PACIFIC PATHWAYS 15-03

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
Pacific Pathways 15-03
Initial Impressions Report

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Pacific Pathways 15-03 Initial Impressions Report

Center For Army Lessons Learned

CALL Director	COL Paul P. Reese
CALL Lead Analyst	Richard B. Averna
CALL Operations Officer	CPT Michael W. Nolan
CALL Analysts	Bruce D. Adams
	John B. Crafton
	Jeffery S. King

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Executive Summary

(U) This initial impressions report (IIR), the third and final in a series, focuses on the third operational phase of Pacific Pathways, 15-03, which consisted of the following exercises: Khaan Quest in Mongolia as Phase 1, Orient Shield in Japan as Phase 2, and a warfighter exercise (WfX) followed by Hoguk in Korea as Phase 3. Unlike the first two Pacific Pathways in 2015, Pacific Pathways 15-03 had a two-month gap between Phase 1 and Phase 2. Although this gap did not have a significant impact on how the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1SBCT), 25th Infantry Division (25ID) (1/25 SBCT) conducted the exercises, it illustrated the differences among each of the Pacific Pathways. The overall operational design did not follow a rigid pattern, but reflected the intent and end state of the United States Army, Pacific Command (USARPAC) commander's vision in the region.

(U) Following this final Pacific Pathways IIR, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) will publish the Pacific Pathways 15 Newsletter. That newsletter — with the cooperation of USARPAC, I Corps, 25ID, and United States Army Alaska (USARAK) — will contain key leader interviews, first-person, Pacific Pathways-specific articles; positive outcomes; and observations. This collaboration will create a shared understanding of Pacific Pathways, facilitate planning development of future Pacific Pathways, and inform Army leaders at large.

(U) As Pacific Pathways 15 ended and 16 began, this method of Army engagement in the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) continued to mature toward operationalizing the USARPAC exercise program. During USARPAC's annual coordination conference that brought together key planners, significant efforts and progress were made in defining roles and responsibilities in the operational design and logistical support of future Pacific Pathways up to 2019. Significant to the discussion and remaining challenges were funding sources and a mechanism for future Pacific Pathways. The original idea that Pacific Pathways is a more effective way of engaging the Pacific theater has been codified by the Army. It is how the Army will operate in the Pacific for years to come.

Regionally aligned forces are now routinely in motion in the Pacific. USARPAC is gaining a strategic edge toward assuring commitment and capability to U.S. partners and allies. For example, although units from the 1SBCT participated in the 10th iteration of the Khaan Quest exercise, its cavalry squadron was the first U.S. unit to participate in the Hoguk exercise. During Pacific Pathways 16-02, the U.S., with the participation of the Philippine Army, will position a mission command node forward in the Philippines for an extended period of time. These activities may seem trivial, but they illustrate the growing confidence U.S. allies and partners have in the U.S. Army's renewed commitment demonstrated in the Pacific Pathways exercises.

(U) One of the positive outcomes of Pacific Pathways is that it provides readiness in the areas of rehearsals, repetition, reconnaissance, and relationships. Pacific Pathways builds unit readiness at the operational level, and not necessarily in the traditional sense of unit assessments from a combat training center (CTC) rotation. Conducting multiple iterations of mission command planning; sea and airport mobility; employing units and equipment in and out of multiple countries; gaining detailed understanding of Pacific theater time, space, and terrain; and working with diverse partner nations result in operational-level readiness that cannot be gained during CTC rotations.

(U) Although the Pacific Pathways concept is still evolving, it has provided those leaders and Soldiers involved at all echelons and warfighting functions the ability to *rehearse* the required deployment activities of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) *repetitively* over a 90-day period, while dealing with the fog and friction of real time and space in the Pacific AOR. For example, during Pacific Pathways 15-03, 1SBCT (an element of the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command [ESC]); mission command elements of I Corps; USARAK; United States Army, Japan (USARJ); and Eighth United States Army (8th Army) conducted strategic sea and air lift activities from Alaska to Hawaii into Mongolia, Japan, and Korea at least six times in support of Pacific Pathways. In addition, as units were employed in theater, leaders and Soldiers gained an understanding of the operational environment, seaports, airports, host-nation roads and rail networks, nuances of different types of terrain, and the extended distances and time zones in the Pacific. In essence, units conducted a constant *reconnaissance* of the Pacific. This level of readiness cannot be replicated in a single CTC deployment.

(U) Finally, the fostering of *relationships* and continued interactions with host-nation militaries facilitated access into and out of the sub-regions of the AOR through possible status-of-forces agreements that the U.S. may not have had before. When Pacific Pathways is viewed as a means to rehearse, conduct reconnaissance, build relationships, and repetitively stress warfighting systems across all echelons, the U.S. Army gains the ability to truly operate in the Pacific AOR.

Pacific Pathways 15-03 Concept

(U) Figure 1 depicts the Pacific Pathways 15-03 scheme of maneuver concept. Figure 1 is followed by the USARPAC, I Corps, and USARAK commanders' purpose, methods, and end state; a description of mission command; and a brief summary of the Pacific Pathways 15-03 exercises.


Figure 1. Pacific Pathways 15-03 scheme of maneuver concept

United States Army, Pacific Command

(U) **Purpose**. The purpose of Pacific Pathways operations is to strengthen relationships with allies and partners, build a broader set of readiness outcomes for all participating forces, and provide crisis response options to the combatant commander.

(U) **Methods**

- Continue the enduring development of relationships with U.S. allies and partner nations.

- Establish a tailored force that meets exercise requirements to achieve specific theater effects.

- Foster a climate of regional interoperability and cultural understanding.

- Sustain U.S. forces' high readiness level through exercises.

- Advance expeditionary ethos and experience within theater joint land component forces.

- Include United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and globally managed Army total force and joint forces.

- Support USARPAC theater campaign plan, creating a joint and/or service-specific presence.

(U) **End State**. USARPAC advanced USPACOM theater security cooperation objectives while validating elements of the U.S. Army operating concept. In the end, Pacific Pathways operations demonstrated U.S. commitment to the region and improve partner-nation interoperability while enhancing U.S. readiness. Moreover, Pacific Pathways operations provided an option for USPACOM response to unforeseen contingencies.

I Corps

(U) **Purpose**. The purpose of Pacific Pathways operations is to build readiness from tactical through theater levels with ally and partner U.S. Army forces in support of theater security cooperation objectives while maintaining operational flexibility in the Pacific.

(U) **Methods**

- Deploy expeditionary adaptive, responsive, and scalable task forces.

- Each Pacific Pathways operation serves as a platform for the following:
  - Rehearsing tactical-to-theater operations (U.S., bilateral, and multinational)

- ○ Reconnoitering operational support locations within the Pacific

- ○ Building technical and human interoperability (army-to-army, joint, and U.S. government)

- ○ Strengthening army-to-army, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational relationships in the Pacific

- Inculcate a deployment mind-set, build agile training plans, and remain flexible to ensure successful accomplishment of training objectives.

- Leverage expeditionary mission command, Army Forces (ARFOR) transition, collective training events, and live-fire exercises to build readiness.

- Leverage bilateral and multilateral training events to build army-to-army interoperability.

- Capture lessons learned, capability gaps, and interoperability challenges.

(U) **End State**. Trained and regionally tested forces ensure U.S. Army operational agility within the USPACOM AOR. These forces also are prepared to respond globally. U.S. Army Forces increase response options within the Pacific by increasing fight-and-win capabilities with allies and partners. Pacific Pathways operations support set-the-theater objectives in an expeditionary fashion without increasing permanently assigned forces to the USPACOM AOR.

United States Army Alaska

(U) **Purpose**. USARAK conducted expeditionary unified land operations training in the USPACOM AOR during Pacific Pathways 15-03 from 01 JUN 2015 to 03 NOV 2015 in order to strengthen relationships with regional allies and partners, and to increase the readiness of U.S. Army forces.

(U) **Methods**

- Provide forces necessary to conduct Pacific Pathways operations.

- Integrate into coalition organizations to conduct joint and multinational operations and exercises.

- Identify and manage mission command transitions.

- Redeploy forces to home station.

