disciplined, most tactically proficient, and most utilized toulay in the kandak. Additionally, they were one of only two toulays that were co-located on FOB Connolly. The other toulays were located at decentralized combat outposts (COP) across Regional Command - East, making interaction with their commanders extremely difficult. All these contributing factors influenced the advisors' decision to make heavy weapons toulay the foundation for their mentorship. It was our goal that any best practices developed in heavy weapons would eventually bleed over into the other toulays as lower leadership laterally transferred to adjacent units, prior to their realignment to Kunar Province. Company advisors spent the first week of their interactions with the toulay commander and first sergeant developing rapport. Although little work-related progress was made, the relationships that were developed created a platform for advisors to more effectively influence their counterparts. The second week of advising focused primarily on assessing their abilities and identifying areas that needed CF support. The toulay commander was an extremely proficient leader who did not need a lot of advising on the individual level. Personnel administrative data was accurately preserved and weapon systems flawlessly maintained. Where the unit did need mentoring however, was conducting troop leading procedures (TLPs).

As the Afghan National Army is a “top down” officer centric organization, toulays did very little in the way of tentative planning for large scale operations. Due to operations security (OPSEC) considerations, the commanders would often withhold the order until only a few hours before execution. When the time came to initiate movement, the platoon leader (PL) would issue a patrol brief and depart without conducting rehearsals. Although the Afghan solution to operational planning will never be as refined the United States Army’s, executing large scale operations with little to no tentative planning or rehearsals cannot be considered “Afghan Right”. In order to remedy the situation, company advisors began to identify patrol leaders 24-hours prior to an operation so that they could be partnered with a CF platoon leader (PL). The PL would then incorporate the ANA patrol leader into non-mission specific planning, allowing the Afghans to participate in the TLPs while still preserving OPSEC. It was the team’s intentions that this would develop the Afghan leaders, influencing them to conduct their own version of the TLPs during daily unilateral patrols.

### **Train the trainer courses:**

Another area in which heavy weapons toulay appeared to be deficient was in their specialty sections. The tashkil constructed by the Afghan National Army places 85% of the entire kandak’s combat power into this particular toulay. It is responsible for training, maintaining and employing the following weapon systems: the M2 machine gun (mounted), 82mm mortars, SPG-9 recoilless rifles, and the M24 sniper weapon system (SWS). The toulay’s ability to effectively and rapidly put these systems into action, directly affected the overall success and lethality of the kandak. Unfortunately, the toulay commander informed advisors that his indirect fire weapon systems (82mm mortar, SP-9) were non-mission capable. Furthermore, his sniper section was completely unfamiliar with the M24 SWS. The toulay’s inability to utilize these vital weapon systems significantly reduced the kandak’s overall combat effectiveness, and with the unit realigning to Kunar Province in just a few short months, it became evident that correcting this situation was a “no fail” task. In order to remedy the situation swiftly, the company advisors developed a CF led training path (See Figure 4-1,2). The path outlined a series of “train the trainer” courses for the mission critical skills that the kandak needed partnered assistance with; drivers training, sniper training, and mortar training. Each course was designed to be Afghan sustainable, creating subject matter experts in each specific field. Once the four to six week course was finished, the students would be certified to continue training their fellow Soldiers after CF had left the area of operations (AO). The program was fielded with two NCOs and three Soldiers from heavy weapons toulay for each specialty section. Once it was deemed successful the course expanded, taking additional Soldiers from 3<sup>rd</sup> Toulay. The team continued the “train the trainer” program up until the outgoing kandak began its relief in place (RIP) with the incoming kandak, receiving mixed results for each course.

Functioning in the capacity of company advisors, the team also helped develop a regimented physical training (PT) program. After an assessment of the toulay’s current system, it was apparent that the Soldiers were not receiving the physical conditioning required to sustain

combat operations in north eastern Afghanistan. The team’s S3 NCOIC worked hand in hand with the toulay first sergeants to construct a holistic PT program. Using sandbags, ammo cans, lead pipe dumbbells, and the existing dirt track; the team developed an Afghan sustainable training path capable of being executed independently of CF resources. Although the ANA leaders seemed enthusiastic about the plan, they refused to execute physical training during the month of Ramadan, significantly impeding the physical development of the kandak’s Soldiers.

**Heavy Weapons Training Path**

<b>SUMMARY</b>		<b>WEEK 1</b>	<b>WEEK 2</b>	<b>WEEK 3</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Each weapon system will be afforded a three week certification process</li> <li>• Each company will provide four Soldiers and one NCO for each training cycle</li> <li>• Assigned personnel will be required to attend their designated area of training every Monday and Wednesday for the entire three weeks</li> <li>• Upon completion of the course the designated NCO will be certified as a “trainer”; responsible for training the remainder of the Soldiers in his section</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inventory weapon systems and equipment associated with the prescribed training</li> <li>• Identify serviceable and unserviceable equipment</li> <li>• Basic weapons familiarization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Classroom instructions on basic functions and capabilities</li> <li>• Practical exercises</li> <li>• Dry run exercises</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Live Fire Exercises (if applicable)</li> <li>• Exam (if applicable)</li> <li>• Culminating exercises</li> </ul>
<p align="center"><b>M24 SWS</b></p> <p><u>TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Basic marksmanship/observer training with the M-24</li> <li>• Use of the MK4 optic and iron sights</li> <li>• Spotter/Shooter relationship</li> <li>• Employment of the sniper team in combat operations</li> <li>• Concealment</li> <li>• Range Estimation</li> <li>• Capabilities of the ANA sniper teams (FO, RECON, over watch)</li> </ul> <p><u>ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Heavy weapons toulay provides 2 x M24 SWS</li> <li>• A/3-61 CAV provides B4 and 13F qualified trainers</li> </ul>	<p align="center"><b>FORWARD OBSERVER</b></p> <p><u>TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Radio operation/communication</li> <li>• Call for fire</li> <li>• Map reading</li> <li>• Land navigation</li> <li>• Understanding of indirect fire systems and their capabilities</li> <li>• Employment of indirect fire systems</li> </ul> <p><u>ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Heavy weapons toulay provides 2 x M24 SWS</li> <li>• A/3-61 CAV provides B4 and 13F qualified trainers</li> </ul>	<p align="center"><b>82 MM MORTAR</b></p> <p><u>TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weapon familiarization</li> <li>• Proper handling of the ammunition</li> <li>• Maintenance on the 82mm mortar system</li> <li>• Identifying broken and missing parts</li> <li>• Set up of the mortar system</li> <li>• Proper employment of the mortar system</li> <li>• Use of the mortar system as an enabler for maneuvering elements</li> <li>• Basic map reading skills</li> </ul> <p><u>ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Heavy weapons toulay provides 82 mm mortars and all subcomponents</li> <li>• A/3-61 CAV provides 11C qualified trainers</li> </ul>	<p align="center"><b>M2 MACHINE GUN</b></p> <p><u>TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weapons familiarization</li> <li>• Headspace and timing of the M2</li> <li>• Loading procedures and function check</li> <li>• Disassembly/reassembly</li> <li>• Weapon system employment</li> <li>• Maintenance of the M2</li> </ul> <p><u>ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Heavy weapons toulay provides 2 x M2 machine guns</li> <li>• A/3-61 CAV provides 2 x 11B trainers</li> </ul>	

**FIGURE 4-1**

FIGURE 4-2




FIGURE 4-2

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Rapport building is critical to the role of an advisor. Although Americans place heavy emphasis on completing tasks and achieving results as rapidly as possible, most Afghans do not. Do not attempt to jump into work related issues during the first few interactions with the Afghan counterpart unless he initiates it. Be patient, develop the situation, and decide a course of action based on each individual.
- As a company advisor, generate a holistic assessment of the toulays and their commanders. Before developing a plan or course of action, take a week or two to identify their weaknesses and deficiencies.
- Practice expectation management in every facet of this role. The ANA’s capabilities will never be flush with that of the United States Army. Keep this in mind when developing training paths and courses of action, as their performance will often fall short of fulfilling normal expectations. It is not the SFAT’s mission to have a partnered relationship with ANA leaders, but to provide insight and guidance when needed. The Afghans will

essentially do what they want regardless of the advisor's intent or current course of action. When this happens, remain flexible and adjust the plan as needed.

- The kandak's toulays will undoubtedly have training deficiencies on all levels. It is unrealistic to believe that one individual will be able to remedy all of the primitive faults that plague this organization. Where advisors will need to become involved is when it catastrophically affects the kandak's ability to successfully complete their mission (i.e. mortars, maintenance, and medical treatment). If the kandak displays a need for retraining on these mission critical skills, utilize the BSI or ANA brigade level assets to establish training programs. Avoid becoming involved in partnered level training on the SFAT level, as it will constrict already limited assets and impede the overall progress as an advisor.
- Ensure major emphasis is placed on the operational planning capabilities of the toulay. Whenever possible, incorporate the toulay commander and patrol leaders into the CF planning process. Doing so will positively influence the Afghan counterpart into conducting TLPs independently of CF support.

### **A/S3 (Chief of Operations):**

Roles within operations became more defined throughout the first month of the deployment. The X3 still operated primarily as the team's executive officer, but placed emphasis on advising the kandak's S3. The A/S3 operated as the team's chief of current operations and advised the kandak's A/S3 and toulay commanders. The S3 NCOIC fulfilled the role of operations sergeant major and primarily advised the toulay first sergeants. This modified task organization proved successful for the team throughout the duration of the deployment.

Functioning as the team's A/S3 and chief of operations (CHOPS), the first priority was establishing lines of communication between the BSI and the ANA's A/S3. Doing so facilitated the construction of a combined operational synchronization matrix (OPSYNC) (see Figure 4-3). This product provided a medium for the BSI and ANA to conduct combined operational planning and also coordinate for enablers. More importantly, it created situational awareness for all parties concerned. Perhaps the team's biggest failure, in regards to operations, was not placing initial emphasis on the kandak's operational planning capabilities. Seeing as how the ANA did not have an S3 when the team arrived to FOB Connolly, it took over a month to simply identify what the kandak was doing in regards to daily patrols. Doing so earlier would have created a base for advisors to observe and refine the A/S3's ability to conduct planning. Another area in which the team lost situational awareness, was not observing the brigade issue their ciphers to the kandak. It is recommended that for at least the first few operations, advisors sit in on the entire planning process from start to finish. This will allow advisors to identify specific shortcomings, generate recommendations, and conduct a thorough after action review upon completion of the operation with the ANA.

