**JRTC Trends 1st and 2nd Quarter FY 2012**

**TREND 1**

**Subject: Actions on contact**

**Observation: Task Force 1: Platoons (PLT) are quick to maneuver on the enemy**

**Discussion:** All PLTs and Companies are very quick to put actions on the enemy when in contact. PLT and Company level leadership are quick to make decisions and act on them.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** At the PLT level, PSGs and PLs are quick to make the decisions for either Battle Drill 1A or 1. At the Company level, Commanders let the situation develop and ensure that PLT leadership execute according to plan.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 1.2 Conduct tactical maneuver)

**TREND 2**

**Subject: Personal engagement skills of HCT**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Most human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCT) cannot perform basic military source operations (MSO) because they lack the interpersonal communications skills to engage personnel in the battle space. HCTs must refine interpersonal skills to engage with people who are of interest to intelligence collection operations.**

**Discussion:** Several courses are offered through Foundry that can help HCT members engage a population with less fear. This training makes the HCT elements more effective and capable of efficiently collecting quality intelligence in less time. It is important that members of a HCT be more comfortable with performing their job and also knowing as much as possible about it. An HCT member who cannot get comfortable within a population cannot collect intelligence.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** (Needs Emphasis): The following are a few of the recommended courses provided by Foundry to increase interpersonal skills of HCT elements. Also listed below are suggestions to increase the members of HCT personal engagement skills. Defense Strategic Debriefing Course: Increases report writing efficiency, elicitation, and tactical questioning skills. This course will grade on interpersonal skills and report writing abilities. Source Operations Course: Will certify and prepare individual members on rules and regulations to lawfully perform MSO. This course will grade individual interpersonal skills, report writing abilities and knowledge of MSO. Joint Senior Interrogator Course: Will enhance individual questioning skills and report writing abilities for HUMINT operations. This course will grade on efficiency of collection while questioning and the ability to transpose collected information into reports increasing quality and efficiency of information collected. Liaise with local law enforcement agencies and allow the HCT members the ability to conduct questioning of law enforcement officials on local practices and statistics. Also when approved by command, an HCT element can conduct basic elicitation in a populated area. This requires strict oversight by the senior team member as to ensure no collection of personal data from persons targeted in the populated area.

**References:** FOUNDRY

(ART 2.1.1.3 Conduct Foundry)

**TREND 3**

**Subject: SIGINT Training**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Continuous turnover of personnel has led to untrained Soldiers being assigned to SIGINT collection teams.**

**Discussion:** Often Soldiers have not received the basic training needed for their assigned duties due to personnel changes and minimal home station training.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Minimum maintenance-level training requirements have been conducted to ensure proficiency of individual Soldiers and teams • STG: Foundry-trained STG Operations • LLVI: Proficiency training on the PRD-13, AR-8200 and team level employment • Prophet: Proficiency training on the specific Prophet system and supporting Trojan system that will be used at JRTC o DRT-Basic course (minimum) NOTE: Fort Polk Foundry has DRT 1101’s that can be signed out for use during the training rotation if Prophet is not used. o Analyst: DEPL 2000 (Required for deployment) and DEPL 3000 Soldiers should receive proper training for the position they will be placed in while at the JRTC and deployed. Leadership should attempt to place Soldiers according to how they will be used while deployed. This helps Foundry and JRTC observer controller trainer (OC/Ts) focus their training.

**References:** FOUNDRY

(ART 2.1.1.3 Conduct Foundry)

**TREND 4**

**Subject: CoIST preparedness**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): Company Intelligence Support Teams (COIST) within the BSTBs arrive at JRTC unprepared for training.**

**Discussion:** One of the most notable shortcomings we observe is that COISTs arrive at JRTC either unformed, untrained or a combination therein. More troubling is that our observation is that the BSTB have generally not set the framework for the horizontal and vertical communication which makes the COISTs so very powerful. Given the aforementioned shortcomings on the BSTB staff, from a manning perspective, COISTs take or should take an even greater role in supporting their companies, the BSTB and their formations to the right and left. JRTC does provide detailed COIST training and equipment to the rotational unit (RTU), we feel that, in the whole, a COISTs success or failure is determined prior to their arrival at JRTC.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** (Needs Emphasis): In order to better set the conditions for a COIST to describe the effects of the weather, enemy, terrain and local population on friendly operations to reduce uncertainty and aid in decision making, they must be formed and trained in sufficient time to impact operations at both JRTC and in theater. CALL Handbook 10-20 gives a wonderful start point for any formation in a nascent state of development for their COISTs. We recommend several immediate steps to develop the nucleus of a positive, successful rotation at JRTC and beyond. First, man and fence the COIST personnel well in advance of arrival to JRTC. Look for soldiers who are 1) free thinking 2) intelligent 3) understand and independently keep up with world affairs 4) have the longevity with the unit to deploy and redeploy with the unit. Second, conduct baseline training of the individuals at home station. Classes or OJT with the BN S2 which will familiarize them with: 1) the patrol functional lifecycle inclusive of briefing and debriefing 2) current threat TTPs 3) classes on applicable systems like TiGR NET and CIDNE 4) a familiarization with information collection (IC) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), in the joint OE. Finally, units must provide a framework for COIST operations; most reliable are nested TACSOP/TOCSOPs which outline how and in what form information is passed, processed and analyzed in the context of the six functions of a staff.

**References:** CALL Handbook 10-20 Company Intelligence Support Teams, Field Manual 3-90.16 BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION and CALL Newsletter 08-17 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

(ART 2.2 Support to situational understanding)

**TREND 5**

**Subject: Engineer CoISTs**

**Observation: (Engineer Team, Task Force 4): Engineer Company CoISTs in the brigade combat team (BCT) are poorly integrated with battalion intelligence teams and they often lack the company commander’s guidance and intent they need to focus their effort.**

**Discussion:** The realities of the modern day battlefield, the prominence and variety of intelligence resources available in a flattened network, and the frequency and variety of required reporting have made the CoIST absolutely essential to the success of company level intelligence operations. CoIST teams in the BCT engineer company vary widely in their manning, equipping and training but most units are now employing them. Teams have been observed functioning at high levels with as few as two, well trained, equipped and guided junior enlisted personnel. Typically, CoISTs in the BCT engineer company have demonstrated the following trends during JRTC rotations: • Most CoISTs lack a well defined role in the intelligence war fighting function. They don’t receive much guidance from or nest into the operations of the battalion S-2. As a result, the information gathered in de-briefs is not well integrated into future targeting cycles. • Commanders typically do not provide their CoISTs with sufficient guidance to keep them employed and focused. Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), especially priority intelligence requirements (PIR), are not well defined or conveyed to the CoIST or integrated into the pre-brief and de-brief formats. • Most units lack a standardized pre-brief and de-brief format all together. When the formats are established, they are not tailored to the route clearance mission. Enforcement of briefing standards varies widely, with units at outlying forward operating bases proving to be the most difficult to gather information from. • Tactical ground reporting network (TIGRnet) is not being effectively used to analyze improvised explosive device (IED) trends and integrate them into the targeting cycle, mission pre-briefs, and RCP tactics techniques and procedures (TTP).

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Early establishment and training of the CoIST is essential to the success of company level intelligence operations. Successful CoISTs in a maneuver support company do not necessarily need to be manned at full strength (x6 personnel); units with two to three Soldier CoISTs can be successful when focused on route clearance operations. CoISTs should be fully integrated into the operations of the battalion S-2 and tied into the regular distributions of intelligence products. Commanders should guide their CoIST with specific and continually refined PIRs. CoIST SOPs should establish intelligence gathering and distribution responsibilities throughout the company and maximize the information gathered in an “every Soldier is a sensor” paradigm.

**References:** CALL Handbook 10-20 Company Intelligence Support Teams, Field Manual 3-90.16 BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION, CALL Newsletter 08-17 Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Field Manual 3-90.119 COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONS (INCL CHG 1), JP 3-15.1 Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations, ATTP 5-0.1 Commanders and Staff Officers Guide and CALL Handbook 11-42 Afghanistan Route Clearance

(ART 2.2 Support to situational understanding)

**TREND 6**

**Subject: MICO connectivity**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): The MICO command post (CP) has limited communications with its outlying elements.**

**Discussion:** The MI company does not come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with a well thought out and war-gamed communications (primary alternate contingency emergency) PACE plan. The MICO commander, along with the company first sergeant, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, should analyze the terrain for probable locations for deployment of the MICO teams, and then balance that against the current and forecasted communications abilities of the company. The JRTC does provide some additional communications platforms for incoming rotational training units to replicate theater provided equipment, but most MI companies don’t take full advantage of these assets.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Recommend that the MICO coordinate for connectivity hardware prior to arrival. Previous units have used SIPR/NIPR Access Point (SNAP) Terminals, PRC-117G TACSAT systems and JNNs for SIPR connectivity. SNAP and PRC-117G systems allow the company to have dedicated assets for NIPR and SIPR access.

**References:**

(ART 2.3 Perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR))

**TREND 7**

**Subject: MI team integration with maneuver**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Coordination of signals intelligence (SIGINT) terminal guidance (STG) and low level voice intercept (LLVI) enablers from the brigade combat team (BCT) to ground force commanders is limited.**

**Discussion:** SIGINT capabilities, limitations and employment are not commonly understood by maneuver units. The lack of understanding leads to improper use of SIGINT enablers. Additionally, SIGINT Soldiers lack the tactical training necessary to instill confidence with the maneuver elements and effectively articulate benefit verse risk.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Soldiers should be able to (through practice) confidently and accurately give a capabilities and limitations brief with proper employment of assets (STG, LLVI, Prophet, or analysis) • Brief should be tailored to address to the lowest level maneuver Soldier, with no intelligence awareness and possibly no security clearance. Cleared leadership may require a more in depth brief. • Military Intelligence company (MICO) and SIGINT leadership should network with supporting maneuver commanders (down to the company-level) prior to arriving at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to briefly inform them on the various SIGINT assets and how to properly employ the different enablers. • BCT should identify as early as possible who SIGINT will be supporting while deployed. Early integration will provide a better understanding to maneuver commanders • Along with technical training on SIGINT tasks, SIGINT Soldiers should understand the supported unit tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP) and be able to proficiently complete tactical tasks. • Tactical training to support maneuver is imperative to SIGINT conducting operations. Tactical training should be conducted with maneuver elements whenever possible.

**References:**

(ART 2.3.2 Perform ISR integration)

**TREND 8**

**Subject: SIGINT platoon SOP**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Units commonly arrive at the Joint Readiness Training Center JRTC without an SOP or working draft.**

**Discussion:** Roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined for the SIGINT platoon leader or platoon sergeant between the MICO and brigade combat team (BCT) S2. Confusion often leads to duplication of effort, internal platoon misunderstandings and poor integration of SIGINT into the BCT S2 function.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** • The SIGINT platoon’s leadership should have clearly defined roles and responsibilities set by the BCT S2 and the MICO commander. If the roles are not clearly defined the platoon leader should seek clarification from the BCT S2 • MICO, BCT S2 and SIGINT platoon should be completely nested in their priority of work and expected details • The platoon leader and sergeant should separate tasks and identify specific roles and responsibilities to stay integrated with the BCT S2 and have current situational awareness of the operational environment • The SIGINT leadership should disseminate roles and responsibilities as well as assigned tasks to subordinates • Leadership should provide quality control and outline policies and procedures for the SIGINT function • Leadership should have (prior to rotation) established their SOP to refine during rotation • All SIGINT personnel should be integrated into the other intelligence disciplines within the BCT S2 and understand their function

**References:**

(ART 2.3.2 Perform ISR integration)

**TREND 9**

**Subject: Trojan operability**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Units arrive at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) without the proper components to operate their Trojan or T-Lite (cable, communications security codes {COMSEC}, generator, etc.) and satellite airtime circuit request.**

**Discussion:** Submission for satellite airtime is required no later than 30 days prior to use which causes a friction point when a unit shows up without a circuit.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** • Conduct good pre-combat checks and inspections (PCC/PCI) of equipment • Bring all necessary equipment, COMSEC keys and spare parts for Trojan system • Ensure COMSEC is accurate for all three mediums (SIPR, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System and National Security Agency) • Coordinate an alternate plan with the JRTC COMSEC custodian • Submit Annex-A and T-Baud requests no later than 60-days prior to training rotation • Assign a primary and alternate (trained) point of contact (POC) responsible for Trojan operations who understands their roles and responsibilities • Have POC listed with Trojan Network Operations Center (TNOC) or Trojan Network Control Center (TNCC), to include NSTS and JWICS phone numbers, to assist in troubleshooting • In the event that SIGINT will rely on the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platoon’s Trojan Spirit for high side access, prior coordination should be made to outline requirements

**References:**

(ART 2.3.2 Perform ISR integration)

**TREND 10**

**Subject: HCT integration**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCT) are poorly integrated into units for operations and support to mission.**

**Discussion:** During rotations it is common for HCT elements to not know whom they are imbedded with and this causes both logistical issues and it hinders the HCT and its ability to operate about the battle space. Before a unit prepares for deployment or exercise the identified HCT elements should contact the units they will join. This will smooth the transition from garrison to operations and will increase the ability of the HCT to move more freely and provide support to the unit. This integration allows the HCT to collect intelligence from a wider range of sources. A lack of integration ultimately undermines the purpose of having a HCT attached or embedded into a unit.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** The operations management team (OMT) for the teams should at a minimum make meet with the unit they will support and brief what HUMINT can provide. The members of the HCT should know what the unit needs and what the unit cannot provide that they will need to acquire themselves. This will alleviate the notion that the gaining unit will provide what we don’t have and it will also show to the unit commander that they support they will not be a burden on the mission.

