NEWSLETTER

Decisive Action

Training Environment at JMRC

Observations, Insights, and Lessons

Handling Instructions for CALL
Electronic Media and Paper Products

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) authorizes official use of this CALL product for operational and institutional purposes that contribute to the overall success of U.S., coalition, and allied efforts.

The information contained in this product reflects the actions of units in the field and may not necessarily be approved U.S. Army policy or doctrine.

This product is designed for official use by U.S., coalition, and allied personnel and cannot be released to the public without the consent of CALL. This product has been furnished with the expressed understanding that it will be used for official defense-related purposes only and that it will be afforded the same degree of protection that the U.S. affords information marked "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" in accordance with U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 380-5, section 5-2.

Official military and civil service/government personnel, to include all coalition and allied partners, may paraphrase; quote; or use sentences, phrases, and paragraphs for integration into official products or research. However, integration of CALL "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" information into official products or research renders them FOUO, and they must be maintained and controlled within official channels and cannot be released to the public without the consent of CALL.

This product may be placed on protected UNCLASSIFIED intranets within military organizations or units, provided that access is restricted through user ID and password or other authentication means to ensure that only properly accredited military and government officials have access to these products.

Regulations strictly forbid posting CALL "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" documents to Department of Defense (DOD) websites that do not restrict access to authorized personnel. AR-25-1, 15 Jul 2005, Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology, paragraph 6-4 n (2) (b) and DOD Web Site Administration Policy and Procedures (11 Jan 2002), Part II, paragraph 3.6.1 require appropriate mechanisms to protect sensitive information.

When no longer needed, all CALL "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" paper products and electronic media will be shredded or destroyed using approved paper shredders or CDROM destroyers.

To allied and coalition personnel:

This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defense purposes only, that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection as such information is afforded by the United States, and that it is not to be revealed to another country or international organization without the consent of CALL.

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA
For Official Use Only

Decisive Action Training Environment at JMRC

DIGITAL VERSION AVAILABLE

A digital version of this CALL publication is available to view, download, or reproduce from the CALL restricted website, <http://call.army.mil>. Reproduction of this publication is welcomed and highly encouraged.

Common Access Card (CAC) or Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login is required to access the digital version.

This publication is located online at:

https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6927&
filename=/docs/doc6927/12-11.pdf

Foreword

Exactly where and when our nation will call upon its military to fight next is unforeseeable. If history serves, the time will come with little warning, and the location will likely be unanticipated. What we do know is that the environment will be complex, that our enemies will likely seek to exploit vulnerabilities learned from U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that our operations will influence, and be influenced by, our increasingly interconnected world.

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) received the mission to design and execute an exercise to train the "Sky Soldiers" of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in major combat operations in such an environment. Building upon the successes and lessons from the first full spectrum operations exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA the year prior, the 173rd ABCT became the first unit to operate within Headquarters, Department of the Army's newly directed full spectrum training environment. During the rotation, doctrinal terminology subsequently changed this to the decisive action training environment (DATE).

In the DATE operating environment, the Sky Soldiers were opposed by conventional and irregular forces — a hybrid threat — that avoided the strengths and exploited the weaknesses not only of 173rd ABCT but also of their multinational and host-nation partners. The 173rd was required to balance simultaneous and varying degrees of offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout the rotation.

The 173rd ABCT performed magnificently; this newsletter chronicles its successes while providing lessons for future BCTs operating in the DATE. While acknowledging that insights from one DATE rotation do not equate to Army-wide trends, there were some lessons learned that we believe are enduring as units prepare for future DATE rotations and our Army prepares for future conflict:

- The hybrid threat requires units to balance simultaneously and effectively the offense, defense, and our years of hard-learned stability operations.

- Units must learn how to transition from forced-entry, analog, mission-command systems to digital platforms while on the move.

- Integrating multinational partnerships, special operations forces, interagency, and existing U.S. governmental, as well as host-national government agencies, is essential to gaining understanding of a new and immature operating environment.

- Intelligence systems are strained and conflicted with the requirement to develop an understanding of both enemy insurgent/criminal networks and enemy conventional formations.

- Brigade-level synchronization of maneuver, fires, engineer, and sustainment support in the DATE has atrophied.

JEFFREY R. MARTINDALE
COL, IN
Commander, JMRC Operations Group

Decisive Action Training Environment at JMRC	
Table of Contents	
Sky Soldiers in the Decisive Action Training Environment: 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Rotation 12-01 *LTC Rob Campbell and LTC Chris Stone*	**1**
Implementing the Decisive Action Training Environment and Hybrid Threat *COL John R. Jones*	**7**
The Role of the Battalion S-2 and the Company Intelligence Support Teams in the Decisive Action Training Environment *CPT Michael J. Mitchell and MAJ Frank P. Slavin III*	**15**
Never Enough Time to Plan *MAJ David M. Lamborn and MAJ Terry N. Hilderbrand Jr.*	**21**
Communication Operations in Decisive Action Training Environments: The Challenges of Operating in Analog and Transitioning to Digital *CPT Luke Pereira, LTC Eric M. McFadden, and MAJ Phillip J. Borders*	**25**
Brigade Current Operations in the Decisive Action Training Environment *MAJ Andrew Zieseniss*	**29**
Integrating the Interagency and Stability Operations into Decisive Action Operations *Dr. James W. Derleth*	**35**
Command Post Operations for the Reconnaissance Squadron *LTC Clark Lindner, MAJ Brian W. Hunt, and MAJ Morrie J. Fanto*	**39**
Executing a Brigade Targeting Process in the Decisive Action Training Environment *LTC Eric T. Smith*	**43**
Fire Support Planning: Regaining Proficiency in Synchronizing Fires *MAJ Thomas C. Fisher and MAJ Brad Fausnaugh*	**55**

Center for Army Lessons Learned	
Director	COL Thomas H. Roe
CALL Analysts	Danny Reinick Marvin K. Decker
Editors	Karen Blakeman Michael G. Brooks Jenny Solon
Graphic Artist	Dan Neal, CALL Contractor

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

Sky Soldiers in the Decisive Action Training Environment: 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Rotation 12-01

LTC Rob Campbell, Deputy Commander Operations Group
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

LTC Chris Stone, Deputy Commander
173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team

On 6 October 2011, the sky over the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany, was filled with parachutes. The 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) and an attached company of Polish paratroopers officially began what everyone at JMRC and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) called "Rotation 12-01." This numeric designation, similar to the one applied to each monthly rotation, had special meaning. It was a decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation designed to introduce a brigade task force, its multinational partners, and even the observer/controller-trainers (O/C-Ts) to unified land operations. The rotation delivered offense, defense, and stability scenarios to challenge the BCT and its leaders. It had been about 10 years since JMRC had seen anything remotely close to this style of rotation, and in many respects we were breaking new ground.


Figure 1-1. Rotation 12-01's exercise schedule showing the deployment, situational training exercise (STX), field training exercise, and redeployment (DEXR) sequences

The Rotation

The rotation, 25 days in length, consisted of a forcible entry exercise by ground and airborne assault followed by a command post exercise (CPX) and STXs for newly formed platoons and companies. The break from the initial forcible entry exercise and force on force provided time and space for the BCT to expand its footprint as it would over several days in a real operation. The time was also used to allow the BCT to transition from analog systems to its digital platforms, a lesson learned from the Joint Readiness Training Center's (JRTC's) experience with 3rd ABCT, 82nd Airborne Division.

At the completion of the STX and CPX period, the BCT re-entered its force-on-force phase and immediately began planning and preparing for a defense against approaching forces from the south. JMRC's Operations Group and the BCT paused following the defense to conduct after action review (AAR) operations at mid-rotation. Offensive operations planning and execution of a deliberate attack completed the force-on-force period, which followed with final AARs.

Figure 1-2. Task organization and participation for Rotation 12-01

The Rotational Unit

The 173rd ABCT started Rotation 12-01 four months after completing post-deployment reset. For leaders across the brigade, nearly all of whom were occupying new positions and learning their roles for the first time, this was their first opportunity to conduct collective training at the battalion and brigade levels. In the months immediately preceding the rotation, the brigade had conducted individual and platoon-level training, culminating with platoon live-fire exercises.

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA
For Official Use Only

Staff training centered on orienting leaders to the operational environment (OE) unique to the DATE and the problem sets it produced. Though individually skilled and combat-tested at the start, it was the OE that would, over the course of the rotation, forge the brigade into a cohesive team.

The Observer/Controller-Trainer

The fleet of O/C-Ts who planned and ran this rotation consisted of a population of officers and noncommissioned officers with combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. The task force senior trainers and a handful of senior majors and junior lieutenant colonels entered the Army prior to 2001 and were familiar with the high-intensity conflict training we experienced as an Army in the early 2000s. Below this level, few had personal experience with DATE-style warfare. Regardless of experience, everyone recognized the fact that the world had changed. We were not going to simply pull the old rotational plans off the shelf and dust them off.

Prerotation Operations Group Training

Prerotational training for JMRC's Operations Group began three months prior to the start of the rotation and consisted of offense, defense, and airborne operations. Additionally, leader professional development sessions and leader-led tactical exercises without troops were spread throughout this period to build O/C-T capacity on how to observe, coach, and train the skills necessary for the rotation. Exercise rules of engagement were also reviewed, as was adjudication of lethal effects on the battlefield to better serve the rotational unit. USAREUR's opposing forces (OPFOR) of the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment re-blued themselves on combined arms maneuver skills with their tracked (M113) vehicles to replicate the armored threat. They also trained to replicate the criminal and insurgent element of the hybrid threat. The 1-4 Infantry rounded out its training just prior to the rotation with its partners: a Bulgarian special forces detachment to assist with the insurgent threat already present in the fictitious country of Atropia and a Slovakian battle group to replicate the dismounted part of the enemy force from Ariana.

The Operational Environment

To resource the rotation, over 93 multinational O/C-Ts augmented Operations Group to gain from the DATE experience and to observe their own formations training in the rotation. Polish airborne, Slovakian, Slovenian, and Bulgarian special forces entered the maneuver box with the 173rd to replicate the hybrid threat, the host-nation force, and to augment the BCT with additional combat power. Over 300 civilians on the battlefield were spread across 10 villages to replicate the Atropian population, both in their villages and as displaced persons.

The scenario took place in the fictitious country of Atropia (part of the DATE scenario developed for the combat training centers [CTCs]). Atropia had been invaded by the bordering country of Ariana over disputed oil and land rights. The situation called for forcible entry of a BCT task force to support a combined joint task force (CJTF) campaign plan to bring the end of Atropian aggression and stability to the area. Pre-existing in Atropia prior to the BCT's entry were host-nation forces, insurgents, criminals, and a population in turmoil.

The Challenges and Lessons Learned

The complexity of this training event was enough to challenge even the most experienced BCT and CTC Operations Group. O/C-Ts grew in their ability to observe, coach, and train the 173rd

ABCT. Simply observing the BCT reacting to the DATE OE provided a learning environment for those doing the evaluating. The DATE OE provided a realistic and relevant complex environment that challenged the BCT and Operations Group immensely. Following the forcible entry, the BCT was faced with a threat ranging from a criminal and insurgent element all the way up to a mechanized uniformed formation. A population of Atropians shattered from recent conflict awaited the 173rd. The pressure from an interagency country team with political objectives also posed a challenge.

The BCT struggled with determining the brigade fight and leveraging lethal, nonlethal, BCT, and external BCT assets to deal with the problems of the OE. As an example, the BCT staff understandably placed its emphasis on the large Arianan maneuver formation approaching from its south. This caused other problem areas such as population conflict and criminal and insurgent elements to go largely unchecked. The brigade special troops battalion was given the mission to address this but was challenged with insufficient combat power. It also was not able to spread itself across the OE to tackle the problem. The BCT staff should have leveraged internal and external assets to assist with this. As an example, special operations forces, the host-nation force and existing government, and the Atropian interagency country team could have offered assistance. In future DATE rotations, it is imperative that the force package be built to best replicate the CJTF assets that would exist to support a BCT.

The transition from analog to digital communication platforms also posed a great challenge to the BCT. Again, the 173rd was breaking new ground just as the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division did at JRTC. Once its digital platforms were functioning, the BCT struggled to maintain maneuver flexibility, as most were used to fixed communication sites commonly experienced from our recent combat tours. The brigade tactical command post lost flexibility to move as the battle evolved, and the commander lost some visibility of the fight through his digital systems. The difficulty transitioning from man-pack radios and laminated maps to modern battle command systems cannot be overstated. This transition deserves more repetition in DATE rotations so tactical units can wrestle with how best to conduct it. Further, digital communication systems should be tested under the load they will experience when a BCT is operational.

The mobile nature of the DATE rotation created another great learning point for all involved. Because the BCT and its subordinate commands were not fixed to a forward operating base or combat outpost, supply, transportation, and mission command on the move had to be relearned. The BCT's ability to execute mission command and its strong junior leaders saved the day when it came time for execution, but the struggle was clear. Gone were the mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles, Blue Force Trackers, and fixed command posts we have all become accustomed to. Units were forced to execute mission command handover while leaders broke down temporary command posts and moved to new positions on the battlefield. No longer could units stockpile supplies at their location. Future DATE rotations should include the movement of units to help overcome the challenges the 173rd faced.

On the Operations Group side, adjudicating lethal effects proved a challenge for O/C-Ts. Having run rotations that did not involve the massing of lethal effects caused our systems to be rusty. The responsiveness from the pull of the lanyard to the O/C-T Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) gun lagged. Aging MILESs also placed a burden on O/C-Ts, who had to physically adjudicate lethal effects for both rotational training units and the OPFOR. Personnel shortages in O/C-T teams also contributed to the challenge. Rehearsals of this process and improvements to augmentation training and integration will bring improvements in future DATE rotations.

Looking back, the stability operations portion of the O/C-T train-up was lacking. Justifiably, we had to work hard to re-educate ourselves on the principles of the offense and defense and teach O/C-Ts airborne operations, but one thing became obvious as the box came to life: There was a significant lack of stability existing in Atropia that deserved attention. This became abundantly clear as the rotation began and matured. More time should have been spent training the O/C-Ts on sources of instability that existed in Atropia and how we would help the unit recognize them and balance its operations to address them.

The hybrid threat and DATE models used to create the OE were found to be superb. The ability of Operations Group and 1-4 Infantry to replicate this OE will always be an area of emphasis as we improve our abilities, but the background scenario offered the right complexity for a BCT to train on unified land operations.

Unique to JMRC but a significant positive effect for rotation 12-01 was the multinational partnership. In preparation for the rotation, Bulgarian special forces units actually trained 1-4 Infantry Soldiers on how best to replicate an insurgent force. Their addition, along with the addition of the Slovakian battle group, assisted greatly in creating a realistic threat for the BCT to face. The Slovenian battle group, which replicated the host-nation force, also contributed greatly to the rotation. This professional force offered a unique challenge for the BCT upon its entry into Atropia.

Having to partner with a largely unknown combat unit in the middle of a contingency operation added a special realism. At one point during the rotation, the BCT commander took note of the high standard to which the Slovenians had constructed their defensive fighting positions and used this example to show his own leaders. The Slovenians brought an O/C-T element with them, which attended daily assessment meetings to help JMRC and USAREUR leaders better understand the challenges experienced throughout the rotation and to assist them in achieving their own training objectives.

Summary and What is Ahead

Most recognize the challenges we face as an Army as we follow 10 years of population-centric warfare and stand in the face of existing and emerging threats. One DATE rotation does not provide trends, but the pages that follow will address a variety of warfighting functions and discuss the challenges and lessons learned in each of them specific to the 12-01 experience. This publication is done in collaboration between the 173rd ABCT and JMRC Operations Group. Additional writings will follow as we further examine the growth experienced by all participants of Rotation 12-01.

The 173rd ABCT was replete with great leaders who carried the day, effectively dealing with the challenges presented to them. The desire of all the professionals involved in creating, planning, running, and experiencing this rotation is to give an honest assessment of the challenges faced across the board — from the rotational unit to the CTC Operations Group. There were moments during the rotation, several in fact, where paratroopers, their leaders from the BCT commander on down, and O/C-Ts from the commander of Operations Group on down scratched their heads in discovery learning at what had just occurred. Rotation 12-01 taught us all numerous things about ourselves, our potential OEs, and our doctrine. For those reasons, the event was superb in every respect.

Implementing the Decisive Action Training Environment and Hybrid Threat

COL John R. Jones, Senior Intelligence Officer
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

> "... it was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in between. This is the new model."
>
> – Hezbollah Secretary General Nasrallah
>
> From a paper by Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, — The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26*

Implementing the Guidance

This article describes the U.S. Army's implementation of a full spectrum training environment exercise, now doctrinally termed decisive action training environment (DATE), conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) located in Hohenfels, Germany, in October 2011. JMRC's first DATE training rotation was based on Chief of Staff of the Army guidance to implement training as part of a common training environment as outlined in Training Circular (TC) 7-101, *Exercise Design;* TC 7-100, *Hybrid Threat*, dated November 2010; and the *Full Spectrum Training Environment Working Draft*, dated February 2011.


Figure 2-1. Rotational planning sources included U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) regulations training guidance and Training and Doctrine Command G-2 publications (TC 7-100 series)

With a common operational environment (OE), the combat training centers (CTCs) and institutional training centers will strive to build the depth of information and complexities of the modern battlefield, and be able to "nest" or "link" sequentially or simultaneously live and simulated exercises across the U.S. Army.

Key Findings

- The DATE and associated publications offer a superb baseline and framework for training unified land operations and decisive action.

- A complex OE, dynamic population, and hybrid threat challenged the rotational unit in its ability to conduct simultaneous combined arms maneuver and wide area security tasks.

- Top-down prioritization and bottom-up refinement are critical in this environment and require the simultaneous use of analog and digital mission command processes at an increased operational pace.

- The rotational unit and training center were challenged in executing, replicating, and evaluating operations that were not based on fixed locations for communications and support.

- Full implementation of the DATE and hybrid threat requires enhancements in training center replication capabilities, simulations, and instrumentation to fully achieve the vision for linked and simultaneous exercises.

Figure 2-2. Regional states and actors within the DATE, encompassing a hybrid threat and complex operating environment

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA
For Official Use Only

JMRC Rotation 12-01: DATE as a Baseline

In Rotation 12-01, using the TC 7-100 series as a baseline, JMRC developed a conventional threat, working in concert with special purpose forces that were enabling a separatist movement (insurgency) to defeat the rotational unit and host-nation security forces. Also employed were a small terrorist cell and criminal network taking advantage of the resulting chaos.

- Operational environment:

    ○ Learning from the lessons of the past decade, the DATE for Rotation 12-01 deployed the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) as an early-entry deterrence capability integrated within an internally troubled sovereign nation's security force while preparing for decisive action against aggressive neighbors with near-peer capabilities. This design created natural tensions between executing wide area security tasks and combined arms maneuver.

    ○ This exercise design meant not going back to conventional operations in isolation from the population, and also marked a significant departure from the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training the Army has been doing for the past decade in which the adaptive threat lacked near-peer capabilities.

    ○ Moreover, the hybrid threat, internally displaced persons, and third-party actors hampered the unit's ability to focus on combined arms maneuver. It also showcased the importance of addressing critical stability issues throughout the phased operation — despite the rotational training unit's best effort to focus on conventional operations while shifting focus to security and stability upon conclusion of the decisive action.

    ○ A notable change from counterinsurgency mission rehearsal exercises was the introduction of a dynamic population "on the move." This required the careful management of civilians on the battlefield (COBs), including contracted role players and professional COBs, to ensure key actors were present at fixed town sets and a sufficient number of internally displaced persons were moving across the operating area at the appropriate times. JMRC's opposing forces (OPFOR) made critical use of the population to gather intelligence on the training unit, hide their movements and activities, and aid in the tactical and strategic information operation campaign.

- Adaptive threat. While the adversary possessed conventional capabilities (mechanized, air defense, artillery, etc.), it was fully aware of the U.S. advantage in precision air strikes and relied heavily on population shielding, irregular force anonymity and targeting, and aggressive use of information operations to counter U.S. advantages. The inclusion of a Slovakian battle group, Bulgarian special operations forces, and multidisciplined intelligence collectors into JMRC's OPFOR was extremely effective and challenged every aspect of the rotational unit's physical, information, communications, and operations security.

Mission Command Without the Established Forward Operating Base

- Early entry – scalable architecture over time. Unable to fall in on previously established communications nodes at fixed forward operating bases, the early-entry architecture required the 173rd ABCT to employ its full range of communications and mission command systems while having to flow in field service representatives and other technicians as part of the mission.

> The 12-01 operations and intelligence architecture linked live/instrumented systems at Hohefels/Grafenwoehr with Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) simulated entities in "wrap" to generate red, green, and white reporting. The simulated data was processed by the USAREUR Analysis and Control Element as a red common operating picture and Tactical Entity Database, and the ground order of battle reporting was simultaneously disseminated to the rotational training units, USAREUR contingency command post, and other joint and Army headquarters as part of the Modernized Integrated Database (MiDB) (iArmy).

  - This mission required the combined joint task force and enabling organizations to develop smart pushes of intelligence products and data, which adapted to the airborne unit's initial entry communications plan and shifting focus between analog and digital reporting systems. Blue Force Tracker proved to be a reliable means of passing data until other tactical satellite systems could be established. The 173rd ABCT was hampered by not having its other broadcast receive capabilities (Common Ground System [CGS] and Global Broadcast System). The CGS and team were transitioning to the distributed CGS-Afghanistan (DCGS-A)-enabled CGS at the time of the exercise.

  - Early-entry operations also required the unit to work with pre-existing national, theater, and host-nation data sources and begin the process of creating tactical reporting databases. This transition is extremely challenging for a BCT when coupled with the requirement to simultaneously conduct analog and digital battle tracking.

- Managing complex tasks and prioritizing effort. Given the hybrid threat and complex OE, stability operations are likely to occur simultaneously to the offense and defense. Units require better tools, systems, and processes for tracking conventional and irregular force activities simultaneously and prioritizing limited staff; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and other enablers to address these challenges.

  - The tempo of the fight and breadth of tasks to accomplish are further hampered by the dual requirement to operate analog and digital — a time-consuming process. Reliable and redundant communications and workstations are needed that are not tethered to fixed locations or require significant field service representative support to sustain.

  - Leveraging host-nation and nonmilitary resources to address security and stability tasks is critical and requires improvements to leader development training and training center replication, which incorporates robust joint, interagency, and intergovernmental enablers.

Implementing the Common Framework of Scenarios

- Nesting and linking:

  ○ Rotation 12-01 linked two simultaneous training events, with the 173rd ABCT in live rotation at the Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr training areas and the 30th Medical Command in command post exercises at Grafenwoehr operating notionally from Baku, also providing live medical support to 173rd ABCT.

  ○ This rotation also set the conditions for subsequent rotations of other units, and 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment will inherit 173rd's end of exercise OE conditions in October 2013 as its decisive action rotation. The reports, data, products, and population dynamics from one rotation add to the depth and complexity of future rotations — a key lesson learned from Iraq and Afghanistan where units must manage the effects of previous landowning units.

  ○ In order to simultaneously link rotations at two CTCs and at multiple echelons, the Combined Arms Center is now developing a theater operation plan that further identifies U.S. interests and objectives, regional support systems and architectures (basing, theater sustainment, ISR, etc.), joint force allocation and apportionment, interagency and host-nation capabilities, and the legal framework for operations.

- Robust simulation "wrap" and instrumented architecture. JMRC's scenario required much of the conflict to occur in simulations and challenged the center's ability to seamlessly transition simulated entities into live, constructive box sets.

  ○ Linking map data across multiple training centers will require creative blending in simulations, and technical solutions are already being worked by the National Simulations Center.

  ○ Army Battle Command Systems are critical for processing simulated and instrumented reports and data and are highly dependent on accurate geo-location information provided by our live and simulated Global Positioning System broadcast. Integrating constructive geo-location reporting will require technical solutions to account for this training environment.

  ○ JCATS and the intelligence sensor emulator, Air and Space Collaborative Environment Information Operations Suite software, had not been updated to ensure proper entity reporting and required significant "normalization" of reporting to present an accurate red picture. JCATS struggled with entity counts larger than 60,000 — exercise entity counts reached 120,000, with only a portion of the battlefield simulated.

  ○ JMRC lacked effective instrumented systems for tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW-II) and Javelin missiles and could not instrument several of our multinational partner capabilities. Instrumentation challenges and limited unit and OPFOR Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System training created circumstances where observer/controllers were artificially adjudicating the results.

- Training brain. Critical to the effective replication of a theater at war is the realistic replication of multimedia and multidisciplined operational, intelligence, governmental, and open-source reporting. The training brain, therefore, is a mix of prepared or rapidly constructed products as well as simulated and processed data — all disseminated across a realistic architecture.

  - A replicated MiDB and Imagery Product Library are two examples of steady-state, all-source repositories of information that should be accessible to training developers for scenario design and execution.

  - Nonmilitary sources of information, often found in open sources, are critical for better understanding the deployed environment, and a key leader database for this OE would provide continuity across the training centers.

  - Just as vital to the data repositories are the joint and interagency specialists capable of preparing data or rapidly constructing products to stimulate the training. JMRC's interagency writers and intelligence specialists from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization, Air Force Center of Excellence, Joint Training Counter IED Operations Integration Center, 66th Military Intelligence Brigade, and the U.S. Army Geospatial Intelligence Battalion constructed detailed imagery, full-motion video, measurement and signature intelligence, signal intelligence, human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and government reporting to depict conventional and irregular force activity as the simulation and live play unfolded.

  - Part of the process involved "bending" real-world intelligence products to match the evolving scenario. All of these products were posted to the USAREUR intelligence portal, which then became a searchable part of the DCGS-A Integrated Backbone — essentially moving the training architecture to the "cloud" for other units in USAREUR to use for future rotations or home-station training.

- OPFOR. The 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry (OPFOR) executed a phenomenal replication of the hybrid threat; however, while well-suited to replicate small conventional and irregular forces, it required significant augmentation to operate a mechanized reconnaissance unit with its combat enablers at two dislocated training areas. Sophisticated enablers and adaptive techniques, rather than overmatch in combat forces, forced the OPFOR to fight in a hybrid way and yielded surprising results.

  - 1-4 Infantry Battalion is normally not staffed or trained to manage a regimental or brigade's worth of combat enablers (military intelligence company, military information support operations, fires, air defense artillery, etc.).

  - Synchronizing live operations with effects from virtual systems (air, artillery, electronic warfare) is also challenging and requires a more robust red cell in exercise control (EXCON) to support.