During the first several months of the deployment, the team would allow the Afghans to generate the plan completely independent of advisors. Once they had completed the plan they would brief the A/S3 or X3 on the general scheme of maneuver, and then request CF enablers. The major issue with being so far removed from the planning process was there was no forcing function influencing the ANA to conduct tentative planning. They would often withhold from conducting any mission related preparations until the brigade had issued them a refined plan, normally occurring between 12-24 hours prior to execution. This severely limited the amount of CF enablers and overall preparation afforded to the kandak. As a contingency, advisors would often need to generate a basic concept of the operation independently of the ANA just to ensure they would have CF enablers during the operation. The majority of the time, the Afghan's haphazardly way of planning was successful, as they received little contact from the enemy. The complete absence however, of even the TLPs could not be deemed as "Afghan Right", as it did not take into account any type of contingency planning. This became evident with the increased resupply operations to COPs Memlah and Sherzad. On several occasions, the toulays suffered casualties due to the high volume of insurgent activity in the area. The Afghans inability to plan, or even make a decision independently of higher influence, resulted in wounded Soldiers having to stay on station for nearly ten hours without any means of evacuating the casualties.

The Afghan's version of the military decision making process (MDMP), or even the TLPs, will need to take into account the increased OPSEC risks of the area. Leaders will never be able to afford their subordinates the appropriate "1/3 - 2/3" rule of planning, as the information will most likely be leaked to insurgent forces. Rehearsals will be generally unspecific and vague, as not to identify the areas in which the patrol will be operating. It is vital to the success of the ANA that advisors identify what the "Afghan Sustainable" version of operational planning is, and then do their best to hold them to that standard.

**Joint OPSYNC Matrix**

3/1/201 SFAT PATROL MATRIX (as of 040900AUG12)							
UNIT	Monday, August 06, 2012	Monday, August 06, 2012	Monday, August 06, 2012	Monday, August 06, 2012	Monday, August 06, 2012	Monday, August 06, 2012	Monday, August 06, 2012
1/A Callsign: Apache Red 44.650	SP-RP: Location: T1: NO PATROL P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
2/A Callsign: Apache White/1 44.650	SP-RP: Location: T1: QRF P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
2/A Callsign: Apache White/4 44.650	SP-RP: Location: T1: Force Protection P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
3/A Callsign: Apache Blue 44.650	SP-RP: Location: T1: PATROL P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: OPORD Pending P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: OPORD Pending P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
4/A Callsign: Apache Green 44.650	SP-RP: Location: T1: PATROL P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: OPORD Pending P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: OPORD Pending P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
3/1/201 IN KDK SFAT Team CPT Dortona	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
1st Toulay	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: OPORD Pending P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
2nd Toulay	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: OPORD Pending P1:
3rd Toulay	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:
WPNS Toulay	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:	SP-RP: Location: T1: P1:

**FIGURE 4-3**

## Summary of Key Lessons Learned

- The team's A/S3 must put immediate emphasis on synchronizing the BSI with current ANA operations. Creating a combined OPSYNC will facilitate the combined operational planning process and afford the SFAT with an increased level of situational awareness.
- In order to fully assess the kandak's operational capabilities, ensure that advisors observe the entire planning process from start to finish. Being present when the kandak receives their cipher from brigade, develops their course of action, and conducts mission preparation will identify specific flaws in the ANAs methods. It is recommended that the A/S3 do this for at least the first few major operations the kandak executes in order to develop a more educated assessment of the operations staff.
- As with any aspect of advising, ensure to practice expectation management. The Afghan's methods of planning will appear insufficient, and in most cases dangerous when compared to the systems used by the United States Military. Despite their inadequacies, if the ANA are able to develop a plan, execute the plan, and return to duty with the majority of their combat power, it can most likely be deemed as "Afghan Right." It is the advisors job to identify the flaws that will lead to catastrophic mission failure and utilize positive influence to effect change.



## CHAPTER 5: THE S4 ADVISOR

### I. Task Organization:

The Bravo Company, 2-502<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault) security forces advisory team (SFAT) deployed with 12 personnel. The team consisted of eight officers and four non-commissioned officers. The following portion of this “First 100 Days” resource details the experiences and lessons learned from the S4 point of view.

The S4 for Team Renegade would be the advisor for the logistics officer and a tactical fire team leader for two other lieutenants, a sergeant, and a specialist. The SFAT was organized into squad structure to aid in dissemination and delegation. This structure worked well for the train-up for deployment. The SFAT executed physical training, daily tasks, and a team live fire exercise utilizing this task organization. During deployment, the team did not utilize the fire team structure as much as it did not apply to the daily battle rhythm of an advising team for a battalion level staff. The advisors ended up aligning with the respective staff sections, breaking down into administrative and logistics center (ALOC) and the current operations teams. While deployed, Team Renegade broke down further into working groups for the military decision making process (MDMP) conducted on the relief in place (RIP) and transfer of authority (TOA) for an infantry kandak. The team logistics advisor accepted the responsibilities of being the team internal supply officer and clerk as well as the logistics advisor the kandak the team would fall in on; the equivalent of a U.S. battalion. Everything that was read and taught stressed that the Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics system was extremely slow, inefficient, and short of critical supplies and was the primary area that was responsible for holding the ANA back from further independence. All of the team’s infantry lieutenants would have the challenge of learning the jobs of their respective staff sections in the five months before deployment. Details of the mission changed daily. The information was constantly changing to include the kandak Team Renegade would be advising, the final destination for the team, and the final roster of individuals deploying.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- The task organization of the team as a squad worked well for the train up prior to deployment.
- The command team did a good job of assigning staff positions to the lieutenants based on abilities, previous experience, and personality.
- Lieutenants need to be prepared to operate in the capacity of a fire team leader whose duties and responsibilities differ from previous experience.

- Remain flexible with the mission and understand its importance in the international security assistance force mission in Afghanistan.

## II. Home Station Training

Training as an S4 consisted of: deploying the team to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), training with the battalion's S4, and individual study both with the team's executive officer and company supply sergeant. Before and after the team's rotation at JRTC all of the lieutenants who would be filling the role as the S4 advisor met on a bi-weekly basis to discuss different products, possible advising tactics, and team internal sustainment. Working with the company's supply sergeant was extremely valuable. The team had the advantage of having an extremely competent and knowledgeable company supply sergeant who walked the logistics advisor through the use of property book unit supply enhanced (PBUSE) system and aided in ordering and preparing the team with all of the supplies that would be needed on deployment. The team S4 and operations non-commissioned officer (NCO) both attended a "crash course" on unit movement officer (UMO) training. The normally week long course was taught in four hours. This was due to the other training demands and time available before deployment. The block of instruction was still extremely valuable with the instructors disseminating the critical information that would be needed to deploy and re-deploy the SFATs. Advisors were instructed on the critical paperwork, restrictions for movement, and the hazardous materials (HAZMAT) paperwork that would have to be included with each team's container. While brief, this block of instruction was invaluable as the team UMO. With only five months to prepare for this unique deployment, the S4 needed to train in all of the above areas in order to function effectively as both a team internal S4, and logistics advisor.

During the five month train-up for deployment, the team also focused on the basics of operating as a squad. Team Renegade was prepared to conduct team internal security as well as execute basic squad level battle drills. The fire team leaders were responsible for leading their team through a fire team live fire exercise (LFX). Both fire teams were certified as "trained" on react to contact. The entire team understood the importance of "being great at the basics." Most of the team's lieutenants would also attend mine resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP) drivers training. Everyone on the team deployed as eagle first responder certified, the division's equivalent of the combat life-saver (CLS) course. Individuals on the team also attended advanced communications training, common remotely operated weapon system (CROWS) training, machine gun qualification, and heavy weapons qualification. The team's battalion and brigade commander both stressed throughout the train-up for deployment that all deploying personnel needed to focus on the basics; physical training, marksmanship, medical training, driving, and battle drills.

## **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- As much as a SFAT S4 learns about the Afghan supply system, they need to equal their study on the U.S. supply system.
- Learn extensively about the PBUSE system, ordering each class of supply, and the requirements needed to do so.
- UMO training is critical.
- The team needs to train on the basic Soldier skills just as hard as they do on their advising mission and staff section roles.
- Lieutenants need to be prepared to learn Soldier skills such as driving and the CROWS system when task organized as a member of a SFAT.

### III. Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

Team Renegade's rotation in JRTC in Fort Polk, Louisiana was a valuable and critical part of the team's preparation for deployment. For the team S4, JRTC provided an opportunity to deploy the team with mission essential equipment and supplies. The team's UMO representatives were also able to utilize this deployment to make sure that they knew exactly what was required to move the team's equipment, sensitive items, and HAZMAT. Throughout the rotation the team had the opportunity to validate much of their home station training and preparation.

The classroom portion of JRTC, "Advisor Academy," presented a large amount of information in approximately eight hours of classroom time a day, spread out over one week. The logistic specific blocks of instruction were valuable. There was detailed information taught on the set up and operation of the Afghan supply system. The instructors for each of these classes had actually worked within the Afghan supply system on different levels. Some of the classes were multiple levels above where the team would be operating resulting in some information not being useful or transferable down to the kandak level. The blocks of classroom instruction offered more technical details on the ANA logistics process and valuable personal insight from U.S. advisors.

JRTC provided valuable cultural experience that was immediately visible upon Team Renegade's arrival and initial interaction with Afghan counterparts. For the lieutenants on the team who had no operational experience, the training was very similar to the interactions that the advisors would have on a daily basis during deployment. The language training at JRTC was an important aspect of the training however, was largely ineffective due to the setting and class size. Some members of the team made it a point to try and learn some basic Dari before arriving to Afghanistan. The Pimsler Language Aids that were provided by the battalion were very effective. Language training is a critical part of pre-deployment training for the SFAT mission.

Having a basic grasp of greeting and formalities was very useful and aided in building rapport with the kandak counterparts right from the start.

