


Interagency Handbook for **TRANSITIONS**

Col. Arthur D. Simons Center
for the Study of Interagency Cooperation



CGSC Foundation Press



**INTERAGENCY HANDBOOK FOR
TRANSITIONS**

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Interagency Handbook for Transitions

Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation
P.O. Box 3429
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FOREWORD

As one of the most perceptive political writers of our time, British historian Timothy Garton Ash noted, “Transitions from the politics of violence to democratic compromise are always messy.”¹ Over the past decade, we have learned this lesson through trial and tribulation in many places around the world, most recognizably in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both countries, our operations are at a critical juncture, and getting transitions right is more important than ever before. As the mission of military forces transforms in size, scope, and responsibility, indigenous institutions will often transition to civilian oversight. These transitions, even among elements of our own nation, will undoubtedly be “messy.”

Transitions require significant vision, planning, and detailed interaction among a wide variety of actors; however, providing this vision and developing a comprehensive approach are easier to articulate than enact. Agency cultures and a dearth of planning capacity within many stakeholder institutions frequently prevent suitable and adaptive approaches. Additionally, working with host nation officials can present other challenges. Success goes beyond merely gaining host nation buy-in to coalition programs; the host nation must set its own priorities and embrace the lead role in cultivating lasting peace and security.

After a decade of trials in working toward cooperation and collaboration among U.S., coalition, and host nation partners, we have learned many valuable lessons. As a result, today’s transitions have an even greater chance of success. Ultimately, the purpose of this handbook is to describe the principles, conditions, and considerations learned over the last decade of conflict. We hope this handbook, made possible through the support of the Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, will bring greater order and understanding to this process and help leaders across the interagency find effective and enduring solutions during the interagency transitions so critical to establishing lasting peace and stability in our partner nations.

Robert L. Caslen, Jr.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding General
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

1 Ash, Timothy Garton, *Facts Are Subversive*, Atlantic Books, 2009.

INTRODUCTION

In early 2011, senior leaders from across the interagency community came together at the headquarters of the United States Institute of Peace to participate in a discussion on how to overcome the “messy” transitions in which they so often struggle. These discussions addressed every perspective and potential risk, as well as the great rewards that could be achieved through effective transitions. This handbook is the result of those exchanges and is intended to provide leaders across the interagency community with an overview of transition processes and procedures to better prepare them for anticipating, planning, executing, and assessing transitions.

This effort builds on the pioneering work of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, published in 2008, and *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, published by the United States Institute of Peace and the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in 2009. These works were instrumental in defining the environment and operational requirements for stability operations across the range of military operations, from stable peace to general war. They also provide a broad framework for long-term stability with a focus on “short-term objectives . . . essential to help the host nation get off life support and on a sustainable path to recovery.”²

Transitions typically receive only brief mention in military doctrine, scholarly works, and research, but they represent periods of significant risk, vulnerability, and opportunity. Executed with due diligence and focus, transitions can cement gains and sustain momentum and progress. Executed without proper planning and forethought, transitions can incur catastrophic operational risk and create conditions from which recovery is impossible. This handbook serves as a guide to transitions, and leaders and their staffs are encouraged to consult the cited sources for additional information and perspectives on transitions.

Army doctrine views transitions as “a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel.”³ This definition does little to highlight the importance or complexity of transitions in contemporary operations, where the number, scope, and nature of transitions achieve a scale beyond anything imagined even a generation ago. Transitions are representative of more than a transfer of

2 United States Institute of Peace (USIP), *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2009, p. 1-5.

3 Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), October 2008, p. 4-14.

responsibility; they mark major shifts in capability and capacity, control, and authority across each of the five stability sectors defined in FM 3-07—Security; Justice and Reconciliation (rule of law); Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well Being; Governance and Participation; Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. The risks span a wide spectrum, both prior and subsequent to the actual transitions. Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of these critical transition points.




Figure 1: Transition Risks

Transitions are typically driven by conditions, events, or time and include inherent tension and friction. This handbook will focus on the **conditions** and **considerations** that facilitate effective and lasting transition to competent host nation authorities. To that end, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute offers a definition of transition that best serves the purposes of this handbook:

Transition is a multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is

inherently complex, and may include multiple, smaller-scale transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on building specific institutional capacities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals.⁴

This definition clearly reflects the complexity of the transitions that occur in stability operations and implies the strategic importance of these transitions in consolidating gains across sectors, while establishing conditions that support policy goals. FM 3-07 further defines the types of transitions agencies can expect in a stability operation:

Transitions mark a change of focus . . . The shift in relative priority between the elements of full spectrum operations—such as from offense to stability—also involves a transition . . . Stability operations include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation.⁵

Planning and assessment help agencies anticipate and facilitate transitions, and careful preparation and diligent execution ensure they occur without incident. Stability operations include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation and its indigenous population. Each transition involves inherent risk that is amplified when agencies must manage multiple transitions simultaneously or execute a series of transitions in succession. Agencies develop measures to gauge progress toward those transitions that mark a gradual, yet significant, shift in effort and signify the gradual return to host nation control and autonomy.

Historically, transitions have occurred with varying degrees of planning, coordination, and unity among military forces, civilian agencies, and the host nation. Their inherent complexity is exacerbated by differences in organizational and national culture, terminology and language, and relative expertise with planning frameworks. A goal of this handbook is to establish a common baseline from which to plan, execute, and assess progress toward transitions. This baseline—the strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction found on the

4 Nicholas J. Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, *Harnessing Post-Conflict “Transitions”: A Conceptual Primer*, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, p. viii.

5 FM 3-07, p. 4-14.

inside of the back cover to this handbook—was developed in concert with the United States Army and the United States Institute of Peace and underpins both FM 3-07 and *Guiding Principles*. As such, it provides a common framework for understanding stability operations and serves as a logical point of departure for planning the complex transitions that occur during such operations.

This handbook begins by examining the seven cross-cutting principles that guide action in stability operations: host nation ownership and capacity, political primacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, and regional engagement. The handbook then describes transition within the context of each of the five major “sectors” or “lines of effort”: security, stable governance, rule of law, sustainable economy, and social well-being.⁶ While each sector contains unique conditions, the United States ultimately pursues a sustainable peace through the seven cross-cutting principles applicable to all sectors. The conditions necessary to achieve a successful transition are included within each sector.

6 Army doctrine defines a line of effort as “A line that links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.”

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Chapter 1

Cross-Cutting Principles

“In Afghanistan, we remain focused on the three areas of our strategy: our military effort to break the Taliban’s momentum and train Afghan forces so they can take the lead; our civilian effort to promote effective governance and development; and regional cooperation, especially with Pakistan, because our strategy has to succeed on both sides of the border.”

President Barack Obama

The cross-cutting principles that guide the execution of stability operations are common among actors—military, civilian, and host nation—that view them as outcomes or end states. These principles apply across the spectrum of conflict and frame purposeful intervention at any point along that spectrum. They inform the comprehensive approach, and help to ensure unity of purpose is maintained throughout an operation. The principles are also keys to facilitating transitions — the outcomes they represent serve as mileposts that enable effective transition. When planning stability operations, the cross-cutting principles provide the foundation for the assessment measures used to gauge progress toward an end state within a sector or along a line of effort.

