NEWSLETTER

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OPERATIONS IN THE DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JRTC, VOL. VI:

THE ART OF BCT SOF IA INTERDEPENDENCE

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Operations in the Decisive Action Training Environment at the JRTC, Volume VI: The Art of Brigade Combat Team — Special Operations — Interagency Interdependence

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Foreword

Decisive Action Training Environment is the Stage: Dance Together or Dangle Separately

In 2013, it is more than clear that the United States will reduce the size of its armed forces. We can expect the size of the U.S. Army to fall below 400,000. Similar reductions face our sister services. These reductions are not merely a question of quantity; budgetary demands will no doubt affect the ability of our forces to meet challenges across the globe as threats morph and proliferate. This is our challenge. Clearly, we must, as an imperative, make the maximum benefit of our training budget as we prepare U.S. forces — ground, air, and sea — to meet the challenges of 2014 and beyond.

The U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) crafted the decisive action training environment (DATE) to do just that: provide a realistic, interconnected, and scalable training environment for military forces in unified land operations that are against a complex, near-peer hybrid enemy. TRADOC designed the DATE scenario to facilitate the shift of the Army's combat training centers (CTCs) to training for global readiness. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) recognized the inherent demand for global awareness with the concept of regionally aligned forces (RAF) to support combatant commands. Expect through RAF, FORSCOM, and the U.S. Army, for designated forces to develop general familiarity with specified countries and issues within their geographic alignment. The CTC program is a linchpin between DATE and RAF. A DATE at the CTCs will prepare forces for regional and global challenges.

The DATE in 2013 is not a return to the CTC rotations of 2001. The DATE in 2013 is not even the full spectrum of operations rotations of 2010. At the CTC, the DATE rotation core allows unified action partners to exercise military power and diplomatic influence in a realistic scenario. The DATE provides a stage for the choreography of joint, interagency, international, and multinational (JIIM) partners with military forces. In looking at the spectrum of international events, two factors become immediately clear:

- No two crises, areas, or conflicts are the same.
- Regardless of the region, the U.S. military forces never operate in a vacuum.

The DATE allows us to craft scenarios that reflect these realities. Without a robust JIIM component, a CTC rotation is not a DATE.

Army Regulation 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*, states "The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) trains conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution." This mission statement is directly linked to Army doctrine. Consider the five tasks of Army stability operations:

- Establish civil security.
- Civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

A decade ago, the Army demurred on such tasks; a tactic that failed disastrously in Iraq during 2003. Thanks to the provincial reconstruction team (PRT), military leaders had great interagency experience as battle-space owners who dominated the host nation. The PRT worked well in those circumstances; it was not a model for operations elsewhere.

In the DATE, the interagency (IA) is the senior partner in the U.S. effort. Interdependency of capabilities and roles makes the IA critical to the success of the United States operation. IA integration and interdependency dictate that CF and SOF leaders train realistically; in a sovereign country, the IA and the military must nest with the host nation. The DATE provides the stage for this dance.

Rotation 13-09 integrated unified action partners (UAP), and expanded political authorities and socio-economic development since political strategy and end state dominated the reasons for committing a unit to a conflict. Meanwhile, traditional planners addressed warfighting skills. "Integrate to achieve interdependence" was the rule. Interdependence reduces redundancies, assesses competencies, and eradicates layered bureaucracy. "Trusting" other agencies, units, and entities is difficult; while it can occur by chance, we must make it a deliberate practice. Indeed, it is our charter to coach, teach, and mentor leaders and units in this art. We must first master the science. With the commanding general's guidance, the JRTC is well on its way to this mastery; he brought all the elements with the Fort Polk command in support of rotations. It is here where we practice the art of interdependence between CF, SOF, and the IA. Through the development

of this art, one will enhance the intellectual capacity of our civilian and Soldier leaders to enable them to operate with common knowledge and capabilities on how UAPs may work and how to leverage these capabilities.



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Chapter 1

The Mindset Change for the Future Operational Environment: Institutionalizing Interdependence

LTC Lawrence W. "Hank" Henry, Commander, Special Operations Training Detachment, Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group

> *As a force, we must continuously learn, anticipate, and evolve in order to defeat an adaptive enemy and the uncertain threat of the 21st century*.[1]

In Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022, LTG Charles T. Cleveland spoke of an adaptive adversary that leverages a myriad of capabilities, ranging from the employment of mass, firepower, and maneuver of a conventional force; to illicit tracking methods of criminal cartels and gangs; to the utilization of information and terror to incite fear — locally, nationally, and internationally. The spectrum of capabilities demonstrated by this adaptive adversary is characterized by Training Circular 7-100 as a hybrid threat.

> *Hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist force, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects*."[2]

The ability to defeat these diverse and complicated adversaries cannot be understood through a line and block chart, skills possessed by special operations forces (SOF), or the unique characteristics within a country team. The ability to defeat this hybrid threat demands a "hybrid response." Given the characteristics of the threat mentioned above, the response must "optimize the force multiplying potential of partnership with the Army and interagency to provide the nation with seamless combat power."[3]

The response this article advocates is a deliberate and mutual reliance by conventional forces (CF), SOF, and elements within the joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) community to conduct operations in an interdependent manner. "The ultimate goal of CF-SOF interdependence is to increase operations by enabling the joint force to present a seamless front to our enemies and a unified face to our friends and partners."[4] In addition, operations conducted in an interdependent manner provide senior leaders with the ability to reduce risk to the force and mission, and reduce redundancies to address the current and future operational environments (OEs). Although CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence throughout planning and execution supports the Chief of Staff of the Army's vision to "prevent, shape, and win," the question is, how do units and/or elements of the JIIM environment train to counter the hybrid threat of the future?

I advocate a change of mindset by institutionalizing best practices and lessons learned that support CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence. The purpose of institutionalizing interdependent training is to facilitate a common understanding and doctrinal approach to CF-SOF-JIIM interdependency. To further create a common understanding and doctrinal approach between CF-

SOF-JIIM elements, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-X-7, *USA Functional Concept for the 7th Warfighting Function*, characterizes interdependency as:

- The deliberate and mutual reliance of one unified action partner on another's inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects.
- The ultimate goal of conventional forces and special operations interdependence is to increase operational effectiveness by enabling the joint force to present a seamless front to adversaries and a united face to friends and partners throughout the phases of operations.
- To dominate any OE and provide decisive results across the range of military operations, the Army requires SOF and the CF to blend their capabilities, and work together to achieve effectiveness and unity of effort.[5]

Although TRADOC's definition does not address the JIIM environment, the capability that unified action partners possess within this environment cannot be overshadowed by CF and SOF contributions to interdependency. An example of an additional mindset change that must take place is the role of the JIIM environment in support of the OE of the future. The role of interdependency becomes increasingly more important as the United States may find itself conducting operations in a sovereign nation where the country team is the supported "command" and not the geographic combatant commander.

Figure 1-1. The 2-505 Commander meets with the advanced operational base commander in the consulate general on the night of the airborne operation.

The Joint Readiness Training Center's Approach to Interdependency: Acknowledge, Communicate, Plan, Execute, Analyze

Understanding the nature of the hybrid threat within a constantly changing physical and political environment, coupled with the nuanced environment of a country team, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) developed an approach to enable a shared vision for interdependence in operations. The JRTC approach is designed to provide training units with a programmed (versus *ad hoc*) method to resource, plan, and execute operations at the Combat Training Center (CTC) and for real-world operations. In the absence of doctrine, this approach was derived from a multitude of observations from previous rotations, senior leader feedback, and how interdependency is characterized within this article. This approach considers critical seams and gaps that reside in the unit's ability to plan and direct operations in an interdependent manner. These gaps and seams affect the unit or agency's ability to:

Acknowledge inherent capabilities.

Communicate through nodes, systems, and functions.

Plan identifying gaps and seams/leveraging capabilities.

Execute the synchronization of inherent capabilities in a mutually supportive manner.

Analyze maintaining the momentum to win.

Acknowledge, communicate, plan, execute, and analyze (ACPEA) uses inherent capabilities to gain and maintain a seamless front to adversaries and partners. In efforts to "institutionalize" the ability to observe, coach, and teach throughout the planning and execution of operations focused on interdependency, the CTC examines key functions within the five steps of ACPEA that drive its approach.

Step 1. Acknowledge

Leaders must first articulate the inherent capabilities possessed by CF-SOF-JIIM elements and consider factors such as: access, placement, mass, firepower, movement and maneuver, unique authorities, and assets, among others. The intent is to provide a clear understanding of unit and country team limitations and capabilities. Stakeholder articulation of goals and objectives will facilitate a shared vision and identify divergences. Finally, stakeholders must identify unique environments/conditions where it would demand to act unilaterally in order to achieve specific strategic goals and objectives.

Step 2. Communicate

Establish a seamless flow of communication through integration of nodes such as Command Post of the Future, systems such as joint and combined targeting boards, and functions such as liaison. The integration of select nodes, systems, and functions will create an environment to gain and maintain a common operational picture (COP) and common intelligence picture (CIP) when conducting mission analysis for operations conducted in a interdependent manner. The maintaining of the COP and CIP is essential to interoperability, which is the foundation of interdependence in operations.

Although preexisting relationships can facilitate a more interpersonal environment between units and country team elements, these preexisting relationships cannot be a substitute for the integration and employment of nodes, functions, and systems. When the "fog and friction of war" is the thickest, it has been observed during decisive action training environments (DATEs) and unconventional warfare exercises (UW EXs) that an element will revert to what it knows best. In some cases, this is not conducting operations in an interdependent manner. If systems, nodes, and functions are relied on versus pre-existing relationships, the greater the possibility for interdependence to occur, despite the environment.

In most cases, the country team already will have its established "nodes, systems, and functions." Within this environment, CF-SOF must be prepared to "tie-in" with a view towards full interdependency.

Step 3. Plan

Maintaining the free flow of information to inform the COP and CIP through deliberate maintenance of integrated nodes, systems, and functions, coupled with understanding the capabilities and limitations of the unified action partners, sets proper conditions for planning. The establishment and sustainment of an integrated unified action partner planning group is critical considering that it functions to identify operational gaps and seams. Further, by understanding these gaps and seams, the planning group leverages inherent capabilities of CF-SOF-JIIM assets to set the conditions for follow-on activities.

What makes the CF-SOF-JIIM interdependent relationship unique is that each element within this community of interest comes with its own unique skill sets. Acknowledging this, the representatives of the CF-SOF-JIIM planning workgroup must not only leverage the inherent capability, but protect it as well. For example, SOF could be leveraged to support CF-JIIM operations; however, the special operations mission criteria must be met for employment. The following is the special operations operational mission criteria:

- Must be an appropriate SOF mission or task.
- The mission or task should support the joint force commander's campaign or operational plan.
- The mission or task must be operationally feasible.
- Resources must be available to execute the mission and should support the SOF mission.
- The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risk.[6]

The development of an interdependent plan creates opportunities for the CF-SOF-JIIM operations to exploit efficiencies, reduce risk (to the force and mission), and reduce redundancy. During some training exercises, it has been observed that the acknowledgement, communication, and planning to support CF-SOF-JIIM interdependent operations is fairly easy. Step 4, Execute, and Step 5, Analyze, generally prove to be more challenging.

Step 4. Execute

The planning workgroup must constantly revisit Steps 1 through 3 during execution of the plan using select nodes, functions, and systems. Synchronizing assets and clearing of fires and other lethal/nonlethal activities are not just the responsibility of the brigade combat team; they are shared by all elements within the community of interest.

Remaining cognizant that some CF-SOF-JIIM goals are divergent, unit and/or agency leaders must direct actions to not only form a seamless front to the enemy, but to also direct operations that are reciprocal in nature as well. This reciprocal environment will enable all unified action partners to achieve their goals in a mutually supportive manner to accomplish the mission.

Step 5. Analyze

Revisit Steps 1 through 4 and modify plans to maximize the impact on the enemy, targeted population, and select segments of the physical environment. Modify plans to maximize the inherent capabilities possessed by select unified action partners for follow-on operations. The consistent utilization of systems, nodes, and functions by the planning workgroup will create the environment needed to maintain momentum throughout the "battle space." These "drills," are not episodic in nature and are strongly recommended in order to increase efficiencies and the possibility of mission accomplishment.

In the absence of doctrine, the above mentioned approach to CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence provides units with an "institutionalized approach" as it prepares for the hybrid threats of the future OE. Although the proceeding passage provided a "road map" to conducting operations in an interdependent manner, the following concepts are common misunderstandings when planning, resourcing, and conducting operations to achieve a unified front.

Figure 1-2. Consul general, brigade combat team commander, and defense attaché meet the provincial governor and police chief D+1.

Interdependence Versus Integration Versus Interoperability

Previous observations suggest that CF and SOF elements were integrated at the tactical level in an effort to conduct operations in an interdependent manner. In most cases, this integration was conducted without considering a "...*mutual reliance* of one unified action partner on another's *inherent capabilities* to provide *complementary and reinforcing effects*..."[7]

Simply integrating CF and SOF elements at the tactical level is not CF-SOF interdependence. Yes, at the operational level integration is needed to gain and maintain a shared vision and increase interoperability among unified action partners. However, at the tactical level, interdependence relies on the exploitation of inherent capabilities of a unified action partner in order to create a favorable environment for another unit or agency to capitalize on, forming a unified front. Further, many senior CF and SOF leaders use the phrase "CF-SOF integration" or "CF-SOF interoperability" when they really mean CF-SOF interdependence. The terms are not interchangeable; words do have meaning. The "interchangeable" uses of interoperability or integration, when one really means interdependence, have caused confusion at the operational and tactical levels. A change in the use of terminology could be the mindset change needed to execute deliberate actions in support of interdependency.

Liaison Officers

The quality of liaison officers (LNOs) exchanged between CF, SOF, and interagency is a major factor in gaining and sustaining the trust, faith, and confidence of a unit or agency's leadership. Historically, LNOs were often junior officers or noncommissioned officers who did not clearly understand what their headquarters was trying to accomplish, let alone the objectives of the "host headquarters." The LNOs' lack of understanding was not because they weren't motivated. They lacked the experience to confidently and competently engage the "host" commander and staff to support that unit's goals and objectives while simultaneously ensuring there was a mutually supportive environment that supported reciprocating activities. To achieve this degree of competence and confidence, an LNO must be a former commander, operations officer, etc. LNOs must have a "graduate level" understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the assets of the "losing and host units." Further, the LNO must possess an uncanny understanding of how these assets fit into the greater picture to support the combatant commands or the chief of mission's stated end state.

Relationships Versus Nodes, Functions, and Systems

Observations suggested that unit commanders and country team leaders believe the interpersonal relationship shared between partners would be enough to facilitate interdependence, an assumption that proved to be false. These relationships, though solid, were not "formalized interdependent relationships." The relationship between the unified action partners, before hostilities, created an interpersonal and candid environment between partners. The interpersonal relationship, though extremely important in establishing rapport, tended to deteriorate once the fog and friction of war was present. This relationship needs to be "formalized" through the addition of unique nodes, functions, and systems to facilitate interdependency.

