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# Peace & Reintegration in Afghanistan

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COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION ON COMPLEX CRISES



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# Peace & Reintegration: An Introduction

Steven A. Zyck<sup>1</sup>

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This document provides an introduction to peace and, in particular, reintegration. These are approached both as abstract policy objectives and as very tangible processes and programmes such as the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP). This report particularly emphasises reintegration given that peace talks involving the Afghan government, the United States, insurgent groups and others have received [significant and sustained attention](#) from the media and analysts. In contrast, reintegration efforts have received relatively less coverage despite the fact that significant effort is being dedicated within Afghan and international institutions to reintegrating insurgents.

After reviewing global research findings related to the role of peace and reintegration within mid-conflict and post-conflict contexts, the author turns to the APRP. The piece addresses the APRP's (i) origins and objectives, (ii) associated institutions, (iii) envisioned reintegration process and (iv) progress to date. As with all publications from the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), the entirety of this paper is based upon open-source information, a large volume of which has been made publicly available by agencies involved, including [the Force Reintegration Cell \(F-RIC\)](#) within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Think tanks and research institutions, particularly RAND, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), have also provided in-depth reviews of the project's design and progress.

As with any on-going initiative, publicly-available documents suggest that the APRP and the broader pursuit of peace and reintegration in Afghanistan are evolving in response to emerging opportunities and challenges. Hence, it is worth noting that this report should be read with the dynamic, sensitive and daunting nature of these processes in mind.

## Brief Background: Peace & Reintegration

Peace and reintegration in Afghanistan have become closely associated with the APRP, though this process is not unique to Afghanistan. As outlined below, research shows that several conflict-affected contexts grapple with similar priorities and processes.

### *Peace*

Joakim Kreutz of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme in Sweden wrote in 2010 in the *Journal of Peace Research* that there has been [a rising trend](#) towards conflicts ending with negotiated settlements such as

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ceasefires and peace agreements.<sup>2</sup> While only 9.9% of conflicts between 1946 and 1989 – during the Cold War – were ended through negotiated settlements, this figure was up to 38.1% between 1990 and 2005. Likewise, Kreutz found that peace agreements and ceasefires have traditionally proven durable and long lasting. While conflicts ended by military victory between 1946 and 2005 restarted after an average of 595 days, conflicts ended via negotiated settlements lasted an average of five years.<sup>3</sup>

Research and global experience have also pointed to other factors which are beneficial in enabling peace agreements to solidify and endure. According to Martina Fischer of the Berghof Foundation, these include [a range of methods](#), including reconciliation efforts which seek to re-unify communities divided during war by ethnic, tribal or sectarian conflict.<sup>4</sup> Other approaches include adjudication for wrongs committed during crime, as seen in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the comparable institution established following the Rwandan genocide. Still others focus not upon prosecution but upon “truth and reconciliation”, as in South Africa. Such approaches are intended to gather information regarding atrocities committed during wars not for the purpose of jailing every perpetrator but in order to enable both sides to feel that the harm they suffered during conflict was publicly acknowledged. Institutions around the world have been established to study such methods, according to Fischer, including the International Center for Transitional Justice, the South African Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Swisspeace and the Center for Justice and Reconciliation, among others.

Specifically with regards to Afghanistan, there have been increasing calls for a negotiated settlement. In late 2008, a “[Strategic Conflict Assessment of Afghanistan](#)” commissioned by the Afghan government argued, alongside many emerging voices at the time, that “a political solution is the best if not the only option for achieving security in the current context”. By October 2008, preliminary talks between the Afghan government and Taliban were held in Saudi Arabia, according to [a study published by Matthew Waldman](#), a noted Afghanistan analyst formerly based at Harvard University. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced his support for such talks, as did the former head of the United Nations in Afghanistan. By 2010, the plans for doing so were endorsed by key Afghan stakeholders at a National Consultative Peace *Jirga* before being codified within the APRP, which was formally presented to and endorsed by international stakeholders at the Kabul Conference in July 2010, according to Waldman. Since that point, momentum behind peace talks has waxed and waned, according to [a timeline of the Afghan war from BBC News](#).

### *Reintegration*

Afghanistan’s on-going reintegration efforts relate to a broader set of experience, both internationally and in Afghanistan itself. These include [disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration](#) (DDR), a process outlined and analysed by Robert Muggah of the Small Arms Survey. Muggah writes that “DDR is a process introduced following a conflict and directed primarily at ensuring the transition of combatants to civilian life” and that this process “often entails a combination of ‘integration’ into standing armies or police forces as well as into ‘civilian’ life”. The World Bank writes that DDR has, since the end of the Cold War, been undertaken in [more than 30 countries](#) around the world. While many DDR activities focus upon the needs of individual combatants

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<sup>2</sup> The source is a journal article which is protected under copyright and may not be accessible to users without requisite subscriptions. Kreutz’s data is also reflected in a number of other publications, including Tara Cooper, Sebastian Merz and Mila Shah, “[A More Violent World? Global Trends in Organised Violence](#)”, Berghof Foundation, 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Peace agreements lasted an average of 1,749 days and ceasefires an average of 1,763 days. It is most interesting to note that Kreutz’s data shows that many conflicts which are “won” by one side through military victory proved either highly durable or highly fragile. Half of those conflicts re-started after only 23 days while some others tended to be far longer lasting.

<sup>4</sup> Fischer’s piece was published as a chapter in B. Austin, M. Fisher, H.G. Giessmann (eds), *Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II*.

as they enter civilian life, a working paper on [“Reintegration and Long-Term Development”](#) indicates that there has been an increasing move towards community-based reintegration in which a former fighter must reconcile with the people of his or her home community; in such programmes, the process of community reconciliation is followed by international aid packages intended to benefit both the reintegrating fighter and his or her community. However, models are wide and disparate. For instance, Alpaslan Özerdem of Coventry University examined a programme in Kosovo which turned the Kosovo Liberation Army into a civil protection body, known as the [Kosovo Protection Corps](#), charged with infrastructure repair and emergency preparedness.<sup>5</sup> In doing so, the reintegrated fighters were able to maintain their self-image as protectors of the community while no longer bearing arms. Other instances are described as being less successful, including those in Nepal which faced a common challenge of combining former insurgent fighters with government troops in a new, post-conflict national army. A [USIP handbook on “Managing Fighting Forces”](#) found that attempting to integrate former insurgents within the ranks of the government forces elicited stiff resistance from officers and soldiers (many of whom had been battling those same insurgents for years). The resulting disagreement reportedly contributed to delays in the DDR process and the maintenance of instability for years after the 2006 “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” formally ended the war between the Maoist insurgency and the state.

Afghanistan has, prior to the APRP, also been the site of projects aiming to reintegrate former combatants. A 2009 article in the journal *Conflict, Security & Development* notes that [Afghanistan was the site of a DDR programme](#) from 2003 to 2006 implemented by the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Benefiting approximately 63,000 members of the pro-government militias which helped the international coalition topple the Taliban regime in 2001 and 2002, ANBP focused on providing combatants with livelihood support valued at USD 700 per person. These funds went to support vocational training, stipends during on-the-job training, agricultural materials (e.g., farming implements) or supplies to facilitate the opening of a small business. The 2009 study in *Conflict, Security & Development* found that the process had encountered significant difficulties and that combatants’ sense of pride and power – derived from their participation in an armed group – had been replaced by shame from their limited role in their communities and their weak financial positions. Such findings were reiterated by Mark Sedra of the Centre for International Governance Innovation, who found that “the [patronage-based networks](#) that have sustained Afghanistan’s local militias survived the DDR program intact in most areas”. Moreover, Sedra and the *Conflict, Security & Development* article both suggest that pre-DDR verification and post-reintegration monitoring of combatants were weak and that many DDR beneficiaries had not actually fought with the *mujahideen* or other armed groups. Instead, they had been inappropriately added to the beneficiary lists by commanders who used the DDR process as a form of patronage for allies and relatives.

Such a challenge also reportedly affected the first reintegration programme in Afghanistan which specifically targeted insurgent fighters and other anti-government elements. The initiative, known as *Program Tahkim e-solh* (PTS, or “Strengthening Peace” in Dari), claimed to have [reintegrated 4,634 fighters](#) between 2005 and 2007, when it ended, according to a RAND study. An article by a former US Army officer published in *Small Wars Journal* indicates that the programme registered fighters – as well as more than 500 detainees – and allowed them to return to their home communities, where they were to be [monitored by local elders](#). Beneficiaries received a range of material inducements in different parts of the country, including land in some cases. Individuals reintegrating under PTS were informed, however, that they would be imprisoned for the rest of their lives if they were found to have participated again in insurgent activities. However, challenges emerged. A UN study cited in [a report from Harvard University and Tufts University](#) found that half of those

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<sup>5</sup> This source is a journal article which is protected by copyright. However, some publicly-available information about the DDR programme in Kosovo can be found in Sultan Barakat and Alpaslan Özerdem, “[Impact of the Reintegration of the Former KLA Combatants on the Post-war Recovery of Kosovo](#)”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Spring/Summer 2005.

benefiting from PTS support had not actually been insurgents. An article in the journal *Special Warfare* found that it “failed because of poor transparency, inadequate accountability, broken promises and top-down, centralized decision-making”. The Center for Strategic and International Studies further noted that individuals reintegrating under PTS were in many cases not kept safe and were [targeted by insurgents](#) and by international forces.

