

Dynamic Mission Command Nodes in the Armored Reconnaissance Squadron
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The ability of an Armored Reconnaissance Squadron (ARS) to execute echelonment of mission command nodes is an art and science that must be planned with absolute fidelity as we maneuver in a more dynamic operational environment. In the era of persistent conflict, the Army has executed Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations for eleven years in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and nine years in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND). Our mission command nodes have become consolidated and static, resulting in a lack of understanding and knowledge base for the current generation of Soldiers. This article's purpose is to outline doctrinal considerations and "A Way" methods for commanders and staffs to train and experiment with echelonment of mission command nodes in an ARS on a dynamic battlefield. We will focus our observations and lessons learned from the National Training Center's (NTC) rotational exercises with a strong emphasis on Decisive Action Training Environment 12-05 (NTC 12-05).

In an uncertain and fluid environment, organizations need commanders who understand and make decisions based on time, space, and critical decision points in a dynamic environment. During NTC 12-05, the ARS was put to the test in a traditional reconnaissance and security role as the BCT "eyes and ears". The squadron was able to stress its mission command nodes across the battlefield.

In the current COIN fight within Full Spectrum Operations, many squadron level and subordinate unit command posts lack the conditions that favor sustaining or cultivating an understanding of the art and science required to echelon our mission command nodes. The Army operated from fixed site Command Posts (CP) due to our current operational environment considerations that include provincial or district boundaries as well as partnered or supported Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) areas of operation. The Army does this very well and it works for current missions under stability operations that are often oriented on securing the people in population centers denying threat access to key terrain and reducing threat freedom of movement along avenues of approach or across borders. The Army has submerged itself into the environment and grown roots in mission command nodes and it has, in some respects, undermined the ability to fight on the move at the squadron level in a dynamic environment. Commanders and staffs are struggling to understand roles and responsibilities in a more fluid environment of decisive action operations at the NTC. We have to reenergize how we approach

offensive and defensive operations and understand our command posts are not fixed in a decisive action environment.

During training for offensive and defensive operations at the NTC, the Observer, Controller, Trainers (OC/Ts) have observed a lack of understanding amongst squadron level staffs for how to echelon squadron level command posts in support of operations over extended ranges. During NTC 12-05 there were successes and failures in the echelonment and employment of mission command nodes when the squadron conducted CAM. In the next two years, the Army will transition to execute Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotations at the NTC with leaders who have never observed and/or trained on the echelonment of a Tactical Command Post (TAC), Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP).

Echelonment of mission command nodes facilitate mission command on the dynamic battlefield. To facilitate this discussion we will examine a method of mission command for an ARS based on lessons learned from NTC 12-05. The CPs we will discuss include the TAC/MCG, TOC and CTCP. There is no graphical depictions of an ARS echelonment of mission command nodes in the March 2010 version of FM 3-20.96 "Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron" or examples of mission command nodes in the September 2011 in FM 6-0 "Mission Command". Below in figure 1, we provide a depiction of an ARS "A way" to echelonning MC nodes.




Figure 1. Example of Echelonment of SQDN Mission Command Nodes in a Dynamic Operational Environment

There are many factors that contribute to a commander's selection of the CP locations. Following are some of the most important and most common across all levels of command:

- Need to see and experience firsthand
- Need to motivate and lead
- Access to information to make timely decisions
- Ability to judge the condition and morale of forces
- Communicate to subordinate, adjacent, and higher forces
- Decision making capability
- Security, including physical protection
- Time and location of critical events

The Tactical Operation Center Command Post (TOC) conducts routine activities such as reporting requirements to higher headquarters, requesting of enablers if the forward element cannot and manages the common operating picture. This CP must maintain communication and coordination with the troops and the BCT. It should be configured to facilitate flow of information and cross talk amongst the staff. Main functions of the TOC include synchronizing all aspects of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations, monitoring the current fight, controlling fires and effects, and planning for future operations. They also coordinate with higher headquarters and adjacent units to assist them in monitoring progress of missions. Above all the TOC has to monitor and support the commander's situational understanding through information management and anticipate the commander's decision points and CCIR.