Security: Freedom from grave threats to safety— whether human or critical infrastructure—is required for lasting peace and stability. Security is necessary to achieve progress within the five sectors and is essential in obtaining a sustainable peace. Security is not pursued by only military forces; all actors impact security. For example, the reform or retraining of security forces is typically a condition of lasting security. Reform of security forces influences every actor, from military and police forces, to state ministries and governing bodies, to civil society organizations. During transition, it is critical the populace views security forces as unbiased, lawful, and accountable to the host nation government and local civil society.

Establishing a lasting, sustainable security is fundamental to success across the other sectors. All end states are intertwined, but without fundamental security little else is possible. The security requirement entails the use of force, but as much in a constructive manner as

possible; however, the military's aim is not exclusively the enemy's decisive defeat in battle. U.S. military doctrine and laws require that a military commander "take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."⁷

Stability operations are inherently multiagency efforts. The military focuses on five major stability tasks (Establish Civil Security, Establish Civil Control, Restore Essential Services, Support to Governance, and Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development) that align with each of the stability sectors. In coordination with experts from various U.S. government agencies and their enabling partners, the military focuses on improving the security situation to the extent that allows civilian organizations to operate effectively. The military facilitates a return to normalcy that encourages the host nation populace to remain in or return to their homes and engage in commerce and other pre-conflict activities. In non-permissive environments (environments unsafe for all but the military), the military may also be required to contribute to broader stabilization tasks. Civilian organizations must pursue a comprehensive, multiagency approach, such as embedding civilian organization members or larger organizations into the military structure to function in this environment. To facilitate communications with agencies not able to embed in military headquarters, military headquarters may need to establish civil-military operation centers or information centers outside major military bases to facilitate discussions with relevant civilian actors. The military commander and civilian counterpart must manage the tension between security progress and the sustainable reconstruction and development of host nation institutions, often a cause of friction between the military and civilians.

Legitimacy: Legitimacy, or the degree of public acceptance and support, is a central principle to building trust and confidence among the people. It is a multifaceted principle that influences every aspect of stability operations from every conceivable perspective. Within U.S. national strategy, both the legitimacy of the host nation government and the legitimacy of the mission are central principles for intervention.

Legitimacy is equally important during transition. As the military and various agencies transition control to host nation institutions, those institutions must be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the local populace, individuals serving within the civil institutions of the

7 FM 27-10, *Law of Land Warfare*, p. 141.

host nation, neighboring states, the international community, and the American public. Without legitimacy, transitions will not be effective or lasting, and potential gains are at increased risk. Legitimacy binds host nation institutions to the people and ensures the enduring support of the governed.

Conflict Transformation: The movement from violent to peaceful means of conflict resolution diminishes drivers of conflict and reinforces mitigators across the five sectors. Significant conflict exists in all societies; transitions strive to increase the sustained ability of the host nation to manage conflict through peaceful means. A government unable to do so risks losing legitimacy and is often incapable of providing security and managing important state functions.

During transition, intervening actors must identify the drivers and mitigators of conflict, work to diminish their impact, and build host nation capacity to manage conflict. It is the state's ability to establish a legitimate monopoly over the means of violence that assures a sustained capacity to manage conflict resolution. As stated in *Guiding Principles*:

This is the end game. It cycles back to the strategic framework and five end states that underpin this manual: a safe and secure environment that enables development; the rule of law that allows grievances to be addressed through a system of justice and confronts impunity; stable governance that permits contestation for power to take place peacefully; a sustainable economy that provides the framework for licit economic competition; and social well-being that affords equal access to basic human needs and the opportunity to live in communities that have mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflict.⁸

Political Primacy: Politics, the competition for access to and the distribution and use of scarce resources, always matters. Political primacy demands that every actor and action be weighed by its ability to build a sustainable peace and long-term stability. Political settlements may bring an end to conflict; however, it is important to remember that throughout transition drivers and mitigators of conflict are neither static nor totally subdued. Throughout transition, political stakeholders seek to understand the implications of political actions and motivations on peace and stability.

Tasks undertaken during stability operations focus on fostering

8 USIP, p. 3-22.

authority and legitimacy within the host nation government, including accommodating and possibly reconciling competing elites in a political settlement. Ultimately, the military's role in stability operations supports achieving desired political aims, which is a primary consideration during planning and execution and should be an explicit aspect of assessment efforts. The military must retain the flexibility to adapt when political aims change. The goal is to achieve a sustainable political settlement among the host nation government, the competing elites, and the people.

Host Nation Ownership and Capacity: Recognized ownership and capacity strengthen legitimacy and improve the prospects for sustainable peace and stability. Every actor seeks to develop within the host nation government the ability to develop and administer effective public policies and services. Host nation ownership is both a targeted outcome and a process. A “by, with, and through” process helps ensure that host nation actors help to achieve the targeted outcome of a sustainable, effective, and legitimate host nation government.

Governments exercise control through both consent and coercion. Legitimate governments gain control through the tacit consent of their populations; whereas, illegitimate governments gain control primarily through coercion. The more coercion required, the greater the collapse when that government's power is reduced. Legitimacy is undermined by corruption, greed, incompetence, bias, disregard for the rule of law, and disenfranchisement. During stability operations, intervening actors work to rebuild the government's capacity and competence by just and consistent application of the law. All stability tasks should cultivate government authority and capacity.

Fostering host nation ownership and capacity requires significant investment in terms of time, manpower, and resources. The government must build and maintain a coherent, effective, capacity-building, and security sector reform effort and must field capability at a tempo that matches the significant demands of the mission. Once the host nation assumes responsibilities in a certain area, U.S. and other resources and manpower can be reassigned to other efforts or sectors, which will help to expand government authority. Thus, ownership and capacity are enablers of transition and, ultimately, withdrawal.

Unity of Effort: Unity of effort is critical to setting the conditions for managing transitions. FM 3-07 describes unity of effort as:

Uniting all of the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success

in stability operations requires collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focus those capabilities toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation.⁹

During stability operations, leaders build relationships across multiagency and multinational boundaries. Many actors will participate in and influence a given operation. Host nation officials will be joined by state actors and international and regional agencies, institutions, and organizations. Competing private sector organizations and contractors will be present as well. Unity of effort is the foundation of success and requires an architecture that supports and strengthens it.

Unity of effort and cohesion are vital, and no set template exists to create and sustain them. Many actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations, contribute to stability operations at their own discretion. Their roles are often defined by competing interests and governed by other factors. In the case of nongovernmental organizations, their activities may be driven by fundamental humanitarian principles, and they may have goals separate from other actors. Unity of effort leverages the willingness of various actors to forge a cooperative environment that focuses effort toward a common goal, regardless of individual command or organizational structures.