**References:**

(ART 2.3.2 Perform ISR integration)

**TREND 11**

**Subject: S2 human intelligence collection (S2X) leaders**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): While in rotation the primary leaders that will run the S2 human intelligence (HUMINT) collection (S2X) positions are not present due to other training reservations or various other reasons.**

**Discussion:** This causes the unit to shift and place people in those positions who will not be filling them during deployment. This places leaders in a position where they lack the knowledge or experience to provide the oversight needed to make a HUMINT collection team (HCT) element fluid and functional. This also impacts the relationship with higher echelons because the stand-in leaders are not fully aware of what support they can receive or ask for from mentioned higher elements. It is understood that all leaders need to be prepared to hold these positions but those who are supposed to fill them are not going to gain the valuable training experience prior to deployment.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Those that will be not available for training due to other training reservations should consider looking at attending courses at other times in order to fulfill the training during rotation. In the event that the training requirements will take the leaders from those positions, it is advisable that the unit send those identified to fill the leader positions in the 2X course. This will allow the HUMINT to function and receive more time training instead of trying to establish the roles and functions during rotation. A solid solution to add is to provide at a minimum a drafted SOP that would provide guidance to all members of a HUMINT element. During rotation is not the time to write the SOP but to modify it and make it more functional.

**References:**

(ART 2.3.2 Perform ISR integration)

**TREND 12**

**Subject: UAS crew endurance and fighter management**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Army Regulation 95-23 Rapid Action Revision of July 2010 removed the crew endurance guidelines chart while still requiring each unit to maintain, enforce and track crew endurance.**

**Discussion:** AR 95-23 requires the aircrew training program commander (company commander) to develop a crew endurance program (CEP) tailored to their unit mission using DA Pam 385-90 and the leader’s guide to crew endurance. The CEP should be on paper, signed by the brigade commander, and outline maximum duty and flight times for a 24 hour period. It should also cover who can authorize extensions for individual operators and reset criteria for exceeding the maximum times. If applicable to the unit, the guide can also cover seven and thirty day periods as well as garrison and combat conditions.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Recommend that the brigade commander signs off on a unmanned aerial system (UAS) platoon crew endurance guide using the following as a starting point and adjusting to specific unit mission requirements: • In a 24 hour period, maximum duty day of 12 hours • Maximum flight day of 12 hours; • No additional time restrictions for night flying due to the nature of UAS operations • The company commander has the authority to extend each individual operator for two hours of duty and one hour of flight. • The battalion commander has the authority to extend each individual operator for an additional one hour of flight. • The brigade commander has the authority to extend each individual operator for an additional two hours of duty and one hour of flight. • If all the extensions are requested and approved, the duty day will be 16 hours with 15 hours of flight. • If additional extensions are needed, the first general officer in the chain of command will have the extension authority. • Each extension is on a case-by-case basis and has to be approved by the operator being extended. • If any operator exceeds 12 hours of duty or flight in a 24 hour period, a 24 hour rest period is required in order to reset crew endurance. • If mission and manning allows, a 24 hour rest period every week resets all crew endurance requirements and allows for continuous operations.

**References:** Army Regulation 95-23 Rapid Action Revision of July 2010

(ART 2.3.2 Perform ISR integration)

**TREND 13**

**Subject: TSCIF accreditation**

**Observation: (Military Intelligence Company Task Force 4): Most signals intelligence (SIGINT) platoons do not have a TSCIF standing operating procedure (SOP) established causing the leadership to make hasty decision to ensure TSCIF approval.**

**Discussion:** Additionally, TSCIF requests are submitted either a few days before the SIGINT platoon arrives at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) or until the units is on ground at the JRTC ““ this lateness causes the JRTC to jump through hoops to get the TSCIF approved so the SIGINT team does not lose training time.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** • Appoint special security representative (SSR) (on orders and trained) that understands associated responsibilities. • It is recommended that the TSCIF request is submitted from 45-14 days out from arriving at the JRTC • TSCIF SOP: o Clearly identifies procedures for TSCIF establishment; o Outlines duties and responsibilities of TSCIF operations after accreditation; o Identifies personnel responsible for TSCIF setup and operation • Security Clearance Access Roster (SCAR) requirement that identifies SCI cleared o Two person integrity o Controlled access points • Early (before arrival) coordination with the JRTC special security office (SSO) to schedule storage of SCI material prior to TSCIF inspection and approval • Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) email accounts. All SIGINT Soldiers need JWICS accounts to access the JRTC homepage. JWICS is the only authorized medium for SIGINT exercises at the JRTC. NOTE: Simply having a Trojan account will not work. Soldiers will be required to access their NSA PKI’s through JWICS email. Emailing PKI’s to JWICS early will expedite training.

**References:**

(ART 2.3.5.2.1 Establish and maintain technical authority and channels)

**TREND 14**

**Subject: Battalion (BN) Fire Support**

**Observation: Utilization of mensurated target coordinates**

**Discussion:** Future Operational Environments (OEs) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations dictate that units carefully weigh cost versus benefit when prosecuting any lethal target. In order to reduce the potential for unintended effects, the United States Armed Forces have trended towards Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs.) The rapid pace of development of these munitions has far exceeded the training and equipment necessary to employ them at the BN/Task Force (TF) level. Even as the Army has developed a near precision mortar round that is organic to the BN/TF. Little consideration was given to the training and capability to accurately locate targets and process the missions. The Precision Fires Course is part of the curriculum of the Fire Support Specialist Senior Leader Course. However, 13F’s ability to maintain currency after certification is hindered by the fact the vast majority of the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) do not have a certified instructor to administer the currency test. This dictates that all mensurated grids be passed to the BCT or the first certified element in the chain to verify the grid coordinate and conduct the Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) call. The effect of this is the diminished responsiveness of fires, the commander’s lack of utilization of surface to surface fires, and directly contributes to an over reliance on close air support. Fire Support Elements (FSE) are habitually ill-equipped to mensurate target coordinates at the BN/TF level. FSE’s have a number of programs capable of mensurating grids available to them. However, units either fail to order imagery or when they do, it arrives on an external hard drive. The unit must then petition the G6 to open a USB port for it to be used. Additionally, most BN/TF do not have the necessary quantity or quality of computers to dedicate to this role. At the company level, Forward Observers (FOs) simply do not have the imagery or training on the equipment to utilize an organic near precision munition.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** A program manager (Fires Master Gunner) must be assigned to preserve this essential capability within the BCT. An emphasis should be placed on maintaining an imagery data base at the BDE level. With battalion FSEs having access to it through the BDE’s portal. Maintaining the imagery in a common location on a secure system will prevent spillage and eliminate that specific disparity between BN/TF’s. Access to Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB) imagery is only part of the problem set. A key to successful employment of PGM’s is the level at which we require target (TGT) location to be mensurated during tactical employment. We must train and certify personnel at the lowest level possible. It is essential that certified personnel are managed at the BCT Headquarters (HQ) level with a critical eye towards the program manager. In addition to airspace deconfliction, CDE calls, and Ballistic Impact Points (BIPs) this is just one of a few issues in the employment of PGM’s at the BN level.

**References:**

(ART 3.3 Provide fire support)

**TREND 15**

**Subject: Lack of fire direction center and gunline standard**

**Observation: Lack of similarities between both Gun Positions (IE. Ammunition, Octants, Equipment placement) and also Fire Direction Centers (FDCs) (i.e. Boards or laminated tracking sheets such as the Five Requirements of Accurate Predicted Fire, Ammunition Tracking, Octants, Meteorological Data (MET) check sheet and time last updated, and Safety T’s posted in different locations.)**

**Discussion:** There seems to be a severe lack of overall standardization across the board with units in both their gunlines and FDCs. A major reason for this is a lack of a SOP.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Section positioning needs to be exact in regards to equipment that may be needed during fire missions so that any change in personnel between sections and/or Batterys, will not hinder section performance or timely delivery of fires. While there is room for adjustments within Battery’s gun positions and fire direction centers, they should not alter anything that may take away from mission execution.

**References:** FM 6-50 MCWP 3-1.6.23 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the FIELD ARTILLERY CANNON BATTERY, FM 6-40 MCWP 3-1.6.19 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the FIELD ARTILLERY MANUAL CANNON GUNNERY

(ART 3.3 Provide fire support)

**TREND 16**

**Subject: 5 Requirements of Accurate Fires**

**Observation: Fires: The firing battery is not maintaining or ensuring the 5 Requirements of Accurate Predicted Fire are accomplished.**

**Discussion:** The Battery Operations Center is where the Battery Commander gains situational awareness on his battery’s firing capability. This capability includes how each firing section and fire direction control are accomplishing the 5 Requirements of Accurate Predicted Fire (RAPF). This is shown in the data where the first round is not within 50 meters of the target. Maintaining the 5 RAPF is no longer the standard but a goal to achieve.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** For Artillery fires to be accurate and timely, the firing unit needs to meet the 5 RAPF. The battery needs to have oversight even in de-centralized firing missions over the firing units’ ability to meet the 5 RAPF. Without battery oversight, there is no forcing function or tracking system to ensure the 5 RAPF are accomplished. The main reason that units are not meeting the standard is due to a lack of oversight with specific regards to MVV. Batteries are not properly maintaining the MVV books or conducting calibration and therefore they are not able to take into account the effects of the ammo lot and powder lot. When battery commanders place the proper emphasis and track their unit’s capability to meet the standard of 5 RAPF then fires will be more responsive and accurate.

**References:** FM 6-40 MCWP 3-1.6.19 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the FIELD ARTILLERY MANUAL CANNON GUNNERY

(ART 3.3 Provide fire support)

**TREND 17**

**Subject: Use of contractors**

**Observation: (Sustainment): Brigade combat teams (BCT) coming to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as rotational training units (RTUs) have been hiring contractors to accomplish their field feeding requirements.**

**Discussion:** The contracts have prevented forward support companies (FSCs) and the brigade support battalion (BSB) assigned to brigade combat teams (BCT) from using and training their authorized cooks (military occupational specialty {MOS}: 92G) or the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) authorized containerized kitchens and accessories as will be required during their deployment to Afghanistan. Therefore, cooks across the BCT are either not deployed to the JRTC or are utilized for non-MOS training. IBCT FIELD FEEDING MTOE (725th BSB MTOE) RANK MOS HHC/BSB INF INF RSTA FA 01 SR FOOD OPNS SGT E7 92G4P 1 1 1 1 1 02 SR FIRST COOK E6 92G3P 1 2 2 2 1 03 COOK E5 92G2P 2 4 4 3 3 04 COOK E4 92G1P 4 8 8 5 4 05 COOK E3 92G1P 3 7 7 4 4 11 22 22 15 13 TOTAL 83 The overall consensus of both RTU and the logistics trainer mentors is that too many contracts are interfering with the goal of training the young soldiers of the RTU on how to utilize their equipment and adapt and overcome to obstacles as resources, personnel, and time are in short supply.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** In order to prepare for deployment to Afghanistan it is imperative that RTUs at the JRTC train as they will fight downrange. In Afghanistan FSCs are utilizing Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKTs), Containerized Kitchens, as well as assigning many of their cooks to a handful of contingency operating posts (COPs) throughout their assigned operational area. Not training the RTU to cook and feed soldiers wastes valuable time, personnel, and equipment at the center and again downrange. RTU logistics leadership as well as the logistics observer controller trainers recognize this missed training opportunity. Additionally, water and ice delivery into the JRTC training box was another contracted event that would be a valuable training opportunity for RTUs. Recommend the RTU utilize their Alpha Company (Distribution Company) of the BSB to purify water using the Tactical Water Purification System (TWPS) and Lightweight Water Purification Systems (LWPS) and then transport that water with their 16 MTOE authorized HIPPOs (which hold 2000 gallons of water each).

**References:**

(ART 4.1 Provide logistics support)

**TREND 18**

**Subject: Supply Officer (S-4) position**

**Observation: (Sustainment) : The S-4 position for maneuver units is often filled by a non-captain’s career course graduate with no logistics experience or logistics school training.**

**Discussion:** This follows the common practice leaves the forward support company (FSC) commander (MOS 90A Logistics) solely responsible for logistics planning and execution because the S-4 is an untrained observer. Typically, it will take a solid six months or more for the new maneuver trained S-4 to learn how to complete their job duties, learn the basics of logistics doctrine, understand what the names and types of logistics equipment his/her unit has on-hand, and then learn the capabilities of that equipment. With the high operational tempo that ourArmy has in the modern contemporary operational environment, maneuver units do not have six months to wait for a S-4 to learn their job. In any case they remain at a significant disadvantage compared to a logistics captain that has completed the combined logistics captain’s career course (CLC3).

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Recommend that the Army change the modified table of organization and equipment to change the military occupational specialty (MOS) of the S-4 slot within all organizations to a logistics officer 90A.

**References:**

(ART 4.1 Provide logistics support)

**TREND 19**

**Subject: Aviation Operations and Logistic Synchronization.**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): Aviation units do not project operations tempo (OPTEMPO) to forecast maintenance requirements prior to arrival for their mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).**

**Discussion:** Aviation units fail to project operational flying hours prior to their MRE at the JRTC. They do not manage their daily OPTEMPO to ensure aviation maintenance is proactive. The second and third order effects of this failure mean units fail to project parts needed to sustain aircraft throughout their fight and then fail to meet the aviation unit’s contract with the brigade combat team (BCT) commander for aircraft coverage.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Operations and production control officers must project their daily sustainable OPTEMPO rate for all airframes in their task force no later than 90 days (D-90) prior to their MRE at the JRTC. We encourage a daily sustainable OPTEMPO rate because the high volume of flight hours that deployed units in Afghanistan experience. Additionally, metrics must be developed for understanding effects to maintenance and operations when those daily sustainable OPTEMPO rates are exceeded (i.e. OPTEMPO is Amber, Red, or Black when we fly a certain number of aircraft hours beyond our daily sustainable OPTEMPO rate requiring a surge in maintenance support and parts).