Nevertheless, a common observation is the unintended reluctance to expand an interdependent relationship established between two units (or agencies) to another unified action partner when the OE demands it. The "standing" unit may understand that it needs to gain and maintain an interdependent relationship with the "new" element; however, the absence of systems, nodes, and functions and established doctrine may "force" the standing unit to revert to its "former partner" in efforts to achieve interdependency. Reverting back to the relationship developed by the former unified action partners can not only be undercutting to the new unit, but can also be counter-productive in achieving a mutual supportive environment.

The aforementioned observations of common misunderstandings reinforces the point that there must be an institutional solution to support a mindset change. However, having doctrine is not enough; the units' home station training and CTCs must provide the venues to support the mindset change needed to facilitate a greater understanding of operations conducted in an interdependent manner.

The Mindset Change — Institutionalizing Interdependence: Future Interdependence Training

> *Integration that relies on personal relationships forged on the battlefield is transient unless made operational and institutional and instilled in our forces from the very beginning of professional military education and throughout planning and training.*[8]

In order for interdependence to properly be understood and applied by the force, senior commanders must allocate the time, funding, and resources for training. This training must take place at the home station, institution, and CTCs. A forcing function that can enable training is to direct interdependence training in annual or quarterly training guidance. Examples of interdependent training that occurs at the home station are the Joint Operational Access Exercise, hosted by the 18th Airborne, and the Silent Quest Exercise, hosted by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Although the Joint Operational Access Exercise is primarily an exercise that focuses on tactical and operational activities in support of the global response force, and Silent Quest focuses on combating the future OE on a strategic level, both exercises heavily emphasize CF-SOF-JIIM interdependence. During SOF theater security cooperation programs, SOF commanders could direct and build the partner nation's capability/capacity in the execution of select training activities with the country team. These activities would not only increase the SOFs' understanding of the nuanced culture of the interagency, but identify the nodes, systems, and functions that the SOF element could establish, tie into, or reinforce to create a more mutually supportive environment.

Although pre-existing relationships are important, they can sometimes be overcome by events, in which case, the unit of action reverts back to what is the most comfortable. To reduce this instinct, as suggested in MG Bennet S. Sacolick and BG Wayne W. Grigsby Jr.'s article entitled "*Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in 'Prevent, Shape, Win,'*" there needs to be an institutional approach to interdependence. In support of this assertion, it is believed that training for interdependence should start at the officer's basic and the advanced noncommissioned officer's courses. The appropriate place to "weave" interdependence training is in the mission analysis/military decisionmaking process block of training.

Further along the institutional "line of effort," select members of the JRTC host rotational after action reviews (AARs) to capture significant lessons learned and best practices with the intent to distribute the findings to CF and SOF headquarters. In the midst of several discussion points, interdependence and the ability to plan, resource, and execute more effectively and efficiently will continue to be a persistent topic of discussion in every post-rotational AAR. Support to the "campaign of learning," as mentioned above, has the potential to provide CF, SOF, and select elements within the JIIM environment with a common "point of departure" when planning, resourcing, and executing future training and real-world operations.[9]

> *The CTCs and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command is campaigning to ensure that the SOF-CF interdependence lessons learned in combat are carried forward into future training and leader development.*[10]

In an effort to provide the venue to further hone the SOF-CF interdependent lessons learned in combat, the JRTC currently replicates the OE of the future through DATEs/UW EXs. Future DATEs/UW EXs will replicate a more volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous adversary that will not only utilize the methods mentioned earlier in this article, but one that will also have a greater focus on weapons of mass destruction. Further, the JRTC will place greater emphasis on the integrated nodes, systems, and functions that facilitate interdependence. To create a more conducive environment for SOF training, the CTC is examining ways to provide increased opportunities for ARSOF surgical-strike elements, joint special operations, specialized elements, and allied special operations forces to train with ARSOF on special warfare elements. The CTCs' near-term goal is to provide a venue where joint special operations forces, in a habitual manner, look to refine specialized skills and their ability to conduct operations in a interdependent manner against a replicated hybrid threat.

The blend of a series of home station and CTC training, along with institutional opportunities and activities focused on critical factors of interdependence, is the change in mindset mandated to create the hybrid response to counter the hybrid threat. This mindset change, institutionalizing interdependence, is the manner in which CF, SOF, and elements within the JIIM environment "shapes, prevents, and wins" within the OE of the future.

> *"The world as we have created it is a process of thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking."*
>
> — Albert Einstein

Endnotes:

1. Cleveland, LTG Charles T., ARSOF 2022, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 3.

2. Training Circular 7-100, *Hybrid Threat*, October 2010, 1-1.

3. Sacolick, MG Bennet S. and BG Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., "Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in 'Prevent, Shape, Win,'" *Army*, June 2012, 39-42.

4. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-X-7, *USA Functional Concept for the 7th Warfighting Function (Draft Version 0.8)*, 14 March 2013.

5. Ibid.

6. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3.05, *Special Operations*, August 2012, 1-13.

7. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-X-7, *USA Functional Concept for the 7th Warfighting Function (Draft Version 0.8)*, 14 March 2013.

8. Sacolick, MG Bennet S. and BG Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., "Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in 'Prevent, Shape, Win,'" *Army*, June 2012, 39-42.

9. Training Circular 7-100, *Hybrid Threat*, October 2010, 1-1.

10. Barbee, COL Michael, "The CTC Program: Leading the March into the Future," *Military Review*, July-August 2013, 18.

Chapter 2

The Interdisciplinary Targeting Process

SFC Dorsal Boyer and CPT Scott Wolf, Special Operations Training Detachment, Joint Readiness Training Center

Targeting in a complex operational environment (OE), such as the one represented in unconventional warfare (UW) Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations, has distinct and unique challenges. These challenges, stemmed from diverse organizations, occupy the OE, their unique missions, and desired end states. The OE consisted of several or all of the following elements:

- Multi-echelon U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (SOF).
- U.S. Army conventional forces (CF).
- Host nation elements.
- Resistance forces (RF).
- A variety of interagency officials, such as the U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
- International organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

This conglomeration of elements creates a unique interdisciplinary environment. Although each element had its own mission, they required each unit to synchronize and nest targeting efforts to achieve the desired effects and overall mission accomplishment.

The process of targeting among various elements — not necessarily geographically accessible to one another — makes deliberate planning and synchronization essential. This requires the heavy use of liaison officers (LNOs), interdisciplinary targeting meetings and working groups, and cooperation of all units involved, particularly the commanders and decision makers from each element. Ultimately, unit commanders and decision makers must agree on desired effects and targets to accomplish their individual mission and end state. This enhances each unit's ability to leverage force multipliers and take advantage of assets that are not organic to their own organization. It also allows for deconfliction of unit-specific operations and alleviates undesired effects that might influence or impact multiple elements within the OE.

Whether conducting UW operations in a joint environment or unilateral environment, the necessity to plan for and execute an interdisciplinary targeting process is crucial. First, we will examine targeting doctrine, beginning with the U.S. Army targeting processes along with joint targeting doctrine to set the foundation of targeting. Next, we will look at the various aspects of UW Rotations 12-09, 13-01, 13-08, and 13-09. Although each rotation had some similarities, there were also many differences. Each rotation provided unique challenges for the rotational training unit. Various tactics, techniques, and procedures were also observed. Finally, we will offer some findings and recommendations based on observed successes and failures, and trends on how to increase targeting success in a UW environment.

Doctrine

Doctrine is the basis for all U.S. military operations. Doctrine is, by no means, the end-all, nor is it absolute; however, doctrine allows for a starting point, no matter how complex the environment may be. This holds especially true for targeting during UW operations in conjunction with conventional operations, such as in UW Rotation 13-01 and 13-09. The synchronization of targeting across the spectrum of organizations and agendas created unique challenges that were not necessarily discussed in doctrine. These challenges will be discussed later; however, to lay the ground work, the doctrinal targeting processes will be briefly presented first.

Within U.S. Army doctrine, there is one publication that deals specifically with targeting, which is Field Manual (FM) 3-60, *The Targeting Process*. It describes the U.S. Army targeting process and specifically focuses on the detect, deliver, decide, and assess (D3A) targeting methodology used for deliberate targeting (see Figure 2-1).



Figure 2-1

While the D3A methodology is ideal for deliberate targeting, FM 3-60 also provides an alternate methodology for dynamic targeting: find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD). F3EAD is well suited for targeting personalities and high-value individuals. F3EAD still uses D3A as a basis, but it is incorporated in the cycle at the detect function and continues all the way through to the assess function (see Figure 2-2).



Figure 2-2

Within the joint environment, Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, is the basis for targeting doctrine. One of the four principles of targeting mentioned in JP 3-60 is interdisciplinary, which is defined as "participation from all elements of the joint forces commander's staff, component commander's staff, other agencies, departments, organizations, and multinational partners." The use of interdisciplinary participation is not confined to the joint environment and actually plays a very heavy role in unilateral UW operations.

The joint targeting cycle consists of six phases: end state and commander's objectives, target development and prioritization, capabilities analysis, commander's decision and force assignment, mission planning and execution, and assessment. Within the joint targeting cycle, deliberate and dynamic targeting is conducted using the find, fix, track, target, and engage (F2T2EA) methodology. F2T2EA is conducted during the mission planning and execution phase of the joint targeting cycle (see Figure 2-3).



Figure 2-3

One critical factor of the joint targeting process is the use of center of gravity analysis during the target development and prioritization phase of the cycle. Enemy center of gravity analysis is conducted during the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and is crucial for the identification of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. These critical factors represent the fundamental basis for the joint targeting process and are essential to mission accomplishment and for achieving desired end states.

Between the two publications, the fundamentals of targeting are set within UW operations. The key is understanding the processes and having the ability to establish systems that are conducive to an interdisciplinary environment. When doing so, the targeting process allows tapping into all elements to achieve the desired goals. While this can be a tedious process, the outcomes far outweigh the difficulties that may arise from developing an interdisciplinary targeting process or system.

Previous Rotations

Over the past year, four UW rotations have been conducted at the JRTC and surrounding areas. These rotations consisted of 12-09, 13-01, 13-08, and 13-09. While each rotation focused on UW, they all had unique aspects within the scenario that caused challenges for targeting. The use of the Army's decisive action training environment (DATE) provided a common regional framework for the development and execution of the UW rotations. Although the DATE scenario

drove the development and continuity of the JRTC UW rotations, significant differences must be explored, as well as how each unit performed the targeting process.

The first significant difference was the lack of a brigade combat team (BCT) partner during Rotations 12-09 and 13-08. The lack of CF interaction served as a double-edged sword to the special operations task force (SOTF) targeting workgroups. The lack of BCT partnership lessened requirements to deconflict effects with CF partners; it also reduced access to some collection capabilities and the ability to mass fire and maneuver against the enemy. The lack of a BCT partner placed a greater requirement on the SOTF to manage reconnaissance and surveillance in the detect phase of the D3A process, as well as significantly limited the ability to leverage air and fires capabilities in the deliver phase of targeting. SOTF collection managers were forced to rely heavily on Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODAs) and RF on the ground to fill priority intelligence requirements. The SOTF, without a colocated BCT, adapted to the use of subordinate elements and nonstandard intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms better than those with colocated BCTs.

Figure 2-4. U.S. Ambassador to Gorgas discusses intent with SOF and CF commanders.

Conversely, Rotations 13-01 and 13-09 both had CF involved within the scenario. This added an additional player in an already complex environment that required both SOF and CF to work interdependently for both elements to accomplish their separate missions. The SOFs' mission was to conduct UW and counterterrorism (CT), while the CF missions were based around noncombatant evacuation operations: defend and attack. LNOs were used to deconflict operations, which benefited both SOF and CF during mutually supported operations. LNOs were

extremely important in the targeting process and allowed each element to understand the other's mission requirements and operational focus.

Another significant difference between the scenarios in 12-09/13-01 serial, and the 13-08/13-09 serial was the regional focus involved. During the 12-09/13-01 serial, the scenario focused on the trans-regional aspect of the exercise: the invasion of an ally by a near peer and the use of surrogate units within the OE. The volume and diversity of threat reporting forced the SOTF to prioritize staff efforts on CT targeting and support to Theater Special Operations Command strategic targets. During 13-01, the responsibility for tactical level targeting fell to the advanced operating bases. One advanced operating base was colocated with the BCT as the primary integrator with the BCT, while a second advanced operating base facilitated UW logistics. The SOTF intelligence sections focused primarily on large-scale threat troop movements and network targeting in support of ODAs, partnered with host nation CT forces. During the 13-08/13-09 serial, the scenario was modified to eliminate two hostile near-peer actors. The removal of one hostile country, as an aggressive threat, and the development of another country, as a proxy of a hostile nation with near-peer capabilities, allowed the SOTF staff to focus its efforts on the desired end state of the exercise, which was UW.

Findings and Recommendations

Based on the four UW rotations, there are several findings and recommendations that come from observations of each rotation that can be applied to targeting in a UW environment. The first finding was that the use of interdisciplinary practices greatly improved targeting operations throughout the entire OE. Though a tedious endeavor, SOTFs and advanced operating bases that took the time to consciously incorporate all elements into the targeting process achieved greater targeting success by conducting synchronization meetings with various elements, such as interagency, host nation leadership, RF leadership and staff, CF LNOs, and the SOTF commander and his staff. This provided a common operating picture and common intelligence picture throughout all elements and allowed for the leveraging of each element's strengths and mitigation of their weaknesses. The SOTF staff was then able to conduct a targeting process that incorporated targets that potentially affected all interdisciplinary elements, and broadened the SOTF's reach-to-action targets. Based on this finding, we recommend that an interdisciplinary targeting process should be established. This formalized process would allow for a "plug-and-play" approach to targeting, depending on which elements were present in the OE. The process would be beneficial specifically to units subordinate to a joint force commander and working outside of the joint doctrine environment.

Another finding through observation of the last four UW rotations was the lack of knowledge associated with center of gravity analysis. The use of center of gravity analysis for targeting in UW operations is crucial. The targeting process in a UW environment is based on the critical vulnerabilities that have been identified during the center of gravity analysis process. These vulnerabilities are the basis for targeting at all levels, starting at the SOTF, and down to the ODAs, and by, with, and through the RF. In conjunction with an interdisciplinary targeting process, center of gravity analysis has the ability to assist in focusing the right assets on the right targets. However, center of gravity analysis is not typically taught at the O-3 level and is primarily taught at the joint or O-4 level and higher. Because SOTF level S2s are typically captains, it is recommended that center of gravity analysis is taught at the Military Intelligence Captain's Career Course and the Noncommissioned Officer Senior Leader's Course. Additionally, an introduction to center of gravity analysis should be received at the Military Intelligence Officer's Basic Course and Noncommissioned Officer Advanced Leader's

Course. We also recommended that all SOTF-level military intelligence officers and senior noncommissioned officers attend the Unconventional Warfare Operational Design Course, conducted at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Conclusion

Whether conducting UW operations in a joint or unilateral environment, the necessity to plan and execute an interdisciplinary targeting process is crucial. While there is no doctrinal way to incorporate all interdisciplinary elements in the SOTF targeting process, the need to establish one is paramount. If used properly, an interdisciplinary targeting process can influence and affect targets far beyond the reach of a normal SOTF. The use of D3A, in conjunction with interdisciplinary partners, opens the "targeting aperture" and gives each element a greater chance of mission accomplishment and reaching the desired end state.