The degree of cohesion possible depends on each actor's willingness to seek and accept some level of operational constraint in order to achieve a broader goal or objective. Once the actors agree on the constraints, they must implement and manage the agreement through appropriate committees and liaisons. Many important actors, such as some nongovernmental organizations, may choose not to participate in formal mechanisms, and additional coordination measures may be necessary. Many actors will operate under separate jurisdiction, which will require close coordination to ensure cooperation, or at a minimum, to reduce interference with coalition efforts. Unity of effort must be embedded in a joint, interagency plan, planning tools, and an integrated headquarters.

Regional Engagement: Regional support for the host nation government is a vital consideration in stability operations and cannot be assumed. Neighboring countries assume a significant role in the ability

9 FM 3-07, p. 1-3.

of the host nation to build and sustain momentum toward the conditions that foster stability and security. Some countries may be hostile toward coalition or host nation interests. Building or maintaining positive relationships that support regional stability requires diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation to achieve that vision.

In particular, regional engagement addresses the political, social, and economic transition required in neighboring states to help stabilize the host nation and maintain positive progress toward regional stability. Transition planning should account for broader regional effects of operations and assure that those effects are considered prior to, during, and after transition.

Trade-offs

Guiding Principles lists several “trade-offs” or dilemmas that have significant impact on transition and the ability to sustain gains over the long-term:¹⁰

- **Stability vs. Legitimacy:** The trade-off between the urgent need for international actors to secure the peace and the possibility that the host nation population does not perceive these actors as connected to their local leaders or government and does not perceive their actions as building the legitimacy or capacity of the host nation.
- **Expediency vs. Sustainability:** Short-term actions that show a peace dividend and signal that violent conflict is over may not be sustainable over time. Inherent conflicts often exist between short- and long-term objectives, such as maintaining employment versus cutting jobs in order to restructure the economy. Large infrastructure projects, oversized armies, and expensive national elections are other examples related to this trade-off.
- **Meeting Needs vs. Building Capacity:** International governmental and nongovernmental actors face a dilemma when it is easier to fulfill needs directly than to build host nation capacity to deliver critical assistance.

Assessment

Continuously assessing progress through the seven cross-cutting principles is fundamental to sustainable security and stability. In the course of operations and throughout the transition process, actors must

¹⁰ USIP, p. 4-26.

ask and answer three essential questions: “Are we acting effectively?” “Are we doing the right things?” and “Are we making sufficient progress toward the end states?” This is the essence of assessment.

Measures of performance (MOPs), a task performance and purpose assessment, answers the first question. MOPs assess completed actions, as opposed to just listing what actions have been undertaken. For example, in the training of police investigators, MOPs would assess the ability of investigators to collect evidence, not the number of investigators trained. MOPs help actors decide whether to repeat or alter their activities.

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs), an assessment of the realization of specified effects, answers the second question. MOEs consider both intended and unintended effects. The assessment must draw on multiple measurements and perspectives. The assessment assists in measuring progress by stressing setbacks and supporting planning. The effects assessments likely will occur over a longer period, as trends may be slow to develop.

An overall effectiveness assessment answers the third question and is a process that requires considerable time and analysis. This assessment evaluates the mission’s progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurements. The MOPs and MOEs support reviews of current plans, while the overall effectiveness assessment supports future plans. Key actors must discuss the trends derived from these analyses to take stock and issue new comprehensive directions.

Ultimately, actors use these seven cross-cutting principles from the outset of planning, through execution, and during assessment. They are both a guide to action and guideposts to long-term success. These seven principles serve to ensure that all actors maintain, consolidate, and sustain positive progress through transition to host nation control and authority.

Chapter 2

Security

Much has changed with the relationship between Afghan National Police (ANP) and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) since Coalition Joint Task Force 82 assumed command of Regional Command-East... The biggest change has been that the regional task forces became directly responsible for ANP progress last fall, an event which allowed for greater opportunities for combined action . . . The new relationship between the ANP and ISAF battle space owners, combined with initiatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has helped combat two obstacles to developing a professional police force: corruption and lack of adequate training.

“Training Afghanistan’s Police Force,”
ISAF Public Affairs Office, May 31, 2010

A safe and secure environment is characterized by freedom of movement and freedom from politically motivated violence, widespread conflict, and attacks on critical infrastructure and communities. In the immediate post-conflict environment, physical insecurity will likely persist. The host nation government and national security forces may not be able or yet willing to provide unbiased security to the population, which in effect creates a security vacuum. In such cases, other informal, non-state, and international actors may fill the void for their own purposes. Accordingly, the host nation government and its security forces must develop the capability and capacity to mitigate drivers of conflict in order to maintain the peace process and public order.

Since no sustained progress will endure without security, a safe and secure environment is a necessary and fundamental condition of transition. It is essential that the military and other intervening actors immediately begin training and equipping host nation security forces and institutions to create and maintain a safe and secure environment. In the absence of security, parties in conflict will maintain their arms and fighting units, inflict violence upon those they oppose, and stifle economic, political, and social development. Schools will remain poorly attended, markets will remain closed or controlled by criminal enterprises, legitimate goods will not move freely across borders, and the host nation government will be unable to establish a lasting and

controlling presence across the country.

In FM 3-07, the Army establishes security as a primary focus for intervening forces:

Security is the most immediate concern of the military force, a concern typically shared by the local populace. A safe and secure environment is one in which these civilians can live their day-to-day lives without fear of being drawn into violent conflict or victimized by criminals. Achieving this condition requires extensive collaboration with civil authorities, the trust and confidence of the people, and strength of perseverance.¹¹

This focus is not only appropriate for military forces, it is essential to sustained success. Without adequate and lasting security, exercised within the rule of law, any progress is transitory and will not be sustainable following transition.

Conditions for Transition

While FM 3-07 establishes the conditions necessary for effective transition, *Guiding Principles* addresses each of these conditions in much greater detail.¹² These conditions include but are not limited to:

- **Cessation of Large-Scale Violence:** Large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt; warring parties are separated and monitored or one party is decisively defeated; a peace agreement or ceasefire has been implemented; and violent adversaries are managed.
- **Public Order:** Laws are enforced equitably; the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized criminal networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained.
- **Legitimate State Monopoly over the Means of Violence:** Major illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed, and demobilized; the defense and police forces have been vetted and retrained; and national security forces operate lawfully under a legitimate governing authority.
- **Physical Security:** Political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free of fear from grave threats to physical

¹¹ FM 3-07, p. 1-16.

¹² USIP, pp. 6-38 – 6-39.

safety; refugees and internally displaced persons can return home without fear of retributive violence; women and children are protected from undue violence; and key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure are protected from attack.

- **Territorial Security:** People and goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm; the country is protected from invasion; and borders are reasonably well-secured from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans.

