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## GTA 90-01-044 JUNE 2013

# Insider Threats-Afghanistan



## **Before – Prevention is the Key**

Predeployment training home-station training lanes, CTCs, and MTCs:

- $\cdot$  Incorporate insider threat attacks and scenarios into rehearsals and exercises
- · Conduct troop leading procedures (PCCs & PCIs)
- · Conduct close-quarters battle drills (CQB) codify in TACSOP
- Conduct close-quarters marksmanship (CQM), advanced CQM, and reflexive firing training codify in TACSOP
- Maintain vigilant 360-degree security (applies to before, during, and after military operations)
- Maintain situational awareness/understanding of Afghan culture in your AO/AOR
- · Conduct CQB, CQM, and reflexive firing refresher training while deployed

## **FRIENDLY FORCES PREVENTION TOOLS**

- · Create/maintain a bond of trust between ANSF and ISAF members
- Maintain positive control of personal weapons and ammunition at all times; know and understand current weapon status: red - magazine inserted, round in chamber; amber - magazine inserted, no round in chamber; green - no magazine inserted, no round in chamber
- Integrate Guardian Angels into all partnered operations
- · Conduct joint/combined security patrols within your perimeter
- Maintain professionalism, respect, and dignity of ANSF officers and soldiers
- Maintain troop discipline during military operations
- Adhere to ROE/EOF procedures
- Involve ANSF in patrol briefs, de-briefs, AARs, and social/sport activities
- Avoid public rebukes; counsel in private, jointly with ANSF chain of command
- Respect Islam, Koran, and mosques; respect Afghan women, elders, and children
- Avoid arrogance (i.e., belief that ISAF culture is superior to Afghan culture)
- Stringently apply force protection measures

#### COALITION PARTNER OBSERVABLE INDICATORS (List is not all-inclusive, but provides "a way")

# Category I indicators – closely monitor situation and/or discuss problems with individual

- Complains about other nations and/or religions
- · Advocates violence beyond what is the accepted norm
- Abrupt behavioral shift
- Desires control
- Socially withdraws in some occasions
- Appears frustrated with partner nations
- Experiences personal crisis
- Demonizes others
- · Lacks positive identity with unit or country
- Reclusive
- Strange habits
- Peculiar discussions

# Category II indicators – refer to counterintelligence (CI) and/or chain of command

- Verbally defends radical groups and/or ideologies
- Speaks about seeking revenge
- · Associates with persons who have extremist beliefs
- Exhibits intolerance
- Personally connected to a grievance
- · Cuts ties with unit, family, or friends
- Isolates self from unit members
- Intense ideological rhetoric
- Attempts to recruit others
- Choice of questionable reading materials in personal areas

# Category III indicators – requires immediate action, such as removing weapon or detention, as last resort

- Advocates violence as a solution to problems
- Shows a sudden shift from "upset" to normal
- Takes suspicious travel or unauthorized absences
- Stores or collects ammunition or other items that could be used to injure
  or kill multiple personnel
- · Verbal hatred of partner nation or individual from partner nation
- Exhibits sudden interest in partner nation headquarters or individual living quarters
- Makes threatening gestures or verbal threats

# DURING

### **Execute rehearsed actions on contact (armed):**

- · Immediately return fire if able, then seek immediate cover
- Quickly attain positive identification of target(s)
- Rapidly adjust weapon status to address the threat (green to red, amber to red)
- Return accurate direct fire
- Suppress and/or neutralize target(s) while minimizing threat to friendly forces and limiting collateral damage to civilians
- Secure area 360 degrees
- Do not rely on outside help such as quick reaction force (QRF), close air support (CAS), or indirect fire
- Time is of the essence; resolve situation with forces at hand

## Execute rehearsed actions on contact (unarmed):

- I. Escape if possible using cover and concealment
  - Have an escape route and plan in mind preferably two
  - · Leave your belongings
  - Carry something to fight with
- **2.** Lock down or conceal yourself using the best cover possible (e.g., canvas, tin, wooden shelter)
  - Barricade your hiding place
  - $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$  Lock the door
  - Silence your cell phone/radio
  - Use something to fight with

**3.** Fight using environmental/found weapons, and employ good tactics such as ambush

- Last resort, life in imminent danger
- · Look for right opportunity magazine changes, etc.
- Act with extreme violence
- 4. Await QRF arrival

## Immediate Aftermath

- Secure the scene to ensure there are no further threats
- Just as there may be a threat from other perpetrators, there may be a threat from objects at the crime scene (e.g., live munitions or unsecured weapons). Units should immediately clear any potential threats (e.g., call in EOD), even if it potentially could contaminate the evidence at the crime scene
- Provide emergency care and medically evacuate (MEDEVAC) any casualties
- Segregate CF and ANSF personnel there may still be a threat
- Maintain 360-degree security

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- Conduct site exploitation; treat it like a police crime scene (forensics collection, evidence, etc.)
- Immediately report the insider attack or any other hostile action involving ANSF members

### Investigate

- The local unit impacted should appoint an officer to assess the crime scene and take steps to preserve it as much as possible until the crime scene investigation (CSI) and Joint Casualty Assessment Team (JCAT) have arrived on scene.
- Leadership should ensure that witnesses do not discuss the incident among themselves or with other unit members until a formal statement is given. Encourage ANSF leadership to do the same with their unit members.
- The Insider Threat Mitigation Team (ITMT) and the JCAT conduct inquiries to collect and analyze critical information related to the insider attack(s). Each attack has unique aspects, and must be scrutinized comprehensively to derive pertinent observations, insights, and lessons to help mitigate future attacks.
- Conduct other parallel investigations in accordance with established U.S. Army regulations and doctrinal practice, such as Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigations.
- Identify insider threat lessons and enemy TTP and incorporate them into force protection policy (SOPs, battle drills).
- Gauge how cooperative the involved ANSF unit is with the investigation and report this.

# • Seek to determine if any ANSF personnel had advance notice or suspicion of the attack.

• Assess the reaction of the involved ANSF unit (are members and leadership remorseful or indifferent to the insider attack?). Take action commensurate with ANSF reaction.

#### Mission planning and operations

- Use a measured response based on current risk assessments when implementing force protection measures.
- Re-emphasize insider threat training and need for situational awareness/situational understanding.
- Initiate a joint CF/ANSF collaboration to restore effective relations between the forces.
- Determine the causes and motivations for the attack and develop mitigation efforts to address them.
- Continue to work with partnered ANSF unit to resolve problems in order to deter future insider attacks.
- Determine and report how cooperative the ANSF unit is with ISAF recommendations and how well the ANSF unit holds its personnel accountable. Base further actions and operations on such information.

#### Share findings and restore operations with coalition partners • Share validated findings within CF and ANSF partnered units.

• Help re-establish an effective working relationship with your partnered unit by conducting a key leader engagement and/or shura to discuss lessons derived from the insider attack. Determine what steps can be taken to prevent another attack from taking place.

# Bottom Line: When in doubt, report observable indicators to chain-of-command/counter intelligence (CI)

COMMENTS? QUESTIONS? Contact the Center for Army Lessons Learned https://call2.army.mil/rfi

AFTER