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111, Aviation Brigade; FM 3-04.113, Utility Cargo Helicopter Operations; FM 3-04.126, Attack/Recon Helicopter Operations;

(ART 4.1.1 Provide maintenance support)

**TREND 20**

**Subject: Medical Capabilities SFATs**

**Observation: SFAT Medics staffed on the team are not the correct rank/grade/experience to support adequate SFAT requirements.**

**Discussion:** The requirements for SFAT medics go beyond the treatment of the medics. It also includes the training and advising the ANSF medics on medical treatment and training staffs the medical planning (awareness of medical roles and responsibilities, medical capabilities, etc.), medical leadership, inventory management, and casualty tracking. Second, medics must have sufficient rank to effectively communicate this training to their respective ANSF counterparts. To the ANSF rank does matters; also, officers have the decision making authority. The risk is that junior NCOs and enlisted do not have clout nor the experience to effectively communicate this information to their respective ANSF counterparts

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Increase the rank of the medic to at senior SSG or SFC that has the requisite skills to have the experience to train on medical management and medical skills that the ANSF need to be trained proficiently. Second, consider a medical service officer in the package that will be able address the medical staff planning.

**References:**

(ART 4.3.1.1 Provide medical treatment (organic and area medical support))

**TREND 21**

**Subject: SFAT 9-Line MEDEVAC**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): SFATs are generally unfamiliar with the basic NATO 9-line MEDEVAC request required to save life, limb, or eyesight.**

**Discussion:** Many SFAT 9-line requests are incomplete and lack required information for efficient air medical evacuation. Wrong grids are passed, inaccurate casualties are reported, and improper LZ markings are some examples which increase the response time of MEDEVAC aircraft.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** SFAT Academy continues to instruct and familiarize SFAT members on proper air MEDEVAC 9-line requests, streamlining the air MEDEVAC process overall.

**References:**

(ART 4.3.2 Provide medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) (air and ground))

**TREND 22**

**Subject: BSTB for mission command**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): BSTBs as a battalion level mission command entities are largely underutilized during Mission Readiness Exercises (MRE).**

**Discussion:** Specifically, it is seldom that we see the BSTB assigned any mission outside of force providing and providing administrative and logistical functions to the BCT staff. We find this to be a function of several, conjoining, circumstances which in the aggregate leave the BSTBs in a position to only be a force provider/sustainer. First, we have observed that the BSTB staff is often undermanned and, at times, seems to be a bill payer for additions to other Battalion level formations’ staffs as well as the BCT functional staff. This lack of depth in the staff often by chance has the impact of only providing the BSTB commander a staff capable of only limited mission command activities, and therefore operations, outside of self sustainment. Second, by nature of their collocation with the BCT Headquarters (HQs) it is very easy for the BSTB to be relegated into a FOB/garrison support role in order to lessen the burden on the Brigade Staff and battle space owner. In its simplest form, managing the FOB Base Defense Operations Cell (BDOC), providing force protection for the entry control points and sustaining the force. We feel that the BSTB, when properly resourced at a relatively low cost in human resources, can offer a much more robust mission command capability to the BCT commander and therefore free up maneuver forces in order to reduce the amount of non-contiguous operating environment.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** During MDMP, we recommend looking for other mission sets for the BSTB in order to expand their role beyond the role of force provider and ADCON headquarters. For example, in several rotations, we have seen BSTBs successfully serve and battle space owners, similar to 4-10 BSTB during OEF 2010-2011. Similarly, with the recent in theater moves towards giving BCT commanders more responsibility for the routes in their Operational Environments, we have seen great success using the BSTB as the mission command, thereby extension of the Brigade Staff, core of the Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) fight. Other, less standard mission sets include, but are not limited to: focused targeting force (FTF) mission command, base defense operations center mission command along with a operational environment owner (OEO) for the immediate area to the forward operating base (FOB), and conducting an increased role in partnership (usually in conjunction with a role as BDOC/OEO).

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.16 BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION, CALL Newsletter 08-17 Brigade Special Troops Battalion and ATTP 5-0.1

(ART 5.0 The Command and Control Warfighting Function)

**TREND 23**

**Subject: BCT staff to BSTB companies**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): Relationships between the BCT Staff, BSTB Staff and BSTB Company Commanders are not well defined**

**Discussion:** Almost everyone we come into contact with who has served in a BCT over the past few years, at one time or another, have observed the mission command friction between the BSTB and BCT with regard to command support relationships. Although doctrine does not spell out the specific answer, there are several problem sets which lead to a loss of synergy with regard to leveraging the BSTB. First, as a scene setter, an operational formation cannot have a command support relationship with a staff function. In short, a commander does not work for a staff member within a defined command support relationship. This in turn leads to often ill defined relationships between the BCT staff and both the Military Intelligence and Signal Companies (MICO and SIG). More often than note, the MICO and SIG company commanders are the respectively second most senior functional officers in their fields. Due to this and the supporting functional role that portions of the MICO and SIG play to the BCT staff tends to turn the scenario into an “Oklahoma land grab.” Often feeling that the MICO and SIG are there to only support their BCT Staff Function, the primary staff officer almost invariably at JRTC seeks to pull the entire company into their direct control. As anticipated, often causes friction between the respective commander and primary staff officer. Unfortunately but not uniformly, with many BCT XOs having a closer relationship with the primary staff officer, the company commander ends up answering to both the BCT staffer and the BSTB commander.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Acknowledging that there needs to be a strong relationship between the BCT staff officer and the functional area commander within the BSTB, we strongly recommend that the roles and responsibilities are outlined in writing. The format for this agreement, and it must be an agreement, has taken several forms. First one course of action calls for a memorandum of agreement between the functional BCT staff primary and the functional company commander. This would, most likely, have solid success if sponsored by the BSTB commander and either the staff primary or BCT XO. Similarly, another device for codifying the relationships could be within the BCT TOCSOP (as approved by the BCT commander). Although these are only two possible solutions, in order to achieve greater unity of effort, we do recommend that BCT functional areas clearly outline the roles and responsibilities.

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.16 BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION, CALL Newsletter 08-17 Brigade Special Troops Battalion and ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide

(ART 5.0 The Command and Control Warfighting Function)

**TREND 24**

**Subject: Aviation Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Integration**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): Aviation task forces are not integrated with the brigade combat team (BCT).**

**Discussion:** As a rule, aviation task forces (TFs) conducting mission rehearsal exercises (MREs) at the JRTC are not from the same division as the BCT they support (i.e. 4CAB TFs supporting a 101st BCT) and are not aligned with the BCT for deployment. In the last three rotations at the JRTC, no aviation TF has come from the same division as the BCT executing their MRE. This pattern strains coordination of logistical and operational support prior to the MRE due to distances (i.e. FT Campbell versus FT Hood) and competing requirements (HAATS, Home Station Gunnery, etc.) from multiple headquarters. Aviation TF’s are slow to integrate with the BCT they will support and provide minimal to no oversight during D-180 and D-90 conferences at the JRTC prior to their MRE.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** (Needs Emphasis): The D-180 and D-90 conferences are essential in setting the conditions for successful MRE execution. Additionally, earlier integration during a BCT-level focus exercise would ensure lines of communications, training objectives and commanders key tasks for training are well integrated prior to arrival at the JRTC. We understand this maybe difficult due to the short dwell time for aviation units and competing demands to complete aviation specific training (i.e. aerial gunner and high altitude training) prior to deployment.

**References:** FORSCOM Regulation 350-50-2, Training at the Joint Readiness Training Center

(ART 5.1.1 Plan operations)

**TREND 25**

**Subject: Multi-Functional Aviation Task Force Operations.**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): As a rule, aviation Task Forces (TF) that come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) are newly formed and have not had sufficient time to determine specific requirements of each airframe and fully understand their support structures.**

**Discussion:** The aviation TF’s primary role is to plan and execute the entire spectrum of aviation operations and can expect to operate anywhere in the assigned unit’s area of operations. Specialized tools, MOSs and supply/maintenance management can be foreign to a commander and his staff who have little to no experience operating as a TF with unlike airframes. The TF allocates resources based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), scheme of maneuver, available assets, and higher headquarters commander’s priorities. The aviation brigade (BDE) TF deploys with all personnel and equipment required to accomplish its mission. Competing requirements often challenge TF needs for limited equipment and personnel. TF shortfalls not met within the parent unit may have to be filled from other units. Additionally, internal and external aviation TF operating procedures have to be tailored for combined or multinational operations and specific theater requirements.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Key considerations to ensure a successful TF organization: • Establish and set the TF as soon as possible. Draw an imaginary line on the flight line and have companies move all their equipment and personnel to their new TF. This will develop working relationships and will give subordinate companies the ability to work with the TF. Additionally, this will allow BDE TF to observe critical shortages in tools, parts and people well in advance to a deployment. • Standardization of one tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP) at the BDE Level. This will ensure all operators work under one standard and will reduce friction on understand how the Task Force operates under of different commander. • The TF senior instructor pilots must be proficient in all airframes and their duties, roles and responsibilities. • The production control officer must understand the uniqueness of each specific airframe and be able to manage all maintenance production requirements. • BDE must provide airframe specific experience in the TF staff to help streamline planning and execution.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111, Aviation Brigade; FM 3-04.113, Utility Cargo Helicopter Operations; FM 3-04.126, Attack/Recon Helicopter Operations; FM 4-02.2 Medical Evacuation; FM 7-0, Training Full Spectrum Operations

(ART 5.1.1 Plan operations)

**TREND 26**

**Subject: Deliberate Targeting Process in Aviation Units**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): Aviation units have become reactive to the air mission request process and fail to understand their role in deliberate targeting as a dominate maneuver force on the battlefield.**

**Discussion:** The targeting process provides the staff a means to focus and synchronize the unit’s efforts based on the current enemy situation, current friendly unit success or lack of success, and directives from higher. The targeting process can also be used as an effective means to assess the current factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), to determine if some change or modification to your current plan is necessary.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Conduct the targeting process based on orders and instructions you have received from your higher headquarters, or because the conditions within your area of operations dictate the need for a subtle change to the existing plan. The end state of the targeting meeting should be a FRAGO to subordinate units that will direct the detection, delivery of combat power, and assessment of targets designated by the commander. Integrated, synchronized and focused combat power relies heavily on the targeting process. To be effective, the process requires command emphasis and the complete integration of all war fighting functions. It must be effectively integrated into the unit’s battle rhythm. The members of the targeting team must be familiar with their roles and the roles of other team members. That familiarity can only be acquired through staff training by the executive officer and operations officer.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 5-0 The Operations Process. JP 3-60. Joint Doctrine for Targeting. 17 January 2002; FM 6-20-10 TTPs for the Targeting Process; FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production, October 2005.

(ART 5.1.1 Plan operations)

**TREND 27**

**Subject: Troop Leading Procedures / Planning**

**Observation: (Task Force 3): Company/Troop commanders and platoon leaders conduct a modified Troop Leading Procedures with limited analysis of the mission, task, and enemy.**

**Discussion:** When companies/troops or platoons are given a mission, the senior leader immediately moves into developing his scheme of maneuver and delegating tasks to his subordinate elements. Sometimes a map is used to pinpoint best possible locations but rarely is terrain or the enemy sitemp analyzed or reviewed to justify the unit’s plans or execution. The commander or platoon leader often puts his units into positions that are not targeted toward the enemy or a specific piece of key terrain. Additionally, he often gives a muddled commander’s intent along with unclear and imprecise tasks to his subordinate units. The majority of these missions result in chance contact with the enemy of which the enemy has chosen the time and place for the contact. Leaders must place their Soldiers in the best possible location to attack the enemy or secure/seize key terrain.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Commanders and platoon leaders must place an emphasis on analyzing the terrain, enemy SITEMP, and mission to maintain the tactical advantage. Establishing a timeline with critical time hacks would facilitate the commander spending time conducting the required analysis. Additionally, the commander should employ the CoIST in developing the enemy situation. The CoIST has the ability to review enemy TTPs, doctrinal templates and historical attack locations which would minimize the strain on the commander and platoon leaders in developing their own analysis. Additionally, the commander and platoon leaders must possess a clear understanding of the doctrinal tasks that would enable the commander and platoon leaders to assign the appropriate tasks to its subordinate leaders.

