

Learning from Operations

2/2012



Heer



**Einsatz-
Auswertung**

**Army
Lessons Learned**



As of: 22 March 2012

From the Contents:

- Example Situation "IED Attack on Reconnaissance Patrol"
- Operational Experiences, Inf Coy, Task Force KDZ
- Advice on C-IED
- Advice and Lessons from Operations
- Operational Experiences of Other Nations

"Learning from Operations" does not replace any manual nor does it have the character of a manual.

	Page
<u>Contents</u>	
➤ Example Situation "IED Attack on Reconnaissance Patrol"	5
➤ DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences / Best Practice	9
- Preparation for Deployment, 2 nd /Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92	
- Green on Blue	
- Suppression of the Enemy	
- FülInfoSysH (Army CCIS) Employment in RC NORTH	
- Enemy Weapons	
- Behavior in the Case of Braking System Failure in Combat	
➤ Advice on C-IED	32
- Supposedly Harmless IED Components Which in Fact Are Fully functional IEDs	
- Employment of Photo Sensors in IEDs to Booby-trap EOD Personnel	
- Employment of Trip-wire IEDs	
- Using Headgear to Carry Explosive Charges	
- C-IED Handbook	
➤ ISAF/KFOR Lessons Learned	37
➤ Operational Experiences of Other Nations	38
- US CAC COIN Lessons Learned	
- UK Green on Blue	
➤ At the Last Minute	40
- G28 Training Guide	
- Lessons Learned on Operations	
➤ Recommended for Reading	42
➤ Further Links (Internet/Intranet)	44

Cover Picture:

CRC in KOSOVO (Photo: *Bundeswehr*)

On Our Own Behalf:

In addition to operational experiences, this issue will particularly address the subject GREEN on BLUE, i.e. attacks by ANSF members on own forces. In this context, we have also set online on our intranet site two guides of the British and U.S. forces which definitely are worth reading.

Although we recently have received contributions from units/soldiers more often, there is still space to further expand contributions by the readers to our brochure.

We therefore continue to strongly request submission of operational experiences, Best Practice, or just suggestions of potential subjects. If you are in doubt of whether and how you should contribute, please call us or send us a LoNo.

Constructive criticism of our brochure is always welcome, too.

The Editors

Please forward feedbacks, suggestions for improving this brochure as well as contributions and suggestions for contributions to HFÜKdo G 3 EinsAusw (GARFCOM G3 Lessons Learned)

**The next DEU issue is scheduled for July 2012
(Copy Deadline: 07 June 2010)**

Its translation will be available in August

Editorial Information

Issued by: Heeresführungskommando Abteilung G 3
Dezernat Einsatzauswertung Heer
Falckenstein-Kaserne
Von-Kuhl-Straße 50
56070 Koblenz

Bundeswehr Communications Network: 90 - 44 00 - 29 53 / 29 91

Phone: 0261 / 896 - 29 53 / 29 91

Email: HFÜKdo G 3 EinsAusw/Heer/BMVg/DE



VISIT US!

LESSONS LEARNED IN THE ARMY

Bundeswehr intranet bundeswehr.org Startseite · Übersicht · Impressum

Suchbegriff

Aktuelles Inspekteur Dienststellen Fachinformationen

Sie sind hier: Startseite > Fachinformationen > Einsatzauswertung Heer

Heeresführungskommando
Heeresamt
▪ **Einsatzauswertung Heer**
Aktuelles
Allgemeines
Publikationen
Tagungen
Erkenntnisse Wehrmaterial

Controlling im Heer
Herkules
IT-Koordinierungsstelle Heer
IT-Sicherheit Heer
Frequenzmanagement Heer

Einsatzauswertung im Heer

Das Dezernat Einsatzauswertung im Heer wertet laufende Einsätze, einsatzgleiche Verpflichtungen und Übungen einschließlich der jeweiligen Vor- und Nachbereitung aus, um so zur Verbesserung in Planung, Vorbereitung, Durchführung und Nachbereitung von Einsätzen des Heeres und der Streitkräfte beizutragen.

Einsatzauswertung

Neuerscheinungen:

Anschlag vom 18.02.11 im OP North
Der Anschlag vom 18.02.2011 im OP NORTH, bei dem 3 DEU Soldaten durch einen AFG Soldaten getötet wurden, ist jedem in Erinnerung. Solche Vorkommnisse haben in ganz AFG deutlich zugenommen. Sowohl die britischen, als auch die US-amerikanischen Streitkräfte haben mit der Erstellung entsprechender Handbücher wertvolle Hinweise zum Umgang mit diesem Thema gegeben, um solche Vorkommnisse in Zukunft zu vermeiden. Hiermit stellt Dez EinsAusWH beide Dokumente zur Verfügung.

Handbuch Green on blue special edition
Das "Land Warfare Centre" hat hierzu im Februar ein entsprechendes Handbuch "GREEN-ON-BLUE SPECIAL EDITION" herausgegeben.

Handbuch Green on special edition (PDF, 2.4 MB)

WEITERFÜHRENDE LINKS

- InfoSys EEBw
- Fachportal C-IED
- Datenbank Nutzung
- Basissystem IdZ
- Post Traumatisches Belastungssyndrom
- Fachinformationszentrum

Download area

for all our own publications and multinational products

Intranet Heer Startseite > Fachinformationen > Einsatzauswertung Heer

(http://intranet.heer/portal/a/i_heer/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9zPiM1NQivbTE5IzMvLT8olywitQ8vdTMvOLE0uLyDP2CbEdFAD1O04Y!/)



Example Situation "IED Attack on Reconnaissance Patrol"

Enemy Situation

Isolated enemy activities are to be expected throughout the area of operations of Task Force MES. There is a permanent IED threat.

Presumed enemy intention is to disrupt ANSF/ISAF operations, to cause harm to ANSF/ISAF forces in order to demonstrate to the local population their own capability to act and government forces' inability to ensure security and order.

Sustained ANSF and ISAF operations have caused significant pressure on INS. Therefore, the enemy will try to contain ANSF and ISAF in areas where enemy conduct of operations will be less affected.


Mission of the Unit

The mission of reconnaissance patrol FAHRMANN, ISR Coy, TF MES is:

- To relieve Recce patrol CARUSO, and
- For this purpose to move from OP NORTH to COP UNICORN.

Course of Events

Towards 12:45 hrs, C-Platoon, 2nd/TF MES left OP NORTH and moved towards the northeast on LOC PLUTO. The platoon was equipped with a CG-20 C-IED jammer.



Towards 13:16 hrs, Recce patrol FAERMANN left OP NORTH with four FENNEK, destination COP UNICORN. At 13:23 hrs, the move had to be halted after leaving a village to tie a loosened tow rope at the lead vehicle. The move continued towards 13:27 hrs.


The vehicles moved with a distance of 50 to 70 m between the individual vehicles and at changing speeds, at peaks about 65 km/h. Towards 13:30 hrs, when the rearmost

FENNEK B crossed a culvert, an explosion occurred beneath the right roadside in the direction of travel (presumably RCIED). The FENNEK was lifted due to the impact of the detonation, overturned several times over the left vehicle side and ended up lying on its roof after approximately 100 m. A civilian working on a field approx. 40 m away was injured. Recce patrol leader immediately ordered to halt and establish all-around security.

The lead vehicle (A) blocked LOC PLUTO to the northeast, Recce patrol leader turned and returned to close to the site of attack. Vehicle C crew was tasked to dismount and contact vehicle B. The crew carried out a 5/25 check and approached vehicle B secured by the other vehicles. Meanwhile, vehicle B crew had succeeded

in opening one vehicle door and leaving the vehicle. Towards 13:33 hrs, Recce patrol leader got off a first situation report.

At 13:37 hrs, Cdr TF MES ordered C-Platoon to return to the site of attack and



support Recce patrol FAERMANN.

Meanwhile, the three remaining FENNEK vehicles secured the site of attack and the attacked vehicle. As they moved into their positions, the linguist noticed three individuals quickly evading southwestward.

Already at 13:38 hrs, first ANSF arrived at the site of attack, reinforcing security and carrying out initial investigations at the blown-up culvert. The injured civilian was rendered first aid and taken away by other civilians. This was filmed by a camera team. Towards 14:03 hrs, C-Platoon arrived at the site of attack; the company commander being with the C-Platoon assumed command immediately, the platoon's mobile emergency physician team (MEPT) provided casualty care.

At 13:58 hrs, IRF TF MES was tasked with moving EOD, MP, ARV and MEPT to the site of the attack; these forces departed at 14:05 hrs. A LUNA UAV was launched at 15:04 hrs to enhance the situation picture.