(U) **End State**. Pacific Pathways 15-03 increased interoperability with host-nation partner forces by increasing military-to-military partnership capability and capacity. Each task force was directly engaged with its regionally aligned AOR mission sets, able to deploy and conduct onward movement, trained in unified land operations and knowledgeable of regional armies and multinational capabilities of U.S. partners and allies in the Indo-Asian Pacific Region. The end-state conditions for this operation were increased operational readiness of USARAK and partner-nation land forces, improved allied and partner-nation military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, clear demonstration of the unwavering support to U.S. partners and allies in the USPACOM AOR, and successful integration and recovery of Army forces at home station.

Mission Command

(U) USARPAC, the Army Service component command to USPACOM, provided overall command. I Corps was the supported command and provided mission command. USARAK, USARJ, and 8th Army were assigned to USARPAC. However, USARPAC designated these headquarters as supporting commands to I Corps, facilitating unity of command for the duration of Pacific Pathways 15-03. USARAK was I Corps' main effort throughout Pacific Pathways 15-03 (02 SEP-30 OCT) and provided the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT)(-), 25ID, and other enablers required to support all phases of the exercise.

(U) Mission command for Pacific Pathways 15-03 (see Figure 2) differed from previous Pacific Pathways because 25ID was not the ARFOR. USARAK served as the ARFOR for the Pacific Pathways task force during Khaan Quest in Mongolia. Upon completion of Khaan Quest, there was a two-month gap before USARAK transitioned mission command and ARFOR responsibility to USARJ for Orient Shield from 02-20 SEP 2015. Upon completion of Orient Shield, USARJ transitioned mission command to 8th Army in Korea on 30 SEP 2015. Upon completion of Hoguk, 8th Army transitioned mission command back to USARAK for redeployment to home station.

(U) Finally, the 593rd ESC, as a supporting effort, assisted with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); liaison; and sustainment as required through the overall Pacific sustainment enterprise for Khaan Quest and Orient Shield. The 19th ESC conducted RSOI on the Korean Peninsula (2ID WfX and Hoguk) and assumed overall sustainment from 30 SEP-30 OCT 2015.

Figure 2. Pacific Pathways 15-03 mission command structure

Khaan Quest

(U) Khaan Quest is a multinational exercise hosted annually by the Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) (see Figure 3). Khaan Quest 15 was the latest in a continuing series of exercises designed to promote regional peace and security. Pacific Pathways 15-03 marked the 13th anniversary of this training exercise. The Torch Party of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (3/21 IN) deployed on 12 JUL 2015, followed by the advanced echelon (ADVON) on 15 JUL and the main body on 18 JUL. Strategic airlift was the main deployment method.

(U) Khaan Quest 15 consisted of a command post exercise (CPX) and field training exercise (FTX) at the Five Hills Training Area in Mongolia (see Figure 4). This was a CTC mission rehearsal, validation exercise for the MAF infantry battalion prior to deploying in support of a humanitarian mission. Both the CPX and FTX focused on peacekeeping and stability operations. The Mongolian, U.S., and multinational forces worked to enhance regional interoperability and mission effectiveness and developed common tactics, techniques, and procedures. Soldiers from 3/21 IN taught classes on the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to the MAF in order to prepare them for the CPX. The FTX was a series of situation training exercises centered on peacekeeping tasks at the company level.

(U) Soldiers of 3/21 IN(-) redeployed back to thier home station, closing on 01 JUL. Unlike Pacific Pathways 15-01 and 15-02, 15-03 had a two-month break between the first phase and the second phase in Japan.


Figure 3. Task organization of Khaan Quest

Figure 4. Khaan Quest training area

Orient Shield

(U) Orient Shield is an annual, bilateral brigade and regimental tactical field training exercise with Japan (see Figure 5). On 23 JUL 2015, 1/25 SBCT(-) loaded equipment for sealift to Japan with brief stops and an upload in California and Hawaii. The boat arrived in Japan and mission command transitioned to USARJ on 26 AUG. RSOI was conducted with the simultaneous deployment of 1/25 SBCT by air, followed by the Torch Party on 24 AUG, the ADVON on 28-29 AUG, and the main body on 1-2 SEP. The BCT moved to the Ojajihara training area in northern Japan (see Figure 6). From 4-20 SEP, 1SBCT(-) and Task Force (TF) Blackhawk (5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment [5/1 CAV]) conducted integrated training with the 44th Infantry Regiment (a Japanese defense force), which focused on platoon force-on-force training. The BCT leaders focused on advanced military-to-military engagements. The Japanese military counterparts focused on sharing U.S. mission command and capabilities to gain an understating of multinational interoperability. As early as 16 SEP, elements of the 1/25 SBCT staff began their transition to Korea in preparation for the 2ID WfX and Phase 3 of Pacific Pathways 15-03.


Figure 5. Task organization for Orient Shield

Figure 6. Orient Shield training area

2nd Infantry Division Warfighter Exercise and Hoguk

(U) Hoguk is the South Korean military's annual maneuver exercise involving all branches of its military (see Figure 7). As part of Pacific Pathways 2015, the U.S. Army was invited to participate in the Hoguk exercise where the 1/25 SBCT provided 5/1 CAV(-) as the main U.S. participating force.

(U) On 21 SEP 2015, the 1/25 SBCT ADVON deployed, beginning its transition from Japan to Korea. On 24-25 SEP, the main body arrived, followed by the vessel arriving at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) on the 28 SEP. RSOI was conducted on the 29 SEP and mission command transitioned from USARJ to 8th Army. From 1-9 OCT 2015, the BCT staff, as a subordinate element of 2ID, conducted a WfX to validate its concept of operations plan and increase its response to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. With specific staff planning tasks being used to increase proficiency in the synchronization of fires, reconnaissance, protection, and security operations in support of simultaneous combined arms maneuver and wide area security, there was an increase in synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects to maximize combat power across all warfighting functions in decisive action missions. During this period, 5/1 CAV(-) conducted maneuver and live-fire training at the Rodriguez Range Complex, allowing it to conduct gunnery for one troop and some of the BCT's

artillery batteries. On 13 OCT, the 1/25 SBCT main body redeployed and on 15 OCT, 5/1 CAV(-) transitioned to participate in Hoguk 15, conducting integrated maneuver training with the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) (see Figure 8). As part of ROKA, 5/1 CAV(-) conducted a multinational FTX designed to advance combined interoperability and greater tactical capability in a multinational environment. On 30 OCT, Hoguk maneuvers ended and from 1-6 NOV, the squadron redeployed to its home station. Mission command transitioned from 8th Army back to USARAK. On 20 NOV, the vessel returned to Alaska.


Figure 7. Task organization for 2ID WfX and Hoguk

Figure 8. The 2ID WfX and Hoguk training area

Chapter 1

Mission Command

(U) **Overview**. Pacific Pathways 15-03 provided significant opportunities for U.S. forces to plan, prepare, and execute mission command with a variety of allies, multinational partners, doctrine, and planning processes. This mission command military-to-military engagement helped increase understanding of how U.S. forces can interoperate in the Pacific theater. In addition, the communications networks in support of Pacific Pathways 15-03 provided an opportunity to integrate communications capabilities in support of multinational operations. These communications networks also provided an excellent tool for mission command readiness. Further, planning and preparations inherent in staff support to mission command were exercised in military-to-military planning conferences and practices during actual deployment with command post integration and staff-to-staff coordination.

Khaan Quest

(U) **Observation: Multi-Echelon Training Concept**

(U) **Discussion**. During the planning conferences, the main priority of the Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) was to add a brigade staff to the training audience. This brigade staff was a notable addition to the traditional three- to four-battalion training audience. The command post exercise (CPX) planning team devoted a significant amount of work to accommodate this new training, which focused on training MAF brigade commands and staff that would later deploy to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). During the execution phase, only two MAF staff members were assigned to the brigade, neither of whom were intended to deploy to UNMISS, leaving significant gaps in the manning scheme.

(U) **Recommendation**. Verify the intended training audience with MAF at the final planning conference and adjust the plan to fit battalion- or brigade-level training.

(U) **Observation: CPX Network**

(U) **Discussion**. The CPX had a hard-wired network that required 18 hours of set-up and configuration. A wireless network would have taken less time to set up, be more cost effective for shipping equipment, and allow the staff for communications (G-6) the flexibility to reconfigure and move workstations quickly. A wireless network can be separated from the unsecure WiFi that was used at the Five Hills Training Area.

(U) **Recommendation**. Contract the Mission Training Complex-Hawaii to provide a secure wireless network for the CPX.

(U) **Observation: International CPX Joint Manning Document**

(U) **Discussion**. Upon arrival to the CPX, several participants were unaware of which positions they would be filling, delaying the start of the exercise.