As the examples above suggest, Afghanistan has experience with reintegration, though its record of success is described by experts as being mixed. The remainder of this report now turns to on-going efforts to reintegrate insurgent fighters within the scope of the APRP.

## Afghanistan Peace & Reintegration Programme

### *Origins & Objectives*

The [“Programme Document” for the APRP](#), which was issued by the Afghan National Security Council in July 2010, notes that the programme was formally launched at a 1,600-person National Consultative Peace *Jirga* (assembly) in June 2010 and was subsequently validated jointly by the Afghan government and the international community at the July 2010 Kabul Conference. According to the “Programme Document”, the APRP aims to:

“promote peace through a political approach. It will encourage regional and international cooperation, will create the political and judicial conditions for peace and reconciliation, and will encourage combatant foot soldiers and commanders, who previously sided with armed opposition and extremist groups to renounce violence and terrorism, to live within the laws of Afghanistan, and to join a constructive process of reintegration and peace.”

This high-level statement of objectives is summarised in the [APRP Guide](#) published by ISAF’s reintegration cell, the F-RIC. This document indicates that “[t]he APRP seeks to enable local agreements where communities, supported by [Afghan government], reach out to insurgents in order to address their grievances, encourage them to stop fighting, and rejoin their communities with dignity and honor.” This ISAF document and the APRP “Programme Document” both place emphasis on the reasons which have led fighters to join the insurgency and on the need for “grievance resolution”. Such a focus is validated by a [2011 RAND study by Seth G. Jones](#) which examined 36 instances in which insurgents had left an armed group and reintegrated prior to the launch of the APRP. Of those cases, 71% had reintegrated in order to pursue the resolution of grievances.<sup>6</sup>

### *Associated Institutions*

The peace and reintegration process in Afghanistan consists of a number of institutions at various levels of government. These are, at the highest level, overseen by the High Peace Council (HPC). The HPC is a 70-member body appointed by President Karzai. According to the [HPC’s inaugural newsletter](#), the 70 members include “religious scholars, community leaders, civil society representatives, former Jehadi commanders, and other respected elders and women”.<sup>7</sup> The HPC is divided into six committees and includes an Executive Board.

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
<sup>6</sup> In addition, Jones’s study found that 36% had reintegrated because they believed that the Taliban and other insurgent groups were losing the war (either nationally or in a specific area). A further 33% reintegrated because they felt coerced into doing so (e.g., they were being specifically targeted and reintegrated in order to avoid being killed by international or Afghan forces). The insurgents could specify multiple reasons for reintegrating; hence, the total among the three categories of responses exceed 100%.

<sup>7</sup> The term “Jehadi commanders” refers to militia commanders, particularly those which were part of the *mujahideen*.

Female members on the council also meet separately in what is known as the “Seventh Committee”. While the HPC is the highest body within the peace and reintegration process, its primary focus has been on negotiations with the Taliban and perhaps less on the reintegration of specific insurgent fighters and commanders.

The HPC is, according to the aforementioned newsletter, [supported by a “Joint Secretariat”](#) which helps execute the APRP under the guidance of the HPC. It includes five departments or units, including the following: a Policy Unit, an Administration and Finance Department, a Field Operations Department, a Development Department and a Communication Department. Of these, the Field Operations and Development departments are most involved in the vetting, registration and reintegration of insurgent fighters.

Figure 1. National and Provincial APRP Structures



*Source: Adapted by the author from several APRP documents and related publications, including [“Victory in Afghanistan: Supporting the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program”](#), Marine Corps Gazette, 2012*

A significant degree of APRP implementation, however, takes place at the sub-national level, particularly in the provinces and the districts, under the guidance of the provincial governors and Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs). A [document issued by the ISAF F-RIC](#) in September 2011 indicates that the PPCs are appointed by provincial governors and include between 25 and 30 members, including civil society representatives, religious leaders, local elders, *Ulema* council representatives and “at least two women”. While the F-RIC document notes that PPCs organise themselves differently in various provinces, they are all supported by Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) which are charged with implementing reintegration at the provincial level in partnership with district and community-level bodies.

Another set of institutions which are active in the APRP at the national and sub-national levels are line ministries, all of which, according to the [ISAF APRP guide](#), have been tasked with leveraging their activities to support reintegration efforts. These include the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, which oversee the Afghan army and police, respectively, as well as ministries involved more fully in promoting social and economic development. For instance, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAIL), the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MoLSAMD), the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) and the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) are actively involved in activities designed to benefit reintegrating fighters and their communities.

Other institutions are also involved in the process. These include a wide range of international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society groups, provincial reconstruction teams and others.<sup>8</sup> For instance, the F-RIC is the ISAF body charged, according to an [August 2011 F-RIC presentation](#), with building “APRP Joint Secretariat (JS) and sub-national operational capacity (people, tools, procedures, and training) in order to facilitate and enhance the conduct of outreach and demobilization operations”. In addition, UNDP “[provides programmatic and operational assistance](#) to the APRP Joint Secretariat and other APRP partners at the national and sub-national level to enable them to effectively implement key components of APRP”. In addition, UNDP manages part of the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to ensure that donor funds are used in the most efficient and effective manner and is slated to remain engaged with the APRP through 2015, according to its [annual APRP report](#) for 2011.<sup>9</sup>

### *The Reintegration Process*

This document now turns to the activities being undertaken by these various institutions in order to reintegrate insurgents. This tri-partite process is reflected in Figure 2. According to the APRP “Programme Document”, the first phase involves [building capacity](#) at the national, provincial, district and community levels, including within the ANSF, to understand the APRP and the reintegration process. This process also involves outreach and strategic communications, including events, targeting insurgent groups and others in order to encourage fighters to reintegrate. According to ISAF, relevant Afghan actors may also reach out to armed groups to encourage them to consider reintegration. A core part of the reintegration process is what is referred to as grievance mapping and resolution, according to [the F-RIC reintegration guide](#). While grievance mapping and resolution begins in the initial phase of the APRP, it is a core element that continues throughout the programme. In short, provincial and other sub-national stakeholders work with civil society groups, insurgent elements and others in order to identify a number of the grievances which have impelled them to take up arms. Once these are identified, a process of responding to the grievances spans the entirety of the reintegration process. Grievances commonly concern conflicts between the insurgents and Afghan government institutions or between the insurgents and local militia commanders, elders or ethnic or tribal groups.

Figure 2. The Stages of the APRP



Source: Adapted from an APRP diagram found in the [APRP “Programme Document”, 2010](#)

<sup>8</sup> The [November 2011 reintegration update](#) from the ISAF F-RIC indicates that PRTs may provide support to sub-national APRP institutions such as PPCs and PJSTs. In addition, PRTs are involved in supporting the development of – and, in some cases, approving – local community grants requested by communities and district to facilitate the APRP’s community-based reintegration model. For instance, PRTs have a vote on approving grants under the APRP which are greater than USD 25,000 in value.

<sup>9</sup> This is the APRP annual report available from UNDP. To find future such reports, see: [http://www.undp.org.af/demo/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=111&Itemid=57](http://www.undp.org.af/demo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=111&Itemid=57).

According to a report on the APRP, entitled “[Peace From the Bottom-Up?](#)” by Deedee Derksen, the second stage in the reintegration process involves the demobilisation of combatants and tends to be the most standardised in nature. It involves the vetting of fighters – a process which involves confirming their identity, their role in the insurgency and any past actions they have been accused of committing. Demobilisation also involves registering fighters, gathering biometric data and assessing their needs and those of the community into which they will be reintegrating. This phase also includes [key security elements](#), including ensuring that he will no longer be targeted by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or international forces. Weapons are also collected in some instances, though the APRP allows fighters to keep their weapons if they reside in insecure areas or could face reprisals from remaining insurgents. Fighters are also provided USD 120 per month for three months as a form of transitional assistance to ease any negative economic impacts associated with leaving the insurgency and resuming civilian life.

According to the [APRP “Programme Document”](#), the final stage of the process involves the “Consolidation of Peace and Community Recovery”. This includes the provision of assistance to those communities which are receiving reintegrating fighters. Such assistance is intended to benefit the entire community rather than only the former fighter. UNDP notes that two forms of assistance are underway in addition to support provided directly by ministries involved in the APRP. These include small grants projects (SGPs) worth up to USD 200,000. According to a [UNDP APRP report](#), small grants projects are intended to “promote disarmament, peace and reintegration, reinforce APRP’s standing across communities...and encourage [communities] to persuade combatant groups to reconcile and reintegrate”.<sup>10</sup> The [annual UNDP report](#) states that 27 SGPs, with a combined budget of USD 1.1 million, were approved in target APRP provinces. The second form of community recovery involves projects directly executed by implementing partners, notes UNDP. For instance, an international NGO, HALO Trust, was recently awarded USD 400,000 to launch a demining project in western Afghanistan which will offer employment to 180 reintegrated insurgent fighters while benefiting surrounding communities.

In addition, [the ISAF APRP handbook](#) notes that, in 2011-12, a number of Afghan government ministries – including but not limited to MoLSAMD, MAIL, MRRD and MoPW – were provided with a total of USD 31 million to support activities outlined in their “annual reintegration plans”. UNDP notes that APRP cells have been established in six line ministries to [coordinate the implementation](#) of national programmes that contribute to the APRP. For instance, MoLSAMD reportedly used these funds to link the reintegration process with its vocational training activities, and MoPW involved reintegrated fighters and their communities in road maintenance. The MRRD has reportedly used its APRP funds to connect its existing national priority programmes, such as the National Area Based Development Programme and the National Solidarity Programme, with reintegration.