**References:** FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company, ATTP 3-20.97 Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop, FM 1-02, FM 5-0

(ART 5.1.1 Plan operations)

**TREND 28**

**Subject: SFAT Aviation Planning**

**Observation: SFATs normally planned aviation into their operations.**

**Discussion:** For example, CCA platforms were planned to support ground convoys and dismounted patrols, air MEDEVAC was planned as a primary means of casualty evacuation, and R&S platforms were planned to gain SA and SU.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** SFAT Academy continues to instruct and encourage SFAT members to properly plan for aviation assets in their missions. Incorporate aircraft into all future SFAT training scenarios to enable “hands-on” training and to build confidence.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 5.1.1 Plan operations)

**TREND 29**

**Subject: Targeting**

**Observation: (Task Force 3): Squadrons routinely struggle with the integration and use of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) during the decide phase of the D3A targeting methodology and ultimately linking nominated and approved targets to a measurable effect along the Commander’s lines of effort.**

**Discussion:** When/if the Squadron S2 develops PIR, there is usually no identified decision point tied directly to it. Rarely is emphasis placed on ensuring wide dissemination down to the lowest level in order to answer PIR and use it to drive the process forward from cycle to cycle. In some cases, PIR is developed and disseminated, but is not routinely evaluated and updated based on PIR that has been answered. The Commander’s long range plan and lines of effort are typically developed early, but not effectively disseminated in order to ensure shared visualization across the Squadron. Targets which are nominated and approved are rarely nested with the Commander’s long range plan and generally the rotational unit cannot provide the “so what” for these targets in relation to the long range plan. This results in a process that targets at random and does not synchronize its efforts in a way that can be measured, assessed, and then subsequently fed back into the targeting process.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Squadrons must establish valid and relevant PIR that can be easily translated to subordinate elements. PIR must be constantly evaluated and updated based on feedback from Troops and CoISTs and lead to decision points which drive the continuous targeting process. Squadrons must also ensure that every target can be linked to specific lines of effort in the long range plan with designated measure of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP). This will allow the staff to provide quantifiable feedback to the Commander in order to maximize targeting efforts

**References:** FM 3-60. The Targeting Process.

(ART 5.1.1.1 Conduct the military decisionmaking process (MDMP))

**TREND 30**

**Subject: Troop Leading Procedures (TLP)**

**Observation: Task Force 1: Commanders are not giving solid Operation Orders and Graphics (TLPs)**

**Discussion:** Company Commanders do not use the proper TLP process. They try to do what they think is best and go with that. If they would use the TLP process; step by step, the planning process and execution would go smoothly.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Use basic TLPs.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.1.1 Conduct the military decisionmaking process (MDMP))

**TREND 31**

**Subject: CIED Working Group**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): Within the BCT targeting cycle, seldom do we observe that the CIED-WG is effectively nested within the overall targeting methodology.**

**Discussion:** Although this is a BCT function, the role habitually falls to the BSTB when there is an Engineer commander or dominant field grade in the BSTB. Regardless of to whom the rose is pinned, given a perceived lack of training repetitions prior to JRTC combined with the tendency of many BCTs to use the BCT Engineer as a planner, the CIED WG often becomes and afterthought and extremely reactionary. Without a capable core to which the enablers can rally on the BCT staff, the efforts of all involved in the CIED fight and moreover the products produced tend to be less effective to the BCT than possible. This in turn, given the lethality and impacts that IEDs have on our formations, requires attention.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** During the train up for JRTC, even without the enablers (EOD, ACME, JIEDDO, ORSA, etc) we recommend that, regardless of leadership, the CIED WG stands up whenever the BCT targeting cycle is exercised. Within this, our largest consideration is that the CIED WG must actually be one cycle ahead of the BCT targeting cycle. Although this sounds counterintuitive, by completing the outputs of the CIED WG prior to the assessment working group (AWG) the BCT S3 is enabled to have a more complete picture of the IED fight in his OE with which to make recommendations on priorities to the commander as well as better information to balance the alignment of IC assets to assist in collecting against CIED NAIs and taking action in TAIs (if used). For example, if the CIED WG is able to provide an accurate assessment of the OE as well as a robust understanding of the network, to include specific personalities for the OEOs, we stand a better chance of synchronizing potential actions against the IED network in conjunction with and supporting maneuver HVTL/HVTIs.

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.119 COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONS (INCL CHG 1), JP 3-15.1 Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations, ATTP 5-0.1 Commanders and Staff Officers Guide and CALL Handbook 11-42 Afghanistan Route Clearance

(ART 5.1.1.1 Conduct the military decisionmaking process (MDMP))

**TREND 32**

**Subject: SFAT Tactical Skills**

**Observation: Task Force 2: SFATs are usually very weak in small unit tactics and basic survival skills.**

**Discussion:** a common trend that has been seen at JRTC for the SFAT is that when the teams are formed, they have little to no experience in small unit tactics. These tactics include basic route planning with enemy analysis, the ability to call for fire, the ability to call for a CASEVAC or MEDEVAC, and the ability to utilize a quick reaction force either air or ground. These shortfalls in tactical knowledge often put the SFAT in higher areas of danger usually cut off from any sufficient support that could aid them when needed. These skills are often assumed to be understood because of the level of rank of the membersof the teams that are put together. However with little training time, the skills are usually unrehearsed and the teams find themselves learning while in contact. “Because you can’t advise when you are dead.”

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** SFATs need to be trained on small unit survival tactics prior to JRTC. This training needs to include more than weapons familiarization, but a measure of effectiveness on the teams’ ability to implore assets and enablers. The teams need to develop their SOPs prior their JRTC and training needs to focus ensuring everyone in the team has the ability to do basic combat skills. There is a great number of simulators that can provide them cheap and easy training to teach the basic concepts. Trainers like the Guard Fist trainer for calling for fires, CCA, and CAS.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 33**

**Subject: SFAT Roles**

**Observation: SFAT integration and roles are often a source of friction.**

**Discussion:** When the Force on Force (FoF) portion of the rotation begins the SFATs often have an issue understanding what their place on the battlefield is and what roles they are supposed doing versus the battlespace owners. This often causes friction between the battlespace owner, usually a company commander, and their tactical mission of security with the SFAT’s mission of advisement, which is usually lead by a MAJ or LTC.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Better integration with an SFA focused BCT will ease these issues.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 34**

**Subject: SFAT COP**

**Observation: Task Force 2: Lack of common operating picture**

**Discussion:** With the SFATs often meeting for the first time at JRTC, there is an issue as to the reporting requirement and who reports to whom and how information is passed.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** SFATs need to establish cross coordination with both their land owning units and SFAT counterparts as soon as possible. Any frictions that are identified need to be addressed immediately by the chain of command. Reporting requirements and passing of information needs to be coordinated and strictly enforced in order ensure that the timely information that both sides possess is able to create a common operating picture in an effective manner.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 35**

**Subject: SFAT Adaptability**

**Observation: Task Force 2: SFATs need to continue to sustain their versatility.**

**Discussion:** As the situation that the SFATs face is usually very fluid tactically, the SFATs have shown great versatility with everything that has been asked of them. With their primary job being advisement, they typically have to act tactically for their counterparts in order to ensure their success. Their ability to keep their battlespace owners informed can make or break the unit’s common operational picture and situational awareness.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Emphasis on team buildling is the key to adatability.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 36**

**Subject: Kandak SFAT**

**Observation: (Task Force 1): Kandak SFAT positions are being filled without regard to occupational specialty or branch.**

**Discussion:** Kandak level SFATs are being formed without regard to occupational specialty or branch. As an example, an ANA infantry Kandak team was formed from the leadership of an FSC with added officers from within the BSB to fill advisor roles. A team of all logisticians does not match the skill set of an infantry Kandak staff.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** SFAT members should be selected with the skill set to compliment their ANSF counterpart they are being required to assist. Fill each SFAT as though we are going to have them operate as their own battalion staff.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 37**

**Subject: SFAT Advisor Experience**

**Observation: Task Force 1:Junior officers expected to mentor Afghan Staff on staff functions without any experience**

**Discussion:** Many SFATs have not functioned as a staff or filled the role they are asked to assist prior to being assigned as a mentor. It is difficult for a new officer to teach the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), or other similar skills, to an Afghan if they have never had experience performing in the WFF assignment they have. Ensuring that SFATs can perform the duties of their assigned WFF at a proficient level, before asking them to teach another staff how to do the same, will undoubtedly increase their effectiveness as assistants.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Conduct MDMP and staff functions training within the SFAAT prior to any face to face mentoring. Completing several iterations of formal MDMP as a staff, as well as learning their specific role on the staff, will ensure that they are capable of teaching those skills to others.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-7.10 Advising Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 38**

**Subject: SFAT Integration**

**Observation: (Task Force 1): Roles and responsibilities of the SFAT with regard to LOU are an evolving process.**

**Discussion:** At JRTC, we continue to push for integration of the SFATs with LOU. However, JRTC can improve SFAT/LOU collaboration and training by establishing habitual "cradle to grave" training relationships between the LOU and SFAT. SFATs have begun to conduct STX lanes but not with the LOUs they will be partnered with during force on force (FOF). This is depriving those command teams of a great opportunity to build rapport, define expectations, and develop capabilities early. Training events for both the SFAT and LOU are not maximized due to the lack of integration, communication and coordination prior to STX lanes. Both elements conduct their respective Pre-Rotational Training (PRT) as separate entities. SFATs have not had the time to learn about their ANSF partners due to the lack of an established relationship and established roles and responsibilities with LOU. Previous rotations of COP Defense have shown that LOUs do not understand how to properly utilize the SFAT during the training. SFATs spend a majority of the training events working on LOU consequence management with the ANSF, as opposed to their primary role of advising and assisting ANSF.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** The LOU commanders (BDE and BN) should conduct a meeting with their respective SFAT/STT teams at Tiger Academy so that the LOU can develop a relationship, and determine initial roles and responsibilities, prior to conducting operations together. This will allow that partnership to fully develop as intended. The continuity cannot be reached when LOUs and SFAT work with someone new each day.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-7.10 Advising Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces; JRTC Rotational Throughput Calendars

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 39**

**Subject: SFAT/BSO Integration**

**Observation: Integration between BSO/SFAT WWFs is minimal to none.**

**Discussion:** There has been a lack of coordination and integration between the Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFATS) and the Battle Space Owners (BSO) Fire Support Element (FSE). The integration of the SFAT into the BSO planning and execution process, has become very important, and vice versa. In order for the BSO to be able to fully support the SFAT’s they need to be kept aware of the missions being conducted and the assets required i.e. Close Combat Attack (CCA), Close Air Support (CAS), Indirect Fire (IDF) Support, logistical support. For the purposes of the BSO, clearance of the ground for IDF/CAS can’t fully be conducted without coordination with SFAT and ANSF with the location of their elements. As well, the BSO needs to be kept abreast of any potentially high visibility missions within their Area of Operations (AO), in the event that the units’ Information Operations (IO) may need to broadcast a message to prevent negative media perception of Coalition Forces.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Coordination prior to missions conducted must be a point of emphasis for both SFATs and the BSO Fire Support Non-commissioned Officer (FSNCO.) Upon arrival into the BSO’s AO, SFATs should conduct linkup with the BSO FSO/FSNCO to acquire any unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for asset requests, receive Points of Contact (POC) and give the Fire Support Officer (FSO)/FSNCO a general lay down of the SFAT’s capabilities and limitations. A TTP recently seen in JRTC to keep integration after initial link-up between BSO and SFATs, has been to incorporate the SFAT into Squadron (SQDN) targeting meeting, building their targets with the Squadron, allowing for the SQDN to not only be aware of all missions being conducted within their AO, but also be able to leverage any assets that the SFAT may require to accomplish their mission. The TTP devised for the employment of IDF by SFAT’s, that has been developed is SFAT coordination and submission through the Troop responsible for the AO. The SFATs submit their request to the Troop. The Troop pushes the information to the Squads (SQDs) for tracking purposes and to establish the Target List Work Sheet (TLWS.) The purpose of submitting IDF requests through the Troop is to expedite the fires by providing the most responsive asset for short suspense mission planning and Troops in Contact (TIC) situations.

**References:** Unit TTPs and Unit Standard Operating Procedures

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 40**

**Subject: Cohesion within the SFATs**

**Observation: Cohesion within the SFATs**

**Discussion:** The SFATs have significantly improved in cohesion and function as the Army has applied the rubric of taking the SFATs from the same brigade. Some of the gains for this approach have included the development of an SOP from the higher levels that have provided direction and structure to the Subordinate SFATs in the element, a degree of familiarity among the members of various teams within the structure, which can foster a cooperative network, and finally, with a mechanism by which the element can more effectively integrate into the BCT given the grade of the senior officer – a colonel - for the SFAT compliment.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Continue to apply this rubric for future rotations.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 41**

**Subject: BCT SFAT Integration**

**Observation: BCT and subordinate battalions are beginning to accept responsibility for the SFATs within their respective areas of operation.**

**Discussion:** During this last rotation, the BCT commander and his BN commanders met together to begin integration for the rotation. This meeting provided a good start as to the process of integrating the elements together, and while it did not solve all of the problems and lacked some of the detailed rigor that could set the relation, offered a good starting point upon which to build.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Future integration meetings should expand to address the details of the warfighting functions such as logistics, so that more rigor is achieved and the framework is present for refined integration. Second, this refinement can be captured then in a subsequent sustainment rehearsal between the BCT and the SFATs. Finally, the SFATs, when partnered with their respective land owning units, can be integrated into the daily logistics synchronization meetings to coherently integrate the SFATs into the logistics process.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 42**

**Subject: BCT Fires, Security Force Advisor Team (SFAT) Fire**

**Observation: Fires: Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Fires continue to struggle with complete integration of SFATs into the Fires arena. SFATs have little to no knowledge on how to request Joint Fires Enablers from the Battle Space Owners.**

**Discussion:** BCT Fires continue to struggle with the implementation and synchronization of Joint Fire enablers with their perspective partner SFATs within their areas of operation. SFATs continue to struggle with the linkage with the battle space owner’s fires cell to request and coordinate surface to surface and air to surface platforms in support of their current and future operations. Units are not taking into account the additional maneuver forces under their umbrella which my require assistance in the fires arena and therefore are led to crisis management in ensuring proper support has been given to the SFAT community when requested. The failure to conduct any synchronization of any plan whether it is Fire Support related or not may result in SFATS and subordinate units executing operations that are not feasible and lack proper recourses to achieve the desired end state . The lack of synchronization between the BCT Fires and the SFATs leaves gaps in operations and hinders the BCT’s ability to maintain situational awareness (SA) and situational understanding (SU) as the planning cycle moves into the execution phase.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** The Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) coached at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is based on initial link up and synchronization meeting that focuses on synchronizing all Joint Fires Enablers in all aspects of fire support with emphasis on operations and requesting assets/enablers from 24-48hrs out. This Fire Support (FS) synchronization meeting is derived from the outputs or plans that are developed during the targeting/cyclical planning process. It is imperative that all Joint Fire Enablers attend this meeting.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2 Prepare for tactical operations)