(U) **Recommendation**. Establish better coordination with international participants prior to execution of the exercise, therefore allowing the exercise to start sooner. Ensure the Joint Manning Document from the final planning conference is disseminated to all participating countries. Ensure all participants are given contact information and other relevant information prior to arrival.

(U) **Observation: Predeployment Training and Engagement Preparation**

(U) **Discussion**. The CPX required participants to conduct the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Many participants did not know what was required of their assigned staff positions. When the CPX started after academic week, several participants at all levels had little knowledge and experience with the MDMP. These issues made it difficult for staff sections to process master scenario events list (MSEL) injects and conduct mission analysis.

(U) **Recommendation**. When conducting brigade-level MDMP exercises such as the CPX, participants must be trained in at least the rudimentary aspects of the MDMP process. Reduce the amount of in-depth academics and include MDMP classes.

(U) **Observation: Predeployment Training During Academic Week**

(U) **Discussion**. Academic week was filled with in-depth instruction on country culture and language. The level and subject matter of the classes did not pertain to the mission, which was to train the MDMP during the CPX to the Mongolian army. There was not enough time spent learning about the roles and responsibilities related to the CPX.

(U) **Recommendation**. In future exercises, conduct training on duties and responsibilities where the U.S. will be in a teacher, coach, and mentor role.

(U) **Observation: MDMP Training and Observer Coach/Trainer Team**

(U) **Discussion**. Since 2012, various methods have been employed to provide additional MDMP-focused training to the MAF. Doing so would significantly enhance training that can afford the MAF with extra understanding and time required to learn Western models of deliberate decision-making.

(U) **Recommendation**. Sustain MDMP-focused training, followed by direct coaching during the staff CPX. 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment did an excellent job, as have previous training support units.

(U) **Observation: Multinational Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Participation**

(U) **Discussion**. Many foreign armies greatly differed in the use of an NCO Corps. The U.S. military relies heavily on a well-trained and integrated NCO Corps. During the CPX, there was a lack of international NCOs in the staff levels. The CPX was a great opportunity to train NCOs. However, due to the absence of international NCO participation, this opportunity was lost.

(U) **Recommendation**. Expectations of the training objectives and end states must be identified, discussed, and agreed on during the initial planning conference. During planning for the next Khaan Quest, NCO participation and staff training should be one of the objectives.

(U) **Observation: CPX Participant Expectations**

(U) **Discussion**. Participants did not have a clear understanding of daily operations or supplies and equipment needed for the CPX.

(U) **Recommendation**. Provide a daily schedule of training and events prior to the exercise. Provide a list of required and recommended items for the CPX (for example, a tactical operations center box packing list).

(U) **Observation: MSEL-Based Training Method**

(U) **Discussion**. Over the years, there have been discussions about replacing MSEL-based, instructor-led training with simulations or similar options. However, with a diverse, multi-echelon training audience, a MSEL-based training system allowed maximum flexibility for the training tempo and objectives-focused training.

(U) **Recommendation**. Sustain simple and dynamic MSEL-based training with regular review and synchronization meetings to ensure the training pace and focus are optimized to meet training audience requirements.

(U) **Observation: Opportunities for International Engagement**

(U) **Discussion**. During the exercise, participants used breaks outside of training for personal interactions. These daily social events presented opportunities to build rapport with host-nation participants.

(U) **Recommendation**. Continue daily cultural interactions by keeping breaks and other meeting events on the timeline. Encourage participants to socialize outside of training.

(U) **Observation: Media and Reporters**

(U) **Discussion**. The platoon executing the Khaan Quest exercise was constantly approached by reporters from more than 12 countries before departing Alaska and while in country.

(U) **Recommendation**. Public affairs training should be incorporated into predeployment training for those units participating in future Pacific Pathways exercises.

Orient Shield, 25th Infantry Division Warfighter Exercise, and Hoguk

(U) **Observation: Bilateral Planning**

(U) **Discussion**. During Orient Shield 15, staff sections experienced challenges during combined planning with their partners. The most significant challenge was the difference in planning methods and doctrine. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) planned for several enemy courses of action to achieve flexibility, but did not do so in great detail. JGSDF emphasized timeliness and breadth, whereas Task Force (TF) Blackhawk focused on detailed analysis and shared understanding.

(U) Planning during Orient Shield was constrained by classification of systems used during the exercise. Products focusing on classified systems, such as Blue Force Tracking (BFT) and Command Post of the Future, could not be rapidly reproduced and shared with JGSDF. JGSDF used USB drives assigned to individual personnel for sharing information. In contrast, the U.S. forces are prohibited from using USB drives and must share information between systems using compact discs.

(U) TF Blackhawk and JGSDF established several mission command nodes during Orient Shield. The number, purpose, and location of these nodes were not discussed during the planning conferences. The TF worked with its partnered JGSDF organization to establish a bilateral operations center for current operations and planning. During the comprehensive training

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exercise, a combined tactical operations center (TOC) was established forward to facilitate mission command. The establishment of these nodes had great training value. However, equipping and manning them simultaneously was challenging for U.S. forces and JGSDF because they each had their own TOCs to maintain.

(U) TF Blackhawk easily overcame language barriers with the use of linguists from the Utah National Guard; contracted translators provided by United States Army, Japan (USARJ); and military translators provided by the JGSDF. Analog graphics were the most useful common product for the exercise. Doctrinal symbols were generally common, although definitions differed from Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols*, 07 DEC 2015.

(U) **Recommendation**. Exchange doctrinal publications that define operational terms and symbols at the initial planning conference. Create "terms of reference" that includes all points of contact involved in the exercise with a description of their duties and responsibilities for planning and execution of the exercise. Smartbooks with phonetic pronunciations of common military terms are always useful for leaders and Soldiers. Smartbooks are best distributed during the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace Program, which occurs well in advance of deployment. Agree on a common exercise map during the planning conferences, preferably the host-nation version. Build common bilateral analog graphics first, then transfer them to U.S. digital systems. Complete planning on the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) systems to enable sharing of products. Agree to use a common planning process during the planning conferences and, if possible, conduct bilateral combined arms rehearsals as the culminating planning event. During the planning conferences, determine the number of unilateral and bilateral centers and cells, and then create the manning document. The deploying unit must determine these requirements early to assist staff and subordinate units with deployment preparations.

(U) **Observation: Transition of Command Authority Onto the Korean Peninsula**

(U) **Discussion**. During Pacific Pathways, reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the brigade combat team (BCT) to the 2ID transition to the Korean area of operations experienced continued friction. Although reception and staging are best done by Eighth United States Army (8th Army) assets, 2ID should assume full mission command responsibility of BCTs for onward movement and integration.

(U) **Recommendation**. When planning a Pacific Pathways exercise, direct linkages across all the warfighting functions should be established early between the Pacific Pathways BCT and 2ID. In addition, during execution, and possibly as early as 30 days prior to the BCT transitioning to Korea, a forward staff should be deployed under the defense coordinating officer. This officer can coordinate and finalize activities of the incoming BCT and make the integration quick and seamless.

(U) **Observation: Integration With Host-Nation Forces (44th Infantry Regiment, JGSDF)**

(U) **Discussion**. Training did not facilitate close integration with JGSDF. At the platoon level, plans were made in relatively short meetings with counterparts to coordinate link-up procedures and markings. This coordination resulted in mission accomplishment, but underutilized both units' capabilities. Similarly, the bilateral live fire exercise (LFX) did not provide many opportunities for interaction among Soldiers. High operating tempo also prevented coordination of bilateral events that could have been used to build relationships.

(U) **Recommendation**. Early in the exercise, bilateral interaction at the platoon level and lower would greatly increase integration. Bilateral capabilities and standard operating procedure briefings or static displays would allow interaction among Soldiers at the lowest level. Bilateral ranges that allow direct observation and interaction among Soldiers would also build relationships and trust among the units. Finally, building time into the schedule for bilateral events would be highly beneficial to building relationships.

(U) **Observation: Planning Conferences Conflicted With Foreign Exercises**

(U) **Discussion**: Planning any international exercise is an extremely involved process. Planning conferences for one international exercise interfered with other portions of Pacific Pathways that were in the execution phase.

(U) **Recommendation**: All in-progress reviews need to be deconflicted with ongoing operations. Utilize multiple foreign exercise planners, and assign them to specific portions of Pacific Pathways. Incorporate a logistics planner into the planning conferences.