- To operate effectively as a hybrid threat, in addition to significantly more combined arms maneuver training than seen at JMRC in the last six years, the OPFOR must receive additional specialized training on irregular use of sophisticated capabilities, criminal operations, and information warfare fundamentals.

- Higher control (HICON) support. The scope and magnitude of the problem set identified in the DATE requires a significantly more robust HICON/EXCON and control mechanism than what JMRC has been using for counterinsurgency mission rehearsal exercises. Specifically, JMRC lacked critical joint, interagency, and intergovernmental planners and role players to replicate the type of environment envisioned in these documents. A robust HICON/EXCON for OPFOR, blue forces, and green forces would facilitate a more realistic exercise and allow for more dynamic "free play" in the rotation.

Conclusion

While shifting to a new exercise design can be a daunting task, especially an exercise of this scope and complexity, our planning team found the DATE and related products facilitated our rapid timeline for designing and implementing this rotation and, in general, will likely serve the Army well as a common framework. Given these were initial publications, we are already working closely with the Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command G-2, USAREUR, and others to address the shortfalls for future rotations.

Almost certainly, repetitive training in a complex operating environment, and executed as part of an interagency, intergovernmental, and combined unified land operation, is a step in the right direction and will better enable our units to succeed on the future battlefield.

The Role of the Battalion S-2 and the Company Intelligence Support Teams in the Decisive Action Training Environment

CPT Michael J. Mitchell and MAJ Frank P. Slavin III
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

During a recent decisive action training environment (DATE) exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Task Force (TF) Rock, the 2nd Battalion 503rd Infantry (Airborne) of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team faced a hybrid threat while conducting offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The training began with an initial entry simulated air land operation and the establishment of command posts. The exercise then progressed to a battalion command post exercise (CPX) and company-level situational training exercise (STX) lanes. Following the CPX and STX lanes, the battalion transitioned to the second half of a 10-day force-on-force decisive action operation against conventional and surrogate forces.

The intelligence section and company intelligence support teams (CoISTs) experienced the complexities associated with an initial-entry operation in the DATE (formerly termed full spectrum training environment at the time the exercise was conducted) that included operating beyond the current counterinsurgency (COIN) comfort zone; such operations included:

- Conducting the military decisionmaking process.

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

- Planning requirements and assessing collection such as reconnaissance and surveillance.

- Targeting cycles and orders processes during defensive and offensive operations that addressed a hybrid threat.

- Transitioning from analog operations at the company level to digital reporting at the brigade level.

- Integration of enablers.

The TF was also provided additional enabling assets to assist in the execution of its assigned missions. These enablers included a human intelligence collection team (HCT); a low-level voice intercept (LLVI) team; and a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) troop.

The scope of this article focuses on how an airborne battalion S-2 section and CoISTs operate while executing decisive operations in the DATE with reflections and comparisons to how Army units fought 10 years ago.

> Intelligence supports the commander across full spectrum operations. It helps the commander decide when and where to concentrate sufficient combat power to defeat the threat.
>
> — Field Manual (FM) 2-0, *Intelligence*

Planning the fight. S-2s preparing to face Krasnovian forces pulled out their smart books with orders of battle, doctrinal templates, high-value target weapon systems, and weapons ranges to assist in planning the enemy courses of action (ECOAs). Once the S-2 conducted terrain analysis to identify mobility corridors, he could plan reconnaissance, surveillance, and collection to confirm or deny ECOAs. Although those smart books still exist, many are filed away in old drawers or are up on shelves collecting dust from years past.

TF Rock had to go back to the basics of understanding how conventional forces fight and break out the acetate, since they were not falling in on well-established digital architecture with prebuilt products that have been updated for years. The major change for TF Rock was that it also had to track the other actors presented in a hybrid threat. The staff strived to provide complete operational environment visualization (see yourself, see the enemy, see the terrain) to the commander to make decisions. The quality of COA analysis and combined arms rehearsal was a direct reflection of the time and effort put into mission analysis and IPB. The more organized time the S-2 spent producing detailed products, the more the staff was able to visualize the environment and create COAs that addressed additional possible and probable ECOAs.

> The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations
>
> — FM 3-0, *Operations*

The intelligence section and CoISTs began the rotation with what was familiar to them by conducting district stability framework operations to gain understanding of the environment through the constructs of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events/political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure-physical and time (ASCOPE/PMESII-PT). At the same time, they also developed situational awareness on insurgent, guerilla, and criminal surrogate forces, including the South Atropian People's Army and Sariat Jamaat, through personality and network analysis. The balance of collection priorities and reconnaissance and surveillance support shifted throughout the rotation between the surrogate forces and conventional forces as the battalion had to prepare to defend key infrastructure. As a result of limited intelligence-collection assets, the battalion focused a majority of collection assets and observers toward conventional forces and placed less emphasis on assessing and planning how the surrogate forces would attack in a supporting role to the conventional main effort.

During the offense, one of the lessons learned was the importance of how to track templated and confirmed high-value weapon systems. The tactical operations center went through four variations of battle damage assessment trackers and experienced difficulty with maintaining delineation between templated enemy positions, reported positions, and destroyed weapon systems.

Fighting the analog fight. The TF entered the area of operations (AO) and executed mission command with map boards, radios, and a few paper tracking charts. The companies operated almost completely analog, with their only digital systems being Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT). The necessity for prebuilt product shells, standing operating procedures (SOPs), and published reporting formats/times/mediums to efficiently and effectively command and communicate was identified when all traffic was passing via radio and BFT messages absent Microsoft Word and PowerPoint. Reports were passed on the command net, the operations and intelligence net, the fires net, and at times the admin net.

The S-2 operations analyst was closely tied in with the radio operator and was able to effectively disseminate the information to the section. The brigade was to operate digitally with the analog bridge at battalion. It took several days for the battalion S-2 section to establish digital communications with brigade and finally establish Outlook accounts, populate the Command Post of the Future, and post products in a shared drive and SharePoint portal. Information flow prior to email and SharePoint consisted of Secure/Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR/NIPR) Network phone calls. S-2s should re-create the "intel rucksack" with products, charts, cheat sheets, and tools that assist when fighting on acetate.

Integration of enablers and managing the reconnaissance and surveillance collection plan. The rotation emphasized the importance of having clearly defined specific priority intelligence requirements tied to named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest while linked to decision points for the commander, especially considering a hybrid threat. The nature of the noncontiguous environment provided challenges for the S-2 to consider, since TF Rock was not the main effort and was geographically separated from the brigade. Specific challenges included daily coordination with brigade through net calls via SIPR Voice Over Internet Protocol phones that routinely dropped the call and coordination of intelligence handoff lines from brigade to battalion without being able to view digital products.

The TF was provided additional enabling assets, including an HCT with flexibility to operate in three separate locations, an LLVI team for signals intelligence, and a RSTA troop. The intelligence collection teams typically remained with the military intelligence company, where the brigade S-2 controlled their employment. An airborne infantry battalion would have to rely on its scouts and maneuver companies for collection.

The S-2 employed intelligence-collection assets to understand all facets of the operational environment, including enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. The collection plan did incorporate all collection assets available to the TF and was modified as the environment changed. The collection plan began with a focus on the nonconventional surrogate forces and developed an understanding of the environment with regard to district stability — something the Army has become comfortable with during COIN operations. With the imminent threat of Arianan conventional forces, the collection plan transitioned to a force-oriented focus. With limited assets and time to collect, the S-2 had to be very specific in the collection plan by recommending asset employment and requests from higher. The CoISTs and S-2 were able to balance the difficult task of maintaining vigilance on surrogate forces and identifying indications and warnings for conventional forces.

Collection plans must be flexible enough to cover multiple mobility corridor NAIs without restricting the unit to just one ECOA movement route. The S-2 section did provide analysis, planning, and integration of intelligence enablers, supported with requests for reconnaissance and surveillance coverage from higher headquarters, that assisted the commander and staff in understanding the environment and enemy enough to employ combat power during defensive or offensive operations.

The CoIST. The most significant structural shift in how companies are structured compared to 10 years ago is the addition of the CoIST created out of hide. These additional personnel in the command post act somewhat like a company staff, relieving some of the burden from the commander, executive officer (XO), and first sergeant. The CoIST has come into being over the past 10 years of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and has been extremely necessary due to the decentralized nature of COIN operations.

In conventional operations, intelligence is traditionally passed from higher to lower headquarters, as the higher headquarters is resourced with intelligence-gathering capabilities and sufficiently staffed with the analytical personnel necessary to collect, analyze, and disseminate pertinent information. In COIN operations, information generally flows in the opposite direction. Small units operating on the ground must gather and determine the significance of intelligence, often without the assistance, analysis, and filtering of higher-level intelligence staff support. This small-unit intelligence enables the company to maintain situational awareness and possibly even attain brief periods of situational understanding and information superiority as it conducts daily activities such as patrols, engagements, and combat logistics patrols.

Through patrol briefs and debriefs, the CoIST was able to rapidly gather information, analyze the situation, and identify insurgents responsible for attacks driving targeted operations. Another significant shift in how we fight is the emphasis on key leader engagements (KLEs). Company commanders were not responsible for linking up with police chiefs, town mayors, and other persons of influence in the AO. The skills developed during COIN operations greatly assist the commanders of today, and now there is more assistance by utilizing the CoIST and fire support officer. Once the company commander conducted the initial KLEs, the CoIST officer in charge (OIC) assumed responsibility, allowing the commander to focus his efforts on engagement area development. The CoIST constructed and updated dossiers on the key leaders within the towns. The CoIST was also used to provide information to the population on the current enemy situation of Arianan aggression as well as what the local security forces and Americans were doing to provide security to key infrastructures.

> The mission of CoISTs is to describe the effects of the weather, enemy, terrain, and local population on friendly operations to reduce uncertainty and aid in decision making.
>
> — Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-20, *Company Intelligence Support Team*

The battalion and company leadership placed emphasis on selecting the CoIST personnel. All members of the CoIST were combat veterans and were selected based on their critical thinking skills. Emphasis was placed on the team operating independently from the rest of the command post and being involved in all aspects of company-level troop leading procedures. The selection of a former platoon leader to run the team was beneficial because company commanders were able to delegate some of the spheres of influence and stability operations planning down to the CoIST OIC, thereby allowing the commander to focus on fighting the company. The CoIST OIC also aided the commander as a tactical adviser during planning and conducted battle tracking during the fight, which allowed the XO to focus on logistics and administration. This decision was personality based and was successful only because the CoIST OIC and XO were able to work in tandem as the senior lieutenants within the company.

The CoISTs initially operated under the district stability framework in COIN like they were trained to do, searching for sources on instability rather than assisting in refined terrain analysis for developing company engagement areas. During the STX lanes, the CoIST provided the company commander with the situational awareness needed to manage the battle while also acting as a mobile command post.

With the advent of Training Circular 7-100, *The Hybrid Threat*, November 2010, and Training and Doctrine Command G-2's *Full Spectrum Training Environment Working Draft* (FSTE), February 2011, the question of how the CoIST operates inside of this construct has not yet been fully developed. Given that company command posts during initial-entry operations will not have the infrastructure, Tactical Ground Reporting Systems, or hard-wired power generation capabilities that we have become accustomed to in COIN operations on forward operating bases or combat outposts, how does the CoIST leverage itself into being a combat multiplier for the commander when it cannot rely upon many of the digital systems designed to increase its capabilities? The integration of the CoIST into operations, and the understanding of the capability it provided, continued to gain momentum as the unit prepared for its mission rehearsal exercise prior to deployment.

This rotation resulted in many of the lessons learned experienced by 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division during Rotation 11-01 at the Joint Readiness Training Center, the first full-spectrum operation in October 2010. Key lessons learned by TF Rock included the need to go back to the basics spending quality time on IPB, creating prebuilt product shells and battle trackers, and employing CoISTs in a role that extends beyond COIN.

Never Enough Time to Plan

MAJ David M. Lamborn, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
MAJ Terry N. Hilderbrand Jr., 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry

There is never enough time to plan. This is evident at the Army's combat training centers as well as in any theater of operations. Competing requirements, enemy action, weather, and other distracters are ever present and hinder a unit's ability to plan — this is an ever-present reality. Thus, every unit needs to be able to plan effectively despite these conditions. The key to effective staff planning is having every member of the staff know his roles and responsibilities. The only way to achieve this is to establish a planning standing operating procedure (SOP) and train the staff on its use. Such an SOP must be grounded in doctrine and tailored to the unit but flexible enough to encompass the full spectrum of unified land operations. Although this may be a quick and cavalier answer, its actual implementation requires a lot of experience, research, hard work, and training. Nonetheless, a professional staff owes this to both its commander and the troops who execute its plans.

To figure out why a unit needs a planning SOP takes only a cursory look at the demands of the unified land operations environment. A staff conducting expeditionary entry into an undeveloped theater of operations will not have its full suite of digital systems upon which it has come to rely on over the last decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The staff will be limited by transportation of the systems, setup time, and the ever-present troubleshooting of complex digital systems that require field service representatives. Furthermore, the unified land operations environment challenges the unit with a combination of difficult stability issues and a hybrid threat that possesses near-peer combat power. The result is that a unit will have little time and resources to plan for transitions between offense, defense, and stability operations.

This type of scenario is exactly what the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany, established to support the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team's (ABCT's) training rotation. The scenario directed the brigade to conduct an airborne entry into an unstable region of an allied nation that was under the threat of invasion by the conventional forces of a neighboring nation (Arianans). For the first several days, the 173rd ABCT had only its rucksacks and 32 vehicles, which had been air-dropped — no digital systems, no elaborate tactical operations center.

Initially, the brigade had to secure a lodgment area to allow the buildup of combat power, make contact with host-nation security forces, and conduct stability operations. Within a few days, however, and before the 173rd ABCT had its full digital systems up and running, the Arianans had invaded, and the brigade had to rapidly prepare a defense against a mechanized force with much more combat power than it had available. Afterward, when the combination of ground forces and precision airpower had halted the enemy advance, the brigade had to rapidly plan and execute an attack. There was very little time to plan these complex operations against a tough enemy.

As with many units in today's Army, the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry (Airborne) has a high operational tempo. The battalion recently redeployed from Afghanistan and went through the process of rotating out the experienced leadership and replacing them with leadership fresh from professional schooling or institutional Army postings. And, as with many other units, much of the institutional knowledge in the unit was lost. Such institutional knowledge had been captured at various points and places, recorded in green notebooks now departing in household goods, stored

on secret computers left in Afghanistan for the next unit, or locked away in the thoughts of those departing. The new leadership then essentially started the training and deployment cycle from scratch. However, this is not a modern problem brought about by the Overseas Contingency Operations, as the following quote attests:

> In the fall of 1998, the Steel Tigers of Task Force 1-77 Armor (2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division) were highly susceptible to the risks all battalions face at the combat training centers. All five company commanders, the executive officer (XO), and the commander were newly assigned to their positions and had neither planned an operation nor maneuvered together before.[1]

To establish the best planning SOP, a comprehensive approach is the ideal method. The starting point for development is a look at the Army's doctrinal evolution of the planning process — referred to as the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). The next step is studying previously written SOPs from peer organizations. Following this, a staff must study its own organization to determine unique planning considerations. Next, capture these ideas in the form of written procedures and specific tools, such as commander's guidance worksheets, warning orders (WARNOs), and staff estimates. Finally, once a staff has developed its plan for planning, it must train until proficient, just as with any other organization at any echelon within the Army. Only then can it abbreviate the process under tough, realistic conditions.

The Army's MDMP has evolved from hard-earned combat lessons over the past 80 years, but it may be facing its extinction in the not-too-distant future if doctrine continues to evolve on its current path. The precursor to the modern version of the MDMP was first codified in the 1932 *Staff Officers' Field Manual* (FM). This eventually developed, after seven revisions, into a detailed 38-step analytical process captured in the 1997 version of FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations.*[2] This document had the MDMP as its centerpiece, and all chapters revolved around its successful implementation by a staff, specifying roles and responsibilities in detail.

The heyday of the MDMP was soon to fade. The successor document to FM 101-5 was the 2005 version of FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, which still had MDMP as a central concept but took a broader, more theoretical view with less practical application and less specific guidance for staffs.[3] Then, with the introduction of the 2010 version of FM 5-0, *The Operations Process,* the MDMP was relegated to an appendix and had much of the remaining specific guidance removed from the previous version. This version focused instead almost entirely on planning theory and placed "design" as its central concept.[4] Unfortunately, this makes the planning process more nebulous and therefore a more lengthy process. It requires a staff to generally work outside of any set of procedures and in a collaborative and iterative style. While this may eventually lead to an innovative and effective solution to a problem, it is almost certainly guaranteed to be a lengthy process, making it less than ideal for the full spectrum demands of the unified land operations environment.

The next step, gathering and reviewing existing products, is a tried-and-true Army tradition. The age-old method of turning to peers and mentors is still quite useful. However, the advent of the Internet has made this process even easier and simultaneously more comprehensive. The S-3–XO Net offers an Army forum under the Army Knowledge Online website structure for future, current, or former S-3s and XOs to share their lessons learned and products developed. Using these existing resources and products, and the hard-won knowledge gained by studying doctrine, the unit is now prepared to develop its own planning SOP.[5]

The process laid out in the planning SOP should closely mirror the MDMP, as proscribed by Army doctrine, FM 5-0. Starting with this, the unit then decides on any minor modifications necessary to suit it. Next, the unit determines who on the staff is responsible for each component of all the steps. The planning SOP serves to describe exactly who is doing what during each step, and how and when to use the tools they have developed.

The most difficult part of this process is developing the tools necessary to facilitate rapid yet flexible planning. One thing that all versions of Army planning doctrine share in common is that they specify the best way to facilitate rapid planning is through increased involvement of the commander. Thus, clearly one tool or set of tools to focus a lot of effort on is development of the commander's guidance worksheet(s). By doing this, the unit establishes the critical input necessary from the commander to help drive a rapid planning process, as identified in Army doctrine. From there, the unit develops the tools specific to the other staff members, particularly their staff estimates. And finally, the unit develops the formats for operation orders (OPORDs) the unit will use. Table 1 shows a listing of the possible tools necessary for the planning SOP.

Planning SOP Tools

- Commander's Worksheets:
    - Initial Guidance
    - Commander's Intent
    - Planning Guidance
    - Wargaming Guidance
- XO Worksheet
- S-3 Worksheet
- Staff Estimates (FSO, S-1, S-2, S-4, ENG, CMO)
- Orders:
    - WARNO 1
    - WARNO 2
    - ISR FRAGO
    - WARNO 3
    - OPORD
- Confirmation Brief Format
- Backbrief Format

Table 1

With these tools developed, and a modified MDMP guide showing when each tool is used throughout the process, the staff has only left to train on the planning SOP. As with any other SOP, the planning SOP should be updated as the unit identifies shortfalls or necessary changes during the after action review process following all training and operations. However, avoid changing the SOP too often, as this will lead to confusion unless the updates are well disseminated across the battalion.

The unit's planning SOP will undoubtedly be a valuable tool in training and combat and well worth the time and effort spent developing it and training on it. All too often in time-constrained environments, the execution on the ground suffers due to an inability of the higher headquarters to rapidly plan. Small tactical units are left to rely on their ability to survive on the battlefield and bring victory through their sheer determination. Effective planning in time-constrained situations greatly enhances their chances of success. In reality, there is never enough time to plan, so all units need a planning SOP.

Endnotes

1. Tim Reese, Matt Waring, and Curt Lapham, "Task Force Battle Drills, *Armor Magazine,* May–June 1999.

2. Christopher Paparone, "U.S. Army Decisionmaking: Past, Present, and Future," *Military Review,* August 2001.

3. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: GPO, July 2005).

4. FM 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: GPO, March 2010).

5. For this article, the authors used the 1-91 Cavalry Planning SOP, which was given to MAJ David Lamborn by MAJ(P) Stacey Corn, as well as two planning SOPs downloaded from the   S-3–XO net — the 1-181 IN Planning SOP and the 1-69 Infantry Planning SOP — both uploaded by David Marr, the founder and administrator of the website.

Communication Operations in Decisive Action Training Environments: The Challenges of Operating in Analog and Transitioning to Digital

CPT Luke Pereira, LTC Eric M. McFadden, and MAJ Phillip J. Borders
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

The conditions of operating in a decisive action training environment (DATE) propose a significant challenge to planning, deploying, and executing operations without the robust communications infrastructure that today's military leaders have grown accustomed to. The dependency on digital communications in current operations has resulted in a lack of proficiency using tactical radios and analog battle-tracking mechanisms.

During the DATE Rotation 12-01 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) was able to take away several key lessons learned, which provided the 173rd ABCT and other modular U.S. Army brigades with valuable training objectives prior to and during execution. Key lessons learned included pre-mission planning; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); analog battle tracking; and the transition to digital applications. Applying the lessons learned helps mitigate the challenges of transitioning between analog and digital systems. Mitigating communications challenges enables commanders the ability to conduct quick and decisive operations without the risk of interrupted communications that result in the loss of situational awareness between echelons, ultimately affecting mission command.

The difference between operating in a mature theater and a decisive action operations environment is significantly different in the quality of organic and attached communications equipment available. Every communications device requires multiple components to facilitate and create an operational system. Without all components to a system, the system will not meet its intended use and capability. Required components include trained operators, power, functional equipment, and bench stock. For example, if the intended range of a Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System radio exceeds that of a man-pack configuration, additional components, to include radio base stations, power sources, fuel, antennas, and spare components, are required for extended radio coverage. Communications is a compound problem in an immature theater that involves timely, planned logistics nested with the correct operations to ensure the quality and quantity of communications is available to support the unit's mission.

Mature operating environments such as Operation Enduring Freedom feature fiber backbones that physically connect thousands of users on numerous joint bases. Satellite network terminals are used with significant bandwidth available to allow large amounts of information to flow, resulting in the connection of Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) with information updates in real-time over vast distances. Additionally, the theater-provided equipment requires minimal exchange of equipment during unit transfer of authority. Even when unit-specific equipment is exchanged, impact on the mission is minimal due to in-theater testing, configuration, and maintenance. As a contingency, secondary and tertiary means of network paths provide users with uninterrupted network access to accommodate maintenance or equipment failures.

In mature operating environments, networks and ABCS are available down to company level. Operating in a decisive action environment inherently does not allow this benefit due to current limits of a BCT's modified table of organization and equipment. Units are required to deploy with organic equipment. Planning for DATE operations creates obstacles on prioritizing how communication systems arrive in theater. Key points to consider are what communication

systems and capabilities the unit requires with the initial-entry forces, and understanding that transitioning to digital capabilities is a slow, deliberate process, facilitating the methodical buildup of capabilities across the BCT. Tactical radios fill the communication gap by providing near-instantaneous communications and the ability of all users from the BCT tactical operations center (TOC) to the infantry dismounted squad to communicate on the same system.

Pre-mission planning for DATE operations requires significant analysis and understanding of the required basic load for each communications system. Consumable items such as batteries, fuel, and spare components rapidly become in short supply and pose special logistical challenges. Planners must conduct in-depth reviews of the battery and fuel consumption rates, which ultimately result in loss of communications capabilities. Understanding consumption rates will drive the process of creating the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans for each unit, location, and warfighting function. During Rotation 12-01, the ABCT was not able to accurately plan and assess the fuel usage rate. Generators powering joint network node (JNN) terminals, command post nodes (CPNs), and radio stations consumed fuel at a rapid rate. The ABCT established the digital network architecture before logistical systems were in place. Consequently, the ABCT and battalion task force staffs were already relying on their systems as a primary means and had to go back to analog battle tracking because of fuel shortages.

RSOI activities apply to the deployment of all elements of communications systems. Developing the plan to organize, deploy, and integrate only equipment and not systems wastes valuable time in building combat power, which affects the BCT's ability to conduct mission command. Organizing the flow of assets as a complete system (operators, equipment, power, and fuel) allows the system capability to function more rapidly. Another consideration for digital communications requires all nodes across the BCT to function simultaneously to create a complete operational network. Communications platforms and their sustainment requirements should be planned prior to RSOI to assist the command in force buildup and projection.

For example, if the BCT and two battalions are operating on Command Post of the Future (CPOF) and three battalions are using analog systems, CPOF is not effective as the primary means of situational awareness. The 173rd ABCT battalion CPNs flowed into the aerial port of debarkation separately over the course of eight days and could not be moved to designated unit locations due to lack of equipment operators. While the ABCT TOC was primarily operating on the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network, battalion TOCs were still using frequency modulated and tactical satellite radio as their primary methods to send reports to the ABCT. The result created a fractured process in which operations at brigade were conducted digitally while the battalions were operating on analog systems, which disrupted information flow and created different operational pictures.

Battle tracking via analog means is fundamental to facilitating battlefield visualization in the DATE. Without the luxury of large-screen televisions, projectors, and computers found in developed theaters, the use of map boards, acetate, and alcohol pens becomes essential. The commander's ability to effectively conduct mission command directly comes from his understanding and visualization of the battlefield as presented to him by the staff. Sending and receiving reports using tactical radios and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) requires formatted reports that are standard throughout the BCT, with both included in the unit's tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP). Each warfighting function proponent of the staff requires the ability to document and store data to predict enemy and friendly actions without the use of computer-based applications. Field craft at the BCT and battalion level is vital to the decision-making process during initial-entry operations and throughout the rotation.

The 173rd ABCT learned this lesson as a result of not being prepared to manually track information while waiting for digital systems to arrive in theater and become operational. The unit simply did not have the capacity to operate a TOC due to the lack of standardized reporting formats in their TACSOP. The 173rd Special Troops Battalion (STB) initially deployed with only one vehicle equipped with a BFT. The result was that the entire staff and commander could only visualize current operations from the front seat of one high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle. The lack of commander's visualization manifested itself during the 173rd ABCT DATE rotation when map data — specifically unit boundaries between 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment and the STB — were unknown, creating a seam for the opposing force to freely operate in.


Figure 5-1. Rotation 12-01 network establishment timeline

Due to the experience of today's warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, a reliance on digital systems is natural and expected. Once JNNs, CPNs, servers, and ABCS arrive in a decisive action operations environment, it is hard to resist the urge to move all mission command to these digital systems. The key to ensuring successful transition between digital and analog is to avoid rushing the process. A unit must develop a deliberate and sequenced process when transitioning mission command systems. It is crucial to establish decision points throughout the BCT to allow a warfighting function to move to primarily digital communications between command nodes. A sequenced transfer of data to digital systems to minimize loss of information requires vigilant planning. Should a failure in equipment or loss of critical data occur, analog battle-tracking methods must be maintained even after the transition. Information loss and latency occurred between the 173rd ABCT TOC and subordinate TOCs as a result of the brigade transitioning to all digital systems before several battalions had functioning systems.