**TREND 43**

**Subject: SFAT Integration**

**Observation: (Task Force 3): Squadrons are consistently challenged with the integration of SFATs and how to synchronize their advisor mission within the Squadron operational environment.**

**Discussion:** Squadrons fail to define the definition of partnership versus advisorship. Units tend to struggle with the overall SFAT purpose and relationship and how to best leverage them as a combat multiplier for the Squadron. The Squadron also has difficulty with integration of specific SFAT enablers (Forward observers, JFOs) and how to ensure that these individuals can request, clear, and employ joint fires in support of ANSF. The objective of combining senior level SFAT officers and NCOs operating within Squadron and Troop Operational environments is to achieve unity of effort and leverage the advisor intellectual capacity with the partner war fighting functions.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Squadron Commander must publish a detailed task organization clarifying command and support relationships with Troops and SFATs, clear reporting channels for both Troops and SFATs and, ideally, “terms of reference” document that defines partner roles and responsibilities as well as advisors. Upon reception, the S1 should collect all pertinent information, including MOS and additional skills/capabilities the SFATs possess (example JFO). Once reception is complete, the individual SFAT personnel should be turned over to the WFF within the Squadron staff that will directly link them into the Squadron’s assets. Next, the SCO should conduct and initial in brief in order to ensure that both parties have a shared understanding of the AO and how they will operate collectively within it.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2.1 Establish coordination and liaison)

**TREND 44**

**Subject: SFAT fires integration and preparation**

**Observation: Fires: Lack of recourses and preparation has made SFAT Fires Integration and training challenging.**

**Discussion:** SFAT teams have been rapidly assembled IOT meet the objective of how we are transitioning the fight in theater, to hand over military operations to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF.) Due to this SFAT Fires Support War Fighting Functions (WFFs) are coming into rotation at JRTC with little or no refresher training in their core competencies, and are in most cases working together for the first time in order to build a cohesive team. Fires WFFs are not filling their roles properly due to lack of equipment, training, and in some cases believing that Fire Support is unnecessary for their mission. SFAT Fire Support WFFs are not being included in fires planning or fires synchronization meetings with the Rotational Unit (RTU) BCT. Due to this Clearance of fires is extremely challenging and counter fire operations are hindered.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Allow for longer integration of these teams prior to coming to JRTC so that JRTC is not the first time they train together in a large scale training event. This will also help bond them together so that they are already coming into JRTC as a cohesive team. For pre-rotational training, a suggestion is to have Fire Support WFFs go through all the same lanes that BCT Fire Supporters go through like Fire Support Situational Training Exercise (STX.) Allow more time for the BCT RTU and SFAT teams to integrate. A recommendation is sending SFATs one week prior to BCT coming to JRTC to enable them to go through STX lanes prior to the SFATs participating in the Command Post Exercise (CPX) with RTU BCT. I believe that this would allow for more synchronized requests, clearance of fires procedures, and more effective counter fire. If all 13A and 13F positions from 162nd INF could be pulled under the Fire Support Division during rotation we could specifically cover down on the SFAT Fires WFFs. This would allow SFATs to receive added attention on top of what we give to them.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2.3 Task-organize for operations)

**TREND 45**

**Subject: Military Police (MP) platoon functions in HHC**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): MP platoons within the brigade (BDE) combat team (BCT) and BSTB are not used in their basic roles or as trainers for host nation security forces.**

**Discussion:** MP platoons coming to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with every intention on conducting their five mission functions. During force on force the MP platoon becomes the support for the entry control point (ECP), conducts casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for the BSTB, or serves as the quick reaction force (QRF) for the forward operating base (FOB). The MP platoon’s five functions are maneuver and mobility support operations (MMSO), area security operations, law and order, police intelligence operations, and internment/resettlement operations, which allows for greater maneuverability across the brigade area of operations (AO). HHC, BSTB Commanders do not understand how to properly use the MP platoon within their scope of operations. HHC, BSTB commanders need to gain a better understanding on how to best utilize the MP platoon by communicating with the BDE Provost Marshal Operations (PMO) cell. The BDE PMO cell advises the BCT and BSTB staff on how to effectively plan missions for the MP platoon in support of future operations. There is limited communication between the BDE PMO cell and the BSTB staff in mission planning for the MP platoon. HHC, BSTB commanders are not given much guidance on how to best utilize the MP platoon for operations.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** BSTB staff should receive advisement by the BDE PMO cell on how to best employ the MP platoon based off the BCT commander’s intent. The HHC, BSTB commander should reference Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team, and FM 3-90.61, The Brigade Special Troops Battalion, to better understand the capabilities and functions of the MP platoon.

**References:** FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team, Ch 8, Sec 2, Para 8-2 thru 8-16; FM 3-90.61, The Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Chapter 2-24, 2-25, and Figure 2-5, Table 3-2; Chapter 3, Sec 2, Para 3-2.

(ART 5.1.2.3 Task-organize for operations)

**TREND 46**

**Subject: Logistics and SFATs**

**Observation: Understanding Logistics Staff Roles and Responsibilities & Partnership with the BCT or Land-Owning Unit**

**Discussion:** Often the teams are composed of combat arms soldiers that do not understand logistics. As a result, teams tend to neglect critical logistics functions (personnel actions, human resource management, logistics planning and forecasting, maintenance, etc.), and this neglect affects both the team’s internal logistics management and the training of the team’s ANSF counterpart. As identified by one of the high ranking US commanders in theater, “Logistics is the Achilles heel for the Afghans.” With this observation, it becomes imperative that the teams must have experienced logisticians that effectively sustain the team and train their respective ANSF counterparts.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** First, the army needs to consider properly manning the team with the appropriate military occupational specialties (MOS) and experience in order for the team to have adequate depth and experience to effectively sustain the team and to train their respective ANSF counterparts. Second, consider increasing the size of the SFAT teams to cover more appropriate skill sets on the team. Third, continue to train the SFATs to tie into the BCT or land-owning unit in order to tap into the BCT’s personnel and experience to augment the training capacity that can enrich the ANSF training in a more comprehensive way. Fourth, ensure that the team members have tested on the proficiency of their MOS to ensure that the respective team members are capable of understanding and subsequently training and evaluating the ANSF. Finally, the SFATs needs to have proper equipment to execute these assigned roles (e.g. tools, communications packages, etc.)

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2.3 Task-organize for operations)

**TREND 47**

**Subject: SFAT Logistical Integration with BCT**

**Observation: SFAT Logistical Integration with the Land-Owning Unit or BCT**

**Discussion:** Often times the integration of the SFAT and the BCT or Land-Owning unit is not well done. For example, with personnel tracking, when the SFAT takes a casualty, the casualty is moved and processed through the medical system, but, since the patient is not a Soldier in the BCT, the soldier is not actively tracked through the system and returned to the unit or replaced when the SFAT requires a replacement. As another example, the SFATs are not normally included into the Logistics Synchronization Meetings, resulting in BCT’s having to develop reactionary plans to respond to urgent logistics needs of the SFATs.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** First, the BCT must actively integrate the SFATs into the BCT, and confirm that this has been done in all appropriate war fighting functions, and in particular logistics. Second, the Army must review the chain of command to prevent confusion between the SFATs and the BCT. Third, ensure that the BCT and the SFATs integrate with a solid sustainment rehearsal that can initially synchronize logistics reporting and operations throughout the area of operations. Fourth, at the battalion levels, the SFATs should be tied into the battalions for daily reporting and integration to ensure that the logistics operations and the combat operations are mutually supporting.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.2.3 Task-organize for operations)

**TREND 48**

**Subject: SFAT Air Ground Integration**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): SFATs are unfamiliar with basic air ground integration techniques such as close combat attack (CCA) employment and aircraft check in procedures.**

**Discussion:** SFATs must use what they are trained on if they are to master these techniques.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** SFAT Academy continues to instruct and familiarize SFAT members on proper aircraft employment techniques utilizing AGI checklists and smart cards. Incorporate aircraft into all future SFAT training scenarios to enable “hands-on” training and to build confidence.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 5.1.3 Execute tactical operations)

**TREND 49**

**Subject: SFAT Radio Procedures**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): SFATs are generally poor at FM commuications/**

**Discussion:** SFATs were generally unfamiliar with troubleshooting the FM radio and many times had to talk “unsecured” to aircraft.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** SFATs must train on their radio equipment to become familiar with how each piece of equipment works. This will enable them to indentify and troubleshoot problems quickly and accurately.

**References:**

(ART 5.1.3.1 Perform ongoing functions)

**TREND 50**

**Subject: Battle Rhythm**

**Observation: (Task Force 3): Squadrons routinely fail to control time and enforce the execution of routine meetings to maintain information flow, continue staff planning and receive commander’s guidance and approval. This rapidly erodes the ability to successfully synchronize war fighting functions during high OPTEMPO collective training.**

**Discussion:** Squadrons are coached during Combat Training Center (CTC) Leadership Training Programs (LTP) on how to nest Squadron battle rhythms with BCT battle rhythms to provide predictability of information flow from Squadron to Troop and within the staff. Squadrons routinely fail to develop their own battle rhythm, waiting until Brigade publishes its final battle rhythm.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** (Needs Emphasis): Squadrons must establish a tactical battle rhythm that includes a daily: shift change (morning and evening); morning update to the commander from the staff; lethal and non-lethal working groups; logistical and maintenance synchronization and an evening update to brigade and/or the squadron commander to ensure comprehensive awareness of latest updates and commander’s guidance.

**References:** FM 5-0, change 1, Para A-49. The Operations Process.

(ART 5.1.3.1 Perform ongoing functions)

**TREND 51**

**Subject: Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Airspace Command and Con**

**Observation: (ADAM/BAE Cell): Air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE) cells must establish AC2 procedures to maintain situational awareness (SA) and synchronize air space users in the brigade combat team (BCT) area of operations (AO).**

**Discussion:** ADAM/BAE cells help decision makers in the BCT tactical operations center (TOC) use the BCT air assets effectively. That means the ADAM/BAE cell must do mission analysis to determine needed AC2 procedures. More often than not this does not happen; ADAM/BAE cells do not have established AC2 procedures that are understood and disseminated throughout the BCT. The fact that most ADAM/BAE cells are comprised of new, inexperienced personnel who have not had extensive training prior to arriving at the Joint Readiness Traing Center (JRTC) compounds this issue. However once here these new teams learn quickly and begain establishing grasp the needed procedures, laying the ground work for their unit standing operating procedures (SOP).

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** At the JRTC, BCTs working with a direct support aviation battalion (BN) have instituted AC2 procedures that include using the aviation command net for talking directly to the aircraft. For this to work, this net must be retransmitted throughout the BCT AO but it is worth the effort. Using the aviation net has greatly increased the ADAM/BAE’s ability to clear fires, deconflict airspace, and retask attack weapons teams and scout weapons teams AWT/SWT in response to a troops in contact report. The brigade aviation officer (BAO) must first establish specific criteria and priorities to aid the battle captain’s decision to employ close combat attack (CCA) at decisive or critical points. All of this is only possible if the ADAM/BAE cell has good SA of the BCT’s airspace. Such SA is maintained by the full use of Army battle command systems ABCS equipment backed up with analog battle tracking system using a map with the airspace control order printed on it and small cutouts of airspace users. It should have active restricted operating zones, rotary wing, unmanned aerial systems, and airlift with callsigns. This analog tracking system must be updated constantly to ensure its accuracy in case digital systems go down. During crisis action planning the ADAM/BAE’s map often becomes the focal point as it is easier for BCT senior leaders to envision assets employed and available to aid in course of action development.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 5.1.3.1.7 Control tactical airspace)

**TREND 52**

**Subject: Support to RCPs**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): RCPs operating in the general support role in task force areas of operation have poorly defined support relationships with land-owning units.**

**Discussion:** : As RCPs operate across unit boundaries, they transition between supporting elements with the capabilities to provide quick reaction force (QRF), vehicle recovery, medical evacuation, aviation and fires support amongst other requirements. Doctrinally, units operating in a general support role would provide their own support but that doctrinal rule is not necessarily feasible in the current operating environment (COE). With its limited capability to support the RCPs, BSTBs rely heavily on land-owning task forces to support their elements in the field. Often, these relationships are poorly defined in higher headquarters’ orders and battalions fail to establish memorandums of understanding with task force commanders, defining the support relationship. In this ambiguous environment, RCPs often have difficulty coordinating timely and appropriate support. This shortcoming is most clear during the recovery of cumbersome and often unfamiliar pieces of battle-damaged route clearance equipment.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Brigade orders should clearly define the responsibilities of land-owning units to support route clearance patrols as they transit the battle space and rest over night at outlying bases. In the absence of a higher headquarters’ order BSTB commanders should establish memorandums of understanding with adjacent commanders, clearly establishing the standards for support to RCPs.