Transition Considerations

The military force assumes a leading role in providing security, preventing destabilization, and improving stability—essentially setting the conditions for enduring stability. Whether acting unilaterally or working within a broader coalition or alliance, the military should assume this role, and providing security should remain its primary focus until transition to the host nation, when it should transition to a supporting role. Army doctrine recognizes the obligation for the military to assume this role in those cases in which U.S. forces occupy foreign territory and describes this role as “Military Government.”¹³

Partnering is a necessary step toward establishing the long term capacity-building activities that support effective transition. This step is evident within the security sector more than any other, where building partner capacity and capability for security is facilitated through advising. Advising is no longer an afterthought to stability operations. It is essential to the gradual transition to effective host nation security. Intervening actors must be prepared to assign experienced advisors immediately to host nation security forces, whether in the form of military forces or civilian advisors. The sooner advisors are introduced, the more effective military combat forces will be in stemming violence, providing security, and establishing public order.

A significant difference exists between policing requirements in the aftermath of intervention and policing requirements over the long-term. Stability policing places a high priority on preventing violent crime with less regard for prosecution under the rule of law. Community-based policing places a much higher priority on embedding the police force within the community, professionalizing the force, and adhering strictly to the rule of law.

13 FM 27-10, p. 141.

Security includes human security. Human security encompasses freedom from fear of persecution, intimidation, reprisals, terrorism, and other forms of systematic violence, as well as freedom from want of immediate basic needs such as food, water, sanitation, and shelter. Supporting nations must be careful not to raise popular expectations or create a culture of dependency within a host nation for some aspects of human security. Intervening actors must focus on physical security and access to markets that can help meet basic human needs.

Trade-offs

Guiding Principles also lists a series of “trade-offs” or dilemmas that should be considered during transition planning and again when assessing progress toward transition in the security sector:¹⁴

- **Prioritizing Short-Term Stability vs. Confronting Impunity:** Initially, dealing with groups or individuals who prosecuted the conflict may be necessary to bring certain factions into the fold or to mitigate tensions. But turning a blind eye to continued use of political violence against rivals or exploitation of criminal networks to generate illicit revenue will enshrine a culture of impunity that threatens sustainable peace.
- **Using Local Security Forces to Enhance Legitimacy vs. Using International Security Forces to Ensure Effectiveness:** While international security forces may be more effective in performing security functions, having local security forces assume these responsibilities would enhance legitimacy. However, local forces often lack the capacity to perform effectively and may have a reputation for corruption and grave human rights abuses. Balancing this trade-off involves training and mentoring local forces and gradually transitioning responsibilities from international actors.
- **Applying Force vs. Maintaining Mission Legitimacy:** Establishing public order may require the disciplined use of force, especially where spoilers and a culture of impunity are widespread. Assertive action ensures credibility, but excessive force can also jeopardize the legitimacy of the mission, especially early on when a mission is under public scrutiny. Finding a way to balance this trade-off is essential and should involve international stability police who are proficient in the use of nonlethal force. As conditions permit, local security forces—properly partnered and advised—should

14 USIP, pp. 6-59 – 6-60.

assume a larger role in achieving this balance.

- **Public Order Functions Performed by the Military vs. the Police:** Achieving public order in these environments often presents a difficult dilemma as to which institution—military or police—should perform public order functions. In cases where military forces occupy foreign territory, a commander must use his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, and unless he is absolutely prevented from doing so, he must respect the laws in force in the country. The military has training and experience in the use of force against violent adversaries and possesses the requisite skills required in investigations, forensics, and other critical law enforcement functions. Traditional police units, however, are trained in nuanced use of force and nonlethal means and can effectively augment military capability. Meshing the capabilities of both these organizations is critical to meeting public order needs.
- **Short-Term Security Imperatives vs. Investments in Broader Security Reform:** With limited resources available, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term requirements. The need for immediate security may divert resources and energy from long-term security sector reform efforts. Demonstrating quick wins can build credibility but may jeopardize the development of a foundation for deeper reform of the security sector. The military and all other actors must strike a proper balance.

Chapter 3

Stable Governance

Military efforts to support governance help to build progress toward achieving effective, legitimate governance. . . Their efforts eventually enable the host nation to develop an open political process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks.

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*

Stability is a condition in which governance handles violence and economic and political disruptions through normal political channels that are acceptable, though not necessarily preferable, to a population. In a stable environment, there is little likelihood of states or groups within the system using large-scale violence as a means to respond to political, economic, or security challenges.

Stability is mainly characterized by a lack of large-scale violence. War or a loss in human security causes a loss in stability. Human security has two main aspects: (1) safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression; and (2) protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities. To maintain or re-establish stable governance, the host nation government must be willing and capable of providing essential state services, and protecting and distributing the state’s resources fairly and equitably. Supporting nations and donors must be careful not to create a culture of dependency within the host nation. A culture of dependency—where the citizens rely on their government or donors to provide them food, shelter, and medical care—will keep them in poverty and create unrealistic expectations that the supported government and donors will be unable to sustain.

Stable governance ensures that accountable officials control access to and the distribution of state resources. If non-state actors gain this control, it weakens the state and makes a return to violent conflict resolution more likely. Generally, in a stable government, the host nation populace regularly elects representative officials according to established rules and in a manner generally perceived as free and fair by the international community. The host nation must establish legislative bodies that are consistent with a legal framework and legitimate constitution. In addition, the host nation must train officials, create judicial processes, and establish the rule of law.

Early elections in a highly polarized society empower elites, senior military leaders, and organized criminal factions; however, the international community that sanctioned intervention will likely seek premature elections as early and visible signs of progress. Therefore, to minimize the likelihood of national polarization and reemergence of violent divisions in society, reform processes should begin as soon as possible at the provincial or local level. Addressing reform early empowers popular leaders to deliver services and meet the demands of their constituents and allows effective reform processes to emerge.

Stable governments also require effective executive institutions. Capacity-building efforts within the governance sector generally require a long-term commitment from the international community to reestablish effective ministries and a functional civil service at all levels of government. Governments also require free and responsible media, multiple political parties, and a robust civil society. Governments thus formed are more likely to be perceived as legitimate by their own populations and the international community.

Because the government may have been corrupt, inept, repressive, or removed from power, some non-state actors may provide essential government services or provide essential goods and services normally provided by private enterprise. They should do so in coordination with the host nation government and not on a long-term basis, as they may displace local businesses and create dependency. Media and civil society organizations may be timid and may not seek to hold the government accountable. The military and supporting agencies may need to train and equip host nation media and civil society organizations to function responsibly so they can contribute to transparency and government accountability without fomenting instability or violence.

Conditions for Transition

While FM 3-07 establishes the conditions necessary for effective transition, *Guiding Principles* addresses each of these conditions in much greater detail.¹⁵ These conditions include but are not limited to:

- **Provision of Essential Services:** The state provides basic security, rule of law, economic governance, and the opportunity for its citizens to meet their basic human needs; essential services (food, water, shelter, emergency medical treatment, and the prevention of epidemic disease) are available or provided without discrimination; and the state provides essential services without significant assistance

15 USIP, pp. 8-98 – 8-99.

from the international community.