TOC "A WAY"




























| PAX | MANNING | BPR # | TYPE | SPC EQP | WFF | NETS |
|---|--|-------|---|-----------|---|---|
|  | Assistant S3 Battle NCO RTO/Driver Track Cdr | HQ34 |  M1068 S-3 TOC Track | BFT/OSRVT | M&M | BDE CMD SQDN CMD A&L SQDN FIRES |
|  | S2 OIC S2 NCOIC/Track Cdr S2 Analyst/DVR Assistant S2 | HQ20 |  M1068 S-2 TOC Track | BFT | INTEL | BDE O&I SQDN O&I BDE FIRES SQDN CMD |
|  | S3 assigned NCO/TC S3 assigned Soldier/DVR | HQ 36 |  S3 Equipment Transport Vehicle | | SQDN Executive Officer Battle CPT/TC CBRN OIC S3 assigned Soldier/DVR | HQ 5  |
|  | S3 assigned NCO/TC S3 assigned Soldier/DVR | HQ 3 |  DRASH | | Targeting NCO (AFATDS)/TC SQDN Targeting Officer Fires Support Specialist-RTO/DVR | HQ 31  |
|  | Operation SGM/TC S3 assigned Soldier/DVR | HQ 37 |  DRASH | | | |
|  | S6 CPN NCOIC/TC S6 CPN Operator/DVR | HQ65 |  CPN | | Battle NCO/TC RTO/DVR | HQ 35  |
|  | S6 OIC/TC S6 LAN MGR S6 SR XMSN SYS OPR-MNT S6 XMSN SYS OPR-MNT/DVR | HQ9 |  Generator | | | |
|  | S6 NCOIC/TC S6 LAN MGR S6 Signal SPT SYS MAINT/DVR | HQ 64 |  | | | |
|  | S3 Assigned NCO/DVR Battle NCO/TC S3 assigned NCO/RTO | HQ 2A |  | | | |
| RETRANS | | | | | | |
|  | S6 TEAM CHIEF/TC S6 Radio Retrans OPR/DVR S6 RADIO RETRANS OPR | HQ 63 |  | | | |
|  | S6 TEAM CHIEF/TC S6 Radio Retrans OPR/DVR S6 RADIO RETRANS OPR | HQ 61 |  | | | |
|  | S6 TEAM CHIEF/TC S6 Radio Retrans OPR/DVR S6 RADIO RETRANS OPR | HQ 62 |  | | | |

Figure 3. "A WAY" slide for equipment and manning of TOC

The TOC is the most robust node based on the amount of information they will process and reports they submit. At a minimum the main command post, ran by the XO, has representatives from every War Fighting Functions (WFF) to continue updates of estimates and provide the commander, higher, and adjacent units with situational reports on the progress of the battle. The commander would make the decision where he wants the S2 based on the S2's ability to "see the battle". The S6 section is also at the TOC, minus any retrans teams out on the battlefield. They maintain the networks, both FM and digital, to ensure the TOC maintains communication with all units. The digital systems in an ARS include a CPN, the 117G, and the Adaptive Wideband Networking Waveform 2 (ANW-2) network. The Battle Captain is essential to the TOC. He ensures all roles and responsibilities are understood within the TOC, report all CCIR to the XO, and approve all reports sent to higher and adjacent units. The S3 section remains with the TOC, ensuring the battle rhythm is followed, and collects the data to be refined into information/knowledge for inclusion in reports that go out to the end user. During NTC 12-05, the importance of the S3 section being echeloned properly was noticed during transition from zone reconnaissance to screening operations. The AS3 / Planner remained at the TOC and this enabled the squadron staff to begin rapid decision making and synchronization process

(RDSP) while the commander and S3 were deployed forward. RDSP (reference FM 5-0 chapter 5), describes the military decision making process (MDMP) as seeking the optimal solution. The RDSP seeks a timely and acceptable solution within the commander's intent, mission, concept of operations and CCIRs of an existing order. The assistant S3 (AS3) and the squadron executive officer's (S XO) ability to recognize changing variables of the operation enables them to visualize multiple COAs, with which to provide recommendations to the SCO. They refined the COAs based on the time available and whether or not they would be feasible. This allowed the SQDN to continue the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight while answering the BDE PIR. This enabled the SQDN to refine the original plan and push out updated orders to forward elements via BFT.




Figure 5-2. Rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process



Tactical Operation Center













The Tactical Command Post (TAC) directly assists the commander in controlling current operations. The TAC aids in control of maneuver and fires during the battle. The commander determines the composition, nature and tasks of the TAC CP with understanding that it must be simpler, smaller, and more austere than that of the main CP. As per FM 3-20.96 Appendix B (2006 version), the TAC also:

- Controls current operations by providing the command group with critical combat information, intelligence and access to the COP;
- Relays the commander's decisions and instructions;

- Provides the backup net control station for the command and O&I radio nets;
- Provides a forward location for issuing orders; provide a forward short-term planning facility;
- Serves as the main CP in the event the main CP is destroyed or unable to function; and
- If necessary, coordinates and then controls special operations such as passage of lines, relief in place, river crossing, or other transition operations.