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<sup>10</sup> For further information on the SGPs, including [SOPs](#) governing their allocation, see [the F-RIC page at the RONNA portal](#).

## Box 1. Afghanistan Reintegration Program

The Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) is an initiative operated and financed directly by the US government. It is complementary to but largely separate from the APRP and was funded with USD 50 million in 2011 and is receiving a second allocation in 2012.<sup>11</sup> An [ARP “factsheet”](#) hosted by the F-RIC indicates that the ARP has funded activities such as “vocational training for reintegrees and their communities, support for provincial governor outreach efforts, establishment of Provincial and District Reintegration Support teams, detainee release shuras, support to the High Peace Council and construction of reintegration centers”.<sup>12</sup> This document further notes that the ARP is intended to serve as a temporary funding mechanism to enable provincial governors and provincial APRP institutions to access funding for reintegration activities before they have access to a Joint Secretariat provincial account.

### *Progress to Date & Experts’ Initial Assessments*

UNDP indicates that, by the end of 2011, [2,689 out of 3,194 registered fighters](#), or 84.2%, had received “transitional assistance”. The US government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) noted that approximately [90% of reintegrating fighters](#) were in the North and West of Afghanistan rather than in the relatively more insecure South and East. By the end of the first quarter of 2012, the F-RIC reported that 3,907 fighters had reintegrated and that 136 had been vetted and were awaiting completion of the demobilisation process; another 327 were undergoing vetting. F-RIC data cited by SIGAR also indicated that greater numbers of reintegrating fighters were anticipated in the future given that [APRP structures had been established in all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces](#) by the end of 2011.

Non-governmental and non-ISAF sources have also studied and provided inputs on the APRP thus far. These include reports of international think tanks as well as documents produced by stakeholders involved and tracking the reintegration process, such as UNDP and SIGAR. They have raised a number of concerns, which are summarised below. As noted in the introduction to this report, the APRP is rapidly unfolding and it is not possible for the author, drawing on open-source information, to indicate which of these challenges have been resolved and which persist.

- **Attacks against Reintegrating Fighters:** Security for reintegrating insurgents is reportedly inconsistent and unclear, thus leaving some reconcilable insurgents unwilling to take the risk of leaving their armed groups. The PRIO study found that “[s]ome commanders are accommodated in safe houses while others return to their villages, but the program includes [no systematic solution](#) for their personal or their family’s security.” [Concerns regarding security](#) for reintegrating insurgents are also echoed in SIGAR’s latest report, which highlights that greater linkages are being made between the ANSF and the APRP in response.<sup>13</sup>
- **Amnesties for Reintegrating Insurgents:** The PRIO study found that, as of early 2011, there was [no clear policy](#) in place to ensure that insurgents who join the APRP would not ultimately be prosecuted for past actions committed. SIGAR wrote in early 2012 that “[t]here is [no uniform policy](#) for how to deal with all insurgents” insofar as prosecution is concerned. ISAF’s guide to the reintegration process, however, suggests that “[p]olitical amnesty is provided for insurgent offenses, but criminal offenses may be subject to later prosecution.” However, it does not specify the distinction between insurgent and criminal offences.

<sup>11</sup> In FY2011, the ARP expended USD 11 million, according to the [ARP factsheet](#) dated September 2011.

<sup>12</sup> The word “reintegrees” is often used to refer to reintegrating insurgent fighters.

<sup>13</sup> This includes the incorporation of information regarding the APRP into the work of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan.


- **Limited Afghan Government Commitment:** While it is not clear to what extent this issue remains, PRIO found in early 2011 that the [strong role given to provincial governors](#) in identifying PPC members and other sub-national elements of the APRP structure made it possible for them to obstruct progress. PRIO indicated that the HPC had to overturn some governors' PPC nominations given that the composition of these councils included many long-time Taliban opponents who insurgents would be unwilling to deal with during reintegration. UNDP echoes this concern and notes that “success of the programme depends on the [buy-in of the provincial governor](#)”.

- **“Fake Insurgents” Reintegrating:**

According to the PRIO report, there are concerns that some reintegrating fighters may in fact not have been [bona fide members of the Taliban](#) or other insurgent groups but are instead attempting to gain access to benefits and avoid targeting by the ANSF or international forces. Reiterating this point, UNDP writes in its [annual report for 2011](#) that it “[is] difficult to clearly identify hard-core insurgents entering the programme from those people who are not insurgents, but claim to be so in order to gain monetary benefits through APRP.” However, UNDP notes that stakeholders involved in the APRP had developed more robust vetting procedures such as biometrics verification to prevent fraud and duplication.

- **Lack of Synergies with a Political Process:** As noted earlier in this document, DDR processes – which aim to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate fighters – generally occur in a post-conflict context after the establishment of a peace agreement. In those cases, reintegration benefits are an inducement during peace talks, and resulting demobilisation efforts can be conducted in a relatively safe and secure environment. According to PRIO and a report by USIP on “[Institutional Options for an Afghan Peace Process](#)”, the United Nations and some in the Afghan government and HPC preferred to [delay reintegration efforts](#) until a peace agreement had been established. However, some international stakeholders, according to USIP, pushed for reintegration efforts to begin earlier as part of a counterinsurgency campaign.

Figures 3 & 4. Fighters Reintegrated under the APRP, Total & By Region, 2010 and 2011



Source: SIGAR, “[Quarterly Report to the US Congress](#)”, 30 January 2012; as specified in the text, the number of reintegrated fighters was up to 3,907 by Q1 2012.

- **Inability to Address Key Grievances:** PRIO also notes that many [insurgents’ primary grievances](#) – including Afghan government’s behaviour (e.g., corruption or poor performance) – cannot be readily

addressed within the scope of the APRP's "grievance resolution" process. A [report by USIP](#) recommends following the Liberian model, where peace and reintegration efforts were accompanied by the establishment of a Governance Reform Commission – and the establishment of a multi-donor programme to improve public administration and economic management – to help build a government which all sides to the conflict could be willing to support and participate in.

- **Weak Monitoring and Evaluation:** UNDP finds that [monitoring and evaluation systems](#) were not adequately put in place at the beginning of the APRP and that baselines (against which to measure programme-related changes) had not been collected. Accordingly, monitoring and evaluation [staff was recruited](#) at the Joint Secretariat in 2011 and UNDP sought an independent firm to engage in monitoring and evaluation starting in early to mid-2012. Moreover, monitoring, evaluation and reporting functions have been specified in the role of Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) and Regional Programme Coordinators for provincial activities such as SGPs.

Beyond the individual challenges noted above, Waldman, a former NGO expert and Harvard researcher who advises the UN chief in Afghanistan, wrote in [a 2009 paper](#) that the reintegration process has one major risk: poorly designed, inadequate or unfulfilled promises of reintegration assistance could discourage its members from reintegrating and could deepen grievances. He cites a US military document which makes a similar point in stating that "unprotected, poorly prepared, or poorly treated former insurgents will become powerful IO [information operations] opportunities for the insurgents". Hence, early challenges in the reintegration process may be overcome, though they may also have a lasting impact on insurgents' perceptions of the value of reintegration.

## Conclusion

The APRP is considered to be a crucial element of the stabilisation of Afghanistan and intends to integrate the political process of negotiation or reconciliation with armed groups and the reintegration of insurgent fighters. It integrates both civilian and military stakeholders and brings together governance, economic and security-oriented processes within a multi-layered institutional architecture. At its initial phases, there are areas where it reflects lessons learnt from previous attempts at reintegration, though experts have also identified potential challenges which exist given the size and complexity of the challenge at hand.

As British Major General Phil Jones, head of the F-RIC at ISAF, said in [a September 2011 briefing](#), promoting peace and reintegration relies not only on structures and resources but on the attitudes and will of a wide range of stakeholders. He stated: "After 30 years of conflict people will be cautious and wary – scepticism and doubt remains widespread. This is a human process that depends on increasing confidence day in, day out. It absolutely requires courageous Afghan leaders to make bold decisions, to reject the cycle of violence and work to build local and national peace processes. It requires huge energy to overcome the inertia of war and great persistence to build confidence and trust at a necessary level to achieve some form of momentum."

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## Chapter 2

# The Peace Process & Afghanistan's Women

Stefanie Nijssen<sup>14</sup>

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Since 2001, research and statistics indicate that the position of women in Afghanistan has improved. While women's positions vary within the country, they are active as nurses, prosecutors and teachers and have continued to work alongside men in provinces, districts and villages. According to *The Guardian*, only around [5,000 Afghan girls](#) were enrolled in school in 2001 in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan. Today, [more than five million children](#) attend school, and more than a third are girls, according to the UK Department for International Development (DFID). [Millions of women](#) have turned out to vote in successive rounds of presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections, and thousands more have competed for positions in parliament and provincial councils, according to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Yet, while women are guaranteed equal rights under the present day Afghan constitution, they continue to face [formidable barriers](#), according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). A June 2011 [Thomson Reuters poll](#) ranked the country as the most dangerous in the world for women due to violence, conflict, limited healthcare and other factors.