Chapter 3

Seven Rules for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Are You NEO Here?

LTC (Ret.) Thomas P. Odom, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Liaison Officer, Joint Readiness Training Center

Most of those in the military know, generally, what noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) means. The overwhelming majority have never participated in NEO, much less planned or executed them. The decisive action training environment (DATE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) provides an excellent vehicle for developing a broader community of NEO practitioners. A word of caution: doctrinal and government guidelines are deceptively authoritarian to the uninitiated. As a long-serving foreign area officer (FAO) and historian, I agree with my special forces cousins, that we — the U.S. government — need a mutually understood framework for NEO. I applaud the efforts to exploit interdependence; some of us that deployed in small-penny packets learned that long ago, others did not.

As an Army historian, I examined two very complex operations into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (later Zaire and now again the DRC). Both involved U.S. military forces and U.S. joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The first operation was very heavy on special operations forces (SOF) and the other on governmental agencies. Both operations involved hostage rescues, NEO, and offensive operations.[1] They would have fit nicely into a DATE scenario at the JRTC. Indeed, I have used them as DATE case studies for leader development classes.

As an Army FAO for the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, I watched or participated in emergency operations as a member of a United Nations peacekeeping organization, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and six U.S. diplomatic missions from Turkey to central Africa. As fate would have it, I served as the U.S. defense attaché in the DRC and then Rwanda from 1993 to 1996.[2] The following are some "rules" I would offer as a framework to NEO and other interagency operations. They are neither a checklist nor a standard operating procedure (there is no such thing as standard NEO). There are some common threads, that we as military leaders and planners, need to consider.

The first rule of NEO: You are doing this because things are *not* going according to plan. Plan accordingly.

Regardless of category — permissive to hostile — no one likes NEO. The host nation doesn't like seeing foreign citizens evacuate; it is bad for business. The U.S. government does not like evacuating officials, dependents, or resident U.S. citizens. U.S. ambassadors typically see NEO as a declaration of failure. A good friend of mine spent 110 days as a hostage in 1964 because his ambassador thought it was important to keep the U.S. flag flying over the U.S. consulate in Stanleyville. Combatant commanders see them as a massive headache and a tremendous drain of resources. Moreover, good NEO will never be seen as effective diplomacy. Bad NEO will be seen as a military disaster. Another good friend of mine successfully evacuated his mission personnel from Kigali, Rwanda, in 1994. Finally, the evacuees will not like NEO, even if they beg for it. In 1964, one of the U.S. hostages killed in Stanleyville was a doctor who was successfully evacuated but then returned, only to be captured. In 1994, Ms. Rosamond Carr evacuated from her highland farm where half of her staff was slaughtered; she was back in the

country within a matter of weeks. The evacuees, diplomats, and the host nation may be relieved that you are there, but this does not mean they are happy to see you. Recent DATE rotations at the JRTC resonated from that dichotomy. Rotations 13-01 and 13-09 both put U.S. consulate general security, and then NEO, as priorities. Immediate linkup and consultation in 13-09 went a long way toward setting the stage for an equally immediate NEO.

The second rule of NEO: U.S. State Department planning will make you cry.

U.S. State Department planning is big on process and guidance but very sketchy on details. Consider that the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) is a process, not an order. State Department evacuation planning is largely a process. Again, I am quite pleased that my special forces partners are trying to frame the interdependence necessary for success. But I caution the practitioner that, just like the Iraqi or Afghan cultures held pitfalls for our Western minds, so does State Department culture for the military. State Department culture and process is personality-focused. The State Department long lagged behind the rest of the U.S. government in accepting information technology. The reason was that the State Department focused on individuals instead of systems. A military commander seeks to put a thumb print on an extant, functioning organization through tweaks, like terms of reference. A country team is what the chief of mission allows it to be. No doctrine or tactics, techniques, or procedures can alter this fact. The same holds true when it comes to planning. A NEO plan is a worst case scenario; as I stated earlier, no one wants it to happen. The result is the State Department puts off NEO until it is almost (or is) too late.

Looking at history again, my friend, the consul in Stanleyville, had already told the U.S. ambassador that the consulate should have been evacuated when he and his team were all taken hostage. When that happened, the embassy itself put together an immediate rescue that had a significant chance of success. However, the chief of mission (the ambassador) refused to execute the plan.

Let me offer another snippet from 1994 Rwanda in the run up to the Genocide. The deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy Kigali, in addressing a warden community meeting, was asked about the Interahamwe (young Hutu radical militias) drilling next to the International Community School. The deputy chief of mission, who used the radio call sign “Peacemaker,” told the questioner not to worry because the Interahamwe were really like extreme Boy Scouts. Less than a month later, the Rwandan President’s plane was shot down, signaling the Interahamwe to slaughter one million people within 100 days. The embassy evacuated overland to Burundi; a U.S. Marine Corps unit was staged to assist, if necessary.

State Department reluctance is matched with a lack of authorities over U.S. citizens abroad. At no time does the U.S. government actually have the authority to force a citizen to evacuate. The doctor killed in Stanleyville went back by his own volition. Roz Carr did the same in 1994 Rwanda. The five Americans who remained behind in Beirut in the late 1980s also ignored the State Department’s warning. Form 77 is the Department of State form used for emergency evacuations as the manifest/personnel inventory running estimate. Form 77 is SWAG. It is based on voluntarily shared information and will change constantly. There are people on the Form 77 who are not in country; there are U.S. citizens in country who are *not* on the Form 77.

This is where the idea of interdependence can become a reality. We love planning and nothing makes a planner happier than using his capabilities. Even with a defense attaché or SOF component on the ground, no one will understand how best to use U.S. military capabilities to

their maximum potential, and within the boundaries set by the chief of mission. Rotation 13-09 allowed the brigade combat team to use its rotary-wing capabilities to expedite the NEO from Marghoz. Doing so required some interdependent thought and practice to accomplish this within a framework acceptable to the situation to the country team, host nation, and U.S. military. The result was successful NEO.

Figure 3-1. Air evacuation of U.S. citizens from Margoz was much faster than a ground convoy.

The third rule of NEO: Those with the most toys — YOU — are not in charge.

The U.S. ambassador, as the U.S. presidential envoy, is the chief of mission. The chief of mission authorities overrule military authorities. The country team (ambassador, deputy chief of mission, chief of station, regional security officer [RSO], consular officer, defense attaché/senior military representative, U.S. Agency for International Development director, etc.) is not a provincial reconstruction team operating in a brigade combat team's battle space. The roles are reversed.

This makes the role of the chief of mission's personality critical. A good ambassador can be a blessing. I worked with two wonderful chiefs of mission in Rwanda. A lesser chief of mission can be the proverbial toad on the road. I had one of those in the DRC. Your processes, targeting structures, and mission command parameters are all excellent; they are also yours and yours alone unless the chief of mission agrees. The chief of mission in the DRC was a strong-willed man. He was a very effective ambassador; his authority and personality, therefore, played a large role in the events of 1964, both bad and good.

I found the same was true in Zaire in 1994. My chief of mission decided early on that the events in eastern Zaire were a sideshow that would last for only two weeks. That very same sideshow is still in play 20 years later.

Again, let's go back to the initial entry of the brigade combat team in 13-09. When the brigade combat team was at the intermediate staging base, the U.S. Ambassador to Gorgas, as the regional coordinator, raised concerns about the size of the U.S. task force when compared to its initial missions. He also raised concerns about notification to Atropian authorities that had to be worked out. These concerns were entirely proper. The brigade combat team commander and his staff had to explain their mission in state-acceptable terms and had to work out a protocol for notifying the host nation. This is interdependence. The ambassador asked his questions because he knew they would come into play. Later, when discussions with the host nation grew more animated regarding a continued U.S. military presence in Margoz, the experiences from these earlier events were used to facilitate a coordinated U.S. response.

Figure 3-2. The brigade combat team commander met with the Republic of Atropia presidential envoy within eight hours of hitting the ground.

The fourth rule of NEO: The country team knows more than you do. To take advantage of that, you must understand the country team members, roles, and missions, then get close and stay close. Try speaking English. This is interdependence in practice.

Regardless of reachback, intelligence briefings, or even a psychic hotline, the country team has a better grasp on the local situation than you do. NEO is an operation. The military commander is the junior partner to the ambassador (or his representative); the operations officer shares roles with the deputy chief of mission. NEO are *not* what you just give to the "leaf eaters." The military commander and his staff must establish effective partnerships with the country team.

The defense attaché is the critical entry component for the military commander in making these introductions. The consular officer and the RSO are the drivers for NEO. The consular officer runs the warden system. The RSO runs embassy security and ties it into local security. The chief of staff and the defense attaché are key players for intelligence. The general services officer and/or administrative officer for the embassy know the local logistics. Drop the use of military jargon and speak plainly.

Historically, the evidence is plain. The U.S. mission in the DRC was the most knowledgeable on what was happening in the country. The same was true for our mission in Rwanda in 1995 and 1996 when we warned, repeatedly, that a larger war was coming, one that would consume the region.

Both Rotation 13-01 and 13-09 highlighted this reality. Successes varied across both rotational training units (RTUs). Key players on the country team saw the establishment of partial partnerships. The chief of base in the consulate tied in well with SOF and less so with the intelligence of the warfighting function across the RTUs. Civil affairs and military information support operations were absolutely phenomenal in 13-09.

Figure 3-3. State Department planning set the stage for Margoz; it was adapted through interdependence to maximize U.S. military strengths and to speed execution.

The fifth rule of NEO: Speed saves lives. What do you call NEO that take too long? A hostage rescue.

Speed is the best antidote to ease concerns under rule one. NEO at the core is an intervention. Longer interventions generate larger reactions. Get in, get the targeted populace out, and get yourself out. Your first 72 hours offers you the best window to do that. If you stay any longer, you will be there longer than you want.

I go back to the immediate rescue in the DRC in 1964; had the operation gone forward, months and several hundred lives might have been saved. Lives were saved in Kigali in 1994 when the U.S. ambassador ground-evacuated the mission staff to neighboring Burundi.

Figure 3-4. 1-505 had the Margoz mission.

The RTU in 13-09 did very well with its NEO. The initial operation at Margoz was delayed somewhat, but it still went faster than a more pedestrian ground convoy. The fact that the country team had not gathered the Margoz evacuees reduced the probability of an enemy reaction, at least until U.S. forces could arrive and secure the area. The speed of the NEO removed key targets of opportunity for the South Atropian People's Army and its partners.

The sixth rule of NEO: Simplicity speeds execution.

Mission command provides for operating under intent through disciplined initiative. Simpler missions facilitate initiative. Yes, State Department planning will make you cry; microscopic contingency planning under an MDMP is self-water boarding. Use the country team as a partner. Consider a tactical command post (TAC) setup. If it takes longer than six hours to establish, a command post is probably too complex. Use the assets in country. Cell phones, smart phones, land lines, and frequency modulation (FM) and single side band radios are faster when you are moving around or adapting to the area. Use local web networks as they apply, especially if the embassy information officers have already tapped into them.

In the operation to rescue the hostages in 1964 and evacuate other internationals, the U.S. mission in the DRC teamed directly with the rescue mission. That teamwork was instrumental in speeding the identification and extraction of civilians at risk. I led the U.S. mission to Goma in 1994 that became Operation Support Hope. My team drew on the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other embassies. We served as the ground guide and fact finders for the full-scale humanitarian effort. My tools included a cell phone with an extended power pack, a notebook, and a very savvy noncommissioned officer.

Rotation 13-09 really captured this theme. In fact, "keep it simple" was the last bullet in the commander's guidance. The air evacuation of Margoz was simpler and faster than a carefully coordinated and escorted ground convoy. The brigade combat team put a TAC in the consulate under the deputy commander to maintain interdependent mission command with the country team.

Figure 3-5. The brigade combat team completed NEO within 72 hours, allowing it to turn to other issues.

The seventh rule of NEO: Stay flexible. Adaptation beats reaction.

Expect surprise is not an oxymoron. Not expecting surprise is moronic. You can adapt if you plan to do so. If you plan to eliminate surprise, you may die planning. Medical, communications, transportation, and security are the big four considerations. Boost your medical capabilities, if at all possible, to handle trauma and other life-threatening conditions. NEO is high stress: the targeted population will have heart conditions. We talked some about communications. Try running an FM TAC for a communications rehearsal. Transportation is a function of what is available and where it is at. An expatriate group living next to a border can simply cross the border. A river may be better transport than local roads. You can boost your emergency transport fleet through judicious hot-wiring of abandoned vehicles. Security is a function of defense and speed. Move quickly and those who might react will get left behind. If you have the assets, push the evacuees out in a continuous flow. Don't wait to fill an aircraft when you can have another at will. Set a time limit for passenger wait times and stick to it. If you fill the quota faster, send them out. If you don't fill it, send out what you have. Your measure of effectiveness is moving evacuees out of country, not adding to the pool waiting to get out.

History, again, echoes loudly with this theme. I had the privilege of meeting the officers of the Belgian Paracommando Regiment. Colonel (and later Major General) Charles Laurent would have been very comfortable with the tenets of mission command in his approach to the Stanleyville rescue in 1964. Thirty years later, the same flexibility allowed us in Kigali, Rwanda, to meet the challenges as we faced them.

The same adaptability was the strength of the RTU in Rotation 13-09. Linkup happened early. The RTU and the country team met to compare issues. Margoz emerged as a discussion point that would be resolved in the next 12 hours. Meanwhile, the RTU reviewed consulate security and the evacuation coordination center with the consular officer and the RSO.

Conclusion

The critical component in NEO is intelligent teamwork across the interagency. No one has the magic answer to NEO. All partners are capable of contributing to a working solution for particular NEO. In the absence of teamwork and intelligent contribution, NEO can devolve into an interagency squabble with immediate tragic results.

Endnotes

1. Odom, Thomas P., Leavenworth Paper No. 14: *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo 1964-1964*, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988; and Thomas P. Odom. *Shaba II: The French and Belgian Military Intervention in Zaire in 1978*. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

2. Odom, Thomas P., *Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda with foreword by General (Retired) Dennis J. Reimer*, Texas A&M University Press, 2005.