(U) **Observation: The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) Planning Process for Combined Ground Training Events**

(U) **Discussion**. Large-scale combined training required operational-level oversight of planning and tracking of preparation tasks. ROKA headquarters did not take the same role in planning Hoguk that other Republic of Korea (ROK) services take when planning large-scale, combined events. Planning did not include full planning conferences with the appropriate attendees from U.S. Army or ROKA units. In addition, the U.S. Army and ROKA training and preparation timeline was insufficient. Most of the planning for Hoguk 15 occurred less than two months prior to execution. Delayed planning, combined with 8th Army's planning and execution of the 2ID warfighter exercise, resulted in the training units having little understanding of the exercise concept to develop and coordinate support requirements.

(U) **Recommendation**. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop a "road map" that specifies the planning timeline and roles of each echelon, and "checklists" of items to be coordinated for each future Hoguk planning conference.

(U) **Observation: Combined Command Post Operations**

(U) **Discussion**. ROKA brigade-level command posts were not designed for combined operations. The participating U.S. Army and ROKA units had some challenges operating together, resulting in additional challenges in COP sharing, communications, and use of translators and liaison officers (LNOs).

(U) **Recommendation**. U.S. and ROK should develop mission command tactics, techniques, and procedures for combined command post operations.

(U) **Observation: Integration of 2ID Systems and Planning Processes**

(U) **Discussion**. Within hours of arrival to Camp Casey, 1/25 SBCT was expected to function as a brigade staff. Digital systems could not be quickly set up. Additionally, brigade staff sections did not have opportunities to interact with division-level staff. Staff sections often worked independently of higher guidance, which led to layering instead of integration.

(U) **Recommendation**. Having a deliberate RSOI process upon arrival would have improved operations. Also, division staff must be available to answer requests for information in a timely manner.

(FOUO) **Observation: Use of the Radio Interface Unit (RIU) Between TF Blackhawk and the 44th Infantry TOCs**

(FOUO) **Discussion**. Joint communications proved difficult when coalition partners used dissimilar methods to communicate tactically. CENTRIXS services (Korea, Japan, and NATO) require significant coordination for use, significant backbone infrastructure, and technical expertise not commonly found below the brigade level. Radio communications typically prove difficult when nations are disinclined to share their encryption for security or proprietary reasons. The RIU enables partner nations to encrypt their individual radio networks and maintain communications between radio networks. Currently, 2ID uses a similar system called RELM repeaters with enough systems to distribute down to the platoon level. However, these systems are stationary.

(FOUO) **Recommendation**. Procure more RIUs or similar systems to integrate U.S. tactical radio communications with partner-nation radio systems. Procure one system for each battalion to enable joint tactical radio communications. Develop mobile solutions to enable on-the-move joint communications.

(U) **Observation: Incorporation of Public Affairs Assets**

(U) **Discussion**. The public affairs officer (PAO) for the brigade was not present to facilitate all the training due to the great distance between training sites. However, in order to overcome this issue, the participating unit from Pacific Pathways 15-03 incorporated the Japanese PAO to participate in and document the training exercises. The Japanese PAO was capable of capturing several pictures a day of the training. There were also separate teams that consolidated data and determined which pictures to post on the brigade and USAJ social media pages. As a result, Soldiers' Families were able to stay connected and understand the value of the exercise.

(U) **Recommendation**. At the planning conference, determine which public affairs assets will be available for the training exercise. These assets help participating units determine how to cover the training exercises and disseminate information properly.

(FOUO) **Observation**: **Command and Control Systems Interoperability During Hoguk**

(FOUO) **Discussion**. Despite over 60 years of military cooperation, there were still significant challenges with sharing information between the U.S. and ROK forces. The U.S. and ROK forces have the capability of communicating through CENTRIXS to the Allied Korean Joint Command

and Control System (AKJCCS). AKJCCS was typically located at the division level or higher for ROK forces. ROKA had a longer planning timeline for coordinating which systems to bridge. Without this bridge, TF Blackhawk had to drive through ROK traffic to obtain partnered brigade orders, maps, and graphics. This process took several days and was inefficient.

(FOUO) Bridging communications between partnered forces at the company level and below was a challenge. During Hoguk, ROKA and U.S. Army companies and platoons communicated with each other by having either a U.S. Soldier ride in a ROKA vehicle with a man-pack, or vice versa. This method also required an interpreter in each vehicle, but did allow secure communication on the move without exiting the vehicles.

(FOUO) **Recommendation**. Provide a complete list of systems to bridge between CENTRIXS to AKJCCS at the planning conference with 8th Army to tie in United States Forces Korea (USFK) and the Combined Forces Command. Additionally, a team of network engineers must work the bridge between U.S. and ROK forces during the operation to sustain connectivity. Units operating in ROK need to use the 2ID network backbone with CENTRIXS-South Korea (CENTRIXS-K) to ensure connectivity. Sharing planning products through the CENTRIXS-K network will significantly improve the planning process and reduce time wasted traveling by vehicle.

(FOUO) Combat vehicles that provide 110 and 220 volts of power can operate a Radio over Internet Protocol (RoIP) or equivalent RELM repeater to transfer U.S. frequency modulation (FM) radio frequencies into compatible ROKA FM radio frequencies. The additional equipment needed includes a ROKA vehicle antenna mounting bracket and radio power.

(FOUO) **Observation: RoIP Equivalent System**

(FOUO) **Discussion**. U.S. forces needed an equivalent system to the RoIP in order to bridge communications over FM radio with U.S. partners. Currently, U.S. forces must rely on allied military forces to provide the bridging capability. The RoIP is manned and operated by U.S. partners. The key to operating the RoIP is having a computer capable of adjusting the frequency type to send the transmission into U.S. coalition forces' radios, which are not directly compatible. This differs from a traditional RELM repeater (no computer or software); a repeater extends the transmission through similar devices.

(FOUO) **Recommendation**. Purchase an equivalent system to the RoIP and provide appropriate numbers as a package for units during deployments that support U.S. partnered forces.

(U) **Observation: U.S. Army and ROKA Combined Communications During Hoguk**

(U) **Discussion**. U.S. Army and ROKA units communicated over FM radio primarily using LNOs with radios in the command posts and maneuvering units. The ROK RoIP was used for the first time for ROK-U.S. communications. However, using the ROK RoIP had limitations due to the number of users on the system. The U.S. Rapid Deployment Portable Repeaters (RDPRs) were also used, although they were limited in number.

(U) **Recommendation**. For future exercises, the tactical communications architecture should be developed during planning to enable both RoIP and RDPR use at the appropriate levels.

(U) **Observation: Combined COP at the Tactical Level**

(U) **Discussion**. U.S. Army and ROKA units were unable to develop a real-time combined COP due to a lack of system interoperability. Additionally, ROKA systems did not support inclusion of U.S. icons and unit information, affecting both the COP and the engagement judgment model used to adjudicate battles.

(U) **Recommendation**. ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff must work on code and database changes required to include U.S. unit icons and information. Additionally, the U.S. must leverage the work of the 2ID/ROK-U.S. Combined Division on the combined COP sharing system for future training.

(FOUO) **Observation: Overall Mission Command Systems**

(FOUO) **Discussion**. There were numerous challenges employing mission command systems during Pacific Pathways 15-03. Planning and coordination could have mitigated some of these challenges. Similar to Orient Shield 15, weather was a limiting factor. Additionally, U.S. Army and ROKA systems were not interoperable.

(FOUO) The most effective combinations of systems and personnel that produced the most favorable outcomes, in terms of mission command, were partnerships at the various levels, and integration and placement of LNOs with the proper systems. At the ROKA division level, 1SBCT provided an infantry captain who conducted updates twice daily following the division commander's update briefs. This captain was available to deal with issues throughout the exercise. At the TF level, LNOs were exchanged and outfitted with a BFT TOC kit. LNOs also received the One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) to monitor Raven unmanned aircraft

system (UAS) feeds. LNOs also had a Korean cellphone for use during non-exercise periods. LNOs also had access to an M998 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HWMMV) with a generator to provide mobility and a reliable source of power for U.S. systems. In phase two, the most effective combined COP was managed by projecting BFT and Army Tactical Communication Information System (ATCIS) live feeds in the ROKA brigade TOC. The OSRVT had the capability of being projected, but was mainly used as a stand-alone system by the intelligence and fires elements for enemy identification and lethal targeting.