Experts cited by media sources such as *Agence France-Presse* have increasingly questioned whether women's gains in Afghanistan [will be maintained](#) in the future and what peace talks that seek to bring the Taliban into the Afghan government will mean for Afghan women. While individuals such as Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have [vowed to protect](#) Afghan women's rights, according to *Pajhwok Afghan News*, questions remain. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) reports that it is not clear whether Afghan women will play a [substantive and influential – rather than symbolic – role](#) in the peace talks. The Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, a process that included 78 discussion groups across Afghanistan in October 2011, recorded many Afghan men and women saying they were worried that women's rights would become [a casualty of peace](#). The Dialogue report noted that many of the 1,500 participants interviewed said that women's rights to education, work and freedom of movement in public spaces should not be compromised and that Taliban-era abuses against women should not be permitted to return.<sup>15</sup> According to Physicians for Human Rights, [women under the Taliban](#) were, among many other restrictions, forbidden from working outside the home, attending school, or to leave their homes unless accompanied by a male family member.<sup>16</sup> Punishments for deviating from the Taliban's code of conduct often included public lashing, amputation, stoning to death or imprisonment.

In light of such concerns, this report first addresses peace negotiations in Afghanistan broadly and then turns to women's role in those negotiations and the implications experts indicate they could have for women's future in

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<sup>15</sup> The Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace report does not list any quantitative data obtained from the discussion groups.

<sup>16</sup> Schooling for girls was limited up to the [age of eight](#), and studies were restricted to the *Quran*. Despite the lack of data on women's activities during the Taliban period, women continued to work underground throughout the Taliban rule to support their families. USIP reported that, during the Taliban rule, groups of women continued to defy and circumvent many cultural constraints even in the face of brutal repression and set up [underground schools](#), health clinics and other services vital for Afghan women and girls.

the country. As with all CFC publications, it is based entirely on a review of the open-source literature concerning this topic.

## Peace Negotiations with the Taliban

The Afghan government indicates that it has had intermittent communications with various Taliban members throughout the past decade. However, it was not until June 2010 that Afghan President Hamid Karzai convened the [National Consultative Peace Jirga](#), or grand assembly, to discuss the prospect of negotiations and reconciliation with the Taliban more formally, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). A month later, in July 2010, President [Karzai introduced](#) the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) at the Kabul Conference. The APRP was developed on the basis of recommendations from the National Consultative Peace *Jirga*. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the APRP is intended to address both reintegration, where low-level fighters transition to civilian life, and peace talks in which insurgent groups reach a settlement with the Afghan government.

In October 2010 the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) was set up to guide the peace process, according to the APRP "[Programme Document](#)". The HPC's structure includes [provincial and district-level](#) institutions promoting peace and reintegration. President Karzai established the HPC and appointed its members, which included figures drawn from Afghanistan's different ethnic and political groups to try to negotiate with the Taliban. Yet progress on both fronts appeared slow. Analysts such as Thomas Ruttig of the Afghan Analyst Network (AAN) found that, because President Karzai nominated the members of the HPC himself, the body was [seen as a governmental](#) institution rather than a neutral party capable of bringing the government and the insurgency together. Nonetheless, in a brief to the National Assembly in June 2011, HPC leadership said that talks with [various insurgent groups](#) were underway. The peace effort suffered a devastating blow on 20 September 2011 with the [assassination of the leader](#) of the HPC, former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani.<sup>17</sup> However, on 03 January 2012, the *Associated Press* (AP) reported that the Taliban had publicly decided to enter into negotiations with the United States, raising hopes for a [negotiated settlement](#) to the decade-long war. A Taliban spokesman said that, along with a preliminary deal to [set up a political office](#) in Qatar, the group was asking for the release of Taliban detainees held by the US government in Guantanamo Bay. Although the negotiations have experienced certain setbacks, such as [the Taliban's suspension](#) of talks, US officials have told the AP the US government said it would press on with reconciliation efforts. Although President Karzai's government was excluded from early, exploratory contacts between the Taliban and the United States, at the time of writing, the Afghan, Qatari and US government were

### Box 1. Women and Reintegration

The reintegration portion of the [APRP](#), which was addressed in Chapter 1, includes a Gender Policy. The policy notes that there is "limited provision for [close monitoring](#) and evaluation of the activities relating to the peace and reintegration process especially from a gender perspective". Women's groups have reported cases of reintegrated insurgents [resuming violence](#) and creating further threats for the communities in which they have returned. The APRP has also adapted a gender-mainstreaming agenda, making it [obligatory for implementing](#) partners to identify any special needs of women and provide solutions as they develop projects. The APRP Joint Secretariat has recommended [the introduction](#) of a Gender Oversight Committee, a Gender Unit in the Joint Secretariat and Provincial and district-level Gender Steering Committees. The UNDP's annual report on the APRP for 2011 states that the Financial Oversight Committee (FOC) has [approved USD 5 million](#) for gender mainstreaming, civil society and public awareness initiatives.

<sup>17</sup> Burhanuddin Rabbani's son, Salahuddin Rabbani, was appointed as the [new HPC chairman](#) in April 2012, writes *Khaama Press*.

in discussion with one another [regarding conditions](#) for the establishment of the political office and a potential prisoner transfer, *Reuters* reports.

### *Women's Place at the Negotiating Table*

Currently, nine of the 70-members of the HPC are women, and UNDP reports that Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs) [mandate the inclusion](#) of at least three female representatives.<sup>18</sup> They attend peace workshops and meetings both in Afghanistan and abroad. Female HPC member Gulali Noor Safi told *Reuters* that women were [not opposed](#) to holding negotiations with the Taliban so long as rights enshrined in the constitution are protected. According to the latest UNDP report on the APRP, “a group of women members of the HPC developed and initiated a [three-month plan](#) for promoting peace, targeting women and youth at all levels through political and social engagement”. That said, many female members of the HPC also expressed concern about their role and influence, given that they will still be vastly [outnumbered and outranked](#) at the negotiating table, *The Washington Post* reported. In March 2012, Safi said that female members of the HPC have been [side-lined from main consultations](#) and are trying to forge a united voice within the council, according to *Reuters*. She said the women on the peace council had set up a committee to ensure their concerns are addressed. “Our mission is to figure out how to keep the role of women active in the High Peace Council and not have our presence serve only as a statistic,” Safi said. In September 2011, the HPC’s Joint Secretariat – which is charged with implementing HPC decisions and overseeing the implementation of peace and reintegration – issued a Gender Policy for the APRP. This policy highlights the importance of “[establishing a gender balance](#) in the composition” of peace and reintegration institutions and the need to designing tools to facilitate the mainstreaming of gender in the APRP.

Despite such a policy, women’s rights advocates have continued to voice concern. Palwasha Hassan, an Afghan women’s activist writes in a report for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) that Afghan elders and community leaders continue to [demonstrate considerable reluctance](#) to include women in peace talks.<sup>19</sup> The Afghanistan country director for the Open Society Foundation, Najla Ayubi, told the Asia Foundation that women are [only symbolically part of the peace talks](#). She stated that “some women have been put in high-level positions, like at the High Peace Council or at the local, provincial level in peace talk committees, but they aren’t able to actually represent women’s voices and interests there”. Some of the female members of the HPC have said that their male colleagues on the council have said women cannot participate in events and peace talks in parts of the country due to insecurity. The Joint Secretariat issued a [Gender Policy](#) for the APRP in September 2011 in which it recognised that persistent discrimination against women within Afghanistan has played a role in inhibiting them from taking part in the design and implementation of national peace and reconstruction processes.

## The Afghan Government & Women’s Rights

The protection of women’s rights and interests within the on-going process of peace talks and reconciliation with the Taliban does not take place in isolation but may also be viewed in the context of the broader relationship between the Afghan state and its female citizenry. This relationship is briefly outlined in the following pages.

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
<sup>18</sup> The Afghan Women’s Network reports that it is lobbying for [30% inclusion](#) of women within the leadership and management of the HPC and the Provincial Peace Committees.

<sup>19</sup> The Dialogue on Peace reported that many Afghans spoke of the [important role](#) that religious leaders, community leaders and elders could play in peace initiatives but noted that the government has given them neither the authority to engage with the insurgents nor the protection they need from insurgents’ threat of assassination.

Over the past decade, the Afghan government has adopted various legal safeguards protecting women’s equal rights as citizens and as [participants in the country’s](#) democratic system, according to AREU. The Century Foundation report “[Women at Crossroads](#)” finds that [Afghan women’s advocacy](#) helped to ensure that the [2004 constitution](#) incorporated equal rights for women and men and established a 25% quota for women in the national parliament as well as in provincial councils and district assemblies. Afghanistan is also a signatory of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Violence against Women (CEDAW) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 2008, the [National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan](#) set out an operational framework for furthering women’s empowerment and gender equality under the government’s overarching [Afghanistan National Development Strategy](#) (ANDS). The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) was created shortly after the fall of the Taliban to manage the formulation and execution of government-wide gender policies. According to the aforementioned UNDP document, the [MoWA is also involved](#) in the APRP implementation and the Director of Women’s Affairs (DoWA) in each province is automatically included as a member of the PPCs. Additionally, the MoWA [has an arrangement](#) with a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are charged with providing shelter for abused women and there have been small advocacy campaigns. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is mandated to monitor the on-going human rights situation and also come up with an effective approach to deal with past war crimes.

In spite of the gains made by the Afghan state to incorporate women into governmental policy and its institutional framework, experts indicate that there has also been a trend less favourable for women.<sup>20</sup> For instance, The Century Foundation found that the [reach of the MoWA](#) has remained limited and that the AIHRC has often been politicised. According to the report, the AIHRC was not given sufficient authority to take [independent action](#) about on-going human rights. Recently, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN’s lead agency for gender, UN Women, urged the Afghan government to [fully and promptly implement](#) the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women, noting progress and implementation have been delayed. Nader Nadery, until recently a commissioner at the AIHRC, contends that there is “very [little political will](#) to address human rights protection as a core responsibility of the state and that the government has failed to take proper and tough measures against serious human rights abusers”.