Working with the battle space owner (BSO) was a challenge during the team's force on force exercise. The brigade that Team Renegade worked with did not understand the concept or understand how to properly utilize and support SFAT, to no fault of their own as they did not have the same training as Team Renegade. The team's experience working with the BSO during the deployment positively increased, but still held its own set of challenges. JRTC focused both on the advising role as a team as well as providing opportunities to validate the home station training on basic Soldier skills. Overall, JRTC was a crucial part of the team's train-up allowing everyone to understand their roles; both team internal and as advisors. The rotation was also an invaluable training aid in developing a relationship with and working alongside a BSO.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Learn as much of the local language as possible before deployment, using both time at JRTC and while at home station. In Pashto speaking regions in Afghanistan the most valuable language may still be Dari due to a higher percentage of officers and officials speaking it.
- JRTC provides valuable experience for UMOs deploying a SFAT.
- The force on force exercise or "the box" validates and emphasizes the importance of the home station basic Soldier skill training as well as the advising mission.
- The JRTC training provided critical and invaluable cultural awareness training; specifically the key leader engagements lanes.

## IV. Deployment

### **Packing:**

Team Renegade received a TRICON to pack everything needed on deployment. Attached to this section is a copy of the team's container packing list (see Figure 5-4). The team packed for deployment with the mindset of being prepared for any contingency. Make sure to work off of the most up to date mission essential equipment list (MEEL). This will give teams a starting point as well as information on what is provided in theater. Everything was brought and planned for from, tactical operations center (TOC) communications gear, to sandbags and extra water jugs. The team brought sustainment and firepower for a squad plus sized element. Armament in addition to each person's M4 and M9 included a total of eight 40mm launchers, two M240Bs, one M249, and one M2, and MK19. Three thermal systems (PAS) were also brought. All of the team's crew served weapons and arms room equipment was stored in a regular M240 weapons rack. The team had enough armament to secure itself if necessary. The

team's brigade supplied all advisor teams with three printers, thirteen computers, and twelve phones as a number of other systems such as four new Garmin 401 global positioning systems (GPS). The printers that were distributed to the teams were not yet in the U.S. army supply system. This in turn created a brigade wide issue with a shortage of printer toner early on in the deployment. Team Renegade filled out a purchase, request and commitment (PR&C) for more printer toner, a Department of the Army (DA) 3953, in order to sustain day to day operations. Brigade also supplied the teams with digital senders. The team only had a limited need for a digital sender and was able to use the BSO's sender in their TOC. The forward operating base (FOB) Team Renegade was located on did not have enough intranet IP addresses in order to run all of the provided phones and computers let alone the digital senders. Space was limited in the container and due to the nature of the deployment the team had to be prepared to operate independently from BSO units who ultimately have more resources available. Even though the team only consisted of 12 personnel the packing list for deployment had to be carefully planned and executed.

#### **Unit movement officer:**

As the team UMO, the S4 traveled separate from the team, moving with the container on a separate strategic air flight. While in Jalalabad, the S4 began to set up the team's account at the supply support activity (SSA) yard and linked in with the battle space integrator (BSI) ALOC that would be the link for team internal sustainment. Before the team occupied FOB Connolly, the team S4, executive officer, and non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) conducted a day long reconnaissance of the team's living conditions in order to obtain a better picture of how and where Team Renegade would be operating. The BSI that Team Renegade would be working with was more than accommodating for the three SFATs that would be working out of FOB Connolly. The team received a 40' by 18' wide "b-hut" to set up its command post where they would run daily operations.

#### **Coordinating:**

A comprehensive command and control relationship chart is critical to aiding in communication with all of the different offices and higher units across the regional command (see Figure 5-1). The team S4's relationship chart will have multiple contacts outside of the standard brigade command and control relationships to include the SSA, property book officer (PBO), theater provided equipment (TPE) office, contracting office, and finance office. The team S4 will also have much more contact with the BSI and their corresponding ALOC than the other staff sections.

## **Property book:**

For the deployment, the team received a separate derivative unit identifier code (DUIC). It is crucial to obtain each class of supply Department of Defense activity address code (DODAAC) and the team's TPE UIC as soon as possible. The team ran into multiple issues with both the organizational property book and the TPE property book. Based on mistakes made both at the team level and at the property book level a few administrative adjustment reports, DA4949s, needed to be completed. There were also multiple issues with the property book office setting up the TPE PBUSE account. Some of the TPE that was signed for from the BSO took an extended period of time posting to the team's TPE property book. The TPE office in the region went through multiple changes of authority and appeared to have organizational and staffing issues. Be prepared to spend time attempting to rectify these issues.

While some property book issues will remain outside of the team's control, teams can avoid any property issues by conducting thorough, comprehensive lay-outs before deployment. There will be multiple staff sections involved as well as the original company or unit. Cross-talk is critical between all parties to ensure that all mission essential equipment is accounted for and properly packed. The S4 also needs to maintain open communication with the original unit in order to affect a proper hand off of property. The entire team needs to be involved in projecting deployment needs and estimated expenditures of supplies using the printer toner as an example.

## **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Prepare for every scenario when packing for the deployment.
- Utilize the team NCO's critical knowledge, experience, and voices of reason on what to pack and what to leave for deployment.
- Keep detailed records of all DD1750s and DA2062s for the team. Good record keeping will aid in property accountability and speed up the process of re-deployment.
- The logistics officer should be prepared to move with the container separately from the rest of the team.
- Be knowledgeable on how to fill out and utilize the following forms: DA1687, DA4949, DD1750, DA2062, DA3131, DA3953.




FIGURE 5-1

**Advising:**

The team S4 needs to be prepared to cover down on each position within the logistics section and work with multiple counterparts. Maintenance was the main effort for the team’s advising efforts and will remain a major focus for coalition forces in Afghanistan for the duration of operations there. The logistics advisor worked with the logistics officer, logistics NCO, and the maintenance officer. The kandak’s logistics officer was the main focus as he had the ability to influence the other key players within his section. The initial logistics counterpart was extremely difficult to work alongside. He was unorganized and showed little motivation to try and affect any positive change within his section. It was clear right from the initial advising session the importance of understanding the Afghan logistics process. Probably more so than any other staff section, the logistics advisor needs to learn and understand their system because it is a “push” system based on the Soviet model which is different from what the U.S. Military is used to working with. Before the regular kandak logistics advisor returned to the unit and re-assumed his duties, the logistics advisor focused on the maintenance officer and logistics NCO. It was determined that these individuals would provide the most economy of effort. Once the regular logistics officer returned to the kandak, the team’s S4 was able to begin affecting the entire section through their interaction.

Outside of advising the logistics section of the kandak and acting as the team internal supply sergeant, the S4 also needs to consistently track the ANA’s maintenance status for

vehicles, weapons, communications gear, and generators. All reports varied in the specific information required however, stuck to a general “shoot, move, and communicate” format. An example of weekly reports due to higher, illustrating the kandak’s mission capable status, was the chart within the commanders’ unit assessment (CUA) slide (Figure 5-2). The S4 will be required to keep an updated maintenance tracker that will be utilized to report the kandaks’ mission capabilities and combat power. The problematic issues with ANA mission capabilities reporting are prevalent at all levels. The brigade level advisor and the BSI use these reports to influence more accurate and realistic planning at higher levels. Getting an updated maintenance status for the kandak was difficult at times and the week to week reports would sometimes shift dramatically. This was a point of frustration for the logistics and communications advisors. Advisors can only try and influence more accurate reporting but ultimately must relay the information their counterparts provided to the higher headquarters advisory team.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- The S4 needs to be prepared to cover down on multiple counterparts within the logistics section.
- Keep a running maintenance slant on the kandak’s equipment. Expect reporting from the ANA to be vague, inaccurate, and to change drastically week to week.
- Identify the positive influencers as soon as possible in order to start affecting the entire section.
- ANA maintenance and logistics is a high priority for ISAF. The entire team should be prepared for their maintenance products and advising efforts to have a lot of high level visibility.






FIGURE 5-2

**Vignette:**

One issue that Team Renegade experienced as soon as the team occupied FOB Connolly was the requisition of approximately 30 high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) that were currently being used by the ANA. These vehicles had been signed over to the ANA to conduct operations before they had their own complete motor pool. The troop that was the BSI for the area of operations (AO) was in the process of turning all of these HMMWVs back in and removing them from their property book. The team accepted this problem about half way through the process the previous advisors had already begun. Going to the ANA motor pool and taking these vehicles, some which were fully mission capable, was always a deliberate operation. There were a number of issues that presented themselves from the start. Some of these vehicles were spread out across the AO, located at the kandak's combat outposts (COP) in different districts. This required coordinating with the kandak logistics officer to arrange

for these vehicles to be brought back to FOB Connolly. As soon as the ANA knew that these vehicles were going to be taken back they began stripping them for parts. There was little the advisors could do to stop this process since the ANA had been taking parts from different vehicles in order to make more trucks fully mission capable since they had never been given the vehicles. The toulay commanders and the maintenance officer knew that these trucks were the property of the U.S. Army and that they would have to give them up. One toulay commander was concerned with being able to prove where these vehicles had gone once they left their motor pool. The advisors filled out a hand receipt detailing which trucks were being re-purposed and the exchange went smoothly. Overall the process was completed without any major issues however; the team always maintained heightened security during our repurposing trips. Advisors always attempted to give the kandak prior notice as to when the trucks were going to be removed. This allowed the advisors to avoid having to tell an individual Soldier that his truck was being taken away at a moment's notice. This practice both helped and hindered the process. Advisors avoided any tense confrontations over the issue. This did give the kandak ample time to strip the trucks of parts which resulted in the team towing shells of vehicles back to the U.S. side of the FOB for turn in.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Removing any U.S. property as quickly as possible from the ANA helps eliminate the amount of time that the repurposing remains an on-going issue. This issue has the potential to stress relationships between advisors and their counterparts.
- The ANA do not track most equipment by serial number; however they may want some documentation explaining the transaction. Preparing these documents will help “ease the pain” of the process and also demonstrates the proper way to transfer property to the ANA.
- Use the BSI as much as possible in this process; both blaming them for having to take away valuable mission capable assets as well as having their Soldiers be seen taking the trucks away that they have used for months if not years. The vehicles are the BSIs and therefore unarguably their responsibility. This will help maintain any rapport with the advisors counterparts.