(FOUO) At the company level, exchange of LNOs in the partnered headquarters' vehicles with man-pack communications aided with coordination and maneuver. During offensive operations, reconnaissance platoons were positioned forward with embedded forward observers (outfitted with man-pack radios) in the reconnaissance Stryker variants to leverage the observation capabilities of the Long-Range Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), enable rapid reporting, and conduct immediate call-for-fire missions upon enemy force identification.

(FOUO) U.S. and ROK forces have the capability of communicating through the CENTRIXS-K to AKJCCS systems. The TF had access to CENTRIXS-K, but the AKJCCS system was typically located at the ROKA division headquarters or higher. The only ROKA brigade that had this capability was the 16th Mechanized Brigade, which is currently part of the 2ID Combined Forces Command. Additionally, ROKA planned for resources further out than the U.S. eight-week planning horizon, making it necessary to coordinate early for systems use.

(FOUO) Bridging tactical communications at the troop or platoon level continued to be an issue when partnering with coalition forces. During Hoguk, TF Blackhawk had a U.S. Soldier ride with ROKA and a ROKA soldier ride in a Stryker vehicle with a man-pack. This required translators in both vehicles, but allowed for secure communication while on the move.

(FOUO) RELM repeaters were drawn to allow U.S. forces to bridge U.S. radios with ROKA secure radios. The device is a mobile retransmission system that extends the radio network. RELM repeaters were limited to specifically designed ROKA FM radios compatible with the U.S. frequency range. A single ROKA-developed RoIP system was provided to the U.S. TF TOC with ROKA signal personnel. This system was capable of bridging secure communications using a computer. This single RoIP in the TF TOC was effective in communicating with U.S. operational control brigade headquarters prior to the line of departure of friendly forces, but had difficulty providing the necessary flexible communication requirements in the offense.

(FOUO) **Recommendation**. Leverage the current integrated combined structure of the 2ID Combined Forces Command to identify solutions to more effectively bridge mission command systems. Within the 2ID Combined Forces Command, there were some solutions that were not widely available to ROKA divisions and brigades. CONUS-based deploying units were not able to immediately and effectively integrate mission command systems for the higher headquarters in order to have a reliable and complete COP. Identify solutions to bridge BFT with ROKA's version (ATCIS) to feed a complete COP.

(FOUO) Provide secure systems at the initial planning conference or mid-planning conference to allow time to complete coordination. AKJCCS was available at the division level and higher. The 8th Army should provide or task a network engineer team to bridge each system. Units operating in Korea need to use the 2ID network backbone with CENTRIXS-K to ensure connectivity.

(U) COMSEC planners need to ensure all classification levels are included for operational needs. Higher headquarters must validate SAAR requests. The dates submitted by TF Blackhawk were not reflected by the SAAR. The higher element needs to confirm the mission and dates of a SAAR before distributing a false mission. Future Pacific Pathways deployments should include a spectrum manager in the manning for the operational unit.

(FOUO) The 2ID Combined Forces Command should develop a solution to bridge company-level FM communications. An interim solution is to acquire additional RoIP systems and design multiple mobile retransmission platforms. Combat vehicles that provide internal 110- and 220-volt power (all Stryker variants with the adapter) can operate the previously mentioned RoIP or equivalent RELM repeater designed to transfer U.S. FM radio frequencies into compatible ROK FM radio frequencies. The additional equipment necessary is a ROKA vehicle antenna mounting bracket and radio power that plugs into the vehicle. Retransmission Strykers (the command variant) are the only platforms able to support the RoIP on the move, while providing the necessary wiring infrastructure and four-antenna mounts. Two-antenna mounts were necessary for the RoIP retransmission on the move; the additional two were required for the vehicle to communicate with the attached element and higher headquarters. This configuration is a possible solution to bridge tactical FM communications at the company level and below.

(FOUO) The RDPR RELM systems are best suited for troop or platoon mobile retransmission with internal U.S.-only FM radios, while the RoIP can bridge a larger variety of U.S.-to-ROKA radios. As previously mentioned, support from a spectrum manager on the ground is vital to the mission. Spectrum managers can directly address issues in the SAAR and facilitate processing requests that were previously submitted.

(U) The Global Rapid Response Information Package (GRRIP) is another viable option to provide a flexible solution between mission command nodes over a distance or to an LNO package.

(U) **Observation: Mission Command Systems**

(FOUO) **Discussion**. Beyond line-of-sight communications such as BFT, the satellite transportable terminal (STT), and the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET)/NIPRNET access points were intermittent during Pacific Pathways 15-03. TF Blackhawk conducted Pacific Pathways during August through October, which is the period of tropical storms and typhoons in the Pacific area of responsibility. The mission command systems relied on the Guam Regional Hub Node (RHN). However, during these months, the RHN connectivity was frequently interrupted by weather conditions. As a result, operations in the TOC were reduced to analog methods. Analog operations enabled planning with JGSDF, but they limited training opportunities with other systems and reduced the command and staff's ability to maintain reliable connectivity with home station.

(FOUO) The TF was unable to leverage the tactical satellite (TACSAT) system because its communications security (COMSEC) keys were drawn for demand-assigned multiple access and not for integrated wave.

(FOUO) The BFT and SIPRNET/NIPRNET access points were erratic during Orient Shield. The newly installed BFT systems on most TF Blackhawk vehicles received inconsistent satellite updates due to moderately thick vegetation and inclement weather. This had an impact on the ability to produce a common operational picture (COP). The moderately thick Japanese forest also made satellite connectivity challenging.

(FOUO) **Recommendation**. Spectrum manager support on the ground is vital to the mission. A spectrum manager can directly address issues with a System Authorization Access Request (SAAR) to facilitate processing or managing previously submitted requests. Future Pacific Pathways task forces should leverage the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) Combined Forces Command RHN to increase reliability of services. The COMSEC manager must have COMSEC keys on hand to respond to operational needs. Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS)-based Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) systems may have been more effective and better suited for this environment. Reevaluate the SIPRNET/NIPRNET access points for expeditionary environmental conditions.

(U) **Observation: Transition Times and Continuity of Communications**

(U) **Discussion**. Across the Pacific, continuous and effective communications is a challenge and can be affected by environmental or equipment failures. For example, the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1SBCT) while in Japan experienced an eight-hour blackout due to heavy rains at Camp Ojojihara and the Guam RHN.

(U) **Recommendation**. Extend satellite time to provide overlapping coverage and prevent a communications blackout during transitions between Pacific Pathways phases. Also, coordinate alternative hub nodes. In addition, it is essential that the satellite communications and RHN controllers understand the overall concept early to coordinate satellite time.

(U) **Observation: Ka-Band Frequency Use in the Pacific**

(FOUO) **Discussion**. Ka-band frequencies were used in Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) satellite transportable terminals (STT), the primary means of transportation for the NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) networks in a tactical environment. Tactical services were down due to interference caused by heavy rains. In the continental United States (CONUS), Ku-band frequencies are the most commonly used frequency band for STTs. However, in both Japan and Korea, the Ku-band has been allocated to civilian use.

(FOUO) **Recommendation**. Diversify WIN-T transmission equipment capability to operate on C- or X-band frequencies to help mitigate the negative effects of the rainy season on Ka-band satellite assets. Develop a robust primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plan. Bring microwave transmission systems, such as the Harris 7800 High-Capacity Line-of-Sight Radio, for tactical communication between nodes.

Chapter 2

Movement and Maneuver

(U) **Overview**. Pacific Pathways 15-03 provided significant opportunities for U.S. forces to plan, prepare, and execute military-to-military engagements and field training exercises (FTXs). These exercises were focused at the company and battalion levels with different allies and multinational partners. Pacific Pathways provided realism and increased overall readiness that cannot be obtained during a combat training center rotation. However, there were areas that needed improvement, which would have enhanced the overall success of Pacific Pathways.

(U) Areas emphasized were integration of host-nation forces, more comprehensive planning of military-to-military engagements and tactical activities, and increased involvement of commanders during planning conferences. Integration at the planning conferences could allow commanders and planners from participating nations to share goals, end states, and training requirements prior to the final planning conference. This type of continuity can foster further development of relationships from the initial onset of the operation.

Khaan Quest, Orient Shield, 25th Infantry Division Warfighter Exercise, and Hoguk

(U) **Observation: Partnered Operations**

(U) **Discussion**. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan affects partnering and operations with the Japanese army. In many cases, this results in parallel execution of training events rather than integrated operations. Although maximum effort was made to partner during each event, having combined operations with elements task-organized under each other was not possible during the comprehensive exercise.