Towards 14:39 hrs, IRF arrived at the site of attack. The casualties were transferred to the IRF MEPT and evacuated under protection to MAS OP NORTH at 14:50 hrs (arrival there at 15:05 hrs). Since MEDEVAC helicopters could not be employed due to weather conditions, already at 15:21 hrs the casualties were ground medevaced (under own forces and ANP protection) to the role 2 mobile surgical hospital (MSH) at KILAGHAY, approximately 15 km away.

At 15:54 hrs, field-expedient repair of LOC PLUTO had been accomplished by ARV employment, towards 16:48 hrs the destroyed FENNEK had been recovered.

At 17:55 hrs, all IRF elements had returned to OP NORTH. C-Platoon, 2nd/TF MES reached its original march destination (COP C1) at 17:59 hrs.

At 19:29 hrs, the treated casualties and security forces had returned to OP NORTH.

CIVPOP Behavior

CIVPOP behavior was inconspicuous; about 40 m away from the site of attack, people were working in the fields. An AFG civilian was injured by IED effects but rendered first aid and taken away by the civilians. Temporary diversion of traffic due to the closing off of LOC PLUTO was controlled by ANP; CIVPOP behavior basically was cooperative.

Although it is unlikely that the civilians working close to the site of attack knew about the attack, a potential cooperation or at least toleration of INS activities cannot be ruled out.

The quick appearance of a civilian camera team may be sheer coincidence. However, it may not be ruled out that they were purposefully informed by INS to collect information on Blue forces' behavior.

Allied Behavior

Cooperation with ANSF was very good. ANP acted quickly, purposefully and effectively. Security provided by them created the prerequisites for quick and safe implementation of own measures. ANP also supported transport of casualties to OP NORTH and FOB KILAGHAY.

The attack occurred at a distance of only approximately 200 m from a permanent ANP CP. It cannot be ruled out, however, that the IED was emplaced taking advantage of the bad weather conditions with partly poor visibility.

Own Forces' Effectiveness

Operational effectiveness of Recce Patrol FAERMANN was assessed as "medium", only. The vehicles did not have IED jammers. Equipped with CG-20 and MEPT, the C-Platoon forces in this situation proved high operational effectiveness.

After the attack, Recce patrol leader and ISR coy forces responded confidently. Establishing self-protection, the rescue of the vehicle crew and immediate initial treatment were exemplary. No faults could be found in the C-Platoon forces' action; they acted in a coordinated and effective manner, maintained contact with the battalion, cooperation with ANSF was ensured.

Own Predictability

LOC PLUTO is the only route to reach COP C1. Own forces employed there time and again must be relieved. A rigid pattern is largely avoided by a changing commitment of forces, alternating rotation cycles and changes in behavior.

Driving behavior of the Recce patrol was in line with its operational doctrine. Driving at high speed was possible in some places only due to the restrictions imposed by COM ISAF's "Driving Directive". In addition, the unplanned halt only one kilometer off the site of attack resulted in the Recce patrol's easy detection and temporary predictability.

Assessment from the Enemy Perspective

From the enemy perspective, the attack can be assessed as only partially successful. Although one armored vehicle was destroyed and ANSF and ISAF forces were temporarily contained, their operations were impeded for a short time, only; they were not lastingly disrupted.

Injuring a local civilian was condoned which should not facilitate cooperation with the civilian population.

Conclusions and Recommendations

- Unpredictability protects! Reliefs, movements and procedures must be modified and adapted time and again in order to keep own predictability as low as possible despite confinement to specific routes.
- Attacks with all types of IED continue to pose the most serious threat to own forces. These can never be precluded entirely – despite jamming and protection equipment and good training. For this reason, conduct after IED attacks must be trained over and over during deployment training and rehearsed in any conceivable variant.
- The ruthless INS behavior towards the civilian population (IED threat, destruction of lines of communication) offers good starting points for information and CIMIC operations. These assets must be involved early and employed appropriately.
- In the case of reserve (IRF) employment, new reserves must be established instantaneously. Transport of the casualties to FOB KILAGHAY was possible, only, since meanwhile new forces were available as reserves.
- Prior to and during deployment, all own forces must be trained in the use of in-theater rescue equipment.





DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



In this and the following two issues of "Learning from Operations", we will publish altogether 5 reports of 2nd/Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 employed as 2nd/TF KDZ from July 2011 until January 2012.

Our special thanks for making available these reports go to Captain Bohnert and the women and men of 2nd/TF KDZ.

Operational Experiences, 2nd/Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 - Preparation for Deployment (1) -



Counter-IED »Train-the-trainers« in Croatia

By Captain Marcel Bohnert and Sergeant First Class Christiane Otto

Given the threat situation posed by improvised explosive devices (IED) in various countries of deployment, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has been organizing a range of different Counter-IED (C-IED) courses in NATO countries. One officer and two senior noncommissioned officers (SNCO) of Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 had the opportunity to attend a two-week train-the-trainers course in KARLOVAC, Croatia (HRV) specifically designed for the ISAF mission.



(1) Parameters and Organization

After a five-hour flight from Hanover with an intermediate stop in Frankfurt, we arrived at Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. There was, however, no time for sightseeing since we were already expected, and, after having been IDed, several small vehicles took us to DUGA RESA – an approximately 90-minute drive towards the southwest. In this slightly remote locality, we checked into a two-star hotel furnished in a medieval style amidst agriculturally used areas and mountains. At dinner time, we already met other course participants in the dining room and were introduced to the responsible officer from Hungary sent by NATO.

At 08:00 hrs the next morning, a bus was waiting to take us to barracks in KAMENSO. On our way there we saw quite a few houses still showing traces of the war in Croatia. At that time, the barracks were operated by the Serbs and KAMENSKO suffered severe damage due to the hostilities. Although the war ended approximately 15 years ago, the locality had not yet recovered entirely and much of the destruction caused by hostilities was still visible.

A Croatian engineer battalion stationed in the KAMENSKO barracks was responsible for our training. Coffee and little snacks were available in the classroom. In addition, welcome brochures and the training schedule for the next two weeks were lying at our tables. Approximately 30 soldiers from different nations gathered in the classroom; beside us Germans also Spanish, Finns, Belgians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Netherlands, Croats and U.S. Americans – covering the ranks from staff sergeant to

VS – NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH
Releasable to NATO/ISAF (Restricted)

colonel. The trainers introduced to us during in-processing were very experienced former Special Forces members from the U.S. and British armed forces meanwhile working for a civilian company hired by NATO. It was clearly visible that numerous



high-intensity operations had left their marks. None of them however had lost his humor which provided for a pleasant training atmosphere.

The objective of the course was to qualify each of us to plan and conduct own C-IED training in the respective sending nation.

Like with other NATO courses in

this field, prerequisites for attending the course were English language skills at least equivalent to Standardized Language Profile (SLP) 2222 and a completed security clearance check level Ü2 (NATO SECRET).

The first days were filled with numerous PowerPoint presentations requiring right from the beginning a high degree of concentration due to the fact that special English was used and the lecturers spoke quickly. Lessons first dealt with the design and use of IEDs and basic IED countermeasures to refresh the required expertise. Training contents included IED awareness, Force Protection, VP check, 5/25 meter checks and jammer employment (electronic countermeasures). Almost all course participants and the trainers had already gained own experience in Iraq or Afghanistan so that the breaks were filled with interesting discussions.



Beginning in the middle of the first week, we several times moved into the training area adjacent to the barracks. In a number of demonstrations, we were able to obtain



a picture of how and by which means training can be conducted purposefully.

Before the weekend, the class was divided into two platoons consisting of two sections, each. Each participant was assigned a subject for a demonstration lesson to be held the following week and to be prepared during the weekend. Some course participants, however, did not miss the opportunity to rent a car and drive to the Adriatic coastline and enjoy the impressive Croat culture and landscape. Since the weather

largely played along, the one or other even felt a bit like being on vacation.

The second week was completely planned, organized and performed by the course participants.

Each day, vehicles, weapons, ammunition and radio sets were available in sufficient amounts for this purpose. Thanks to the engineers stationed on site, the IEDs could be simulated very well and realistically during the patrols. The support team could satisfy almost any wish.

The detonations often took place in puddles or



bodies of water and in some cases even very close to the training unit. This would be very difficult to implement in Germany due to applicable security regulations.



(2) Subject-specific Focus

According to the trainers, 70-80 % of Allied casualties in Afghanistan at present are caused by IEDs. With regard to practice, above all correct tactical behavior after an IED attack appears to be relevant for the training unit. Here, 5/25 meter checks and VP checks are elementary.

During the 5/25 meter checks, the vicinity of the halting vehicle and the dismounted forces is searched for wires or other indications for IEDs to provide protection for the vehicles and the forces.

The procedure is as follows:

- (1) Visually check 5 meters around the vehicle while still inside (using also visual aids),
- (2) Dismount looking at the ground (tread) and close vehicle doors,
- (3) Visually check under the vehicle,
- (4) Physically check for a radius of 5 meters around position,
- (5) Visually scan and then physically search for a radius of 25 meters around position, and
- (6) Establish security.