Chapter 4

Special Operations Task Force 54: Conventional and Special Operations Forces Interdependence to Support the Commander

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Special Operations Training Detachment, Joint Readiness Training Center

The Joint Readiness Training Center conducted Decisive Action Training Environment Rotation 13-09 from 09-31 August 2013. For special operations forces (SOF), this was the largest unconventional warfare (UW) exercise to date. One of the primary training objectives, for both the conventional forces (CF) and SOF alike, was to facilitate interdependence among themselves, in addition to leveraging the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) capabilities.[1] While the term "interdependence" is often only discussed as an action that occurs between CF and SOF, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, *Special Operations,* states:

> "The Army must seamlessly integrate lethal and nonlethal special operations and conventional force capabilities while maintaining unique cultures and capabilities that shape the environment and enable success of the joint force in the operational environment."[2]

Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) 54 was the Army SOF representative during the 13-09 UW rotation. The SOTF was able to facilitate interdependence between the CF and brigade combat team. However, the highlight for the SOTF was its ability to establish interdependence with the Gorgas country team that consisted of the ambassador, chief of station, defense attaché, and the deputy chief of mission. The relationships facilitated the introduction of key personnel such as the Atropian Liberation Council president, Atropian Liberation Council military commander, and Republic of Atropia military and political liaison officers. These individuals were crucial to the SOTF's overall UW efforts. Countless hours of planning and discussion were required to continue the close-working relationship necessary to maximize interdependence. In addition, strong-working relationships were essential in figuring out solutions to the complex set of political and military issues. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations,* explains the complexity of the interagency by stating:

> "The interagency is not formal structure, which resides in a specific location and has its own hierarchy and resources, but a community of agencies that depends on an established process for coordinating executive branch decision-making. Each major policy issue has different sets of actors and different sets of formal and informal guidelines that govern interagency activities."[3]

Figure 4-1 provides an example of which JIIM organizations could be utilized. The amount of organizations reinforces the possibility of associated complexities.



Figure 4-1. Leveraging pre-existing relationships to facilitate rapport and interdependence.

The SOTF conducted various engagements with the country team. As discussed earlier, the country team provided valuable information and personnel to support the SOTF UW efforts throughout the rotation. The U.S. ambassador served as the overall approving authority for the SOTFs' missions and provided top cover for the SOTF. During initial meetings, the ambassador established that he would give the overall guidance and end state for the political decisions and operations that may affect the region. Another key role the ambassador held was acting as the intermediary between the SOTF and host nation government on all issues. The defense attaché was the arbitrator between the SOTF and U.S. ambassador. His purpose as the main contact for the SOTF commander was to coordinate military operations and facilitate the unconventional logistics effort through the resistance force. Experience and time in country afforded an expanded knowledge that proved valuable throughout the rotation. The chief of station was the main individual for providing operational information. He provided current intelligence on the operational environment (OE) for the SOTF. In addition, the chief of station provided manning, logistical, financial and signal intelligence, and other aptitudes in support of SOTFs' mission. The most important component of support was synchronization between the Central Intelligence Agency and SOTF operations. The chief of station also presented a strategic view of the OE to the SOTF commander.

The deputy chief of mission coordinated valuable interactions between the mission-critical host nation and U.S. officials. He also enlightened both parties by providing background information and personalities on host nation officials to U.S. officials. Additionally, the deputy chief of mission resourced points of contact within international and nongovernmental organizations to U.S. officials.

Figure 4-2. SOTF commander meets with the U.S. embassy staff and Atropian officials.

The area operations base leveraged pre-existing relationships with the resistance force to build a shared understanding of the common operating picture and common intelligence picture in Atropia and the People's Democratic Republic of Atropia. Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODAs), operating west of the zone of separation, used resistance networks to provide early warning for the airborne operation in support of the noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). In addition, the area operations base was able to utilize the ODAs, operating in a UW capacity, to leverage pre-existing relationships. The SOTF commander developed a very strong working relationship with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division (3/82) commander, Panther 6. Developing and maintaining a shared vision is a vital component to facilitating rapport and interdependence.

Leveraging JIIM Capabilities by SOF and CF During NEO, Defense, and Subsequent Interdependent Activities

SOF leveraged the JIIM capabilities through the chief of station during NEO to facilitate the common operating picture and common intelligence picture. The ambassador conducted video conferences with the 3/82 commander and his staff. Other examples of SOTF 54 and CF leveraging JIIM capabilities included the use of the defense attaché to facilitate discussion with Atropian Liberation Council commanders' resistance networks west of the zone of separation. This in turn, developed an area complex to support UW. SOTF 54 leveraged resistance information from the People's Democratic Republic of Atropia through the ODAs to facilitate operations in search of special mission units and 3/82 in the Republic of Atropia. SOTF 54 used the chief of station intelligence network to develop a shared understanding of the OE. SOTF 54 developed the nonstandard logistical lines to increase the resistance force capabilities.

SOTF facilitated daily meetings with the RF to enhance the common operating picture and to form a parallel objective. Coordinating with the Atropian Liberation Army, the commander synchronized military efforts on both sides of the zone of separation, dividing the Republic of Atropia-side of Atropia and the People's Democratic Republic of Atropia-occupied area of Atropia. Prior to the NEO, it was crucial for the brigade combat team to utilize the pre-established relationships with the country team to deconflict airspace with the defense attaché.

Figure 4-3. SOTF commander meets with Republic of Atropia officials.

Alignment between Gorgas and the Republic of Atropia, in terms of border crossings through customs checkpoints, advanced freedom of movement for the CF and SOF elements. The defense attaché assembled with the Republic of Atropia political liaison and SOTF for weapons coming from Gorgas into the Republic of Atropia. Synchronization between the consulate general and the embassy in Gorgas was primarily achieved directly via different staff sections of the SOTF (i.e., AS3, civil affairs, military information support operations, and judge advocate general).

Gaining and Maintaining a Shared Understanding of the OE and its Role and Responsibility

The SOTF gained a shared understanding with the country team, Republic of Atropia/Atropian Liberation Council officials and the Atropian Liberation Army resistance leaders. Host nation officials' biweekly meetings provided valuable intelligence and situational awareness. The RFs' daily meetings, direct coordination with the country team, and interaction with resistance leaders on a daily basis proved critical to enabling a shared understanding of the OE and its complexities. Through a developed trust and shared understanding between all stakeholders' interests, successes were achieved.

> "*Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities through unified action, and joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired military end state. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives*."[5]

Mutually Adjusting Plans/Orders to Facilitate a More Unified Effort in Achieving Goals and Objectives

As the SOTF staff received updated information, host nation capabilities, and cultural and political guidance, the SOTF quickly adjusted its plans to ensure all sides of the spectrum were taken into consideration to develop a mutually agreed-upon plan.

Systems in Place to Facilitate Information Flow between the SOTF and the Interagency

The most successful system utilized was the daily interactions with the country team. These meetings allowed the SOTF to increase situational awareness, build rapport, and improve the common operating picture and common intelligence picture across the OE. Working groups, such as the Atropian Liberation Army transition working group, the U.S. embassy transition working group, and the nonlethal working group were also key. Each one of these groups provided essential information to the commander that was necessary for making informed decisions. Joint planning groups allowed for the SOTF staff and RF staff to facilitate the expansion of the combined operating picture. One-on-one impromptu meetings, phone calls, and emails were essential for follow-up discussions and guidance. Specifically, this was true when key issues were not discussed in formal meetings.

Leveraging Combat Enablers

The 3/82 commander understood the importance of SOF interdependence and immediately established a relationship with SOTF 54. Using liaison officers planning sessions, the SOTF established a reciprocal communications bond with the CF. The SOTFs' primary enablers were the civil affairs and military information support operations representatives. The representatives from both branches contributed greatly to the overall mission. Civil affairs supported the SOTF by taking lead of the transition plan. Military information support operations developed the information operations plan. Both civil affairs and military information support operations integrated their efforts with their CF counterparts to maximize unity of effort.

Conclusion

SOF elements, leveraging all aspects of JIIM functions, became a vital tool for exchanging ideas, coordinating mission execution, and for achieving national strategic objectives. In this rotation, we saw the CF and SOF facilitating interdependence. We witnessed the consequences that SOF and CF endured due to the unfamiliar requirement to share battle space and synchronize tactical-level execution. While SOF-CF interdependence poses challenges, similarly, there exists great opportunities that will enhance the U.S. government's ability to rapidly achieve mission objectives.

Endnotes

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-X-7, *USA Functional Concept for the 7th Warfighting Function* (Draft, Vol. 0.8), March 2013. This document defines interdependence as "The deliberate and mutual reliance of one unified action partner on another's inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects."

2. Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*, 31 August 2012.

3. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, 24 June 2011.

4. Ibid.

5. Army Doctrine and Training Publications 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 16 May 2012.

Chapter 5

Effective Press Conferences: 3/82 Airborne Public Affairs During the Joint Readiness Training Center Rotation 13-09

MAJ Gabriel J. Ramirez, Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group

In preparation for assuming the duties as the global response force, paratroopers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division (3/82) and other key Army units, deployed to the fictional country of Atropia, located at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), to participate in Rotation 13-09. The 3/82 "Panthers" were the second unit from the 82nd Airborne to train at the JRTC for its global response force mission using the decisive action training environment. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne (2/82) "Falcons" executed a similar exercise nine months prior. Both units executed an airborne assault, lodgment expansion, noncombatant evacuation operations, and defense and offense.

The operations above only scratch the surface of what our forces must accomplish in today's complex and ever-changing battlefield. The inclusion of continuous media coverage is one aspect our forces must recognize and plan for in their operations. As we observed during 2/82's rotation, inform and influence activities (IIA) were vital and Rotation 13-09 was not any different. The Panthers learned lessons from the Falcons and adjusted to win the informing fight at the JRTC. This article shares public affairs observations and lessons learned specifically focused on the use of press conferences to help shape the information environment.

Public affairs practitioners have a responsibility to inform both the American public and international community about U.S. military operations and actions. "The global expanse of the information environment and technology enables news reports and analyses to rapidly influence public opinion and decisions concerning military operations."[1] Maximum disclosure with minimum delay is a good rule of thumb when asking what can and should be released. To achieve this goal, public affairs officers (PAOs) have a number of tools they can use to inform audiences. These tools include press releases, public service announcements, and press conferences.

The PAO needs to ask: Can a press release get all the information out. If the answer is no, then your organization should consider holding a press conference. Press conferences can be effective if run properly. First and foremost, a press conference must address a topic that is significant and relevant. Additionally, it must be conducted in a timely manner, as close as possible to the incident/event. If the reason for having a conference is not significant, relevant, and timely, then you are wasting your time and also that of the media. Doing so, can hurt your credibility and prevent you from getting the message out in the future.

So why hold a press conference? Simply put, they:

- Provide more information than a press release.
- Allow media to ask questions and get clarification directly from the source, if the issue is complex.
- Allow you to counter misinformation with facts.

FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY... JRTC... FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

Inside Today

Deadly Weapons in Roadways Near Marghoz ...page 3

Janan Citizens Cooperating With Soldiers...page 5

NGOs Still Assisting? ...page 7

"Even the five fingers of the hand are not alike"

Help the Environment...

Recycle your paper!!!

Weather

FRI	SAT	SUN
Cloudy	P-Cloudy	Sunny
10% Precip	10% Precip	0% Precip
High: 90 Low: 71	High: 90 Low: 72	High: 89 Low: 71

Volume 13, Issue 5 — August 23, 2013

Al Mediyah Times

An Independent View

Tensions Soar in Marghoz

The residents of Marghoz, Kirsham Province, yell at American soldiers to leave their village now.

By Reid Jones
Western International News

Recently, tensions were heightened as Marghoz villagers began protesting that the presence of the American soldiers put them at higher risk of attack by the Republic of Atropia's enemies.

The U.S. soldiers initially came to Marghoz, Kirsham Province, to provide security for the evacuation of the international contractors who worked with the BVS pipeline in the area.

After residents were targeted by local insurgents, local officials

See Tensions page 2

Figure 5-1. Al Mediyah Times

Before examining the 3/82's press conferences, we should note the unit concept for nonlethal operations during Phase II (joint forcible entry-airborne operation). The theme the unit wanted to stress was: U.S. forces partner with the Republic of Atropia to protect and defend the population. The IIA end state for this phase was:

- Population understands the purpose of U.S. presence and activities in support of its safety and security.
- Civilians do not interfere with initial entry and combat operations.

The 3/82 took lessons from the 2/82's rotation and applied them to its messaging efforts. One example of this was the extensive coordination with the U.S. embassy to approve both a press release and a radio public service announcement to inform the Atropian populace of the U.S.

presence and its activities. The Panther Brigade moved forces into the village of Marghoz to facilitate the evacuation of American citizens from the country. However, this purpose was not clearly communicated to the populace, causing many civilians to believe that their village had been invaded and the U.S. presence was placing them in great danger (see Figure 5-1).

The First Press Conference

On 23 August, after the urging of the senior official in the Atroprian Ministry of Interior, Panther 6 participated in a press conference to explain what had transpired since U.S. forces arrived in Atropia on 19 August. Roughly an hour before the press conference, COL Fenzel of Panther 6, met with the senior official in the Atropian Ministry of Interior and the U.S. consul general and the Panther PAO to go over the details of the press conference. At this meeting, the group agreed on the order of opening statements, the key message they wanted to present, and what questions they might encounter. In its opening statement, the group did not formally address the reason why U.S. forces were in Marghoz, or the preparations that were ongoing by the U.S. military to deter enemy aggression. These two questions were the second and third questions asked by reporters, and had been asked several times by various reporters in restated versions. If the group addressed these questions in the opening statements, the message could have been clearer.

Figure 5-2. The initial press conference at the provincial governor's office.

While the opening statements and question-and-answer portion of the press conference went well, there were a number of issues that detracted from the overall effect of the event. First, the location was not ideal, because there was too much noise from helicopters and passing military convoys. Second, the conference was held outdoors during the hottest time of the day. Last, the unit did not consider the use of a podium or plan on allocating an area for the media to set up

microphones. A chair was eventually used to hold microphones, but only after reporters asked if there would be a microphone stand. Even though these minor missteps seem insignificant, they can lead to missed opportunities. There are just a few moments to make lasting impressions. Preparations for the event, both the speaking and setup portions, are equally important. One of the trends we continually see at the JRTC is a lack of media briefing setup checklists and press conference format. This is really unfortunate since Army public affairs has several documents that serve as guidelines on how to perform these missions. By simply adhering to these checklists and format, many of these events could have had more informational significance.

Some items to remember when planning a press conference include:

- The topic needs to address a significant issue.
- Location of the event should be in a secure area that is as noise free as possible.
- The briefing area needs to be large enough to accommodate the anticipated audience.
- You should consider backdrop, podium, public address system, map of area, and press packets.
- Timing (must concede with the event that is about to occur/or directly after the event).
- Start the event on time.
- Sequence of events (meeting/search of media, ground rules, introduction of speaking party, questions and answer session, formal exit of speaking party followed by reporters).