(U) **Recommendation**. As the exercise concluded, the Japanese government passed a bill reinterpreting the language of Article 9 to allow for increased levels of partnering in future exercises. However, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) leaders believe change may take considerable time.

(U) **Observation: Orient Shield Maneuver Area**

(U) **Discussion**. The Ojojihara Maneuver Area was a small training facility. The maneuver area was approximately 7.45 by 1.86 miles (12 by 3 kilometers), with two main routes running from east to west. The area

was forested and had several streams and hilltops. There were ranges that supported training with small arms, crew-served weapons, tanks, and anti-tank guided missiles, with a small impact area for artillery and mortars. There was a medium-sized, military-operations-on-urban-terrain training site with multi-story buildings. Off-road maneuver was limited and, when combined with the overall size of the training area, impacted the scale of operations. This was a main factor in determining the task-force size and vehicle-density list for the entire Pacific Pathways deployment.

(U) **Recommendation**. If required to use the Ojojihara Maneuver Area for future exercises, consider limiting task organization to a reconnaissance troop or infantry company with enablers and a battalion-sized headquarters element. For Stryker-based organizations, use the larger maneuver areas available in Japan.

(U) **Observation: Predeployment Training in Preparation for Pacific Pathways**

Discussion. The Pacific Pathways 15-03 participants could have benefited from an advanced language course prior to deploying. This type of course would have given junior Soldiers and leaders a basic knowledge of the partnered nations. It also would have enhanced the overall success of the operation.

(U) **Recommendation**. Ensure organizations participating in Pacific Pathways are given enough time to conduct thorough cultural training that incorporates language classes so that Soldiers can have basic conversations with counterparts. In conjunction with the language program, continue to conduct the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace Program prior to deploying to the Pacific area of responsibility.

(U) **Observation: Miltary-to-Military Engagements and Troop-Leading Procedures**

Discussion. In order for Pacific Pathways to continue to flourish at the company and troop levels, send key personnel to the planning conferences. With key leaders participating at the planning conferences, leaders will be able to reach out to partners and begin the process of integrating a training plan for the upcoming operation. Company and troop commanders will

then have the opportunity to conduct informal discussions to foster more in-depth relationship building. It would also mitigate the stress felt by leaders trying to locate partners in the first few days of the operation. Leaders could save time due to the already established relationships from the planning conferences. This process also enables the companies and troops to integrate with participating units and discuss the employment of doctrine into training. By exercising this method, units could develop a more thorough training plan that encompasses all the capabilities of each participating Army.

(U) **Recommendation**. Planning conferences should include representatives from every warfighting function and echelon of the command. Staff captains and experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), Eighth United States Army (8th Army), United States Forces Korea (USFK), 2nd Infantry Division (2ID), United States Forces Japan (USFJ), the brigade combat team, and Task Force (TF) Blackhawk should meet with their counterparts from the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and JGSDF at initial, mid, and final planning conferences. This can facilitate proper coordination a few weeks before operations. No officer or NCO should be the single point of success or failure for any portion of the exercise.

(U) **Observation: Rodriguez Range Complex**

(U) **Discussion**. Prior to Hoguk, the Pacific Pathways unit spent two weeks at the Rodriguez Range Complex. The range had numerous facilities and a staff willing and able to support training. The unit took full advantage of the training opportunities available. The cavalry troop trained and qualified to meet standards with all weapons systems, from the M4 to the MK19 and 120mm mortars. The cavalry troop progressed from the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) to a section live fire exercise (LFX). The LFX included all available enablers including M777A2 artillery; 120mm mortars; live tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles from the anti-tank guided missile Strykers; and Raven unmanned aircraft system (UAS) flights. The cavalry troop also incorporated training on the Javelin missile simulator. In addition to supporting the LFX, the artillery platoon conducted direct-lay live fire, simultaneously firing all three howitzers. The forward support troop and staff also were able to conduct weapons training in the EST through qualification and leveraged the on-site convoy simulation trainer.

(U) The Rodriguez Range Complex had excellent sustainment and life support facilities. The maintenance area was designed to support mechanized vehicles and was more than adequate to conduct vehicle maintenance and services. TF Blackhawk cooked meals using a

containerized kitchen and served meals in the dining facility. Other facilities included three snack bars, a shopette, barber shop, and free laundry with large-capacity machines. The barracks were two-story buildings, open-bay style with bunk beds and foot lockers. There were also several buildings available for command posts and tactical operations centers with an estimated capacity of greater than two battalions.

(U) **Recommendation**. Sustain training at the Rodriguez Range Complex for future Pacific Pathways deployments. Range control personnel are extremely accommodating with a wide variety of training options. Make contact early with the Rodriguez Range Complex to schedule all available resources and coordinate for other assets such as aviation, demolitions training, and simulators.

Chapter 3

Intelligence

(U) **Overview**. Understanding the area of operations — friendly, enemy, and threat capabilities; topographical, manmade, and human terrain nuances; and patterns and activities across a wide range of pertinent information — is significant to setting the theater. Developing a baseline of information is vital for enduring theater cooperation and engagement or, in worse cases, humanitarian contingency and combat operations. The intelligence warfighting function plays an important role in providing the needed information for understanding the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR).

(U) **Observation: Intelligence Section Challenges**

(U) **Discussion**. The participating unit had significant challenges with courier orders, specifically with the authority to issue them. The participating unit received guidance from several different headquarters that were contradicting each other. Several higher headquarters inferred that they held the authority to issue courier orders. Ultimately, the issue was not resolved until the end of the operation.

(U) The participating unit faced further challenges because it did not bring its own topographic section on the Pacific Pathways mission. For example, the training unit had to rely on partners to provide the maps. These maps were found to be outdated and used a different grid-reference system. Also, not all the key leaders had maps for the exercise, resulting in challenges with battle tracking and call-for-fire missions.

(U) **Recommendation**. Ensure courier order regulations for the entire Pacific AOR are disseminated to the lowest level well in advance of the participating unit's deployment in support of the operation. Although there was a force cap on personnel, the topographic section should be considered for the mission due to its ability to produce maps for key leaders.

(U) **Observation: Integration of the Raven Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)**

(U) **Discussion**. The participating unit did not initially plan to fly the Raven during Hoguk due to the risk of loss in urban terrain and potential damage to civilian property. However, Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) partners requested its use. The 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) airspace manager expedited restricted operating zone requests for the exercise. The task force (TF) had great success using the Raven to identify opposing force vehicles. The Raven pilot and platoon leaders sent requests for fire through

the chain of command to the ROKA brigade headquarters. The TF liaison officer and ROKA staff observed the targets on the One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) and cleared and denied fires based on positive identification of enemy forces.

(U) **Recommendation**. TFs participating in Hoguk in the future should continue to incorporate Ravens into their operations. ROKA would like to take advantage of Ravens and will facilitate airspace deconfliction. Additionally, the next TF should take several OSRVTs and place them at each command post. To ensure restricted operating zone requests are submitted according to the 2ID planning timeline, establish the correct points of contact during the planning process.

(U) **Observation: Limited Number and Distribution of Translators**

(U) **Discussion**. ROKA translators were organic members of the Republic of Korea (ROK) administrative staff at echelons of battalion and above, but were not assigned to company or platoon levels. The Eighth United States Army (8th Army) supported 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment (5-1 CAV) with 35 Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) Soldiers. ROKA units were assigned only one translator, an officer from the Third Republic of Korea Army (TROKA) headquarters.

(U) **Recommendation**. The field army will need to develop a concept for use of translation officers at the platoon, company, and battalion levels for future exercises.

Chapter 4

Fires: Lethal and Nonlethal Effects

(U) **Overview**. During Pacific Pathways operations, fires were employed at the battery and battalion mortar platoon or section level. The challenges in Pacific Pathways 15-03 were with planning and coordination of fires to conduct military-to-military engagements during field training exercises (FTXs).

(U) **Observation: Fires Planning and Coordination**

(U) **Discussion**. Fires planning was not included in the planning conferences. The U.S. and Japan had questions about clearance of fires, timelines for fire missions, policies, and terms. These questions were not answered until several days into the exercise.