- **Stewardship of State Resources:** National and sub-national institutions of governance are restored, funded, and staffed with accountable personnel; the security sector is reformed and brought under accountable civilian control; and state resources are protected through responsible economic management in a manner that benefits the population.
- **Political Moderation and Accountability:** The host nation government enables political settlement of disputes; addresses core grievances through debate, compromise, and inclusive national discussions; and manages change arising from humanitarian, economic, security, and other challenges. A national constituting process results in a separation of powers that facilitates checks and balances; the selection of leaders is determined through inclusive and participatory processes; a legislature reflects the interests of the population; and electoral processes are free and fair.
- **Participation and Empowerment:** Civil society exists and is empowered, protected, and accountable; media are present, professional, and independent of government or political influence; equal access to information and freedom of expression are upheld; and political parties are protected and able to form freely.

Transition Considerations

These conditions do not specify the form of government or a model for governing the host nation — ultimately, the host nation will decide the form of government in accordance with its cultural and societal norms. A centralized government may be antithetical to the host nation culture, in which case, civil society will reject it. The community that sanctioned the intervention must take great care not to impose a foreign system of government on the host nation; such models will impede transition and will likely empower factions that will eventually destabilize the host nation.

Many post-conflict nations will likely face a shortage of well-trained, professional civil servants. Civil servants plan and deliver essential state services. If they are not well-trained, if they are corrupt, and if cronyism and nepotism pervade the service, the public trust of the government will suffer, and the government will lose legitimacy. The transition process may require external donor funding to attract the right personnel to civil service; an independent commission to hire, train, and promote

personnel; and extensive integrity, literacy, and ethical training. The host nation should keep trained, indigenous professionals (doctors, engineers, and educators) working in their professions, rather than using them as interpreters, translators, or clerical staff for supporting governments and nongovernmental organizations.

Actors must be aware of the dependency dilemma—the tendency for the host nation to rely on intervening forces for external support longer than necessary. Dependency occurs when donors undermine market incentives and individual incentives to work hard, conserve scarce resources, and improve their own circumstances. However, establishing sustainable governance will require long-term commitments from external actors that may breed dependency.

Stability operations seek to foster processes that strengthen political settlements (elite consolidation) and build the government’s capacity or ability to function. Elite consolidation resolves conflict by allocating power among competing elites. Capacity building generates institutional capacity to meet the government’s basic functions and the population’s expectations. The mission must balance these two actions. Governments will use public appointments to strengthen alliances, reduce elite opposition, and create patronage, which could all undermine capacity building initiatives in the short term.

Trade-offs

Guiding Principles also lists a series of “trade-offs” or dilemmas that intervening communities should consider during transition planning and again when assessing progress toward transition in the Governance sector:¹⁶

- **Rapid and Effective Delivery of Essential Services vs. Legitimacy for Nascent Government Institutions:** Initially, international actors may possess the only capability to provide essential services to the population and may also create unrealistic expectations by providing goods and service not previously provided by or expected from the government. Having international actors provide critical goods and services can undermine the legitimacy of host nation government institutions. International actors must carefully balance the urgency to deliver with the need to build local capacity.
- **Hiring Host Nation Actors to Assist International Organizations vs. Staffing Domestic Institutions:** International organizations often

16 USIP, pp. 8-126 – 8-127.

attract some of the most educated and experienced host nation actors. While this temporarily boosts the economic well-being of those individuals and helps international organizations achieve their goals, it can also deprive domestic institutions, organizations, and private commercial interests of domestic talent that is badly needed.

- **Rapid Service Delivery and Resource Procurement vs. Empowerment of Spoilers or Criminal Elements:** International humanitarian organizations and military forces spend vast sums of money on projects that can have a substantial political and economic impact. In the quest to provide rapid delivery of services, international organizations or domestic government bodies must not use or purchase resources from adversaries, unless these resources were confiscated from adversaries by coalition or host nation security forces. Doing otherwise will inadvertently empower adversaries and undermine the legitimacy of the host nation.
- **Responsible Fiscal Management vs. Providing Immediate Services:** Under pressure to provide services, host nation governments may spend significant amounts of money without adequate oversight. Fiscal management reform can take years to achieve, and capacity will likely be weak. The government will have to carefully maneuver between the need for short-term results and fiscal accountability and program sustainability.
- **Early Elections vs. Maturation of Politics and Processes:** Elections are necessary to provide representative governance and bestow legitimacy on a new government. Operating the government for too long with appointees may reduce the legitimacy of government institutions in the eyes of domestic and international audiences. However, rushing to hold elections before the necessary conditions exist can undermine the political process and create barriers to future political development. International actors must carefully balance the pressures to hold elections with the patience needed to do the job right.
- **Political Appointments vs. Meritocracy:** Appointing warlords and other power brokers who played a role in violent conflicts is often a necessary step to facilitate an end to hostilities. Meritocratic appointments, conversely, offer opportunities to bring in qualified individuals to govern effectively based on talent and technical skills. One way to manage this trade-off is for the host nation government to limit the time period for political appointments during the transition phase and gradually increase merit-based appointments.

Chapter 4

Rule of Law

Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights, and ensures their safety and security.

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

Rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, including public, private, and the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights principles.¹⁷ These fundamental elements are essential for a rule of law to take root in a society after the collapse of effective and stable governance. Establishing and supporting rule of law requires a broad effort that integrates the activities of a wide array of actors and focuses law and order capabilities to support host-nation civil institutions.

The rule of law exists when all persons and organizations within the host nation are held accountable to the law. It is strongest when laws are consistent with human rights norms and standards; legally certain and transparent; enforced fairly and equally; and adjudicated independently. The population must have access to formal and informal institutions of justice; where access exists the population's use of the institutions will inherently strengthen and legitimize them. The population may be wary of or unable to access the state's justice system for numerous reasons; for example, the state may lack the personnel required to establish and run an effective justice system.

These functions must be rooted in a shared sense of confidence among the population that the justice sector is oriented toward serving the public rather than pursuing narrow interests. Planning and executing the transition of rule of law functions, although critical for building public confidence, is often the most difficult and complex transition conducted in a stability operation. Failure to ensure continuity of rule of law through this transition threatens the safety and security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation, and serves as an obstacle to sustained stability.

In many states emerging from conflict, those removed from power

17 *Rule of Law Handbook*, U.S. Army JAG Legal School and Center, 2009, p. 5.

may have used the justice system as a tool of repression and applied justice unequally. Transition requires the justice system—not violence—be the populace’s preferred means of obtaining justice. Rule of law is fundamental to long-term stability.

Conditions for Transition

While FM 3-07 establishes the conditions necessary for effective transition, *Guiding Principles* addresses each of these conditions in much greater detail.¹⁸ These conditions include but are not limited to:

- **Just Legal Frameworks:** Laws are legally certain and transparent, drafted with procedural transparency, equitable, and responsive to the entire population.
- **Public Order:** Laws are enforced equitably; the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and politically-motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal elements—from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks—are pursued, arrested, and detained.
- **Accountability to the Law:** The population, public officials, and perpetrators of past conflict-related crimes are held legally accountable for their actions; the judiciary is independent and free from political influence; and horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms exist to prevent the abuse of power.
- **Access to Justice:** People are able to seek and obtain a remedy for grievances through formal or informal institutions of justice that conform with international human rights standards, and a system exists to ensure equal and effective application of the law, procedural fairness, and transparency.
- **Culture of Lawfulness:** The general population follows the law and seeks to access the justice system to address its grievances.

