HANDBOOK

No. 12-14   Version 1.0   JUN 12

Senior Leader's Guide to

Transition Planning

Observations, Insights, and Lessons

Handling Instructions for CALL Electronic Media and Paper Products

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) authorizes official use of this CALL product for operational and institutional purposes that contribute to the overall success of U.S., coalition, and allied efforts.

The information contained in this product reflects the actions of units in the field and may not necessarily be approved U.S. Army policy or doctrine.

This product is designed for official use by U.S., coalition, and allied personnel and cannot be released to the public without the consent of CALL. This product has been furnished with the expressed understanding that it will be used for official defense-related purposes only and that it will be afforded the same degree of protection that the U.S. affords information marked "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" in accordance with U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 380-5, section 5-2.

Official military and civil service/government personnel, to include all coalition and allied partners, may paraphrase; quote; or use sentences, phrases, and paragraphs for integration into official products or research. However, integration of CALL "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" information into official products or research renders them FOUO, and they must be maintained and controlled within official channels and cannot be released to the public without the consent of CALL.

This product may be placed on protected UNCLASSIFIED intranets within military organizations or units, provided that access is restricted through user ID and password or other authentication means to ensure that only properly accredited military and government officials have access to these products.

Regulations strictly forbid posting CALL "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" documents to Department of Defense (DOD) websites that do not restrict access to authorized personnel. AR-25-1, 15 Jul 2005, Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology, paragraph 6-4 n (2) (b) and DOD Web Site Administration Policy and Procedures (11 Jan 2002), Part II, paragraph 3.6.1 require appropriate mechanisms to protect sensitive information.

When no longer needed, all CALL "U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, For Official Use Only [FOUO]" paper products and electronic media will be shredded or destroyed using approved paper shredders or CDROM destroyers.

To allied and coalition personnel:

This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defense purposes only, that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection as such information is afforded by the United States, and that it is not to be revealed to another country or international organization without the consent of CALL.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER

Senior Leader's Guide to

Transition Planning

Version 1.0

DIGITAL VERSION AVAILABLE

A digital version of this CALL publication is available to view, download, or reproduce from the CALL restricted website, <http://call.army.mil>. Reproduction of this publication is welcomed and highly encouraged.

Common Access Card (CAC) or Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login is required to access the digital version.

This publication is located online at:

https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6974&

filename=/docs/doc6974/12-14.pdf

Senior Leader's Guide to Transition Planning Version 1.0

Table of Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

Focus of Guide

It is to be expected that nations will continue to require assistance from other states and organizations in order to recover from natural disasters, conflict, or chronic societal problems. Such assistance ends as the host nation transitions back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency and other actors transition out of their assumed roles and responsibilities. As the host nation transitions back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency they will be faced with issues involving sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency and social reform. Managing transitions at all levels requires close cooperation between the host nation, other governments and militaries, and civil society. Although many of the lessons and best practices used in this guide are derived from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn (OIF/OND), the intent is to provide a guide that is flexible enough to be used for transition planning of a military campaign or crisis of any size or scope.

The term "transition" implies the transitioning from one phase of military operation to another or the transitioning of authority and responsibility from one entity to another.

Joint Publication 5-0 (Joint Operation Planning) refers to transition as "an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness".

This guide primarily focuses on planning for phase IV and V (Stabilize, Enable Civil Authority) of the Joint Campaign Phases leading to the termination of hostilities or transitioning of responsibilities to the host nation or other agencies. Arguably, phase IV and V can be the most difficult phases to plan for and achieve success; however, there is markedly less doctrine or guidance written on transitioning to assist the joint planner. The purpose of this document is to provide planners a guide that assists in planning and executing actions that decrease the military involvement in a campaign and result in an orderly transfer of functions and responsibilities to other entities. This guide will be completed in multiple versions in order to provide the timeliest and most complete information available for current transition planning. We welcome comments or additional information for the next version.