- Do not leave the process of repurposing U.S. equipment up to the BSO entirely. The advisor can act as a mediator; helping work through the process in a much more amicable manner than the BSO is likely to.

### **The Infantry Kandak Logistics Officer:**

The 3/1/201 kandak logistics officer was a very personable individual who portrayed an inherent desire to help improve the kandak, complete the mission, and look out for the welfare of his Soldiers. He reported a very storied past, allegedly fighting with Massoud in 2001. It was from his service with the Northern Alliance that he received his commission. Regardless of his positive nature, right from the start it was evident that he was extremely dependent and set on receiving coalition force (CF) support and direct aid. The logistics advisor attributed this as a direct result of his previous partnered experience early on in Operation Enduring Freedom where CFs were more prone to give direct aid to the ANA and solve their problems for them when the focus was on offensive operations rather than transition to Afghan led sustainable operations.

From the outset, the logistics advisor attempted to make it clear that Team Renegade was here to help coordinate for enablers, try and affect results by shadow tracking issues to higher levels, and provide advice to streamline and improve the efficiency of the kandak's logistics section. The advisors were not there to solve their logistic issues or provide direct aid to the kandak. The team did decide to provide some aid early on by helping repair the air conditioning in two of their four litter ambulances (FLA). This course of action was decided upon due to these vehicles directly affecting the survivability of Soldiers and casualties. Throughout the early interactions with the logistics officer and other Afghan counterparts, the mistake was made of not denying the kandak help with issues as soon as questions were asked.

The logistics advisor was too concerned with rapport and how a direct denial of help would affect the team's ability to continue to work effectively with the logistics counterpart. Responses to the logistics officer's requests for aid and help in solving problems were usually "I'll look into it," or "I'll have to ask my commander and I can't give you an answer right now." The logistics advisor would use these responses even when he knew exactly what the answer to the kandak's request was and that the team would not be helping them out with these issues. The logistics officer asked for help in fixing their barracks air conditioning, fixing their generators, and the use of coalition expended oil for their vehicles. Answers to these questions immediately should have been, "no" instead of avoiding this negative response by using excuses or finding a way to avoid of giving a direct response. The logistics advisor knew that coalition forces would not be able to provide them with any of these items and told his counterpart "no" on multiple occasions however an attempt to keep a positive relationship with his counterpart instead of just tearing of the proverbial Band-Aid from the start was always in the back of the advisors mind.

The S4 re-addressed the role of the team to the logistics officer and saying “no” over and over again to him became common place. This changed the dynamic of the advising relationship. There was a noticeable difference in the logistic officer’s tone and hospitality. However, the logistics officer and the rest of the kandak staff made fewer demands of their advisors and began to work more independently.


**Vignette:**

Three days before the start of Ramadan the kandak reported that the kandak’s water pump had broken. This immediately became a major concern of both the kandak and the advisors. The kandak began asking the advisors for help in fixing the problem right away. Once they pulled the water pump from the ground they asked for better electrical cable to try and fix it. It was at this time that the relationship with the logistic officer drastically changed. Whether in frustration or misinterpretation from an interpreter the logistics officer told advisors to, “stop thinking and just get me the new electrical cord.” After this interaction the issue with the logistics officer was brought to the kandak commander. Interaction with the logistic officer following this confrontation was much more terse and succinct. Relationships were stressed when advisors refused to help the kandak with the problem. Over the next few days, they asked for bottled water for their Soldiers and for permission to pull water from a pipe running from the CF side of the FOB. The team continually had to deny the kandak CF support which raised concerns over rapport with them and the overall effects that the broken pump could have on the unit. The team formulated an emergency plan that could be utilized in the case that the kandak’s Soldiers health and welfare was endangered. The denial of aid to the ANA acted as a forcing function for the logistics officer to solve the problem. While the pump was not functioning, the kandak found a temporary solution for water by sending their 500 gallon water trucks to local well in the area. Advisors shadow tracked the issue with the advisors at the brigade level and maintained the best situational awareness possible so that actions could be taken if necessary. The logistics officer successfully solved the issue by going to the corps level where he was able to purchase a new pump in the Jalalabad bazaar. The pump was successfully installed and placed into operation resulting in a complete success for the kandak as they solved the issue unilaterally.

## Summary of Key Lessons Learned:

- The Afghans are capable of finding solutions to their problems; whether it is using water trucks temporarily while they acquired the pump or going all the way to the corps level to find a solution. Working towards ANA self-sustainment will more than likely require “tough love”.
- Saying “no” to the ANA is a reoccurring theme and remains critical in order for the Afghans to find their own solution. This is constantly stressed in training however still can remain difficult, especially when conditions are set early across the team to provide some basic things to the kandak such as bottled water, air conditioning and vehicle maintenance, and the most basic of medical supplies such as medical tape.
- An ANA logistics officer may not be happy with the lack of CF support but, in the end telling a counterpart that “I’ll check with the commander” is not doing him any favors.
- ANA counterparts might surprise their advisors with their ability to resource an issue and find a solution.
- Over time advisors might find themselves becoming more and more frustrated every time they meet with their counterpart as they make more of the same requests and demands. Breaking the ANA from their dependence on CF support is difficult and requires the entire team’s efforts.

After an initial assessment with the logistics counterpart, it is crucial to set up goals for the logistics section. Team Renegade developed an overall glide path outlining the kandak’s limitations, time sensitive achievements, and desired end state to help guide advising efforts (see Figure 5-3). Team Renegade was given an overall goal that the kandak needed to achieve, both operationally and logistically. Unfortunately, the team would not be able to reach the intended end state with the original kandak since they were moved to Kunar province under the 201<sup>st</sup> Corps re-alignment plan. The advisors would receive and begin advising a brand new kandak which had just been activated. 1/4/201 kandak arrived to FOB Connolly in the middle of August. Expectation management was a re-occurring theme that presented itself multiple times throughout the deployment. The term “Afghan Sustainable” is probably over used; however, it remains an important lesson. Whether it is their method of reporting a toulay’s maintenance status or the completion of their Ministry of Defense (MOD) forms, U.S. advisors have to understand what works for the ANA and not expect the detail and format that is required in the U.S. Military.



<b>PACKING LIST</b>		PACKED BY SSG, DOE, JOHN	1. NO. BOXES	2a. REQUISITION NO.	
				2b. ORDER NO.	
3. END ITEM RENEGADE TRICON			4. DATE 30 APR 12		
			5. PAGE <u>1</u> OF <u>3</u> PAGES		
BOX NO. <i>(a)</i>	CONTENTS - STOCK NUMBER AND NOMENCLATURE <i>(b)</i>	UNIT OF ISSUE <i>(c)</i>	QUANTITIES REQUIRED		
			INITIAL OPERATION <i>(d)</i>	RUNNING SPARES <i>(e)</i>	TOTAL <i>(f)</i>
	GREEN FOOTLOCKER	EA	7		7
	BLACK CONICO TOUGHBOX	EA	3		3
	STANLEY WHEELED TOUGHBOX	EA	2		2
	WEIGHT SET (see 1750)	KIT	1		1
	CLS BAGS COMPLETE, ACU PAT	KIT	3		3
	5 GALLON WATER JUGS	EA	9		9
	5 GALLON WATER COOLER/DISPENSER	EA	1		1
	3 FOOT SHOVELS	EA	2		2
	PUSH BROOMS	EA	2		2
	SKILLCRAFT SHREDDER	EA	1		1
	HP PRINTER	EA	3		3
	HP DIGITAL SCANNER/SENDER	EA	2		2
	SIMARON POWER CONVERTER	EA	2		2
	B-BAG	EA	12		12
	OE-254	SET	1		1
	PROXIMA SCREEN 60X60	EA	1		1
	TV HAIER 42" LCD	EA	2		2
	COM 201	SET	3		3
6. THIS CERTIFIES THAT THE ITEMS LISTED HEREON ARE WITHIN THE SPECIFIED BOXES					
TYPED NAME AND TITLE 1LT, DOE, JOHN			SIGNATURE		

DD Form 1750, SEP 70

Reset

Adobe Professional 7.0

FIGURE 5-4

<b>PACKING LIST</b>		PACKED BY SSG, DOE, JOHN	1. NO. BOXES	2a. REQUISITION NO.	
				2b. ORDER NO.	
3. END ITEM			4. DATE 30 APR 12		
			5. PAGE <u>2</u> OF <u>3</u> PAGES		
BOX NO. <i>(a)</i>	CONTENTS - STOCK NUMBER AND NOMENCLATURE <i>(b)</i>	UNIT OF ISSUE <i>(c)</i>	QUANTITIES REQUIRED		
			INITIAL OPERATION <i>(d)</i>	RUNNING SPARES <i>(e)</i>	TOTAL <i>(f)</i>
	WHITE DRY ERASE BOARD MEDIUM	EA	4		4
	6 ACETATE ROLLS	BOX	1		1
	WHITE DRY ERASE BOARD LARGE	EA	1		1
	BOLT CUTTERS LARGE	EA	1		1
	#44 ASIP BATTERIES 5590	BOX	1		1
	HANDCART	EA	1		1
	M2A1 (SEE 1750)	EA	1		1
	M2A1 SPARE BARREL (SEE 1750)	EA	1		1
	M3 TRIPOD	EA	1		1
	M240B W/ PEQ15, M145, M192	EA	2		2
	MK19	EA	1		1
	PAS13V3	EA	2		2
	PAS13V2	EA	1		1
	M249 W/ PEQ15, M145	EA	1		1
	M249 SPARE BARREL	EA	3		3
	M4 W/ PEQ15, M68, M951	EA	1		1
	M500	EA	1		1
	M320 W/ LRF	EA	6		6
6. THIS CERTIFIES THAT THE ITEMS LISTED HEREON ARE WITHIN THE SPECIFIED BOXES					
TYPED NAME AND TITLE ILT, DOE, JOHN			SIGNATURE		