A vulnerable point (VP) is a terrain point where the IED threat is assessed to be particularly high. These are for instance culverts underneath the road, choke points, crossroad areas or sites where IED attacks have already occurred frequently. It is the convoy commander's or patrol leader's responsibility to identify in advance VPs on the map, to prioritize them based on HUMINT if required, and to determine where VP

checks shall be conducted. VP checks can be carried out in different formations (e. g. V or Y formation).

A SWEEP in this context is an extended – up to several days – search covering longer distances.

After an IED attack on a convoy or patrol, the following (ideal-typical) rules of engagement must be considered:

- (1) Contact/communication (internally and externally),
- (2) Leave the immediate danger zone (kill zone),
- (3) Set a mounted 360-degree security,
- (4) "Pause" and get an overview (complex ambush?),
- (5) Carry out 5/25 meter checks
- (6) Close off the road (pylons, flag, signal pistol, green laser pointer, megaphone, etc.),
- (7) Approach the destroyed vehicle (e. g. in V or Y formation),
- (8) Carry out 5/25 meter checks around the destroyed vehicle, and
- (9) Rescue casualties, render first aid, etc.



The procedures described here represent ideal-typical responses to an IED attack. In reality, the scenarios may well be different. For instance, Close Air Support, artillery support or support by reserve forces are some options.

It should be emphasized that after an IED attack security always has priority over rescue and assistance. The risk of subsequent firefights and secondary IEDs must never be underestimated. In particular, attention must be paid to ensure that any soldier observes the principle of 360-degree security. Experience has shown that after an attack many soldiers by intuition are focused on the situation at the site of attack. Awareness of the forces earmarked for deployment for this problem must be raised from the outset already during deployment training. In




the case of secondary IEDs, the described procedure will start anew. It must be mentioned in this context that INS in Afghanistan continuously adapt their procedure to our own protection measures. This results in the need to apply flexible tactics, train alternative procedures and to exercise caution as to routine processes IAW the principle *Don't set patterns*.

(3) Conclusion

To summarize, the C-IED "Train-the-Trainers" course in Croatia was of high quality and very beneficial in particular due to the operationally experienced trainers who had a good grasp of the subject. English skills were refreshed, training options for dealing with IEDs were demonstrated, and experience exchanged with other nations. Beyond that, the Croat engineers should particularly be mentioned. Despite minor organizational deficits mainly due to the fact that the young NATO member Croatia conducted this course for the first time, they evidently strove for the well-being of the course participants and were dedicated to solve any minor and major problem.

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

NOWZAD IED ATTACK



(4) Additional Information

Meanwhile, there a plethora of training aids, instructions and guidelines on how to deal with IEDs is available. The Armed Forces Office's "Streitkräftegemeinsame Ausbildungshilfe Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices" (Joint Training Manual Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices) and the Infantry School's Training Note »Schutz vor behelfsmäßigen Spreng- und Brandvorrichtungen bei Einsätzen der Bundeswehr im Ausland« (Protection

Against Improvised Explosive Devices During Bundeswehr Operations Abroad) are two positive examples in this context.

The pocket cards "IED Awareness" and "Mission Handout No. 18" summarize important drills and measures. Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Information Center in Grafschaft, Rhineland-Palatinate, activated in April 2010 is the central point of contact for the provision of data and information on IED threats in the Bundeswehr (to be reached via <http://cied.bundeswehr.org/>). The C-IED Information Center is also intended to network other relevant agencies and organizations – also outside the Bundeswehr – and to develop recommendations for appropriate protective action and countermeasures from information obtained.

(5) Consequences from the Company Commander's Perspective

Under the influence of the course and in preparation for deployment as 2nd/TF KDZ in Afghanistan, I designated one C-IED specialist (in the rank of staff sergeant – NATO code: OR-6) who is the first point of contact of his unit in all pertinent matters and will expand his expertise and undergo advanced training whenever possible. He is to support the element leaders with advice on all C-IED-specific issues and training projects and conduct such training himself, respectively.

(All photos: Marcel Bohnert)

Army Lessons Learned Section's Comment:

The consequences from the company commander's perspective are fully shared. Realistic training and implementation of the latest lessons from operations involving different nations give point to attending this course.



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



Operational Experiences, 2nd/Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 - Preparation for Deployment (1) -

Formation and Training of an Infantry Company for Task Force Kunduz

By Marcel Bohnert, Friedrich Schröder and Floris Dohmeyer

(1) General Remarks

Early 2010, 2nd/Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 was tasked with forming and training a reinforced line company for TF KDZ. The battalion's task to form TF KDZ from July 2011 on had already loomed earlier, the battalion, however, initially was tied by numerous other tasks.

(2) Adoption of the Company Structure

Gradually bringing together about 130 women and men as well as numerous combat support forces within less than one year and their preparation for deployment was a challenging task.

Initially, an organizational challenge in this context was the new company structure. The organic A-Platoon of 2nd/Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 under the command of First Lieutenant (OF-1) B. was integrated into the future 2nd/TF MES whose main body consisted of 4th/Light Infantry Battalion 292 in Donaueschingen. In turn, one infantry platoon of 2nd/Light Infantry Battalion 291 from ILLKIRCH (FRA) under the command of First Lieutenant H. was subordinated to 2nd/Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 for accomplishing the tasks of 2nd/TF KDZ from July 2011 on. These structural changes automatically entailed tasks the company had to compensate "in passing". Lessons learned in Afghanistan in recent years have proved that the line companies' structure on deployments – company command, two infantry platoons and one mechanized infantry platoon – is appropriate. From the company's perspective, however, pulling an entire platoon out of the overall structure of the company is more than merely shifting personnel. The atmospheric vacuum created by this structural change had to be filled with life immediately, or in other words: a new company structure had to develop, and not only on paper. This entailed a number of difficulties at the outset which were not that much due to both parties' self-image based on the pride they take in their respective service. First and foremost a look at the map of Germany is recommended to understand the initial distance on the personal level: ILLKIRCH is located 3 km south of STRASBOURG and thus approximately 700 km – about ten hours by bus – southwest of MUNSTER. Subsequently, this geographic hurdle implied that one could only afford to "fly in" the light infantrymen from ILLKIRCH for joint training highlights to spare them the strain of permanently being away from their home base.

However, this in turn had the consequence that neither the company commander at the tactical level nor the first sergeant at the interpersonal one were able to immediately put their marks.

(3) Foci of Training

During preparation for deployment as infantry company, scenarios in the context of the comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy had to be mastered in addition to the training segments covering the classical composite force operation which is very important for operations in Afghanistan, too. This was not always easy, and it was necessary to give subordinate soldiers confidence in their actions by means of information and multifarious training, including the ISAF pocket card.

Furthermore, specific training elements of high importance for Afghanistan had to be included, like behavior under IED threat, MEDEVAC request, or mounted and dismounted urban combat. There were only a handful of soldiers in the company with operational experience from Afghanistan. Therefore, self-reliant familiarization with - for many leaders - new, Afghanistan-specific subjects and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) was required just as the subsequent planning, organization and conduct of training. Of course, we had to take care that training on specific weapon systems, as for instance the FLW 100/200 remote-controlled light weapon station, the automatic grenade launcher (AGL), the G3 DMR, or the G82 were not neglected. In addition, a need for organization primarily ensued as to a plethora of parallel requirements: like the gradual inflow of support forces, achieving the required vaccination status, preparation of personnel documents to be carried along, dealing with materiel shortages and vacancies caused by personnel on training courses, filtering high information density of Lessons Learned/Best Practice papers, limited allocation of training areas and ammunition, familiarization with communications and command and control assets, as well as to demonstrating performance under the directive on training and maintenance of individual basic skills. The risk of a disproportion between organizational effort and training period was omnipresent. Direct relations of the subordinate units with other units were very useful since for instance materiel and equipment available to a limited extent only could be made available temporarily for own purposes while avoiding bureaucratic mechanisms. In addition, setting clear priorities was required to avoid getting lost in details and duplication of efforts. In our company, the company commander set the priorities in preparation for deployment as follows: (1) near-operational training, (2) excellent physical fitness, and (3) intense medical training (*see figure*).



(4) Armor Firing Simulation Center

One of the major training events prior to deployment was the rotation at Armor Firing Simulation Center in MUNSTER from 21 to 25 March 2011 where the training status at platoon level was to be consolidated and raised to company level in the course of the week. The greatest difference in comparison with previous rotations at the Armor Firing Simulation Center was that all training segments without exception were conducted under live firing conditions. The initial worry that due to safety requirements the training might have restricting effects on the combat scenario as demonstrated by previous firing exercises at the Infantry Training Center in Hammelburg, during platoon training was not confirmed and was entirely invalidated during final live firing by the company. No matter with whom we talked within the company, everybody was favorably impressed. Overall organization was well

VS – NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH
Releasable to NATO/ISAF (Restricted)

structured as also were the individual training elements conducted and evaluated at the various levels in a constructive manner. The week at the Armor Firing Simulation



Center was structured as follows: The platoons with their subordinate combat service support elements had to arrive by Monday morning at their training stations to be trained alternately from Monday to Wednesday in the scenarios (1) relief operation, (2) ambush, and (3) area seizure. Night firing times on Monday and Wednesday were used to consolidate the respective subjects also under conditions of limited visibility. On these evenings, the platoons after completion of all measures

moved into the assembly area of the firing range where they were received the next morning by the exercise control section of the Armor Firing Simulation Center.