Figure 1. Key Problems Facing Afghan Women, 2006-2011



Source: Adapted from “[Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People](#)” by The Asia Foundation.

<sup>20</sup> The country director for the Open Society Foundation, Najla Ayubi, also says that the exclusion of the Taliban at the conference was also a mistake and a sign that “the international communities [were] not taking women’s issues seriously”.

Such concerns have been increasingly inflamed in recent months, as peace talks with insurgent groups have moved forward. Most notably, a government-appointed *Ulema Council* of 150 leading Muslim clerics [issued a statement](#) on 02 March 2012 urging the application of a conservative interpretation of Islamic law regarding women, according to *The Wall Street Journal*. The council said Afghan law should require women to wear the veil, forbid them from mixing with men in places of work or education and prohibit them from traveling without a male chaperone. The AREU claims the clerics' statement strongly [echoed previous Taliban decrees](#), and would, if applied logically, bar all women from political office. Although the points made by the *Ulema Council* are not legally binding, its edict was [later endorsed](#) by President Karzai, [possibly in a bid](#) to align himself as more sympathetic to Taliban goals in the context of proposed peace negotiations, according to the AREU.

In addition, three additional recent incidents concerning human and women's rights have raised anxiety about the Afghan government's commitment to these issues. Firstly, women were in general reported to have [been excluded](#) from government delegation attending the 2010 London Conference, according to an article by *The Guardian*. Similarly, Human Rights Watch reported that the Afghan government had [attempted to exclude women](#) from the official delegation at the December 2011 Bonn Conference and address issues pertaining to women's rights at a side event on civil society. Secondly, in December 2011 *The New York Times* reported that the government [failed to re-new](#) the five-year term of three commissioners, including Nadery, within the AIHRC. This news came on the heels of the publication of an AIHRC report, championed by Nadery, detailing atrocities over the past 30 years. The article said that this move raised questions about the Karzai administration's commitment to human rights. Nadery was an outspoken member of the AIHRC and long-time human rights activist. Thirdly, recent statements by international and Afghan officials reveal that women visiting relatives at a men's prison near Kabul have in recent weeks been subjected to [invasive vaginal searches](#) to keep out contraband while most male visitors gain access to the US-financed prison with a basic pat down. Afghanistan's Interior Minister Bismillah Mohammadi, who oversees the country's prisons, refused to bring an end to the practice.

## Non-State Influences on Women's Role in Reconciliation

Beyond the Afghan government, other stakeholders are also influencing the debate concerning women's role in peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Afghan civil society organisations (CSOs) are [lobbying the government](#) and the international community to ensure protection of their rights and to allow them to contribute to reconciliation effort. Afghan civil society has been supported in its efforts to enshrine women's rights by the international community. According to *Khaama Press*, US Secretary of State Clinton said that any peace deal with the Taliban must include an acknowledgement of the Afghan constitution, which enshrines rights for women. "We [will not waver](#) on this point," Clinton stated.

In addition, the Taliban is also among the most important stakeholders in discussions concerning the role of women in peace and reconciliation. Experts cited below suggest that the Taliban may be less opposed to women's rights than it had been during its earlier incarnation in the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s. News reports indicate that segments of the Taliban have revised their positions relating to women. The Afghan Analyst Network reported that HPC chief Rabbani had, prior to his assassination, [started talks](#) with members of the three most active insurgent groups, the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami and the Haqqani Network. Rabbani found that insurgent representatives with whom he met were not interested in re-establishing a government along the same lines as they had done in the 1990s. The former spokesman for Taliban's leader Mullah Mohammad Omar said in 2010 that the "Taliban [want to participate](#) in government". The Taliban spokesman said that Afghan women "should be allowed work and education in accordance with the guidance of the Qur'an" while

also noting that “there should be a separation of the sexes”.<sup>21</sup> A recent report by the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and USIP, entitled “[Beyond Power Sharing](#)”, suggests that some insurgent field commanders are perhaps less ideological and more “pragmatic” than in the past. According to USIP, Taliban statements suggest that the group may be willing to moderate some of its previous views on [social issues](#). However, the report produced by PRIO, CMI and USIP also warns that today’s Taliban is highly decentralised and that caution should be applied when assessing group-wide trends or ideologies.

## Conclusion: Women’s Achievements in the Afghan Peace Process

While controversial, studies suggest the idea of peace talks is popular among Afghans. “A Survey of the Afghan People” published by the Asia Foundation revealed that in 2011, [82% of Afghans](#) supported the government-led reconciliation process. And yet, research indicates a number of challenges that Afghan women hope will be addressed in the scope of and following any peace and reconciliation process.

- **Security:** A 2011 AIHRC report found that violence against Afghan women [is on the rise](#). According to Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, the [state is still unable to protect women](#) from violence. While the work of women’s organisations at the community level is reported to be appreciated by most villagers, The Century Foundation’s states that there are still reports of hostile reactions to women’s political efforts, especially in insecure areas where women’s groups [lack the necessary protection](#) for their staff. In 2010, *The Independent* reported that in some Taliban-controlled areas, women were threatened with night letters: “We warn you to leave your job as a teacher as soon as possible otherwise we will cut the heads off your children and shall set fire to your daughter,” read one.
- **Justice:** According to Article 54 of the 2004 Afghan constitution, the government is required to adopt measures to eliminate negative practices that endanger “the physical and physiological well-being of the family.” However, an Afghan official wrote in *The Culture & Conflict Review* that “the justice sector, for instance, remains [severely under-reformed](#) and lacks capacity to provide legal protection for women under Afghanistan’s progressive laws”. A female legal aid provider from Baghlan says the [existence of widespread corruption](#) within judicial system in Afghanistan often means that traditional and informal forms of justice are frequently preferred to government courts. Nadery states that these informal system have been linked with [gross human rights abuses](#) such as forced marriage and extrajudicial killings. A study conducted by the Afghan Women and Children Research Center, claims *baad*, the practice of trading women for marriage to resolve a dispute or debt, is [still common](#).
- **Women outside the Home:** The Asia Foundation reported that in 2011 that 79% of female respondents say women [should be allowed](#) to work outside the home. However, freedom of movement for girls and women is still highly [restricted by armed groups](#), reports USIP. The AREU reported that women campaigning for public office often struggled in the face of male indifference and the assumption that women [could not act as](#) effective representatives or service-providers.
- **Education and Employment:** The Ministry of Education said that insurgents set fire to 49% of girls’ schools in Paktika, [69%](#) of them in Zabul and 59% of them in Helmand between 2006 and 2009. Parents’

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<sup>21</sup> According to the PRIO, USIP and CMI report, the insurgency does not tend to see or present itself as an [ethnic Pashtun movement](#) and has achieved modest expansion among other ethnicities primarily through clerical networks and in remote areas, yet some outside the insurgency view it in ethnic terms. Since many of the violations against women’s rights are committed under Pashtunwali customary laws, this may prove beneficial to negotiations on women’s rights.

fear of retaliation by insurgents has prevented some from sending their children to school. With regards to employment, USIP reports that traditional customs regarding women's movements and low employment levels mean women [simply cannot survive independently](#) within Afghanistan.

Those points noted above are a small selection of those included within the literature on women's role within Afghan society. However, the aforementioned information seems to suggest that while the Afghan government and the international community have continually recommitted their efforts to the protection of women's rights, women still face myriad challenges. Whether or not those challenges will continue to be addressed will depend on the future of any negotiations that take place.



# Economic Reintegration & Infrastructure

Rainer Gonzalez Palau<sup>22</sup>

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
During the last decade, the Afghan government and international community worked to promote peace, governance, security and development in Afghanistan. However, as discussed in a report entitled [“Talking about Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan”](#) from the International Crisis Group, the current situation is still [fragile and volatile](#). A recent article in *The Independent* adds that insurgency hampers service delivery, accessibility, development initiatives and employment opportunities and, in doing so, may foster grievances which further fuel violence. In order to address this situation, the Afghan National Security Council passed the [Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program](#) (APRP) in July 2010. The APRP, which is introduced in the first piece in the CFC’s introductory report on [“Peace and Reintegration”](#), “provides means for anti-government elements to renounce violence and reintegrate and become a productive part of Afghan society”. As highlighted in the following pages, such processes can draw upon international experience and frameworks regarding the reintegration of armed groups and fighters. This piece introduces the main challenges encountered in many international reintegration programmes and discusses how Afghanistan and other countries have utilised infrastructure-related activities to help combatants transition to civilian life.

The United Nations’ [“Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration”](#) says that employment is critical in fostering short-term stability, reintegration of combatants and returnees, economic growth and sustainable peace. The United Nations encourages an approach to employment-based reintegration that includes three tracks which are outlined in Figure 1: (i) stabilisation, (ii) local reintegration and (iii) transition. The Stabilisation Track aims to consolidate security and stability through short-term programmes targeting conflict-affected individuals such as ex-combatants in the immediate aftermath of conflict. These programmes, which include cash-for-work, public employment or small enterprise grants, stimulate economic and social recovery and restore livelihoods. The Local Reintegration Track utilises employment to foster the reintegration of former fighters and others (e.g. returning refugees) at the community level in order to ensure reconciliation between returning/reintegrating individuals and the broader community. Such a phase may follow upon the stabilisation-oriented employment activities and may benefit reintegrating individuals as well as others in the community. Finally, the Transition Track aims to establish sustainable, long-term employment opportunities and livelihoods. In this case, transition refers to the process of moving from the recovery phase of operations after the end of the conflict to a long-term development model rather than the sort of security transition process currently underway in Afghanistan.