DD Form 1750. SEP 70

Adobe Professional 7.0

FIGURE 5-5



<b>PACKING LIST</b>		PACKED BY SSG, DOE, JOHN	1. NO. BOXES	2a. REQUISITION NO.	
				2b. ORDER NO.	
3. END ITEM			4. DATE 30 APR 12		
			5. PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES		
BOX NO. <i>(a)</i>	CONTENTS - STOCK NUMBER AND NOMENCLATURE <i>(b)</i>	UNIT OF ISSUE <i>(c)</i>	QUANTITIES REQUIRED		
			INITIAL OPERATION <i>(d)</i>	RUNNING SPARES <i>(e)</i>	TOTAL <i>(f)</i>
	BUSHNELL 1500	EA	6		6
	MK 93 MOUNT	EA	2		2
	UNIVERSAL PINTLE ADAPTER	EA	2		2
	TRANSVERSING AND ELEVATING MECHANISM WITH ADAPTER	EA	2		2
	CATCH BAG ASSEMBLY	EA	2		2
	MK 19 AMMO TRAY	EA	2		2
	.50 CAL AMMO HOLDER ASSEMBLY	EA	2		2
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
					0
6. THIS CERTIFIES THAT THE ITEMS LISTED HEREON ARE WITHIN THE SPECIFIED BOXES					
TYPED NAME AND TITLE ILT, DOE, JOHN			SIGNATURE		

DD Form 1750, SEP 70

Reset

Adobe Professional 7.0

**FIGURE 5-6**

## CHAPTER 6: THE S6 ADVISOR

### I. Task Organization

The communication section for the security force advisory team (SFAT) consisted of one communications officer and one communications non-commissioned officer (NCO) within a 12-man team. Similar to other staff sections, the S-6 position was filled by an infantry officer. The task organization at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) was changed due to the communications NCO not being present because of training conflicts. This left only the S-6 officer in charge (OIC) to advise and set up internal communications. Decreasing the task organization to only a communication officer was considered, but eventually the idea was declined because there was a need for a Soldier with 25U's specific skill set. Ensure to plan for a communications NCO but do not rely on it, be able to understand and complete all tasks. Set a standard for the S-6 NCO and what his role is on the team. The S-6 is accountable for all tasks being completed within the communications section to include planning and reports. He is the subject matter expert and is the one who is more hands on in regards to radio equipment. By the time the team deployed the S-6 section consisted of a communication officer and NCO.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Plan for a communication NCO with the team, but be prepared to take on all tasks if necessary.
- Identify roles and responsibilities within the communication section.
- Set a standard in which the communications officer expects tasks to be accomplished.

### II. Home Station Training

The home station training for deployment was very specialized for the team's S-6. The brigade set up day long courses spread throughout a week period. These courses were broken up by radio system. With a condensed timeframe and steep learning curve, all that could be grasped was an overview of each radio type. The S-6 ensured the team was ready for deployment in all communications and networking needs. He provided oversight to verify all communications equipment was fully mission capable (FMC), all accessories were present and accounted for, and the team had all necessary training complete for network access overseas (see Figure 6-1). The S-6 needed to make sure there was personal training on both internal and ANA organic equipment to ensure a greater understanding of all communication systems. Some considerations for training include the following: antenna installation, radio troubleshooting, programs within the computer network (Adobe, Ventrilo, etc.), blue force tracker (BFT), and SIPR/NIPR access point (SNAP) terminals. The S-6 should make contact with the battle space owner (BSO) S-6 to plan what equipment is already available and what theater provided equipment (TPE) is available, so a mission essential equipment list can be compiled and

requisitioned. On a small 12-man team, the need to take on tasks outside the communication section is a necessity. Ensure that throughout JRTC and during home station, emphasis is placed on learning how other staff sections are functioning and what their daily tasks consist of. Home station training is an important aspect to developing as a new communications officer and a SFAT member.

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Be prepared for a steep learning curve if not a 25 series qualified Soldier.
- Get in contact with the BSO communication section for understanding what equipment is already available and what TPE is available, so a mission essential list can be compiled and requisitioned.
- Be prepared to train on the following equipment: antenna installation, radio troubleshooting, programs within the network (Adobe, Ventrilo, etc.), BFT, SNAP terminal, and all ANA organic equipment.
- Ensure the team is ready for deployment, to include all necessary certificates for network access overseas and making sure all equipment is FMC for deployment (See Figure 6-1).
- Take the time to understand other staff sections, as there are many times when the S-6 will need to cover down on adjacent tasks.

SFAT S-6 Certificate Tracker									
Name	SAAR	Thumb Drive Awareness	Phishing Awareness	SafeHome Computing	AUP	PED & RSM	PII	IAA	SocialMedia and OPSEC
Doe, John	Complete	Complete	Working	Not Started	Not Started	Not Started	Complete	Complete	Complete
Smith, Bill	Complete	Complete	Complete	Complete	Complete	Working	Complete	Complete	Not Started
Lopez, Joe	Not Started	Not Started	Not Started	Complete	Complete	Complete	Not Started	Complete	Complete

	Complete
	Working
	Not Started

**FIGURE 6-1**

### III. JRTC

Upon arrival to JRTC, the team had a week of classes called the “Advisor Academy.” It consisted of cultural awareness, language training, key leader engagements, and certain individual section training. There was a lack of information involving the role of the S-6 position. Ensure questions are asked about any specific details an advisor might need to know when advising Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers. After the advisor academy, the team entered the “box rotation”, which included a six day force on force exercise. The SFAT executed operations from a forward operating base (FOB) with an ANA kandak and a U.S. infantry platoon serving as the battle space owner (BSO). The team fell in on an Afghan kandak staff. This was where a lack of communication background and being a new S-6 became most obvious. Establishing a combined tactical operations center (CTOC) for a kandak advisory staff was difficult (but manageable) and allowed the team to battle track down to the platoon level. Although on deployment the team did not battle track out of their command post (CP), it was informative training for an S-6. The force on force portion of the exercise provided crucial experience with battle tracking and tactical networking. The steep learning curve for an infantry officer serving as an S-6 was daunting at JRTC; however, it was a valuable experience that drastically increased the capabilities of the training.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- If the S-6 cannot find a solution internally, do not be afraid to branch out and ask the BSO or adjacent units.
- Do not react to an issue; have set plans if communications go down or if a hasty mission is issued.
- Understand what is related to communications in the CTOC (networks, phones, tac-sat, radios, etc.)


### IV. Deployment

The first step upon arrival to the FOB was to establish the team’s communications and ensure that the team’s CP was up and running effectively. This consisted primarily of establishing communications with higher and all applicable adjacent units. The next task was to link in with the battle space integrator’s (BSI) communication section to set up and network all computers, printers, and phones as well as establish the communication cards and phone rosters. Network access is crucial in the digital army so ensure that all hard drives from home station are imaged upon arrival in country. Establishing a CP never runs as smoothly as planned. Issues will develop from network connections to radio malfunctions. Any problems that could not be solved internally were brought to the BSI or adjacent units for help. Networking with the communication populace throughout Regional Command - East also helped when troubleshooting issues. In addition to setting up the CP, training the SFAT on internal communication equipment is important. Set up a training plan for personnel locator beacons

(PLB), multi-band intra team radio (MBITR), simple key loader (SKL), and any other necessary equipment to ensure the team knows how to properly use and troubleshoot issues that might arise on their communication equipment. These tasks greatly increased the overall effectiveness of the communications section and the team as a whole.

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Link in with the BSI upon arrival in country and work on getting communications up ASAP.
- Build a good line of coordination chart with the S-6 community (see Figure 6-2).
- Establish a CP never runs as smooth as expected; issues arise from network connections to radio malfunctions.
- Continue to train the SFAT on internal radio equipment while deployed.



## **Advising:**

When the team arrived to their FOB, expectation management was the first lesson learned. The ANA communications officer was in Kabul receiving training and did not return until after the kandak's move to Kunar Province. Be prepared for counterparts to leave for extended periods of time, either for military or personal reasons. Since classified information flow is hand carried from brigade to kandak, many staff officers will leave for brigade on a daily basis. It was not until two weeks later when the new communications officer arrived from Kabul. The new S-6 was enlisted in the ANA for nine years, and had just recently made the switch to officer. In the initial meeting with his counterpart, the advisor wanted to get to know him, learn about his background and family, and build rapport. The main purpose of rapport building was so the counterpart could learn to trust his advisor. This rapport helped when certain tasks needed to be completed in a condensed timeline. Do not plan for a meeting to go a certain way. The initial meeting went the opposite of what had occurred at JRTC and what was expected. After the initial introduction, the expectation was to exchange pleasantries, but the ANA S-6 went straight into business stating that he would get the most up to date accountability sheets of all his radio equipment by the next day. He also mentioned that he was very busy and could not talk long. During the next encounter the advisor ensured to outline his role, letting him know that the S-6 advisor's primary task was to encourage and guide sustainable and effective products. This meeting went much better, he apologized for the quick meeting and the S-6 advisor apologized for not seeing up a meeting beforehand. Once the initial growing pains of expectation management had ended, it was time to talk about work and what needed to be done to help the communication section be more effective.


The lack of training and accountability of the ANA radio equipment were the major issues with their communications. The ANA did not see communications as a priority, especially when it came to training. In order for communications to be seen as a priority, the SFAT commander had to stress the importance of communications to the ANA kandak commander. Unlike many other sections in the kandak, the ANA S-6 already had a training plan broken down day by day, which was quite rare. One thing that the ANA had to learn to improve was their ability to create a tentative plan. They were always reacting instead of planning ahead. Conversely, the S-6 had a plan, but was not allotted the scheduled time to execute it. A good practice was to set up achievable goals for training and accountability of the ANA radio equipment during the time as an advisor. Try and make the advisors ideas and goals the ANA's, this way it can be sustainable and they have a vested interest.

The ANA asked for assistance whenever a difficult issue occurred. The only time to assist a counterpart was when he had exhausted all means to complete the task. Another issue was the importance of keeping accountability of their equipment. A good practice that helped advise this issue was by showing the S-6 an example of what right looked like. Show them how the SFAT keeps accountability of their equipment (See Figure 6-3). This way they could see how an effective system works and could develop a system that was sustainable. The ANA had

a bad habit of asking the SFAT for supplies. Remember the role of an advisor was to work to make them self-sustained. The only way to ensure that the ANA S-6 did not get dependent on his advisor was by telling him “no” upon the first request for supplies.