Transition Defined

Transition may be defined as a multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex. It is not a retrograde operation but is a maneuver that may include multiple smaller-scale transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on building specific institutional capacities and creating immediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long term goals.

The primary focus of transition is to conduct a seamless transfer of functions from U.S. Military Forces to U.S. civilian agencies, HN government or non governmental agencies to help a severely stressed government to avoid failure or to recover from a devastating natural disaster, or assist an emerging host nation government to build a new domestic order following internal collapse or defeat in war. Before the transition planning begins, it may be prudent to step back and examine the current strategy and determine if policy choices or operational and tactical actions are taking the outcome in the wrong direction. It may be time to redefine what success and failure look like. It may also be the right moment in time to determine if a continued buildup of security forces is the best direction or should there be more focus on developing a social contract between the government and the people to ensure a lasting peace.

Campaign Phases

Phasing is a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts however it requires detailed planning in the transition from one phase to another. Although the six-phase model (Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, Enable Civil Authority, and Shape) has been accepted by most commanders for campaign planning purposes, it is not a template for all conceivable joint operations and may be tailored to the character and duration of the operation.

Phase O	Shape
Phase I	Deter
Phase II	Seize initiative
Phase III	Dominate
Phase IV	Stabilize
Phase V	Enable civil authority
Phase O	Shape

Figure 1. Campaign Phases

Ideally, phases are distinct in time, space, and purpose from one another, and should be planned in support of each other representing a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Realistically, transitions between phases may be blurred or overlap even though they are designed to be distinct shifts in focus. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the commander and is therefore usually event, not time driven.

Although detailed planning is required to transition between each of the six phases, the transitioning of the last two phases, and the focus of this guide, can be the most challenging since they will require the involvement of U.S. governmental agencies, host nation (HN) government, HN military, and non-governmental organizations.

Planning for phase IV and V and the eventual transition of responsibilities to the HN and other agencies should begin early in the campaign planning cycle. Early engagement with key strategic partners is critical to ensure integration and synchronization.

Seven Types of Transition

Complex environments will require different types of transition as hostilities subside and responsibilities are handed off to the HN or other entities. There are at least seven distinct types of transition operations that may occur during a campaign. Each of the transitions must be closely synchronized and partnerships must evolve to ensure unity of effort and a seamless overall transition. In all cases the population must be secure and satisfied for any transition to be successful.

1. U.S. Military to HN Military – Before the U.S. military can hand over its responsibilities to the HN military, there are three questions that must be answered.

- First, is the HN military trained and equipped to a level of proficiency to maintain the security of the country at the existing level or better and give the country the opportunity to continue to stabilize? This type of transition involves training the HN military to a level of proficiency that enables the U.S. military to reduce their security forces and eventually redeploy.

- Second, is the U.S. military prepared to turn over security and other responsibilities that will make them dependent on the HN military? As the U.S. completes the withdrawal of forces, especially in a non-permissive environment, they become vulnerable unless the HN can maneuver, provide fire support, and respond to attacks.

- Third, is the HN military prepared operationally and strategically? Full transition to self-reliance in external defense will prove difficult if they do not look beyond stabilization of internal security. They must also be well equipped, free of corruption, have an effective pay system and capable of conducting themselves like a professional military organization.

Historical examples of transitioning operations to the HN Military include the Vietnamization of South Vietnam's forces as the U.S. Forces assigning them increasing combat roles. A more recent example would be the Security Forces Assistance provided to the Iraqi Security Forces. It is critical that this type of transition is seamless and does not allow gaps that insurgents or other opposing forces can exploit.

2. U.S. Military to HN Governmental Organizations – One of the key elements of this type of transition is to identify the functions you are transferring to governmental organizations and assessing whether they are ready and capable of successfully performing them. If a national government is weak, corrupt, or incompetent then transitioning functions before they are ready can seriously exacerbate an already difficult situation. Convincing the population that the HN government is ready to assume all the responsibilities involved in providing a secure and prosperous environment is also critical to this type of transition. There will always be an element of the population that does not want the U.S. to leave and will act to delay the transition. The economic effect of the transition and U.S. departure must also be considered. In most cases, a gradual and pragmatic process is preferable.