One of the greatest challenges our Army faces as we transition from digitally mature theaters of operation to DATE will be mitigating the overreliance on digital mission command. Battle tracking and planning must be balanced and simultaneously occur on both digital and analog means. Through command emphasis on training and an increased utilization of tactical radio capabilities, quick and decisive operations can overcome digital shortfalls. Overcoming digital dependency requires understanding communications assets from a systems perspective and not just pieces of equipment; planning for a slow, deliberate approach to developing the digital infrastructure; and focusing on the information flow operations.

Brigade Current Operations in the Decisive Action Training Environment

MAJ Andrew Zieseniss
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Standing in the center of the brigade's current operations (CUOPS) cell, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team's (ABCT's) brigade operations officer diligently monitored the brigade command chat windows and map displays of the Command Post of the Future. A low but constant murmur filled the command post as staff officers received reports and passed along instructions to subordinate units that used a full complement of digital systems. The main effort of the Arianan 306th Reconnaissance Brigade was advancing through the brigade's area of operations (AO).

For the first time in the 173rd Brigade's history, Sky Soldiers, with their multinational partners, were engaged in direct combat with a determined enemy who had tanks and personnel carriers. The brigade of lightly equipped paratroopers was leveraging its skills, determination, and a well-rehearsed plan to face this adversary. The outcome of the fight depended heavily on how well the brigade CUOPS team could manage the common operational picture (COP) as well as integrate and synchronize all the brigade's critical capabilities across the entire area of operations. It was shaping up to be a long day for the brigade operations officer and the Sky Soldier team.

The unique challenges encountered by brigade combat teams (BCTs) conducting contingency operations in the decisive action training environment (DATE) present a comprehensive test of staff structure and procedures. In this environment, BCTs must be prepared to simultaneously conduct all three elements of decisive action: offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The BCT must also be prepared to operate in an austere environment where everything from the sustainment infrastructure to the digital architecture may be nonexistent upon initial entry into the AO. How well the brigade's CUOPS manages the BCT-level operations in these austere conditions is a significant factor in overall mission success. The 173rd ABCT's exercise in October 2011 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) highlighted several CUOPS lessons learned in the following areas:

- Operating in an austere environment.

- Establishing and maintaining the COP.

- Establishing a framework for running the CUOPs synchronization meeting.

- Defining roles and responsibilities for CUOPs personnel.

- Maintaining continuous mission command support to the commander.

Operating in an Austere Environment

For the past decade, BCTs have deployed in support of operations in relatively mature environments. BCT staffs have fallen in on established networks, mission command systems, and standing operating procedures (SOPs) suited to a particular AO. As units conducted their relief-in-place transition, one incoming individual simply replaced an outgoing individual at the same workstation. The nature of operations during the past 10 years rarely challenged BCTs to develop and implement systems from the ground up. This has caused an atrophy of basic command-post skills once taken for granted before the Army digitized with a complex integration of various mission command systems.

In the DATE, a BCT cannot expect to inherit the infrastructure and systems established by a preceding unit. Home station training and development of CUOPS SOPs must take this into consideration. A well-developed initial plan and detailed execution checklists can help guide current operations for the first 24-48 hours. However, CUOPS officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and Soldiers must have the appropriate procedures and training to be able to manage brigade-level operations in an analog environment until the establishment and integration of mission command networks.

Immediately following its initial entry operation during the early stages of JMRC Rotation 12-01, the 173rd ABCT was able to effectively manage operations for the first 12 hours from the early-entry command post (EECP) on the drop zone. This was accomplished through a well-rehearsed plan and a thorough execution checklist. However, as operations progressed and the EECP transitioned into the BCT main command post at a more permanent location, young officers and NCOs were challenged with basic battle tracking and managing events across the AO using nondigital procedures. A clear efficiency lag remained until the full set of mission command systems was established after four days of analog operations.

Over the past decade, most brigade staffs have had insufficient training in managing operations in a nondigital environment. Basic battle tracking skills, once taken for granted, need to be reclaimed and sustained. In preparation for operations within the DATE, the brigade staff must think through how it will manage operations until its mission command networks are established and fully operational at the brigade and battalion levels.

In preparation for these operations, units should address the following areas:

- Revisit techniques and procedures for battle tracking in a nondigital environment. Train staff officers and NCOs to battle track on map boards while using radios or limited digital systems, such as Blue Force Tracker, for passing information. Brigade leaders should not assume that the staff is proficient at this task.

- Establish procedures for transitioning analog data into digital databases. Develop procedures for maintaining and integrating this data and information into the unit's knowledge management portals and databases once digital systems become fully functional. The staff must also address how this information will be shared across each of the warfighting functions.

- Re-evaluate unit tactical operations center (TOC) SOPs defining how the BCT CUOPS will operate in the DATE. Many BCTs have developed SOPs for operating in a mature digital environment while conducting counterinsurgency operations. Although still relevant, these TOCSOPs must be expanded to incorporate a full set of procedures ranging from completely analog to fully digital operations.

- Develop and practice reports and briefings using analog systems. Conducting briefings, updates, and various staff meetings in an austere environment can also be very challenging and must be addressed in advance. Structuring key meetings and updates while using basic communication means and briefing techniques can pay great dividends, save time, and reduce undue frustration.

- Validate how the CUOPS integrated cell conducts battle drills using analog systems. It is equally important to practice CUOPS battle drills when only limited systems are available. All TOC personnel can benefit from well-structured and easily available CUOPS smart books, smart cards, and other hard copy references.

Establishing and Maintaining the COP

A critical component to mission command is the ability for the BCT staff to produce a thorough and accurate COP for the commander. A well-developed COP helps the commander make critical decisions at the appropriate time. The staff should integrate knowledge from across each of the warfighting functions into the COP. This will help present an overall picture of events taking place in the AO. In the DATE, management of the COP becomes more complex as the BCT addresses all three forms of decisive action with various means and capabilities.

The 173rd ABCT found its greatest challenge in managing the COP during the period of transition from EECP to a fully functional digital operations center. A lack of established procedures for handling this transition degraded its ability to maintain an accurate COP, which impacted the commander's ability to clearly understand what was occurring in the BCT's operational environment. Subsequently, the brigade staff was overwhelmed as it tried to manage operations. Once the BCT's full complement of digital systems was fully established, maintaining an accurate COP became more routine.

Establishing a Framework for Running the CUOPS Synchronization Meeting

One of the most important meetings the BCT will conduct on a daily basis is the CUOPS synchronization meeting. The meeting allows the staff to synchronize operations within the short-term planning horizon.

The standard CUOPS synchronization meetings used during counterinsurgency operations are still relevant and can be good for restructuring in anticipation of operations in the DATE. While much of what is synchronized in a counterinsurgency environment is based on bottom-up requirements, BCT operations within the DATE are mostly top-driven. Many of the requirements are developed by the BCT staff and directed to the subordinate units through the targeting process or fragmentary orders. For this reason, the chief of the CUOPS section may want to re-evaluate the SOPs for how the CUOPS synch meeting is conducted.

Not all BCTs incorporate subordinate unit liaison officers (LNOs) into the BCT TOC. However, LNOs can be very effective for the BCT and battalions they represent if the right person is assigned to that role. Training LNOs to provide the right input for the CUOPS synchronization meeting pays great dividends for the battalions and facilitates brigade-level operations.

Recommendations for managing the CUOPS synchronization meeting:

- Be consistent and conduct this meeting on a daily basis at a set time. Do not allow other competing requirements to interfere with or overcome this event.

- Develop a structured agenda and format for this meeting prior to deploying and incorporate them in the BCT TOCSOP.

- Unit LNOs are an invaluable asset. Integrate them into the process and train them to bring the right information to the meeting.

Defining Roles and Responsibilities for CUOPs Personnel

It is important to determine who will oversee the short-term planning horizon for the brigade and be responsible for the synchronization of current operations within the CUOPS integrated cell. Doctrinally, the brigade executive officer is the person who provides oversight of CUOPs. Some BCTs designate the deputy commander or S-3 to fulfill this role. A case can be made for any of the three. Regardless, the BCT must clearly define the key staff proponent who will oversee and provide direction to the CUOPS.

It is equally important to define the roles and responsibilities for each functional staff section within the CUOPS integrated cell. NCOs and junior officers are often underutilized, which places undue stress on more senior staff members. This unwelcome trend can be mitigated through clearly defined roles and responsibilities combined with training. NCOs can fulfill many of the tasks, and junior officers must be empowered and used to their full potential. For a short time, senior members of the staff can work their way through the high-tempo environment with limited rest. However, when conducting operations over an extended period of time, BCTs must have systems in place and trained personnel who can manage operations in the absence of primary staff officers.

These are key considerations as units refine their roles and responsibilities pertaining to CUOPS:

- Clearly define who is in charge of the BCT CUOPS integrated cell.

- Empower NCOs and junior officers within the BCT staff.

- Ensure all members of the CUOPs section clearly understand their roles and responsibilities.

- Spell out roles and responsibilities in the BCT TOCSOP.

Maintaining Continuous Mission Command Support to the Brigade

Over the course of counterinsurgency operations during the past decade, BCTs have primarily conducted operations from one central location. Occasionally, brigades have been required to move their main command post based on the tactical situation. During operations in the DATE, the operational environment will likely be more fluid and could require the BCT to move the command post routinely. The staff must be prepared for this possibility. A proper integration of the TOC and the tactical command post (TAC CP) during these moves becomes critical for seamless mission command support to the commander.

After fully establishing its main command post, the 173rd ABCT tactically relocated their command post twice in 21 days. Each time, the movement of the main command post took well over 24 hours from disassembly to reassembly. The gap in capability provided by the main command post made the role of the TAC CP extremely important in controlling operations in the BCT's AO.

Important considerations prior to jumping the TOC:

- Does the TAC CP have the appropriate systems to ensure sufficient mission command support to the BCT?

- Does the TAC CP have the right personnel to manage operations? Is each warfighting function properly represented in the TAC CP? For example, if the BCT is trying to integrate an aviation task force or plan major air operations, is the brigade aviation officer (or designated representative) present in the TAC CP?

- Does the commander fully understand which mission command systems will be degraded, with subsequent effects, while moving the main command post? What measures have been taken to compensate for this temporary shortfall?

Conclusion

The 173rd ABCT faced the full range of challenges presented by operations within the DATE. The onslaught of Arianan near-peer conventional forces stressed the BCT, coupled with the various insurgent, terrorist, and criminal elements that make up the hybrid theat. The complex civil environment created sources of instability and forced the staff to make critical decisions pertaining to the stability operations as it was conducting defensive operations and planning the upcoming offense. The fast-moving environment placed an enormous challenge on the BCTs current operations integrated cell. The sheer determination and energy of the CUOPS Sky Soldiers, as they were climbing the steep learning curve of this exercise, enabled the brigade to succeed. The BCT was able to concentrate the right amount of combat power at the right place and the right time to stop the enemy's advance and force it back. Although hard lessons were learned, the BCT never lost its ability to see itself, the multifaceted hybrid threat, and a very complex operational environment.

References

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (Final Approved Draft), *Unified Land Operations*, 22 September 2011.

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0.1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, September 2011.

Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, March 2010.

FM 6-0, *Mission Command*, September 2011.

Integrating the Interagency and Stability Operations into Decisive Action Operations

Dr. James W. Derleth
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

With the completion of the Iraq redeployment and major combat operations in Afghanistan winding down, combat training centers (CTCs) are moving away from preparing units to conduct counterinsurgency operations to training units to conduct decisive action operations (DAOs). The goal of DAO training is to get "Army leaders to think differently about training and leader development to support an expeditionary Army that is fully trained and capable to conduct simultaneous offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations anywhere along the spectrum of conflict." (Field Manual [FM] 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations,* February 2011). While it is imperative to prepare Soldiers to effectively mitigate the variety of threats facing the United States, there are numerous challenges that must first be overcome. They include improving the ability of units to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations with equal proficiency and integrating the interagency (IA) in a "whole of government" approach to fulfill U.S. foreign policy goals.

This article examines the role of the IA and stability operations in the Joint Multinational Readiness Center's (JMRC's) first DAO rotation (12-01). Specifically, it identifies challenges to integrating the IA and stability operations into the rotation, the ramifications for the rotational training unit (RTU), and provides recommendations for integrating the IA and stability operations into future DAO rotations.

The Interagency and Stability Operations in CTC Training

While it might seem unusual to include the IA and stability operations in the same article, they are in fact closely related. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, October 2011, describes how the "Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage … through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations." It also notes strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of IA and multinational partners: "the central idea is the synchronization, and/or integration of the activities of government and non-government entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort." Therefore, the IA should be included in all operations and, in particular, stability operations. This is because stability operations are "more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations." (FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, October 2008). Since fostering stability in a complex, dynamic international environment is difficult, success requires a "whole of government approach." (*U.S. National Security Strategy*).

Although the doctrinal intent is clear, there were numerous challenges to integrating this guidance into Rotation 12-01. They included: limited IA support, ineffective contract role players, a complex scenario that made it difficult to execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations, ineffectual assessment criteria, and the lack of appropriate observer/controller-trainer (O/C-T) education and training.

- Lack of IA support – Although JMRC has used official channels to solicit IA support, it has had limited success. There are numerous reasons for this situation. First, the Department of State (DoS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) together have less than 8000 Foreign Service officers. By comparison, there are approximately 1.68 million uniformed personnel in the U.S. armed forces. In other words, the Department of Defense (DoD) is around 210 times larger than the DoS and the USAID combined. Consequently, sending personnel to support a 3-4 week exercise is a significant burden for IA entities. In addition, while there is undoubtedly a professional and national security benefit to their participation, in contrast to the DoD, there is no career benefit, as joint assignments are not included in personnel evaluations. Another obstacle is the widespread interagency view that DoD training scenarios don't include relevant IA involvement.

- Ineffective IA role players – To make up for the lack of IA support, the Department of the Army created a contracting mechanism to bring in subject matter experts (SMEs) to role play as IA personnel. However, the contract doesn't allow the CTCs to select the SMEs who support its rotations. This leads to the situation where the contractor, not the CTC, decides who is a qualified role player. Consequently, JMRC has had SMEs without requisite field experience, or SMEs who actually work against rotational training objectives because they replicate what they "did downrange," regardless of whether it was effective or has been superseded by updated guidance.

- A complex scenario that made it difficult to execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations – Although we created a scenario that allowed for significant play for all three missions, the scenario — defending against an invasion and then executing offensive operations to push out the invading force — overwhelmed the staff and made it difficult to simultaneously plan and conduct offensive, defensive, and stability missions.

- Ineffectual assessment criteria – To assess whether a unit accomplished its training objectives, measures of effect (MOEs) that are directly linked to training objectives must be identified in advance. MOEs are different from measures of performance because they don't measure the education and training the RTU has received. Rather, they measure the effectiveness of the education and training. As an illustration, the number of information operations messages put out by an RTU is not as important as their effect in shaping local perceptions. Traditionally, the training cadre and RTU focus on and collect data for measures of performance.

- Inappropriate education and training for O/C-Ts – Because of the complexity of contemporary warfare, CTC training cadres must not only be versed in their specific military occupational specialties, but more importantly, know how to ensure their interactions with rotational peers fulfill unit training objectives. O/C-T academies typically focus on exercise procedures rather than acting as adult educators and mentors.

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA
For Official Use Only

The Rotation

During the rotation, the RTU focused on the offensive and defensive missions and downplayed the stability mission. This was the result of a variety of factors, including a scenario that included an immediate threat to be mitigated and traditional staff structures, which are heavily weighted in favor of lethal operations. An example of the latter was the lack of a high-ranking staff proponent to facilitate the incorporation of stability operations into planning and operations. This meant the task was delegated to an S-9 section, which by the modified table of organization and equipment was fully staffed but lacks resources and support for DAO scenarios.

This situation has numerous ramifications. First, as operations in Afghanistan suggest, even though we win 99 percent of the tactical engagements, if an area is not stabilized, U.S. government foreign policy goals are not realized. Second, although offensive, defensive, and stability operations are doctrinally to be planned and conducted simultaneously, a focus on the first two limits the amount of interagency involvement. While the IA should be involved in all operations because its conduct affects broader U.S. national security interests, some commanders don't use their civilians effectively in the warfighting phases of an operation. At the end of the rotation, some JMRC senior staff wondered if we had forgotten everything we learned in the last 10 years.

An unforeseen issue for both the RTU and training cadre was the legacy of their deployment experience. Whether gained in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, both the cadre and RTU had difficulty looking outside their experience. This led them to apply experience which wasn't relevant. The country of "Atropia" (the setting for 12-01) is very different than either Afghanistan or Iraq. Like most countries with which the United States has relations, Atropia is a sovereign state with bilateral treaties which govern U.S. interactions, and the U.S. ambassador controls all civilian AND military personnel. This means missions and end states must be developed in consultation with the U.S. Embassy to ensure they fulfill US foreign policy objectives. This is a very different situation from what many leaders have experienced in the last 10 years.

The combination of these factors meant that at the end of the rotation, the population of the main town had turned against the host-nation government, insurgents had increased their support, key infrastructure had been destroyed, and U.S. government personnel had been ordered out of the area because of decreasing security. Since the DAO rotations are designed to replicate a deployment with follow-on forces, this means the next RTU will start with this unenviable situation.

Summary and Recommendations

To overcome these challenges and foster the inclusion of the IA and stability operations into rotations, JMRC has enacted a variety of initiatives:

- Hired a senior interagency training adviser. He has been able to greatly increase the number of IA personnel supporting rotations — both from the Continental United States and from theater.

- Integrated stability operations and the interagency into rotational materials (scenarios, operations and intelligence briefings, operation orders, scenario combat battle injects, etc.).

- Developed and incorporated a block of instruction on stability operations into the leadership training program.

- Created specialty training, including situational training exercise lanes, to practice the whole of government approach to understanding the operational environment.

- Designed and implemented the first integrated company intelligence support team, district stability framework, and attack-the-network training.

- Created a stability operations leadership development program taught jointly by the JMRC Deputy Commander and the IA training adviser at home station. The purpose of this program is to help units understand stability operations and provide them with ideas for structuring their formations to effectively execute them.

Two premises guided these efforts. First, by including a stability message throughout the products and training timeline, it would foster the integration of a whole of government approach and stability operations into the RTU's planning process. To reinforce this message, scenarios are being designed so that if the RTU ignores the stability missions and the IA, it will have to divert combat power to deal with scenario injects, such as protecting infrastructure, caring for internally displaced personnel, providing security for U.S. Embassy personnel, etc. Other JMRC initiatives and recommendations include the following:

- Mitigating the challenges associated with contract role players by creating IA "role player briefs" and mandating a series of pre-rotational and rotational role player meetings to educate both IA and IA contract role players on the overall scenario, their roles, training objectives, key events, etc. JMRC is also rewriting contracts to ensure they allow JMRC to bring in the SMEs and role players which JMRC — not contractors — believe can most effectively support training objectives.

- Improving assessment. To help RTUs assess the effectiveness of their training, JMRC is changing its rotational assessment products. Specifically, it is grouping training objectives and identifying MOEs for them. JMRC believes this will have numerous benefits. It will identify the data that needs to be collected, lessening the overall amount of data collected; identification of MOEs will help O/C-Ts focus on the overall competencies the RTU is trying to develop; and MOEs will provide an "assessment shell" that helps O/C-T task force senior trainers build inclusive after action reviews.

- Educating and training O/C-Ts in outcome-based education and training, adult-based learning, and mentoring techniques. The intent is to improve the O/C-Ts' ability to help "develop leaders able to solve difficult, complex problems … and consider alternative, sometime nonconformist, solution and the second and third-order effect of those solutions" (FM 7-0).

The JMRC believes these initiatives will measurably increase its capability and capacity to educate, train, and mentor RTUs to effectively execute all decisive action operations missions. They will also help RTUs work more effectively with their interagency partners in a whole of government approach to national security.

Command Post Operations for the Reconnaissance Squadron

LTC Clark Lindner, MAJ Brian W. Hunt, and MAJ Morrie J. Fanto
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

The functions and placement of command posts (CPs) are decisions that have presented challenges to squadron commanders throughout history. Where to position, for what duration, and to achieve what purpose are but a few of the considerations that commanders are faced with. These decisions are further complicated by the advantages and constraints associated with bridging the gap between analog methods used to receive information from lower echelons and managing information feeds from those above. What's more, 10 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan in relatively static locations have atrophied our knowledge of the process to identify mission command requirements, properly plan against these requirements, and then conduct operations utilizing multiple mission command nodes.

As our Army withdraws from Iraq and begins training against a new hybrid threat, the requirement for adherence to a process becomes ever more apparent and critical. As such, the purpose of this article is to identify the roles and responsibilities associated with each command post, and through the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and the mission command approach (plan, prepare, execute, assess), provide a framework to assist commanders in positioning CPs at the right place on the battlefield, for the proper duration, to achieve the desired results.

The Five Ws

All too often, the selection of CP locations is an arbitrary one made with little analysis or based upon poorly shaped guidance. Moreover, the experience of 10 years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations has eroded the experience levels of even senior commanders who rarely had to "jump" a CP while deployed, resulting in guidance that fails to account for the highly technical systems resident in modern CPs and the "front-end" work required to establish and maintain those systems. As such, the requirement for deliberate planning is even more pertinent today than ever before with the staff responsibility to conduct detailed analysis to support a commander's intent. A commander who decides where to position his CPs and to what effect must consider these factors as well as others, such as security/survivability, manning, duration, and continuity among nodes. Beyond the functions of what command posts should do is the mandate to understand how they do it, as the requirements listed above are frequently reliant on a complex communications architecture.

During Rotation 12-01 conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team elected to collocate the squadron tactical operations center (TOC) with the brigade TOC to facilitate information sharing as well as reduce security requirements. While this decision set the conditions for information sharing and certainly reduced security requirements through shared manning, what it did not account for were the communications problems it would create in the squadron; a unit that fights through the use of its radios.

Keeping the TOC nearly 15 kilometers rearward of the squadron's screen line in complex terrain forced the squadron commander to employ a forward tactical command post (TAC CP)/ command group for an extended duration (nearly 72 hours) just to maintain communications with subordinate elements. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the decision, the staff has the responsibility to synchronize the directed course of action (COA) to support the commander's intent.

In the Beginning…

Before a unit can begin the process of positioning CPs, it must first identify the requirements associated with each node. Doctrine provides a clear set of functions that must be performed by successful CPs at every level:

- Maintaining running estimates and the common operational picture (COP).

- Controlling operations.

- Assessing operations.

- Developing and disseminating orders.

- Coordinating with higher, lower, and adjacent units.

- Conducting knowledge management and information management.

- Performing CP administration.[1]

In a cavalry squadron, these functions include the TOC, the field trains command post, and the command group.

Doctrine further provides clarity as to the nodes available at different levels. A cavalry squadron is not manned to provide the commander a TAC CP or assault CP, as these are formations resident only at brigade and division levels, resulting in an ad hoc element created to support the commander's mission command requirements. What's more, doctrine does not account for the current manning level in a given unit, a factor that must be constantly weighed in the running estimates as the staff conducts the MDMP. Manning is a zero-sum game and must be identified as a limiting factor when devising mission command COAs to ensure that appropriate leaders are in place at the decisive location where they can influence the battle. Applied to Rotation 12-01, when the squadron collocated its TOC with the brigade, it neglected to account for the competing needs of the squadron commander to both maintain situational awareness and position forward to provide critical, on-sight guidance to subordinate commanders developing the security zone fight.

The Problem

The strength of a cavalry squadron derives from its ability to play a role that is bigger than it is. This manifests itself in two primary ways. First is the capitalization on a robust signal architecture that allows rapid communications among elements, since most maneuver elements have reliable communications. Forward scouts can rapidly develop/report the situation forward

and then incorporate enablers such as artillery/close air support through the aforementioned signal architecture. Of course, this assumes proper signal planning to support communications across the depth and breadth of the battlefield.

When this signal architecture works, the commander has the ability to maintain situational awareness of subordinate elements through monitoring voice communications as they occur, similar to what squadrons have done for the past 30 years.

Second, the commander has a robust digital communications suite available through the use of the Army's Battle Command Systems (ABCS). Far and above the voice techniques of old, these systems provide automated processing of data to present real-time updates to leaders inclusive of streaming video from unmanned aircraft systems, intelligence feeds as well as digital communications to speed calls for fire. However, these systems are resident only down to the squadron TOC, so if the squadron commander desires to take advantage of this incredible capability, he either has to position himself at the TOC or rely on a well-trained staff to retransmit this information to him via the means available in his vehicle: Blue Force Tracker (BFT) or voice.

Unquestionably, the squadron commander has a responsibility to position himself on the battlefield where he can make the greatest impact, and this requirement will frequently pull him away from the TOC. How then, can he take advantage of the systems at his disposal while positioning forward?

Bridging the Gap

Unlike the operational tempo of a small wars conflict that takes place over years, the hybrid threat and an adversarial near-peer bring about violent conflict in which the winner and loser is determined within hours. In order for the squadron commander to make decisions, the staff must have processes in place to maintain situational awareness through a COP. Effective reporting begins with comprehensive tactical standing operating procedures (SOP). The entire unit should report, track, and update analog data in the same manner so that information can enter the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) at the squadron staff level.

For the troop-level and below, this means either building graphics in the BFT or ABCS, or using maps with overlays or hand-drawn graphics (an art which has fallen into disuse over the course of COIN operations and has recently been eliminated from the Army's Battle Staff Course). Additionally, the squadron needs a reporting plan in place that begins immediately after the initial movement to refresh icons so that the COP does not become stale. A well-written, rehearsed, and adhered-to SOP is essential to effective communications among echelons in today's fight.

Just as critical to this plan is the understanding and delineation of who will perform these tasks/roles. During Rotation 12-01, the squadron commander elected to man a robust TAC CP forward to support his mission command needs for nearly 72 hours during the security zone fight. To maintain situational awareness and command functions forward, he necessarily pulled critical personnel away from the TOC, inclusive of the S-3, assistant S-3, fire support officer, joint terminal attack controller, assistant S-2, operations noncommissioned officers, radio operators, and security element personnel.

Because the unit's modified table of organization and equipment does not authorize a TAC CP for a squadron, the absence of these personnel in the TOC inevitably degrades the capability and functions of that node. More than that, the absence of the ABCS architecture, excepting BFT, in the ad hoc TAC CP forward, significantly reduced the capabilities of these critical staff functions due to their geographic separation from the TOC and its connectivity to digital systems.