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Figure 1. United Nations Three-Track Approach to Post-Conflict Employment/Reintegration



Source: Adapted from “[United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation & Reintegration](#)”, 2009

According to a report on “[Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants](#)” from International Alert, reintegration is one phase of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process which fighters frequently undergo at the end of a conflict. Reintegration commonly involves livelihoods for former fighters which enable them to take care of their families and transition to civilian life. However, International Alert notes that reintegration efforts are generally most effective when employment opportunities are not only provided to ex-combatants but also to their communities at large. According to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), such a [community-centric approach](#) has been adopted within the APRP in Afghanistan, where benefits are tied to communities which accept former insurgent fighters rather than being allocated solely or even primarily for the “reintegers”, as they are commonly referred. Before further discussing reintegration under the APRP in Afghanistan, this report reviews the experiences of other post-conflict states in using socio-economic approaches to reintegrate former fighters.

## Challenges & Lessons Learnt from Other Reintegration Processes

According to [International Alert](#), DDR efforts carried out by national governments and the international community in Latin America, Africa and Asia throughout last two decades have yielded the following lessons:

- Labour market analyses are rarely done to ensure that the assistance provided via reintegration programmes is aligned with local market gaps and contextual realities. For instance, poor planning has led some DDR programmes to provide reintegrating fighters with computer trainings despite the fact that their home communities lack electricity.
- In many post-conflict states, the DDR process begins at a time when the economy is weak or in decline. As such, reintegrating fighters become frustrated when the vocational training or grants they receive do not ultimately lead to suitable, if any, jobs. To overcome this challenge, reintegration efforts in Colombia

involved 35 private companies which, under the coordination of the Interior Ministry, offered training, apprenticeships and/or jobs for reintegrating guerrilla fighters.

- Reintegration efforts are often undermined by market competition. Reintegrating fighters attempting to begin a civilian livelihood, many for the first time, find it difficult to compete with established traders or craftsmen.
- In some contexts, ex-combatants may face stigma, biases and discrimination which undermine their businesses or prevent them from being hired by local employers. Accordingly, International Alert notes that DDR programmes should view livelihoods as a social as well as technical or economic process.
- Age matters in reintegration, and DDR programmes may need to tailor the offerings they provide according to the age of combatants and the number of years that they have been away from civilian livelihoods.

International Alert further notes that DDR programmes must be viewed as long-term undertakings which require continued support rather than as a process which can be quickly completed with short-term trainings or cash payments.

### *Infrastructure-Specific Experiences*

With many examples worldwide, a significant proportion of DDR projects concern reconstruction projects and the infrastructure sector, whether at the national or community level. For instance, following the end of the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the World Bank describes how it helped [demobilise and reintegrate 158,000 members](#) of the Ethiopia National Defence Force by involving them in the rehabilitation of public infrastructure. *ABC* further notes that the Eritrean government is employing veterans in the rehabilitation of the [Asmara-Massaua railway](#). Similarly, a [European Union project in Liberia](#) promoted access to livelihoods for both civilians and ex-combatants by facilitating their involvement in community infrastructure projects. This approach made ex-combatants and the broader community work together in projects intended to benefit everyone, thus helping to implicitly foster the acceptance of the fighters.


The case of the Kosovo Protection Corps ([KPC](#)) is a prominent example in which ex-combatants contributed substantially to [rebuilding infrastructure at the community level](#), according to the International Organization for Migration. The KPC, which was composed of 2,800 former Kosovo Liberation Army combatants, was created in 1999 in accordance with the [UN Resolution 1244](#). In addition to rebuilding infrastructure, the KPC offered disaster response capabilities, including search and rescue, provided humanitarian assistance and assisted in de-mining efforts. A Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) "[Critical Study](#)" of the KPC describes the experiment as a success. The benefits of the KPC were further validated in 2010 by [a separate study](#) from the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies.

## Reintegration & the Role of Infrastructure Rehabilitation

This report now turns from past global experience to on-going reintegration efforts in Afghanistan. The APRP structure, according to the March 2012 "[Guide to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program](#)" by the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC), includes national as well as subnational structures (*see Figure 2, next page*). While the APRP's full structure is further discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume, execution of reintegration activities closely involves the Joint Secretariat, which includes ministerial representatives. Afghan ministries, among others, then implement reintegration activities

targeting those communities which accept reintegrating insurgent fighters as well as communities and districts where there is a potential for reintegration. This process involves a wide range of sub-national structures, including Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs), Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs), district-level bodies (including District Development Assemblies (DDAs)) and Community Development Councils (CDCs). While all such organisations have a role in contributing to the objectives of the APRP, CDCs and DDAs, for instance, pre-date and are institutionally separate from the APRP.

Figure 2. Organisation Structure of the APRP, including Associated Institutions<sup>23</sup>



Source: Adapted from “[A Guide to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program](#)”, March 2012

Within this reintegration structure, several Afghan ministries play a crucial role in providing assistance – including infrastructure-related assistance – to reintegrating fighters and their communities. These include, among others, MAIL, the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) and the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD). According to the F-RIC, ministries such as these work with the Joint Secretariat to develop policies and programmes to support reintegration efforts within the APRP. These initiatives, many of which are reportedly at their initial stages, will be subsequently supported, implemented and managed by the ministries themselves at the sub-national levels. The last [Quarterly Report](#) released by the US government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) notes that socio-economic reintegration efforts are moving forward but that it is too early in the process to identify their outcomes or impact. The APRP began to function in late 2010, and many ministries did not develop working plans until mid-2011. However, initial plans and efforts can be extracted from the working plans publicly released by the MoPW, one of the ministries with relevance to the infrastructure sector.

<sup>23</sup> The acronyms for the ministries are as follow: Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs; Ministry of Tribal, Border and Ethnic Affairs; Ministry of Public Works; Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled; and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

For instance, reintegrating fighters and their fellow community members would be recruited as contractors for the MoPW for routine maintenance of roads within [Faryab](#), [Baghlan](#), [Paktiya](#), [Herat](#), [Nangarhar](#) and [Kunduz](#) provinces (see Table 1 for further details). This initiative involves the creation of a Public Works Corps (PWC) which will provide opportunities to both reintegrees and non-reintegrees.

Table 1. Reintegration Opportunities under the MoPW Implementation Plan for SY 1391 (2012-13)

| Province     | District                                                     | Distance (km) | No. of Community Maintenance Groups (#) | No. of Persons Engaged (reintegrees & community members) |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Faryab       | Ghormach                                                     | 47            | 6                                       | 150                                                      |
|              | Almar                                                        | 33            | 4                                       | 100                                                      |
|              | Provincial Teams (Inspectors and Equipment Operators Groups) |               |                                         | 22                                                       |
| Kunduz       | Ghaziabad                                                    | 25            | 3                                       | 75                                                       |
|              | Markaz                                                       | 5             | 1                                       | 25                                                       |
|              | Imam Sahib                                                   | 20            | 2                                       | 50                                                       |
|              | Khanabad                                                     | 33            | 4                                       | 100                                                      |
|              | Provincial Teams (Inspectors and Equipment Operators Groups) |               |                                         | 22                                                       |
| Baghlan      | Baghlan e Jadid                                              | 33            | 4                                       | 100                                                      |
|              | Pul-e Khomri                                                 | 48            | 6                                       | 150                                                      |
|              | Provincial Teams (Inspectors and Equipment Operators Groups) |               |                                         | 22                                                       |
| Paktia       | Ahmadabad                                                    | 12            | 1.5                                     | 37                                                       |
|              | Chamkani                                                     | 25            | 2.5                                     | 63                                                       |
|              | Milan                                                        | 9             | 1                                       | 25                                                       |
|              | Said Karam                                                   | 31            | 4                                       | 100                                                      |
|              | Provincial Teams (Inspectors and Equipment Operators Groups) |               |                                         | 22                                                       |
| Herat        | Zindajan                                                     | 60            | 7.5                                     | 186                                                      |
|              | Adraskan                                                     | 22            | 2.5                                     | 63                                                       |
|              | Provincial Teams (Inspectors and Equipment Operators Groups) |               |                                         | 22                                                       |
| Nangarhar    | Surkhrod                                                     | 75            | 8.5                                     | 213                                                      |
|              | Kama                                                         | 16            | 1.5                                     | 37                                                       |
|              | Provincial Teams (Inspectors and Equipment Operators Groups) |               |                                         | 22                                                       |
| <b>Total</b> |                                                              | <b>494</b>    | <b>59</b>                               | <b>1,606</b>                                             |

Source: "[MoPW Implementation Plan for the APRP](#)", 2012

According to the [MoPW Implementation Plan](#), reintegrating fighters will take part in a re-orientation programme in which the APRP and the PWC concept will be explained. After registration, each reintegrating insurgent or community member's skills and experiences will be assessed so they can be placed in the most appropriate role based on factors such as literacy and capability. Furthermore, the assessment will identify those individuals who are willing to work in remote areas or those who prefer to work near their communities of origin. The Implementation Plan stipulates that the reintegrees and their community are classified in the following groups:

- **MoPW Reinforcement Groups:** These groups will be added to the maintenance teams currently working on those mountain passes which are in a poor state. It is expected that these groups will increase the

effectiveness of maintenance efforts at the targeted passes. Each group will consist of 50 individuals overseen by two supervisors.