The tactical company command utilized the platoon training period from Monday to Wednesday mainly for training command post functions in the Trauen Camp themselves. Based on the sand table briefing held by Armored Firing Simulation Center on Tuesday morning on the company live firing exercise to take place on Thursday and Friday, subsequently the order for situation development and its methodological implementation in the terrain were developed. In retrospect we can say that an issue of order prepared over a period of two days does not imperatively constitute the ideal basis for a better field order in stride. In this case, less might possibly have even been more!

Nonetheless, preparation of the company order for relief from Barbaradorf proved to be an appropriate platform for introducing a future-oriented allocation of tasks within the command post. The subsequent live firing exercise on Thursday and Friday simply was a humdinger.

A few words on the setting: 2nd/Inf TF TRAUEN – reduced by the mechanized infantry platoon – at the outset of the exercise secured at Combat Outpost (COP). At that time, mechanized infantry platoon monitored from an Observation Post (OP) and in the first phase of situation development was attacked by INS. Mechanized infantry platoon destroyed INS with its main weapon system; also artillery and Close Combat Attack (CCA) were employed. All these combat operations were controlled by the responsible tactical platoon leader and used live ammunition. Immediately after INS destruction, the following radio-transmitted order by the battalion was issued to the company (abridged quote): *"Ambush against ISR forces while on patrol in Barbaradorf. Casualties and materiel breakdowns. Enemy follows to destroy ISR forces. 2nd/TF TRAUEN attacks immediately with all forces on Barbaradorf to relieve encircled forces."*

Subsequently, the company commander for the first time during predeployment training had the opportunity to lead all elements of his company, including combat support, under live firing conditions. "Live firing" in this case in addition to real breaching charges employed by the engineers in the locality and real employment of artillery using Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST) also implied tactical employment of the armored bridgelayer, the Tactical PsyOps Team (TPT), and the Mobile Emergency Physician Team (MEPT). Since during this live firing exercise no classical target sector markers did exist along the firing range that had to be clung to slavishly, action from the individual soldier up to the tactical approach taken by the company commander could be attuned to operational doctrine. Just like on deployment! Here, the often quoted principle "Train as you fight" pertained indeed. As far as raising own

soldiers' awareness for friendly fire is concerned, there is hardly anything better than exercising mounted and dismounted combat at company level in urban terrain under the conditions of live firing and an effective range of almost 360 degrees.

In summary, the five-day rotation at Armor Firing Simulation Center from the company's perspective can be rated as excellent. The training was a targeted preparation for the upcoming challenges on deployment and marked a further step towards achieving full operational capability (FOC) at all echelons of command.

(5) Internal and External Follow-on Training

Numerous support forces, like for instance electronic warfare forces, the TPT or JFST, during preparation for deployment offered both to the battalion and the company leadership to conduct follow-on training, an offer that was extensively made use of; not least because Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 had not been deployed as one to Afghanistan before. In addition to an early deployment

training seminar and the supplementary CPCM (Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management) training dealing with subjects like "intercultural competence", "personnel recovery" or "legal parameters on deployment", the battalion planned and organized officer professional development/NCO development events on topics like "media" or "lessons learned from operations". Furthermore, weekly updates of the operational picture of own and other forces in Afghanistan were provided. At company level it was important to identify own follow-on training requirements and conduct appropriate events. In this context, the company commander regularly scheduled a usually 30-minute NCO development event regularly held on Friday. The topics ranged from "regional and cultural studies on Afghanistan (host nation orientation)" or "counterinsurgency" to "CCA",



"Vulnerable Point (VP) Check" and "military symbols". Also NCOs had the opportunity to select and give short presentations on topics identified as important; these included for instance "Route Clearance Package", "action to be taken in the case of ambushes", or "leishmaniosis". In order to put each soldier in the position of being "mentally enriched" in his/her day-to-day environment, we developed intra-company learning sheets with common ISAF abbreviations and posted them throughout the company facility. Moreover, a pocket card, also developed within the company, was handed out to each soldier depicting schematically the region around Camp KUNDUZ including important reporting points, lines of communication (LOCs) and localities.

In addition, important information and situation plots were collected and displayed in the company's "Afghanistan Room" set up for the preparation for deployment. The battalion uploaded a "Knowledge Base Afghanistan" to the public network providing a range of digital information on the country of deployment and determined SOPs for deployment which were integrated early into the companies' and platoons' training. Beyond that, intra-company standards were set, too. To give but one example: referring to the lessons learned from a suicide attack in Afghanistan, the company commander recommended to mark the inside and outside of the soldiers' boots with their respective blood groups and names. Further, mainly tactical standards resulted from section and platoon training.

(6) Fact Finding in the Country of Deployment



In September 2010, Commander, Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92, Lieutenant Colonel Lutz Kuhn, and his company commanders undertook a one-week fact-finding mission (FFM) in Afghanistan. Accompaniment of the two infantry company commanders on site at that time, including stays at choke points like the police headquarters, elevations 431 and 432, as well as J92 in Kunduz, revealed that operations in the Kunduz region were primarily planned and

conducted at company level. In the case of enemy contact, tactical combat management was a formidable challenge to the company commander. In addition to commanding own maneuver platoons, this included for instance request and/or coordination and employment of Close Air Support (CAS), indirect fire, snipers, reconnaissance UAVs, and medical forces. Furthermore, there was frequent cooperation with the U.S. Route Clearance Package (RCP) and, of course, the Afghan security forces like the Afghan National Police (ANP) or Afghan National Army (ANA). During the fact-finding mission it was striking that there seemed to be a certain tension between the soldiers employed outside and inside the camp. Approximately 80 % of the just under 1,500 Germans deployed in Kunduz leave the camp only on the occasion of their flight to and from the country of deployment.



(7) Assessment by the Company Commander

Reinforced 2nd/Mechanized Infantry Demonstration Battalion 92 was well prepared for accomplishing its task as 2nd/TF KDZ in Afghanistan. Training had achieved a high level, and it was with good conscience that I released my soldiers for their "cuddle week" (seven days special leave before the beginning of deployment). In retrospect, it should be noted that time and again a considerable outside pressure on the company could be perceived during preparation for deployment. As described under (2) and (3), this above all resulted from organizational requirements arising in particular from the continuous in- and outflow of materiel from the Bundeswehr pool of materiel for preparation for deployment; the need to flexibly select personnel for training courses during ongoing preparation for deployment; and the work loads of the dispensary related to the preparation of the "Medical Information for Personnel File, also Change Notice" (Document Type 90/5) and the associated vaccinations. A better understanding and taking greater account of the burdens to all echelons of the company already during their preparation for deployment are not only desirable but imperative. At least at times, I could not spare my company the much-quoted "mission before the mission" although weekends by and large were free. My respect is due to my soldiers mastering the strains of this early phase with flying colors and whose motivation and commitment with respect to the forthcoming deployment were outstanding.

(Photos: Marcel Bohnert, Daniel Hartung, Claudia Schenkel)



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



GREEN on BLUE (GoB)

Situation:

"GREEN on BLUE" refers to the – attempted or accomplished – intent of ANSF members to kill ISAF forces and other personnel serving with the Coalition Forces. One security incident of this kind in the DEU area of responsibility known is the attack by an ANA soldier against a Marder crew during maintenance and servicing at Observation Post (OP) NORTH on 18 Feb 2011.

In the past three years, the number of such incidents has increased significantly in AFG (from 4 incidents in 2009 to 17 in 2011. As to 2012: until 03 Feb 2012 there had already been 9 incidents.). On the whole, these make up for only a small portion of incidents, though. As compared to the total of security incidents during the period 01 Jan 2011 - 31 Jan 2012 (63,000 → >1,000 KIA, >10,000 WIA ISAF), the percentage of GoB incidents herein is low (27 → 52 KIA, 61 WIA ISAF). After the Quran burnings of 20 Feb 2012, however, another 6 GoB incidents occurred.



Assessment:

The increase in incidents is due on the one hand to the increased ISAF personnel strength and on the other also to the buildup of ANSF.

At present, screening as to reliability/trustworthiness and motivation is rather insufficient when hiring ANSF. Besides, according to current intelligence half of the incidents at max can be attributed to INS or their politico-religious intentions. Very often, the causes identified are personal disputes, overburdening, and drug abuse.