The Solution

The Army's doctrine provides a clear roadmap to successful mission command, which remains applicable even against the complex hybrid threat experienced during the recent unified land operations fight at the JMRC. It begins with detailed mission analysis to understand the operating environment where a commander will have to exercise his mission command. The time-honored practice of "seeing the terrain, seeing the enemy, and seeing yourself" remains as valid today as in years past. Clearly assessing the terrain and its effects on operations, particularly associated with mission command, is a paramount first step toward success.

Balancing these factors against potential threats and our ability to mitigate through available assets comes next. The staff must ensure that available assets, such as retrans and BFT, are appropriately incorporated to provide the commander feasible mission command COAs. Just as importantly, the staff must provide the boss with honest and sometimes negative feedback related to a given COA. The degradation of capability associated with manning an ad hoc node forward, coupled with the personnel impacts to the TOC, cannot be glossed over or overcome simply through motivation. Conscientious information must be presented to the commander for his evaluation and judgment. Further, the staff owes corresponding solutions to mitigate these effects. Cleared routes to facilitate transit to and from forward elements, enemy timelines or bracketed windows for safe movement for the command group, and a detailed schedule for updates are just a few examples of mitigating factors that would assist a commander in balancing the competing requirements of forward command presence versus capability.

Finally, commanders and staff alike must continually reassess the viability of a selected COA during execution. More than just a technical functions check of systems, leaders must constantly evaluate the effectiveness of the squadron's plan for mission command and then be prepared to adjust the plan in order to prevent ultimate failure. Adherence to this methodology provides for a COA that might work. Ignorance ensures defeat through a failed plan.

Endnote

1. FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, C1, 18 March 2011, page A-1, paragraph A-4.

Executing a Brigade Targeting Process in the Decisive Action Training Environment

LTC Eric T. Smith, Deputy Brigade Trainer
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Shortly after P-hour, the airborne brigade's assault command post (ACP) assembles on the drop zone and moves to a wooded hilltop to establish communications with the joint task force (JTF). Distant scattered explosions and small-arms fire can be heard. The operations noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), handset pressed to his ear, receives the initial situation reports (SITREPs) from the battalions — all have achieved their assault objectives. Three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been found before detonation, and one battalion has received ineffective mortar fire. The battle major sends the SITREP to the JTF, and the S-2 NCOIC downloads the latest reconnaissance and surveillance reports on his Global Rapid Response Intelligence Package.

The S-3, S-2, and fire support officer (FSO) cluster around a map board. While nothing in the operational environment (OE) is an immediate threat to the airhead, the IEDs and mortar fire must be neutralized. They are also concerned that no reports of civilian activity have arrived and the host nation security forces are nowhere to be found. The S-3 prioritizes the reconnaissance plan. The S-2 and FSO begin to refine established named areas of interest and targeted areas of interest. The brigade's first targeting meeting in the decisive action training environment (DATE) is complete.

The DATE challenges brigade combat teams (BCTs) to conduct all three elements of decisive action — offense, defense, and stability operations — simultaneously in the short, medium, and long-term planning horizons. The BCT must be able to conduct current operations while planning to exploit and/or mitigate their effects and while rapidly shifting emphasis between the three components of decisive action. The OE requires a novel approach to targeting at the brigade level. This article describes a method for a BCT to implement a graduated targeting process that starts with austere mission command networks and limited information pertaining to the OE, then increases the depth and detail of analysis as its networks and staff estimates improve.

When the principal adversary is a conventional threat, targeting at the brigade level has been historically lethally focused, with a battle rhythm tied to the air tasking order (ATO). Field Manual (FM) 3-60, *The Targeting Process,* describes two targeting meetings per day, each focusing 24, 48, and 72 hours out and involving a targeting working group (WG) and the targeting decision board. Under this doctrinal construct, the targeting WG is "facilitated by the fires cell [to] ensure the effects of scalable fires and meet the BCT commander's guidance and intent." The targeting decision board is "focused on updating the commander, gaining new guidance, and obtaining approval of planned and proposed targeting actions."

The length of the BCT targeting cycle and the time frame it incorporates are based on the commander's assessment of the OE. For example, when conducting counter-insurgency operations, the targeting cycle is normally significantly longer, typically two to four weeks. The number of meetings, their complexity, and the number of participants increases. A longer

targeting cycle may incorporate an assessment WG, assessment decision brief, targeting WG, targeting meeting, and targeting decision brief (DB), with a host of staff working groups that feed either the assessment WG or the targeting WG.

Both paradigms operate on fixed periods, extended through time, execution, decision, and development. The execution is the next period, whether 24 hours or two weeks, in which the BCT has already issued a targeting order and subordinate units are executing troop leading procedures (TLPs). Changes within this targeting cycle should be kept to a minimum. The decision cycle occurs 24-48 hours (or 2-4 weeks) and is the period in which the staff will nominate targets for the commander's approval. Targets within the developmental cycle are nominated for planning, briefed to the commander for guidance, but not yet briefed for execution.

Neither example is suitable for BCTs operating in the DATE because offensive, defensive, and stability operations are occurring simultaneously and in different levels of emphasis at different locations in the OE. Additionally, the BCT may be conducting an initial entry and not have the benefit of assuming an established process during a relief in place with a like unit. Staffs will have to adapt their methodology, enabling a process designed to nominate and approve targets in the near term while assessing and planning for the long term, all in an austere environment. This can be accomplished by varying the lengths of the decision and execution cycles while extending the development cycle in time and simultaneously planning for the growth of staff participation in the process itself.

Figure 9-1. BCT staff initial targeting cycle

This process is displayed graphically in Figure 9-1. Red bars indicate the targeting cycle, blue bars indicate what cycle is under decision on a particular day, and green bars indicate which cycle is under development. On Day 1, the BCT conducts its initial entry into the OE. Our hypothetical staff is operating from an austere command post, communicating predominantly analog with subordinate battalions and their higher headquarters (HQ). Following a targeting

decision brief, the brigade issues a targeting fragmentary order (FRAGO) directing tasks for Cycle B (Day 3) and submits nominations to the higher HQ for inclusion on the ATO. On Day 2, the staff assesses the BCT's effect on the OE on Day 1, nominates targets for decision on Day 4, and develops targets for Days 5-7. This structure allows the staff to nominate targets for approval in the near term, give subordinates 24 hours to conduct TLPs, and develop targets in the long term out to six days.

As the mission command networks and main command post improve, the staff will be able to extend the time horizon. In Figure 9-2 the commander has directed the staff at the targeting decision brief on Day 3 to expand its time horizons starting tomorrow, and the executive officer (XO) has modified the battle rhythm by adding one targeting cycle to the developmental period. Day 4 ends with the staff nominating targets for decision on Cycle E (Day 6) and developing targets through Cycle I (Day 10). Thus, the staff continues to nominate for decision in the near term while development is now extended to the next seven days.

Figure 9-2. Expansion of staff planning

In Figure 9-3, the commander again directs an expansion of the cycle, this time by enlarging the decision period. He directs the staff at the targeting decision brief on Day 6 to expand execution and decision cycles to 48 hours beginning with Cycle H. The staff then expands the scope of its analysis and briefs Cycle H for decision on Day 7 and Cycle I for decision on Day 8. By doubling the size of the execution and decision periods, the staff has now extended its outlook to Day 20, nearly doubling the scope of its analysis in time. This benefits subordinate units, for whom the targeting FRAGO published on Day 8 now refers to tasks on Days 11-12, giving them an extra 24 hours to conduct targeting and/or TLPs at their level.

Figure 9-3. Expansion of execution and decision cycles

This process can be continued indefinitely, based on the tempo of operations within the OE. If the tempo is high but the commander wants to plan deeper in time, extending the developmental window through multiple targeting cycles will accomplish this. If the tempo of current operations tapers, the commander can extend the execution cycles as shown in Figure 9-3. A combination of the two would be appropriate in a low-tempo, complex environment.

Throughout this process, the BCT is nested within its higher HQ's targeting cycle. In the examples above, the BCT was able to extend execution and decision cycles. If these are dictated by the higher HQ, then the same result can be accomplished by combining two 24-hour periods into one execution/decision period at the BCT level. Using the structure in Figures 9-1 and 9-2, the BCT staff on Day 8 would brief the commander for decision on Cycles J and K (Days 11-12) and develop Cycles L-S (Days 13-20). Regardless of the alphanumeric designator, the result is the same.

Development of the Staff Battle Rhythm in Support of Targeting

The targeting process is used to refine and synchronize brigade operations, constantly re-evaluating changes in the OE utilizing the same model for problem solving the staff uses when it conducts the MDMP (Figure 9-4). Every targeting cycle, regardless of scope, contains an assessment, nomination, refinement, decision, and an order. The examples above show a hypothetical implementation of a BCT targeting process in terms of time, focusing on when the commander will be briefed by the staff for decision. The brigade XO, as chief of staff, is responsible for crafting a battle rhythm that supports the commander's visualization of the brigade's operations.

Figure 9-4: Targeting cycle relationship to MDMP including course of action (COA) development through approval

In the scenario outlined above, staff processes on Day 1 are austere. Key staff members meet to conduct a hasty assessment, nominate targets for the next execution cycle, and then refine the targets within the scope of their warfighting functions. They reconvene to synchronize their refinements, brief the targets to the commander for decision, and issue the targeting FRAGO. The complexity inherent in the DATE drives a minimum of three meetings as part of the brigade targeting process: targeting meeting (assessment and nomination), targeting WG (refinement), and targeting decision brief (decision). These three meetings can be conducted in any environment, with any number of participants.

Figure 9-5 builds upon Figure 9-3 to show the three meetings that support the targeting process, arranged to support a BCT staff with increasing capabilities. Note that the meetings are split over two days starting on Day 9 to give the staff additional time to develop a quality product. In this scenario, the brigade is new to the OE, so the assessment and nomination portion of the targeting process receive more effort (an entire day starting on Day 9), while the refinement and decision are both scheduled for the second day (Day 10).

Figure 9-5. Baseline staff battle rhythm for targeting

Based on the BCT's experience during the initial entry, the XO decides to add additional WGs to the process. He prioritizes a counter IED (CIED) working group and counter-indirect fire (C-IDF) WG. The CIED WG requires analysis across the staff, so the XO schedules it prior to the targeting meeting to allow the WG to bring its analysis to the assessment phase of the targeting cycle. The C-IDF WG is composed of a smaller audience and can take readily available data for use in refining targeting nominations. The XO schedules this event between the targeting meeting and the targeting WG (Figure 9-6).

In Figure 9-6, the XO has added the first CIED WG on Day 4, following the targeting decision brief, so the staff estimates developed at that working group can be incorporated into the targeting meeting on Day 5. The first C-IDF WG on Day 5 develops updated estimates that directly feed the COA development occurring at the targeting WG that day. This schedule continues until Day 8 when the XO decides to space meetings out to give the staff more time to develop their estimates.

Figure 9-6. Incorporation of working groups

Not all subject areas require a staff WG directly in support of each targeting cycle. In some cases, the staff proponent can brief nominations and support target refinement based on his staff estimate, while chairing a recurring WG in order to take advantage of analysis across functional areas. In Figure 9-7, the XO has added an inform-and-influence-activities (IIA) WG and a civil affairs (CA) WG to the staff battle rhythm.

Figure 9-7. Additional working groups

In Figure 9-7, the XO has determined the CA WG needs to convene with all its participants weekly (Day 4 and Day 11), while the IIA WG needs to convene every third day (Days 5, 8, 11, 14). Staff proponents for these WGs, the S-9 and S-7 respectively, are still responsible for briefing their staff estimates at the targeting meeting and targeting decision brief, and they will be conducting staff coordination between scheduled working groups, but the XO's scheduling prevents the staff as a whole from becoming absorbed in meetings, even as their capability grows.

Developing Meeting Attendees

The examples above show a targeting process and battle rhythm developing over time following an initial-entry operation. Planning for personnel to attend these events is just as critical, particularly with the case of an initial entry operation. In the first example, it was the S-2, S-3, and FSO in the ACP who attended the first targeting meeting. By Day 13, attendance at this meeting will be substantially larger. FM 3-60 has suggested attendees for the targeting meeting/ WG and targeting DB; however, the XO must refine attendance requirements based on the growth in capability in the main command post and ongoing operations within the OE.

Figure 9-8 shows in matrix form the attendees for the staff meetings and how the meetings grow over time. It is the XO's responsibility to constantly re-evaluate who attends what event to ensure that the right staff members are present and prepared to provide input. One assumption in the example is that the full staff is present and mission command networks are established on Day 9, enabling the staff to conduct the targeting meeting in accordance with the unit's command post standing operating procedures (SOP). (See Figure 9-9.)

Event/ Day	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Targeting Meeting	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Attendees	S-3, S-2, FSO	S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), FSO, FSNCOIC	S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), FSO, FSNCOIC, TARGO, ALO	XO, S-3, S-2(CM), FSO, TARGO, FSNCOIC, ALO, S-7, S-9	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), FSO, TARGO, FSNCOIC, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-7, S-9	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), FSO, TARGO, FSNCOIC, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-7, EWO, MISO, S-9	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), FSO, TARGO, FSNCOIC, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-7, EWO, MISO, S-9, S-4, LNOs	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), FSO, TARGO, FSNCOIC, ALO, BAO, ABE, Planner, S-7, EWO, MISO, S-9, S-4, S-6, LNOs	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), TARGO, FSNCOIC, S-9, FSO, EWO, MISO, S-7, PAO, BJA, Chaplain, Med Planner, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-4, S-6, LNOs	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), TARGO, FSNCOIC, S-9, FSO, EWO, MISO, S-7, PAO, BJA, Chaplain, Med Planner, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-4, S-6, LNOs	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), TARGO, FSNCOIC, S-9, FSO, EWO, MISO, S-7, PAO, BJA, Chaplain, Med Planner, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-4, S-6, LNOs	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), TARGO, FSNCOIC, S-9, FSO, EWO, MISO, S-7, PAO, BJA, Chaplain, Med Planner, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-4, S-6, LNOs	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), TARGO, FSNCOIC, S-9, FSO, EWO, MISO, S-7, PAO, BJA, Chaplain, Med Planner, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-4, S-6, LNOs	XO, S-3, S-2, S-2(CM), TARGO, FSNCOIC, S-9, FSO, EWO, MISO, S-7, PAO, BJA, Chaplain, Med Planner, ALO, BAO, ABE, S-4, S-6, LNOs
Targeting Working Group	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No		No		Yes	Yes
Targeting Decision Brief	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Assessment Cycle	Current	Day 1	Day 1-2	Day 1-3	Day 1-4	Day 1-5	Day 1-6	Day 1-7	Day 1-8		Day 1-10		Day 1-11	
Decision Cycle	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	J	K	K	L	L
Development Cycle(s)	None	D-F	E-G	F-I	G-J	H-K	I-L	J-M	K-N	K-N	L-O	L-O	M-P	M-P
Targeting FRAGO Issued for:	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9-10	Day 11-12		Day 13-14		Day 15-16		Day 17-18
Additional Working Groups:														
C-IED WG														
C-IDF WG				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
IIA WG				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	
CA WG				Yes							Yes			Yes

Figure 9-8. Targeting process planning matrix

A technique for establishing the brigade SOP for meeting attendance is to use a quad chart. (See Figure 9-9.) Building a quad chart for each meeting conducted as part of the brigade battle rhythm will assist participants in understanding what meetings they should be attending, what will be discussed, and what the outcomes will be.

The quad chart in Figure 9-9 is for the targeting WG. Although this is the brigade SOP, it will not be fully executed until the staff is present and the main CP is established. Prior to that, a modified attendee list is planned. (See Figure 9-8.) In addition, the initial targeting meetings will most likely be conducted before the mission command network is fully established, so the unit SOP accounts for analog processes as well.

Brigade Targeting Meeting

Purpose: Refine assessments, nominate targets for decision and planning for the current targeting cycles

Time: First day of targeting cycle, 1000

Location: Brigade conference room/ tent with broadcast to battalion CPs

Chair: S3

Proponent: FSO

Attendees: XO, S2, S2(Collection), EWO, FSNCOIC, TARGO, ALO, BAO, ABE, S4, S6, S7, PAO, MISO, S9, BJA, chaplain, Med Planner, LNOs

PACE
Primary: Adobe Connect
Alternate: CPOF/ SVOIP
Contingency: slides/ ventrillo
Emergency: COP mapboard

Inputs: AGM, HPTL, staff estimates

Outputs: Recommended updates to AGM, HPTL

Staff Homework: Update staff estimates, concept sketches for new targets

Knowledge management
Digital: Brief and products posted on S3(FSE) page on portal
Analog: Paper copies and briefing boards with S3(FSE)

Agenda:

1. Brigade mission
2. CDR's intent and guidance for targeting
3. Calendar
4. S2 OE update (PMESSI-PT)
5. S3 operations update
6. CCIR/ ISR plan review
7. AGM review
8. HPTL review
9. Staff assessments
10. Targets to delete
11. Targets to reengage
12. Target nominations

Figure 9-9. Sample brigade quad chart

Summary

BCTs operating within the DATE must be able to conduct a targeting process that provides assessments and recommendations to the commander, at the appropriate time, so the commander can make decisions and give guidance to the brigade staff. In order to accomplish this task, the brigade staff, led by the XO, must define how the targeting process will operate in terms of targeting cycles, battle rhythm, and meeting attendees. Innovative and adaptive problem solving, based on the commander's intent and the OE, will enable the brigade staff to conduct an effective targeting process in support of ongoing operations.

List of Acronyms Used:

ABE	assistant brigade engineer
ACP	assault command post
AGM	attack guidance matrix
ALO	air liaison officer
ATO	air tasking order
BAO	brigade aviation officer
BCT	brigade combat team
BJA	brigade judge advocate
CA	civil affairs
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CDR	commander
C-IDF	counter-indirect fire
CIED	counter-improvised explosive device
CM	collection manager
COA	course of action
COP	common operational picture
CPOF	Command Post of the Future
DATE	decisive action training environment
DB	decision brief
EWO	electronic warfare officer
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FSE	fire support element
FSNCOIC	fire support noncommissioned officer in charge
FSO	fire support officer
HPTL	high-payoff target list

HQ	headquarters
IED	improvised explosive device
IIA	inform and influence activities
JTF	joint task force
LNO	liaison officer
MISO	military information support operations/officer
MDMP	military decisionmaking process
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
OE	operational environment
PAO	public affairs officer
PMESSI-PT	political, military, economic, social, security, information – physical environment, time
SITREP	situation report
SOP	standing operating procedure
SVOIP	Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol
TARGO	targeting officer
TLP	troop leading procedure
WG	working group
XO	executive officer

Fire Support Planning: Regaining Proficiency in Synchronizing Fires

MAJ Thomas C. Fisher and MAJ Brad Fausnaugh
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

While professional artillerymen have unquestionably sustained the ability to deliver fires both accurately and precisely through 10 years of stability operations focused on counterinsurgency (COIN), the Army has lost some of its capability for synchronization and planning for fires in support of maneuver operations against conventional military forces. During a recent training rotation at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and at the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) headquartered in Grafenwoehr, Germany, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) had the opportunity to plan, synchronize, and deliver fires to defeat a hybrid threat in the decisive action training environment (DATE).

The brigade conducted an airborne assault and built up combat power to defend against a conventional force's attack to seize key terrain. During the airborne assault, the 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment air dropped two M119 howitzer sections, along with the battalion assault command post and elements of the forward support battery, to provide fires to the brigade. It consolidated the mortars from the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment and 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment into team fires on the drop zone and remained prepared to deliver fires while the brigade built up its combat power. Near simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, task organized with one artillery battery, moved via air to a secure the airfield on Grafenwoehr Training Area and completed a ground tactical plan to secure key terrain. After four days of operations, the brigade had accomplished its initial objectives and began receiving the remainder of its equipment via air land movement.

Over the next nine days, firing batteries conducted situational training live-fire exercises at the JMTC in Grafenwoehr. Meanwhile, the brigade and battalions continued the scenario in a constructive command post exercise (CPX), during which they faced attacks by both criminal and insurgent elements while the conventional opposing force crossed the border and began offensive operations. At the conclusion of the CPX, fire supporters had completed the defensive fires plan, began rehearsing, and began refining targets to complete fire support tasks. After the defense was successful, the brigade quickly transitioned to offensive operations and attacked to defeat remnants of the conventional forces.

During all operations, the brigade's fire supporters faced challenges in rehearsing and synchronizing fires. Their products were no different from those normally used in COIN operations. However, the full development of fire support and field artillery tasks, as well as the synchronization of the fires plan with maneuver, made it difficult to accomplish key tasks.

Step 1: Fire Support Planning

The first step in delivering fires both accurately and precisely is fire support planning. There are three areas in fire support planning that units have consistently struggled with during JMRC COIN mission rehearsal exercise rotations and also in the DATE:

- Developing clearly stated fire support tasks (FSTs).

- Publishing detailed fire support execution matrices (FSEMs).

- Developing and publishing target selection standards (TSS) and attack guidance matrices (AGMs).

FSTs are written in the task, purpose, execution, and assessment format. Fire support personnel have a solid understanding of task and purpose for FSTs, as this relates directly to target development. The difficulty lies in developing the execution and the assessment. The assessment portion of the FST focuses on combat assessment, which consists of three parts: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment, and re-attack recommendation. The 173rd ABCT did not address the assessment section for their FSTs. This is critical for subordinate units in developing their fire plans to support the BCT. The assessment must have a stated BDA for the task and identify who is responsible to collect the BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment. This information is then sent to the BCT for the decision to re-attack, change munitions, or move on to the next high-payoff target on the list. This will also assist in developing TSS/AGM.

The second area of fire planning that units struggle with is the document fire supporters use to synchronize fires with the maneuver commander's plan, the FSEM. When fully developed, the maneuver commander understands where his fires assets will be located at a specific phase in the battle to provide accurate, timely fires. The fully developed execution portion of the FST describes each target using a method that lists target, trigger, location, observer, delivery system, attack guidance, and communication.

The most difficult part of the execution to plan is the development of tactical and technical triggers for each target, which was evidenced during attempts to suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD) in support of an air assault operation. Because the aviation element did not provide air corridors, routes with check points, or coordination points for the ingress of forces, the fires battalion planned SEAD fires off of an estimated flight time from the pickup zone to the helicopter landing zone of 40 minutes. The agreed upon SEAD trigger was 38 minutes after liftoff from the pickup zone, but because the flight estimate was off by 10 minutes, the assault force landed eight minutes before SEAD was to be initiated. Because the tactical trigger was based off an estimate rather than maneuver control measures, SEAD for the first lift did not occur. By using air corridors and check points, the fires battalion would have been able to refine the technical trigger for SEAD to impact before the assault force or been able to refine the trigger if it had conducted a rehearsal.

						FIRE SUPPORT TASK # 2					
TASK:	Neutralize enemy mechanized formations in forward engagement areas within AO BAYONET.										
PURPOSE:	To facilitate the destruction of the 306th Recon BDE by TF BAYONET.										
						FIRE SUPPORT TASK # 3					
TASK:	Neutralize enemy indirect fire assets within AO BAYONET.										
PURPOSE:	To facilitate FOM within AO BAYONET.										
						FIRE SUPPORT TASK # 4					
TASK:	Degrade enemy forces mission command and counter-fire capability.										
PURPOSE:	To protect TF BAYONET battle positions.										
						FIRE SUPPORT TASK # 5					
TASK:	Prevent civilian population from interfering with TF BAYONET operations.										
PURPOSE:	To ensure FOM and minimize civilian casualties in AO BAYONET.										

	FST	1	2	2	2	2	3,4	1	1/2	2	2
EXECUTION	TARGET	AB 0005	AB 0010	AB 0015	AB 0020	AB 0025	AB0035/0040	AB 4585	AB 4590	AB 5001	AB 5006
	TRIGGER	As Acquired	BRDM	306th MECH	306th MECH	306th MECH	ID location of Stationary HVT	BRDM-K	306th MECH	306th MECH	306th MECH
	LOCATION	FASCAM (TBD)	QV 0171 6020	QV 0249 5876	QV 0250 6081	QV 0251 6013	HVT (TBD)	PV 9901 6308	QV 0208 5795	QV 0360 5870	QV 0667 5932
	OBS	1-91 CAV	1-91CAV	1-503 PIR	1-503 PIR	1-503 PIR		1-91 CAV	1-91 CAV	1-344	1-344
	Delivery System	155mm	105mm	105mm	105mm	105mm	HIMARS	155mm	105mm	105mm	105mm
	ATTK GUID	400mx400m	BTRY 2rds	BTRY 4rds	BTRY 4rds	BTRY 4rds	1 x GMLRS	BTRY 2rds	BTRY 4rds	BTRY 4rds	BTRY 4rds
	COMMO	BDE FIRES (V) F874	BDE FIRES (V) F874	BDE FIRES (V) F874	BDE FIRES (V) F874	BDE FIRES (V) F874	BDE FIRES (V) F874	BDE FIRES (V) F874	BDE FIRES (V) F874	43.500 SC/PT	43.500 SC/PT
	PURPOSE	Facilitate destruction of the 306th Mech BDE.	Disrupt 306th MECH along PL BLUE	Facilitate destruction of the 306th Mech BDE	Facilitate destruction of the 306th Mech BDE	Facilitate destruction of the 306th Mech BDE	Destroy enemy IDF capability	Disrupt recon forces	Disrupt enemy AR formations	Facilitate destruction of the 306th Mech BDE	Facilitate destruction of the 306th Mech BDE
ASSESSMENT:											

Figure 10-1. A sample FSEM

The last area of concern includes the TSS/AGM. During the initial phases of the rotation, the BCT struggled to develop and distribute TSS/AGM, which had the greatest effect during the defensive operation. The fires plan utilized the attack aviation elements to engage the armored force, maximizing the tank killing capabilities of the AH-64 Apache helicopters. The plan called for the Apaches to remain in hide positions and have the combat observation and laser teams (COLTs) observe and call fire to them when armored forces were identified. In this scenario, the aviation element would not have been acting in a maneuver role but as a fire support asset. However, the FSEM did not capture this, nor was the role rehearsed. As the battle progressed, the AH-64s assumed the role of air weapons teams and subordinate units coordinated to attack dismounted squads, allowing armor to penetrate obstacles faster than anticipated. The ABCT quickly recognized this deficiency and developed a thorough TSS/AGM for the brigade air assault mission that included attack aviation, close air support, direct support artillery, and reinforcing artillery to assist in target selection and engagement. The lesson learned is that the earlier fire support planning products are produced and disseminated from the brigade to subordinate elements, the more improved is the target refinement process, to include triggers, assessments, and re-engagement criteria.