MEDIA BRIEFING SET-UP CHECKLIST

Briefing Subject	Briefing Date	Briefing Time
Speaker	**Briefing Location**	

Personnel Prep	
	Speaker provided talking points and 5 good / 5 bad questions
	Speaker murder board conducted
	Facilitator selected and briefed
	Escorts selected and briefed
	Interpreters selected and briefed
	Rehearsal Conducted
Site Prep	
	Briefing area secure and separated from the BCT operations and TOC
	Briefing area separated from generators or other noise
	Briefing area large enough to accommodate anticipated audience with seating
	Adequate electrical power and outlets for video equipment
	Sufficient lighting and has it been checked/tested
	Suitable backdrop
	Are the following items on hand (as appropriate):

	Podium		Pointer
	Public address system		Computer w/ CD/DVD
	Projector screen		Proxima (projector)
	VHS player/recorder		Television monitor
	Lighting system		Visual aids
	Maps of area of operation		News releases / press packets

	Video camera or digital voice recorder to record briefing
	Event catered or refreshments provided (as per funding regulations)
Sequence Plan	
	Plan to secure media reception area
	Plan to search media as they pass through security
	Plan to escort media into briefing area
	Ground rules established by facilitator
	SMEs introduced
	Questions monitored and ground rules enforced
	Plan to escort media to reception area when briefing complete
	completed and forwarded to BCT

Figure 5-3

Refer to media briefing setup checklist from the *Army Public Affairs Handbook*, Volume 2.0 (see Figure 5-3) and news briefing and press conference format from Field Manual 3-61.1, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (see Figures 5-4 and 5-5) as references.[2]



Appendix H

BRIEFINGS AND PRESS CONFERENCE FORMATS

NEWS BRIEFING AND PRESS CONFERENCE FORMAT

Before the Presentation

Know your publics
Anticipate interests, concerns and questions
Consider the latter in preparation

Prepare your presentation
Develop a strong introduction
Develop a maximum of three key messages
Assemble your supporting data
Prepare audiovisual aids
Practice

Prepare for answering questions
Anticipate what questions will arise
Prepare answers to those questions
Practice questioning and responding

The Opening Statement

A strong opening statement sets the tone for the press conference or news briefing and is crucial in attempting to establish trust and build credibility. The elements of a strong opening are:

Introduction
A statement of personal concern
A statement of organizational commitment and intent
A statement of purpose and plan for the meeting

Key messages and supporting data
A maximum of three "take-home points"
Information to support the key messages

Conclusion
A summarizing statement

Total time for all presenters should be 15 minutes or less. Do not have too many presenters. Three is usually sufficient.

Introduction

H-1

Figure 5-4. News briefing and press conference format



FM 3-61.1

Remember that perceived empathy is a vital factor in establishing trust and building credibility and your publics assess it in the first 30 seconds.

Examples are:

Statement of personal concern: "As a resident of this community I'm interested in the safety and well-being of our families and neighborhoods."

Statement of organizational commitment and intent: " I'm here to share with you the knowledge and confidence I have in the military's ability to assist the citizens of our community. They have been trained in their occupational skill to assist with the task at hand."

Statement of purpose and plan for the presentation: Today I would like to share with you the most current information regarding the (incident.) I will also be available to answer additional questions or to continue the discussion.

Key messages and supporting data

The key messages are points you want your publics to have in their minds after the presentation. They should:

Address central issues.
Be short and concise.
Examples are:
"We have trained personnel and emergency response plans in place to aid in protecting the health, safety and welfare of the public. We are working with local and state officials to handle the incident.

"We are actively responding to the emergency...."

To develop your key messages:

Brainstorm
Think freely and jot down all pieces of information you wish to communicate.

Select key messages
Identify the most important ideas. Repeat the process until you list is down to three items.

Identify supporting data
Other information you listed probably provides support to your key messages. Organize it to reflect this.

Conclusion

Restate verbatim your key messages.

Add a future action statement --- What is your organization going to do about this problem in the short and long term?

H-2

Figure 5-5. News briefing and press conference format, continued

The Second Press Conference

The 3/82 held its second press conference on 26 August, the morning after the successful defense of the brigade combat team lodgment and the Atropian city of Dara Lam. The unit's theme during Phase IV (defense of Area of Operation Bear) was: U.S. forces partner with the Republic of Atropia to protect and defend the population. The IIA end state for this phase was: population supports U.S. activities and the Republic of Atropia authority.

Figure 5-6. The second press conference at the consulate general's office.

This press conference should have been a clear communications victory for the unit, but this was not the case. The 3/82 succeeded in highlighting partnership by having a press conference with both Atropian and U.S. forces involved in the defense of the area. However, they failed to capitalize on the success of the combined defense. Additionally, little to no hard data was given regarding the battle (enemy losses, etc.), nor did they highlight quantifiable successes resulting from the interdependence between conventional and special forces.

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Al Mediyah Times | Tuesday, August 27, 2013 | Page 4

Marghoz Chemical Plant Seized

Soldiers with the People's Democratic Army attacked and captured a chemical weapons production facility near Marghoz, Kirsham Province, on Sunday.

By Blu Davis
American Today News Services

As Atropian soldiers stood guard at a chemical plant near Marghoz, a group of militants with the People's Democratic Aarmy moved in quickly and capture the facility on Sunday.

According to a Marghoz villager, the chemical plant belongs to the Republic of Atropia.

"The American army is going to get it back eventually" she said.

A member of the PDA explained ease with which the chemical plant was taken.

"We seized it from them, " he said.

With regards to the People's Democratic Republic of Atropia government's plans for the plant, he admitted he was in the dark as the rest of his colleagues in uniform who were currently guarding the facility.

"We personally don't know," he said, adding that this decisions will be left to those in higher ranks and positions within his government and it's militant branches.

However, he emphasized that the rumors of sarin gas usage in the area was not a subject upon which he was allowed to speak.

"I can't confirm or deny any such things out here," he said.

Another soldier refused to even address the issue, citing his priority was removing those wounded among his men to safety.

A soldier with the Republic of Atropia army said his unit, whose job included guarding the chemical plant, sustained an eighty percent casualty rate, adding they lost twenty-seven soldiers in the battle.

He added the PDA contingent that attacked and captured the facility was comprised of just over thirty soldiers.

One local observer, who asked to remain nameless, noted he had seen a few barrels of sarin loaded into PDA vehicles and removed from the compound.

Seeking Refuge

By Loni Jacques
Eastern European Capital News

Residents of Dara Lam saught refuge in the town's cafe after a fierce firefight erupted between American forces and troops with the People's Democratic Republic of Atropia Sunday morning.

During the early morning hours, city security was breached, allowing insurgents access to the community and putting citizens in harm's way.

Major Egbon, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division is working with Republic of Atropian police officers to secure the citizens and assess casualties suffered by the people of Dara Lam.

"At this time, as you can see, we've secured the citizens in the cafe," said Egbon.

Egbon stated the total number of injuries could not yet be confirmed, but American medics did assist in treating injuries.

Emergency alerts were broadcast throughout the day, warning citizens of the dangers outisde and asking them to stay indoors.

Because of the rush for safety, residents were separated from their family members after the gunfire began.

Atropian government officials announced that anyone who has been separated from family members should make their way to the Dara Lam cafe, where they will be safe.

Citizens gathered in the Dara Lam cafe after a firefight broke out in the middle of the town early Sunday.

Figure 5-7. Marghoz chemical plant seized by the People's Democratic Army.

There were several factors that led to a disjointed press conference that morning. First, Panther 6 attended a meeting with U.S. Special Forces and the members of the Atropian Liberation Army. This meeting went over its scheduled timeframe and prevented the Panther PAO from conducting a detailed preparation of all members who were scheduled to speak at the conference. Shortly before the press conference, Panther 6 and the Atropian Liberation Army forces met the remainder of the group, waiting in the consulate general's office (Republic of Atropia Army representative, the senior ministry of interior official, and consulate general). The team had ten minutes to determine speaking order, themes and messages, names of everyone on the panel, and what questions they might encounter.

Several questions arose that highlighted the need for preparation and rehearsal. One question that stood out was: "In Marghoz, the People's Democratic Army seized sarin gas. What is being done about this?" The question was deferred to the ministry of interior who stated that

"No sarin had fallen into enemy hands and Marghoz was under the control of Atropian forces." This response was not correct. The People's Democratic Army had, in fact, seized sarin gas, which was confirmed by reporters who photographed the removal of the gas from the weapons of mass destruction site (see Figure 5-7). Preparation of the group could have prevented this misinformation by the panel from getting out.

Other problems with the press conference was the location change that occurred several times before the original start time. While this may not seem like a big deal, it actually is. Asking media to move repeatedly without a good explanation gives the appearance that your unit is ill-prepared and not ready to conduct a professional briefing. Last, the numerous location changes caused credential media to be searched multiple times.

Conclusion

"Commanders have the responsibility to conduct public affairs operations that inform U.S. audiences about their military operations to the fullest extent possible."[4] To perform these responsibilities, commanders must rely on their PAOs and the tools they have. These tools include press releases, public service announcements, and press conferences. Press conferences have long been used by public relations to get relevant information out to the people in a timely manner. However, successful press conferences are planned and rehearsed to get our information out to the masses. Rotational trends continue to show that units either do not have the tools/ checklists to perform press conferences, or do not understand the time necessary for PAOs to adequately prepare commanders and panel members for a press conference. Commanders must take time out of their immensely busy schedule so that they can be best prepared to win the information fight.

Endnotes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*. Department of the Army, Washington D.C. January 2013, pg. 1-2.

2. ST 45-07-01, A*rmy Public Affairs Handbook Vol. 2.0*. Army Public Affairs Center, Fort Meade, Md.. June 2009, pg. 4-6, 4-7 and FM 3-61.1, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*. Department o the Army, Washington D.C. October 2000, Annex H.

3. FM 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*. Department of the Army, Washington D.C. January 2013, pg. 1-2.

Chapter 6

A Military Information Support Task Force in an Unconventional Warfare and Decisive Action Training Environment: Military Information Support Task Force 47

MAJ Louis I. Frias and MAJ Donald Galster, Joint Readiness Training Center

The Military Information Support Task Force (MISTF), as defined in Field Manuel 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*, is a task force composed of headquarters and operational assets that assist the supported commander in developing operational and tactical military information support operations plans and other information capabilities for a theater campaign or other operations. Furthermore, the MISTF 2022 concept identifies a MISTF as a modular special operations forces (SOF) mission command structure. Mission requirements determine the composition and the assigned or attached units. This concept is part of the MISO Command Strategy 2022 and nested in the Army SOF 2022. These strategies gave the 7th Military Information Support Battalion (MISB), 4th Military Information Support Group the framework to exercise a MISTF.

Figure 6-1. MISTF 2022 Concept

The 7th MISB took on the daunting task of deploying to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as MISTF 47, an operational level headquarters that incorporated, analyzed, and displayed a common operational picture of information-related capabilities (IRC) by employing,

coordinating, and synchronizing inform and influence activities in an unconventional warfare and decisive action training environment across the spectrum of operations, from operational to tactical. During JRTC Rotation 13-09, the 7th MISB was presented with a complex environment to develop, refine, test, and validate its processes, systems, functions, and nodes. When considering the possible range of operations and the multiple organizations involved (friendly, neutral, and adversarial), this role quickly becomes a wicked undertaking.

The 7th MISB span of control stretched across three countries, and involved support to a joint special operations task force (SOTF), a SOTF, an airborne brigade combat team, U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations and sovereign countries, and a hybrid threat consisting of organized crime, a terrorist network, an insurgency, and a near-peer conventional military. MISTF 47 commander's visualization of support was based on the six principles of mission command:

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
- Create shared understanding.
- Provide a clear commander's intent.
- Exercise disciplined initiative.
- Use mission orders.
- Accept prudent risk.

MISTF 47, as outlined in the MISTF 2022 Concept, was a one-stop shop for all IRC in theater. To achieve this, the 7th MISB had to reach beyond its organic assets. In addition to the 7th MISB's MISO capabilities and its organic cultural intelligence cell, MISTF 47 had additional capabilities from the MISO tool kit and from sister services to include additional counter intelligence corps members, military deception-trained psychological operations Soldiers, combat camera, an Air Force behavioral scientist, an electronic warfare officer, fly-away broadcast system with associated personnel from John Hopkins University applied physics laboratory, Psychological Operations Print System-Light, associated personnel from 3rd MISB, two liaison officers from the 193rd Special Operations Wind, and Pennsylvania Air National Guard, home of the EC-130 Commando Solo. These capabilities were added to the MISTF 47 operational tool kit, adding to its strength as the headquarters element for theater inform and influence activities.

To prepare for its deployment to the JRTC, the MISTF 47 conducted a series of staff exercises that solidified the processes, functions, and relationships within the nucleus of the organization. The validation of its preparation was MISTF 47's support to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne (3/82) in a joint operation access exercise (JOAX) at Fort Bragg, N.C. Through this exercise, MISTF 47 was able to educate 3/82 leaders and Soldiers on IRC, which MISTF 47 brought to the fight and successfully integrated with MISO and personnel.

In addition to the staff exercises and JOAX, reserve component MISO elements, attached later to 3/82 for JRTC Rotation 13-09, were incorporated into MISTF 47's preparation. A tactical MISO detachment from the 312th Military Information Support Company, Upper Marlboro, Md., and a tactical MISO team from the 310th Military Information Support Company from Forest Park,

Ga., participated in MISTF 47's planning process. In addition to the planning process, MISTF 74 conducted a series of briefings to the 312th Military Information Support Company, and provided MISO-specific equipment to supplement the 312th tactical MISO detachment to ensure MISO capabilities were pushed to the lowest elements possible to support the 3/82. MISTF 47 also incorporated a tactical MISO detachment and four tactical MISO teams from the 9th MISB, and 8th Military Information Support Group. These elements assisted in synchronizing and nesting MISTF 47's campaign plan with tactical MISO emanating from SOTF 54. MISTF 47 successfully prepared for an early integration with conventional force and other SOF elements in JRTC Rotation 13-09; its greatest success was yet to come.

To continue this shared understanding and facilitate synchronization of all IRCs, MISTF 47 shared its campaign plan with the 3/82, SOTF 54, and the joint SOTF commander, via special operations planning liaison elements (SOPLEs). These liaison elements, coined by MISTF 47, were under the operational control of the 3/82, SOTF 54, and joint SOTF commander. They were integrated as early as the Leaders Training Program for the brigade combat team and final planning conference for SOTF 54. This ensured that MISTF 47's campaign plan was synchronized from the start of the brigade combat team and SOTF planning process. The SOPLEs also ensured that the IRCs, now organic to the MISTF, were available to planners during the planning process to fill gaps in the brigade combat team and SOTF capabilities. This facilitated interoperability. The SOPLEs were MISTF 47's greatest success at the JRTC Rotation 13-09.



Figure 6-2. MISTF 47 campaign plan showing the lines of effort to meet their objectives and achieve theater special operations command end state.

The SOPLE, as a new concept, was a success that proved its worth in synchronizing, coordinating, and facilitating interoperability between SOF, conventional forces, and interagency during JRTC Rotation 13-09. The SOPLE concept encompassed more than what is described as traditional liaison duties in Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1, *Commanders and Staff Officer Guide*. ATTP 5-0.1 defines liaison activities as the ability to augment the commander's ability to synchronize and focus combat power. Liaison activities ensure:

- Cooperation and understanding among commanders and staffs of different headquarters.
- Coordination on tactical matters to achieve unity of effort.
- Synchronization of lethal and nonlethal operations.
- Understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized results.