(U) Translation of artillery and mortar doctrinal terms of partnered forces was challenging. The linguists were able to hold conversations, but did not understand artillery terms. For example, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) term "check fire" means fire into the center to check if it is safe. The U.S. Army's term "check fire" is a call for all firing activity to immediately cease. The JGSDF field artillery battalion commander developed a bilateral call-for-fire worksheet with doctrinal terms in both languages. The worksheet, along with partner cooperation, made the process of clearing fires exponentially faster and safer. This process was used during the combined live fire exercise and the comprehensive exercise.

(U) **Recommendation**. Include a fires planner in the planning conferences or develop a list of requests for information that can be answered prior to the exercise. Bringing artillery leaders into the planning process to negotiate training objectives allows both sides to discuss procedures. Develop and agree on products during the planning conferences to ease friction during execution. Develop simple fire support products that can be quickly translated. Ensure fires terminology is translated correctly.

(U) **Observation: Ammunition Data**

(U) **Discussion**. The 105mm ammunition for the M777A2 howitzers delivered to the Rodriguez Range Complex was different from what was requested. Leaders in the fire support element and fire direction center were unfamiliar with the rounds as well as safety procedures. However, they were able to determine the correct computational procedures to fire the rounds safely.

(U) **Recommendation**. Bring all regulations, publications, technical manuals, and safety notices to the training events. Request the lot numbers and Department of Defense Identification Codes (DODICs) before arrival to allow time for research.

(U) **Observation: Direct-Fire Artillery Training**

(U) **Discussion**. While at Rodriguez Range Complex, the artillery platoon conducted a direct-fire range. This was a rare opportunity for gun crews to demonstrate their crew drills in a direct-fire mode. The direct-fire range was not planned until arrival at the Rodriguez Range Complex, but was conducted safely through coordination with range control.

(U) **Recommendation**. Rodriguez Range Complex staff was willing to assist with planning. Be prepared to utilize the opportunities at the Rodriguez Range Complex to maximize its available resources.

Chapter 5

Sustainment

(U) **Overview**. Pacific Pathways remains challenging for sustainers in all functional areas. It was noted that some issues remain constant throughout the Pacific Pathways series of exercises and not all lessons are being learned. Constant communication and synchronization through sustainment meetings and rehearsal-of-concept drills have been key to improving overall support to these exercises. Pacific Pathways 15-03 has done a particularly effective job of capturing medical-related issues. It is important that this information is disseminated throughout the command because it is associated with the overall health and readiness of the force.

Khaan Quest

(U) **Observation: Command Post Exercise (CPX) Concept of Support**

(U) **Discussion**. During the initial days of the CPX, there was no assigned U.S. "mayor" responsible for support functions such as billets, transportation, or supplies. Also, regarding multinational participant meals, increase awareness about dietary needs of multinational participants, particularly Hindus and Muslims.

(U) **Recommendation**. A camp mayor should be identified as a CPX requirement during the planning conferences. Ensure food served in the dining facility is provided and properly labeled for multinational participants who have specific dietary needs.

Orient Shield, 2nd Infantry Division Warfighter Exercise, and Hoguk

(U) **Observation: Sustainment Operations**

(U) **Discussion**. United States Army, Japan's (USARJ's) support package for providing logistical and sustainment support to Task Force (TF) Blackhawk consisted of a logistical task force (LTF) forward deployed from the 10th Regional Support Command. USARJ included this LTF in all planning conferences and correspondence to ensure TF Blackhawk received the required support during the conduct of operations. Due to the early tasking from USARJ and involvement in the planning conferences, the LTF was successful in providing all non-vehicular support for the duration of the exercise. The LTF conducted daily logistics synchronization meetings with the deployed TF to ensure requirements were met. According to the original plan, a Fort Wainwright, AK-based Army field support brigade (AFSB), a brigade logistics support team (BLST) chief, and the 593rd Expeditionary

Support Command (Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA) would provide a liaison officer (LNO) package to deploy and integrate with TF Blackhawk in order to expedite the flow of Stryker parts to Japan. This did not occur, resulting in zero vehicle parts arriving in Japan for the exercise. As a result, identified vehicle faults were not corrected due to the lack of parts. This negatively impacted the operational readiness rate of the squadron fleet deploying to Korea.

(U) **Recommendation**. Continue to include the LTF in operations when conducting theater security cooperation exercises in Japan. Continue to integrate the LTF into planning conferences early and often. Include the AFSB, BLST chief, and expeditionary support command representative into the planning process. Conduct a rehearsal of the parts ordering process and parts flow requirements prior to execution of the exercise.

(U) **Observation: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)**

(U) **Discussion**. Pacific Pathways units did not receive an RSOI brief when they arrived in Japan or Korea for Hoguk. A brief addressing basic but important issues, such as curfew, off-limit areas, local laws, human trafficking, and the black market would have been useful.

(U) Upon arrival in the Republic of Korea (ROK), there were several administrative requirements for Soldiers that could have been completed before the exercise. For example, driver's license classes could have been completed at Fort Wainwright. Military installations in ROK required the use of the Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS). Soldier in-processing using this system could have been completed at Osan Air Base, South Korea, upon arrival instead of requiring personnel to accomplish this task individually at various other locations.

(U) During Hoguk, the unit had two minor incidents involving vehicles that resulted in minimal damage to civilian property. In both cases, the unit followed procedures outlined by Eighth United States Army (8th Army) and the incidents were resolved without issue. However, the military police investigators informed leaders that drivers should have been familiarized with United States Forces Korea (USFK) Regulation 190-1, *Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision*, as part of RSOI prior to operating vehicles on public roadways.

(U) When the unit arrived at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, South Korea, Soldiers had to acquire resources by their own means and, in some cases, at their own expense. For example, WiFi was available in the tents at Camp Coiner, South Korea, but had to be requested weeks in advance. Soldiers were not aware of WiFi availability and, as a result, paid out of pocket for Wi-Fi hotspots.

(U) The unit conducted operations with little regard for holidays and weekends, unlike Soldiers and Civilians permanently assigned to ROK. Upon arrival at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, two holidays — the Chosuk Holiday and Labor Day — led to disruption of services. For example, portable toilets were not emptied at Camp Coiner, the library was closed for access to Internet and printing, and planning with ROKA counterparts and higher headquarters was severely limited.

(U) **Recommendation**. Provide an RSOI brief to all personnel in advance or upon arrival to theater. In coordination with 8th Army, U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan Command and USFK should identify the administrative requirements for Soldiers entering ROK prior to deployment. Begin working on these requirements as part of Soldier readiness processing. Provide applicable regulations to organizations deploying in support of Pacific Pathways in advance. In coordination with 8th Army and U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan Command, identify available resources for Soldier support during the planning conferences while considering the impacts of holidays on planned activities. Support from a spectrum manager on the ground is vital to the mission. Spectrum managers can directly address issues with Department of Defense Form 2875, *System Authorization Access Request (SAAR)*, and facilitate processing requests or managing requests previously submitted. Research the feasibility of having United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) deploy the MoraleSat equipment suite, Cheetah system to improve morale. The Cheetah system is an asset typically available at the division level or higher. The Cheetah system consists of four computers, four phones, and a router to provide wireless Internet capabilities. This system can give Soldiers the ability to connect to home during deployment.

(U) **Observation: Operational and Logistics Support**

(U) **Discussion**. Coordination for sustaining U.S. forces in accordance with the exercise concept and timeline was insufficient. The concept of operations was not known early enough to set a sufficient supporting location for logistic support analysis. This resulted in sustainment challenges throughout the exercise.

(U) **Recommendation**. The training "roadmap" and "checklists" must include the required coordination for logistics support.

(U) **Observation: Class IX Stryker Parts**

(U) **Discussion**. Stryker parts were not in the supply support activity (SSA) inventory. In order to receive Class IX parts, they must be deployed with the Soldiers or shipped from home station. In addition, the 593rd Sustainment LNO was not available to the unit that the brigade combat team deployed

to Korea. Plus, the nature of the Pacific Pathways series of exercises made delivery of critical repair parts challenging. The short timeframe a unit is in a specific country, difficulty with ship-to addresses, and customs issues made it difficult to get repair parts to units in a timely manner.

(U) **Recommendation**. Bring a robust Class IX inventory or send Class IX parts by strategic air to avoid customs issues associated with commercial shipping. Coordinate an LNO prior to the start of the exercise. The brigade should provide a brigade logistics support team for future Pacific Pathways exercises. The availability of a field service representative was beneficial to equipment maintenance and troubleshooting.