Step 2: Synchronizing Fire Support Assets

The second step in delivering fires both accurately and precisely is synchronizing fire support assets. The two enduring areas of concern across all types of rotations are communications structure and fire support rehearsals.

In regard to communications structure, the Army has developed a robust satellite communications package through years of COIN operations to address the needs for long-range communication. However, this has degraded unit tactical frequency modulated (FM) radio skills, where units do not fully plan or exercise their FM digital communications abilities. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) has the ability to transmit data over FM, although there are planning considerations. Each FM digital path requires a radio, and each radio requires a power supply. During the DATE rotation, units were not prepared with enough radios or did not have power supplies to locate radios in the tactical operations center (TOC). This required the brigade to run AFATDS over the command post node, which requires more time to emplace. Another advantage of utilizing FM digital is the ability to use the upgraded forward observer system on COLT M1200 Armored Knight vehicles, as well as the enhanced Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device at the platoon forward observer level, to quickly transmit calls for fire on priority targets. Well-developed primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans would have mitigated identified gaps in communications.

The most effective way to synchronize fire support assets is through rehearsals. There are three fire support-specific rehearsals listed in FM 3-09, *Fire Support*, November 2011: fire support rehearsal, digital (technical) rehearsal, and field artillery tactical rehearsal. The issue that became evident during the DATE rotation was conducting the rehearsal down to the lowest appropriate level. The supported unit's combined arms rehearsal is conducted down to the company, troop, and battery levels. The same must occur for the fire support rehearsal. However, because of time and movement constraints, units often elect to rehearse down to the battalion fire support element. This can be effective if the battalion fire support officer (FSO) can execute a rehearsal down to the company/troop level and can refine tactical and technical triggers before execution. Often this is not the case, and company/troop FSOs do not receive the guidance for trigger refinement or for priority targets.

During the DATE rotation, the unit conducted rehearsals down to the battalion FSO level, while only one battalion was able to conduct a fire support rehearsal down to the company level. Additionally, the unit decided to execute the fires rehearsal for the offense over Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol phones because of difficulties experienced with FM communications. This greatly affected the abilities of field artillery batteries and platoons to attend the rehearsal, negating refinements of technical triggers. Ultimately, the rehearsal challenges affected both the defensive and offensive operations where unrefined triggers allowed targets to escape engagement areas before fire support assets could deliver effects. Conducting fire support rehearsals down to the observer level allows units to identify triggers that need refinement, deconflict priority targets, and recommend changes to re-engagement criteria.

Field Artillery Tasks

Synchronizing fires from the field artillery battalion headquarters' perspective focused on the timely and accurate delivery of fires identified in the execution of the FSTs. The unit struggled throughout the rotation to translate the execution portion of the FST into fully developed field artillery tasks. There were several challenges that prevented the unit from gaining the level of detail needed to accomplish each task:

- Communication and cross talk.

- Rehearsal challenges.

- Trigger refinement.

To combat these challenges, fire supporters identified roles for each firing unit, established communications routing for calls for fires, and began refining attack guidance to ensure the desired effects were achieved.

One of the first challenges faced was the inability to cross talk with the maneuver battalion FSOs, which greatly hindered the ability to plan in the defense. FSTs focused on neutralizing enemy mechanized formations in engagement areas and neutralizing enemy indirect fire assets. It was difficult to identify how maneuver battalion FSOs planned to neutralize the enemy because refinements from FSOs weren't flowing into the planning process. Additionally, there was difficulty understanding the meaning of neutralize in terms of artillery effects. Fortunately, the fires battalion was able to position the artillery battery to range each engagement area and to focus its reinforcing battery's fires on the counterfire fight. Another difficulty was identifying the formation to be targeted and then translating the neutralization maneuver task into the munitions required to neutralize it in terms of field artillery fires.

The intelligence picture eventually helped to identify the composition of the mechanized formations expected in the engagement areas, which helped to calculate the munitions required to produce 10 percent casualties or materiel damage. Because no formation was specifically identified in the FST, the battalion planned to fire a lot of 105 millimeter high-explosive rounds with just six guns to neutralize numerous tank formations across the operating environment. Developing field artillery tasks in the defense enables units to identify planning shortfalls earlier and ask the right questions to clarify the targeting objectives for fires.

The planning timeline became much more constrained as the brigade transitioned to offensive operations. The battalion staff was challenged to publish the operation order while undergoing numerous insurgent attacks and harassing fires, causing the TOC to relocate three times in 36 hours. Despite this, the battalion staff developed initial field artillery tasks and published them as an appendix to Annex D in the brigade order. This enabled fire supporters to better understand the scheme of fires, the movement triggers, and positioning guidance for the artillery batteries. As the beginning of the offense approached, the unit completed the plan fully knowing that portions of the execution in field artillery tasks had not been fully developed or rehearsed. In the end, the brigade was able to clearly identify what it wanted to accomplish and why, but was not able to fully develop how to accomplish each field artillery task, resulting in hundreds of rounds planned for smoke missions with no planned smoke targets.

Role of the Fire Support Coordinator

The DATE rotation posed some new challenges with the incorporation of defense, offense, and stability operations. There was an additional challenge with the change in modular concept as well. The Department of the Army made it official in its September 2011 doctrinal terms update eliminating the effects coordinator position and the fires and effects coordination cell. The Army retains the fires support cell, FSO, and the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). According to the recently published FM 3-09, *Fire Support,* November 2011, the FSCOORD is the BCT's organic fires battalion commander; the 173rd ABCT was working with this structure during the rotation. The challenges are for the fires battalion commander to command his unit, placing it in the best location to support the brigade and be the primary adviser on the planning for and employment of field artillery and fire support. During the rotation, the role of the FSCOORD was crucial to the success of offensive, defensive, and counterfire operations. The FSCOORD ensured a fire support rehearsal was conducted before each major operation, even with a compressed timeline that threatened cancelling the rehearsals. During each rehearsal, friction points were discovered that needed addressing before the operation commenced. In the fire support rehearsal before the brigade air assault operation, it was discovered that smoke ammunition allocation was not enough for the two primary smoke targets. This issue was resolved before the air assault was executed. The FSCOORD insisted that counterfire drills be conducted on every shift each day, which resulted in reducing response time and effectively countering enemy indirect fires.

Conclusion

While the brigade experienced many challenges combating and delivering fires against a hybrid threat, the rotation was an absolute success. The ABCT improved its core competency in synchronizing and delivering fires to support maneuver and regained skills needed to defeat the enemy today and in the future. Observer-controller-trainers and the unit gained immense experience that will continue to benefit the artillery community for years to come. And most importantly, the rotation proved once again that the Field Artillery is King of Battle!

As a way ahead, future units preparing for the DATE should focus on the following areas during trainup exercises:

- Develop detailed FSTs early in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), preferably in warning order 1 or warning order 2 after mission analysis.

- Incorporate assessment tools such as TSS, AGM, and commander's guidance for fires into collective training and/or certifications. These tools ensure every element understands their role in deciding to re-attack targets or shift targets to other delivery assets.

- Conduct fire support and digital rehearsals often. Also, establish a PACE plan for FM and digital rehearsals to ensure the plan is truly rehearsed and synchronized.

- Incorporate discussions and recommendations for artillerized MDMP into field artillery battalion staff training. Apply recommendations from the Fort Sill White Papers where applicable.

- Develop fire support products for dissemination early in course of action development.

Radar Employment and Management During Unified Land Operations

CW3 Hondo J. Hack and CW3 Chad Cavender
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

As the Army returns to its core competencies when conducting unified land operations, a focal point for artillerymen must be the brigade staff's ability to plan for, position, and secure its radar systems while also synchronizing radar zones, cueing schedules, and movement triggers with the maneuver plan. Not only will brigade combat teams (BCTs) have to implement a zone planning concept more complex than ever before, they will have to carefully manage their organic radars, assuming little or no augmentation from higher headquarters. This article addresses BCT counterfire radar employment and management issues based on observations made during the recent decisive action training environment (DATE) Rotation 12-01 conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.

Atrophy of Core Competencies

As a professional artillery community, the Army's radar planning and synchronization skills have been degraded from a decade of conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations. These forward operating base-centric operations have allowed units to place sensors in static positions and continuously cue, except during periods of routine maintenance. However, this convenience will not be practicable during decisive action operations when fighting a near-peer with the ability to target our indirect fire systems and target acquisition sensors.

Radar Management and Counterfire Issues

BCTs struggle with radar management during offensive and defensive operations. Once a command relationship and control method is determined, it is not always implemented correctly by operators focused on the fires warfighting function. Current Army doctrine for fire support further complicates centralized and decentralized control for counterfire operations. Field manuals list conflicting roles, responsibilities, and recommended augmentation of key fire support personnel in the management of radars and counterfire operations. Fire support doctrine should be consolidated to address these inconsistencies.

Who Should Manage Counterfire Radar Planning?

Where BCTs break down in proper employment of their firefinder radars is an understanding of who controls the radar during centralized or decentralized counterfire operations. Due to short manning in the BCT fires cell, the fires battalion took on the task of writing radar deployment orders (RDOs). This would seem like a logical choice due to the resident technical expertise on radar planning and employment within the battalion. However, the fires battalion did not have visibility on the task force (TF) maneuver plans like the BCT fires cell did. As planning and execution of offensive and defense operations progressed, the unit soon learned that its ability to develop and prioritize zones that supported the TF maneuver plan became very difficult to accomplish. This difficulty was primarily due to not being in the TF reporting channels.

During phases of execution, the unit struggled with understanding which zones to keep active and which zones could be deactivated, as well as understanding where new zones needed developing to support the TF. Ultimately, the RDOs were not nested with the overall BCT scheme of maneuver, and the TF was not supported with prioritized radar zones during offensive and defensive operations. While the field artillery (FA) headquarters has the technical knowledge to conduct radar planning, it became apparent that it was not located in a position to be able to manage radar planning and execution, nor did it possess the most current tactical updates to better support the maneuver elements. The fires battalion should have a role in the development of the RDO, but the primary responsibility for producing and disseminating the RDO belongs to the BCT fires cell in order to better synchronize radar efforts across the entire BCT.

Zone Management

Target acquisition assets are employed to support counterfire operations as part of the combined arms commander's overall battle plan and are not a separate operation. Centralized control optimizes coverage to support the commander's intent. Zones are a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search into areas of greater or lesser importance and focus radar coverage on the combined arms commander's priorities.

Proactive and Reactive Counterfire

In addition to allocating prioritized targets to subordinate TFs, BCTs should also allocate call for fire zones (CFFZs), critical friendly zones (CFZs), and censor zones (CZs) to their subordinate battalion fires cells. Critical to this allocation is the synchronization of the radar zones according to the scheme of maneuver. The two complementary components of counterfire are proactive counterfire and reactive counterfire.

Proactive counterfire describes the pre-emptive efforts of the BCT to eliminate the enemy's strike capability before it can impact the BCT's operations. This type of counterfire is employed for offensive, defensive, and stability operations and is supported by the radar with varying zone priority. In offensive operations, CFFZs are placed on pre-cleared engagement areas below the coordinated fire line (CFL) or beyond the CFL within the BCT area of operations. The CFZs are placed over TF objective areas, and CZs are placed over friendly indirect fire systems. For example, during offensive operations, if a smoke target is allocated to a maneuver unit that is conducting a breach, a CFZ should also be allocated over the breach site. The subordinate fires cell should also refine the smoke target that it is allocated. In a similar fashion, there should be a refinement back from the battalion of the CFZ so that it is positioned over the actual breach site. The subordinate fires cell should develop triggers to activate and deactivate the CFZ over the breach site when necessary. The final coordination should occur during fire support rehearsals.

Reactive counterfire is the response by the BCT to enemy strike activity. This type of counterfire is also employed during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. There is a change to zone priority based on the type of mission the BCT is executing. If the BCT is conducting defensive operations, CFZs will have higher priority than CFFZs, as commanders will seek to protect critical mission command nodes on the battlefield.

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA
For Official Use Only

Figure 11-1. Positioning a radar system during the rotation

Radar Positioning Issues and Considerations

During Rotation 12-01, radar positioning was clearly affected by the ability of the fires battalion to secure it. The brigade as a whole was extremely short manned, and the fires battalion was no exception. The Q36 consisted of a three-man crew, so the radar was collocated with the FA battalion tactical operations center (TOC) due to force protection considerations. Because the radar was collocated with the FA battalion TOC, the radar was out of operation for about two hours each time the TOC moved. On one occasion during a defensive operation, this two-hour time lapse caused the Q36 to be out of operations during the opening phases of the enemy's attack on the BCT. This lapse allowed the enemy's artillery to have a significant impact on BCT operations early in the fight.

In light of these recognized limitations, the artillery battalion attempted to balance the probability of acquiring enemy indirect fire with the survivability of the battalion TOC and the radar system. To accomplish this balance, the radar and battalion TOC repositioned often. This relationship did not always facilitate good site selection for the radar or the battalion TOC because positions had to provide concealment for the TOC and provide track volume for the radar. In most cases, this worked well for one and not the other.

There is not a single correct answer to the question of whether to collocate the radar with the FA battalion TOC or provide a separate force protection element to protect the radar. No matter what course of action is chosen, there are trade-offs that must be understood to mitigate those risks during the planning process, such as using lightweight counter mortar radar (AN/TPQ-48) to cover prioritized zones while the Q36 moves, or understanding site selection issues with the radar if collocated with the TOC.

Understanding the capabilities and limitations of moving radars, the timing of moving the radar, and war gaming the effects of radar survivability moves during the planning process is critical to the BCT's counterfire fight and the protection of critical friendly positions. Selecting the appropriate radar position area gives the BCT the highest probability in acquiring enemy fire support assets, and it enables the counterfire fight. Fire supporters have lost the art of planning sensor positions to support offensive and defensive operations. This is due to units becoming accustomed to positioning the radar only one time while supporting stability operations.

As an additional technique for providing radar security, the BCT S-3 (operations staff officer) should plan and coordinate for an infantry/scout squad to provide security of the Q36. This will prevent the Q36 from being tied to a battalion TOC location, provide flexibility in site selection, and give better dispersion to key BCT assets.

Radar Cueing Considerations

The BCT struggled with developing a synchronized cueing schedule. The artillery battalion knew it should develop a cueing schedule or at least designate cueing agents, but it was not synchronized with the maneuver TFs. The maneuver TFs had little visibility on how the radar was supporting their operations. The reason for the lack of synchronization was because radar planning was happening at the artillery battalion and not at the BCT fires cell. In order to develop a synchronized cueing schedule, the BCT fires cell should designate search sectors by phase, develop zone priorities for each TF by phase, and enforce a zone refinement cutoff time. Then, during the fire support rehearsal, the fires battalion commander and BCT fire support officer can ensure that the battalion fires cell designates cueing agents if they hadn't already done so and refine the radar cueing schedule. A situation-based cueing schedule would have served the unit well both in the offense and defense.

The two types of cueing schedules are situational cueing and demand cueing. These two types of cueing schedules can be used individually or combined, and their uses are dependent upon the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.

Situational cueing is the preferred technique for cueing radars and is the most responsive. This method ties cueing to events and/or triggers that are determined during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and planning process. For example, during offensive operations an event or trigger may be a breaching or air assault operation. In a defensive operation, cueing may be tied to suspected enemy phases of fire depicted on the decision support template. Situational cueing focuses the radar on the commander's intent and on what is critical.

Demand cueing is the activation of radar once the enemy is known to have begun firing. For demand cueing to be effective, cueing agents must be designated and a responsive communication system between the agents and radar established. Specific cueing guidance must also be established to fully exploit the radar's capabilities and minimize or eliminate unnecessary radiation. The situation will dictate who best can cue the radar and the specific conditions under which it should be cued.

Rehearsals

Based on some of the challenges faced during the rotation, the need for a synchronized plan is clear. The fire support rehearsals and the combined arms rehearsals provide a last chance for units to make corrections to plans prior to execution. It is important to include the radar crew members, such as the radar section chief and target acquisition platoon leader, in the fire support rehearsal. They should brief task, purpose, position, azimuth of search, cueing schedule (if applicable), and any zones that are active for each phase of the operation. This will give visibility to all fire supporters and the FA battalion commander on how the radar is supporting the operation for each phase. This also ensures that zone and cueing schedules make sense. This allows time for final coordination to be made prior to this information being briefed in the combined arms rehearsal (CAR). Each battalion fires cell that has been allocated a zone for that phase of the operation should brief the triggers for turning its zone on and off.

The target acquisition platoon leader should also be included in the CAR. He should brief task, purpose, position, azimuth of search, cueing schedule if applicable, and any zones that are active for each phase of the operation. This will give visibility to all fire supporters and the entire command on how the radar is supporting their operations during each phase.

Conclusion

Units preparing for a DATE rotation should consider placing the target acquisition platoon leader at the BCT headquarters to facilitate the synchronization of target acquisition sensors with the maneuver plan. Fire support cells must plan and manage radar zones with triggers tied to the phasing of the operation, and the target acquisition plan must be synchronized through fire support rehearsals. These tactics, techniques, and procedures, combined with permissive fire support coordination measures, enable the BCT to rapidly attack and suppress enemy indirect fire systems.

References

Field Manual (FM) 3-09.12, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition*, June 2002, pg. 5-15, 16.

FM 3-09.21, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battalion*, 22 March 2001, pg. 3-11.

FM 3-09.31, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander*, October 2002, pg. 4-20.

FM 3-60, *The Targeting Process*, November 2010, pg. 4-14.

The Importance of Synchronization and Rehearsals in the Battalion Deliberate Attack

**CPT Justin J. Michel, LTC William J. Butler, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
LTC Michael M. Larsen, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team**

Recently the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) Sky Soldiers executed the first decisive action training environment rotation at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). This rotation was also only the second time an Army combat training center (CTC) conducted a decisive action rotation. For almost 10 years, our CTCs have rightfully focused on preparing our BCTs to deploy and win during their yearlong deployments to Afghanistan or Iraq. Our focus as deploying units has been on training critical tasks to help us defeat counterinsurgents. As a result, the critical skills associated with successfully synchronizing and executing combined arms maneuver at the company, battalion, and brigade levels have degraded over time. The intent of this article is to share observations, insights, and lessons learned from one of the 173rd ABCT's infantry battalions as it conducted a deliberate attack against a near-peer competitor in prepared defensive positions.

In preparation for CTC rotations before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, units were able to undergo significant focused training and set their key personnel. CTC rotations were oftentimes the most important event brigade or battalion commanders conducted while in command. Commanders planned and trained for up to a year prior to "deploying" to Cortina to fight the Krasnovians. Units were able to train at their home station in a division-resourced training exercise that was designed to replicate the CTC rotation as closely as possible. The division tasked sister brigades to provide observer-controllers and opposing forces, and the division staff was fully involved as the higher headquarters to help prepare its brigade for this event. Fast forward 10 years to the recent decisive action rotation and units were afforded none of those same opportunities. The battalion and brigade commanders had only been in position for four months, and many key company-level leaders were brand new. The highest level of training that any battalions were able to conduct prior to the rotation was at the platoon level, and the brigade and battalion staffs were all brand new to the unit and to their staff positions.

These differences are highlighted to show that through no fault of its own, the 173rd ABCT was not afforded nearly the same amount of preparation and training that units used to get prior to attempting a major CTC rotation. They conducted a very demanding brigade-level exercise and battalion-level tasks, but did not have the time to conduct those tasks as companies or battalions prior to deploying to the JMRC. To their credit, the leadership throughout the brigade approached the rotation as an opportunity to challenge their paratroopers, leaders, staffs, and units to learn as much as they could.

Our doctrine for company and battalion offensive operations clearly defines the fundamental characteristics of the offense: surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity. These characteristics are necessary components for successful offensive operations and are achieved through deliberate and detailed troop leading procedures (TLP) and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

SURPRISE- A force achieves surprise by <u>attacking the enemy at a time or place and in a manner for which the enemy is not physically or mentally ready.</u> The CAB commander must have a <u>clear understanding of his current state in relation to the enemy</u> and other conditions of his operational environment; a sound understanding of what the end state is for the assigned mission, and a vision of how to move his force from the current situation to the end state.

CONCENTRATION- A force achieves concentration by massing the effects of combat power. The CAB <u>Commander uses the shared COP to maneuver his armor and mechanized infantry forces while applying precise indirect fires to overwhelm his foes at the decisive point,</u> and quickly shift from one objective or direction to another.

TEMPO- Tempo is the ability to adjust the rate of operations relative to battle circumstances and relative to the enemy's capability to sense and react. It is the controlled rate of military action. <u>While a rapid tempo is often preferred, the tempo should be adjusted to ensure synchronization.</u>

AUDACITY- Audacity is a simple plan of action, boldly executed. <u>Audacity is a key component of any successful offensive action and increases the chance for surprise.</u> Leaders must understand when and where to take risks, plan for them, and execute boldly.

Figure 12-1. Doctrinal definitions of the characteristics of the offense

In the current operational environment, most units successfully incorporate these characteristics when conducting movements to contact or some of the various forms of raids or cordon and search operations. Our Army has ample experience in Iraq and Afghanistan conducting these types of offensive operations at all levels. We have translated our doctrine into highly successful tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that have led to numerous successful missions downrange. Junior leader initiative, understanding of cultural habits, and the ability to develop the situation at the small-unit level have been the direct result of thousands of these types of operations. Most units understand and can readily flow from a cordon and search into a raid or a movement to contact at the platoon and company level.

The Army lacks the same depth of experience, however, in the deliberate attack. While many planning considerations for the deliberate attack are the same as other offensive operations, some are subtly different. For example, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) necessitated for the deliberate attack during JMRC's Rotation 12-01 required a shift from targeting individuals and insurgent cells to targeting a large force with nearly comparable capabilities. Indirect fires had to be offensive in nature and used to set conditions for the attack rather than defensive in nature and used as a reaction to conditions established by the enemy. Adjacent unit coordination required battalions, companies, and platoons to fight in a coordinated, synchronized effort to support one another on the same objective without the aid of Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and mounted automations and weapon systems. All of these subtle shifts in planning requirements had a drastic impact on the execution of the operation and mission success.

As the task force transitioned from the defense to the offense, it faced an enemy who had seized key terrain and fortified its defensive positions with mined wire obstacles, preplanned indirect fire targets, a robust counterreconnaissance force, and a mechanized/armored force.

Based on the enemy's capabilities and the strength of the defense, the battalion elected to shorten its planning process in an attempt to achieve a surprise attack on the enemy position. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, "In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable." The battalion issued a timely warning order to its companies that defined each company's boundaries, infiltration routes, and general tasks and purposes. To meet the accelerated timeline, the battalion elected to forego the remaining portions of the MDMP and skip the combined arms, fires, and communications rehearsals. It did not conduct any contingency planning. Each company then issued its own warning order and made hasty preparations to meet the accelerated timeline. The intent of this compressed timeline was to give each subordinate element more time to plan and execute its piece of the mission.

The battalion wanted to get inside the enemy commander's OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop by attacking significantly earlier than expected to beat him during the counterreconnaissance fight. The battalion successfully infiltrated to the enemy defensive position without losing any Sky Soldiers to the enemy counter reconnaissance force; however, the unintended second-order effect was an unsynchronized deliberate attack. The companies essentially executed separate attacks that were not supported by the other companies' indirect fires, close combat attacks (CCAs), or close air support (CAS) assets. Ten years ago, a trained and prepared unit may have been able to complete this mission. Today, our units have to focus on synchronizing warfighting functions and enablers to successfully execute complex combined arms maneuver.

In the absence of complete battalion and company operation orders and detailed unit rehearsals, each company planned in a vacuum. Company-level leadership only knew the task and purpose of adjacent companies by a graphic depicted on a PowerPoint slide. This graphic did not include fire control measures. The lack of rehearsals and adjacent unit coordination led to poor synchronization and situational awareness at all levels. Though the battalion scout platoon successfully infiltrated and was observing the enemy defense, its reports were not able to be effectively analyzed, disseminated, or incorporated into the concept of the operation and rehearsed prior to mission start point. In the battalion's rushed attempt to surprise the enemy, it failed to adequately set conditions for successful actions on the objective during a complex mission. Company commanders spent a large portion of their time trying to figure out what was supposed to be happening versus reacting and adapting to what was actually happening, all while trying to conduct a night movement under night-vision goggles (NVGs), negotiating obstacles, and avoiding enemy counterreconnaissance.

As the operation unfolded, the mission quickly changed from a battalion deliberate attack to three piecemealed company movements to contact. Companies arriving on the objective area more than one hour apart were unable to support each other, and their fires were not given a clear task and purpose centered on a decisive point. They were also unable to adjust their plans once they started taking significant casualties, as they didn't know where their forces were located, where adjacent units were, or when they were cleared to fire.

Figure 12-2. Attack phase of the operation

The lack of synchronization at the unit level had a large impact during the execution of the breach. One company took over three hours to move 400 meters to support a fellow company that experienced 90 percent casualties during the initial breach. The breach of a mined wire obstacle to defeat/destroy an enemy in a prepared defensive position is a very complex mission. Only a very few of the most senior leaders in the battalion had any experience conducting a deliberate breach when queried at the final after action review. This is no fault of the units or commanders, but a fact given our recent focus on counterinsurgency operations. When so few leaders or Soldiers in the unit have any experience conducting a breach, the requirement to conduct effective rehearsals is even more important. The five tenets of the breach — suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault — must all be planned, synchronized, and rehearsed in extreme detail to ensure mission success. Lessons learned from this phase of the operation and the training exercise in general highlight the importance of a detailed MDMP and TLP process, which lead to the successful implementation of the four characteristics of offensive operations.

How does a unit achieve surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity during offensive operations against an enemy occupying a fortified position on key terrain? Lessons learned from this

training exercise indicate that mission success or failure is highly determined by the level of detail in a unit's plans and rehearsals. A detailed and synchronized plan sets the conditions for successful implementation of all four offensive characteristics. Each of these characteristics builds upon the others and leads to more opportunities, better synchronization, and increased lethality. This chain reaction begins with surprise. The enemy may know through his own IPB or counterreconnaissance that an attack is pending, but he does not know how that attack will play out. A detailed and well-rehearsed plan can be executed with audacity and synchronization and not give the enemy time to react. The friendly force capitalizes on the enemy's inability to react through the initiative of small-unit leaders and overwhelms him with the effects of CAS, artillery and mortar fires, CCA, direct fire weapon systems, and maneuver to achieve its mission. Understanding the enemy disposition, composition, and strength is critical to surprising him; reconnaissance forces have to be given time to develop the situation. The time that the attack occurs is not nearly as important as the level of preparedness and synchronization within the attacking unit.