Transition Considerations

It is imperative that the indigenous population has confidence it will be treated fairly and justly under the law. The indigenous population must also believe it will have access to justice and an open and participatory government and trust that all persons, entities, and institutions—public and private—are accountable to the law. Rule of law establishes

18 USIP, p. 7-65.

principles that limit the power of government by setting rules and procedures that prohibit accumulation of dictatorial or autocratic power. It prescribes government conduct according to publicly recognized standards or regulations, while protecting the rights of all members of society. It also provides a vehicle to resolve disputes nonviolently and in a manner integral to establishing enduring peace and stability.

Rule of law is an essential condition for transitions; it helps to ensure the permanence of the conditions necessary for lasting stability. In general terms, the rule of law exists when:

- The state monopolizes the use of force in the resolution of disputes.
- Individuals are secure in their persons and property.
- The state is bound by law and does not act arbitrarily.
- The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs.
- Individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial justice system.
- The state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- Individuals rely on the existence of justice institutions and the content of law in the conduct of their daily lives.

Trade-offs

Guiding Principles also lists a series of “trade-offs” or dilemmas that should be considered during transition planning and again when assessing progress toward transition in the Rule of Law sector:¹⁹

- Culture vs. Human Rights: Pertinent United Nations agencies and declarations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations will often insist that all laws and institutions in a host nation conform to international human rights norms and standards. Many of these internationally-recognized norms and standards are at odds with those of many traditional societies, and attempts to impose these norms and standards may become a significant grievance that undermines stability in the host nation. However, as a minimum, military forces and civilian agencies involved in mentoring host nation rule of law institutions and engaged in

19 USIP, pp. 7-94 – 7-95.

security force assistance should ensure those institutions and forces are trained to respect human rights in accordance with international human rights principles.

- **Security vs. Human Rights:** Security and human rights often compete with one other in the aftermath of conflict, where insecurity reigns. States around the world work to balance the need to protect the security of the population with the need to protect human rights. In the aftermath of conflict, abandoning human rights principles at the very moment they should be promoted sends the message that human rights do not matter. Suspending human rights in the aftermath of a conflict under the claim of promoting security will make it more difficult to reinstate them later.
- **Peace vs. Justice:** In the aftermath of conflict, justice for conflict-related abuses often competes with the imperative of protecting the peace. In some instances, ensuring justice is administered to certain individuals may ignite tensions and negatively influence a fragile peace. The question often arises about whether to prosecute and ensure justice or not to prosecute and preserve peace. Some argue that justice should prevail at any cost. Others argue that it is more important to preserve peace than to prosecute individual perpetrators immediately after the conflict. Intervening organizations should carefully consider any decision to pursue justice against certain individuals, whose prosecution may impact peace.
- **Quick Fixes vs. a Strategic Approach:** There is the temptation, coupled with a sense of urgency, to start fixing the justice system immediately. This approach has yielded suboptimal results in the past. There are certainly activities that can promote rule of law in the short term. However, a strategic approach is much more likely to be successful in the long term. FM 3-07 includes a lengthy discussion of the necessity of maintaining a strategic focus while balancing the need to show progress through “quick fixes.”²⁰

20 FM 3-07, p. 1-2.

Chapter 5

Sustainable Economy

Growth is critical to undermine extremists' appeal in the short term and for sustainable economic development in the long term. Our top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military agriculture redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan's once vibrant agriculture sector. This will help sap the insurgency of fighters and of income from poppy cultivation.

"The Way Forward in Afghanistan,"
White House, December 1, 2009

In the aftermath of conflict, economies tend to careen toward destabilization. They often suffer from serious structural and institutional problems that must be addressed immediately, but they also possess significant growth potential. Commerce—licit and illicit—previously constrained by conditions in the environment, emerges quickly to fill market voids and enable entrepreneurial opportunities. International aid and the requirements of intervening actors often infuse the economy with abundant resources, which stimulate rapid growth across the economic sector.

However, much of this growth is transitory. It highlights increasing inequalities in income, the government's lagging capacity to manage and sustain growth, and mounting opportunities for corruption. Rather than focus efforts toward achieving immediate economic growth, intervening actors should aim to build on those elements of the economic sector that enable the economy to become self-sustaining: physical infrastructure, sound fiscal and economic policy, an effective and predictable regulatory and legal environment, a viable workforce, business development and increased access to capital, and effective management of natural resources.

The population must be free to pursue opportunities in a lawful, predictable economic system. The sustainable economy "is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation."²¹ Persistent or exacerbating economic difficulties are manifested in social and political unrest that destabilize the state and can drive violent conflict. Sustained economic

21 USIP, p. 9-132.

growth can help prevent return to conflict by broadly and equitably improving the standard of living, reducing the cost of necessary goods and services, and increasing nonviolent opportunities to gain wealth. Stable economic growth requires investors to be able to make decisions based on calculated risk with a large degree of predictability. Long-term growth capital flows quickly out of unpredictable markets.

Conditions for Transition

While FM 3-07 establishes the conditions necessary for effective transition to stable economic growth, *Guiding Principles* addresses each of these conditions in much greater detail.²² These conditions include but are not limited to:

- **Macroeconomic Stabilization:** Monetary and fiscal policies are established to align the currency to market levels, manage inflation, and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management. This condition requires a robust and enforceable legislative and regulatory framework to govern issues such as property rights, commerce, fiscal operations, and foreign direct investment.
- **Control Over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace:** Illicit wealth no longer determines who governs; predatory actors are prevented from looting state resources; ex-combatants are reintegrated and provided jobs or benefits; and natural resource wealth is accountably managed.
- **Market Economy Sustainability:** A market-based economy is enabled and encouraged to thrive; infrastructure is built or rehabilitated; and the private sector and the human capital and financial sectors are nurtured and strengthened.
- **Employment Generation:** Job opportunities are created to demonstrate progress quickly and employ military-age youths; foundations are established for sustainable livelihoods.

Transition Considerations

British military doctrine states that “Conflict is a significant driver of poverty and vice versa.”²³ During stability operations, military forces

²² USIP, p. 9-133.

²³ Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, London: Ministry of Defense, 2009.

will work alongside civilian development agencies. To better coordinate multiagency and multinational efforts, the military must understand the charters, constraints, and policies that underpin the supporting development agency's programs, as well as its organizational approaches to the mission, which can be accomplished by providing positions of influence on the staff of the appropriate headquarters.

Leaders must understand who benefits and who loses from development programs. Understanding the potential impact of development programs on drivers of conflict helps leaders forecast more accurately the likely effects on conflict dynamics. The experience of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that poorly planned development can destabilize the host nation by producing unintended consequences, such as the following:

- Aid may be misappropriated by adversaries.
- Aid may disrupt local markets.
- Aid may benefit some groups and not others, further escalating tensions.
- Aid may displace local resources that can be used elsewhere to further conflict.
- Aid may inadvertently legitimize the political causes of adversaries.