During the transition to the HN, some of the activities may fall within three subcategories in which the U.S. Embassy would maintain oversight. These subcategories are:

- National Level Turnover – This is normally coordinated by the UN and will seek support and contributions from donor nations. These are mechanisms that can be linked to the goals set by the HN government in its economic strategy of self-sustainment.

- Provincial Turnover – This will be led at the JTF or CJTF level to gain support of the HN government at the local level of governments.

- Security Transition – This represents the turnover of security responsibilities at the national level. It may be led by the JTF or CJTF and is designed to build enduring security institutions and strong civil-military partnerships. The U.S. Embassy will monitor this but is not in charge.

- The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 more commonly known as the Marshall Plan is a historic example of a successful transition to the HN. One of the United States' first significant postwar foreign policy initiatives, it was created to rebuild Europeans prosperity as a means of bolstering the democracies against the threat of communist dictatorship. Some of the same principals used in Europe at the end of WWII were applied more recently in Iraq. A strong HN government supported by the people is critical in preventing subversion from outside forces and vital to a successful transition.

3. U.S. Military to U.S. Governmental Organizations – Because the military has the capability to be on the ground early and in sufficient force for emerging crisis, they are often called upon to conduct missions that would normally be performed by other U.S. Government agencies. As the situation stabilizes and the HN government continues to mature, it may be necessary to transition or transfer functions to an appropriate U.S. Government agency or organization. It is important that this transition is well planned, seamless, and deliberate to avoid gaps or disruption of the overall stabilization process.

As functions are transferred from the U.S. Military to the U.S. Embassy, establishing an enduring presence becomes a key element. This includes activities or programs that continue to build a security force to provide security for its country's population over the long term, promote the continued advance of economic and developmental programs, and establishing a strong and representative government.

This type of transition was used in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake response as the U.S. Military transitioned their responsibilities to the United

States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies. It was also a key element of the successful transition of operations in Iraq as the U.S. State Department assumed the remaining responsibilities from the U.S. Military. Often, military planners may not appreciate the differences or understand   the capabilities or limited capacity of other U.S. agencies. It may be an unrealistic expectation to ask an agency to perform the same functions as DOD when they have limited capabilities and resources. When transitioning functions to another U.S. Agency, you must be able to match capacity to capabilities.

4. U.S. Military to International NGOs – This type of transition frequently occurs at the end of a Humanitarian Assistance or Disaster Relief operation in which the U.S. Military is conducting initial emergency relief operations in a permissive environment. Once the situation has stabilized and non-governmental organizations have the resources to maintain the level of effort, the military may want to transition operations to the NGOs. It should be remembered that as you transition functions to a non-governmental organization and give up those responsibilities you will also lose the influence.

5. U.S. Military to International Governmental Organizations – This type of transition is often found in humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations. A good example occurred during the relief effort of the Haiti Earthquake in 2010. The purpose of Joint Task Force-Haiti was to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and USAID. The military possesses significant capabilities that are useful in emergencies, but long-term plans for relief and reconstruction are best left to nonmilitary government agencies. The military was able to quickly step in with its logistics capability and disciplined command structure to reestablish essential services. The military was able to use its extensive communication capabilities to establish and maintain liaison with principle actors and stay engaged with the UN cluster system as they transitioned responsibility to them. Once again, good security is vital to a successful transition of responsibilities to the United Nations or other international organizations.

6. U.S. Military to Other Nations - In some situations, it may be necessary to transition a portion or all of an operation to a member of the coalition forces to enable the U.S. Forces to refocus or reset for another mission. This would only be done if the HN is not prepared to assume full responsibility and the HN is comfortable with the nation that is assuming the mission. Before a mission can be transitioned to another nation the relations between this country and the HN must be examined for historical, religious, or cultural differences that might disrupt the transition operations. The

capability and capacity of this country must also be looked at to ensure there is not a loss of ability that would affect the overall transition.