The required cooperation in training and joint operations often bring about inter-cultural differences and tensions due to mutual ignorance.

It should be noted as a matter of principle that fundamental attitude of ANSF towards ISAF is positive.

Conclusion:

All units must intensively be familiarized with the subject of "cultural awareness" during their preparation for deployment to promote mutual respect and trust.

These measures can prevent many attacks that are not religiously and/or politically motivated. Passive protective measures, like self-protection or "Guardian Angel" should remain the responsibility of the local commanders.

On the Army Lessons Learned Intranet Site, two brochures by the British and U.S. land forces on this subject are available for download.



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



GREEN on BLUE COM ISAF INSIDER THREAT TACTICAL DIRECTIVE

As a sequel to the so-called "GREEN on BLUE" incidents, COM ISAF has issued an Insider Threat Tactical Directive (ITTD).

The ITTD underlines the mandatory knowledge and consideration of cultural differences and the necessity to thoroughly screen AFG personnel employed inside camps, FOBs or COPs.

Furthermore, it requires a number of individual measures, including:


- Incessant vigilance of the individual, report of any peculiar observations as a matter of principle,
- Establishment of zones to which exclusively ISAF/U.S. personnel are granted access,
- Increased conduct of identity checks,
- Dignity and respect in the treatment of ANSF personnel, including regular training in the behavior in the case of threats posed by offenders from within.

The contents of the Tactical Directive (TD) will become integral part of the in-processing briefings for all newly deployed soldiers. In addition, subordinate units and formations will be familiarized with its contents at least twice a year.

Individual measures ordered by COM ISAF will be implemented accordingly in the RC NORTH area of responsibility.

Already on 23 January, after the attack against our FRA fellow soldiers, COM RC NORTH specified corresponding rules and modes of behavior in the form of "Best Practice" in a letter to the commanders in RC NORTH.

The ITTD shall also be used at home during deployment training to prepare the units and each individual soldier for this challenge.

	HEADQUARTERS International Security Assistance Force/ United States Forces-Afghanistan Kabul, Afghanistan APO AE 09356	
TO:	SEE DISTRIBUTION	
SUBJECT:	COMISAF INSIDER THREAT TACTICAL DIRECTIVE	
DATE:	2 March 2012	
References:	A. <i>Operations Plan (OPLAN) 38302, Revision 6, dated 31 Oct 11.</i> B. <i>COMISAF Tactical Directive, Revision 4, dated 5 Nov 11.</i>	

COM ISAF's Insider Threat Tactical Directive (ITTD) is available for download at the intranet portal of Army Lessons Learned.



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



GREEN on BLUE

Letter by COM RC N, Major General Kneip, to the Commanders of RC NORTH on the Occasion of the Attack by an ANA Soldier against FRA Soldiers

"Mazar-e Sharif, 23 January 2012

To all Commanders of RC N

The tragic and completely unacceptable events in RC East, taking the lives of four French comrades, shall remind us all to be vigilant, anytime, anywhere!

We must stay close to our Afghan partners, But we must also be aware of the threat, be aware of the various options to counter and to mitigate the threat. Especially those who newly arrived in theatre should check and - if necessary - improve their procedures and situational awareness. The old teams should look for best practise and improve, where necessary.

The trustful relationship and good cooperation we enjoy with our Afghan partners, which is the result of your mens' daily hard and courageous work, might be exploited and misused by the enemy. In order to protect our soldiers and our partners, to protect the success of our mission thoughtfulness, vigilance and precaution are of utmost importance.

Our predecessors and you yourself have developed a number of routines, procedures and best practices to be applied in order to enhance the safety while maintaining good partnership and cooperation.

I want to share this best practice with you once again, as a reminder, in order to encourage all of you to again and again think this vital issue through and take relentless efforts to apply the necessary measures.

Any list of best practises is not designed to be complete, of course it can never be. I ask all of you to contribute to gather your experiences and thoughts, especially in the process of HOTO, we must not allow for knowledge being lost.

Just want to remind you on some examples for best practise in countering this type of threat:

- *Establish and check a good and clear routine wrt the use of mobiles inside camps, inside meeting rooms, for local workers. There are to be clear lines and regulations. We all know how much the INS use mobiles.*
- *Establish and check regulations for using local guards inside your camps or in support for your own camp security. Separate weapons from ammo, check the guards, two men rule for moving inside a camp, etc.*
- *Security has always to be established, even during sports events or handover ceremonies or other gatherings. While most of your men are involved in the main activity, a security overwatch need to be established all the time, i.e. overwatching the soccer field, when you play soccer against Afghan partners.*

VS – NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH
Releasable to NATO/ISAF (Restricted)

- *Use proper entrance rules for DFACs, Gyms, meeting rooms, etc: no bags, ID check for all, no Afghans with loaded weapons, separate long guns from ammo.*
- *Establish and communicate a proper and honourable entrance procedure for Afghans, when they enter your camps.*
- *Use always two men walking policy when you are outside your own camps, inside ANSF camps together with Afghan partners.*
- *Train the CPT of the ANSF leadership together with your own teams, CPT, FP groups, not get familiar, to get a grip on their activities.*
- *Check on a routine basis your terps. Equip your terps and other local, with own mobiles, not allowing them to use their own mobiles for official use inside ISAF camps.*
- *Get your ANSF commanders to talk about this issue - how could we all prevent us from these actions of suiciders, intimidation, assassination, murders. The ANSF leadership, platoon leaders, coy COM, Kdk COM must get to know their soldiers by heart.*
- *Biometrical enrollment must be enforced. We hope to have the right equipment ready in due course.*
- *Talk with your soldiers about the appropriate behaviour and conflict resolutions in relation with the Afghans. In some cases the starting point of these events most likely were linked with an internal dispute between ISAF soldiers and ANSF soldiers.*

I would appreciate if you could:

- *Take your own measures to counter these threats*
- *Forward your best practise to me as an commanders perspective*
- *Stay close to the Afghan partners with a firm confidence, and*
- *Respond firm if needed"*



Suppression of the Enemy

Situation:

There are increased reports that the units during their preparation for deployment are trained – in the case of enemy fire – to initially fire 2-3 (!) magazines as bursts in the direction of the enemy in order to force him to take cover. Thereafter, controlled fire fight is started. This has allegedly been taken from training regulations of the Special Forces Command.

Assessment:

In the light of experience firing entire magazines as burst in a rough enemy direction does not have any suppressing effect on INS. Furthermore, fire bursts can be controlled to a limited extent only.

We know from own action reports but also from Allied Lessons Learned that the enemy is not impressed by indiscriminate fire. It was observed that INS continued the fire fight despite shots falling only a few meters away.

In addition, firing in the assumed enemy direction bears the risk of jeopardizing uninvolved persons.

Ammunition is wasted.

Special Forces Command training regulations imparting the procedures practiced do not exist!

Conclusion:

Military leaders both during training and deployment must give clear weapon control orders and ensure that fire discipline is maintained. Firing entire magazines as fire bursts is inappropriate and must be inhibited.

Moreover, in modern operations the relatively indiscriminate firing of entire magazines puts uninvolved persons at risk and may result in criminal prosecution.

Action to be taken:

- Convey to the soldiers that fire bursts can hardly be controlled and therefore must be confined to close combat engagements!
- Convey to the soldiers that ammunition during training and deployment is a "finite" asset which is not available infinitely and that lack of ammunition has already led to combat abortion, or even to the death of FRA soldiers (KABUL, 19 August 2008) who after several hours of fire fight without noteworthy support had simply run out of ammunition!
- Make the soldiers aware of potential legal consequences of indiscriminate fire at larger distances.
- Platoon and squad leaders must strictly ensure maintenance of fire discipline and counter the procedure described.



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences




FülInfoSysH (Army CCIS) Employment in RC NORTH

Based on the experience made by the Chief, Information Management Cell, FülInfoSysH (Army CCIS) at RC North, CJ6, in Mazar-e-Sharif, this article is to give the current status regarding Army CCIS employment with DEUCONISAF at RC NORTH which in many cases differs considerably from employment in Germany, in particular as to information exchange.

In Afghanistan, Army CCIS is primarily used to display the situation of mobile forces outside the camp and for information exchange between the forces operating outside the camp and the respective Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs). But also the various TOCs at the different locations exchange position and situation data. In addition,

Nutzung FülInfoSysH mit IMC




there is an exchange of data with the ISAF Forces Tracking System and other nations using such systems. These data are exchanged through the NATO FRIENDLY FORCES INFORMATION system (NFFI). The figure opposite shows the three-tier application. Tier 1 marks the exchange of data between vehicle and TOC, tier 2 the exchange between TOC and Information Management Cell (IMC), and tier 3 the exchange between IMC and

ISAF SECRET applications. This way, exchange of position data in both directions is realized.