Breaching Organization	Breaching Fundamentals	Responsibilities
Support Force	• Suppress. • Obscure.	• Suppress enemy direct fire systems covering the reduction area. • Isolate by preventing enemy forces from repositioning or counterattacking to place direct fires on the breach force.
Breach Force	• Suppress (provides additional suppression). • Obscure (provides additional obscuration in the reduction area). • Secure (provides local security). • Reduce.	• Create and mark the necessary lanes in an obstacle. • Secure the near side and far side of an obstacle. • Defeat forces that can place immediate direct fires on the reduction area. • Report the land status and location.
Assault Force	• Assault. • Suppress.	• Destroy any enemy forces capable of placing direct fires on the reduction area from the far side of an obstacle. • Assist the support force with suppression if the enemy is not effectively suppressed. Be prepared to breach follow-on and protective obstacles after passing through the reduction area.

Figure 12-3. Organization for breaching operations

Concentration of combat power at the decisive point is achieved through the MDMP and TLPs. All friendly units must be effectively tasked and integrated into the plan. The weapons company must be accounted for and properly integrated to ensure its mobility and lethality are properly employed. The weapons company's diverse capabilities make it an enabler for numerous roles in the attack. It can successfully conduct reconnaissance, defeat armor, counterattack, or serve as a support by fire element for the breach. As Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery once said, "Every Soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the battle he is to fight fits into the larger picture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole." Only through a detailed order and combined arms, fires, and communications rehearsals can a unit ensure the synchronization and deconfliction of its warfighting functions to mass the overwhelming effects of its combat power. During the rehearsal, each adjacent unit must demonstrate how its mission affects the other companies. Each adjacent company must understand how it can support its neighboring company and under what circumstances it may be required to do so. With that level of fidelity, each company commander will be prepared to execute his portion of the mission without fear of failing.

Tempo can be achieved through the successful implementation of surprise and concentration. Conditions are set during the MDMP and the TLPs for every subordinate unit to execute its assigned mission. By ensuring every unit has a complete understanding of its mission, limits, and role in the operation, it can then more readily execute its assigned task without hesitation. This understanding of required conditions before future actions enables the unit to seamlessly flow through the numerous phases of its operation and prevent weakness at transition points. Key leader understanding of the operation, placement, and personal action is critically important and can make or break a unit's attack. In this case, some leaders were in places to effectively motivate and personally lead vital portions of the fight, but in other cases the lack of subordinate commander initiative or sense of urgency to support a stalled company in the breach contributed to both companies becoming combat ineffective. The pace of their execution prevents the enemy from mounting an effective response and helps lead to mission success.

Audacity is the culminating result of surprise, concentration, and tempo. It is, first and foremost, the product of good leadership, but also the result of a well-planned and rehearsed operation. More than just a bold attack from an unlikely avenue of approach, audacity is the product of a highly planned, rehearsed, and synchronized plan that enables leaders at all levels to accomplish their mission. In the absence of sufficient time to allow a baseline of synchronization, it becomes more critical for leaders to position themselves during execution to best provide mission command. During the battalion's deliberate attack during JMRC Rotation 12-01, critical unit leadership was positioned forward in positions where they could readily understand and affect the fight. This proved important as the operation progressed. When the criterion for audacity has been met with the successful integration of surprise, concentration, and tempo, we present the enemy with a problem set that he is unable to defeat.

The paratroopers, noncommissioned officers, and officers of the 173rd ABCT were challenged by a rigorous training exercise designed to test their paratroopers, staffs, leaders, and commanders in an environment never before replicated at JMRC. The enemy threat during this rotation was much more diverse and capable than previous rotations with their ability to incorporate unmanned aircraft systems, electronic warfare, thermal, and NVG technology into the fight. Compounding matters even further, the task force was forced to account for conventional armor and infantry formations, enemy special operations forces and insurgent elements, criminal organizations, civilian local national government leaders, and civilians on the battlefield while simultaneously conducting offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The unit handled all of

these aspects while operating under a much more robust and diverse communications set that has become reliant on automations such as Command Post of the Future, BFT, and tactical satellite, which were not always available to the unit and often targeted by the enemy throughout the rotation.

Additionally, the units had to contend with changes to the friendly situation. Many of these changes centered on task organization and the assigned military table of organization and equipment (MTOE) available to each unit. Our current MTOE and friendly task organization at the brigade and battalion levels is significantly different with the incorporation of the cavalry squadron in the brigade and the assigned weapons company and attached forward support company to the battalion. All of these factors combined to form a challenging, lethal, and fluid training environment that necessitated the combination of modern TTP with proven doctrine. TTP learned during the past 10 years played an almost equal amount of significance as those garnered during high-intensity operations prior to the start of our current conflicts.

In this training exercise, the task force faced a modern and more lethal or confusing enemy and civilian situation. This rotation was the most demanding environment the JMRC could produce. There were several takeaways that will benefit future brigades, battalions, and companies when they conduct similar training. These lessons learned center around the four characteristics of offensive operations: surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity. Each of these four characteristics has to be effectively planned, rehearsed, and incorporated into the operation from the beginning of the MDMP and TLP process until mission completion. As the CTCs begin planning and executing more decisive action rotations, we hope these observations and lessons learned will assist future rotational units.

The Leader's Guide to Receiving and Employing Reconnaissance Troops

CPT James M. Gibson and MAJ Romas J. Zimlicki
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

> The problem is to grasp, in innumererable special cases, the actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly.
>
> — Helmuth von Moltke, 1800-1891

Introduction

During the execution of offensive operations, a commander often seeks to gain and maintain visual observation of his enemy to gather critical information about that enemy's activities and resources. Commanders may also require data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, and sociological characteristics of a particular area that can only be gathered through a detailed reconnaissance of that terrain. Conversely, should the commander find himself in a defensive posture or recognize vulnerabilities in the disposition of his forces, he will surely depend on the early and accurate warning of his enemy's movement to protect his main body with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy. This article specifically explores invaluable resources commanders often have at their disposal to meet the above mentioned objectives through the analysis of the assets organic to a light reconnaissance squadron: the mounted reconnaissance troop (MRT) and the dismounted reconnaissance troop (DRT).

The purpose of this article is to provide battalion-level leadership and staffs insight into the significant planning considerations specific to the employment of reconnaissance troops. The article is based largely on the lessons identified throughout the decisive action training environment (DATE) Rotation 12-01 conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) located in Hohenfels, Germany. This article covers the following:

- Contrasting case studies of battalion attacks with and without the assistance of a reconnaissance troop.

- Doctrinal foundations of reconnaissance operations.

- Planning considerations specific to reconnaissance troops.

The MRT provides a supported infantry battalion with a capacity to rapidly gather detailed information requirements over large areas of terrain utilizing powerful sensor systems while also maintaining the ability to sustain itself for extended periods of time. However, when operating in restricted/severely restricted terrain, or when requiring continuous observation of an objective for an extended period of time, specially trained and strictly disciplined scout troopers of the DRT provide the commander an ability to stealthily execute an area reconnaissance. Additionally, the commander has the option to conduct the precision targeting of enemy targets through DRT-observed, precision-guided munitions or the employment of specially trained scout sniper teams.

Whether executing offensive or defensive operations, the capabilities that a reconnaissance troop provides commanders on the battlefield can often be the difference between mission success or mission failure. The successful integration and tactical employment of a reconnaissance troop in support of an infantry battalion requires that a commander and staff understand the troop's unique capabilities and limitations while operating in a high-risk environment.

Mission Execution: A Case Study into the Effective Employment of a Reconnaissance Troop (Part 1)

The execution portion compares two different scenarios. The scenario presented is from JMRC's DATE Rotation 12-01. The graphics below were produced by 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR). At the battalion level, the operation was named Operation Rock Lobster. The 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment played a supporting role by isolating the objective to the west. The 2-503 PIR had an MRT attached to it for the majority of the rotation, but for this specific operation, the MRT was returned to its parent squadron. This case study displays the operational plan of 2-503 PIR, whereas the end of the article contrasts the original plan with a plan that deliberately integrates the MRT.


Figure 13-1. Attack graphics for Operation Rock Lobster

In this example, the battalion is conducting a movement to contact to occupy assault positions. Following occupation, the battalion initiated an assault on a strongpoint. The battalion departed 24 hours prior to mission execution to attempt to gain the element of surprise, initiating infiltration the day prior to its planned assault to facilitate the occupation of assault positions prior to when it expected the enemy to be prepared. The goal was to occupy positions and remain hidden until time to assault at the end of evening nautical twilight the following day. However, surprise was lost immediately when a company received indirect fire from enemy observation posts (OPs) the moment they crossed the line of departure (LD). It encountered limited contact en route to its assault positions and eventually assaulted the objective with little to no awareness of the location of enemy positions, weapon systems, mission command nodes, or obstacles. A reasonable casualty estimate in this scenario runs to 50-60 percent of the battalion. If reconnaissance assets had been used, they would have had the ability to create a security zone that would have freed the battalion to maneuver without harassment. The intelligence provided by the MRT would have improved the situational awareness, target refinement, and planning of the Rock battalion.

Reconnaissance and Security Operations: A Doctrinal Foundation

The foundation of reconnaissance troop missions can be found in the seven fundamentals of reconnaissance, the five fundamentals of security operations, and an understanding of what these principles entail.

Fundamentals of reconnaissance. The seven fundamentals of reconnaissance are foundational to everything that is done in reconnaissance operations. Troop leadership and individuals should have these fundamentals going through their thoughts in every phase of execution. Violation of any of these fundamentals will cause alarms to go off in a scout's mind.

- Ensure continuous reconnaissance:

    ○ Before: understand the enemy and terrain.

    ○ During: update and refine.

    ○ After: maintain contact or handover for follow-on forces.

- Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. They are not a personnel security detachment, quick reaction force, forward operating base (FOB) security element, or something similar because they have heavy weapons and vehicles. They are a collection asset.

- Orient on the reconnaissance objective. This is their primary focus. Recon assets must remember to watch their assigned objectives and not allow themselves to be distracted.

- Report information rapidly and accurately. The staff intelligence officer (S-2) must be tied to reporting. If further detail is needed, the operations (S-3) section can always be queued. Do not let the operations reports fall into a reporting black hole.

- Retain freedom of maneuver. Gain contact with the smallest element possible. Always leave an out and an ability to maneuver. Engagement criteria must support the commander's intent.

- Gain and maintain enemy contact. This contact may range from surveillance to close combat. Surveillance is generally preferred and usually accomplishes required tasks. As a reminder, the forms of contact are: visual; direct fire; indirect fire; obstacles; enemy or unknown aircraft; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; electronic warfare; and non-hostile (this may include civilian, factions, military, police, and paramilitary).

- Develop the situation rapidly. In contact, the troop's main focus is to develop information on the enemy and report it, more than it is to destroy the enemy.

Zone reconnaissance. Zone reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning enemy, terrain, society, and infrastructure in accordance with the commander's intent. It is conducted within a location delineated by an LD, lateral boundaries, and a limit of advance. (Field Manual [FM] 3-20.971, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Troop*, August 2009)

The key differences between zone and area reconnaissance missions revolve around size, complexity, and time. Zone reconnaissance is the larger of the two missions. It requires a route reconnaissance and is generally the more complex and time-consuming task. Due to the scale of the mission, zone reconnaissance tends to be less focused on detailed events. A zone reconnaissance may be deployed in front of a battalion or larger element that is moving to an objective as a way to create a security zone, proof routes, and reconnaissance pull the higher unit along its intended approach. It is very useful when information on cross-country trafficability is desired.

Area reconnaissance. Area reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning enemy, terrain, society, and infrastructure of a specific area in accordance with the commander's intent. The objective in an area reconnaissance, however, is relatively smaller than that for a zone reconnaissance. As a result, area reconnaissance proceeds faster than zone reconnaissance. Reconnaissance objectives may be a small village or town; facilities such as water treatment plants, weapon storage sites, or political headquarters; other sites of tactical importance such as a suspected assembly area, a cache site, or an airport. (FM 3-20.971)

Route reconnaissance. (Army/Marine Corps) A directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. (FM 3-90, *Tactics*, July 2001).

Fundamentals of Security Operations

- **Provide early and accurate warning.** The principal function of a screen.

- **Provide reaction time and maneuver space.** The screen supports this through harassment and targeting of reconnaissance forces.

- **Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected.** The array of the screen and how it fights will be driven by the focus.

- **Perform continuous reconnaissance.** Once emplaced, the screen will often serve as a reconnaissance and surveillance entity.

- **Maintain enemy contact.** This is achieved through depth and target handover. (For example, dismounted operations handing over to a mounted force, handing over to a

troop command post, handing over to a counterreconnaissance force, and/or handing over to defending force.)

Screen. A security element whose primary task is to observe, identify, and report information, and which **fights only in self-defense**. See FM 3-90. 5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, April 2008. A task to maintain surveillance; provide early warning to the main body; or impede, destroy, and harass enemy reconnaissance within its capability without becoming decisively engaged. Army: A form of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (FM 3-90)

A screening force is typically a static operation reinforced with active patrols. However, a unit may screen to the flanks and rear of a moving force. If a troop is placed in front of a moving force, it becomes a reconnaissance force. Screen is a task that can be performed at the platoon through squadron level. Guard and cover missions exceed the capabilities of a reconnaissance troop.

The Planning Process: Considerations Specific to Reconnaissance Troops

Commander's Guidance

The battalion commander must provide a clear picture of what he needs from the reconnaissance effort and his desired end state. The three essential components below are what will drive the reconnaissance. Additionally, these components must be very clear and completely understood by the planners, staff, and reconnaissance elements.

- **Focus of reconnaissance:** Comprised of the commander's intent with emphasis on the end state and a specific reconnaissance objective.

- **Tempo of reconnaissance:** The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. The tempo of reconnaissance allows the squadron commander to determine time requirements for reconnaissance in relation to the higher headquarters mission and information requirements.

> The tempo for reconnaissance may be defined using terms such as "stealthy," "forceful," "deliberate," or "rapid." However, the squadron commander must ensure that he clearly defines for his subordinate how he interprets those terms. (FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron*, March 2010, page 2-8)

- **Engagement criteria** (both lethal and nonlethal) and **bypass criteria**: the size or type of enemy force he expects his subordinate units to engage or avoid. This drives planning for direct and indirect fires as well as establishment of bypass criteria. The (battalion) commander must also consider information engagement and how the troop interacts and influences the local populace. In a screen, additional guidance must be issued for displacement from the screen.

Planning Methods

Figures 13-2 and 13-3 provide staff planning tools to aid the battalion staff in maximizing the resources that a reconnaissance troop can provide to an infantry battalion. It is key to get

the troop commander involved in the planning process early. Staff members must remember that reconnaissance and the information it provides can feed the planning process. There is an illustration for both reconnaissance and security operations. Each illustration provides a checklist to the staff to ensure effective troop integration. The checklist is not a perfect document, but it will provide the essentials and basics needed to maximize the task force's chances of success.


Figure 13-2

Figure 13-3

During JMRC Rotation 12-01, it became clear that the involvement of the troop commander in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) could be a force multiplier. He aids the staff by providing an experienced captain and senior scout to the processes of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and reconnaissance and surveillance collection. This is not a doctrinal answer, but it is a rotational lesson learned. Few on an infantry staff will understand the capabilities of an attached reconnaissance troop better than the commander of that troop. This is a mutually beneficial relationship; the troop commander is able to stay closely tied to the planning process, which reduces his planning requirements while boosting the effectiveness of the staff.

Screen

The staff must keep in mind that a screen is intended to target enemy reconnaissance assets and provide early warning to the main body. This is the task that a troop supporting a battalion will perform. It is important to remember that like a screen door, a screen line is porous. It is NOT a defensive line and it is NOT intended to stop enemy forces.

> Forces in the security area furnish information on the enemy and delay, deceive, and disrupt the enemy and conduct counter reconnaissance" (definition of security zone, FM 3-90).

Screening forces are there to prevent enemy reconnaissance assets from pinpointing friendly positions and to harass the enemy forces to buy the main body time. Reconnaissance troops are often told to screen areas that are well outside their capability. Some battalions regard a screen as if it were a defensive line. This mistaken assumption creates a false belief that the screen will protect the battalion more than it will and may see the main body surprised or not ready for the enemy main attack.

Battlefield arithmetic must be applied when emplacing a screen. An important factor for a battalion staff to remember is the size of screen that a reconnaissance troop can employ. Within those factors, the MRT is also different from the DRT. If an MRT is performing a screen, it is reasonable to expect that it can man a maximum of six listening posts/OPs based on the unit's modified table of organization and equipment and normal manning fills. It may do this either mounted or dismounted, at two per platoon, for either a long or extended duration screen.

The doctrinal maximum frontage for a screen line is 6-10 kilometers, depending upon the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The depth of the screen is going to be affected by the size of the frontage and the number of OPs required. The depth will also be affected by the distance from the screened forces. The greater the OP requirement, the more shallow the screen will be, and thus the less effective it will be at sensing and reducing the enemy. Along with this,

it is incumbent upon the supported battalion to provide a counterreconnaissance platoon to the screening force if at all possible. This is not doctrinally required, but it is a practice that frees the scout platoons to acquire targets without giving away their locations. When the screening troop is expected to provide its own counterreconnaissance platoon, it reduces the frontage of the line by a third. In addition to the cost paid by the troop for coverage, there is a lower probability of the screen effectively destroying the enemy reconnaissance assets. This is caused by the wrong tool being used for the job. Scouts are designed to find the enemy. Infantry and armor are designed to destroy the enemy. Providing a counterreconnaissance platoon to the screen line is a price many battalions will not want to pay, but it is worth the investment.

Zone Reconnaissance

A zone reconnaissance can be a time-consuming event depending on focus and tempo. The volume of area must be taken into account when determining the focus and tempo. The time-space challenge can be mitigated through the use of external collection assets, including unmanned aircraft systems, low-level voice intercept systems, and augmentation to the reconnaissance troop, such as the battalion scout platoon, a rifle platoon, or a weapons platoon. When issuing the tempo portion of the reconnaissance guidance, it is important that the battalion does not issue time available guidance as "take as much time as needed." Tempo guidance that is issued in that manner says to the scouts that they have until the battalion gets impatient, and it only forces them to move at a rapid pace to stay ahead of demand.

The reconnaissance force may make contact, which is part of its role. It is to help identify and destroy enemy OPs, security forces, etc. Many infantry units get frustrated by this. It is better that the reconnaissance force makes contact and identifies enemy positions than it is for the main body to become fixed. If that reconnaissance force had not made contact, the enemy position would not be known. The knowledge enables deliberate maneuver on the threat. Preferably, the reconnaissance force will make contact with the smallest element possible and retain freedom of maneuver, allowing it to disengage from the threat and hand off intelligence. The reconnaissance force must be aware of these fundamentals and employ them to execute its mission well and avoid the need to be rescued. A decisively engaged reconnaissance element will create no end of frustration to the supported battalion that will just wish it had sent its own forces forward instead.

Planning Considerations when Utilizing a DRT

Accelerated planning timelines. To the extent to which the tactical situation permits, it is important to fully integrate the DRT leadership into the battalion's targeting and planning processes to facilitate their parallel planning at the troop, platoon, and even team levels. As observed during JMRC Rotation 12-01, the quickness in which events occur on a fluid and constantly evolving battlefield often limits the amount of time subordinate units, specifically DRTs, have to conduct their own troop leading procedures (TLPs) prior to mission execution.

TIME	EVENT
☐ 1930-2020	☐ Troop commander receives task/purpose of mission from squadron S-3 at the FOB.
☐ 2045	☐ Troop commander returns to the combat outpost and delivers a fragmentary order to troop leadership.
☐ 2200	☐ The troop departs the start point from the combat outpost to conduct a rapid zone reconnaissance and screen along a designated phase line.

Figure 13-4. Observed planning timeline for a dismounted reconnaissance troop's transition from defensive to offensive operations during Rotation 12-01

The full involvement of the troop's eight team leaders throughout the TLPs allowed the troop to meet extremely demanding suspenses and timelines.

Load plans. Re-emphasizing how significant a trooper's load plan is to the successful completion of his mission as well as to his own survivability in a hostile environment, it becomes essential to identify the exact items and quantities of those items troopers are required to transport on various missions. Although battalion-level staffs should provide input for what equipment should be carried on a mission, leaders at the lower-levels should be afforded an opportunity to refine the recommended load plan based on their experience and understanding of the tactical environment and mission at hand. Applying this technique of "top-down planning, bottom-up refinement" should result in established standing operating procedures for load plans required to execute various mission sets in difficult terrain during varying weather conditions.

Mutually supporting hide sites. Battalion commanders and staffs will likely find themselves in difficult positions where they require the observation of more named areas of interest (NAIs) than they have reconnaissance and surveillance assets. However, commanders should be mindful of assigning DRTs areas of responsibility so extensive that the DRT is forced to sacrifice the security of mutually supporting positions to observe all assigned NAIs. Any hide site, no matter how expertly constructed and concealed, risks the chance of accidental discovery by enemy forces. When a hide site is compromised, the survival of its occupants often depends on whether or not they are within the range of another mutually supporting position's direct fire weapons.

Advanced training for dismounted enablers. As battalion staffs dedicate combat enablers to DRTs, they should be mindful that the addition of various non-organic elements often creates unique difficulties that the DRT must negotiate through. As addressed earlier, DRT troopers spend considerable time training and improving their ability to stealthily move dismounted through incredibly challenging terrain while carrying exceptionally heavy combat loads. There are very unique challenges involved with the dismounted tactical movement through hostile territory in both daylight and nighttime conditions that takes the typical scout trooper years to learn and refine, not the least of which is the exceptional level of physical fitness required in such situations. However, in a deployed scenario, dismounted combat enablers are often pushed to the DRT immediately prior to its execution of a combat operation without providing the DRT adequate time to evaluate and retrain attached Soldiers as necessary. This often hinders the

movement of DRTs as they have to adjust their rate of march accordingly. As such, dismounted combat enablers must be proficient at moving in a tactical environment during daylight hours as well as during hours of limited visibility before attachment. If possible, integrate enablers with DRTs during predeployment training events.

Engagement criteria. Although the purpose of a DRT is rarely to engage enemy forces with direct fire weapon systems, battalion commanders and staffs must address when and in what situations the DRT is expected to engage and destroy enemy targets through the high-payoff target list, target selection standard, and attack guidance matrix. The DRT should be prepared to destroy enemy targets in the following situations:

- The battalion's engagement areas become over-saturated with enemy vehicles.

- The battalion has received extensive losses in the vicinity of its engagement areas and is at risk of losing its position of advantage in the fight.

- Targets of opportunity are identified after contact with the enemy's initial force has been made.

As the battle evolves and commanders reach critical decision points, they may overlook the fact that DRTs are capable of bringing with them a significant anti-armor killing ability with their Javelin missiles and, to a lesser extent, their AT4 launchers.

Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planning considerations. Visualizing several contingency scenarios on how a battle is likely to unfold enables battalion staffs to identify the need to not only designate the locations of primary ambulance exchange points (AXPs), but to also plan for alternate AXPs as well. Additionally, during defensive operations, battalion staffs must be mindful that their emplacement of obstacles does not completely isolate forward positioned DRTs from receiving ground CASEVAC assets when air assets are unavailable. During the defensive phase of JMRC Rotation 12-01, a critical medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) situation arose as a series of forward emplaced obstacles separated the squadron's DRT from the closest AXP to the point of injury. As a result, a troop first sergeant was forced to spend valuable time redirecting the MEDEVAC transport to a hastily identified, alternate location.

**Mission Execution: A Case Study into the Effective Employment of a
Reconnaissance Troop (Part 2)**

Figure 13-5. Portrayal of an alternative use of the reconnaissance troop

Applying the principles discussed in this article, it is instructive to examine how the originally presented scenario might have changed with better incorporation of reconnaissance assets. The graphics in Figure 13-5 illustrate a sample use of the reconnaissance troop and represent another possible alternative. The notional reconnaissance graphics are placed over the original graphics to contrast them using nonstandard colors to make them stand out, cross-referencing the two planning trees for screen and reconnaissance.

In the first scenario, the battalion distinctly lacked understanding of the enemy set on the objective. The use of the troop in the reconnaissance pull method would have aided the battalion in identifying enemy weak points, mission command nodes, heavy weapons locations, and target refinement. Before that, the troop could establish a security zone for the battalion. Upon the

receipt of order, the assigned troop commander is brought into the battalion MDMP as chief of reconnaissance. During mission analysis, he assists the battalion staff intelligence officer (S-2) and operations officer (S-3) by offering any known information of the area, assisting with initial IPB, development and refinement of the commander's critical information requirements, and co-production of the reconnaissance and surveillance matrix.

In the second scenario, the focus of the troop would be to confirm routes, identify and destroy enemy OPs, confirm that battalion assault positions are clear, and transition to a screen at the end of the zone mission. If launched soon after receipt of warning order #2, the troop would have approximately 26 hours to conduct its reconnaissance. This would leave the battalion six hours to get to its assault positions. The reconnaissance platoons would be able to move very slowly, maximize stealth, and clear all possible enemy OPs with the smallest element possible. The rate of movement could be less than 1 kilometer per hour given the size of the area of operations. As the zone reconnaissance is taking place, the S-2 and S-3 confirm the enemy situational template and verify route trafficability. Scouts will eliminate enemy OPs with organic mortars or artillery and employ direct fire only in self-defense. Contact points are established along phase lines and possible locations of platoons having incidental contact to facilitate linkup between reconnaissance assets and follow-on forces.

Once the troop reaches its LD (in this case PL Blue), the troop conducts a change of mission and emplaces a screen line. The focus of the screen will be the objective, specifically looking for locations of mission command elements, strength and disposition of forces, location of key weapon systems, security procedures, and obstacle construction. Ideally, it will be in place observing the objective (OBJ) 12 hours prior to execution. During that time, it will be feeding a detailed picture to the S-2 and refining targets for the fire support officer. Two platoons will be used in this role while the third platoon will be used for route security on the identified avenues of approach to maintain the integrity of the security zone. They will engage only to defend themselves and protect the integrity of the security zone. They will withdraw if they are at risk of being overwhelmed. At approximately 6-8 hours prior to execution, the battalion should be able to deploy with much greater speed and much lower risk. The platoon conducting route security can link up with the companies and guide them to their release points or assault positions. Once the battalion is in position and prepared to move to a breach site, the screen can direct smoke targets and work the target list that was developed earlier. The battalion would pass through the screen and initiate assault. Upon completion of the assault, the troop can transition to act as a pursuit force or screen beyond the objective to protect against enemy reinforcements.