- **Community Maintenance Groups:** These groups will consist of 24 labourers and one supervisor. Each CMG will be responsible for routine maintenance as well as preliminary emergency maintenance of eight km of roads near their communities.
- **Equipment Operators Group:** These groups will consist of 15 individuals at the provincial level. From their bases in provincial departments of public works offices, they will go to targeted CMG locations to provide support by operating technical equipment.
- **Inspectors Group:** These groups will consist of seven individuals who are highly skilled and who will conduct roads inspection and monitor CMGs' work.

The sole implementer of the PWC is the MoPW, and management and coordination is provided via a Programme Development Unit (PDU). Figure 3 shows the proposed structure of the PDU, according to the SY 1391 (March 2012 – March 2013) implementation plan.

In addition, there are a series of programmes under the mandate of the MRRD that also deliver labour-intensive social infrastructure projects and contribute to reintegration, according to the MRRD's "[Annual Implementation Plan](#)" for SY 1391. Firstly, the [National Solidarity Programme](#) (NSP) was created by the Afghan government to help enable local communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development projects. Many of the projects implemented by communities are related to basic, small-scale social infrastructure. Additionally, the [National Area-Based Development Programme](#) (NABDP) aims at sustainably reducing poverty and improving livelihoods in rural Afghanistan. The programme tackles five thematic areas: (i) local institutional development, (ii) productive rural infrastructure, (iii) natural resource management, (iv) rural energy development and (v) local economic development. Moreover, the [National Rural Access Programme](#) (NRAP) aims to establish a quality rural road network, providing increased employing opportunities as well as enhancing the capacity of communities and the private sector to manage, deliver and maintain public transportation facilities. Finally, the Rural Water Supply, Sanitation & Irrigation Programme ([RU-WatSIP](#)) aims to construct more than 100,000 water points across the country in order to achieve the goal of providing access to basic water and sanitation infrastructure to 15 million of people. According to the [MRRD's implementation plan](#) for the current year, the NSP is receiving USD 20 million associated with the APRP, and NRAP is receiving USD 15 million. Relatively smaller sums are being provided to NABDP (USD 5 million) and RuWATSIP (USD 0.8 million).

Table 2. Communities & Beneficiaries of APRP-Related NSP Activities, SY 1391

| <b>Province</b>  | <b>Communities Involved</b> | <b>Beneficiaries</b> |
|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Badakshan</i> | 44                          | 7,722                |
| <i>Farah</i>     | 7                           | 1,458                |
| <i>Ghazni</i>    | 56                          | 9,072                |
| <i>Ghor</i>      | 44                          | 7,722                |
| <i>Helmand</i>   | 2                           | 324                  |
| <i>Jowzjan</i>   | 57                          | 10,004               |
| <i>Kandahar</i>  | 34                          | 5,508                |
| <i>Khost</i>     | 1                           | 162                  |
| <i>Kunduz</i>    | 93                          | 16,307               |

|                  |     |        |
|------------------|-----|--------|
| <i>Laghman</i>   | 36  | 6,700  |
| <i>Nangarhar</i> | 7   | 1,228  |
| <i>Nuristan</i>  | 37  | 6,408  |
| <i>Takhar</i>    | 62  | 3,500  |
| <i>Uruzgan</i>   | 22  | 3,564  |
| <i>Zabul</i>     | 78  | 12,636 |
| <i>Total</i>     | 580 | 92,314 |

Source: “[MRRD Implementation Plan for the APRP](#)”, 2012; see Annex C

The implementation of the APRP by the MRRD between March 2011 and March 2012 experienced difficulties due to a number of reasons, according to the MRRD’s “[Annual Implementation Plan](#)”. That document notes that delays in project implementation resulted from a number of factors, including the delayed approval of last year’s “Annual Implementation Plan”, late transfers of funds to the MRRD programmes (particularly NRAP) and complex and time-consuming procurement processes. In addition, the MRRD found that there was a need for greater coordination and the national and provincial levels and for harmonised reporting systems and processes across the programmes.

## Conclusion

Under the APRP, Afghanistan has moved forward with reintegration. As has been shown in other post-conflict states, providing socio-economic support to reintegrating fighters and their communities may help to solidify peace and security. Engaging fighters in infrastructure construction, rehabilitation and maintenance as a reintegration option is one approach being attempted, though it remains too early to understand what effects such efforts are having. However, referring to the three forms of reintegration noted by the United Nations (*see Figure 1, page 2*), plans may be needed to eventually move from stabilisation and local reintegration models to transitional approaches that facilitate long-term development and self-sustaining livelihoods for former combatants and their communities.



# Security Aspects of Reintegration

Mark Checchia<sup>24</sup>

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Fighters leaving the insurgency and taking up offers of peace and reintegration may face [unemployment, poverty and social challenges](#), according to the *Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR)*. Those who want to switch sides require screening, according to a 2011 RAND paper by Seth G. Jones, in order to [determine their level of sincerity and to establish their identities](#). The screening process may help to identify those fighters who wish to reintegrate only for monetary gain or to gain a tactical advantage for the insurgency. The RAND report notes that [screening, or vetting](#), consists of interviews with the reintegrating fighter, as well as engagements with those familiar with the individual (e.g., tribal elders, villagers, etc.) Screening also includes verification of the insurgents' past actions and checking their biometrics. Biometrics can be used to check if the Afghan government or international community has previously engaged with this individual (e.g., if he had previously attempted to reintegrate) and can enable the Afghan government to help monitor that "reintegree" in the future.

Amin Tarzi of the US Marine Corps University says the National Consultative Peace *Jirga* held in early June 2010 in Kabul involved a debate over the intensity of screening and verification measures. Many members of the Peace *Jirga* were in favour of relaxed standards to encourage greater numbers of fighters to reintegrate. However, Tarzi writes that "[t]he United States and a sizable number of Afghans both inside and outside the political system have reservations about reconciling those members of the Taliban who may be [inseparably linked](#) to international terrorist networks." Hence, they advocated a stringent screening process.

Available reports note at least four reasons why an insurgent might attempt to take advantage of the reintegration process – and, hence, why thorough vetting is a priority.

- *Gaining Opportunities for Attack*. There remains a possibility that reintegrees could successfully insert one of their own into the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or other significant position under the guise of reintegration. Deedee Derksen notes in her paper "Peace From the Bottom-Up?" that many fighters express a [preference for joining the Afghan Local Police \(ALP\)](#). A possible instance of this infiltration happened in March 2012, when an ALP member [drugged and killed nine Afghan police colleagues](#) before escaping in the police truck with most of the police station's weapons. The *New York Times* reported he was a reintegrated insurgent and the Taliban stated the perpetrator rejoined the insurgency
- *Spying for the Insurgency*. Screening also aims to [identify fighters who maintain relationships](#) with the insurgency given that those individuals may attempt to reintegrate in order to gain information to pass on to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. This particularly applies to reintegrees placed in the Afghan security services.

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- *Delaying Counter-Insurgency Efforts.* An insurgent commander may use discussions regarding reintegration in an attempt to [delay operations](#) by Afghan or international forces in their area. Such a lull in operations may be used by the insurgency to buy time or gain other tactical benefits at the local level.

In addition, screening can also identify individuals who have [no contact with insurgents](#) but who believe that they may be able to receive material benefits by reintegrating. For instance, reintegrees are provided with transition assistance amounting to USD 120 per month for three months, as stated in the recent CFC report on [“Peace and Reintegration: An Introduction”](#). In addition, some reintegrees have received economic opportunities in de-mining and infrastructure maintenance – along with members of their communities.

While the majority of documents concerning reintegration in Afghanistan warn against including non-insurgents in the process, other experts suggested that doing so may have advantages. Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Floyd of the Australian Regular Army expresses a different view in a paper entitled [“Grasping the nettle: why reintegration is central to operational design in southern Afghanistan”](#). Floyd, who was deployed to Afghanistan in 2010 with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Regional Command South, writes that there may be benefits in offering [reintegration-type assistance](#) to Afghans who may not have participated in the insurgency. He writes:

*“Many factions, groups and individuals do not take active or direct roles in hostilities, yet have disintegrated from the social and political processes and fabric of the rest of Afghanistan. Such groups and elements warrant equal inclusion in reintegration efforts, not least due to their latent potential to produce insurgents, and their harbouring of political and possibly criminal antagonists.”*

Floyd further notes that many Afghans may perceive themselves as displaced or disconnected from their community, and suggests that providing such individuals with training, education and jobs can keep them out of the insurgency and link them with the Afghan government in a positive context. According to a 2011 paper for the United States Institute for Peace by Deedee Derksen, some international actors also “view [reintegration of non-insurgents](#) as legitimate”.

## Post-Reintegration Monitoring

Monitoring builds upon this screening process discussed above. RAND suggests those former fighters accepted into the peace and reintegration programme [must be monitored](#) to determine if they have severed their insurgent connections. However, a [report on APRP implementation](#) from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) says in the initial stages, “robust vetting and verification mechanisms [had] yet to be in place” as of the third quarter of 2011. UNDPs latest report indicates that vetting SOPs, including biometrics verification, have since been developed to [prevent fraud and duplication](#), and have been systematically in use to ensure that those who join the programme are not common criminals. The United Nations’ Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) recommend the monitoring of former combatants and suggests that this can consist of regular [communication with local people](#), such as neighbors, tribal chiefs or religious figures, who observe the reintegrated fighter and can assess any possible recidivism. In addition, asking the reintegrees to periodically report on insurgent activity may be a good indicator of commitment to a peaceful civilian life. Other options also exist, including more intrusive approaches involving visits by personnel from the international community or host-nation government.