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.119 COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONS (INCL CHG 1), JP 3-15.1 Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations, ATTP 5-0.1 Commanders and Staff Officers Guide and CALL Handbook 11-42 Afghanistan Route Clearance

(ART 5.1.3.4 Synchronize actions to produce maximum effective application of military power)

**TREND 53**

**Subject: Information Management (IM) in Aviation Command Po**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): Although battalions (BN) exercise IM systems, they often encounter friction in maintaining good vertical and horizontal IM.**

**Discussion:** Units lack systems to establish a good common operational picture (COP) for both staff and subordinate units to facilitate resource allocation, decision making, and proper assessments. The key to IM is using standing operating procedures (SOPs) for systems like the Command Post of the Future (CPOF), the tactical operations center (TOC), and TIGER NET. Units do not disseminate information both internally and externally to whoever needs to know. Some processes that affect both the brigade (BDE) and BN’s ability to conduct good IM are: • Units have multiple information systems like CPOF, voice over internet protocol (VOIP), FM, Breeze, and JABBER on which the BDE and BN receive information vertically and horizontally; • Units do not follow a digital rules of engagement (ROE) to make information easy to find and common to all • Units do not define means and methods to disseminate information both vertically and horizontally; • BN staffs fail to collaborate in parallel with their BDE counterparts; • Units do not identify the information to analyze and make usable for those who need to know.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** (Needs Emphasis): Some key measures to consider in a standing operating procedure (SOP) that can facilitate good vertical and lateral information management are: 1. Information systems. From the multiple digital information systems, define and follow priority of systems to use to collect, store, display, and disseminate information. 2. Digital ROE. Develop procedures to follow a digital ROE that makes information easy to find, common to those who need to know, and easily assessable, and manages bandwidth use. 3. COP. Define what relevant information should be displayed and format for displaying information. Ensure information is common to both internal and external elements. Capture information that is relevant. The TF commander must have input on what is important to effectively battle command. 4. Information flow. Define what information is relevant and how it should be disseminated vertically and horizontally. Identify means and method to disseminate information to insure it gets to the right place for analysis. Is our primary-alternate-contingency-and emergency (PACE) plan the same as the BDE and do we have a PACE plan down to the company CPs? 5. Analysis process. Define what relevant information should be disseminated for proper analysis. Identify the means and method to send and receive the analysis.

**References:** CALL Newsletter 08-17: Tactical Operations Center; Call Article-Information Management and Battle Tracking, By LTC Scott Wuestner; Fire Support Division, JRTC Operations Group; FM 6.0 Mission Command; FM 3-90.61 Apendix D; CALL Newsletter 08-01 Battle Tracking; CALL Newsletters 95-7; 08-17 Tactical Operations Center; 07-15 First 100 Days; CGSC Knowledge Centers; SOP Central-How to write an SOP and PLT TACSOP; FM 3-90.61 Appendix D .

(ART 5.2 Conduct command post operations)

**TREND 54**

**Subject: Combined TOCs between the ASNF and the SFATs**

**Observation: Combined TOCs between the ASNF and the SFATs**

**Discussion:** The SFATs in many cases are rapidly moving to setting up combined TOCs and working to develop parallel systems with the ANA. The advantages of this procedure are that the SFAT is gaining quick situational awareness of what and how their respective ANSF counterparts gather information and apply that information to the decision making process. This also potentially leads to the follow-on requirements of shadow tracking, forecasting, battle tracking, and parallel planning

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Continue to train and reinforce this trend, and continue to develop opportunities to integrate the SFAT & ANSF with the land owning unit for combined operations.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 5.2 Conduct command post operations)

**TREND 55**

**Subject: Commander Decision Cycle and Drivers**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): Staff running estimates can be maintained in order to feed and force the maintenance of the commander’s decision cycle.**

**Discussion:** One of the most elusive trends we see here at JRTC in the BSTBs is that the commander’s seldom maintain a solid grasp on how decisions are made. With notable exceptions, many BSTB mission command elements often work on a personality based, informal, process to make important decisions. Although this is effective, it can and has occasionally led to decisions being made by the staff that should have had the commander’s attention prior to issuing a directive from the staff. This is, in our experience, a function of several items. First, BSTBs do not maintain nor hold credence to establishing and using decision support matrixes (DSM). Second, CCIR tend to remain fairly static throughout a rotational units time at JRTC. While battle rhythms (BR) are generally established and adhered to the common operating picture (COP) is often relegated to a CPOF feed. Spanning each of these four elements, when not functioning properly, we also have observed that staff running estimates are not kept current. However when the CCIR, DSM, COP and BR are maintained and important to the commander, the staffs’ running estimates invariably are also well maintained.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** BSTBs should continue to maintain and adhere to nested battle rhytms.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** In order to feed the commander accurate and timely recommendations (DSM or otherwise), we recommend that the BSTB XO very closely monitors what we call the “big four:” common operational picture (often incorporated into a commander’s card), the decision support matrix, updated and refined Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (inclusive of SIR), and a nested battle rhythm. Each of these four tools directly has a role in both how BSTBs receive, disseminate, and analyze information as well as driving the recommendation process and synchronization of resources under the auspice of the military decision making process as directed in ATTP 5-0.1, Chapter 4. By maintaining these four products we have found that it forces the staff to maintain accurate running estimates

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.16 BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION, CALL Newsletter 08-17 Brigade Special Troops Battalion and ATTP 5-0.1 Commanders and Staff Officers Guide

(ART 5.2 Conduct command post operations)

**TREND 56**

**Subject: Functionally incomplete TOCs**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): The physical layout of the TOC must facilitate the seamless and rapid dissemination of information across all functional areas.**

**Discussion:** Most BSTBs we train with are fairly adept at establishing redundant communications, digital battle tracking and to a lesser degree analog tracking. What we tend to see as a problem area is that not all functional staffs are represented on the current operations floor. By committing resources and the appropriate manpower to the current operations floor, we have found that the time, space differential between the current fight and ALOC operations is drastically reduced. This becomes particularly important during crisis action planning as well as during shift changes, operational synchs and logistical synchs. Given the manpower shortages often encountered in the BSTB staff, it is not always possible to have representation from each functional area, rather, if viewed as an ALOC LNO having one, mentally agile, Soldier on shift at any time can also suffice to meet this perceived requirement.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Ensure inclusion of all staff functional area on the current operations floor. At a minimum, the ALOC should have an LNO on the TOC floor.

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.16 BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION, CALL Newsletter 08-17 Brigade Special Troops Battalion and ATTP 5-0.1

(ART 5.2.1 Conduct command post operations to support tactical operations)

**TREND 57**

**Subject: Engineer company command posts**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): Engineer company command posts (CPs) have historically demonstrated short-comings in their MC and battle-tracking capabilities during training rotations at the JRTC.**

**Discussion:** Typically, brigade combat team (BCT) engineer company CPs are tasked with MC of route clearance operations. Route clearance patrols (RCPs) often operate across the breadth of the BCT area of operations, transitioning across battalion/task force boundaries, and straining conventional modes of MC and support. While operating in this capacity, engineer company CPs consistently demonstrated the following trends: • Before arriving at the combat training center (CTC), units spend minimal efforts preparing their CPs for operations, CPs are manned and equipped hastily, resulting in shortages or deficiencies in personnel, automated battle command systems, computers, communications equipment, and training. • Poorly conceived CPs often lack defined areas for current operations and battle tracking, future operations and planning, administrative operations, and company intelligence support teams (COIST). Overlap of these functions increases friction in the CP and degrades the performance of each role. • Company CPs lack a set of battle drills. When they are established, they are identical to those of higher headquarters, are not tailored to the route clearance mission, and are unrehearsed. • Companies have very little experience working with supported task forces and have not formally established command and support relationships. Consequently, RCPs are ill-equipped by their CPs, during pre-mission briefs, on the friendly situation. Shortcomings in the command post have a real impact on the effectiveness of training in the company, higher and adjacent units. Effort spent on preparing the CP prior to rotation pay dividends by forcing subordinate, higher and adjacent units to exercise MC and support functions, allowing every echelon to perform at a higher level.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** A company command post exercise (CPX) prior to the CTC rotation allows unit MC nodes to hit the ground running at the JRTC. Companies can accomplish this individually or in conjunction with a higher headquarters CPX. The CPX will help the unit validate their plans for equipping, manning and layout of the CP. The CPX will rehearse and refine company battle drills and overcome short-comings prior to the CTC rotation. If training constraints don’t accommodate a CPX, units should exercise their CPs during field training exercises in, at least, a current operations capacity to implement systems, troubleshoot equipment, establish/validate SOPs, and rehearse battle drills.

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.119 COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONS (INCL CHG 1), JP 3-15.1 Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations, ATTP 5-0.1 Commanders and Staff Officers Guide and CALL Handbook 11-42 Afghanistan Route Clearance

(ART 5.2.1 Conduct command post operations to support tactical operations)

**TREND 58**

**Subject: HHC command posts (CP)**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): Most head and headquarters companies (HHC) have inadequate CPs**

**Discussion:**

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Those companies who have an annex in their tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP) for CP setup, information flow charts and battle drills and have them blown up and posted have had the greatest success. Those who have had their personnel trained in command post of the future and blue force tracker had greatest success in battlefield tracking.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-90.61 The Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Appendix D; Command Post Operations; CALL Newsletter 08-17: Tactical Operations Center; CALL Newsletter 07-15 First 100 Days; CALL Handbooks on Company-level Stability and Support Operations: Volume 1 05-17 Trends, Challenges, and C2 Volume 2 05-26 Peacekeeping, EBO, and Security Volume 3 05-27 Patrolling, IO, and Intelligence; CGSC Knowledge Centers SOP Central-How to write an SOP and PLT TACSOP; FM 3-90.61 Appendix D; CALL Handbook No. 10-20 CoIST; CALL Handbook 11-38 Commander’s Guide to Female Engagement Teams.

(ART 5.2.1 Conduct command post operations to support tactical operations)

**TREND 59**

**Subject: Company/Troop Command Post (CP) Mission Command**

**Observation: Observation: Companies do a good job of working as individual cells within their CP, but are not able to synchronize their efforts and ensure that they are utilizing all available assets to ensure success. The company/troop CP often consists of a few people who are multi-tasked to the point of ineffectiveness. They cannot effectively battle track, process information, and disseminate the required products to platoons. The companies/troops never update their enemy SITEMP during the entire force on force. Platoons execute missions without clear awareness of the enemy or population situations.**

**Discussion:** A CP’s primary function is to facilitate mission command by receiving information, analyzing it, and issuing guidance in the form of orders. CP placement, manning, and equipping must all be considered. Without the proper battle and intelligence tracking systems, unit, enemy, and population specifics are lost; intelligence is missed, and consequently the unit’s actions become desynchronized. The following functions maximize the commander’s mission command of the unit: 1. Receive Information 2. Distribute Information 3. Analyze Information 4. Submit Recommendations 5. Integrate Resources 6. Synchronize Resources

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** The command post should both enable the commander to effectively command and manage information simultaneously. Current command posts only function when run by the commander or First Sergeant directly. The CP must have the tools to build a company/troop common operating picture (COP), analyze enemy information, conduct targeting, and track/forecast logistics. The company/troop needs a SOP that clearly lays out the expectations, physical layout, personnel required, and parallels the BN’s efforts for reporting and synchronizing their intelligence collection efforts. Companies need to resource this capability and force those responsible to learn their roles.

**References:** FM 2-94.4 Intel Support to Operations in the Urban Environment; CALL Newsletter 07-01 Tactical Intelligence; JRTC Knowledge Management Site Link: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/590889

(ART 5.2.1 Conduct command post operations to support tactical operations)

**TREND 60**

**Subject: Battery Operations**

**Observation: Fires: The battery Command Posts (CPs) were rudimentary and will need to be relooked throughout the time you are preparing to deploy. In addition to working on the CP structure the battery struggled with reporting across the board. The battery had difficulty when in contact sending concise and clear reports to allow leaders to make decisions.**

**Discussion:** In addition to working on the CP structure the batteries struggled with reporting across the board. The batteries had difficulty when in contact sending concise and clear reports to allow leaders to make decisions. Their Common Operations Picture (COP) does not follow the battalion’s very well.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Utilizing the Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) kits and manning them as if a small S2 section will help provide a better resource for communicating with the BN and seeing a very similar COP.

**References:** FM 6-50 MCWP 3-1.6.23 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the FIELD ARTILLERY CANNON BATTERY

(ART 5.2.1 Conduct command post operations to support tactical operations)

**TREND 61**

**Subject: Integration of Aviation Liaison Officers (LNO)**

**Observation: (Aviation Division): Aviation LNOs are either not used or not fully used in the current operations cell.**

**Discussion:** Commanders use LNOs to transmit information directly, bypassing headquarters and staff layers. They are available extensions of their subordinate units who assist the BCT staff with situational awareness (SA) of battalion (BN) current and future operations. Additionally, LNOs provide their parent BNs with relevant information of BCT/BN activities and operations. Some tasks associated with LNOs include: • Understand what the sending commander wants the receiving commander to know. • Circulation of requests for information (RFI) pertinent to their battalion to gain timely answers. • Acquire or generate subordinate unit timelines based on various sources of information (subordinate products, commanders update briefing notes, e-mail). • Ensure the BCT has the most current BN and company (CO) graphics. • Track changes to CO mission statements. • Track completion of task organization changes. • Track casualties and replacements. • Assist in leveraging logistical concerns. • Attend and participate in targeting meetings. • Orient their BNs on upcoming tasks (before warning orders, if authorized).