A SOPLE is a hybrid of a special operations liaison element and special operations command and control element as outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations*. They were the focal point for the synchronization, coordination, and deconfliction, and integration focal point for all IRCs between MISTF 47 and the brigade combat team, SOTF, joint SOTF, and the interagency. These elements improved the flow of information, facilitated planning, and enhanced mission accomplishment through interoperability.

Each SOPLE was comprised of a company command team (commander and first sergeant) who were organic to 7th MISB. The MISTF 47 commander chose these Soldiers because they were already a cohesive team that understood the commander's vision and intent. These SOPLEs were trusted agents of the commander and were able to speak on behalf of the MISTF commander and MISTF capabilities when it came to planning operations. The SOPLEs were able to conduct the following at all levels, in addition to the roles and responsibilities of ATTP 5-0.1:

- Share and nominate MISTF 47 targets during targeting meetings at all echelons.
- Participate during mission analysis, identify and integrate MISTF 47 assets.
- Synchronize, coordinate, and deconflict with their perspective units and MISTF 47.

MISTF 47 had a unique role in coordinating, synchronizing, and deconflicting IRCs emanating from two SOF elements: one conventional force element and interagency in two simultaneous efforts encompassing unconventional warfare and the DATE. The SOPLE was the key element that combined these efforts and ensured interoperability when it was most needed and effective.

The biggest challenge for MISTF 47 was solidifying its role as the synchronizing and coordinating element for all IRCs within theater. Although the SOPLEs were a great success in synchronizing and coordinating efforts, there was still a gap in authority. This gap led to a dilemma on whether or not MISTF 47 should be the overall product approval authority of all MISO products, or allow current doctrine to sub-delegate the authority down to specific commands (division, brigade, joint SOTF, and SOTF). If MISTF 47 was to be the sole synchronizer and coordinator of all MISO, then approval authority of all inform and influence

activities residing at MISTF 47 would create a unity of effort and eliminate message fratricide within the theater. However, if MISTF 47 was to be the sole product approval authority, then the supported elements would lack speed in the approval process that is critical in a challenging asymmetrical environment. By sub-delegating the product approval authority to a lower command, the speed and agility of the process is maintained and synchronization is left up to the commander's discretion.

Figure 6-3. MISO coordination meeting with MIST-Atropia, the 3/82 SOPLEs and information operations officer, 312th Tactical MISO Detachment and Tactical MISO Detachment 9D30 (-).

The dilemma that faced MISTF 47 was identifying an approval process that would have the correct balance of due diligence and responsiveness of MISO with the associated environment. Field Manual 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations*, states, "Key to a streamlined approval process is the early development and staffing of a product approval process by the MISO staff planners. Supported commanders at all echelons determine their specified approval process. MISO staff planners and supporting MISO unit commanders must advise the supported commander to achieve the most effective means to secure rapid approvals while exercising due diligence. A lengthy and convoluted approval process, involving multiple staff sections, creates a drawn-out succession of unnecessary reviewers and leads to less responsive MISO."

Adding to the complexity of the approval process for MISTF 47, 3/82, and SOTF 54, was the addition of ambassadorial approval. The MISTF and SOTF, operating in Gorgas, and the 3/82 in Atropia, had to submit their programs, series, and products for review and approval within the

respective U.S. embassy and U.S. consulate. The product approval process for 3/82 was from the tactical MISO teams to the tactical MISO detachment, then from the tactical MISO detachment through the brigade combat team to the 21st Infantry Division for approval, and lastly to the U.S. consulate for final approval. The MISTF's role in the approval process only materialized if a concept of operations dealt with leveraging MISTF 47 assets (print, video, broadcast, internet activities, or electronic warfare). This was the only time the MISTF had direct control of synchronization of IRCs.

The MISTF was not utilized to its fullest potential as a robust SOF mission command structure, as identified in JP 3-05, *Special Operations*; specifically, "The ability of SOF to operate unilaterally, independently as part of the overall plan, or in support of a conventional commander requires a robust C2 structure for integration and coordination of the SOF effort. Successful special operations require centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2 through an appropriate SOF C2 element." Without the ability to control synchronization through the approval process, MISTF 47 was left to rely on synchronization between MISTF 47, the joint SOTF commander, SOTF 54, and 3/82 through a campaign plan, lines of effort, MISO planners, liaison officers, and commander-to-commander relationships. MISO, as a special operations core activity, begs the discussion of a centralized SOF mission command structure for all MISOs.

The participation of the MISTF in a JRTC rotation is a giant leap from what the JRTC has seen from the MISO community in past years. The MISO regiment has taken great strides to view and apply the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the role of a psychological operations task force and an information operation task force to the MISTF 2022 Concept. The MISO regiment is redefining MISO in a post OIF and OEF environment and in support of the MISO Command Strategy 2022 and the Army Special Operations Forces 2022 Vision.

Chapter 7

Special Operations Task Force 54: Creating a Mutually Supportive Effort Through Mission Command

**MSG Weyer, Special Operations Training Detachment,
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"Military operations are human endeavors. They are contests of wills characterized by continuous and mutual adaptation by all participants. Army forces conduct operations in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments."[1] Such is the nature of operations according to Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) replicates that reality with the decisive action training environment's (DATE's) most recent Rotation, 13-09, from 09-31 August 2013.

During 13-09, Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) 54 established an operating base in the country of Gorgas from where it planned, prepared, and supported the onward movement of one Operational Detachment-Bravo (ODB) and one Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) to conduct foreign internal defense in the Republic of Atropia, and two ODAs to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) in the denied area of the People's Democratic Republic of Atropia (PDRA). It was also from this location that they would plan for and support the brigade combat team's mission to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) upon its introduction into the area of operation.

> *"The concept of mission command traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik, which roughly translates to mission-type tactics. Auftragstaktik held all German commissioned and noncommissioned officers duty-bound to do whatever the situation required, as they personally saw it. Understanding and achieving the broader purpose of a task was the central idea behind this style of command. Commanders expected subordinates to act when opportunities arose."*[2]

Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust

The establishment of trusted relationships is inherent to all special operations forces (SOF) operations. In this DATE rotation, these relationships were with the interagency, host nation counter-terrorism (CT) force, conventional forces (CF), and resistance forces (RF). Early in the planning and preparation phases of the operation, the SOTF proactively established and diligently maintained a transparent and constructive working relationship with the Gorgas country team. To accomplish this, the SOTF commander and key staff/enablers met frequently with the ambassador, defense attaché, and chief of station to discuss intentions.

Demonstrating an understanding of the interagency environment will literally open doors to meeting goals and objectives. Failure to understand this same environment can nail these same doors shut. The efforts of the SOTF must be in concert with those of the country team. Recognizing this, SOTF 54 was able to quickly move beyond simple concurrence for the conduct of operations, to gaining tangible support in the form of workgroups and allocation of embassy staff energy. This trust relationship carried over to the U.S. consulate general in the Republic of Atropia, which benefited both the ODB upon its initial linkup and the brigade combat team

upon its introduction into the area of operation. Because most embassies are fairly unfamiliar with the specifics of military operations, the introduction of a brigade combat team, compounded with pending NEO, is an emotional event. The relationship established by the SOTF early on, set the conditions for a more accepting country team. Likewise, the trust relationship that was established with the RF leadership by the SOTF, enabled the brigade combat team to gain the support of key personalities to minimize the impact of a forced entry on the local population. Once trust was established between the SOTF and the brigade combat team, it flowed between the brigade combat team and the ODB. Even after the brigade combat team was colocated with the ODB in the Republic of Atropia, the brigade combat team continued to synchronize efforts through the SOTF in Gorgas.

Figure 7-1. SOTF and brigade combat team commanders meet with Atropian counterpart.

Create Shared Understanding

Very early in the initial phases of planning, the brigade combat team and SOTF exchanged liaison officers (LNOs). To facilitate information flow, the mutual adjustment of plans and orders, and to gain and maintain a shared vision, the SOTF provided five LNOs to the brigade combat team headquarters. Once in the Republic of Atropia, these LNOs worked in shifts to maintain situational understanding and to provide informed advice to the brigade combat team commander and his staff. As the brigade combat team operational tempo increased, the brigade combat team and commander had less time to share ideas and plans and the LNOs grew in importance. The same was apparent from the perspective of the SOTF, considering that its assigned LNO became the single most dependable point of sharing information and perspectives, questioning

assumptions, and exchanging ideas. The headquarters regularly exchanged situation reports and intelligence summaries to facilitate a common approach to the problem-set and to maintain a shared understanding and purpose. At the advanced operating base, the initial plan was to establish a joint tactical operations center to facilitate advanced operating base/CF/RF planning and meetings. However, this never materialized due to the constant movement of the brigade combat team tactical operations center. To establish a reliable form of communications during movements and operations, the advanced operating base trained and aided the brigade combat team in single channel/cipher text; a different technique than the frequency hopping that the CF uses. This benefited both units because SOF crossed brigade combat team tactical boundaries.

Provide a Clear Commander's Intent

The importance of the commander's intent cannot be overstated in UW. Unlike named operations that we have become accustomed to over the past decade, the UW environment does not enable commanders and subordinates the luxury of having real time push-to-talk capability to issue guidance and receive feedback. In UW, SOF rely on communications windows to exchange information. Constrained by the capabilities of the denied area government or occupying power, these communications windows may be limited to one hour per week, where only data in text format can be exchanged. In this environment, commanders have to rely primarily on their subordinates' thorough understanding of intent to reach the desired end state. Understanding of the commander's intent also applies to unified action partners, as it did for the ODAs conducting UW in the PDRA. As the brigade combat team prepared for the defense, the UW ODAs were to receive conventional attachments to attrit the enemy armor capabilities. Leaders soon realized that this was not a realistic task for an ODA. Instead, given the defensive plan and brigade combat team commander's intent, the ODAs devised their own plans. The ODAs sabotaged infrastructure to channel enemy forces into an appropriate defensive plan. They further provided critical reconnaissance that could not have been acquired by technical means.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative

No commander can be in every location at every meeting to make every decision that has an impact on the operation. Reality dictates that the commander delegates tasks and responsibilities to his staff or subordinate commanders and delegates efforts or responsibilities. Both the brigade combat team and SOTF commanders realized very early that the interagency environment alone required a large part of their time, an already limited resource. Such situations require that subordinates exercise disciplined initiative. It is through disciplined initiative that subordinates create opportunities, develop situations, and take action to maintain the initiative. In the UW environment, this most commonly becomes a battle fought at the ODB and ODA levels when dealing with RF. In an effort to achieve the end state, an ODA must guide, through education of desired legitimacy, a relatively untrained and, in some cases, undisciplined RF. It is through leveraging of United States support that the ODA and ODB educates the RF Soldiers and leadership as to the proper conduct of warfare, especially in an environment where sabotage and subversion may seem like a grey area. The ODBs and ODAs in this DATE rotation demonstrated a thorough understanding of this concept. This understanding set the conditions for a less-complicated transition phase where individuals were identified to assume positions of government, security, or professional occupations.

Use Mission Orders

Due to early coordination between the SOTF and brigade combat team, the SOTF commander was able to determine how to best support the brigade combat team's NEO. Though its respective missions were unrelated and may have been executed unilaterally with success, SOF had access to information that the brigade combat team did not, and the brigade combat team had fires and maneuver capabilities that far exceeded that of the SOTF. This early recognition and maximum use of interdependence allowed commanders to issue directives to subordinates to support the efforts of the unified partner force preemptively. This gave subordinates the opportunity to attain intended results, allowing them to determine how to best achieve them.

Accept Prudent Risk

At the onset of the exercise, one of the ODAs conducted foreign internal defense with the CT force as part of security cooperation. Even after conditions changed, due to the invasion of the PDRA into the Republic of Atropia, the CT ODA remained colocated with the CT force. Remaining separate from the ODB, or brigade combat team, meant the CT force had to focus primarily on force protection, and, therefore, reduced its potential effectiveness as a CT force. In addition, its force protection created an additional requirement to allocate additional forces to supplement its security. As fate would have it, the ODB had civil affairs and military information support operations teams at its location, unable to infiltrate into the UW ODA locations because enemy patrols and checkpoints denied the ODB's ability to utilize the auxiliary. The combination of these two factors reduced the SOTF's ability to access vulnerable civilian populations and garner additional support for the cause, as well as limited the effectiveness of the SOTF's surgical strike capability.

Conclusion

The principles of mission command, examined above, illustrate why mission command is essential to mission success. "To implement mission command successfully, a shared understanding of the environment, problem, and strategic intent must exist with echelons above and below. Shared understanding ensures purpose is linked to intent."[3]

Endnotes

1. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command.* 17 MAY 2012, pg iv.

2. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*. 17 MAY 2012, (p.v).

3. Dempsey, GEN Martin E. "The Facets of Mission Command," *Mission Command, Army,* JAN 2011, pg 43, 44.

Chapter 8

The Joint Readiness Training Center's Role in Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: The Army Special Operations Forces Implementation, Assessment, and Feedback Cycle of Unconventional Warfare Doctrine at the Joint Readiness Training Center

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The U.S. military defines doctrine as the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.[1] As members of a combat training center, joint readiness training planners develop each scenario and associated problem-sets to facilitate the application of current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) within a doctrinal frame in order to tackle a complex environment and ultimately achieve tactical and operational success.

Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military. It helps standardize operations, facilitating readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. Doctrine provides the military with an authoritative body of statements on how military forces conduct operations and provides a common lexicon for use by military planners and leaders.

Current Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) doctrine defines unconventional warfare (UW) in concept, by defining the characteristics of the UW environment and the principles of UW operations, but it does not define how to implement this doctrine in the infinite operational environments (OEs) where UW operations could occur. Just as current UW doctrine has been revised to maintain relevant capabilities, the implementation of UW TTP through experimentation and practice at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) must be tested and assessed under a wide variety of OEs. If these TTP succeed in accomplishing missions while maintaining the principle of UW doctrine, they are shared to educate the ARSOF community. Likewise, if TTP fail, new TTP must be developed, tested, and shared.



Figure 8-1. Sources of UW doctrine

Implementation of Doctrine at the JRTC

The JRTC conducts rigorous, relevant, and realistic training by providing an environment that allows participating rotational training units (RTUs) a place to validate brigade and below, or, in the case of special operations forces (SOF), battalion and below, core mission-essential task list or directed mission-essential task list collective tasks. In order to meet this objective, the JRTC takes a structured approach. This process, discussed below, provides an overview to the SOF community on how to achieve a scenario that allows units to conduct doctrinally-based training. The end state of this process is what we refer to as "implementing doctrine."

The process begins with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC). The Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD) and Special Operations Forces-Plans (SOF-Plans) take their training guidance from these two commands. Guidance comes from a one-on-one discussion between senior leaders and staff, video teleconferences, emails, and both informal and formal visits. This is a continuous process that occurs at the general officer level and down through subordinates. This training guidance is then presented to the JRTC operations group as a whole, which conducts the same process with U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). It is at this level that both FORSCOM and USASOC guidance is synchronized to meet the Chief of Staff of the Army's training objectives for the JRTC.