Figure 1. Stages of the APRP Programme



Source: ISAF F-RIC, "[Guide to the APRP](#)", 2012

## Security for Reintegrated Insurgents

A 2011 RAND paper by Seth G. Jones found that reintegrated insurgents frequently faced security concerns. These included [animosity from members of society](#) and targeting by insurgents. Fighters who participate in the APRP [require protection](#) so they will not be targeted by remaining insurgents, as noted in the "Guide to the APRP" produced by the Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC) within ISAF. The RAND paper further notes that the former fighter who seeks to lay down his arms and reintegrate faces the [threat of retaliation](#) from those insurgents with whom he formerly fought. In addition, there are reportedly concerns that reintegrated fighters may accidentally continue to be targeted by Afghan and international forces. These two issues – retaliation and continued targeting – are addressed separately below.

### *Retaliation*

Taliban retaliation reportedly presents a challenge for peace and reintegration efforts. For instance, in April 2012, a Taliban commander who had joined the peace process was [killed in Herat province](#), *Pajhwok Afghan News* reported. While the reason for his killing is not known, the article reports speculation that the killers were associated with his former Taliban group. The RAND paper notes the leader may realise that the reintegree [has valuable information](#) about operations, supply lines, personnel and their locations and habits and, therefore, wants to keep him from talking about all this to the authorities. There may be a motive of simple payback for leaving the group and being disloyal. ISAF's F-RIC notes that successful reintegration efforts must ensure the former fighter is confident he will [survive the process](#).

## *Continued Targeting*

Reintegrating fighters may also need assurances that Afghan and foreign forces will cease targeting insurgents once they have begun the reintegration process. According to the F-RIC's "Guide to the APRP", there are concerns that weak [internal communication](#) could prevent the identities of reintegrating fighters from being well publicised among the Afghan forces and the international coalition. As a result, Afghan and international forces could potentially treat former fighters as active insurgents. This situation is particularly problematic if the former fighter is on the Joint Prioritized Effects List ([JPEL](#)), which includes the names of insurgents listed for immediate kill or capture. The RAND paper notes that "[r]eintegration candidates who are on the JPEL need to be [properly vetted](#) and their names should be forwarded to the regional command and the target support cell to coordinate reintegration procedures". If this does not happen, and they remain targeted for kill or capture, it [could make further returnees reluctant](#) to enter the reintegration process, according to the aforementioned "Guide to the APRP".

The intended reintegree may fear punishment or retribution by ISAF or the Afghan government. For example, former Taliban Ambassador Abdul Sallam Zaeef had been captured in Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and was sent to Guantanamo Bay. He was released four years later and returned to [Afghanistan to be reintegrated](#), but was under close watch, *The Washington Post* noted. In April 2012, Zaeef [fled Afghanistan](#) for the United Arab Emirates, fearing for his life after ISAF forces attempted to search his home, *Al Jazeera* reported. [Other examples](#) are taken from the RAND paper:

*"In 2007, British and Afghan government forces offered protection to Mullah Salam after he reintegrated. The Afghan government provided him security, logistical support, economic assistance, and a case officer... Mullah Salam survived several assassination attempts by the Taliban who stigmatized him as a collaborator. The same was true for Haji Kaduz, a Barakzai leader in Helmand who reintegrated in 2009 and survived several assassination attempts".*

Individuals or groups who wish to reintegrate may be treated harshly. In another case, the RAND paper notes, Tor Jan Pirzai reintegrated after the collapse of the Taliban regime and worked peacefully at a job in Musa Qalah in [Helmand](#) province. But he was later [arrested and beaten](#), apparently on the orders of a district administrator. When he was finally released, Tor Jan re-joined the Taliban as an active commander.

## Benefits of Reintegration

[International Alert](#), an international peace building organisation, suggests there are several ways to insure that the reintegree is employed in a position [best-suited to his needs](#) and wants. For instance, some past conflict resolution programmes that have proven successful kept the reintegrees in a local community defense force. In Afghanistan, Derksen notes that some of the reintegrees have the [skills and background](#), and the desire, to be able to join the Afghan Local Police but must pass the same screening requirements as others who attempt to join the ALP. The ALP, as *The Diplomat* suggests, can provide security to their community and [guard reintegrees against Taliban reprisal](#) actions as the conflict is resolving.

As US Army Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Johnson wrote in a 2010 article for *Military Review*, [properly executed reintegration](#) can reduce insurgency by reducing insurgents' grievances. The government can, according to Johnson, do so by solving the problems the insurgents are encountering, providing access to justice and resolving disputes which have led particular individuals to join the insurgency.

The material benefits tied to reintegration – for insurgents and their communities – may also reportedly contribute to security. The preceding chapter notes that reintegration programmes can begin with cash-for-work, relocation and support, public employment or start-up grants which provide opportunities to stimulate economic and social recovery and restore livelihoods. However, the UN Policy Document on Post Conflict Employment and Reintegration says success requires [creating sustainable, productive employment opportunities and decent work](#). It requires supporting policies, in order to develop institutional capacity. In addition, reintegration may support security by bringing a fighter and his home community back together through a process of reconciliation or social reintegration. Hence, a paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies describes the engagement of tribal, religious and other leaders [as essential](#) to the success of reintegration programmes. Failure to deliver on promises can reportedly contribute to recidivism and remobilisation of particular fighters. The UN policy for post-conflict employment creation, income generation, and reintegration highlights that screening, monitoring, security and meaningful employment are all [steps toward long-term stability](#) and eventually, prosperity.



## *Annex A. Further Readings*

The following readings may be of interest to individuals wishing to learn more about global and Afghanistan-specific issues pertaining to peace and reintegration.

- “[A Guide to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program \(APRP\)](#)”, International Security Assistance Force, March 2012, ISAF HQ Force Reintegration Cell.
- “[A re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant reintegration: ‘social reintegration’ approach](#)”, *Conflict, Security & Development*, March 2012, by Alpaslan Ozerdem.
- “[Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer](#)”, RAND Corporation, 2011, by Shames Shinn and James Dobbins.
- “[Afghan Reintegration Drama](#)”, *The Diplomat*, February 2012, by David Axe.
- “[Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program: Programme Document](#)”, National Security Council, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, July 2010.
- “[Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme \(APRP\)](#)”, Third Quarter Report 2011, United Nations Development Programme.
- “[Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace](#)”, the report of The Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan and Its Regional and International Dimensions, 2011, by Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas R. Pickering (co-chairs).
- “[Allies turn Afghan insurgents into partners](#)”, *The Army Times*, October 2009, by Sean D. Naylor.
- “[Attacks on U.S and NATO Soldiers by Afghan Security Forces](#)”, The New America Foundation, March 2012.
- “[Beyond Power Sharing: Institutional options for an Afghan peace process](#)”, United States Institute of Peace, 2011, by Hamish Nixon and Caroline Hartzell.
- “[Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission](#)”, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011, by Paul James-Allen, Aaron Weah and Lizzie Goodfriend.
- “[Demobbed Afghans Face Uncertain Future](#)”, *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, April 2005, by Galima Bukarbaeva.
- “[Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles](#)”, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme, 2006, by Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor.
- “[Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration](#)”, 2005, by Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein.
- “[Experts Discuss the Possibility of Reconciliation in Afghanistan](#)”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2010, by Katherine Hubbard.
- “[Ex-Taliban Ambassador Flees to UAE Fearing For His Life](#)”, *al Jazeera*, April 2012.

- [“Former combatant reintegration and fragmentation in contemporary Afghanistan”](#), *Conflict, Security & Development*, April 2009, by Steven A. Zyck.
- [“Golden Surrender: The Risks, Challenges, and Implications of Reintegration in Afghanistan”](#), Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 2010, by Matt Waldman.
- [“Grasping the nettle: why reintegration is central to operational design in southern Afghanistan”](#), Australian Civil-Military Centre, January 2011, by Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Floyd.
- [“Impact or Illusion? Reintegration under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program”](#), United States Institute for Peace, September 2011, by Deedee Derksen.
- [“Peace From the Bottom-Up? The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program”](#), International Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2011, by Deedee Derksen.
- [“Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration”](#), United Nations, October 2009.
- [“Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program”](#), *Prism*, National Defense University Press, September 2010, by Amin Tarzi.
- [“Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents”](#), a report prepared for the US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, RAND Corporation, 2011, by Seth G. Jones.
- [“Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan”](#), *Military Review*, November-December 2010, by Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Johnson.
- [“Strategic Conflict Assessment: Afghanistan”](#), a product of the British government’s “Understanding Afghanistan” initiative, UK Department for International Development, 2008, by Sultan Barakat, Antonio Giustozzi, Christopher Langton, Michael Murphy, Mark Sedra and Arne Strand.
- [“Stress and gripes, not Taliban, drive Afghan insider attacks: NATO”](#), *Reuters*, April 2012, by Jack Kimball.
- [“Surrendering rebel leader killed in Herat”](#), *Pajhwok Afghan News*, April 2012, by Ahmad Quraish.
- [“Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice”](#), Berghof Foundation, 2010, by Martina Fischer.
- [“West’s Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality”](#), *The National Interest*, February 2012, by Michael Hart.



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