(U) **Observation: Postal Support Operations**

(U) **Discussion**. Postal operations were not emplaced for troops, not only during Pacific Pathways 15-03, but also during 15-01 and 15-02. Although cellphones, email, and other digital systems provide connectivity back home, deployments to austere locations and operational security may preclude such technology. Mail, in the form of a letter or small package from home, is a morale booster. Mail deliveries can be coordinated even with a 60- or 90-day deployment.

(U) **Recommendation**. USARPAC should engage the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) manpower and personnel staff section (J-1) on postal support operations. For those units deployed for Pacific Pathways, 1st Corps should assist in establishing an Army post office (APO) or fleet post office (FPO). For example, if the vessel used is a U.S. Naval ship, which remains with the unit throughout deployment, it may be possible to establish an FPO. It is feasible to establish an APO at a U.S. Embassy or use a U.S. Embassy post office augmented with unit mail handlers for a temporary time period. Also, an APO can be located with the forward command post when established, such as "the hub or Pacific Pathways coordination center," to provide mission command and facilitate logistics.

(U) **Observation: Unit Identification Codes (UICs)**

(U) **Discussion**. UICs outside of the battalion could not be accessed. Enablers with personnel actions were not able to receive assistance. Simple tasks, such as pulling an enlistment record brief for updating and viewing, could not be accomplished.

(U) **Recommendation**. The forward personnel staff officer (S-1) should be given access to UICs for Soldiers who are attached to the battalion. Create and assign a TF UIC to personnel while in support of the operation.

(U) **Observation: Derivative Department of Defense Activity Address Codes (DODAACs)**

(U) **Discussion**. TF Blackhawk did not receive a derivative DODAAC when it deployed and was instructed to use its home station DODAAC. The TF was unable to order parts or supplies in theater and, instead, relied on shipments from Fort Wainwright.

(U) Due to the need to continue maintenance operations and services at Fort Wainwright and limitations on the number of personnel authorized to deploy, the TF did not deploy its maintenance warrant officer for Pacific Pathways 15-03. Without this warrant officer's skillsets, there were challenges with Class IX ordering, requisitioning, and walk-throughs. No parts or supplies were ordered through the Standard Army Maintenance System since arrival for Pacific Pathways 15-03. TF Blackhawk had to rely on walk-up Department of Army Form 2765-1, *Request for Issue or Turn-In,* that had to be signed by the finance staff officer (S-8) at Fort Wainwright. As a result, it was difficult to capture exercise costs or part usage, such as Stryker parts, to develop a future Authorized Stock List recommendation in Korea. These issues hampered the TF's ability to repair vehicles.

(U) A logistics officer from the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, joined the TF staff for this exercise, but only after completing the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) Warfighter Exercise, by which time the TF had been in ROK for several weeks. This logistics officer was able to improve sustainment operations, but without a system in place before the TF arrived in ROK. The TF maintenance noncommissioned officer requested parts through the squadron maintenance technician who was located at Fort Wainwright. Parts were consolidated at Fort Wainwright through walk-throughs, received at the SSA, and then shipped to Korea using Federal Express.

(U) To maintain the operational readiness rate, The TF conducted walk-throughs at several camps across the peninsula to repair faults on legacy vehicles. However, walk-throughs alone were not an effective process because several of the requested parts were not on hand upon arrival at the SSA.

(U) TF Blackhawk packed and unpacked its vehicles, equipment, and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) many times between July and December 2015. Unit movement officers gained considerable experience in their additional duties during Pacific Pathways 2015. Completing and maintaining the proper qualifications, documentation, and mobilization standard operating procedures were essential prior to deployment.

(U) **Recommendation**. Sustainment planners must be involved with all planning conferences. A system for maintaining Strykers must be built during the planning conferences. Strategic air can be utilized to support units with requisitioned parts as they travel throughout the Pacific theater. Expeditionary Support Command officers who augment the staff must be integrated as soon as possible during operations. Establish a deployed DODDAC and a total amount of funding for each class of supply in order to make requisitions during deployment. Prepare for numerous movements throughout the Pacific area of responsibility by training and stabilizing unit movement officers (UMOs) well in advance of deployment.

(U) **Observation: Deployment Procedures**

(U) **Discussion**. The participating unit for Pacific Pathways 15-03 was challenged during deployment procedures. This was due in part to the delay with customs requirements of the Pacific countries. As a result, the deploying unit had to alter its load plans, increasing the amount of time and paperwork involved. Unit Deployment List lock-in and compass reports were also affected, because the reports had to be altered multiple times. Another significant issue involved multiple vessels being used to transport equipment. This required the unit to split its equipment at the port and re-do the military shipping labels and ready-for-issue identification tags.

(U) **Recommendation**. Ensure the vessel type and quantity of vessels are disseminated to the executing unit in a timely manner in order to facilitate the UMO and brigade mobility officer. Also, ensure proper dissemination of partner-nation customs requirements.

(U) **Observation: Sustainment Challenges**

Discussion. Forecasting Class IX repair parts for the Pacific Pathways mission proved to be challenging, along with the ability to resource parts for the Strykers. To offset these requirements for repair parts, the participating unit decided to use Federal Express to ship parts from the rear to the forward elements. However, Federal Express items were held up at customs. To offset this issue, a dedicated aircraft could have been used to run logistical ring routes. The participating unit also had communications issues with sustainers participating in Pacific Pathways 15-03. This miscommunication resulted in personnel not positioned in key areas in a timely manner, which led to a delay in receiving parts. Another concern was the equipment restriction levied by the Korean authorities. Stryker quantities were limited, which also limited the amount of available repair parts.

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(U) **Recommendation**. Have a dedicated airlift for the Pacific Pathways mission that can conduct logistical ring routes every 48 hours. To offset the cost requirements, participating units could use pre-planned aircraft, alleviating Federal Express shipping costs. Finally, a mobility Soldier should be available on both sides of the operation to support a fluid push-pull process.

(U) **Observation: Camp Carroll Army Base, South Korea**

(U) **Discussion**. Camp Carroll was an ideal location to conduct deployment and redeployment operations. The camp offered the required resources to deploy and redeploy units. The staff of each agency was helpful and provided the required information and support to successfully redeploy TF Blackhawk. The TF successfully conducted wash rack, agricultural inspection, and line-haul operations without incident. The TF gained a reputation of professionalism due to the close working relationship it created with other agencies. The camp also offered the life support to refit an organization to include appropriate sleeping arrangements; morale, welfare, and recreation; food establishments; a commissary; and post exchange.

(U) **Recommendation**. Continue to use Camp Carroll as a base to conduct deployment and redeployment operations. Coordinate in advance to ensure there is appropriate support to conduct operations and deconflict with other units.

Chapter 6

Protection and Engineering

(U) **Overview**. This chapter focuses primarily on the brigade level and below and covers chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense and engineering.

(U) **Observation: CBRN Threat**

(U) **Discussion**. Due to the real-world enemy situation, any military training in the Republic of Korea (ROK) will involve a CBRN scenario. Task Force (TF) Blackhawk did not include a protection planner in the planning conferences or a chemical officer on staff. The TF's CBRN platoon had to conduct gunnery at Fort Wainwright, AK, during Hoguk; therefore, only one nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer deployed to ROK.

(U) During a planning conference, TF Blackhawk coordinated to use Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) during the Hoguk exercise. However, the JSLISTs that were issued were intended only for real-world incidents. Therefore, these suits could not be used for the exercise. As a result, TF Blackhawk used training JSLISTs for one platoon during the weapons-of-mass-destruction site reconnaissance mission. All other Soldiers had chemical protective masks available, which were brought from Fort Wainwright, but did not have JSLISTs for the exercise.

(U) **Recommendation**. The chemical officer is an important staff officer to include in the Hoguk exercise. A chemical officer can add recommendations for all phases of Hoguk operations. Additionally, units should plan JSLIST training at home station or upon arrival at ROK.

(U) **Observation: River Crossing**

(U) **Discussion**. During Hoguk, TF Blackhawk conducted two deliberate river crossings. The TF crossed on ROK army floating bridges and U.S. Army rafts. For most members of the TF, it was the first time conducting a river crossing. The TF did not have an engineer on the staff and did not have an engineer involved in the planning process until days before the river crossing when the commander and staff met a U.S. engineer battalion at the crossing site by chance. There were no issues with the river crossing, but closer coordination with an engineer could have enhanced the TF staff's training and planning.

(U) **Recommendation**. Include a U.S. Army engineer battalion in the planning conferences and an engineer on the TF staff.

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