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Define what standard information requirements and tasks we want the LNOs to battle track and execute. This can be included within a BDE/BN tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP). Understand that someone needs to supervise them at the BDE/BN they support; doctrinally that is the chief of staff but the Battle Captain, operations SGM or chief operations (assistant S3) is typically the individual responsible for this task. Further standardize how the LNOs present information. Provide a template example of what information the BDE will want; equip them with needs of their BN. Ensure they know what planning meetings to attend and what they are suppose to bring and brief. Assist them in developing their briefing skills. Rehearse with LNOs those briefings where key leaders must get relevant, thorough information in a single rapid review. Assist them to develop sufficient understanding to receive guidance and thoroughly answer questions. Commanders should understand that an LNO should be a tier one NCO or officer who can actively represent the interests of their battalion in the BCT tactical operations center.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (App E); FM 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team (Chapter 2, page 9),

(ART 5.2.1.1 Organize people, information management procedures, and equipment and facilities)

**TREND 62**

**Subject: HHC Troops to tasks**

**Observation: (HHC Task Force 4): Most companies have not done a good troop to tasks analysis for the requirements of 24 hour operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).**

**Discussion:** Although troops to tasks will always remain a problem for the HHC, most companies have not done thoroughly analyzed these requirements because they do not have a clear picture of the scope of the operation from battalion. Most companies fail to take into consideration the 24 hour manning of company command posts, entry control points, quick reaction forces, base defense operations cells, personal security details, or female engagement teams. While all duties may not come at once, they fail to have a simple idea of what will be asked and the manning requirement to fill what is asked. Most companies are unfamiliar with the requirement of the female engagement teams and fail to consider that the BCT will pull most from the brigade special troops battalion and the brigade sustainment battalion.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Recommend that HHC commander gain clear picture from battalion on what duties the company will required to fill at the JRTC. Coordinate with the JRTC to get ground truth manning requirements from the unit being replaced in theater. Coordinate with the battalion early so they can get with BCT to ensure FET team manning and training is done at home station. Those companies that have analyzed and planned for 8 hour shifts, with 8 hours for rest and 8 hours for other company tasks( i.e. maintenance, details from BDOC and forward operating base mayor) have had the greatest success.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-90.61 The Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Appendix D; Command Post Operations; CALL Newsletter 08-17: Tactical Operations Center; CALL Newsletter 07-15 First 100 Days; CALL Handbooks on Company-level Stability and Support Operations: Volume 1 05-17 Trends, Challenges, and C2 Volume 2 05-26 Peacekeeping, EBO, and Security Volume 3 05-27 Patrolling, IO, and Intelligence; CGSC Knowledge Centers SOP Central-How to write an SOP and PLT TACSOP; FM 3-90.61 Appendix D; CALL Handbook No. 10-20 CoIST; CALL Handbook 11-38 Commander’s Guide to Female Engagement Teams

(ART 5.2.1.1 Organize people, information management procedures, and equipment and facilities)

**TREND 63**

**Subject: Personal security detail (PSD) and QRF**

**Observation: (HHC Task Force 4): The PSD and QRF platoons are under manned, ill equipped, and untrained.**

**Discussion:** Most companies put their PSD or QRF platoon together at the last minute. This creates a melting pot of low density MOS Soldiers who have no training as a unit and no qualification or familiarization on weapons systems and equipment.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Those companies that filled the PSD or QRF early in the home station training process usually resourced and trained the Soldiers accordingly (i.e. weapons qualification, mounted gunnery, squad live fire, platoon live fire). These units enjoy the greatest success. These platoons are no different than any other maneuver platoon in the BCT and must be trained as such.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-90.61 The Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Appendix D; Command Post Operations; CALL Newsletter 08-17: Tactical Operations Center; CALL Newsletter 07-15 First 100 Days; CALL Handbooks on Company-level Stability and Support Operations: Volume 1 05-17 Trends, Challenges, and C2 Volume 2 05-26 Peacekeeping, EBO, and Security Volume 3 05-27 Patrolling, IO, and Intelligence; CGSC Knowledge Centers SOP Central-How to write an SOP and PLT TACSOP; FM 3-90.61 Appendix D; CALL Handbook No. 10-20 CoIST; CALL Handbook 11-38 Commander’s Guide to Female Engagement Teams.

(ART 5.2.1.1 Organize people, information management procedures, and equipment and facilities)

**TREND 64**

**Subject: BSTB Standard Operating Procedures**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): BSTBs often arrive at JRTC without a published TACSOP/TOCSOP.**

**Discussion:** For obvious reasons, a unit’s TACSOP and TOCSOP set the conditions for how operations are conducted and how information is digested for a recommendation to the commander. The largest error we observe in this area at JRTC is that units take the “it’s in draft form” as rationale for not having published either product. Invariably during the course of the rotation, we observe a very wide swath on each subordinates units’ take on “the standard.” This reflects in everything from uniforms to PCC/PCIs to how patrol reports are processed. Conversely, we have noticed that when units arrive at JRTC with a published TACSOP/TOCSOP, there is a much lower learning curve on how to adjust to the friction of our operating environment.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** We hold the position that it is far better to have and have published a nested 70% product than to wait to write the SOPs till returning to home station as this seldom seems to happen. Once a unit redeploys to home station from JRTC, in most cases, they will be out-loading within 30 days and in country in 60-90 which leaves very limited time and motivation to capture their processes. Rather, when a unit has a good start point, it becomes much more tenable to update existing SOPs in a timely, painless manner. To assist units, we have published several examples of TACSOPs and TOCSOPs on our AKO web page at: www.us.army.mil/suite/grouppage/55128

**References:** Field Manual 3-90.16 BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION, CALL Newsletter 08-17 Brigade Special Troops Battalion and JRTC BSTB Best Practices, www.us.army.mil/suite/grouppage/55128

(ART 5.2.1.3 Establish or revise standing operating procedures (SOP))

**TREND 65**

**Subject: Head and headquarters company (HHC) BSTB TACSOP**

**Observation: (HHC Task Force 4): Most HHCs do not have TACSOPs (or even a draft in progress).**

**Discussion:** HHCs fail to emphasize their TACSOP (when they have one), especially its implementation and rehearsal of its contents. The maneuver platoons in the HHC lack basic pre-combat check and inspections (PCC/PCI) checklists, load plans, medical evacuation and communications plans, battle drills, and marking SOP’s. They spend most of their time at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) trying to create what should already be in the company TACSOP.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Have a TACSOP in place and rehearse its contents. This needs to also have a focus on military police (MP) specific tasks or have the platoon create a MP specific TACSOP annex.

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-90.61 The Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Appendix D; Command Post Operations; CALL Newsletter 08-17: Tactical Operations Center; CALL Newsletter 07-15 First 100 Days; CALL Handbooks on Company-level Stability and Support Operations: Volume 1 05-17 Trends, Challenges, and C2 Volume 2 05-26 Peacekeeping, EBO, and Security Volume 3 05-27 Patrolling, IO, and Intelligence; CGSC Knowledge Centers SOP Central-How to write an SOP and PLT TACSOP; FM 3-90.61 Appendix D; CALL Handbook No. 10-20 CoIST.

(ART 5.2.1.3 Establish or revise standing operating procedures (SOP))

**TREND 66**

**Subject: Signal company battle tracking**

**Observation: (Signal Company Task Force 4): Most companies do not track their assets properly.**

**Discussion:** Units do not update tracking boards regularly. Most company command posts (CP) have maps but do not track current asset locations or identify possible communication dead space. Shift non-commissioned officers in charge should be responsible for keeping products up to date. Soldiers should be able to look at these products within the company or platoon CP and understand of the unit’s current communications capabilities.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** We recommend several battle tracking. These products should be updated as statuses change with an “as of date.” The following are recommended battle-tracking products: • Map Board: All critical mission command (MC) nodes should be plotted. They can use overlays to display routes and coverage of systems • Network Status Charts: This chart provides a graphical representation of each communications network. • Communications Status Chart: This chart shows who has what communication system and what may be in reserve for future operations. • Maintenance Status Chart: This is a chart that lists the current status of each system within the unit. If systems are deadlined or not fully mission capable then an explanation should be provided. • Significant Activities: Any significant activity that could impact communications support. Criteria should be developed for this chart not to turn this product into an “everything activities chart.”

**References:** Field Manual 6-02.43, The Signal Leaders Guide

(ART 5.3.5 Establish a tactical information network and system)

**TREND 67**

**Subject: Signal company information flow**

**Observation: (Signal Company Task Force 4): Need to improve the information flow between the signal company and the brigade and battalion (BN/BDE) staff.**

**Discussion:** The companies typically do an outstanding job keeping their Soldiers informed through shift change briefs and internal communications. However, each company faced difficulties when communicating with the BN/BDE staff before and during the rotation. The companies typically do not have a clear understanding of their command and support relationship with the BDE or BN prior to the deployment. This usually leads to confusion for the company during the rotation.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Recommend that the signal company commander have the S-3 clearly define the command and support relationship of each section of the signal company in the BDE and BN orders. When the BDE and BN are collocated, the BDE and BN orders should define the command and support relationship of the network operations (NETOPS) section and the retransmission (RETRANS) teams. When the BDE and BN are not collocated, the BDE and BN orders should define the role of the entire company. Additionally, the “detached” elements must always remember that they are always a part of the signal company. The NETOPS section may work for the BDE S-6 but they should also serve as a medium for information to get back to the company, especially those relating to future operations.

**References:** Field Manual 6-02.43, The Signal Leaders Guide

(ART 5.3.5 Establish a tactical information network and system)

**TREND 68**

**Subject: Signal Planning**

**Observation: (Signal Company Task Force 4): The signal company plays a huge role in network planning for the brigade (BDE) network.**

**Discussion:** The signal company has been actively engaged in assisting the BDE S-6 with planning the BDE network. The company leadership has been providing the BDE invaluable insight of the employment of their Joint Network Node (JNN) and retransmission (RETRANS) equipment.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** The signal company leadership should continue its role in network planning. The network support company should provide a technical briefing to the signal company as well as all of the BN S-6s. The meeting should discuss all the technical information of the network as well as reporting requirements and team packets for each RETRANS, command post nodes, JNN, etc.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:** Field Manual 6-02.43, The Signal Leaders Guide

(ART 5.3.5 Establish a tactical information network and system)

**TREND 69**

**Subject: Signal company commander and the brigade (BDE) S-6**

**Observation: (Signal Company Task Force 4): Most units do not have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the signal company commander and the BDE S-6. This usually results in tension, conflict, and in some cases failure to conduct parallel or collaborative planning.**

**Discussion:** Understanding their respective roles and responsibilities and avoiding a legacy mindset can help the signal company and the BDE S-6 section avoid common frictions. In some cases signal company commanders are absorbed into the BDE S-6 section as the assistant BDE S-6. You can either be an S-6 or a commander but one cannot effectively do both at the same time. The signal company mission is the same as the BDE and the company commander can synchronize the efforts of the company with the BDE S-6 by attending planning sessions with BDE S-6 or through the proper employment of the network operations (NETOPS) section. The NETOPS has all of the tools needed to plan the BDE’s digital and tactical networks.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Ensure signal company commanders have the opportunity to serve as commanders. Use the NETOPS to plan the networks and the BDE S-6 to communicate with the BDE S-3 to task subordinate units. The BDE S-6 does not have tasking authority over the signal company but it helps when they inform the signal company commander of missions/taskings that will be published in future orders. This ensures in greater synchronization of their efforts, frees up time for the commander to effectively command the company, and increase the effectiveness of the one-thirds, two-thirds rule.

**References:** Field Manual 6-02.43, The Signal Leaders Guide

(ART 5.3.5 Establish a tactical information network and system)

**TREND 70**

**Subject: Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) SOPs**

**Observation: EOD companies do not have tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) or internal team SOPs.**

**Discussion:** The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is not the place to build the unit SOP. Units need to come with these SOPs already in place and practiced. The integrated forum is a better arena for validation, integration and training in larger scale operations, not focusing on 10 level SOP structuring.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** The rotational training unit (RTU) needs to build a standard SOP while in garrison and reach to their counterpart in theater for their SOP. This will help the RTU refine their procedures for the upcoming mission.

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations. See: https://jrtcintranetportal.nasw.ds.army.mil/Task\_Forces/TF4/Task%20Force%204%20Documents%20Library/Best%20Practices/EOD/Team%20Book.doc

(ART 6.11 Implement operations security)

**TREND 71**

**Subject: “Green on Blue” fratricide risk mitigation**

**Observation: (Task Force 3): Combat Advisors demonstrate early complacency and relaxed force protection posture during extended periods around Afghan Security Forces. This complacency exponentially increases the chance of a successful “green on blue” fratricide.**

**Discussion:** Generation 3 combat advisor teams (SFATs) arrive to execute collective training in established teams from home station Brigades and Battalions. Shortly following initial introduction and establishment of combined operations centers, SFAT members rapidly reduce awareness and profiling of Afghan Soldiers and Police due to routine, daily interaction. At times, weapons are not within arm’s reach. Though trust must exist between host nation security forces and combat advisors, Soldiers must recognize their lackadaisical attitude and force protection posture will increase the risk of intentional fratricide.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** During routine, daily interaction with ANSF, identify and appoint a designed Coalition Force (CF) Soldier who is not involved with mission planning or conversation to maintain an alert but relaxed in the background posture and observe all non-CF members for “outlier” profiles or activities. This technique requires a great deal of persistence to ensure the designated “guardian” is alert at all times and maintains situational awareness of the local area.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:** CALL Handbook 12-07 “Inside the Wire Threats – Afghanistan”

(ART 6.11.3 Counter the threat)

**TREND 72**

**Subject: Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team leaders**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): An EOD team leader must be able to intelligently converse with the on scene commander and provide accurate damage assessment and courses of action (COAs) for mitigation.**

**Discussion:** EOD team leaders are normally sergeants or staff sergeants. They often find themselves needing to control scenes with higher ranking officers and debriefing personnel of all ranks. It is critical that they understand the full operation, their piece in it and the effects of their actions. Team members are often not able to clearly articulate both costs and benefits for all actions. Without the proper communication skills, on-scene commanders are far less likely to listen to recommendations or respect the team leader’s directions, producing unnecessary risk. Team members are not taught to think in terms of the greater operation.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Speaking to an on-scene commander in terms of COAs, actions, or mitigation to further the mission will produce the intended result. Like all other skills, this needs to be rehearsed. While conducting exercises, technicians should be approached and challenged to speak in a professional, mission-oriented manner. They need to think and speak in a language that supports mission needs.