The TAC is led by the operations officer to assist the commander anywhere on the battlefield. The TAC relinquishes control of non-battle related reporting to the Tactical Operation Center (TOC). Multiple units rely heavily on a Mobile Command Group (MCG) versus a complete TAC. MCG consisted of two M3A3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFV) as well as the squadron commander and command sergeant major's High Mobility Multipurpose Wheel Vehicle (HMMWV) providing the SCO the ability to break away and move across the battlefield. The TAC and MCG could be co-located or separate based on the commander's ability to "see the fight". We observed a TAC/MCG forward with four track vehicles and two HMMWV with the addition of Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) and/or Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) vehicles. Figure 2 is an "A WAY" for manning and equipping the TAC/MCG that was very effective during NTC 12-05. During this rotation, the TAC vehicles consisted of two M1068's, which can be configured in to a "light" or "heavy" TAC role.

TAC and MCG "A WAY"

| PAX | MANNING | BPR # | TYPE | SPC EQP | WFF | NETS |
|--|--|-------|---|------------------------------|--------------|--|
|  | Battle CPT/TC RTO/DVR S2 Analyst NCO/(OSVRT) S6 Signal INFO SVC NCO | HQ 60 |  | OSRVT 4 FM Nets TACSAT | INTEL MC | BDE CMD SQDN CMD SQDN O&I SPARE |
|  | SQDN Fire Support Officer SQDN FS NCO/TC Fire Support Specialist-AFATDS Operator/DVR Targeting NCO (AFATDS) | HQ 30 |  | AFATDS (FM)★ CUOPS | FIRES M&M | BDE FIRES FM BDE FIRES DIGITAL SQDN FIRES FM SQDN FIRES DIGITAL |
|  | Squadron Commander/TC GUNNER DVR | HQ 66 |  | | | SQDN CMD BDE CMD |
|  | Squadron Operations Officer (S3) GUNNER DVR | HQ 33 |  | | | SQDN CMD BDE CMD |
|  | Assigned NCO/TC DVR | HQ 6 |  | | | SQDN CMD BDE CMD |
|  | Squadron CSM/TC DVR | HQ 7 |  <i>SCO's Alternate Vehicle</i> | | | SQDN CMD BDE CMD |

Note: Mobile Command Group
CFV and/or HMMWV mix (usually consisting of SCO's Track and another vehicle)
Separating from TAC's M1068's moving close to FLOT

Figure 2. "A WAY" slide for equipment and manning of TAC and MCG (excluding JTAC/ANGLICO/ALO attachments)

A "light" TAC is essentially two M1068's back-to-back with ramps down and the JTAC/ANGLICO vehicle. The CFVs provide local security oriented towards the enemy threat. The advantage of this configuration is its ability to displace quickly in less than 5 minutes, unless a Quick Erect Antenna Mast (QEAM) antenna is fully extended. The disadvantage is the inability for assigned staff members to have full situational understanding as they conduct short term planning and lay out the multiple battle tracking/chart's for fire support, S2 products, decision support matrix criteria, CCIR, friendly current composition/disposition, etc. This method was effective in short-term occupation of a site to control the battle with expectations of "jumping" within a few hours or even minutes. If the commander needs move closer to the forward line of troops (FLOT), he has the ability to break away from the TAC with his CFV and another designated vehicle pending on the tactical situation. In this case, the S3 would operate out of the TAC while the commander moves out with designated staff members such as the S2 Analyst/FSO/JTAC/ANGLICO/ALO as needed.



The TAC in “light” configuration with M1068s back to back

A “heavy” TAC configuration is established with the two M1068s back-to-back, ramps down, and Standard Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) set up. The attached JTAC/ANGLICO/ALO vehicles are set next to the SICPS near the entry point. CFVs maintain local security. All staff are located in the SICPs planning and battle tracking with the commander’s ability to give guidance directly to all TAC personnel. All battle tracking boards are posted and actively updated with the commander having the best situational understanding of friendly and enemy forces giving him the ability to make critical decisions at decisive points of the operation. The establishment of a “heavy” TAC is dependent on the duration of the site, enemy threat, and its ability to communicate with subordinate, adjacent, and higherquarter elements. An effective battle drill for the “heavy” TAC is when the conditions favor the TAC in mission command and it would be on an location for two or more hours, the “heavy” TAC was set up.



