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AFZH-BFSB

20 November 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Operation GRYPHON LONGSWORD Executive Summary

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an executive summary and after action review for Operation GRYPHON LONGSWORD (GLS).
2. Building on the success of the Operation GRYPHON TOMAHAWK, a Mission Readiness Exercise conducted in February 2014, GLS was designed and executed to enhance the ability of the 201<sup>st</sup> BfSB to conduct ISR-focused training with specially focus on ISR integration with maneuver forces and employment of mission specific ISR capability sets. GLS was a 16 day exercise, designed, resourced and executed by 201<sup>st</sup> BfSB, which trained over 1500 Soldiers in an expeditionary field environment incorporating combined arms maneuver and wide area security scenarios across multiple training sites on JBLM, Satsop Industrial Complex in Elma, WA and Yakima Training Center. The primary purposes of the exercise was to certify the ISR Capability Set concept, conduct a proof-of-concept for Advanced Collective Training Environment Concepts, and to develop proficiencies in ISR integration between MI and maneuver formations in an expeditionary environment. Training objectives that drove this exercise were: 1) Conduct Mission Command in an expeditionary environment, 2) Alert, Stage, Deploy, Redeploy, 3) Train Maneuver-ISR Integration, 4) Certify 201st BfSB Capability Sets, and 5) Execute a Joint Fires Exercise. Execution of the exercise included task organized capability sets with Stryker infantry mission sets.
3. As the Higher Command (HICON), the Brigade Command Post replicated the Mission Command responsibilities of a Joint Task Force. This was done to provide training units with maneuver and intelligence support that those individual headquarters would normally provide in the real world combat environment.
4. The EXCON (White Cell) synchronized and directed the exercise through multiple daily meetings to confirm responsibilities and resources necessary to execute individual events from the Master Events Synchronization List (MESL). This cell executed daily synchronization during nightly meetings to ensure the readiness of all supporting outside agencies.
5. Key enablers for this training exercise included maneuver support (4-23 IN, 2SBCT, 7ID), Joint Fires Exercise at Yakima Training Center (2-17 FA, 2SBCT, 7ID, DIVARTY, 7ID and 6th ANGLICO, USMC), Mission Training Center, JBLM), signals environment support (Operations

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Support Technology, Inc. (OSTi), Intelligence specific training (INSCOM-Foundry), Observer/Controller support (7<sup>th</sup> ID), Civil Affairs support (84<sup>th</sup> CA BN, 85<sup>th</sup> CA BDE), aerial ISR analysis from the Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination unit (Aerial Intelligence Brigade, Ft. Gordon), Chemical Reconnaissance (112<sup>th</sup> CRD, 1SFG and 110<sup>th</sup> CRT, 48th CM BDE), Weather Support (1<sup>st</sup> Operational Weather Squadron, USAF) and the 373<sup>rd</sup> MI Battalion, Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC)). The synchronization of so many elements from multiple organizations and components was critical to distributive training, enhancing the capabilities of maneuver forces and developed TTPs and procedures that will not only increase effectiveness with the 7ID formation but will also inform intelligences and ISR formations across the Army.

6. Comptroller: One of the ancillary objectives for this exercise was to assess the capability for multi-functional BDEs to conduct certification training events at home station. To inform this objective, 201<sup>st</sup> BfSB captured the costs of executing GLS and translated the overall cost into a “per Soldier” cost. The below funding breakdown reflects the internal exercise costs, funded by 201<sup>st</sup> BfSB, OPTEMPO costs by unit (201<sup>st</sup> BfSB and 4-23 IN), and the costs of external funded requirements provided by Foundry (INSCOM).

<u>Exercise Costs (funded by 201<sup>st</sup> BfSB):</u>	
SATSOP Lease	\$12,100.00
Latrines	\$10,000.00
Garbage/Refuse	\$1,800.00
<u>Range Control (OTA)</u>	<u>\$4,900.00</u>
Exercise Specific:	\$28,800.00

201<sup>st</sup> BfSB (pure costs)

CL III	
Package	\$47,000.00
Bulk Fuel	\$40,360.00
CLVIII	\$12,500.00
CL IX	\$36,125.00
TMP RENTAL	\$6,000.00
FSR	\$27,900.00
<u>GPC (Supplies)</u>	<u>\$13,515.00</u>
Unit Total:	\$183,400.00

4-23 IN (pure costs)