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Be patient; do not expect things to get done quickly.
- Be prepared for the ANA S-6 to leave for extended periods of time, for either military or personal reasons.
- The initial impression with the ANA S-6 is important.
- Establish goals to achieve during the time as an advisor and try and make SFAT ideas and goals theirs.
- When the S-6 asks for the first thing ensure to let them know that the team’s mission is not to equip them with supplies but to help be self-sustaining.
- Show the S-6 an example of what right looks like (See Figure 6.3).
- Understand that communication is not a priority in the ANA, working and accounted for radios is sometimes good enough.
- The only time to assist is when he has exhausted all means to complete the task.



V. Point of Contact (POC) for Local Nation Linguist (LNL)

A very important mission essential resource is the LNL. Being able to clearly understand information exchanged between the advisor and his counterpart is essential. Being the POC for LNLs is a job in itself. Ensure to set the standard and that the LNLs understand. If the LNL is

not performing to standard, the POC has the right to terminate him. LNLs get paid at the end of each month. A good practice is to keep a running timesheet for each day to keep track of days they went on mission, took leave, or did not show up altogether (see Figure 6-4). When it is time for the LNLs to get paid, they have a tendency to ask for extra days for financial reasons. It is important to uphold the standard; as with ANSF if given a little they will keep asking and will develop bad habits. The key to managing leave time is to set a standard as well as making sure to have enough LNLs to complete the mission at all times. Lastly, anything the LNL does or fails to do falls back on the POC.

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Upon receiving the LNLs, sit them down and set a standard in which the POC expects them to uphold.
- LNLs that are not doing their job to standard can be terminated upon the POCs request.
- Keep a running timesheet for each day to keep track of days they went on a mission, took leave, or did not show up altogether (See Figure 6-4).
- It is important to uphold the standard, if given a little they will keep asking and will develop bad habits
- Anything the LNL does of fails to do will fall back on the POC.

<b>Local National Linguists Time Sheet (FEB)</b>															
Name	AFG #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Kahlid	1234	L	L	LP	LP	LP	L	L	L	L	LP	L	L	L	L
John	5678	W	W	P	P	P	DO	DO	DO	DO	X	X	X	W	W
Nejib	9012	X	X	X	X	X	X	L	L	L	LP	L	L	L	L
Name	AFG #	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
Kahlid	1234	DO	DO	DO	DO	L	L	L	L	L	LP	LP	LP	LP	LP
John	5678	N	N	N	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	P	P	P	W
Nejib	9012	L	L	LP	L	L	L	L	LP	LP	LP	LP	L	L	LP
												W	Worked Day		
												P	Patrol		
												L	Living with Unit		
												LP	Living with Unit + Patrol		
												DO	Day Earned Off		
												N	Night Shift		
												X	Unpaid		

**FIGURE 6-4**



## CHAPTER 7: THE FSO ADVISOR

### I. Introduction

This section serves as a lessons learned guide for the Fire Supporter for a security force advisory team (SFAT). The concept of an SFAT has many complexities and gray areas. The role of the Fire Support Officer (FSO) or Fire Support NCO (FSNCO) does as well. The fire support element (FSE) for Team Renegade during Operation Enduring Freedom XIII faced the challenges of integrating assets in support of combined and independent Afghan patrols, training their indirect weapons sections, and creating a fire support team with an FSO. The lessons learned highlights key tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that were effective for their deployment.

### II. Task Organization

The original task organization for the fire support element consisted of an FSO and FSNCO. Adding an indirect fire infantryman (11C) to the team was considered but was later dropped due to other positions that took priority. The two-man FSE was based on the belief that the SFAT would deploy with 18 Soldiers. However, right before the deployment, the team's numbers went down to 12 personnel. Other SFATs kept two fire support personnel but Team Renegade chose to bring two communications personnel based on the nature of the mission. It turned out in Afghanistan, that the battle space integrator (BSI) had a fire support element and mortar personnel to aid in the mission, enabling advisors to effectively execute all fire support tasks with one FSO organic to the team.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Plan the FSE task org based on what personnel the unit wants to have but be prepared to cut some of them.
- Have clearly defined tasks to all personnel. Once when there is a system in place, stick to it. Give roles such as compiling slides, editing reports, etc. to the same group of people so there is continuity within each role.
- Try to get in touch with the Battle Space Integrator (BSI) before deploying and see what that unit brings to the table. Their personnel numbers can affect the advisors' task organization.

### III. Home Station Training

Second Battalion received the Warning Order about the SFAT deployment right before winter block leave. The unit was told that it would deploy in June to Afghanistan to serve as advisors for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). After leave was over in mid-January, advisory teams had four and a half months to figure out what an SFAT role was, develop a

training path, execute a rotation at Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and pack up for the flight overseas.

The initial understanding of the fire supporter's role in an SFAT was simply to serve as an enabler. A FISTER would be a tool at the Team Commander's disposal to aid Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts during operations. There may be an Afghan counterpart to train, but fire support is a concept that is fairly new to the ANA. The enduring tasks for the team's FSE was to remain proficient at requesting and adjusting surface to surface fires, being able to provide terminal guidance operations for close air support, and train the rest of the SFAT on forward observer (FO) tasks. The nature of the team FO's doctrinal tasks had not changed.

The training path that was officially put out by the brigade did not include much fire support training. The training was broken up into two categories: training that familiarized all team members on FO tasks, and training that re-certified or enhanced the skills of the fire supporters. Official training for non-fire supporters included only one air-to-ground integration range for the team. The range included targets to be engaged by mortars, field artillery and rotary wing assets. The range allowed FSO/FSNCOs to review their skills but the intent was to introduce other members of the team to a new skill set. Soldiers who got to observe benefited from the training. However, not every member of the team got to observe. Essentially, it was up to each team's FSE to train other members on FO tasks.

As far as training for the FSE was concerned, a lot of the training it received was developed internally. The main goal was to maximize the amount of joint fires observer (JFO) qualified personnel across the SFAT formation. Three classes of the Joint Fires Observer Course were offered at the team's home station, but not every deploying or alternate FSO/FSNCO was allowed to attend. The end state was that every team had either an FSO or FSNCO that was JFO qualified, but not every fire supporter that deployed had that qualification. Additionally, any other training for the FSE had to be scheduled outside official training times that consisted of classes that really did not aid fire support Soldiers in developing their proficiency as enablers.

Under these circumstances, experience proved to be a key factor in adapting to the ever-changing role of the fire supporter. Both the FSO and FSNCO had recently returned from deployments overseas. Both Soldiers were well versed in the operational aspect of integrating fires which included knowing the latest Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) in requesting and clearing fires as well as the latest rules of engagement. The two Soldiers were also experienced in command post (CP) operations should the upcoming SFAT mission require a company intelligence support team (COIST) or information operations (IO). The bottom line is that an experienced Soldier can adapt better to real-world situations.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Continue to study on observer tasks and drills. The FSO and the FSNCO are the subject matter experts on fire support for the team.
- Go to the Joint Fires Observer Course. The ability to control enablers is essential for the advisory mission.
- Be flexible with training for the SFAT. There may not be official times allotted to train on FO tasks. Make time outside the regular schedule.
- Pick a FISTER with recent deployment experience to join the team. Having someone who knows the latest products and details from previous deployments is more beneficial than having personnel who have to work from square one.

### IV. JRTC

The advisory teams arrived at Fort Polk, Louisiana for JRTC in March of 2012. There, they trained in a number of areas concerning SFAT. The FOs only had a one-day class on joint fires observer familiarization. That training took place during other class sessions that were officially considered mandatory for all Soldiers. It was up to the Team Commander's discretion to let his FSE skip other training to attend an inadequate training session which is not the same as attending the JFO course.

During that rotation, Team Renegade operated out of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) with an ANA kandak and a U.S. infantry battalion as a battle space owner (BSO). The team fell in on an Afghan kandak staff but the FSO did not have a counterpart so he simply served as an enabler. The FSNCO worked with the BSO to request assets in anticipation of operations and then managed whatever assets he could get during missions.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Even if there is not a designated FSO, try to suggest to the kandak commander or kandak command sergeant major to pick one to be mentored.
- Stay ahead of the game when it comes to requesting assets. The general timeline is at least 72 hours prior to the operation.
- Know all FO tasks and fire support planning concepts prior to JRTC.
- Take the time to understand how the BSO's different staff sections work. There will be times when a task requires coordination with multiple shops.

### V. Deployment

About two weeks prior to the deployment, it was confirmed that there would be only 12 personnel on the team. The FSNCO position was therefore dropped and the fire support element consisted of one FSO. When Team Renegade arrived in country, the BSI provided briefings on

the SOPs for requesting and adjusting fires. The main TTP was that air, ground, and collateral damage considerations are all cleared through the BSI.

### **Advising:**

Upon arriving at FOB Connolly, the team learned that the BSI had its own FSE and mortar section. The FSE provided the Afghans with assets to support operations. The mortar section was able to provide trainers to develop the ANA mortar sections. However, the mortars section served the additional duty of mayor cell so they were only available to help train two days a week on certain days. The heavy weapons toulay commander provided a roster of personnel for the training and a layout was conducted to assess the kandak's indirect capabilities. There were no mortars that were capable of shooting live rounds. Some of the personnel had experience, but they were ignorant to important TTPs for operating the system. The remaining personnel had no knowledge on the mortar system. In cooperation with a heavy weapons toulay commander, an experienced but stubborn mortar section leader, and a valuable artillery lieutenant, advisors developed and executed a training path for the mortars and FOs (see Figure 7-1).

The artillery officer proved to be especially helpful. He was only trained on the D-30s (Soviet 122mm howitzer) on the gun line, but was smart enough to learn, retain, and teach about FO tasks and mortar drills. He also spoke broken English which was very helpful. Rather than having to micro-manage every aspect of training, advisors were able to meet with this lieutenant before a training session, teach him the training concept, and then watch him develop his own Soldiers. By the time the kandak redeployed to Kunar Province, they had two proficient mortars sections and one team of forward observers.