The TAC being setup in the “heavy” configuration with SICPS and battle tracking boards

The commander, S3, AS2 or S2 Analyst, FSO, FSNCO, Fire Support Specialist AFATDS Operator, JTAC/ANGLICO/ALO, S6 Signal Information Service NCO should all be located within

the TAC/CMD GRP. The TAC will aid the commander in control of maneuver and fires during the battle and employ anywhere on the battlefield. Equipment that the TAC employs with includes a communication package such as radios (FM, HF, and TACSAT) and digital systems (BFT/FBCB2). They only control the actual battle, allowing the TOC to push and pull reports as necessary. They relinquish C2 when battle is over or if they are degraded while on the move to a better location. BFT was heavily and effectively employed during CAM where quick and concise reports were necessary. On average, over 250 BFT FIPRs were sent daily from the ground cavalry troops to all echelons of mission command nodes. The excellent use of BFT allowed commanders to send time sensitive reports and make critical rapid decisions on FM without over saturating the net with non-time sensitive information. The OSRVT (One System Remote Video Terminal) was present in the S3 M1068, but non-functional due to maintenance issues. If the OSRVT functioned, the commander would have access to the multiple UAS feeds that would have added to his situational awareness, especially in multiple passes that were possible mobility corridors for the BCT. Overall, the TAC set up in Figure 2 effectively allowed the squadron commander to control his subordinate units and give timely and accurate reports and recommendations to the BCT Commander.

The Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) is the pusher/puller unit based on METT-TC positioned typically 8 to 10 km from the forward line of troops. This command post could be split depending on operations. By doctrine, the CTCP plans and coordinates sustainment for tactical operations and may serve as an alternate for the TOC. CTCP consists of elements of the Forward Support Company (FSC), Squadron S-1 and Squadron S-4 with the S-4 as the officer in charge (OIC). The Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP), Squadron Aid Station (SAS), and FSC forward cell will usually collocate with the CTCP. Additionally the tactical situation may dictate that the Main Aid Station (MAS) and/or Forward Aid Station (FAS) be located with the CTCP depending upon the developed concept of support by the Medical Platoon Leader. The CTCP functions to:

- Track the current battle with the same battle tracker map boards and tracking charts as due the TOC and TAC,
- Control sustainment of the current operations, provide sustainment representation to the TOC for planning and integration,
- Forecast and coordinate future requirements,
- Monitor MSRs and control sustainment traffic
- Coordinate the evacuation of casualties, equipment, flatracks, and detainees.

CTCP "A WAY"

| PAX | MANNING | BPR # | TYPE | SPC EQP | WFF | NETS |
|-----|--|--------|------|---------|-------------|--|
| | HHTTRP XO/TC RTO DRV | HQ10 | | | SUST C+C | BDE A&L SQDN CMD SQDN A&L SPARE |
| | HHTTRP CDR/TC RTO/DVR S6 COMMO LINE CHIEF | HHT 6 | | | M + M | SQDN CMD SQDN A&L |
| | HHTTRP 1SG/TC RTO/DVR | HHT 7 | | | 1SG | SQDN CMD SQDN A&L |
| | SQDN S4 OIC/TC SQDN S4 SQDN S4 assigned Soldier/DVR | HQ 4 | | | S4 | SQDN CMD SQDN A&L |
| | SQDN S1 OIC/TC SQDN S1 assigned NCO SQDN S1 assigned Soldier/DVR | HQ 1 | | | S1 | SQDN A&L |
| | Chaplain/TC Chaplain Assistant/DVR | HQ 12 | | | CHAP | |
| | SQDN S1 NCOIC/TC SQDN S1 assigned NCO DVR | HQ 13 | | | S1 | SQDN A&L |
| | CBRN NCOIC/TC CBRN assigned Soldier/DVR | HHT 30 | | | CBRN | |
| | HHTTRP Supply SGT/TC HHTTRP Supply Soldier/DVR DVR | HHT 40 | | | Supply | |

Figure 3. "A WAY" for equipment and manning of TOC (Minus MAS and Maintenance (UMCP) Section)