In addition to the exchange of position data, also text messages can be exchanged between all participants. Here, both free text messages and pre-formatted messages in response to specific incidents can be transmitted.

At present, 15 domains at 6 locations are operating for the various units in the Army CCIS realm in Afghanistan. Within these domains, work stations for most diverse users are operated. Also more than 400 combat vehicles are equipped with the Army CCIS



which in line with the specifications of the respective command posts report their own positions to the respective TOCs via VHF, HF, Tetrapol or InMarSat MiniM. At TOC level, the data are prepared and evaluated. Army CCIS enables creation of different information sections to provide information on the situation map. Additional data from patrol reports, for instance on detected IEDs, roadway damage, and restrictions to trafficability are included in separate information sections and from there are transmitted to the mobile forces in accordance with the relevant situation.


The networks for the respective domains, but also for the integrated server system were set up by portions of the deployable access networks (VAN) and links made available via the different satellite systems. The minimum bandwidth required for sufficient transmission speed is 128 kbps (2 ISDN lines).



Situation analysis and the update of the tactical symbols of the mobile forces are done by appropriate situation analysts in the respective TOCs. These also monitor movement of their subordinate vehicles. Furthermore, the situation analyst ensures incorporation of own symbols in the NFFI output and acceptance - and thus representation - of external symbols in the respective own situation section. If all prerequisites as described above are fulfilled (network connection, situation analysis, integration into NFFI), the data exchange process from the vehicle to the TOC and to the Information Management Cell is as follows:

In the vehicle, Army CCIS is set to operation. Prior to the vehicle's move-off, data are exchanged between vehicle and TOC. Subsequently, the position of the vehicle is reported automatically to the TOC. At the TOC, this information is displayed on the situation map and through the NFFI automatically distributed – via IMC – to the other TOCs and displayed at the respective situation maps. At IMC, these position data are transferred through a gateway to the ISAF FORCES TRACKING SYSTEM, thus enabling representation in the Afghan Mission Network. Also through this gateway, position reports of other ISAF forces return

to Army CCIS and are distributed, also to the TOC level.



to Army CCIS and are distributed, also to the TOC level.


VS – NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH
Releasable to NATO/ISAF (Restricted)

In addition to this automated position reporting, Army CCIS provides the option to transmit short text messages between the vehicles as well as to the TOCs. This enables transmission of additional information and notes/remarks.

Beside the options of the Blue Force Tracking and its use as navigation system during DEU forces' movement in Afghanistan described so far, Army CCIS offers many more functions. Especially at the TOC level, there are functions that can be used for pre-deployment planning of operations in a mission-oriented manner.

Due to the multifarious employment of soldiers in Afghanistan and their different level of coming into touch with the Army CCIS, deployment training in Germany must be adapted accordingly. A vehicle commander or the driver for instance does not need to be trained in the capabilities of the primary staff functions. They must, however, know how to set to operation vehicle equipment and be capable of transmitting their own position. The situation analyst at the TOC level must absolutely be familiarized with the utilization of the map-situation application and the NFFI application, and must be able to manage data exchange via NFFI. Administrators must be familiarized with the network structure, be able to administer the NFFI application functions, and also be trained in the administration of the various vehicle components. Training must be accomplished in Germany in a "Tailored to the Mission" approach starting at the unit level and continued in all training phases.

The Army CCIS provides many options to support and assist at the different levels during deployments. But it is up to the human being to employ this technology.





Behavior in the Case of Braking System Failure in Combat

1. Situation

As a consequence of being taken under fire, hydraulic hoses of various protected vehicles can be damaged or destroyed.

2. Assessment

Depending on the technical design of the parking-brake system, a vehicle with intact force transmission can be moved out of the danger zone/kill zone by means of the engine power working against a blocking parking-brake system, if need be over several hundred meters both on and off road. This depends on terrain conditions, external circumstances and engine power. When not used in accordance with specifications as is the case here, damage to the braking system may occur which, however, is acceptable when faced with a threat situation. For design reasons, blocking of the parking brake due to combat effects can occur with larger protected vehicles only.

3. Conclusion/Action to be taken

Within the scope of the centralized, mission-oriented driver training in the Joint Support Service's driver training organization - in the future basic driver training Class G – appropriate behavior shall be trained theoretically with a view on the specific type of vehicle and be demonstrated during practical technical training. However, real training on a protected vehicle during deployment training is ineligible owing to the cost resulting from damage and/or wear and tear, and first and foremost due to the unacceptable downtimes given already limited numbers of vehicles available for training.

Practical exercise is possible only during simulator-based training on specific types of vehicles.

4. Examples

Protected medium trucks – YAK/DURO
Since the YAK/DURO vehicles are equipped with an air braking system there is a theoretical chance that the damaging event described and its consequences may occur. Bundeswehr Technical Center 41 has demonstrated that the driving power allows for driving on with limitations when the parking brake is actuated.





Protected command and utility vehicle, class 1 – MUNGO

The MUNGO is equipped with a hydraulic dual-circuit braking system with mechanical parking brake. Therefore, the described damaging event and its consequences may not occur; a specific training, thus, is not required.

Protected command and utility vehicle, class 1 – ENOK

The ENOK is equipped with a hydraulic dual-circuit braking system with mechanical parking brake. Therefore, the described damaging event and its consequences may not occur; a specific training, thus, is not required.



Protected command and utility vehicle, class 2 – EAGLE IV

Vehicles of the EAGLE IV type are equipped with an air braking system; therefore there is a theoretical chance that the damaging event described and its consequences may occur. For these vehicles, too, tests have demonstrated that the driving power allows for driving on with limitations when the parking brake is actuated.

Protected command and utility vehicle, class 3 – DINGO 1 & 2

DINGO 1 & 2 vehicles are equipped with a braking system theoretically allowing the damaging event described to occur. The engine output of both vehicles is sufficient to overcome the braking torque. Therefore, with the current configuration of both types of vehicles implementation of the suggestion is technically feasible.



ATV FUCHS (all versions)

ATV FUCHS vehicles are equipped with a braking system theoretically allowing the damaging event described to occur. Bundeswehr drivers, however, can operate an emergency release device to enable driving on.

(Photos: YAK, MUNGO, EAGLE, DINGO – Bundeswehr; ENOK – Mercedes-Benz; FUCHS – Rheinmetall Defence, YAK – DARKLIGHT_GER)



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



Enemy Weapons (1)

AK 47 S Assault Rifle	
Parameter	Data
Type	Assault rifle
Caliber	7.62 x 39 mm
Total weight	5.2 Kg
Overall length	69.9 cm with folded shoulder stock
Mode of fire	Automatic fire, single round
Rate of fire (theoretical)	600 rounds/min
Muzzle velocity	710 m/sec
Effective range	300 m
Ammunition feed	30-round curved-box magazine
Remarks	Due to lessons learned from operations used up to a distance of 500m



AKS 74 u Assault Rifle	
Parameter	Data
Type	Assault rifle, short
Caliber	5.45 mm x 45
Total weight	3.7 Kg
Overall length	67.4 cm 16.54 in with folded shoulder stock
Mode of fire	Automatic fire, single round
Rate of fire (theoretical)	650 rounds/min
Muzzle velocity	900 m/sec
Effective range	300 m
Ammunition feed	30-round curved-box magazine
Remarks	Due to lessons learned from operations used up to a distance of 500m



MG PKM	
Parameter	Data
Type	Medium MG
Caliber	7.62 x 54 mmR
Total weight	7.5 Kg
Overall length	119.2 cm
Mode of fire	Automatic fire
Rate of fire (theoretical)	600 - 850 rounds/min
Muzzle velocity	825 m/sec
Effective range	Up to 1500 m
Ammunition feed	100/200/250-round box magazine
Remarks	





Enemy Weapons (2)

DShK Heavy Machine Gun		
Parameter	Data	
Type	Heavy Machine Gun	
Caliber	12.7 x 108 mm	
Total weight	8.3 Kg	
Overall length	Approx. 130 cm	
Mode of fire	Fire burst	
Rate of fire (theoretical)	600 rounds/min	
Muzzle velocity	850 m/sec	
Effective range	2000 - 2500 m	
Ammunition feed	50-round belt	
Remarks	Weapon of main effort. Mostly used in complex attacks.	
82-mm Mortar		
Parameter	Data	
Type	Medium Mortar	
Caliber	82mm	
Total weight	56 Kg	
Overall length	Approx. 120 cm	
Mode of fire	Single round	
Rate of fire (theoretical)	15 - 25 rounds/min	
Muzzle velocity	211 m/sec	
Effective range	3000 m	
Ammunition feed	Single-fire Gun	
Remarks	Weapon of main effort. Mostly used in complex attacks.	
PzFst 18 Rocket-propelled Grenade		
Parameter	Data	
Type	RPG	
Caliber	64mm	
Total weight	2.6 Kg	
Overall length	105 cm (ready-to-fire) 70.5 cm (pushed-in)	
Mode of fire	Single round	
Muzzle velocity	115 m/sec	
Effective range	200 m	
Ammunition	Single-use weapon	
Remarks	Markedly lighter and easy to hide.	



