



Insider Threat

The overall classification of this briefing is: **UNCLASSIFIED**





Purpose

To inform of the risks posed by the Insider Threat.

To train on the different types of Insider Attacks, how to recognize them, how to prevent them and how to mitigate their effects should they occur.





Agenda

- Purpose
- Reference
- Background and History
- Types of Insider Threat
- Conceptual Framework





References

1. ISAF Insider Threat Handbook, 31 Mar 13.
2. US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned "Inside the Wire Threats Afghanistan" Handbook & Graphic Training Aid, Oct12/Jun 13
3. US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group Tactical Pocket Reference "Insider Threats in Partnering Environments," Jun 11.

The collage features three key documents:

- Top Right:** "Insider Threats - Afghanistan" handbook cover, No. 13-XX, Oct 12. It includes the title "Insider Threats - Afghanistan" and the subtitle "Observations, Insights, and Lessons".
- Middle:** "Insider Threats in Partnering Environments" tactical pocket reference. It is titled "Insider Threats in Partnering Environments" and "A Guide for Military Leaders (June 2011)". It contains sections on Infiltration, Mitigating Infiltration, CO-OP, and CO-OP & Grievance Based Action Indicators & Risk Factors.
- Bottom:** "ISAF Insider Threat Handbook" cover, COMISAF's Guidance on Combating Insider Attacks. It features a photo of soldiers and the ISAF logo.





Definitions

- Insider Threat:
 - the potential for an attack by a person or persons in **a position of trust** with CF personnel by virtue of their employment, status, access or affiliation.
- Insider Attack:
 - Occurs when a person or persons in a position of trust initiates an act of violence against CF.
 - Attackers possess **motive, intent and capability**, and need **opportunity** in order to conduct an attack.
 - Insider Attacks are characterized by surprise, speed and shock.


Source: ISAF Insider Threat Handbook,



A Tactic as Old as History



Trojan Horse



Julius Caesar




Pham Xuan An



Benazir Bhutto



The British Experience



- 1839 to 1919: Three Anglo-Afghan wars
- Extensive employment of advisors to lead indigenous units
- Numerous Insider Attacks against advisors, diplomats and their families
- Many advisors killed for cultural missteps, e.g. inadvertently sleeping with their feet facing Mecca
- Afghan soldiers frequently deserted and employed tactics learned in British service against the British-Indian army

“We shall part with the Afghans as friends, and I feel satisfied that any government which may be established hereafter will always be disposed to cultivate a good understanding with us.”

British envoy Sir William MacNaghten.

MacNaghten and three officers accompanying him were seized and murdered by Afghan resistance leader Akbar Khan during a meeting in Kabul on 23 December 1841. His body was dragged through the streets and displayed in the bazaar.



The Russian Experience



- 1979 to 1989: Soviet occupation
- Soviet advisors killed by ANA as whole units defected to the Mujahadeen.
- Relatively few Insider Attacks due to Soviet TTPs for employing advisors
- Announcement of withdrawal in 1987 led to initial increase, but the Soviet “response” stopped it

“Lieutenant Sadykov, an Uzbek, let out all the grievances that he had bottled up... He was incensed and began to abuse the advisers... He started firing in the corridor and then ran outside, still shooting at random. Major Semenchenko was killed, and Maloletkin and an Afghan soldier were wounded... The family of Semechenko was informed that he had died heroically while carrying out his international duty.”

The KGB in Afghanistan, Vasiliy Mitrokhin



Strategic Consequences

In response to an Insider Attack on 19 January 2012, in which four French soldiers died and 16 were wounded, the French government suspended all partnering and training operations with ANSF.



“The French army is not in Afghanistan so that Afghan soldiers can shoot at them.”

President Nicolas Sarkozy
20 Jan 12



Types of Insider Attack



Infiltration

Impersonation

Co-option

Personal

**Ideological
Argument
Stress**



CBS/AP | November 20, 2012, 11:51 PM

Attack on U.S. base in Kabul thwarted



Afghan security forces inspect scene at a U.S. base in Kabul Nov. 21, 2012 after, officials say, two would-be suicide bombers were shot as they approached / AP

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Co-option

- The voluntary or involuntary recruitment of an LN
- Same objective as Infiltration; it allows the enemy access to CF facilities
- Objective is to employ a cleared individual to work for the enemy in order to:
 - collect intelligence
 - conduct subversion or espionage
 - commit acts of violence
- Different to Infiltration because co-opting an LN circumvents the initial screening and vetting process which might expose an infiltrator
- Enemy can co-opt a LN through threat, intimidation, bribery, or blackmail
- Enemy can capitalize on a grievance by radicalizing or recruiting a LN

Source: CALL Handbook 12-07, Inside the Wire Threats - Afghanistan



Pashtunwali example

- An understanding of culture allows us to predict behavior.
- Pashtunwali (The “Way of the Pashtun”) is a term coined by anthropologists and is unfamiliar to Pashtuns, but it accurately represents an unwritten code of conduct which regulates social relations between individuals and groups.
- Consists of the following concepts, but can vary by region:
 - Nang (honor)
 - Badal (revenge)
 - Melmastia (hospitality)
 - Nanawatai (asylum)
 - Tureh (bravery)
 - Sabat (loyalty)
 - Imandari (righteousness)
 - Isteqamat (Trust in God)
 - Ghayrat (courage)
 - Namus (protection of women)
- The Pashtu “system of ethics, which regards treachery and violence as virtues rather than vices, has produced a code of honor so strange and inconsistent that it is incomprehensible to a logical mind.”



Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*, December 1900





Relevance of Pashtunwali to Insider Attacks

- For example the concepts of honor and revenge are central to Afghan males' identity and their role in society
- Honor (nang)
 - Sometimes described as “more important than facts”
 - May be considered more important than life
 - Protection of female honor (segregation)
 - Shame avoidance, saving face
 - Includes loyalty, manliness and chivalry
 - Central to the survival of the family & its lineage

“Any man who loses his honor must be completely ostracized. No-one would congratulate him on the birth of a child. No-one would marry his daughter. No-one would attend his funeral. His disgrace would endure for generations. He and his family must move away.”

Tribal elder, Paktia province, 2006

- Revenge (badal)
 - Redress, especially if honor has been wronged
 - Failure to take revenge is shameful

“A Pushtun waited 100 years, then took his revenge. It was quick work.”

Pashto saying



Personal

Activities conducted in response to a wrong (perceived or real) perpetrated by CF individual, unit or country, an ideological difference or due to individual stress

Source: CALL Handbook 12-07, Inside the Wire Threats - Afghanistan




“We would have killed many of [the Americans] already, but our commanders are cowards and don’t let us.”

PVT Abdul Hanan, ANA,
Quoted in the NY Times, 26 Sep 12



Motivation



- Types of Attacks in Afghanistan, as of 1 Nov 13 (97 Total)
- Reported fate of the attacker(s):
 - Killed 42
 - Escaped/Jackals 36
 - Captured 32

Source: ISAF; The Long War Journal



Insider Attacks Often Defy Explanation


- Insider Attacks are about **motive, intent and capability**; an attacker needs **opportunity**.
- Honor (nang) and Revenge (badal) demand some sort of action against an insult: perceived or real.
- "Those who kill an infidel shall not be put into hellfire with him. The killing of a warring infidel earns one a place in paradise."

Statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in response to the Koran burning, Feb 12





Insider Threat Conceptual Framework



Source: ISAF Insider Threat Handbook





Insider Threat Indicators

- **Baseline:** A recognizable and predictable pattern of behavior, which provides a basis for comparison
- Develop a Baseline through daily interaction with Local Nations you see regularly
- **Anomaly:** Anomalies in the baseline can provide pre-event indicators of an Insider Attack
- An Anomaly may not indicate an impending Insider Attack, but it requires a decision
- If you think to yourself “That’s unusual,” you may have subconsciously noticed the indicators of an attack

Baseline + Anomaly = Decision

- **Decision:**
 - Report and continue to monitor
 - Communicate with the individual identified as a potential threat
 - Escalate force in accordance with the RoE

Source: ISAF Insider Threat Handbook





Guardian Angels

- Definition: Designated armed individuals, pairs or small groups of personnel whose **sole** purpose is to protect other US personnel who are in close proximity to local nations in a position of trust.
- Mutual trust and cooperation between local nations and US forces is key to mission success and Insider Threat mitigation. Ensure Guardian Angels' presence and profile does not undermine trust with local nations.
- Guardian Angels should complement routine force protection measures, but are not a substitute for them. Make them part of a layered defensive plan.
- Select and train Guardian Angels early and continuously
- Consistently assign Guardian Angels to the same KLEs as an assigned duty
- Plan for Guardian Angel employment prior to mission execution
- Local nations may be your best defense against an Insider Attack

Be Polite, Be Professional But Have a Plan to Kill Everyone You Meet.

GEN James Mattis



Effect of Guardian Angel Employment

- Consider the effect of Guardian Angel profile and posture on the purpose of the primary mission.
- Ensure Guardian Angel presence and profile does not undermine trust between ISAF and ANSF.
- In order to preserve trust, consider:
 - Weapons type to be carried
 - Type of PPE worn
 - Location of Guardian Angels and/or other Force Protection Personnel



“They come here and they look like they are going to fight us. They are always talking down to us like we are little children.”

SGT. Abdul Karim Haq, ANA



Complacency example

- 12 Feb 12: Two US Officers killed at the Ministry of the Interior, Kabul by ANP LT Abdul Saboor, in retaliation for the Koran burnings:
 - LTC John Loftis, USAF AfPak Hands chief plans adviser, fluent Pashto speaker
 - MAJ Robert Marchanti II, USARNG
- Both shot in the back of the head while sitting at their desks
- Both advisors enjoyed strong friendships with their Afghan counterparts
- The door to their office was equipped with a cypher lock but the advisors had propped it open in order to encourage their counterparts to enter
- Nanawatai
 - Pashtun concept of asylum
 - An assumption
- Abdul Saboor fled the Ministry after the attack and remains at large
 - ISAF withdrew all advisors for several weeks following the attack





Take Aways

- We don't know categorically the cause behind Insider Attacks, so we must prepare for all types
- Prevention is the key to success
- Battle complacency every day; Be the Hard Target.
- Advising is inherently risky, but mitigate the risk by understanding the threat and defending against it
- Understanding the local culture and traditions are a critical part of your operating environment; ensure you understand it. Leaders enforce its importance
- Create a connection with the local nations you see regularly:
 - Establish a baseline of normal behavior for the local nations you know
 - Leverage local nation partners to detect Insider Threats and protect CF
 - Defeat the enemy's IO campaign
 - Treat local nations as partners and equals

“Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.”

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency



QUESTIONS