After a unit is identified to attend training at the JRTC, based on USASFC training objectives, a general environment is presented to the RTU. During this initial planning, the RTU is presented with collective tasks the JRTC can support. It is incumbent at this meeting for both parties to understand four essential points:

- First is the USASFC guidance for the particular rotation.
- Second is what the JRTC can support.
- Third is the RTU commander's training objectives.
- Fourth is the doctrinal framework for the mission.

Over the past decade, the JRTC focused on replicating Iraq and Afghanistan. As we move forward, the decisive action training environment (DATE), based on the Caucasus region, has become the standard for preparing forces for future conflicts. Although a Caucasus-based map is used, the historical base products for the DATE allow the JRTC to modify the required political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure variables to meet training objectives.

Following the initial meeting with the RTU, the SOTD and SOF-Plans begin development following a standard military decisionmaking process (MDMP). During the MDMP, developing a scenario that provides a realistic environment to facilitate doctrinally correct training is a priority. This requires extensive research that often includes reaching out beyond the JRTC. Courses of action are developed and presented to the USASOC, USASFC, and the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) on a routine basis to provide quality control. This also goes beyond the Army community. The Air Force and U.S. government interagency partners are brought into the process as subject matter experts. Once this is completed, the rotational design becomes a truly collaborative effort. With dozens of units, each with its own unique training objectives and specific doctrine, a scenario must be developed that allows for each unit to achieve its training goals and objectives.

The next step of the process is to develop the inner workings of the scenario. Specific problem sets and events, based on the principles of joint and UW doctrine, are created, resourced, and deconflicted to provide a day-to-day training environment for the RTU. The JRTC is an interactive training environment. Although we can and have developed situational training exercises, the DATE is a continuous force-on-force event. This is a time-consuming process that requires constant scrutiny and oversight to ensure the RTUs are presented with problems that allow for doctrinally based solutions and forcing functions so that the RTUs will apply specific TTP. Considering the latitude and complexity of a UW environment, this at times, can be a daunting task. In order to achieve success in this complex UW environment, we fall back to doctrinal references as our guide.

The JRTC provides world-class after action reviews (AARs) to the RTUs. To achieve this, Soldiers must be observed, coached, and trained and leaders must use structured materials for reference. In the past, the Army Training and Evaluation Program was the governing tool to assess whether or not an RTU achieved a "go" or no-go" at the JRTC. The use, or lack of use, of the Army Training and Evaluation Program system has many merits and drawbacks, which is not part of this discussion; however, it does have relevance. In order to provide consistent and quantifiable feedback to the RTU and SOF community, a common point of reference is required. During the development of the scenario, collective tasks of battalion, company, and Operational

Detachment-Alpha are identified. Research is conducted to determine what references are available to successfully observe, coach, and train. Where collective tasks are not available or are out of date, SOF at the JRTC develop required "performance" measures. These performance measures are critical to the scenario development process. No matter how well a scenario is designed, it must provide the RTU with opportunities to conduct doctrinally based collective tasks that meet commanders' training objectives.

The last step is synchronization. As stated before, developing the JRTC scenario is a collaborative effort between competing interests. As with all missions with multiple lines of effort, what may be seamless can often diverge. Communication is the key to achieving synchronization. The RTU, JRTC, and higher commands must maintain open lines of communication during the entire development process. Personal viewpoints and experiences will always play a role in development of any training event. However, developing a doctrinally based scenario will provide the RTU with an environment where it can solve problems utilizing doctrinally based solutions. Applying doctrinally based solutions to complex problems achieves the end state of implementing doctrine.

Assessment of Unconventional Warfare Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

In the past, the JRTC relied on Army Training and Evaluation Program mission training plans as a means to identify and validate the individual and collective tasks that were required to correctly implement the principles of doctrine. As the Army transitioned from Army Training and Evaluation Program/mission training plans to the Combined Arms Training Strategy, SOF at the JRTC and the SWCS saw that specific UW individual and collective tasks had been lost and "performance measures" were needed to validate the effectiveness of UW TTP that supported doctrine.

In the summer of 2013, key members of the Special Forces Doctrine Proponent of the SWCS, responsible for the revisions to UW doctrine, met with SOF planners and observer/coach trainers to provide analysis, feedback, and performance-measure development based on the principles of UW doctrine published in Training Circular 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*. A considerable amount of time was spent analyzing the principle of UW doctrine in each phase by special forces elements from the battalion or special operations task force level, the advanced operating base, and SFODAs to develop a usable list of individual and collective tasks or performance measures. These measures could be used to assess the effectiveness of UW TTP utilized by each element and can be used as a means of capturing trends for further analysis. The development of a comprehensive task list, that supports the principles of UW doctrine, is an ongoing project and will need to encompass the other elements of the ARSOF community and joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational elements that are inherent to the UW environment.

Following a rotation, the SOTD provides analysis and identifies trends from each rotational unit. This data is compiled from multiple sources to include the collection of observations by the observer/coach trainers, as well as observations and feedback from key personnel and role players. All the data compiled is analyzed and organized in a manner that provides a clearer, more thorough understanding of the RTU's performance using the developed performance measures as a guide for successful implementation of doctrine.



Figure 8-2

Feedback to the Force

An important part of the JRTC process is to provide feedback to the SOF community. SOF rotations at the JRTC typically number six to seven rotations per year. Quantifiable feedback is paramount to achieving home-station training success and in preparing units slated for the JRTC to fully utilize the training opportunity.

The first critical piece in providing feedback to the force is delivering it directly to the RTU. Although observer/coach training is a continuous process, there are two forms of AARs at the JRTC. The first form is what we refer to as a "green book" AAR. Although many see this as an informal AAR, it is not. The location of this AAR may be in the field, but the preparation and emphasis placed on this AAR is anything but informal. The second form is the final AAR. All SOF units — from detachment on up — receive a final AAR. Typically, company level and below AARs are formatted the same as green books, while the battalion and company leadership AARs are what one would expect to be "formal." The AARs are held a day or so after exercise termination, which allows RTU leaders and staff the time to de-stress and focus on lessons learned. The AAR is two-fold. Although the purpose is to look at the RTU and not "sharp shoot" the scenario, RTU problems and trends are identified. These trends are used by the SOTD and SOF-Plans for further development of the scenario at the JRTC to provide specific opportunities that address unit inefficiencies. The JRTC does not currently provide unit assessments to USASFC, USASOC, or SWCS; however, the JRTC does provide general trends in the force when inefficiencies are identified across multiple units.

As we begin the transformation into ARSOF 2022, it will be paramount to share lessons learned among the entire force. To this end, SOF at the JRTC will be returning to an old process that is updated to modern systems. One avenue is through the Center for Army Lessons Learned, which has a mission to "rapidly collect, analyze, disseminate, and archive observations, insights, and lessons, TTP, and operational records in order to facilitate rapid adaptation initiatives and conduct focused knowledge sharing and transfer that informs the Army and enables operationally based decision making, integration, and innovation throughout the Army and within the joint interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment." Utilizing this medium will not only translate to an increase in SOF performance, but will also allow them to achieve a greater understanding across joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational forces that is key for proper utilization of special warfare and strike capabilities.

Another avenue for providing feedback is an annual USASOC combat training center conference. The first conference was recently held at Fort Bragg to discuss the JRTC's recent rotations and the way ahead. The purpose of the conference was to maintain open communications between the force and the JRTC to meet standing and emerging USASOC training guidance. The ultimate premise of the event was that the JRTC does not have all the answers and good training at a combat training center is a collaborative effort. This event provided a four-day format, allowing personnel from the USASOC, USASFC, SWCS, JRTC, special forces groups, military information support operations, and civil affairs to discuss how to best implement doctrinally based scenarios at the JRTC and how to meet the USASOC commander's training guidance.

The last effort to facilitate feedback is the continued publication of professional papers and development of a SOF-only portal to distribute lessons learned. This will be a continuous process that, in order to be successful, will require broader participation from the SOF community. Lessons learned during deployments and home-station training are just as important to the JRTC experience as publications posted by the JRTC personnel. Having a continuous and circular feedback structure will be the key to success for SOFs' future.

Conclusion

A continuous implementation, assessment, and feedback cycle informs doctrine and performance measure publication, which in turn will shape future exercise design and execution at combat training centers. The relationships between the planners (SOF-Plans), the assessors (SOTD), and the doctrine (SWCS) needs to be a persistent relationship in order to refine SOF UW TTP as new technologies emerge and new potential UW environments are presented. The JRTC provides a unique laboratory to test and validate doctrine, TTP, and assessment measures. This continuous process is directed to best enhance SOF/conventional forces/joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational forces interdependence through holistic training.

Endnote

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 08 November 2010.

Chapter 9

Leveraging Interagency Interdependence at the Tactical Level

MAJ Michael Loveall, Brigade Mission Command, Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group

As our Army prepares for future operations, spanning the range of unified land operations (ULO), we must train and prepare to leverage all possible assets both within and outside of our formations, especially the capabilities resident within the joint, interagency, international, and multinational partners, to include unified action partners (UAPs), nongovernmental organizations, and interagency partners.[1] Tactical commanders at all levels, specifically at battalion and brigade levels, must utilize and leverage the capabilities represented by different U.S. governmental partners and nongovernmental organizations that constitute the "interagency" and "international" pieces of joint, interagency, international, and multinational partners that function in their operational environments. This is in fact, a central informing tenet of ULO: synchronizing and coordinating the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.[2] Leveraging our interagency and UAPs is not only a good idea, but it is a foundational aspect of our current Army doctrine. In future operational environments, tactical-level commanders must be able to leverage our interagency and UAPs and their inherent capabilities, or even better, we leverage our own formations and abilities.

During Rotation 13-09 at the Joint Readiness Training Center in August 2013, the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (3/82), the Panther Brigade, executed a decisive action training environment rotation, the second such rotation in the past year. One of the many unique challenges facing the Panther Brigade during this training event was a robust presence of interagency capabilities and how best to leverage them at the tactical level to accomplish the assigned missions. The rotation ably replicated the critical interaction between an airborne brigade combat team and key interagency and nongovernmental organizations, and UAPs in a contested environment, similar to an environment necessitating a global response force (GRF) employment. This training allowed us to extrapolate several key observations and lessons learned.

Upon notification of deployment as the Army's GRF, the Panther Brigade conducted an airborne assault into the Kirsham Province in the nation of Atropia. The considerations of the applicable rules of engagement, United Nations (UN), and other bilateral and multilateral agreements, and the status of Atropia as a sovereign nation, added to the geopolitical complexity for the 3/82. While Atropia was a U.S. ally, the operational environment was uncertain due to the near-peer, Ariana-backed People's Democratic Army's (PDA's) occupation of the western half of Kirsham Province and a PDA-sponsored insurgency, the South Atropian People's Army, in the eastern half.[3] A poorly enforced UN-mandated zone of separation divided the province. Several transnational terrorist, or criminal organizations, operated in the eastern half of the province as well. The brigade did have the capabilities of a U.S. consulate in the provincial capital of Dara Lam, led by a consulate general who was the senior U.S. official in the province. The rotational design was important because it exercised systems and processes that the unit was likely to encounter on a GRF deployment, such as Syria, Mali, Yemen, and Sudan, which are some of the possibilities for future deployments of the GRF.

The 3/82 executed a highly successful training event and learned many key lessons. Many of these critical lessons learned centered on the benefits, difficulties, and missed opportunities of working interdependently with the interagency and UAPs during the rotation. This codification of lessons learned was informed during the rotation by the emerging concept of interdependence. The concept of interdependence focuses on leveraging the inherent capabilities of unified partners to create complementary and reinforcing effects that assist each partner in accomplishing the mission.[4] While much of the discussion about interdependence has focused on the relationship between special operations forces and conventional forces, the concept also applies to the interaction between conventional forces and the interagency partners. This concept is highlighted by COL Bill Benson in an article from *Military Review*:

> "The tasks associated with stability operations were not new to the Army; but the belief that stability operations could be 'as important as — or more important than — offensive and defensive operations' was. The belief that these operations were not only the responsibility of specialized forces but also of general-purpose forces at every echelon was also new."[5]

This idea of interagency interdependence is the prism by which the Panther Brigade approached its interaction with the interagency and UAPs during the conduct of its recent rotation.

Interagency Interdependence: Inherent Capabilities and Complementary Effects

There are numerous challenges when conducting effective interdependence operations. Task saturation, personality differences, differences in missions, and regulatory and statutory requirements are some of these challenges. The biggest challenges facing an effective implementation of interdependence, as observed at the Joint Readiness Training Center, is the unique nature of the joint, interagency, international, and multinational partners and an interagency environment. In the end, interagency interdependence is almost exclusively in the human domain. Interdependence must rest on a flat platform of equal partners cooperating with each other, rather than a regimented command structure. Leaders at the tactical level are much more comfortable applying munitions and men against a tactical problem than they are leveraging personality and persuasion. Even with these environmental and institutional challenges, there is a great deal of benefit from addressing and working through these challenges.

Understanding the Operational Environment

Understanding the operational environment (OE) is the foundation for successful execution of the operations process. All three of the Army's planning methodologies — troop leading procedures, the military decisionmaking process, and design — are predicated upon a comprehensive understanding of the OE. The Panther Brigade had to prepare for its deployment to Atropia on a very tight timeline from mission notification to mission execution, typical for a GRF employment. This is the first example of where interagency interdependence yielded tactical benefits. The brigade staff, primarily through the civil affairs (CA) company commander, who was also serving as the brigade combat team S9 and the brigade combat team S7, established communication and built relationships with several members of the country team in advance of its mission. The consulate's country team was very familiar with the area, having served in the consulate from anywhere between six months to two years. It is self-evident that the consulate country team, having years of experience in the area and within the OE, can assist

any unit with refining its understanding of the OE. In this example, the unique and in-depth understanding of the OE was the interagency team's inherent capability.

Figure 9-1. Panther 6 LTC J.C. White arrived at the U.S. Consulate General within an hour of the drop.

The brigade staff leveraged this familiarity to gain critical insight on some specific aspects of the OE, including attitudes of the populace, capabilities of the host nation government and its governing officials, competency of the host nation security forces that provided consulate security, current messaging efforts, and a refined understanding of the geopolitical situation in the province and region. The brigade staff also used this opportunity to learn about the local leaders, specifically the power brokers resident within the province. This relationship-building with the country team prior to its employment (both at home station following issuance of the warning order and at the intermediate staging base) helped the unit to refine its understanding of the OE. Following the inherent capability addressed above, the complementary effect is clearly a refined understanding of the operational environment. The unit has a better understanding of what it faces and the consulate staff understands what the immediate future holds.