Conclusion

While the employment of a reconnaissance troop does not always ensure mission success, it can greatly enhance the accuracy of the intelligence the commander has available throughout the MDMP, while also increasing the freedom of maneuver for his main body by enhancing its security zone.

Observing 1-91 CAV, 173rd ABCT throughout its JMRC DATE rotation has again reaffirmed how much reconnaissance troops are significant combat multipliers for battlefield commanders. Time and time again, the squadron's MRTs and DRTs were called upon to execute reconnaissance and security-focused missions in difficult terrain and for extended periods of time that only highly trained reconnaissance troops could successfully perform. However, as identified in this analysis of the integration and tactical employment of reconnaissance troops, there are

several planning considerations battalion commanders and staffs must address to mitigate the exceptionally high risk associated with reconnaissance missions. Successful integration and employment of reconnaissance troops hinges upon understanding and effective planning.

Glossary of Terms Used

Security operations – Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. (FM 3-90)

Security area (zone) – Area that begins at the forward area of the battlefield and extends as far to the front and flanks as security forces are deployed. Forces in the security area furnish information on the enemy and delay, deceive, and disrupt the enemy and conduct counterreconnaissance. (FM 3-90)

Reconnaissance – A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called recce; recon. See FM 3-0, *Operations*, June 2001.

Reconnaissance handover – The action that occurs between two elements in order to coordinate the transfer of information and/or responsibility for observation of potential threat contact, or the transfer of an assigned area from one element to another. (FM 3-20.96)

Reconnaissance pull – Reconnaissance that determines which routes are suitable for maneuver, where the enemy is strong and weak, and where gaps exist, thus pulling the main body toward and along the path of least resistance. This facilitates the commander's initiative and agility. (FM 3-20.96)

Reconnaissance push – Reconnaissance that refines the common operational picture, enabling the commander to finalize the plan and support shaping and decisive operations. It is normally used once the commander is committed to a scheme of maneuver or course of action. (FM 3-20.96)

Reconnaissance objective – A terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy force about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. (FM 3-90)

Tempo – The rate of military action. (FM 3-0)

Engagement criteria – Protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an enemy force. They can be either restrictive or permissive. The squadron commander visualizes engagement criteria through analysis of the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). (FM 3-90)

Contact point:

1. In land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable, where two or more ground units are required to make physical contact. (See FM 3-90.)

2. In air operations, the position at which a mission leader makes radio contact with an air control agency. (See FM 3-04.111, *Aviation Brigades*, December 2007.)

3. In evasion and recovery operations, a location where an evader can establish contact with friendly forces. (See FM 100-25 [FM 3-05], *Army Special Operations Forces*, December 2010.) Also called CP. See also checkpoint; control point; coordinating point.

Brigade Challenges for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Operations in an Expeditionary Environment

MAJ Joseph R. Caldwell
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) are critical actions a brigade must execute with precision when entering a new theater or area of operations (AO). RSOI must be planned and executed in an efficient and synchronized manner in order for the brigade to build combat power as quickly as possible. Additionally, the joint staff planning and coordination tasks are extensive and vital to mission success once on the ground. RSOI tasks are even more complex when operating in a semi-permissive or hostile environment. An initial-entry force is at its most vulnerable point when executing its RSOI tasks, building combat power, and expanding the lodgment within its assigned AO.

RSOI planning and execution was a challenge for the brigade staff during the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team's (ABCT's) recent training rotation executed within the decisive action training environment at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany. The 173rd ABCT was tasked with rapidly deploying from Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, and conducting an airborne assault into the country of Atropia (Hohenfels Training Area). From there, the brigade staff was faced with the complex task of managing RSOI operations in three different, noncontiguous AOs after the airborne assault: Grafenwoehr Training Area (AO Rockies), Hohenfels Training Area (AO Andes), and a replicated intermediate staging base in Grafenwoehr cantonment area (Baku International Airport). All heavy equipment was received and staged at the Baku International Airport and was moved by ground convoy into the brigade's AO.

Chapter 4 of Field Manual 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, April 2010, describes the importance of synchronized RSOI operations in an expeditionary environment.

> An expeditionary Army depends on its ability to project combat power where needed. The process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration is designed to rapidly combine and integrate arriving elements of personnel, equipment, and materiel into combat power that can be employed by the combatant commander.

The three primary challenges the brigade staff faced while executing RSOI were:

- Establishing mission command nodes at aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs).

- Standardizing RSOI reporting requirements.

- Establishing appropriate tasking levels for subordinate units during RSOI.

These three focus points manifested themselves within the first 24 hours following the brigade's airborne assault. RSOI planning and execution is essential to both shaping and decisive action operations following the initial entry into an immature theater. The execution of RSOI tasks must be the decisive operation for the brigade following initial entry into a theater or AO until sufficient capability has been established to begin follow-on operations.

The lack of established mission command nodes at each of the APOEs and APODs hampered the brigade's ability to monitor its progress in building combat power. Personnel and equipment did arrive into the 173rd's AOs in a timely manner in accordance with the air-land timeline. In a few cases, mission-critical equipment remained in an APOD staging area for up to 12 hours after its arrival into the area of responsibility. This was due to the brigade not having a detailed plan for monitoring the arrival of mission-critical equipment. Additionally, the brigade main command post did not have effective communications with the APOEs. This communication shortfall caused the brigade headquarters to lose intransit visibility for mission-critical equipment once it departed the APOE. Personnel in charge of the APOD reception areas did not have equipment manifests, did not know what mission-critical equipment was expected, or what to do when mission-critical equipment arrived. Personnel accountability was equally challenging. In some cases, after personnel arrived to the staging area and were, in turn, released to their parent unit, it took up to 48 hours before the parent unit captured the newly arrived personnel on its personnel status report. The brigade staff did not have one hundred percent accountability of all its personnel and equipment until five days after its initial entry.

The special troops battalion (STB) was tasked to run the reception and staging area in AO Andes near the flight landing strip. Equipment and personnel were received and marshaled into designated holding areas until the owning unit took control of them and moved them forward into their respective areas. The lack of brigade staff augmentation at the RSOI mission command node and lack of established standardized RSOI reporting requirements caused the STB to execute tracking and reporting tasks on its own. The STB did not monitor the brigade administrative/logistics radio net at the reception area. Additionally, there was not an established method of communication between the two APODs and their APOEs. Communication between these key locations would have made the brigade staff's accountability challenge much easier. A published timeline detailing the arrival of equipment and personnel would have also assisted the line battalions with their mission planning and reporting.

Because the STB did not have personnel or equipment manifests, it had to manually write down the names and the parent units for all arriving personnel. This specific information was not reported to the brigade S-1 until roughly 12 to 24 hours later. The root cause for this challenge was the lack of an RSOI standing operating procedure. Reporting responsibilities and predesignated reporting formats must be prepared prior to deployment. Common understanding of RSOI reporting responsibilities would facilitate a more efficient transition for onward movement and integration.

During the initial hours and days after a forced-entry operation, securing and expanding the lodgment are vital to mission success. Securing the lodgment sets conditions for a successful RSOI process. The 173rd ABCT focused on executing multiple tasks 24 hours after its forced entry. The maneuver battalions and companies were conducting operations while simultaneously working to meet their RSOI requirements. Owning units at the battalion and company underestimated the time and manpower it would take to move new arrivals from the reception area to their tactical assembly areas. The battalions and companies knew they had personnel and equipment arriving at the APOD, but they did not have a published schedule directing when they should expect their personnel and equipment to arrive into theater. In many cases, the STB would contact the owning unit and report it had personnel and equipment to pick up from the staging area, causing units to be reactive rather than proactive. The ad hoc nature of RSOI operations resulted in the reception area being cleared two to three times in a 24-hour period. In order to execute efficient RSOI operations, subordinate units must not be overtasked with concurrent requirements.

The past 10 years of armed conflict has caused the U.S. Army to focus less on contingency operations and more on counterinsurgency. The 173rd ABCT's rotation at the JMRC reminded leaders at all levels of some of the key planning factors required when executing forced initial-entry operations. Building combat power is the foremost task for the maneuver commander. Overtasking the line battalions with follow-on missions before the completion of critical RSOI tasks degrades their ability to safely receive, move forward, and integrate their Soldiers into the fight. Limited communications networks between all APOEs and APODs will adversely affect how the entry force can track its progress throughout the RSOI process. Lastly, the subordinate units must have published reporting guidance from the brigade staff. Focusing planning and leadership emphasis on these areas will greatly improve an initial-entry force RSOI efforts in an immature theater.

The following challenges demonstrate the importance for the order of battle when conducting initial forced-entry operations:

- Execute forced-entry operations – Consolidate and organize.

- Secure lodgment – Set conditions for executing RSOI operations.

- Execute RSOI – Build combat power.

- Expand lodgment – As capability increases, extend operational boundaries.

- Close RSOI operations – Execute required operations.

In conclusion, the RSOI process must be thoroughly planned and rehearsed before deployment. There are many specified tasks and implied tasks. These include convoy security, force protection measures, and reporting requirements. Each battalion must know its roles and responsibilities. RSOI operations must be a brigade-level unified effort, with the focus on accurate and timely reporting on the progress of the buildup of combat power. Communications with the APOE and APOD can assist in keeping situational understanding of the force flow into theater. The importance of RSOI planning and execution is essential to both shaping and decisive operations following the initial entry into an immature theater. RSOI must be viewed as the center of gravity and the brigade's key task during the initial hours of insertion when executing unified land operations.

Mission Command of the Brigade Support Area in Decisive Action Operations

MAJ D.T. Syd Hills
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

For the past decade, major changes have been implemented into the force sustainment community to streamline logistics support tailored to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the modular logistics model implementation, very few units have engaged in conventional operations on the linear battlefield in decisive action operations or operational environments with a hybrid threat. The challenge to sustainers for decisive action is how to successfully provide mission command in this type of environment with the application of the new force structure.

The center of gravity for logistic support is the brigade support area (BSA). In the past, the BSA was a mass conglomerate of logistics assets that included support platoons working in conjunction with forward support battalions as well as unit field trains and elements from maneuver battalion headquarters and headquarters companies. With the fielding and manning of sustainment brigades and forward support companies (FSCs), the dynamic of effective BSA mission command has changed, but the basic principles requiring flexible support have not.

BSA Operations on the Contiguous Battlefield: An Overview

The single largest difference in decisive action operations for the BSA is its requirement to remain flexible and mobile versus being in a fixed position with externally resourced force protection. This additional support includes contractors, dedicated security, and built-in support from collocated echelons above brigade support. These additional support characteristics ease the demands of mission command and enable sustainment forces to stay focused on supply flow and convoy resupply operations.

Figure 15-1. BSA defense is essential for keeping unit supply lines open

In a conventional BSA structure, the brigade support battalion (BSB) must provide its own security internally while still maintaining the ability to provide support. Unlike during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the BSA must be configured and ready at all times to move, flex, and change its internal structure to support the maneuver plan. The BSA must also be capable of integrating FSCs within its boundaries while conducting resupply missions both near the BSA and forward of the unit front line trace.

Figure 15-2. Almost a lost art is the planning and manning of defensive perimeters in brigade or logistic support areas

Defense of the BSA

First and foremost, defense of the BSA is an exceptional demand without the security of a forward operating base (FOB) or a base defense operations center (BDOC). During the recent decisive action rotation conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), the importance of a quick reaction force (QRF) was the primary means of security operations for the BSB. QRF operations in the contiguous fight are much different than those of BDOCs. Fighting positions and pre-emplaced obstacles must be tactically sound and involve leader oversight, management, and manning by the tactical operations center (TOC) as well as each company operations center. If a BSA is not provided additional security assets from a maneuver unit, tenant units are faced with a significant troop-to-task challenge. To combat the challenges of multitasking troops, many of these missions are short taskings and hasty fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) directed by the brigade as the fluid battle progresses into offensive or defensive operations. If the BSA is compromised by a hybrid threat enemy force, the logistic flow could bring the BCT operations to a halt. In this scenario, maneuver can be greatly affected by the enemy's actions even more so than in a COIN environment. Units faced with having to control this type of support area must have specifically assigned duties to subordinate elements, a solid troop-to-task plan, as well as contingency plans for unexpected missions.

When planning for the defense of the BSA, many factors are taken into consideration to include area trafficability, cover and concealment, suitable helicopter landing zone sites, access to lateral routes, and positioning away from enemy lines of communications (LOCs).[1] Listening posts/observation posts and roving patrols are also essential. Sector sketches, proper weapons emplacement, mutually supportive firing positions, and combat vehicle integration are all fundamental necessities that have not been sufficiently trained and addressed by BSBs in years. Unit tactical standing operating procedures (SOPs) must also involve an SOP specific to BSA defense.

Figure 15-3. During unified land operations, TOCs must be well run and organized, complete with backup systems to track essential information for early entry operations, displacement, and gaps in digital connectivity

TOC Operations

The lack of fixed hard stand facilities presents new challenges for mission command and TOC operations. Establishment of a BSA with a doctrinal 25 to 40 kilometer LOC from the maneuver units carries the implied task of additional signal retransmission assets. For initial-entry operations, the BSA TOC must have a working and specific analog communication plan, since use of the Blue Force Tracker, tactical satellites, and frequency modulated communications will be the only link to the unit's higher headquarters. Each communications system in the BSA TOC must have a clearly defined second and third level of redundancy. The TOC must be able to have communications with both higher headquarters as well as each and every fighting position and the QRF. Prior to mission execution, the BSB must have SOPs that clearly define different TOC configurations based on the time the BSA will be at a set location.

Once the unit is able to stand up a command post node or joint network node and get Nonsecure and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network communications, the common operating picture of the maneuver forces becomes even more important to the commander than seen in fixed combat outpost and FOB missions. To maintain sustainment flow, a constant update of supply status needs to be maintained on the maneuver units. The security and plans officer's (SPO's) concept of support must be nested into the maneuver plan and be complemented by pre-drafted contingency plans as the brigade makes changes to its operations. In decisive action operations, the support operations section must be directly linked both physically and digitally into the current operations cell and S-3 section of the BSA TOC. Operations such as a hasty counterattack or defensive operations create the need for the BSA TOC to be prepared to react to changing operational needs. Supply stocks inside the BSA must be carefully tracked and managed; if not, the unit will be required to move without the ability to carry all materiel on site.

Personnel in the BSA TOC must have clearly defined duties and responsibilities. The commander of the BSB is the commander of the BSA, but delegated additional duties must be managed much like troop-to-task priorities. Battle drills and contingency plans must be displayed, rehearsed, and understood by both the day and night crews manning the TOC.

Knowledge Management and the Military Decisionmaking Process

The challenges of a hybrid threat create the necessity of the commander's staff to take on a different configuration and role during decisive action operations. The largest struggle for the BSB staff during this type of operation is the constant sense of being in "execution mode" based on brigade operations. The staff must rehearse and always plan to execute a hasty military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Once the initial entry plan is executed, the remaining missions will often come down from the BCT only in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) and warning orders (WARNORDs). The BSB staff must abbreviate the planning process but still be able to produce a mission analysis brief, running staff estimates, and proposed courses of action for the BSB commander. Hasty planning must all be nested into the brigade commander's priority of support. Tenant units in the BSA cluster cannot rely simply on short-term taskings, but rather still be given hasty FRAGORDs and abbreviated operation orders (OPORDs) so they can rehearse and adhere to the one-third, two-thirds rule of planning. The BSB staff must practice the art of creating a concept of support and OPORD brief with just a brigade WARNORD or FRAGORD on hand. If not, all of the tenant units will also always be in the react mode and have limited flexibility.

One technique to prepare for decisive action operations is the creation of contingency plans (CONPLANS). Much like drafting a contingency operation, these plans are all war-gamed and staffed out prior to mission deployment. Planners, logisticians, SPO planners, FSC commanders, and unit S-4 officers must come together to devise basic outlines of how to react to hybrid threat situations. Once a mission is in execution mode and events change, the unit can refer and execute these CONPLANs.

Based on the operational tempo, a reliable and simple battalion knowledge management (KM) SOP is necessary. The KM SOP covers communications plans but also must include a standard set of locations and directions for TOC and staff personnel to find and access information. Since both analog and digital systems are in play, the BSB staff needs to have these standards outlined in order to constantly update the common operating picture for the commander and ensure seamless mission command during changes of mission.

BSA Displacement

During unified land operations, several factors may cause the BSA to displace to best support the maneuver plan of the BCT. Change of unit areas of operation as well as a change of mission for the BCT may force a jump of the BSA. For JMRC Rotation 12-01, the BSA displaced at the change of mission from the defense to the offense to better support the BCT. During BSA displacement, mission command of the battalion, as well as re-establishment of the Role II aid station, present unique challenges. Despite a change of mission, the BSB is still required to provide support while moving. For this type of operation, the BSB has to have a clear SOP and duties and responsibilities for the establishment of a tactical command post (TAC) or a forward logistics element able to displace early and re-establish communications with the BCT headquarters. The SPO section must continue to plan and prepare for mission support while displacing and is also usually part of a forward TAC package during movement.

Challenges of the displacement include breaking down the area defenses as well as potential coordination with host-nation forces. For a successful jump of the BSA, a preplanned and rehearsed movement sequence directed through an OPORD is essential. The BSA and BSB must also have a standard checklist and sequence of events for BSA displacement. Members of the chain of command all have to possess clear guidelines and duties and responsibilities to maintain mission command for the move. It is the responsibility of the BSB staff to be able to present to the BSB commander and BCT commander a working, detailed analysis of the projected time the move will take as well as all of the redundant systems in overview so that the brigade staff can plan accordingly.

Conclusions

Although the modular logistics concept has been in practice for many years now, it has rarely been applied to decisive action operations. Lack of mission command in the BSA will affect both the BSB as well as the entire BCT. For the BSB to be successful, the BCT must publish a clear and concise BSA SOP that includes CONTPLANs and standardized BSA battle drills. Flexibility is the key variable in decisive action operations. BSA operations that are standardized and can react and plan with the BCT will best serve the entire BCT, to include any attached non-BCT units.

Endnote

1. *Sustainment in the Theater of War CGSC Student Text 63-1*, October 2007, pg 6-10-6-11

Sustainment Reporting During Early Entry Operations

MAJ Jonathan D. Reeves, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
MAJ Jeffrey A. Smith, 173rd Brigade Support Battalion

Reporting sustainment data has become simplified in the combat theater environments of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn (OND). During transfers of authority, brigade combat team (BCT) sustainers fall in on established Nonsecure and Secure Internet Protocol Router Networks (NIPRNET/SIPRNET), and the unit being replaced provides the "how to" instruction on properly filling out the logistics status reports sent daily to the supporting sustainment brigade. All supported task forces (TFs) are assisted by the unit they are transitioning with as they conduct their right-seat and left-seat rides. If used, the Battle Command Sustainment and Support System (BCS3) is set up and the supporting field service representative (FSR) conducts refresher training. Upon the completion of the transfer of authority, sustainment reporting is not a significant issue because a majority of the problems have been addressed.

In the developed counterinsurgency environment, BCT sustainers must conduct very little analysis on how to best transmit, receive, and distribute sustainment data to ensure that a synchronized, distributed sustainment common operational picture (COP) is shared by all. Logistics status report (LOGSTAR) data is gathered, confirmed, then updated on BCT standard PowerPoint slides to provide commanders the visibility they require. The LOGSTAR is a fairly standard Excel spreadsheet used throughout the operating environment and pushed down to the TF S-4s and forward support companies (FSCs) for data population. The bottom line is that maintaining sustainment visibility across the established BCT area of operations (AO) requires very little imagination or staff analysis.

Breaking the Norm – Reporting in Early Entry Operations

However, when a BCT receives the mission to conduct an early-entry operation, the accustomed OND/OEF system(s) of sustainment reporting become obsolete. This change in reporting formats and procedures forces the BCT sustainers to analyze what communications systems will be available, when they will be available, where these capabilities are projected to be located within the brigade's AO, and where they are listed on the prioritization of equipment in-flow. The primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) planning process for sustainment reporting must be aligned with the brigade's timeline for when communications systems become available. Additionally, the BCT must decide which information system will be used throughout different phases of the operation. Information systems are defined in Field Manual (FM) 4-0, *Sustainment,* April 2009, as equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information to provide access to COPs for commanders.

Depending on the distribution of BCT units in the AO, frequency modulated radio communications may not be feasible for reporting sustainment data, making Blue Force Tracker (BFT), a Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) variant, the primary system for sustainment reporting. Relying on BFT requires some staff planning prior to the commencement of the operation. The entire BCT must understand the reporting requirement and format to ensure an adequate posture is acquired. In a recent unified land operations rotation at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), the BCT used BFT for initial sustainment reporting; however, reports varied from the simple reporting of a color code (green, amber,

red, black) for commodities to the estimated quantities on hand of each particular commodity. Initially, the support operations section had difficulty sorting through the multiple versions of reporting to maintain a thorough situational awareness of the posture of each battalion TF. This difficulty led to emergency requests popping up on the BFT screen. A related issue became the hunt for BFT icons and addresses on the screen in order to start requesting the posture of nearby BCT elements to see if sustainment stocks existed for cross-loading until units could be resupplied.

Figure 16-1. Only a few hours after the initiation of an early-entry operation, a brigade support battalion support operations officer sits at the BFT receiving sustainment reports

To successfully use BFT during the initial entrance into the AO, at a minimum the maneuver companies, TF S-4s, FSCs, support operations officer, and BCT S-4 must rehearse the initial reporting requirements, distribute role names, and publish report formats prior to the entry. It is critical the BCT ensures the supporting expeditionary sustainment command/theater sustainment command elements are also included in the dissemination of information and that they are able to receive and execute resupply operations under a BFT or other suitable reporting format. Additionally, the dissemination of critical changes to the original sustainment preparation of the battlefield analysis must be shared once ground truth data becomes available, whether through the sending of free texts, the publication of updated sustainment graphics, or the development of graphic control measures. Another key player before operations begin is the FBCB2/BFT FSR or a designated brigade point of contact, who will be critical to the success of utilizing this system for reporting and ensuring a BFT gunnery-style communications check is completed with all systems and that the appropriate maps and data are uploaded.

The PACE Transition

Other communications systems can also be integrated into the sustainment PACE process early in the initial-entry operation before the communications infrastructure is fully established across the BCT. Secure tactical satellite (TACSAT), SIPR NIPR Access Point (SNAP) Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), and Combat Service Support (CSS) VSAT can all be utilized as transmission mediums in building the sustainment COP once initial movements are complete. The earlier a BCT can establish connectivity the sooner its critical sustainment systems can be employed. Once the CSS VSAT and the Combat Service Support Automated Information Systems Interface (CAISI) bridge module is established, the BCT can employ the BCS3 system (per FM 4-0, the Army's unclassified and classified logistics fusion center employed at multiple echelons for maneuver sustainment support) as the tool for sustainment reporting, to provide a sustainment COP, and to provide in-transit visibility of inbound units and supplies. Additionally, per FM 6-02.43, *Signal Soldier's Guide*, March 2009, the Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS) can be utilized to monitor deployment status and track unit movements into the AO and the Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4) used to better organize the efficient flow of medical data.

The key for success is to have a brigade-approved and resourced reporting plan synchronized with the movement of key communications systems and then to ensure the plan is rehearsed across the BCT. Reporting requirements, including report times and formats, must be known down to the platoon operator level. Next, the triggers for transitioning from one PACE to another must also be understood across the BCT. The brigade must thoroughly analyze and brief the transition from analog to digital sustainment COP. The end state must produce a maneuver commander who is capable of making operational decisions, fully knowing that sustainment postures are sufficiently represented in the sustainment COP.

The Future – APP Based Sustainment Reporting?

Though this article has been based upon current systems and stimulated by the JMRC's first unified land operations rotation, the best answer for sustainment reporting during early-entry operations may be coming in the near future. As FM 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, dated 21 April 2010 states, "At present, there are a number of joint systems in various stages of development that provide visibility of force deployment and sustainment. Unfortunately, present systems do not completely satisfy the requirements of force tracking and much of the process must be accomplished manually." The biggest development is the Joint Battle Command – Platform, "an Android-based smartphone framework and suite of applications for tactical operations. The government-owned framework, known as Mobile/Handheld Computing Environment, or CE, ensures that regardless of who develops them, applications will be secure and interoperable with existing mission command systems so information flows seamlessly across all echelons of the force."[1] This system is touted as the follow-on program to FBCB2 and BFT and may possibly be the tool to provide an app-based sustainment COP that is simple enough to become the reporting tool of choice for today's BCT sustainers.

Endnote

1. Claire Heininger, PEO-C3T, *Army Develops Smartphone Framework, Applications for the Front Lines*, 18 April 2011.

Battalion Logistics: Unifying Sustainment at the Lowest Level

CPT Michael W. Kummerer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
CPT Ross M. Hertlein, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team

On a battlefield where forward operating bases and combat outposts are replaced with field trains command posts (FTCPs) and combat trains command posts (CTCPs) and where SIPR (Secure Internet Protocol Router) and SVOIP (Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol) are replaced by Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and frequency modulated radio transmissions, logisticians quickly realize that the ability to provide Soldiers with basic sustainment needs is no longer a given. The prospect of actually running out of drinking water or ammunition becomes very real, and the success of entire units often lies on the shoulders of the sustainment planners and executers at the lowest level: the battalion S-4 and the forward support company (FSC) commander.

Field Manual (FM) 3-21.20, *The Infantry Battalion*, and FM 4-90, *The Brigade Support Battalion*, clearly outline some of the responsibilities of the battalion S-4 and the FSC commander. However, what is not found when referencing these publications is a clear description of how these two individuals interact and work with each other. This article examines how sustainment doctrine applies to the relationship and responsibilities of the S-4 and FSC commander in unified land operations and will provide an example of an effective logistics reporting flow.

FM 4-90, *The Brigade Support Battalion*

6-6. The FSC commander is the senior logistician at battalion level for the combat arms battalion for general supply, distribution, and maintenance. The FSC commander assists the battalion S4 with the battalion logistics planning and is responsible for executing the logistics plan in accordance with the supported battalion commander's guidance.