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations.

(ART 6.12 Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) protection support)

**TREND 73**

**Subject: Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) evidence collect**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): Some EOD units place evidence recovery at a higher priority than safety.**

**Discussion:** Collection of evidence has caused EOD injuries. Deeming explosives and related components used in enemy attacks safe to transport poses inherent risks. According to ATTP 4-32, “There is no safe procedure for disposing of UXO, IED, CBRN devices or other explosives, merely a procedure that is considered the least dangerous,” para 2-3. When you add in enemy influences, risks are magnified. This risk does not overmatch the benefits of collecting, processing, exploiting and analyzing tactical and technical intelligence and their future life-saving properties to the effort of defeating IED networks. Still EOD technicians should never place themselves under undo risk to obtain the technical and tactical intelligence. It is a delicate balance between lifesaving collection and risk mitigation.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** EOD technicians should learn and practice on existing and emerging tactics techniques and procedures (TTPS), especially booby-traps and events aimed at first responders. They need to know what evidence holds value and educated on the benefits of evidence and information collection. They also need to know if they feel the risk is too high it is okay not to collect.

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations; ATTP 3-32.16 EOD MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

(ART 6.12 Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) protection support)

**TREND 74**

**Subject: EOD team operations with HME**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): EOD teams must know homemade explosives (HME) precursors and be able to communicate the associated hazards and reduction methods for HME and precursors.**

**Discussion:** With the low cost of HME to produce, it is becoming the explosive of choice throughout most of the hybrid threat. Knowing what HME means knowing: “¢ types of HME “¢ how HME is made by type “¢ the stages of HME production by type “¢ chemical requirements for HME by type “¢ purification requirements for HME by type “¢ testing for proper chemical balance percentages by type As experts, EOD teams should be able to: “¢ properly identify what stage a lab is in “¢ what element the bomb makers were missing (indicating whether a particular non-kinetic affect is working), “¢ what explosives are being produced and therefore may be seen on the battlefield, “¢ non-kinetic effects through shifts in shipping patterns from where the like item is found “¢ how to potentially identify labs (ie. high heat signature on houses during the drying stage) “¢ sophistication and strength of cells by purification denoted by coloring shades when it is almost exclusively the same HME (ie. Predominantly ammonium nitrate)

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Send at least one company representative to one of the chemical energetics courses to act as the company’s subject matter expert and review the Combined Joint Task Force Paladin Homemade Explosives Brief,

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations. See: https://jrtcintranetportal.nasw.ds.army.mil/Task\_Forces/TF4/Task%20Force%204%20Documents%20Library/Best%20Practices/EOD/CJTF%20Paladin-%20HME%20Brief%20June%202010.pptx

(ART 6.12 Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) protection support)

**TREND 75**

**Subject: EOD dismounted operations**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): EOD teams must be able to the “shoot, move, and communicate” on ground.**

**Discussion:** EOD units are great at being the subject matter experts on hazardous materials. EOD needs to improve tactical expertise in dismounted operations and operations with limited personnel numbers. EOD elements must not hinder an operation nor can they focus so much on Soldier skills that they lose their technical knowledge. Missions have specific requirements that are often repeated; EOD teams must carry heavy, bulky equipment to meet those tactical requirements. Technicians must have the physical stamina and tactical expertise to do so. The skills to shoot and move while burdened and clearly communicate while managing an incident site are critical.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Company command teams need to find a balance between the technical and tactical skills, work more with team leaders to pick and choose equipment for specific missions and to learn to operate for long or many days shooting, moving and communicating while under a load and duress.

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations; ATTP 3-32.16 EOD MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

(ART 6.12 Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) protection support)

**TREND 76**

**Subject: Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) command relation**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): EOD company command teams do not fully understand their direct support or general support (DS/GS) roles within the supported brigade combat team (BCT) and maneuver task forces (TFs).**

**Discussion:** Company commanders understand the differences in the command relationship structure but their subordinates do not. When platoon and team leaders are separated from their command element with limited communications to the company command post, they must understand the support relationship to know their lines of responsibility and influence, who provides their life support, tasking and guidance, and logistical support.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Review the EOD support in GS and DS relationships line by line to understand their structuring. EOD company commanders need to ensure that the EOD annex is correct and attached to the brigade base order and that the regional command fragmentary order issuing the support relationship is complete and correct.

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations. See: https://jrtcintranetportal.nasw.ds.army.mil/Task\_Forces/TF4/Task%20Force%204%20Documents%20Library/Best%20Practices/EOD/EOD%20Support%20Relationships.pptx

(ART 6.12 Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) protection support)

**TREND 77**

**Subject: Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities**

**Observation: (Task force 4): EOD company command team does not clearly articulate full EOD capabilities and limitations to their respective supported elements.**

**Discussion:** EOD commanders habitually present fifteen or more slides outlining EOD capabilities and limitations in the improvised explosive device-defeat (IED-D), attack the network, and counter-IED fights. Brigade commanders often don’t have the time for lengthy presentations. A short brief outlining the company’s capabilities and limitations is a more useful choice for the brigade commander. Save the long briefs for the brigade engineer and operations officer. A concise brief that everyone can remember will better increase knowledge and integration of EOD capabilities across the brigade staff.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** All EOD leaders down to team leader should carry a one to three slide presentation outlining their capabilities and limitations. A full capabilities brief needs to be presented at a minimum the maneuver battalion S-3s and brigade S3 and engineer to be able to speak on the company’s behalf for the brigade commander.

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations. See: https://jrtcintranetportal.nasw.ds.army.mil/Task\_Forces/TF4/default.aspx?RootFolder=%2fTask%5fForces%2fTF4%2fTask%20Force%204%20Documents%20Library%2fBest%20Practices%2fEOD&FolderCTID=&View=%7b61D9B61B%2dB545%2d40EF%2dA332%2d2389F47BAE6E%7d

(ART 6.12 Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) protection support)

**TREND 78**

**Subject: Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) command relation**

**Observation: (Task Force 4): EOD company support relationships should be clarified before arriving at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).**

**Discussion:** Companies should be in a defined relationship with the brigade combat team (BCT) rather than under the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) to maintain coverage across the BCT AO. As with most enablers, the BCT often wants to place EOD within the BSTB. In an advisory and assistance mission where US conventional forces are no longer engaged in combat operations and the host nation has the primary response mission in partnership, this model works. During combat operations, the company command needs to be nested in the BCT headquarters for taskings and prioritization. Without access to the BCT fusion, synch and targeting meetings, the EOD Company is not synched in with the operational plans early enough to leverage potential support opportunities. Even when the BSTB is the head of the BCT improvised explosive device (IED) fight, the EOD Company must remain nested in with the BCT. For administrative and logistical support, the BSTB is an optimal headquarters, but tasking and prioritization need to remain somewhere within the BCT S-3 shop.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** EOD companies need to base their missions off of both the BCT and Task Force Paladin missions and intents. The support plan should outline the command relationship and be written into the EOD annex included in with the BCT base order prior to arriving at the JRTC pre-rotational training.

**References:** Field Manual 3-34.214 EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITIONS (INCL C-1 and C-2); Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-65 Commander’s Guide to EOD Operations. See: https://jrtcintranetportal.nasw.ds.army.mil/Task\_Forces/TF4/Task%20Force%204%20Documents%20Library/Best%20Practices/EOD/EOD%20Support%20Relationships.pptx

(ART 6.12 Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) protection support)

**TREND 79**

**Subject: mTBI Screening**

**Observation: (Sustainment): More Soldiers are screened for mTBI with increasing accuracy.**

**Discussion:** In the past, units did not take the mTBI tracker as serious as the casualty tracker. They were coached and mentored to develop and maintain an mTBI tracker. Once the rotational unit was given a block of instruction on how to utilize the Blast Exposure and Concussion Incident Report (BECIR) report to track mTBIs, they would send this report to higher twice a day. During the medical synchronization meetings, the surgeon cell explained the importance of screening Soldiers exposed to blasts within a 50 meter radius. The units complied with the requirements and began to screen more Soldiers than the trainer mentors adjudicated at the point of impact.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Recommend the company commanders and battalion commanders ensure their Soldiers are adhering to the mTBI standards. Once they display an importance to the mild traumatic brain injuries, all of their Soldiers will continue to take it more seriously. The brigade surgeon cell will continue to reinforce the importance to screen and track mTBIs. They must ensure everyone has access to the SIGACT system and receive a block of instruction on how to utilize the BECIR report. The echelon I and II facilities need to understand why mTBIs should be tracked. If the SIGACT system is not available, it is up to the surgeon cell to request a standard tracker from division and ensure a standard tracker is pushed to the lower echelons of care to track their mTBIs.

**References:** Field Manual 4-02.17 PREVENTIVE MEDICINE SERVICES

(ART 6.8.1 Provide preventive medicine support)

**TREND 80**

**Subject: SFAT Embeds**

**Observation: Task Force 2: Embedding the SFATs with their ANSF**

**Discussion:** While some SFATs are resistant to such austere living; by the end of rotation the teams usually see the benefit of being that close to their counterparts. Embedding allows the ANSF access to their counterparts when they are needed, which helps the SFAT build and maintain rapport with them.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Embedding the SFATs with their countrparts is central to effective advising.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 7.6.1.2 Conduct security assistance)

**TREND 81**

**Subject: SFATs embrace roles as mentor**

**Observation: (Task Force 1): SFATs, operating as ANSF assistants in the Task Force area of operations continually ensure that ANSF capacity is the focus of all their efforts.**

**Discussion:** As SFATs build relationships and work with their Afghan counterparts, they continue to emphasize the priority of the Afghan competencies as their mission objective. Afghan staff and command functions improve with the efforts of their advisors and continually moves closer to Afghan-independent operations.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Commanders of SFATs give clear guidance to subordinate advisors to focus their efforts toward the same goal. Assessing capabilities of their counterparts allows them to prioritize efforts along their designated lines of effort. Daily meetings allow the ANSF and SFATs to synchronize with each other and move forward together toward their common goal.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 7.6.4.1 Conduct foreign internal defense operations)

**TREND 82**

**Subject: SFAT Advising ANSF**

**Observation: (Task Force 1): Lower ranking members of SFATs (E2-E4) are advising at their skill level to ensure that the ANSF Leadership and Primary Staff are not the only ANSF being advised by SFATs.**

**Discussion:** A PFC driver/ gunner belonging to an SFAT was tasked with searching a confiscated vehicle. Instead of searching it himself, he invited three AUP to search the vehicle with him as he coached them through thorough search techniques. When the AUP found evidence in the vehicle, the junior SFAT member then coached the AUP on how to properly handle evidence and conduct basic Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE). While senior SFAT members were working with their counterparts, junior members of the team taught classes on weapons maintenance as well as basic first aid to ANSF.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Junior members of SFATs are primarily tasked with driver and gunner responsibilities or hold other specialties such as communications or medical. While the primary mission of the SFAT is to advise ANSF leaders and primary staff, the entire team regardless of rank can still play a part in advising and assisting the ANSF. In doing so, they are able improve the ANSF organization they are working with as a whole, as well as create a learning environment throughout the entire ANSF organization from top to bottom.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 7.6.4.1 Conduct foreign internal defense operations)

**TREND 83**

**Subject: SFAT Cultural Training**

**Observation: Task Force 2: Cultural training is cebtral to advising.**

**Discussion:** The SFATs who have been culturally trained, typically do not make cultural mistakes and are able to build rapport with their counterparts quickly and effectively. When the rapport has been established, the SFATs typically are able to develop their counterparts further as the rotation goes on.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):** Cultural traiinig is a core skill for SFATs.

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):**

**References:**

(ART 7.6.4.1.1 Provide indirect support to foreign internal defense)

**TREND 84**

**Subject: Counterinsurgency**

**Observation: Understanding the fundamentals of counterinsurgency (COIN)**

**Discussion:** Units come to the JRTC with a basic understanding of the fundamentals of COIN. However, the application throughout the rotation demonstrates the contrary. Units are, for the most part, proficient in lethal operations. They often over look the non-lethal aspects during the planning phase. The result is the inability to conduct consequence management effectively, and assess affects of lethal operations on the population. Much time has been dedicated rotation after rotation with the leadership, discussing both the imperatives and paradoxes of COIN, and the need to balance and integrate non-lethal with lethal operations. Units are too lethally focused, and they forget the “center of gravity” is the population and not Anti-Coalition Militants.

**Techniques and Procedures (Sustain):**

**Techniques and Procedures (Needs Emphasis):** Units need to emphasize non-lethal operations as much as lethal. Soldiers must understand the implications of their actions while interacting with the local population. Recommend units at home station, once identified for deployment to theater, and prior to JRTC rotation, develop a training plan which includes educating the organization on counterinsurgency doctrine and cultural awareness, and TEWTs which include practical exercises on COIN. Finally, recommend non-lethal operations, especially consequence management, be added to all JRTC STX training lanes

**References:** Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Karzai’s 12

(ART 7.6.4.3 Conduct counterinsurgency operations)