### **Equipment maintenance:**

The reoccurring problem for mortars proved to be maintenance. This was true for every part of the kandak including mortars. As mentioned before, the kandak had no functioning mortars. They also had no functioning SPG-9 recoilless rifles. In the U.S. Army, there is a system in place to assess equipment deficiencies, conduct maintenance, resupply equipment, and reset equipment. The ANA's system is nowhere close to being as efficient as a U.S. system.

After the layout, advisors developed a list of equipment parts needed for their mortars (see Figure 7-2). The list was translated into Dari and handed over to the heavy weapons toulay commander to submit up his chain of command. A week later, the kandak S4 was asked if he received a MOD-63 from the heavy weapons toulay. He said he did not. When advisors re-engaged the heavy weapons toulay first sergeant, he said that he submitted the form to the kandak commander directly. Afterwards, the kandak commander took the form straight to his brigade and got approval for four new 82mm mortars and two new SPG-9s (Soviet 82mm recoilless rifles). The task was completed, but the logistical process advisors had hoped to create

at the kandak level had failed. However, this event would not have even occurred if advisors had not initiated the dialogue for resupply and then shadow tracked the progress of the request.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Take the time to learn about all of the SOPs and procedures that are emplaced by the BSI.
- There is rapport to be built to with the ANA but there is also a relationship with the BSI. Understand the balance.
- Conduct a layout of all equipment right away and get started quickly on the inventory request. These things take a long time. Afghans will often not get the supplies they need unless advisors inform their chain of command.
- Have manuals on all ANA used equipment. Chances are they were made by the Chinese or Russians so the manuals will be hard to find especially in country. Have those manuals ready before the deployment.
- Assess what the Afghans already know and what they have. There is a good chance that there is an experienced NCO or Officer who can help advisors train Afghan Soldiers.
- Find and pick a fairly bright officer and designate him as a counterpart. Get his chain of command to bless off, but it is highly important to find a counterpart to train and help lead the ANA fires cell.
- If possible, schedule training to be everyday for a short period of time. Executing training a few days a week for an extended period proved to be ineffective.
- Whether it is re-supplying mortar parts or some other task, understand that the U.S. way of conducting business isn't necessarily the way Afghans conduct business. Forcing a technique onto the Afghans will not work.

SIX-WEEK TRAINING CALENDAR (24JUN12 TO 03AUG12)						
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Drivers TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Religious TNG	Command Maintenance	Juma	Mortar/FO TNG
Drivers TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Religious TNG	Command Maintenance	Juma	Mortar/FO TNG
Drivers TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Religious TNG	Command Maintenance	Juma	Mortar/FO TNG
Drivers TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Religious TNG	Command Maintenance	Juma	Mortar/FO TNG
Drivers TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Religious TNG	Command Maintenance	Juma	Mortar/FO TNG
Drivers TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Mortars TNG Sniper TNG	Religious TNG	Command Maintenance	Juma	Training Complete

Figure 7-1

**Explanation:**

With approval from the kandak commander, the mortars trained on their weapons system three days a week. Mondays and Tuesdays consisted of crew drills for the mortars. Saturdays consisted of crew drills and forward observer training. This schedule proved to be inefficient because the mortar section did not train internally on their tasks and drills between Tuesday and Saturday.

**LIST OF MORTAR PARTS NEEDED TO BE  
ORDERED (RUSSIAN PARTS)**

3 X 82mm mortar base plates

3 X 82mm mortar tubes

3 X MPB-82 sites

3 X 82mm mortar bipod with mounts and chains

Equipment to cleaning kit to include bore staff, bore brushes, rags and other brushes

**Figure 7-2**

**Explanation:**

A re-supply request list was developed after the 3/1/201 kandak conducted a proper inventory of their mortar systems. The advisors recorded the deficiencies and developed a list of supplies needed. The list was turned into the heavy weapons toulay to give them a frame of reference for developing their official resupply request.

## **Chapter 8: Team NCOIC**

### **I. Introduction**

This section serves as a lessons learned guide for the team non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and command sergeant major (CSM) advisor for a security force advisory team (SFAT). The concept of an SFAT has many complexities and gray areas. The role of the senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) in the team is no different.

#### **Notification and formation of SFAT:**

Upon receiving the mission to deploy as an SFAT, ensure at least two weeks with minimal interruptions for Soldiers to transition from their duties and responsibilities within their platoon or company into their new jobs as SFAT members.

Key tasks such as writing non-commissioned officer evaluation reports (NCOER) and transferring counseling and chapter packets need to be started immediately. The SFAT will receive new Soldiers from multiple outside organizations requiring continuity from the Soldiers' previous chain of command. Ensure all personnel files, maintenance records and tracking files should be copied and given to the new chain of command. Additionally, all of the Soldiers the team receives will not deploy with the SFAT as some are kept at the home station as alternates to possibly deploy later in contingency situations. The administrative information on Soldiers needs to be kept up to date to facilitate a proper handover of information to the command team that will be responsible for them once the team leaves.

#### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Incoming SFAT Soldiers will most likely not bring weapons or equipment from their units so be prepared to provide the equipment for them. A list of assigned weapons and surveillance, target acquisition and night observation (STANO) should be provided to the unit armorer. Ensure the unit armorer as well as the platoon armorers do not issue these to former users.
- All equipment that is signed for from supply, including computers and furniture should be signed back over unless taken on deployment.

### **II. Task Organization**

The original SFAT consisted of 18 Soldiers, most of which were infantry but were assigned to serve in the role of a staff advisor. Two captains, six lieutenants, two corporals, a staff sergeant, and sergeant first class composed Team Renegade. One of the difficulties was the six lieutenants did not get partnered with a NCO to blend the doctrine, knowledge, and experiences that only a officer / NCO team have.



### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- The rank and mixture of NCOs and officers is not as important as the personalities of the Soldiers.
- The lieutenants on the team continuously completed tasks and duties normally assigned to a captain with a full staff at their disposal. This was accomplished by guidance from higher, training and instruction in staff functions.

### III. Senior NCO position

Serving as the advisor to the Afghan National Army (ANA) kandak command sergeant major (CSM) as well as the team NCOIC can be frustrating. Advising the ANA CSM and being responsible for the team's needs was time consuming. Just like the rest of the SFAT that filled multiple roles as trainers, advisors, staff members and Soldiers the team's NCOIC job was complex.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- If the staff is not producing quality products in a timely manner consider their background and experience and provide training and coaching as necessary.
- Delegate tasks to other members of the team. Sensitive items accountability, maintenance tracking and supply requests can be assigned to other members, but are still the responsibility of the NCOIC.
- Consider conducting staff oriented training events such as the military decision making process (MDMP) before deploying.
- Find a way to ensure the S4 position is staffed by a logistician. The infantry lieutenant that served as the S4 advisor did an outstanding job, but many of the tasks could have been accomplished smoother and with more haste with a school trained logistician.

### IV. Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

During pre-deployment training at JRTC in March of 2012 the rotation began with classes and briefings. Classrooms were organized according to the type of ANSF unit each team was advising. The team worked alongside an ANA staff which consisted of Afghan role-players as well as U.S. Soldiers. The complexities of advising an ANA CSM while still completing all tasks required of platoon sergeant required a large amount of planning and preparation. The role player in JRTC portraying the CSM required an interpreter to communicate through. There was only one interpreter available for the SFAT during JRTC which presented a problem of who and what has priority use of the team's only linguist.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Do not forget basic Soldier skills and battle drills, the situational training exercise (STX) lanes were not SFAT specific and were a great chance to train on the basics.
- Be prepared to multitask and appoint duties to other Soldiers that might be out of their normal scope of responsibilities.
- The time at JRTC in the classroom receiving briefings and classes could have been accomplished by a mobile training team of cadre at the unit's home station. This would increase time available at Fort Polk to conduct more training.
- Refine any systems the team has in place while at JRTC. Spreadsheets, logs and formats that brief well do not always stand up to the first use. Find the problems and fix them while at JRTC.

### V. Deployment

The team arrived at FOB Connolly in Regional Command - East the beginning of June eager to positively affect the 3<sup>rd</sup> kandak. Team Renegade tried to positively influence the ANA by referencing doctrine and using correct terminology at all times. Treat the NCOs and officers in the Afghan Army the same way U.S. Army NCOs and officers would be treated. The SFAT worked as the middle man on certain tasks such as returning tactical vehicles the ANA had signed for back over to the battle space integrator (BSI). Some of the situations that will be presented to the SFAT are tasks while some are more like favors. It is up to the team's commander to decide which ones to carry out and which ones not to. Just like each SFAT advisor has a different personality and leadership style so did their counterpart. Never get into an altercation with a counterpart, and never promise anything that cannot be delivered. The ANA CSM rarely approached advisors with requests and when he did he always had a justification for why he wanted them. Much of the advising the first two months took place on the ANA side and security was the highest priority. While interacting with counterparts on the ANA side, be careful to not set patterns and to always have dedicated security.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Treat Afghan rank the same as the American rank. A lieutenant colonel is a lieutenant colonel regardless of the nation they serve.
- Have a primary alternate contingency emergency (PACE) plan for security, communications, and movement.
- Work with the BSI and use them as a common sense check, sometimes they have more insight on the kandak if they have been with them longer.
- Work around their schedule. The Afghan national security forces (ANSF) have normal meetings, prayer, and chow hours just like any army. Figure out those times and avoid interruptions.
- Avoid slang terms and swearing as another way to show professionalism

### **Very Important Person (VIP) visits:**

During the time at FOB Connolly, multiple very important people (VIP) visited. The day prior to each visit, a visitor packet was updated and time was spent rehearsing any briefings that were to be given. The preparation for a VIP visit usually consumed four to five hours of time the day prior. The day of the visit, the commander and the NCOIC met the VIP at the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) and escorted them to the office. Generally the VIP visits lasted two to four hours.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Be prepared to receive a VIP visit with a 24 hour notice.
- Regardless the rank or position, treat all VIP visits with the same respect and courtesy.
- Upon arrival at the FOB build a visitor packet and capabilities brief. Ensure both get reviewed and updated regularly.
- Inform the BSO chain of command who is coming, when and how long they will stay.