7. U.S. Military to Private Sector – In certain stabilization and reconstruction environments, it may be necessary for the U.S. Military to restore critical infrastructure that might otherwise belong to private organizations. It is important to transition these entities back to the private sector as soon as possible but once again security will be the key to this type of transition. It may not always be a direct transfer to the private organization. The situation may require ownership to flow through the U.S. government or the HN government for a period of time. The transition of the oil industry in Iraq was a critical milestone for the country to get back on its feet and ensure a smooth withdrawal of U.S. forces.

A detailed plan addressing the various functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. The transition plan must be able to set up the HN for success. Ultimately, the host nation will decide the form of government in accordance with its cultural and societal norms. We must take great care not to impose a foreign system of government on the host nation; such models will impede transition and will likely empower factions that will eventually destabilize the host nation. The ultimate objective should be to facilitate a system that will work for the HN and not necessarily a mirror of the U.S. model.

Conditions Based Versus Time Driven

Although timelines may be politically driven, they must be designed specifically to give the commanders on the ground the maximum amount of flexibility needed. Identifying elections or other HN governmental dates must be taken into account when planning a timeline. They must allow time to build security capacity and continued stability. In some cases timelines may be necessary just to change the mindset of the commanders. An example might be that after a certain date, the main focus will be on advising and assisting the HN security forces to ensure that there is sufficient time for them to achieve a level of proficiency before U.S. forces are scheduled to begin redeployment. However, when improperly used, timelines are dysfunctional and force sub-optimal decisions in an effort to meet a given deadline. For the greatest likelihood of success, timelines should be based on ground realities and on a dialogue between the commanders and agencies on the ground and policymakers.

The transition planner must build flexibility into the plan to take into consideration all contingencies. Built in decision points may be preferable to adjust the pace of transition and retain or position resources where

needed based on continuing assessments of the operational environment. Below is a sample checklist of decision points for termination or transition to the HN or other agencies:

- Has the end state been achieved?

    ○ Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?

    ○ Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered, and how do they influence termination planning?

    ○ Has the joint force commander identified post-conflict requirements?

- Can forces be safely withdrawn from the operational area? What are the force protection requirements?

    ○ What additional support will be required for redeployment?

    ○ What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between

    ○ post-conflict requirements and the redeployment of the joint force?

    ○ What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the joint force?

- Has coordination for redeployment of the joint force been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?

- Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Component forces will be released?

- Has thought been given to which contracts would be continued and which ones should be removed?

- Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United Nations, or civilian organization?

- What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the post-conflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?

- Will the joint force be expected to support these types of activities?

Planning Considerations

Planning considerations for transition should include:

- Who are the key stakeholders in the transition process? Who are the potential promoters and detractors? How can these be leveraged or mitigated respectively?

- What Key political, environmental, cultural or religious milestones/events could affect the transition process?

- Which aspects of security are best transitioned as a complete function? Which are best done incrementally?

- Has the security transition been coordinated with the other Lines of Effort?

- What are the dependencies within the security and other lines of operation that could be affected by transition or could affect the transition process? What risks or opportunities do these present? What does it mean for the coordination and sequencing of transition of these responsibilities?

- Has a comprehensive assessments of systems been established based on measurable preconditions? Has a process for the nomination and approval of transition been established?

- How will transition affect the requirements to support the force with regard to logistics and force enablers?

- Has an information plan been established to support the transition plan? Does it address HN and coalition target audiences at the appropriate levels?

- What forces will be required to support the HN post transition? What force structure may be required for a potential intervention to support the HN? What is the long term plan for the further development of HN capacity?

- Logistic staff should keep in mind their responsibility for the following considerations:

  - The continued provision of unbroken support to force elements and the identification of any risks that could be mitigated by coalition partners.