CL III	
Package	\$8,264.00
Bulk Fuel	\$54,464.00
HAZMAT	\$1,272.00
CLVIII	\$800.00
CL IX	\$209,660.00
TMP RENTAL	\$1,211.00
FSR	\$27,900.00

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GPC (Supplies)	\$8,547.00
Unit Total:	\$311,318.00

**Exercise Grand Total: \$523,518.00**  
**Estimated Cost per Soldier (1500 pax) \$349.01**

7. Roles of the Staff. Each staff section contributed to the training exercise while maintaining garrison duties and responsibilities.

a. S1/S4. During GLS, the 201st BfSB Brigade S1 facilitated Personnel Operations and Personnel Service Support supporting units in three separate locations. During the operation the BDE's S1 personnel priorities were Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting, Replacement Operations and Casualty Reporting. The operation allowed the BDE S1 to enhance the readiness and HR capabilities of the BDE and ensure Human Resource (HR) support was properly planned, prioritized and managed. The Brigade S4 was responsible for accurate and timely reporting, tracking and updating of equipment and supplies all units, both organic and attached, in support of GLS. The BDE S4 was additionally responsible for coordinating and resourcing all training support requirements and for setting up and facilitating the Brigade's first ever sustainment rehearsal.

b. S2. The S2 section worked close with the EXCON to manage the higher-level intelligence flow to the subordinate battalions. The EXCON also utilized the S2 section as a mechanism for injects to control the pace of training by reporting through intelligence channels and GRINTSUMs. Additionally, the S2 section served as the JTF G2/G2X to provide technical reporting channels for the BN-level collection assets so as to replicate more realistic reporting conditions. In conjunction with operations reporting channels, the S2 disseminated intelligence and information in order to drive the operations of subordinate unit collection assets jointly with maneuver unit employment. These actions ensured the exercise remained within the planning and scenario parameters if relevant intelligence data was not collected by the subordinate units. During the execution of the exercise, analytical training and intelligence production was mainly achieved by the inclusion of augment personnel from 2-2 SBCT ACE, which formed a fusion cell to augment analytical capabilities. This augmentation allowed BDE S2 personnel to fulfill crucial roles in EXCON, planning, O/C support, TOC operations, Collection Management, and external support.

c. S3 / S5 (EXCON). The S3 staff, not involved with EXCON, ran current operations and provided HICON for the BNs during the exercise. The CUOPS / TOC floor performed mostly as a BLUFOR element by receiving reports, battle tracking, and disseminating official communication for EXCON. S3 CUOPS/BTL CPT ran the BDE CUB as part of HICON. The EXCON staff was led by the S5 team. EXCON consisted of the following elements: training site management, the Red Team, a White Cell led by Foundry and a representative of each intelligence discipline, the Opposition Force management, fires and effects management, and the HICON control element. The Red Cell controlled the digital and notional movement of the enemy forces. The White Cell

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managed the intelligence injects, the dossiers, and handled all dynamic scripting and inject production. The OPFOR manager ensured that all physical OPFOR knew which training areas to occupy, their task and purpose in those areas, and managed all fires and effects involved with the training that took place at each training area. The HICON control element ensured that the Brigade staff understood the overall script and flow of the exercise and wrote the necessary Orders, FRAGOs, and answered RFIs as needed to ensure that the training audience had every available opportunity to conduct integrated intelligence and maneuver training.

d. ADAM/BAE. The ADAM/BAE cell provided EXCON support as Lane Directors, OICs and RSOs at Regensburg, Point Du Hoc and Mytkina MOUT sites. These teams set-up and collapsed site training devices, maintained EF-Johnson radios for training personnel, facilitated OPFOR and role-player training integration, and provided observer-controller support. The OIC of the BAE successfully served as the day shift Battle Captain, which was highest OPTEMPO time of the exercise. The BAE coordinated for aviation support from the Washington Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve for CH-47 air insertion and extraction of Strike Packages and LRS detachments between SATSOP and JBLM, which resulted in the movement of over 200 Soldiers from multiple units during the operation. Additionally, ADAM/BAE personnel simulated rotary-wing aircraft at both SATSOP and Yakima Training Center, providing valuable practice in air/ground integration and employment of Close-Combat Attacks for supported units.