Counter-IED Information Center

Counter-IED Memo 01/2012



Supposedly harmless IED components which in fact are fully functional IEDs

Facts:

In early January 2012, within the AOR of RC Southwest, CF spotted some individuals who were emplacing a suspicious object on/alongside one of the main LOCs. In this area, hoax IEDs (HOAXs) had already been emplaced several times before, in order to spy out the MO of CF on the site.

The forces of the CF patrol (no EOD personnel) found a bag with a pressure plate inside it. On closer examination, they discovered an electrical pressure switch in the inside of the PP. The CF patrol took the PP with them to the camp for further examination. Five hours later, a detonation occurred within one of the accommodations that killed one soldier and wounded eight others. The explosion took place while the soldiers were discussing and handling the device (the pressure plate).

Apparently, a fully functional IED was hidden inside the seemingly harmless PP.

Assessment:

The IED had been built in such a way that the threat posed by the explosive components could not be detected from outside. The functional IED was only emplaced after the CF's awareness had significantly decreased due to the hoax IED / IED components repeatedly been found in that area.

This incident clearly underlines that even if there have been repeated finds of (supposedly) harmless objects, it must *always* be assumed that any suspicious object might be a fully functional IED.

Recommendation:

IEDs as well as IED components are to be recovered and examined by EOD personnel only! During training, deployment preparation and also in theatre, all military personnel must be made aware of the insurgents' potential COAs and are to be briefed on the necessity to avoid repeating behaviour patterns.




Fig.: Design of the IED - Example



Counter-IED Information Center



Counter-IED Memo 02/2012

Employment of photo sensors in IEDs to booby-trap EOD personnel

Facts:

A Light Dependent Resistor (LDR) is a variable electrical resistor, whose resistance value is light-dependent. Amongst others, it is used as illuminance meter, twilight switch and sensor in light barriers. An LDR can also be integrated into an explosive circuit of an IED. When light hits the resistor, this triggers the explosive charge. Alternatively, also switches with photo diodes that work in a similar manner as LDRs can be employed.

Switches with photo sensors are suitable for the construction of anti-EOD “booby traps” that are primarily directed against EOD personnel.

LDR can be built in on the inside or outside of an IED as an additional triggering device which sets off upon light incidence during opening/exposure/recovery.

The combination of IED circuits and LDR has already been encountered in some cases in the AFG area of operations (see InfoZ Counter IED Memo 04/2010). In February 2009, for example, an LDR was secured during the discovery of IED components in the KUNDUZ area.




Fig.: Location of an LDR switch inside an IED

Assessment:

Recent intelligence from the area of operations suggests that INS intend to employ photo sensors as a countermeasure against EOD operations. The utilization of such switches requires a certain amount of basic electronic skills, and the assembly of IED components and/or IED emplacement is ideally performed during darkness or with sufficient protection from light. For this reason, the utilization of photo sensors will remain limited to a few cases. The employment of IEDs booby-trapped against EOD personnel in the AOO is not a new phenomenon and must therefore always be reckoned with in EOD operations.

Recommendation:

Whenever possible, UXO exposure, recovery and disposal must always be performed with non-contact stand-off systems to minimize the threat posed by booby traps targeting EOD personnel.



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



Counter-IED Information Center



Counter-IED Memo 03/2012


Employment of trip-wire triggered IEDs

Facts:

In early January 2012, an IED was handed over to DEU forces by local people (within the AOR of RC North, in the BAGHLAN area). The IED basically consisted of a customary yellow 20 l container filled with explosives, and a battery pack connected to a plastic bottle. The IED was constructed to be triggered by trip wire. The trip wire led into the plastic bottle inside which it was connected to an improvised switch designed to close the electric blasting circuit upon tensile load, i.e. on pull.

According to the local people who had handed over the IED, the device had been found emplaced within a dry valley (Wadi) that was frequently crossed by dismounted friendly forces.

Over the last two years, trip wire has been used in some cases for securing villages in the KUNDUZ area.



Example of possible IED positioning



Battery pack connected to plastic bottle



Canister containing explosive charge

Assessment:

Judging by both its design and the location where it was found, the IED in question was targeted against dismounted forces moving to their respective mission area via regularly used routes. Unlike pressure plates (PPs), which only have a very limited triggering area, trip-wire mechanisms can cover a road at its entire width. Thus, the road/route may be blocked requiring a relatively small input of material. The discovery of this IED again underlines that the enemy will always try to exploit predictable behavior on the part of friendly forces.

Recommendation:

During training, deployment preparation and also in theatre, all military personnel must be made aware of the insurgents' potential COAs and are to be trained in tried-and-tested search procedures. All military personnel must further be briefed on the necessity to avoid repeating behavior patterns.



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



Counter-IED Information Center

Counter-IED Memo 04/2012



Use of headwear as charge carrier for suicide bombings

Facts:

In mid-February 2012, German forces in the area of responsibility of Regional Command (RC) North learned about a possible suicide-bomb attack. Headwear typical of the country, a Pakol, was to be used as a charge carrier. An examination of the secured headwear by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assets revealed that the Pakol was fitted with about 1 kg of homemade explosive (HME) and metal rivets as effect-enhancing fragments. The explosive charge was hidden in the thick head band and in the top.

According to available information, it cannot be ruled out that the suicide-bomb attack had been planned to be carried out on the occasion of a meeting (shura) of village elders with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) representatives.



Secured Pakol with position of the explosive charge inside the head band



Typical way the Pakol is worn

Assessment:

The Pakol as common headware is rather inconspicuous and therefore well suited to conceal things. Other headwear typical of the country is also suited to contain improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in principle.

Unlike the turban attacks carried out in 2011 which, using relatively small explosive charges, had been designed to kill individual high-ranking target persons, the IED found in the Pakol, a fragmentation charge, was meant to cause as many victims as possible.

This find shows again that the insurgents are very flexible in adapting their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). An attack carried out with a high number of victims, particularly among coalition forces, would be a considerable success for the insurgents which would find appropriate media attention.

Recommendation:

Inform friendly forces in training, preparation for deployment and on deployment abroad about this possible insurgent TTP.



DEUCONISAF Operational Experiences



Counter-IED Information Center



Counter-IED Handbook No. 1

Pocket Card for Soldiers on Deployment

Facts:

This Counter-IED Handbook No. 1 is based on current directives and lessons learned on the C-IED threat in Afghanistan. It is a compilation of essential own tactical C-IED policies and examples from deployment. In addition, the handbook comprises overarching C-IED subjects which play a significant role in dealing with the IED threat and have proved their worth on deployment.

The handbook is to assist the tactical command and the actions taken by the deployed forces under IED threat in theater at all times and to enhance their confidence in what they are doing. It is no substitute for studying the principles of the relevant directives.



Assessment:

The C-IED handbook provides advice and guidelines for movements in the country of deployment under IED threat. Its six chapters give general information on IED, checklists for the preparation of a move, rules of conduct and advice on how to behave, introduces reconnaissance procedures and addresses the adequate behavior after an IED attack. An annex including reference documents and a list of abbreviations complements the handbook.

Recommendation:

Any unit preparing for deployment should request this handbook (Mission Handout No. 22) and implement during deployment training. By kind permission of Counter-IED Information Center, the handbook (DEU) is available for download at the Army Lessons Learned intranet site.



ISAF/KFOR Lessons Learned



Army Lessons Learned Events in the Second Quarter of 2012

08 - 09 May 2012 Army Lessons Learned on Deployment Seminar in KOBLENZ

Lessons Learned Seminar of 26th/27th DEUCONISAF with again more than 400 participants.

This Lessons Learned Seminar will build on the seminar held in KOBLENZ on 05/06 October 2011 and will enlarge upon the lessons learned discussed during the event and discuss new ones in working groups.



22 - 24 May 2012 Materiel Evaluation Discussion, MUNSTER



During the Materiel Evaluation Discussion, findings relating to vehicles, weapons, and equipment will be discussed in close cooperation with soldiers of all rank categories having returned from deployment, and representatives of the user offices and industry to ensure that the new and further development of defense materiel is purposefully focused on mission requirements.

Armored command and utility vehicle GFF ENOK 1, MULTI A4 truck FSA (vehicle protection equipment), TEP 90, FENNEK engineer Recce vehicle, and MRAV BOXER A1 will be dealt with for the first time in the evaluation discussion.

30/31 May 2012 ORF Bn KFOR Lessons Learned Seminar


Lessons Learned Seminar with members of ORF Bn KFOR II-2011/ I-2012 and GARFCOM and Army Office representatives aimed at exploiting operational experiences of the ORF Bn for preparing the follow-on battalion for deployment.