FM 4-90 has the FSC within the CTCP with the company HQ, field feeding team, a maintenance section to move classes of supplies forward to the logistical release point for unit 1SGs to pick up the supplies. The CTCP, if operating independently, would consist of the FSC CP, the squadron S4 and the HHT commander co-located with the FSC commander. The CTCP is as mobile as the unit it supports. They provide direct logistical support to the squadron. The FSC commander assists the Squadron S-4 with the logistics planning and is responsible for executing the logistics plan in accordance with the commander's guidance. The CTCP may be co-located with the TOC due to degradation in ABCS platforms when the CPs

operates independently. If this is the case, the ALOC (S1/S4 section) HHT CDR and FSC representative (XO) will operate within the TOC to maintain SA of the battle to provide feedback to the TOC, with respect to sustainment. During NTC 12-05, we observed the ARS execute differently in the manning and equipping of the CTCP which was overall successful. Figure 3 displays “A Way” of organizing the CTCP (Note that the MAS/FAS and UMCP elements are not depicted). The Squadron placed the HHT Troop Commander as the OIC and HHT 1SG as NCOIC of the CTCP. The Squadron S-1 and S-4 conducted sustainment planning and execution.



Security at the CTCP

The FSC commander was located with the FTCP able to contact the S-4 through FM and BFT. Within the dynamic environment of the hybrid threat, conventional forces, criminals, insurgents, terrorist, mercenary, paramilitary, and guerrilla are all threats. The HHT commander is the senior troop commander with a previous ground cavalry troop command. His leadership, tactical, and technical experience made him the perfect choice as the OIC of the CTCP for movement, coordination, security, and force protection supporting the S-1, S-4, and FSC representatives. If the TOC and TAC were not able to execute mission command, then the CTCP had the most senior maneuver captain able to assume control of squadron operations. The HHT 1SG coordinates with all section NCOICs daily, brief of the overall tactical CTCP security and force protection, field sanitation, standards and discipline, anticipated timelines, taskings, medical issues, manning. The HHT M1068 is the central control hub that the S-1, S-4, and the HHT troop commander operate out of for planning and battle tracking in coordination with the Squadron Maintenance Officer (SMO) and Maintenance Control Officer (MCO) who is usually located in the shop van. Typically, and unfortunately, the CTCP has a limited communication plan with only FM and BFT. The CTCP usually does not have High Frequency (HF) radios and Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) communications. With the extended distance this could be problematic if the HHT Troop Commander had to assume control of the operations if the CTCP was not in good position to communicate with FM and had to rely on BFT. If HF is available, it is highly recommended that the CTCP personnel are trained and equipped with the one HF radio as a contingency plan. The CTCP's effective execution of sustainment operations during DA 12-05 is an example of lessons learned in training at their home station in their development of SOPs, which facilitated successful operations at the National Training Center.

Managing Transitions: Managing transitions between mission command nodes is critical as reconnaissance troops move forward and communications degrade over vast distances. MC node placement should be planned in MDMP with considerations including security, terrain, line of sight, cover and concealment, and located away from main avenues of approach. During MDMP, the staff develops a plan that addresses the initial and subsequent positioning of each mission command node by each phase of the operations and the most likely branches and sequels. The movement planning for command posts must address triggers for displacement, sequence of locations for likely situations, and timing to ensure that the CPs are functional or have an alternate CP operational at critical times. The movement and positioning of the CPs and MCG and the supporting communications architecture must be integrated into war-game and rehearsals. During NTC 12-05, on the early phase of executing full spectrum operations, the TOC and TAC began to move simultaneously to position themselves for mission command while the CTCP remained stationary about 12 km to the rear. At this same moment, the enemy forces executed a spoiling attack. The ground cavalry troops were executing a screen when they received direct and indirect fire contact from the enemy. The Squadron did not give control of the operation to the CTCP while the TOC and TAC were moving. Additionally, the CTCP did not have updated operationally graphics, current friendly force array and enemy (Situation Template) SITTEMPs. Due to this, there was ineffective control and a breakdown of situational awareness of the enemy composition and disposition. The enemy was able to penetrate the screen line quickly, eventually engaging and destroying the TOC and TAC. The ARS was unable to coordinate a counter-attack. If the CTCP was given control of the current operations, there is a likelihood that the squadron could have reacted in a timely manner, coordinating with adjacent units and placed effective fires on the enemy, spoiling the attack. After this event, the TOC and TAC were reconstituted and the squadron ensured that there was deliberate planning in mission command.