The S-4 and FSC Commander Relationship

It was late in the afternoon on the first day of defensive operations. In 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment's (AFAR's) battalion tactical operations center (TOC), radio traffic could be heard of the first troops in contact as enemy reconnaissance elements began filtering into the area of operations. The battalion had not yet seen the enemy forces described by the battalion S-2 the night prior during the operations order brief and had not yet fired its first rounds from the howitzers that were sure to be a crucial part of the defensive fight. However, right now, the battalion of enemy armored vehicles and the threat of enemy artillery that outgunned and outranged them was not the topic of discussion; rather the battalion staff and leadership were huddled together voicing their concern over a civilian disguised as a United Nations aid worker that breached their security, entered the battalion TOC, and left with the most sensitive of information ... the location of the battalion headquarters and the brigade's only fire finding radar, the Q36. The decision was made to leave the current location and jump TOC. As the last elements left the old battalion footprint, a barrage of enemy artillery impacted in an area that surly would have created catastrophic damage to personnel and equipment. The large logistics vehicles were the last vehicles to arrive at the new TOC location, only to find that there was nowhere to provide cover and concealment for such

large vehicles. As plans were discussed as to what to do with the FSC, the vehicles sat out in the open along the road in plain sight ...

For an effective sustainment program to be established at the battalion level, it is essential for the S-4 and the FSC commander to work jointly to unify their logistics efforts. This includes establishing clear roles and responsibilities and keeping in constant communication with each other. In the most basic sense, the roles and responsibilities seem relatively easy; the S-4 plans sustainment and provides requirements, the FSC commander resources requirements and executes the plan. However, as it is clearly outlined in FM 4-90, the FSC commander, as the senior logistician, has a responsibility to be involved in the planning process.


Figure 17-1. Sources used to establish logistics requirements

In a sense, during mission analysis, course of action development, and the military decisionmaking process, the FSC commander must put on his "staff officer hat" and work with the S-4 in creating the sustainment plan. The key step in creating this plan is establishing requirements; ultimately, as stated earlier, this is the S-4's responsibility. The S-4 is typically branch affiliated with his battalion and brings inherent operational knowledge that is essential in establishing these requirements. The FSC commander should assist the S-4 in this process, because as a logistician, he brings invaluable sustainment knowledge to the table. However, they cannot allow themselves to work in a bubble during this process. Figure 17-1 gives just a few examples of other sources that can be used in creating these requirements.

Another key factor in establishing requirements is understanding what external elements will be attached or detached when task forces are established. FSC commanders who are losing supported units have a responsibility to ensure the FSC commander that is gaining that supported unit clearly understands the type and amount of support that will be required to sustain that unit. A prime example of this is when a firing battery or firing section is detached from the fires

battalion and is attached to a maneuver battalion. The maneuver battalion FSC commander might not fully understand how much of a strain the artillery Class V will put on available transportation systems. Based purely on space availability, there is often a need for FSCs that are losing supported units to detach support systems and Soldiers to augment the FSC gaining additional supported units. These personnel and equipment additions and subtractions must be included in the planning processes.

Once the requirements are established, it is the FSC commander's responsibility to create the concept of support (COS). If the S-4 and FSC commander are working together throughout the whole process, then this should be happening simultaneously. Therefore, just as the FSC commander assists the S-4 in the planning process and in establishing requirements, the S-4 must also work with the FSC commander in creating the COS. When creating the COS, it is always important to ensure two things. The first is that it supports the maneuver plan; the second is that it is supportable by the brigade support battalion (BSB) or whoever may be providing the next higher echelon of support. Once the COS is created, the S-4 and FSC commander should validate the plan with the S-3 and executive officer (XO), and the FSC commander should validate the plan with the higher supporting unit support operations officer (SPO). This is the best way to identify shortfalls and friction points in both the requirements and the concept of support, and will further synchronize the plan, which will provide a much higher probability of mission success. After the COS has been validated by the supported battalion XO/S-3 and the SPO, the FSC commander should brief the supported battalion commander on the plan.

FM 4-90, *The Brigade Support Battalion*

6-8. The FSC commander/XO typically collocates with the supported battalion S1/S4 at the combat trains command post (CTCP). The battalion S-4 ensures the battalion's orders and requirements are passed to the FSC commander, who has supported the battalion S-1/S-4 with requisite information during the planning process.

Maintaining Synchronization

> *On the eve of offensive operations, the 4-319th AFAR S-4 was diligently crunching numbers and going over calculations at his desk. In a matter of hours, one reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron and two infantry battalions would be conducting breaching operations at deliberately placed enemy obstacles. Although it was never discussed or formally requested, the artillerymen of 4-319th knew that their most crucial contribution in this type of operation would be a smoke screen that would conceal the maneuver units conducting the breach. So, the S-4 continued to crunch the numbers; distance, range, length of the screen, burn time, concentration … After he had verified and reverified the numbers he knew time was of the essence. Alpha and Bravo battery were short thousands of smoke rounds that would be required for this type of operation. Immediately, the S4 contacted the BSB SPO and received good news. The BSB would coordinate for an emergency air resupply of 105mm HC [hexachloroethane] smoke rounds that could be delivered in 90 minutes. Ninety-five minutes later, the plane carrying the much needed smoke rounds flew over an unsecured drop zone (DZ) unable to make contact with any unit on the ground. The BSB simply did not have the personnel to push out to the DZ with so many competing requirements... Meanwhile, the Soldiers from Golf FSC stood by, idly preparing a patrol to deliver a recently repaired howitzer to Alpha Battery. They were less than 10 kilometers away from the unsecured DZ at the time the plane flew overhead …*

Once the requirements have been established and the COS has been created, it is essential that the integration between the FSC and the S-4 continue. Although FSC commanders should have a constant presence within the battalion staff during the planning process, it is not feasible to expect a continuous presence throughout mission execution; after all, they are commanders and do have a company to command. So when FM 4-90 states that the FSC commander or XO typically collocates with the S-4 at the CTCP in order to continue sustainment synchronization, it is recommended that the XO fill this essential role. Throughout an operation, the S-4 is constantly receiving logistical updates and is continuously creating requirements; it is not feasible for him to pick up the radio or get on the BFT every time a new requirement is created or a change to the COS is required. It is therefore the FSC XO's responsibility to deconflict friction points at the CTCP and ensure the flow of communication continues back to the FSC commander at the FTCP.

Other FSC positions that provide further synchronization with the supported battalion are the noncommissioned officers in charge of the combat repair teams/maintenance contact teams. These teams are not only critical to the "fix it forward" principle described in the two-level maintenance concept; they also provide the FSC commander with eyes and ears on the front line and validate maintenance statuses that are used to "paint the picture" for the battalion and brigade commanders. It is critical that these invaluable members of the team are proficient in the use of the BFT, as this is the primary means of communication with the FTCP.

FM 3-21.20, *The Infantry Battalion*

10-198. The FSC regularly interfaces with the BSB in order to provide logistics support to the battalion. He ensures requests are filled correctly by the SPO and the distribution company in the BSB.

Getting Involved in the Bigger Sustainment Picture

It was early in the fight. It had only been a few days since the Golf FSC commander and his undermanned company of 40 Soldiers had jumped into Hohenburg DZ. Up to this point, there had been little contact with the BSB. The resourceful Soldiers of Golf FSC had successfully been able to scrounge up enough Class I and Class III to keep operations going. But now, the company and the battalion that they supported were in desperate need of a resupply. The day prior the commander sent a BFT message to the SPO with his requirements: 1500 gallons of JP8 fuel, 1000 gallons of bulk water, and 12 cases of heat-and-serve meals. The only response ..."Resupply will occur tomorrow." The Soldiers of Golf FSC didn't know what time the resupply would arrive or what it would be carrying. When the resupply finally arrived, it delivered 500 gallons of JP8 and a couple boxes of bananas. Well short of what was required and what was expected.

As important as it is for the FSC to integrate with the battalion staff, it is equally as important for the FSC to integrate with the BSB. If feasible, the FSC commander should strive to communicate with the SPO on a daily basis during offensive and defensive operations. At a minimum, this communication should include a logistics status (LOGSTAT) report of the FSC's current supply point balances as well as any planned resupply missions to the FSC's supported units and any requirements the FSC has of the BSB. This is also the time the FSC validates time, location,

and supplies that are coming from the distribution company. Figure 17-2 illustrates an effective method of reporting logistics in the brigade combat team (BCT) in which the critical sustainment coordination is conducted between the FSC commander and the BSB SPO, working logistician to logistician.


1. Companies report LOGSTAT to BN S4
2. FSC reports supply point balances to BN S4
3. S4 allocates resources from supply points and issues resupply requirements to FSC
4. BN S4 reports LOGSTAT to BDE S4 and provides non-supply point requirements/emergency supply point requirements
5. FSC reports supply point balances to SPO (minus resources allocated for resupply)
6. BDE S4 provides non-supply point/emergency supply point requirements to SPO
7. SPO allocates resources from BSA supply points and issues resupply requirements to A/BSB
8. FSC resupplies supported units based on requirements from S4
9. BSB resupplies FSCs based on requirements from SPO

Figure 17-2. An effective method of BCT logistics reporting

Another method of logistics reporting could be that LOGSTATs go directly from the battalion S-4 to the brigade S-4 and to the BSB SPO. This can only be effective, however, if the FSC commander and battalion S-4 are fully synchronized, and it is still often more effective for the coordination to occur between the FSC commander and the BSB SPO. An example of a situation in which it might be more effective for the S-4 to coordinate directly with the SPO is when requesting Class V. Because FSCs do not have ammunition handlers or managers, the subject matter experts usually reside in the battalion S-4 shop; this is especially true in a fire support battalion. In this case, coordination between the battalion ammunition manager and ammunition warrant officer in the BSB is acceptable as long as the FSC commander is still kept abreast as to what the requirements will be for transportation and storage. Once the requests have been submitted and approved, the FSC can once again coordinate directly with the SPO for resupply.

Regardless of the communication flow that is used for LOGSTAT reporting, it is important to note that it should be done in conjunction with the Logistics Reporting Tool (LRT) of the Battle Command Sustainment Support System. As stated in FM 4-90, A-1, the LRT is the Army standard for submitting routine logistics status reports from the unit and supply point level.

Figure 17-3. The Golf Battery Commander sends LOGSTAT reports via BFT

In summary, in order to ensure success during future unified land operations, it is critical that synchronization of sustainment begins at the lowest levels. The FSC commander has an inherent responsibility to synchronize his mission with both the supported battalion as well as with the BSB. The battalion S-4 must synchronize his unit with the current operations and constantly refine the running estimates and requirements while simultaneously communicating those requirements with the FSC. Brigadier General Vincent Boles once said, "The last 50 kilometers are the toughest in logistics. That's where our papers get graded." During unified land operations, the last 50 kilometers occurs within the BCT's area of operation. It is up to the sustainment planners and executors in the BCT to ensure the Soldiers at the end of those 50 kilometers are provided what they need to complete the mission.

The Special Troops Battalion in Decisive Action Training Environments

MAJ Marlon S. Ringo, MAJ Phillip J. Borders,
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

MAJ David D. Johnson, MAJ Kyle W. Lands,
173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team

Recently, the completion of a decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation by the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, provided many valuable lessons learned. These lessons demonstrated what unique capabilities a special troops battalion (STB) brings in enhancing the overall ability of a modular brigade as a battalion mission command node in what was then called the full spectrum training environment.

To be capable battalion mission command nodes, STBs must understand themselves, their enablers, their missions, and their operational environments (OEs). According to Field Manual (FM) 3-90.61, *The Brigade Special Troops Battalion,* December 2006, the STB is the BCT's force provider in today's modular Army as it begins to shift its focus to combating hybrid threats. STBs, by doctrine, can also accomplish specific missions assigned by the brigade commander. The intent of this article is to share observations made during the 173rd ABCT's DATE rotational training experience at JMRC.

It is important that the STB must first understand its own capabilities to convey them to the brigade commander and his staff. During its JMRC rotation, the 173rd STB staff faced many of the challenges common to units training early in the Army Force Generation process. For example, the staff, comprised of several junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), was short of personnel in several key positions and was not practiced in conducting the military decisionmaking process or preparing running estimates in support of the targeting process. Additionally, the unit had not fully developed its tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP), to include the tactical operations center SOP (TOCSOP).

Without the TACSOP/TOCSOP dictating battle tracking systems, it was problematic for the staff to gain situational awareness and maintain a common operational picture. The unit's TACSOP was mainly focused on counterinsurgency operations, as commonly seen in many recent training units at JMRC. A TACSOP/TOCSOP must concentrate on all environments in the DATE (offense, defense, and stability) to enable the unit to see itself as well as address systems for the sharing of information such as battle update briefs and shift change briefs. Ultimately, the STB S-3 and executive officer (XO) must work in concert to facilitate the synchronization between staffs, while the operations sergeant enforces the SOPs and conducts battle drill training with the staff.

A continuing challenge in today's modern TOC is the reliance on the digital system to see itself. Brigade and battalion staffs today are overly reliant on digital TOC systems and have forgotten or have never known what it was like to operate solely with analog systems. Army Battle Command Systems have both augmented and constrained units since their introduction into the Army inventory. Every TOC in the DATE must be a hybrid TOC consisting of both digital and analog systems to facilitate redundancy when digital systems fail or are unavailable. Under the direction of the operations sergeant and battalion XO, TACSOP/TOCSOP products must be

identified, elaborated and clarified, and prepared in garrison for implementation prior to training events or deployments. The current generation of staff officers and NCOs is extremely proficient in working with digital systems, which attest to the Army's modeling several of its weapons platforms, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, and mission command systems after video games/systems. Soldiers and officers have forgotten how to operate tactically in the absence of the tools they have become accustomed to over the past decade.

Part of seeing itself is the STB's understanding of how all its enablers can impact the brigade's OE. The STB provides several key enablers to the brigade and subordinate battalions, including military police (MP), engineer, intelligence, and communication operations.

In the DATE, an MP platoon, with its limited personnel, cannot perform all five of its MP tasks (maneuver and mobility support operations, area security operations, law and order operations, internment and resettlement operations, and police intelligence operations). Utilization of the MP platoon to facilitate detainee operations and provide partnership and mentorship by, with, and through the host-nation police is vital in stability operations. The engineer company provides mobility, route clearance, countermobility, survivability, and airfield damage repair, all of which are necessary for freedom of movement, defensive preparations, and stability support operations. The military intelligence company provides reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection with unmanned aircraft systems as well as human intelligence collection teams and low-level voice intercept for human and signal intelligence collection in support of the brigade. The signal company provides network support systems as well as retransmission capabilities, enabling the entire modular brigade to communicate throughout the OE.

A brigade must understand and have situational awareness of what critical enablers are needed to complete the picture. Understanding how it implements such enablers is just as important. During the 173rd ABCT's initial entry air-land operations, one of the Joint Network Node systems arrived with the vehicle, the Harris Small Tactical Terminal, and required personnel, but without the 10-kilowatt generator to power the servers. The failure by air loading planners to include all of the necessary equipment resulted in digital signal capability being delayed or unavailable for 24 hours to the ABCT. The STB commander and staff did not have visibility on this deficiency due to the incompleteness of the TACSOP and the lack of an analog tracking system displaying this information in the STB's TOC.

During the 173rd ABCT's DATE rotation at JMRC, the STB found itself as a benefactor of key enablers due to its assigned mission in the rear area. As the ABCT focused forward on the conventional offensive and defensive fight, the STB was the ABCT's main effort in stability operations, conducting wide-area security with the district capital in its OE. Although the 173rd STB's main effort was stability operations, the STB's engineer company was task-organized with maneuver elements to conduct mobility and countermobility operations. Initially, the STB commander and engineer company commander assisted the brigade engineer with mobility and countermobility planning. The initiative ensured obstacles met the brigade commander's intent, but because the engineer assets were detached, the STB relinquished maintaining situational awareness on obstacle effort. As a result, Class IV barrier material support was insufficient, resulting in obstacles being incomplete or not constructed to standard. The dual focus of the engineer efforts and the stability operations resulted in the battalion commander and his staff struggling with a clear picture of both efforts and not being able to provide the appropriate amount of command focus on each area.

It becomes imperative for the STB to maintain situational awareness of detached enablers to ensure the elements are supported and the mission is ultimately accomplished. The 173rd STB focused on insurgent, terrorist, and criminal threats as well as the general populace. The STB's mission highlighted some of the dilemmas the DATE presents when required to protect and provide humanitarian relief to internally displaced persons (IDPs) while continuing force protection of the STB's base of operations, to include the brigade's key air line of communication. The STB relied heavily on the civil affairs and military information support operations attachments to work in concert with the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international government organizations (IGOs) to ensure the protection of IDPs and grant a safe and secure route to the established IDP camps out of sector.

The DATE does not lend itself to the concept of the linear battlefield as written in earlier versions of FM 3-0, *Operations*, February 2001. Instead, the OE has become both nonlinear and noncontiguous (FM 3-0, *Operations*, February 2011). The challenge for the modular force is best described as an insurgency intertwined throughout the populace while facing a conventional force. It is necessary then for the STB to prepare to assume the role of "land owner" to conduct wide-area security by applying elements of combat power in a decisive action to protect populations, command posts, infrastructure, and civilian activities. The STB does this to deny enemy forces freedom of movement, tactical advantages, or operational gains. To that end, the 173rd ABCT commander task-organized units according to mission sets and attached a number of assets to the 173rd STB in support of stability operations.

The 173rd STB found itself in a complex environment focused predominately on stability operations. Stability operations will continue to challenge units as they did the 173rd STB if the sources of instability are not addressed. The enemy, unchecked, will capitalize upon and begin manipulating the populace to achieve their desired end state. The greatest stability lesson learned by the 173rd STB is that perception is reality, and the earlier you take the offensive in information operations, the greater the chance of mission success in the eyes of the population and the international community. In order for stability operations to be successful, STBs must partner with a multitude of interagencies, IGOs, NGOs, and host-nation governmental officials to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief as outlined in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations,* October 2008. A landowning unit's leadership must be flexible, adaptable, and adept at critical problem solving to concentrate on the myriad challenges they will encounter in their area of operations.

The STB is not only the modular brigade's force provider in today's Army but also a combat multiplier if supported with proper attachments/enablers capable of solving the myriad problems inherent to the DATE. Furthermore, STBs must have the ability to understand themselves, their enablers, their mission, and the environment to operate as a capable battalion mission command node for the modular brigade. Ultimately, an STB that can understand and effectively "see itself, see the enemy, see the terrain" in support of the commander's intent will accomplish any mission assigned, as the old adage goes.

Military Police in the Decisive Action Training Environment

CPT Peter J. Wetterauer
Joint Multinational Readiness Center

As the Army's training model integrates the broader decisive action training environment (DATE) and moves away from a focus on a strict counterinsurgency (COIN) approach, there will be an increased training emphasis and a heavier reliance upon the combined arms effort. However, the Army must not lose sight of the lessons learned in Operations Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and Enduring Freedom, combined with COIN doctrine, and apply them to the DATE. The military police (MP) provide support for maneuver forces engaged against conventional forces. They can also have a major role in preventing the development of all five hybrid threats found in this operating environment. As an example, during the conduct of stability operations MPs can positively influence the local population by proactively dealing with resettlement of displaced personnel while partnering with local police forces. In the DATE, the enemy will take a multifaceted approach by utilizing conventional forces and leveraging criminal organizations and potential insurgent groups to reach their desired end state; how well combatant commanders understand these dynamics and utilize the assets available to them is critical to mission success.

According to doctrine (Field Manual [FM] 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, February 2010, paragraphs 1-25 through 1-33), military police are designated to secure lines of communication in the operational environment. The operating environment in a DATE scenario may be noncontiguous. As a result, the lines of communication are potentially unsecured in the support area, loosely defined as the rear area. Doctrinally, MPs conduct the following five functions:

- Maneuver and mobility support.

- Area security.

- Internment and resettlement.

- Law and order.

- Police intelligence operations.

In the conduct of a security mission, partnerships established with host-nation police can become force multipliers as well as additional sources of intelligence. MPs are especially suited to this mission because of their inherent mobility, communications, and firepower as well as their creation of common bonds with local law enforcement.

An MP platoon is designed to engage and defeat level II threats, which "include small-scale, irregular forces conducting unconventional warfare" and delay a level III threat, according to doctrine (Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater,* page vii; FM 3-19.4, *Military Police Leaders' Handbook,* paragraph 6-119). In the DATE, there resides an increased potential for enemy action in the support areas by unconventional state and non-state actors, or from conventional forces that may have been by-passed by friendly conventional combat forces. Adding to the complexity in this area may be multiple population centers and quite possibly displaced persons who must be secured and sustained for a period of time. During the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team's (ABCT's) DATE rotation, there was little consideration of support area security or security of the lines of communication, resulting in freedom of maneuver

for enemy forces. This freedom of maneuver allowed the enemy to infiltrate the nearby city of Aghjabadi, conduct ambush attacks on patrols and convoys, and attack the special troops battalion headquarters at Aghjabadi airfield, the primary air line of communications for the 173rd ABCT. In the DATE, MPs are well-suited to an area security mission because they regularly interface with civilians during the conduct of their law enforcement duties and they have organic mobility, communications, and firepower capability.

Efficient and humane internment of enemy prisoners of war and other detainees is a critical requirement for a task force. Internment support is generally provided by an MP internment and resettlement (I/R) battalion that contains the integrated guard forces and specialized training necessary to operate a detention facility. However, because the modular brigade does not contain an organic I/R battalion, the corrections noncommissioned officer (NCO) assigned to the brigade provost marshal's office must provide expertise to the planning and conduct of detention operations.

Documentation of the circumstances of capture and recovery of associated evidence is critical to detention operations. During the 173rd ABCT DATE rotation, the higher commander ordered the release of eight detainees because the suspects were detained without proper evidence. The detainees consisted of civilian personnel from the local city of Aghjabadi as well as members of the South Atropian People's Army (SAPA). Consequently, the enemy exploited this event using propaganda, resulting in increased population tensions and opposition to U.S. forces, culminating in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on key U.S. personnel and local leaders in the city of Aghjabadi.

Common experiences and knowledge of law enforcement make MPs natural liaison officers with the host-nation police force. The relationship provides the ability for the unit to conduct assessments of host-nation police force operational capability, disposition, and ethical standards. Through the host-nation police, a task force can also gain insight into organized crime, criminal trends, and public attitudes toward criminal activities. This insight is imperative to understanding hybrid threats. Conducting joint operations with host-nation police will effectively raise the public's perception of local law enforcement and help maintain or restore legitimacy of the local and national government in the eyes of the population. It is possible, had a partnership or liaison been established between U.S. forces and the Aghjabadi police, that the VBIED attack in Aghjabadi could have been prevented. For example, proper evidence collection would have allowed a legal detention of the SAPA personnel who were later responsible for the attack. Furthermore, the additional intelligence gained by a close partnership with the Aghjabadi police could have enabled the early identification of these nonlocal insurgents.

Local government and security force corruption creates powerful propaganda in the hands of an insurgent. Through a close partnership with host-nation police, a task force can help identify and deter this corruption. A technique to measure corruption is gathering host-nation police payroll information and comparing it to numbers of active police. Conducting mentorship of a police station's armorer or logistics NCO is another approach, such as through collection of weapons serial numbers that can be later referenced if host-nation security force weapons are found in an enemy cache site. Police corruption did not become an issue in the 173rd ABCT rotation, but as the DATE develops further, there is an increased potential for police and governmental corruption.

Resettlement operations and dislocated civilian control are primarily conducted to minimize civilian interference with military operations (FM 3-39.40, *Internment and Resettlement Operations,* paragraph 10-2). By properly conducting resettlement operations, a unit can affect the operating environment by minimizing this interference. Large groups of dislocated civilians are breeding grounds for disease and crime, and are potential screening or recruiting grounds for an insurgency, all of which can increase population tensions and allow a hybrid threat to gain momentum. In the 173rd ABCT rotation, the brigade did not address large groups of dislocated civilians, which resulted in disenfranchised population pockets that the enemy (SAPA) was able to use as camouflage to further enable their freedom of movement and sustainment.

In conclusion, military police organizations can be extremely agile and are trained and equipped to operate as decentralized elements. This flexibility allows MPs to be used as an economy-of-force element that can greatly enhance a task force's ability to deal with a hybrid threat. Military police have an inherent law enforcement approach that enables them to interface effectively with a civilian population and host-nation police and assist a task force in preventing the development of a hybrid threat.

PROVIDE US YOUR INPUT

To help you access information quickly and efficiently, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) posts all publications, along with numerous other useful products, on the CALL website. The CALL website is restricted to U.S. government and allied personnel.

PROVIDE FEEDBACK OR REQUEST INFORMATION

<http://call.army.mil>

If you have any comments, suggestions, or requests for information (RFIs), use the following links on the CALL home page: "RFI or CALL Product" or "Contact CALL."

PROVIDE OBSERVATIONS, INSIGHTS, AND LESSONS (OIL) OR SUBMIT AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW (AAR)

If your unit has identified lessons learned or OIL or would like to submit an AAR, please contact CALL using the following information:

Telephone: DSN 552-9569/9533; Commercial 913-684-9569/9533

Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

NIPR e-mail address: call.rfimanager@conus.army.mil

SIPR e-mail address: call.rfiagent@conus.army.smil.mil

Mailing Address: **Center for Army Lessons Learned**
                           ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50
                           Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

TO REQUEST COPIES OF THIS PUBLICATION

If you would like copies of this publication, please submit your request at: <http://call.army.mil>. Use the "RFI or CALL Product" link. Please fill in all the information, including your unit name and official military address. Please include building number and street for military posts.

PRODUCTS AVAILABLE "ONLINE"

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Access and download information from CALL's website. CALL also offers Web-based access to the CALL Archives. The CALL home page address is:

<http://call.army.mil>

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

- **Combat Training Center Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends**
- **Special Editions**
- *News From the Front*
- **Training Techniques**
- **Handbooks**
- **Initial Impressions Reports**

You may request these publications by using the "RFI or CALL Product" link on the CALL home page.

COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
Additional Publications and Resources

The CAC home page address is:

<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp>

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal/index.asp>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.usapa.army.mil> or the Reimer Digital Library <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx> (requires AKO password and ID).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)

CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid/index.asp>.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Center acts as an advocate and integrator for COIN programs throughout the combined, joint, and interagency arena. Find the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

> *Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes*
> *so they may be shared and become Army successes.*

Center for Army Lessons Learned

10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350
http://call.army.mil

JMRC
JOINT MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER
TRAIN TO WIN

**BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY
AND UNIT CAPABILITY
AT AND BY THE JMRC**

US Army Combined Arms Center

"Intellectual Center of the Army"   www.leavenworth.army.mil