Quick impact projects are an effective means to rapidly change the local political situation. The following guidelines provide additional considerations for such projects:²⁴

- **Influence:** Ensure a strategy exists for communicating the positive benefits of the project, politically significant communities are included, and key leaders are engaged. Use the project to promote understanding, if not reconciliation, across sectarian divides and shape the emerging political settlement.
- **Do No Harm:** Ensure that the project is conflict-sensitive, and when selecting beneficiaries, avoid creating or exacerbating conflicts, jealousies, or rivalries.
- **Participation:** Ensure that the host community and local government are involved in identifying, planning, designing, and

24 Stuart Gordon, *Stabilization Quick Impact Projects*, London: Ministry of Defense, 2009.

delivering the project.

- **Efficiency:** Ensure resources are used in the most efficient and cost effective way and the project is not diverting resources from other, more important projects.
- **Timeliness:** Ensure the project will be implemented or completed in a time frame relevant to the commander's overall campaign.
- **Sustainability:** Ensure continued access to skilled labor, operating expertise, and recurring costs associated with each project are addressed.
- **Coordination:** Ensure the project is in line with national priorities and is coordinated with the activities of other relevant actors.
- **Delivery:** Ensure the most appropriate agency delivers the project and favor local expertise and civilian agencies whenever practicable.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation:** Ensure there is a plan for assessing the project's effectiveness as well as its impact on the overall conflict dynamics.

Trade-offs

Guiding Principles also lists a series of “trade-offs” or dilemmas that intervening actors should consider during transition planning and again when assessing progress toward transition in the Economic sector:²⁵

- **Economic Efficiency vs. Political Stability:** Because stability operations do not follow standard development practices, political considerations will typically outweigh economic ones, which means the best approach may not be the most optimal or efficient from an economic perspective. Intervening actors should not measure the success of an economic program purely by its economic criteria, as they would in a normal development scenario; rather, they should measure how the program supports peace and reconciliation. Ultimately, long-term stability requires programs that are economically sustainable.
- **Sophistication vs. Simplicity in the Income Tax System:** Initially, the capacity for administering tax policies will be weak. Rather than trying to create a sophisticated income tax system for

25 USIP, pp. 9-159 – 9-160.

the entire population, it may be wise to install an interim, simple tax system, such as excise or sales taxes, which are easier to increase over time. Tax policies should be crafted to avoid creating grey economies and black markets, and they should mirror those pre-existing host nation tax policies that were generally accepted by the populace.

- **Creating Donor Trust Funds vs. Strengthening the Host Nation Budget Process:** Many international actors prefer to manage their assistance funds, but doing so can create a bifurcation between host nation and donor-funded budget systems. Once accountability structures are functioning with adequate safeguards, spending should transition into an integrated, comprehensive, state public investment program and capital budget to strengthen the government capacity and ensure host nation input in the budgetary process.
- **Macroeconomic Reforms vs. Political Stability:** While there may be an urge to quickly stabilize the economy or make it more closely resemble that of the intervening community, doing so too aggressively can negatively influence political stability. Cutting subsidies to public sector enterprises with bloated work forces or “right-sizing” large military forces in search of a peace dividend can create a pool of unemployed and disgruntled recruits for disaffected groups seeking to disrupt the peace process. All economic stability measures must be accompanied by a careful assessment of the political situation in the country.
- **Employment Opportunities for Ex-Combatants vs. Women and Minorities:** In war-torn economies, employment opportunities will be scarce. Prioritizing jobs for ex-combatants may mitigate violence, but it may also seem unjust to others who may be more qualified, particularly those who may have been systematically discriminated against before or during the conflict. This is a difficult trade-off, but the imperatives of maintaining a fragile peace may require prioritizing ex-combatants, at least in the near term.
- **Public vs. Private Sector in Public Utility Services:** Having politicians manage local utilities may help build internal management and governance capacity; however, doing so also risks preserving corrupt, pre-conflict arrangements that jeopardize quality service and perpetuate discriminatory practices. In many countries the government operates major utilities. The private sector, on the other hand, would likely be more effective in reestablishing services and customer relationships. The intervening community must strike

a careful balance between these two approaches. Some utilities may benefit from a hybrid public-private relationship where a private concession is issued to operate a facility.

- **Meeting Urgent Needs for Jobs vs. Focusing on Sustainable Employment:** During the initial stability phases, there is often an urgent need to put people to work. Doing so often involves creating jobs that may produce tangible results quickly but do not necessarily develop sustainable incomes or livelihoods. Balancing these two imperatives has proven to be a critical challenge.

Chapter 6

Social Well-Being

The most immediate needs of a host-nation population emerging from conflict or disaster are generally clear: food, water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations

In times of crisis, the international community usually responds quickly with appropriate aid by leveraging resources from across the globe to provide for the needs of an affected people. Once the situation is adequately stable and secure and international aid organizations are allowed to operate, they can provide the immediate humanitarian needs of the host nation populace, establish sustainable assistance programs, and assist with any displaced or dislocated civilians.

However, intervening communities must also pay attention to long-term requirements such as developing educational systems, addressing past abuses, and promoting peaceful coexistence among the people. These requirements are most appropriately supported by the efforts of civilian actors, including other government agencies, intergovernmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Resolving issues of truth and justice are essential to this process, and systems of compensation and reconciliation are fundamental to success.

Social well-being reflects the freedom to pursue basic human needs through individual efforts or through the charity of others, the freedom to individually choose nonviolent pursuits, and the ability to peacefully coexist with others. Conflict inevitably causes some degree of humanitarian crisis, often including shortages of basic human needs (water, food, shelter, and health services), population displacement, lack of access to education, and poor essential services infrastructure. Occupying powers have some obligations to provide humanitarian assistance in accordance with the 4th Geneva Convention, but for the purposes of transition to a stable civilian government, intervening military and civilian agencies must concentrate on creating a secure environment that allows the government and people of a supported nation to rebuild their homes, livelihoods, and institutions and avoid creating cycles of poverty and dependency.

Conditions for Transition

While FM 3-07 establishes the conditions necessary for effective transition, *Guiding Principles* addresses each of these conditions in much greater detail.²⁶ These conditions, as they relate to the Social Well-Being sector, include but are not limited to:

- **Access To and Delivery of Basic Needs Services:** The population has equal access to and can obtain adequate water, food, shelter, and health services to ensure survival and a life with dignity. These services should be accessible or delivered in a manner that fosters reliability and sustainability.
- **Access To and Delivery of Education:** The population has equal access to quality education that provides the opportunity for advancement and promotes a peaceful society.
- **Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:** All individuals displaced from their homes by violent conflict have the option of a safe, voluntary, and dignified journey to their homes or to new settlement communities; have recourse for property restitution or compensation; and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term development.
- **Social Reconstruction:** The population is able to coexist peacefully through intra- and intergroup forms of reconciliation—including mechanisms that help to resolve disputes non-violently and address the legacy of past abuses—and through the development of community institutions that bind society across divisions.