e. FIRES. The 201st BfSB Fires Cell ran an Echelonment of Fires (EOF) Exercise and a Joint Fires Exercise (JFE) at Yakima Training Center (YTC) from 08 - 17 NOV. The BfSB worked closely with C Battery/2-17 Field Artillery Battalion, the 2-2 SBCT Fire Support Element (FSE), 4-23 IN Battalion's Mortar Platoon, and 6th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) to integrate these units during the EOF maneuver lanes. 3-38 CAV Fire Support Teams (FIST) served as observers and successfully executed digital fire missions in support of the lanes. 3-38 CAV FIST safely observed over 600 x 155mm high explosive, smoke and illumination rounds, along with over 300 x 81mm and 120mm mortar rounds.

f. PAO. On 4 November, the BfSB PAO section coordinated with our partnered community of Gig Harbor to have the Chamber of Commerce visit the Brigade during Gryphon Longsword. The BfSB Color Guard Team also supported 7th ID's tasking to provide the BDE Color Guard Team and guest speaker to speak at Peninsula High School in Gig Harbor for a Veterans Day assembly. Newspaper reporters from The Ranger and the Tacoma News Tribune also embed with the 502nd MI BN and the 4-23 IN BN's during missions to the Satsop nuclear facility during Gryphon Longsword. Finally, the exercise was supported by a six man team from the 20<sup>th</sup> MPAD that conducted both training and actual media coverage for the duration of the exercise.

g. S6. The Brigade S6 shop, in conjunction and coordination with the 63rd Network Support Company, installed, operated and maintained the Brigade's Combat Net Radio (CNR), voice, data, Mission Command System (MCS), and collaborative networks. First-time accomplishments over this exercise included: (1) Successfully linking

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collaborative efforts between Brigade organic units and elements not physically linked into the 201st Domain through use of collaborative tools including the Brigade SharePoint portal and XMPP (transverse) chat software. (2) Successfully linking DCGS-A systems in standalone mode due to satellite latency through the Brigade DDS and synchronized with the remaining mission command architecture. (3) Fully synchronizing Integrated Waveform (IW), DAMA, and dedicated UHF TACSAT nets simultaneously. (4) Directly connecting Company-level elements into the Brigade Mission Command architecture without the use of dedicated WIN-T assets through the use of DP-115 terminals. (5) Linking unconventional elements directly into the Mission Command architecture.

h. SJA / Surgeon. Provided legal advice on scenario-based issues concerning intelligence law and detainee operations. Provided continued support to commanders by processing Courts-Martial cases, Article 15s, and administrative separation actions while in a training environment in order to minimize processing delays. The Surgeon cell was responsible for planning and executing all medical support operations for the exercise. This cell conducted both training and real-world medical support at all training locations. This included providing ROLE I health support and MEDEVAC services to both JBLM and SATSOP, as well as coordinating with outside health care facilities for higher echelons of care (ROLE II-III). The Surgeon cell was responsible for 20 medical personnel assigned to carry out these operations who serviced 77 actual health issues at the three distributed locations.

i. Unit Ministry Teams (UMT). UMT conducted battlefield circulation throughout the exercise providing feedback on Soldier morale and welfare. While in a field environment, UMT personnel conducted religious services at all training sites. UMT provided technical supervision and training to the battalion Unit Ministry Teams.

j. Retention/Safety/EO. These three special staff agencies conducted constant coverage of training events, training units and training locations. Safety conducted battlefield circulation throughout the exercise providing feedback on Soldier safety and equipment maintenance and operations. Additionally, the BDE Safety Officer ensured that all environmental policies and procedures were adhered to by each unit maintenance and food service team. This agency also inspected water buffaloes, portable latrines and hand wash stations to ensure they were serviceable and properly positioned.

8. Conclusion: This exercise was successful in achieving all stated training objectives as well as capturing lessons learned in both conducting large-scale collective training events on JBLM and incorporating and training with external agencies and organizations. As identified in this exercise, integration of enablers is a critical step in the Integrated Training Strategy. However, without a dedicated and well-developed training plan the effective integration, both within and external to the BDE, will be unsynchronized and counterproductive. One of the most relevant lessons learned is that organizations should understand the capabilities of other units to leverage training opportunities and build proficiencies early in training cycles.

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1. Operation GLS AAR comments
2. Media Package (DVD)
3. Daily Training Storyboards
4. DCGS-A to CPOF AAR
5. FMV Capabilities Proof of Concept
6. 502d MI WMD-E AAR Narrative
7. Reconnaissance Hand Off Smart Card

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