In conclusion we have the means to conduct echelonment of mission command; we just have to re-energize our formations to learn from the past. The best way to learn is to practice. Too often, our Command Post Exercises are static at home station. Occupy the land around post and establish the nodes. We are a mobile fighting force and we are not taking advantage of home-station training for our command post. Commanders and staffs have to relearn the field craft to operate in austere environments and control a battle in a dynamic environment.

Home-Station Training for Mission Command Nodes: Prior to coming to NTC most units have not stressed their mission command nodes during training events. Situational

training Exercises and Live Fire Exercises are generally the first time commanders produce orders and disseminate to the unit and execute mission command during a collective training event. The most common reason is Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. Battle rosters from squadron down to troops have not been locked in, and therefore we never get past the individual training to execute collective training events during Command Post Exercises. As a leader you have to lock in teams and squads as soon as possible and develop those teams and squads early so they can develop platoon SOPs which tie into the troop/company's SOPs. Building these teams and squads early allows that element to develop trust and mutual understanding in the formation. You also allow yourself to evaluate those elements and ensure they understand and have the competence to execute the four elements of successful mission command. The same principle applies to the mission command nodes throughout the squadron.

Observations from OC/T at NTC: Troop command posts routinely fail to collect, analyze and disseminate information in a timely and accurate manner. Information Management is the CP's primary task. This task is essential to the success of the troop's mission and answering the Information Requirements (IRs) to squadron and BCT. If at the lowest element the CP cannot answer the BCT's IRs, the BCT will deploy forces into an unconfirmed Enemy SITTEMP and a potential disaster. At squadron level the TOC must know and understand what to do with IRs that answers the BCT's questions. They must understand the six TOC functions and the information management tenets. Bottom line is you need to balance your strengths in the MC nodes.

Recommendation: Conduct home station operations as in the field. All information flows from squadron in forms of orders or FRAGOs so begin the developing processes at home. At troop level, commanders need to setup command post at home station. Get rid of the training room and establish your command post. Although somewhat difficult at first, a battle rhythm emerges, allowing the further development of skills within the CP for information and knowledge management. Develop trackers, have them updated and post information in a manner that develops habits of platoon leadership coming to the CP to gather info. The ColIST should develop information briefing of the area you may be going to or even culture awareness briefs once a week where relevant and timely information can be disseminated. Review who is in your CP and adjust accordingly; you have to balance your strengths and weaknesses within your unit.

At SQDN level, TOC and TAC need to be employed during all training events. Establish a collective training plan that starts in a fixed site (BCTC) with approved BDE level orders to

work on. This exercise trains the squadron headquarters to exercise mission command over the full spectrum of tasks the squadron is expected to perform, and can be nested within a brigade level CPX. The first iteration is internally evaluated; the second iteration is an externally evaluated brigade war-fighter exercise. The squadron should be given missions that include reconnaissance, security, and battle handover throughout all spectrums of conflict in order to plan and prepare orders. The brigade and squadron provide all needed resources to conduct the exercise, to include exercise control, Training Support Packages (TSPs), sufficient training areas, and required simulation to drive events, provide outcome, and simulate applicable ABCS. The CPX should permit coordination, integration, and synchronization of all War-fighting Functions. Next incorporate the Troop level CPs and Commanders to exercise the orders process in a distributed forum but within a fixed site. One all echelons within the squadron are confident and competent in a static environment; establish all nodes distributed in field setup tents, generators and vehicles working off our CPNs to communicate with our command posts. Finally once we have tested our systems add stress. A response cell replicating higher and adjacent headquarters staff, with which the command group and staff must communicate and interact, may be necessary for this task selection. This is particularly important in order to exercise the flow of information from squadron to brigade and the combined arms battalions, in order to train situational awareness/understanding. Displacement of CPs during the CPX should occur over realistic distances. Establish triggers to move nodes into / out of a field training event and ensure every node has the ability to control the fight and the TOC can manage the transitions.

REFERENCES:

FM 5-0: Operations Process

FM 6-0: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces

FM 3-20.96: Reconnaissance Squadron, September 2006 (Note: Reconnaissance Squadron 2006 contains Appendix A and B which were invaluable to this article which are absent in the 2010 publication)

FM 3-20.96: Reconnaissance Squadron, March 2010

FM 3-20.971: Reconnaissance and Cavalry Troop

FM 17-95: Cavalry Operations, December 1996

ATN: CATS: ARMOR: HHT, RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON (HBCT) (17206G000)

TC 7-100: Hybrid Threat