### **Training the ANA:**

While not specifically an SFAT function the team conducted specialized training while at FOB Connolly. It was decided that drivers training and sniper training were two skills which the ANA would be trained on by the SFAT. Drivers training was chosen to decrease preventable damage through proper operator level preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS). Increasing the level of competence in the ANA's driving ability also helped decrease vehicle accidents. Sniper training was chosen as a way to increase the standoff distance of direct fire engagements while simultaneously decreasing civilian casualties (CIVCAS).

The drivers training focused on operator PMCS, proper driving techniques, use of ground guides and a driving course. At the completion of training all the drivers were able to PMCS their vehicles and better understood the importance of proper maintenance. Most of the drivers completed the drivers course without running over safety cones and nearly all of the ANA fastened their seatbelts before moving the vehicle.

Sniper training began with proper techniques for disassembly, maintenance and reassembly of the M-24 sniper weapon system (SWS). Proper firing positions, range estimation, and camouflage were introduced in later classes. Each class began and safe weapons handling with proper clearing procedure in order to stress the importance of these key tasks. The SFAT conducted three ranges for the ANA snipers with the focus being grouping of shots and zeroing their rifles. At the completion of the final range, the best shot had achieved just less than two minutes of angle (MOA) groups. This is the equivalent of a ten inch group of shots on a target at 500 meters.

### **Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Take down student names for every class conducted and follow up with commanders when different Soldiers show up to the training.
- Use subject matter experts (SME) and NCOs to teach. As the company's master driver and graduate of the Army's Anti-terrorism evasive driving course, the team NCOIC had the knowledge and background to conduct drivers training.
- Be brilliant at the basics. During every sniper training class the importance of safe weapons handling and maintenance were stressed.
- A small victory is still a victory. It took about ten classes until the ANA began putting on their seatbelts without being reminded.
- Identify key skills that need to be trained or refined; compare the time and effort of training to the outcome to decide what should be priority.
- Be prepared to conduct training for the ANA using only SFAT personnel. The BSI may not have the skill set or be available to conduct training.
- Plan and rehearse the class before teaching the ANA.
- Ensure the interpreters understand what is being taught and that what is being said translates.



FIGURE 8-1

**Explanation:**

3/1/2011 IN KDK conducts sniper training at FOB Connolly. The kandak had over thirty five M24 SWSs that should have been assigned to the snipers within the kandak. When conducting an inventory it was noted that most of the weapons were brand new and had never been fired. Having properly trained ANA snipers increased the standoff for direct fire engagements and helped reduce CIVCAS through proper identification of targets.



FIGURE 8-2

**Explanation:**

While conducting sniper training, many of the products used were translated for the ANA to keep and use for future training.



FIGURE 8-3

**Explanation:**

While conducting drivers training, the SFAT put ANA NCOs in the lead to coach their Soldiers through a driving course.



## **Chapter Nine: The Team Medic**

### I. Introduction

This section serves as a lessons learned and helpful practices guide for the medic of a security force advisory team (SFAT). The medic of an SFAT team must not only advise an Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) counterpart, but he must also conserve the fighting strength of the team he is attached to. The following is a guideline for best practices and lessons learned.

### II. Home station training

The pre-deployment training for Team Renegade medic differed from that of the other team medics. As a late addition to the team, the Team Renegade's medic was not afforded the opportunity to go to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. The bulk of the training received was from other members of Team Renegade; including a team live fire exercise, language training, and advisory techniques. Other training was provided by the Brigade Combat Team Trauma Training (BCT3) course. This was a great opportunity to hone the individual skills of not just the medic, but the entire team.

It is crucial to know treatment protocols for ANSF and local nationals (LN) before arriving in Afghanistan. This can be obtained by contacting the battle space owner (BSO) or battle space integrator (BSI). For example, our protocols stated that no ANSF will be treated unless injured on a partnered operation; unless the Soldier was in jeopardy of losing life, limb or eyesight. Local nationals were treated the same, only receiving treatment if injured in a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) situation. These protocols will differ by location and the policy letter for the area of operations (AO) should always be reviewed before combined operations.

### III. Deployment

Once in Afghanistan, it was important for advisors to assess the ANSF's level of medical proficiency and supply. This required determining who the kandak's medics were, and conducting a thorough inspection of the kandak's aid station. Once that was complete, Team Renegade's medic also learned how the kandak was resupplied from outside the FOB and how to best shadow track the ANA medical system. The complete assessment gave the medical advisor a starting point for training and advising the ANA.

Prior to deployment, ensure to inquire about medical resupply in the host nation. This can be a big problem initially, but can easily be resolved through a unity of effort between the medical advisor and team S4 advisor. Above all else, do not provide the ANA with any supplies. Establishing this up front will deter the ANA's further attempts to acquire supplies from coalition forces.



**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Inventory available medical supplies.
- Ask about medical resupply.
- Assess medical task proficiency and plan training accordingly

**Training:**

Training the ANA medical staff was a difficult issue. A training schedule was developed to build a “train the trainer” program within the ANSF. This allowed the ANA to gain independence in their medical capabilities through their trained leadership. However, the ANA cancelled sessions at the last minute. When sessions did occur, their medics were not receptive to their advisor’s instructions. Advisors learned to keep their schedules flexible and to adjust their instruction to accommodate an ANA perspective. The focus became to develop capabilities that were satisfactory for the kandak but were not necessarily adequate in the U.S. Army.

The best way of achieving what was called the “Afghan Right” standard of medical proficiency was hands-on training. These sessions contained some lectures, but these lectures quickly transitioned to practical exercises to allow the ANA to have more experiential learning. If advisors had chosen to use power point, the ANA would not have learned as effectively; especially since most of them could not read. Ultimately, executing tasks with repetition proved to be the best methods of helping the ANA retain knowledge.

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Correlate training and teaching points with senior medical personnel.
- Influence counterparts to implement changes to battlefield casualty treatment.
- Hands on training and repetitions are the key to gaining muscle memory.
- Revisit previous training to check on learning.

**Advising:**

Most advising will come from medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and tactical medical treatment standard operation procedures (SOP). Work with the ANSF counterpart to cut down medevac times by preplanning medevac routes and capabilities before mission. Try to influence ANSF to create clear and concise SOPs for casualty collection points (CCP) and mass casualty (MASCAL) situations. This will cut down on confusion during times of high stress.

All of these advisory points should be achieved with as little visibility outside of the organization as possible. This will help ANSF forces to gain the respect of the local populace and cut down on the danger of ANSF on coalition forces attacks.

**Summary of Key Lessons Learned:**

- Work with ANSF to pre plan medevac capabilities and routes to cut down on evacuation time.
- Work to develop CCP and MASCAL SOPs with the ANA.
- Advise the ANA from a distance to ensure they remain in the lead and to build the organization's confidence in its medical team.

## Glossary

AA&E- arms, ammunition, and equipment

AAR- after action review

AAR- administrative adjustment report

ABP- Afghan border patrol

ALP- Afghan local police

ANA- Afghan national army

ANP- Afghan national police

ANSF- Afghan national security forces

AO- area of operations

AOI- area of interest

AOR- area of responsibility

ASG- Afghan security guard

AUP- Afghan uniform police

BAF- Bagram air field

BATS- biometrics automated toolset

BCT3- brigade combat team trauma training

BFT- blue force tracker

BSI- battle space integrator

BSO- battle space owner

BUB- battle update brief

CAR- combined arms rehearsal

CASEVAC- casualty evacuation

CAT- combat advisor team

CF- coalition forces

CHOPS- chief of operations

CIED- counter improvised explosive device

COIST- company intelligence support team

COP- common operating picture

CP- command post

CREW- counter radio controlled improvised explosive device warfare

CROWS- common remotely operated weapon system

CSM- command sergeant major

CTOC- combined tactical operations center

CUA- commanders' unit assessment

CUAT- commander's unit assessment tool

DODAAC- Department of Defense activity address code

DSG- district sub-governor

DUIC- derivative unit identification code

EOD- explosive ordinance disposal

FMC- fully mission capable  
FO- forward observer  
FOB- forward operating base

GIRoA- Government of The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
GPS- global positioning system

FSO- fire support officer  
FSE- fire support element  
FSNCO- fire support non-commissioned officer

HCT- human intelligence collection team  
HIIDE- handheld interagency identity detection equipment  
HMMWV- high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle

IED- improvised explosive device  
IO- information operations  
IPB- intelligence preparation of the battlefield  
ISAF- international security and assistance force  
ISR- intelligence surveillance reconnaissance

JAF- Jalalabad air field  
JFO- joint fires observer  
JRTC- joint readiness training center

KLE- key leader engagement

LFX- live fire exercise  
LNL- local national linguist  
LPD- leader professional development  
LT- lieutenant

M-ATV- mine resistant ambush protected all terrain vehicle  
MBITR- multi band intra team radio  
MDMP- military decision making process  
MEDEVAC- medical evacuation  
MEEL- mission essential equipment list  
MoD- ministry of defense  
MoI- ministry of the interior  
MRAP- mine resistant ambush protected

NAI- named area of interest  
NCOIC- non-commissioned officer in charge  
NCOPD- non commissioned officer professional development  
NDS- national directory of security  
NoK- north of Kabul

OIC- officer in charge  
OP- observation post  
OPD- officer professional development  
OPORD- operations order  
OPSEC- operations security  
OPSYNC- operational synchronization matrix

PBO- property book officer  
PGOV- provincial governor  
PIR- priority information requirements  
PLB- personal locator beacon  
POC- point of contact  
PR&C- purchase request and commitment  
PSD- personal security detachment

RCC- route clearance company  
RC-E- regional command east  
RC-IED- remote controlled improvised explosive device  
RCP- route clearance platoon  
RIP- relief in place  
RFI- request for information  
RPG- rocket propelled grenade

SAF- small arms fire  
SFAT- security force advisory team  
SKL- simple key loader  
STX- situational training exercise  
SoK- south of Kabul  
SOP- standard operating procedure  
SSA- supply support activity  
SWS- sniper weapon system  
SVBIED- suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device

TLP- troop leading procedures  
TTP- tactics, techniques, and procedures  
TOA- transfer of authority  
TOC- tactical operations center  
TPE- theatre provided equipment

UIC- unit identification code

WARNO- warning order

X3- executive officer / operations officer