Additionally, the unit, through special operations forces channels, sent its CA officer (S9) into theater 24 hours prior to its deployment to set conditions for its first mission — noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) — to extract American citizens from the provincial capital. The NEO mission was an overwhelming success due to the communication with the country team prior to the deployment. The unit had a general idea of the number and disposition of American citizens and understood the intent of Dara Lam's consulate general and the consulate's systems and processes. The unit also had all the appropriate paperwork and support material ready when it arrived in Dara Lam. The CA company commander/S9 was also able to help set the conditions for successful initial meetings between the key leaders of the interagency team and

the key leaders from the brigade. These initial meetings are often cited by senior Department of State and other interagency personnel as critical to relationship building, particularly in a time-sensitive environment, such as the one faced by the 3/82 in Kirsham Province. While the inherent capabilities remain the same, the complementary effect here is a common understanding of each partner's interests and goals, truly an example of unity of effort.

Even with these successes, the Panther Brigade did miss some opportunities with regards to refining its picture of the OE before deployment. Other members of the brigade staff did not reach out to country team members or request liaison authority from the division headquarters. From an intelligence perspective, the brigade intelligence section would have benefitted from the regional security officer's perspective on the threat in and near the capital, on the potential drop zone, and throughout the province. The brigade would have also benefitted from intelligence from the chief of base. The intelligence provided by the chief of base is more strategically oriented, but it, nonetheless, would have helped develop an understanding of the strategic context in which the brigade was operating. The unit, and more specifically the brigade commander, did conduct several meetings with the special operations forces task force and embassy personnel colocated at the intermediate staging base. The commander did exchange valuable intelligence with these sources to help refine his understanding.[6]

Also, the brigade staff did not effectively share information from the country team across the staff. This is less an indictment of the unit and more of an observation on the systems and processes used in planning at the intermediate staging base. There was no formal mechanism in the Panther planning process to provide assessments into its plans. Units must remember that even while they are in the "plan" or "prepare" phase of the operations process, other U.S. government partners have been in the "execute" phase for days, months, or years and will likely have an ample amount of assessments to feed the planning process. These assessments include near real-time assessments. The staff missed an opportunity to use already established interagency tools, such as the District Stability Framework, to accomplish the integration of interagency knowledge into the planning process. The commander and select staff participated in a video teleconference with the Dara Lam consulate team on D-2. The results of this video teleconference were not distributed across the staff and did not inform any running estimate or change any intelligence product. These are specific indicators that communications and hard work of the staff were not shared or leveraged across all warfighting functions.

Building Relationships, The Decisive Effort

Figure 9-2. Panther 6 COL Fenzel established and sustained relationships.

The foundation of successful interagency interdependence operations is relationship building. As previously stated, this is usually the most difficult aspect for tactical leaders, not because tactical leaders do not have the personality or the ability, but because of demands on time, mission considerations, and an unfamiliarity with the interagency environment. The 3/82 was able to quickly develop a very effective relationship with the interagency team due to several critical actions. First, it conducted effective predeployment communications at the commander (video teleconference) and staff levels. Second, the brigade immediately colocated its nonlethal staff elements at the consulate, including the brigade combat team S7, public affairs officer, CA company, and military information support to operations detachment.

There was also a clear command emphasis on interagency interdependence. For the first two phases of the operation, the deputy brigade commander, or a maneuver battalion commander, also had daily interaction with the consulate staff. The brigade commander made multiple stops daily to the consulate and host nation government officials during the first two phases of the operation. The brigade commander made it clear throughout his formation that the consul general was the senior American in the province and even brought him into the brigade main command post. During the defense, and at the approval of the consul general, the brigade moved its tactical command post into the consulate building to better facilitate interagency interdependence. This decision came with risks; not every consul general would allow this. Nonetheless, with the enemy's lack of adherence to the law-of-land warfare, diplomatic status, and imminent attack, the decision proved to be sound and effective. Every morning, during the consulate's daily emergency action committee meeting, the unit would provide an operational and intelligence update to the consul general. The Department of State was also focusing on interagency

interdependence; the Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) discussed in depth, the primacy of ambassadors and chiefs of missions, the State Department's role in conflict prevention and resolution, and working with interagency partners to include Department of Defense entities.[7] The Department of State's QDDR and other foundational documents ought to be mandatory reading for tactical level commanders in the new OE. This hourly contact between both Panther staff and consulate staff and Panther leaders and consulate leaders — and the understanding of each other's missions and culture — was an excellent example of U.S. government unity of effort that exemplified what interagency interdependence should look like.

Without question, the most important inherent capability resident within our Department of State interagency partners is their relationship with key leaders and influencers. Specifically, from this training event, the relationship between the consul general and the two key Atropian officials was instrumental to the Panther's mission accomplishment. The governor of Kirsham Province was the key local leader who had a significant impact on the local populace and understood the nuances of the province. The deputy minister of the ministry of interior — who also happened to be the president's cousin — was the president's special envoy to Kirsham Province and exercised practically unchecked power within the province. It is important to note that our Atropian allies are a nondemocratic nation with an authoritarian regime. The consul general had a very good relationship with both of these key leaders and was asked early on by the brigade commander to facilitate his rapport-building and serve as a link between U.S. forces and the key Atropians. This was clearly beneficial on several occasions.

First, in the two blue-on-green instances, the immediate phone calls from the brigade combat team commander to both the governor and the deputy ministry of interior representative, helped set the conditions for effective consequence management and prevented a schism between host nation leaders, the populace, and the U.S. forces. Second, the brigade combat team commander's incorporation of the provincial governor and deputy ministry of interior representative into his media events and key leader engagements were quite effective in his messaging campaign. This incorporation showed a united effort that rebuffed the enemy's messaging campaign, which showed the U.S. forces as invaders and reckless imperialists. Lastly, this relationship helped the brigade combat team commander communicate with both leaders to develop his understanding and to gain both provincial and national level support for his mission and objectives. The commander was also able to leverage this relationship during transition planning near the end of the unit's mission. As the brigade left theater, there were initial plans — not developed but being worked by brigade combat team staff, interagency staff, and host nation officials — addressing the transition from offensive operations to stability operations. The complementary effect of having host nation leaders, interagency leaders, and the brigade combat team all in agreement with each other is the essence of unity of effort and was the single most important contributor to successful interagency interdependence for the Panther Brigade.

Connections to Nongovernmental Organizations

A second example of how the Panther Brigade leveraged the interagency to facilitate a relationship and shape operations was its interaction with and leveraging of nongovernmental organizations within the OE. Operating with and building relationships with nongovernmental organizations is an excellent example of shaping operations that enabled the brigade's decisive operation. The brigade conducted four basic missions during the rotation in accordance with the decisive action training environment execution of ULO: airborne assault and expand the lodgment, NEO and stability operations, defense, and offense. The brigade was not tasked to

conduct humanitarian assistance or handle internally displaced persons. However, the OE did present the unit with a population that had numerous internally displaced persons — up to an estimated 10,000 within the province — and a population that was in need of some basic sustenance and provisions.

Figure 9-3. The brigade combat team integrated its staff with the interagency community.

The brigade empowered its nonlethal team at the consulate, headed in this effort by the CA company commander, to work with and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations and control the internally-displaced persons situation through the nongovernmental organizations to the extent possible without disrupting decisive operations. The nonlethal team worked with the consulate's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in Dara Lam and with the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) at the U.S. Embassy-Gorgas to coordinate relief supplies and programs that would help with movement and control of the internally displaced persons. The brigade resourced transportation for many of the internally displaced persons to extant UN camps so that they were out of harm's way when fighting started. It also coordinated between the consulate, U.S. Agency for International Development, OFDA, and the division for U.S. Air Force flights to bring in UN and nongovernmental organization-resourced supplies. Lastly, the brigade leveraged the consulate staff and its established relationships with the nongovernmental organizations in the area to create a seamless effort without putting the nongovernmental organizations or their work at risk. These nongovernmental organizations, also referred to "implementing partners," were not accountable to the interagency and only work together as a coalition of the willing.

While these were missions that did not receive much attention, they significantly shaped the human environment and facilitated maneuver and messaging for the decisive operations. There are many examples of inherent capabilities here. The leveraging of the Department of State/U.S.

Agency for International Development implementing partners, OFDA resources and funding sources, OTI programs setting conditions for transition, and the pre-existing relationship between the Department of State personnel and the nongovernmental organizations on the ground are the three critical capabilities that the 3/82 leveraged to create the effect of a placated and largely pacified civilian population.

Assisting in Austere Environments

Another central tenet of the future operational force and the anticipated OE is the expeditionary nature of operations. Brigade combat teams have become the basic units of employment and will most likely continue to be in the future. Battalions and below do not have the sustainment capability to be independently employed. Divisions and above have too large of a footprint to make their deployments palatable to allies unless absolutely required; additionally, the brigade combat team, with its robust mission command architecture, can command forces over large areas in today's OE, further making deployment of a division headquarters unnecessary. Even with the sustainment capability of the brigade combat team, the austere nature of possible GRF employment scenarios show that the interagency partnership can also assist brigades as they assume their missions.

One key example of this during Rotation 13-09 was with communications. The Panther Brigade established a tactical command post colocated with the consulate in Dara Lam. However, it was not able to properly resource the required communications infrastructure to make the tactical command post fully functional. The unit missed two opportunities. First, the consulate had both secure and nonsecure lines of communication that the tactical command post could have utilized to facilitate mission command operations. With a chief of base assigned to the consulate, there would certainly be a robust communications architecture for the transmission of classified and unclassified information. The consulate staff reminded it of this capability in several of the morning meetings.

Second, the consulate office had a military advisory and assistance team that also had a communications infrastructure, albeit a less robust communications platform than the consulate. Also, the unit did not take advantage of this capability. Not reflected in the rotational scenario, but to be considered, is the fact that a consulate or unified partners would have existing contracts for supplies, materials, and sustenance already in place and could assist the newly-arriving unit in developing these expeditionary-type sustainment functions. Units operating in future operating environments should be prepared to piggyback off of interagency and unified partners' existing logistical and sustainment capabilities to ease the burden of expeditionary deployment and austere environments.

The inherent capabilities and complementary effects examined above show the true benefits of interagency interdependence: relationships and rapport-building, refining our understanding of the OE, and leveraging the existing U.S. government knowledge and systems in an austere environment. It also shows, for the benefit of our Army, common difficulties, areas where we continue to miss opportunities, and areas of improvement.

Training and Preparing for Interagency Interdependence: A Paradigm Shift?

How do tactical leaders at the battalion and brigade level prepare themselves and their units to operate with the interagency so that they can leverage interagency interdependence? As with much of the analysis of interagency interdependence and operations in the joint, interagency, international, and multinational environment, there are no clear answers to this question.

One recommendation is a concerted unit-level education program. The emphasis on a U.S. government unity of effort and interagency interdependence is just underway in our generating force and our professional military education system. It will take several years — a generation maybe — for this concept to become part of our professional ethos if we leave it to the schools. An effort to establish a leader of professional development and professional reading program will help alleviate the general unfamiliarity of these concepts. Additionally, commanders should consider the changing nature of the contemporary OE and incorporate joint, interagency, international, and multinational considerations and interagency interdependence into training events down to and including battalion level collective training events, with particular emphasis on staff exercises and command post exercises. Commanders need to seek out training that prepares their units for interagency interdependence, such as the interagency training conducted at the Joint Maneuver Training Center at Camp Atterbury, Ind., and the Department of State training courses, and should also become familiar with the Department of State foundational documents, such as the Department of State QDDR.[8] This individual and professional development effort, coupled with training events, will help our senior company grade officer and junior field grade officers — and noncommissioned officer counterparts — better prepare for interacting with the joint, interagency, international, and multinational environment in the future. At the very least, our leaders and Soldiers must understand the dynamics that they are likely to face on the future battlefield with respect to how U.S. government partners and forces interact and support each others' missions.

Broadening experience assignments is another way to improve the unit's ability to conduct interagency interdependence. Commanders and assignment officers need to consider moving officers and noncommissioned officers with unique assignments back into a maneuver unit. Augmenting a GRF or deploying unit with a quality FA59 strategic planner, FA48 foreign area officer, foreign service officer, or political advisor from a parent division staff would greatly enhance the unit's ability to understand the strategic context and interagency culture. Strategic career officers should also be selected for resident senior service college and fellowships. There is no reason a colonel or lieutenant colonel former defense attaché cannot be a deputy brigade commander if interagency interdependence is critical to a unit's mission. Additionally, an increased emphasis on broadening assignments and interagency fellowships/experiences is required throughout the force and should be a consideration in promotion and key-billet boards. The former recommendations can be implemented rather quickly but the latter recommendations would likely require a paradigm shift within our Army.

The last recommendation that addresses training challenges is leveraging local partners. In most Army communities, there is a willing and robust civilian infrastructure that supports our Army and its families every day. These interagency tasks and effects can be easily replicated and trained by civilians who possess expertise that many Army trainers do not. Local government officials, college staffs and professors, local media outlets, and local business leaders can be a valuable training asset for commanders that seek them out and leverage their unique perspective. There are several companies that specialize in training strategic tasks and effects and interagency operations. While the challenge of money and time are still present with these agencies, the

training they provide is invaluable and is not readily available in our formations. Brigades can also contact other agencies within the U.S. government to see what assistance they can provide and can coordinate mutually beneficial training opportunities with other federal or state governmental agencies.

Conclusion: Interdependence is Good For Everyone!

The inherent capabilities and complementary effects examined above illustrate why interagency interdependence is critical to our formations as we prepare for the next mission, whether a GRF employment, deployment of a regionally-aligned force, or a deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The benefits of interagency interdependence are even more critical in an era of fiscal austerity and shrinking force structure; we must be able to leverage our interagency and UAPs and their inherent capabilities, or better, leverage our formations and our abilities. The cultures of the interagency and U.S. forces may be different, but we are all charged with advancing the foreign policy of the United States and protecting our national interests abroad. With a mandate so important and fundamental to the security of our nation and critical to mission accomplishment in future operational environments, it is a clear imperative that we continue to better understand, execute, and leverage interagency interdependence at the tactical level of command.

Endnotes

1. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 16 May 2012, pp. 1-3. ADRP 3-0 defines UAPs as: military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.

2. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 10 October 2011, pp. iii. See also U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 535-3-1, pp. 8-12 for a discussion on the doctrinal underpinnings regarding the complexities of the future operational environment.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 15 August 2012, pp. 323. JP 1-02 defines three types of environments: permissive, uncertain or hostile. Uncertain environment is defined as an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.

4. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-X-7, *USA Functional Concept for the 7th Warfighting Function (Draft, V 0.8)*, March 2013. This document defines interdependence as: The deliberate and mutual reliance of one UAP on another's inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects.

5. Benson, Bill. Unified Land Operations: "The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century," *Military Review*, March/April 2012, pp. 8.

6. Embassy personnel colocated at the intermediate staging base were personnel of the U.S. Embassy Gorgas and had only been in charge of the Dara Lam Consulate for a few weeks since the shut-down of the U.S. Embassy in Baku, Atropia.

7. Department of State. *The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power*, 2010. Pages 29-35 and Chapter 4 (121-153) focus on interagency operations from a Department of State perspective.

8. For more information on training opportunities at Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training Center, see http://www.campatterbury.in.ng.mil.

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