Transition Considerations

The public will turn to almost any actor to fulfill basic needs. Actors will also fill the vacuum of needs caused by an ineffective government. Providing for basic needs of the populace reinforces stabilization activities, as the people are focused on their own survival. Human insecurity inhibits meaningful political progress. The host nation will fight the contest for security, trust, and confidence within the population, as well as its support against adversaries. The population must believe that the situation will improve under the host nation government, and intervening actors must take action to marginalize potential adversaries.

26 USIP, pp. 10-162 – 10-163.

Trade-offs

Guiding Principles also lists a series of “trade-offs” or dilemmas that intervening communities should consider during transition planning and again when assessing progress toward transition in the Social Well-Being sector:²⁷

- **Delivering Assistance through Host Nation vs. International Capacity:** Initially, conflict-affected populations may need immediate humanitarian aid that only international actors are equipped to deliver. However if sustained for an extended period, delivering aid through international organizations can promote a culture of dependency and thwart the development of host nation capacity. To minimize this impact, international agencies must balance the demand to meet emergency survival needs with opportunities to promote host nation capacity.
- **Meeting Immediate Survival Needs vs. Instability:** While there may be an urgency to meet immediate survival needs, humanitarian supplies can be captured by insurgents or rebel groups and redirected to support those engaged in the conflict. Also, if intervening communities direct relief more toward families of combatants, they may create perceptions of inequity and create tensions. International agencies must plan relief efforts carefully and monitor delivery to mitigate potential negative consequences.
- **Responsibility to Protect vs. Safety of Relief Workers:** The humanitarian crisis in a war-torn country may be severe and demand urgent delivery of basic needs for survival. But the severity of a crisis can also mean that the security situation in the country or region is untenable and unpredictable, which places relief workers at great risk. International agencies must ensure adequate security for staff workers who go into danger zones to provide relief.
- **Rapid Return of Displaced Populations vs. Instability:** Having displaced populations return to their homes creates a positive sign for the prospects of peace. However, encouraging large populations to return without proper planning and preparation will create greater problems, including further internal displacement. International agencies and actors must prepare receiving communities for the influx, provide security guarantees, establish property dispute mechanisms, and offer economic and humanitarian assistance to prevent instability.

27 USIP, pp. 10-192 – 10-193.

- **Giving Property to Original Owners vs. Existing Occupants:** Returning property to pre-conflict owners may be ideal and just, but doing so may simply displace existing occupants who sought shelter in the property during the conflict. Evicting large numbers of tenants, particularly in a country where property ownership laws are ambiguous, can be very destabilizing. Intervening forces and international agencies must plan for property dispute mechanisms, compensation arrangements, and other means to address this recurring trade-off in advance.
- **Pursuing Reconciliation vs. Stability:** In a society emerging from violent conflict, it can be tempting to forget the past, as remembering runs the risk of reigniting old tensions. But depending on the society, sustainable resolution of the conflict may require that the population actively seek reconciliation. Again, intervening actors and international agencies must plan efforts carefully and with great sensitivity to timing, broad participation, and the need for resourcing and sustaining these complex reconciliation processes.
- **Restorative vs. Retributive Justice:** Restorative justice programs focus on restoring relations between the victim and the perpetrator, but they may fall short of punishing war criminals and human rights violators. Retributive justice programs hold these criminals accountable for their actions but do not necessarily strengthen the community's social bonds, which can cause problems over time. Intervening actors need to balance these approaches based on the local environment and their potential for supporting long-term stability.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Effective transitions begin with leaders who are comfortable with ambiguity. The conditions that typically drive transitions are often challenging to assess and almost always transitory in the absence of stable security. Ultimately, effective transitions cannot focus on an “exit strategy,” but rather on establishing the conditions that facilitate the host nation’s transition from a broad state of crisis to one of relative normalcy.

Planning is an essential element of effective transitions. It allows leaders to anticipate transitions and act more decisively amid the uncertainty that prevails during and after conflict. As a result, planning is the single most important tool leaders use to drive effective transitions. It allows leaders to reconcile the inherent tension in post-conflict situations and offers the flexibility necessary to contend with ambiguity.

Understanding the cultural nuances of the host nation, understanding history and its timeless influence on the future, and understanding the context of the conflict are equally important to effective transitions. Through understanding, leaders can visualize the changes necessary to facilitate transition and translate that visualization into concrete action. Understanding helps a leader make better, more informed decisions—decisions that provide the impetus necessary to transition effectively.

Together, planning and understanding fuel effective transitions. This symbiotic relationship ensures their influence on operations is consistent and complementary. Together, they drive success; separately, they defy positive outcomes.

This handbook is the result of consultations across the interagency community, hours of discussion, and the collective experiences of a decade of conflict. The complexities of modern conflict require creative, adaptive approaches that encourage leaders to apply their cognitive skills in pursuit of original solutions. This handbook is intended to avoid checklist approaches and instead provide a “thinking tool” for leaders to use in planning and executing transitions.

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The Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation is a major program of the Command and General Staff College Foundation, Inc. The Center's mission is to foster and develop an interagency body of knowledge to enhance education at the U.S. Army CGSC while facilitating broader and more effective cooperation within the U.S. government at the operational and tactical levels through study, research, analysis, publication, and outreach.



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Strategic Framework for

RULE of LAW

- Just, legal framework
- Public order
- Accountability to the law
- Access to justice
- Culture of lawfulness

SOCIAL WELL-BEING

- Access to and delivery of needs services
- Access to and delivery of education
- Return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons
- Social reconstruction

CROSS PRI

Host Nation Over
Political
Local
Unit
S
Conflict
Region

STABLE C

- Provision
- Stewards
- Political r
accounta
- Civic par

for Stabilization and Reconstruction

SAFE and SECURE ENVIRONMENT

- Cessation of large-scale violence
- Public order
- Legitimate State monopoly over the means of violence
- Physical security
- Territorial security

CROSS-CUTTING PRINCIPLES

Ownership and Capacity
Political Primacy
Legitimacy
Equality of Effort
Security
Transformation
Local Engagement

SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY

- Macroeconomic stabilization
- Control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace
- Market economy sustainability
- Employment generation

GOVERNANCE

Provision of essential services
Stewardship of State resources
Accountability and moderation and
Transparency and participation and empowerment

Interagency Handbook for **TRANSITIONS**

Transitions in post-conflict environments from the means of violence to representative compromise are extraordinarily complex and fraught with risk. They require significant vision, planning, and detailed interaction among a wide variety of internal and external actors; however, providing this vision and developing a comprehensive approach are easier to articulate than enact. Differing cultures and a dearth of planning capacity within many stakeholder institutions and the host nation frequently prevent suitable and adaptive approaches.

In early 2011, senior leaders from across the U.S. interagency community participated in a discussion on how to overcome the “messy” transitions in which they so often struggle, co-hosted by the United States Institute of Peace, the Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. These discussions addressed every perspective and potential risk, as well as the great rewards that could be achieved through effective transitions. This handbook is the result of those exchanges and is intended to provide leaders across the interagency community with an overview of transition conditions and considerations to better prepare them for anticipating, planning, executing, and assessing transitions.

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