We will report on the seminar's result in the next issue of "Learning from Operations".



UNITED STATES ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH - US ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY CENTER

Inside the Wire Threats – Afghanistan GREEN on BLUE



The US Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth - US Army Counterinsurgency Center is the leading agency of the US land forces for evaluating lessons from operations and for turning these into recommendations for the US Army and allied forces.

Contents:

At present, US Armed Forces are the main victim of GREEN on BLUE incidents. This caused CALL to address itself to the backgrounds and own options to avoid/prevent such incidents.

The handbook subdivides into four sections:


1. Introduction – problem presentation and procedures already practiced.
2. Predeployment Training – implementation of the measures in deployment training.
3. Intelligence – description of potential causes for insider attacks.
4. Operations – application of lessons learned on operations.

The handbook offers to the reader approaches to preventing such incidents and the various procedures for implementing these during the preparation for deployment.

The original document is available for download at the Army Lessons Learned intranet page under "Publikationen/International".



A Commander's Guide to Threats in Helmand Province



The Commander's Guide to Threats in Helmand Province provides military leaders of all echelons with insights into INS structures, motivations and procedures. The high quality of these statements has prompted us to have this guide translated into German.

The four chapters give insights into structures and motivations of the INS, their procedures and objectives, and on how an insurgency is kept running even against superior regular armed forces.

Chapter 1 – Helmand Security Dynamic

This chapter describes general aspects, structures and INS integration into/interaction with the population.

Chapter 2 – The Insurgency in Helmand Province

Here, INS regional structure, objectives but also their vulnerabilities are described.

Chapter 3 – The Insurgent Threat in Helmand Province

Details are given on the INS targeting cycle, on how they operate across all phases, right up to how they evaluate and exploit operations.

Chapter 4 – Sustaining the Insurgency

This chapter describes the support to INS, but also INS methods to intimidate the population and to recruit new fighters and their training.



At the Last Minute



Training Guide for Firing the G28 Rifle, Telescopic Sight



Situation:

Since January 2012, the G28 telescopic sight rifle has been used during deployment training of elements of 13th Mechanized Infantry Division. From July 2012 on, the weapon will be available for operations. So far, only technical instructions of the manufacturer have been available for this weapon, but absolutely no instructions or training documents for training in the units.

Assessment:

Due to the lack of clear training documents, the training in the units was not coherent and there were wide differences in attitudes how to employ this weapon.

Action Taken:

On 13 March 2012, Infantry School issued a training guide for firing the G28 telescopic sight rifle. This training guide is available on the intranet and should be downloaded by units with G28 in stock.



At the Last Minute



Lessons Learned on Operations

Information for DEUCONISAF Personnel

Also DEUCONISAF personnel have immediate access to Army Lessons Learned publications.

DEU LL Cell at CoS DEU Element HQ RC North (XO Office) specifically for this purpose has established a website with download section on the CAMP MARMAL intranet.



[Intranet CAMP MARMAL > Einheiten > Einsatzauswertung](#)

In the ISAF SECRET network, the site of DEU LL Cell can be found under:

[RC North HQ Portal > COM > Lessons Learned](#)

Make available your experiences gained / Best Practice to follow-on contingents!

Your ideas, proposals and suggestions for improvement will be reflected in deployment training, equipment and materiel improvements, and the further development of procedures and processes.

Recommended for Reading

Der Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan [The Bundeswehr Mission in Afghanistan]



In its recently published annual paper, the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI) focuses on the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan. This annual paper was initiated by an empirical study "ISAF 2010" by the SOWI.

In addition, it was the specific political context of the ISAF mission that induced the SOWI to dedicate its annual paper exclusively to this subject. The anthology comprises articles/papers both by own and external authors and is intended to contribute to an "informed strategic discussion on German security policy and the highest-profile Bundeswehr mission", writes Ernst Christoph Meier, Director of and Professor at the SOWI in his preface.

This volume for the first time compiles internal and external perspectives on the mission. The first part of the anthology gives the strategic context, an assessment and review of the mission, with that of the Bundeswehr Chief of Staff, General Volker Wieker, leading the way. He states that also after transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan government, the country at the Hindu Kush will "remain a great challenge to the international community and continue to be dependent on support on a partnership basis". "We must not let Afghanistan down, as happened in 1989 – with the fatal consequences we still struggle with today", so General Wieker.

The second part focuses on the specific operational reality and reflects on the impacts this reality has on the soldiers, their social environment and the Bundeswehr. The different contributions provide a review documenting the Bundeswehr's transformation towards an operational Army. The authors here also draw upon the results of field research collected and evaluated by the SOWI research team from numerous talks, interviews and observations during 22nd ISAF contingent deployment.

The authors speak of a "Generation Mission", of the "mission as a place to learn", of a "two worlds problem" and a potential "generation conflict". Death and killing already form part of operational reality, the authors state. But the Bundeswehr is not only confined to combat situations. Everyday military life in Afghanistan is marked by a diffuse threat. An attack may occur anytime and anywhere. Nevertheless, one deployment is not like another, since not all soldiers do experience the same things during their deployments – depending on their respective location of deployment, their respective tasks and on whether they operate inside



The SOWI Team (Dr. Anja Seiffert, Dr. Phil C. Langer, Carsten Pietsch and Hauptmann Bastian Krause) talking with members of 22nd DEUCONISAF at PRT Kunduz in May 2010

or outside the camps. Experiences gained during operations shape and change the mind, the authors write. It remains to be seen how the experiences of this "Generation Mission" will concretely impact the Bundeswehr as an organization. One thing, however, is particularly important to the soldiers risking their lives on deployment. They expect "positive effects of their commitment" – put in a nutshell: "They want their mission not to be futile".

The relation between operational Army and society is in the focus of the third part.

One article deals with the attitudes of the Germans toward the ISAF mission based on the public surveys conducted by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences. The author states that it is insufficient to "tout for the population's sympathy, interest and support for the Bundeswehr", the politicians rather "also are to convey the concrete effects of missions abroad, since this is the only way" to generate "stable support". The population does not regard the mission as an end in itself. Another article inquires after the backing the ISAF mission experiences among the European populations. It refers to inquiries of European populations and shows that the different attitudes toward the mission result from fundamental security-political convictions. This is an unfavorable precondition "for developing a common European strategic culture".

The fourth part of the volume, finally, in an exemplary manner deals with the issue of mission-related standards. One article deals with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, another with the perceptions of the Afghanistan mission on the side of soldiers, politicians and the churches.

Despite all the criticism as to the past ten years of the mission and all uncertainties as to its outcome, the contributions to the anthology are "marked by a cautiously hopeful perspective that the remaining chances will be exploited in the best possible way". This, however, requires not only a "major concerted effort", but also an honest and open debate "both on the effectiveness of the commitment up to now and on what shall come after ISAF".

(Dr. Anja Seiffert, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI))

Price: EUR 34,95

Year of publication: 2012

ISBN 978-3-531-18301-5

Published by: Anja Seiffert, Phil C. Langer, Carsten Pietsch

Publishing house: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

Further Links (Intranet/Internet)
(Page 1 of 2)

Army Lessons Learned

Intranet Heer
Startseite> Fachinformationen >
Einsatzauswertung Heer



**Bundeswehr Lessons Learned
from Missions Database (InfoSys EEBw)**

<http://eebw.bundeswehr.org/EEBw/.iws>



Portal C-IED Information Center

<http://cied.bundeswehr.org>



**Information on the "Infantryman of the Future –
Basic Configuration" (IdZ-BS) System**
(Manuals, further training documents, wind tables etc.)

[http://168.6.1.35/LogZH/Inhalte/LogService/
Informationen/LogDokumente/IdZ/pgldZ.htm](http://168.6.1.35/LogZH/Inhalte/LogService/Informationen/LogDokumente/IdZ/pgldZ.htm)



Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

www.ptbs-hilfe.de
www.angriff-auf-die-seele.de



Bundeswehr Scientific and Technical Information Center
Readings for deployments

<http://166.87.4.2:8080/portalW/index.htm>



Training in the Army

[http://ausbildung.bundeswehr.org/
portal/a/i_ausbildung/orgbereiche/ausb_heer](http://ausbildung.bundeswehr.org/portal/a/i_ausbildung/orgbereiche/ausb_heer)



Further Links (Intranet/Internet)
(Page 2 of 2)

**Central Coordination Point
for Intercultural Competence**


Intranet Streitkräftebasis > Startseite >
Arbeitsbereiche > Interkulturelle Kompetenz



Brief the troops

Intranet Bundeswehr

Startseite > Intranet aktuell > Streitkräfte >
Einsatz > Unterrichtung der Truppe



<http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/coin/gen.-petraeus-counterinsurgency-guidance.html>

Bundeswehr Training Forum



<http://ausbildungsforum.bundeswehr.org>

Military History Research Institute



<http://www.mgfa.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/>