  - The need to continue the development of HN logistic capability and capacity through partnering/mentoring and ensuring the sustainability of the HN institutions and supply chain.

○ Begin the planning phase for the redeployment of the force either intra or inter-theater.

Chapter 2

Beginning the Planning Process

Command Emphasis

Like any other operation, the success of transition planning and operations will be dependent on the level of command emphasis it receives. Commanders may be so consumed in current operations that they may be reluctant to devote the necessary time needed to plan and execute transition operations. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. Transitions are also natural breeding grounds for rumors, given the natural anxiety of change and the unknown. Transition planning must be "top driven" to provide the energy needed to prompt commanders at all levels to dedicate the time and resources and keep them informed of what to expect. Some sections may be consumed by the change while others are focused on non-transition work, and there can be very different levels of awareness of key transition milestones. This may necessitate frequent meetings and continuous guidance to maintain that level of energy throughout the command.

Assembling the Right Team

When assembling a transition planning team, it is advantageous to "cast the widest net possible" by including representation from as many agencies, partners, and supporting units as possible. It also provides the expertise required to address the multitude of complex issues involved in transition planning and gains "buy in" and increased cooperation as the plan is implemented. It may seem more efficient to use fewer people but it may result in surprises or unanticipated events if representation of all units and partners are not included in the planning effort even if it is only part time planners or LNOs to attend meetings.

Transition Planners should be a Functional Area (FA) 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy) officer or be a School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduate. If possible, a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) 1 should be included as part of the planning team. In addition, the planners should take the Leader Engagement Training course offered through the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). This is offered online at www. disam.dsca.mil/. Any knowledge of how the State Department or other U.S. Agencies operate would also be useful.

Transition planners should have enough time remaining on their tour to see the planning process through to the end. This is especially true of the full time planning leads or assistant leads. Although this may not always be

possible, it can be very disruptive to lose a key planner before the plan is complete.

In most cases the J5 Plans section of the Commander's staff is responsible for developing transition plans. However because of the complexity of transition planning and the number of external players to coordinate with, it is possible that the current members of the staff may not have the necessary expertise or experience to achieve the level of detail or scope required. This may require the use of a team of experts to assist the full time planning staff. There are different ways to accomplished this depending on the situation and personnel available:

- A "Relief Team" brought in to perform the normal responsibilities of the current J-5 Plans staff freeing them up to focus primarily on transition planning

- A "Tiger Team" of experts to augment the J-5 staff with transition planning being their primary responsibility

- A 'Grey Beard" team of retired general offices to advise the current J-5 staff

If possible, planners should see the plan executed to end. They must have a vested interest in the plan and how it impacts on the unit's ability to execute their plan of operations.

Selecting a Planning Methodology

Because of the complexity of transition planning and the external participants involved, special consideration is given to selecting a methodology to meet the needs of the situation. Non-military actors may be participating in the planning and not be familiar with traditional military planning processes, lexicons, or the level of detail required. This requires that careful consideration be given to the planning methodology to ensure it provides a rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, timely preparation of COAs, and prompt transmission of decisions to subordinate units and external players. Two methods of planning discussed in detail in FM 5-0 are the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Design is another planning process that may be used in conjunction with JOPP and MDMP or used independently.

- Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) – JOPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs for conducting transitions, select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The planning staff uses JOPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, identify resources, and identify and mitigate

risks involved in transition. Additional information on JOPP can be found in Joint Pub 5-0.

• Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) - MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process. The MDMP is an adaptation of the Army's analytical approach to problem solving. The MDMP is a tool that assists the commander and staff in developing estimates and a plan. The MDMP helps the commander and his staff examine a battlefield situation and reach logical decisions. The process helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reach a decision. The full MDMP is a detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming process used when adequate planning time and sufficient staff support are available to thoroughly examine numerous friendly and enemy courses of action (COAs). The military decision-making process has seven steps (Figure 2-1). Each step of the process begins with certain input that builds upon the previous steps. Each step, in turn, has its own output that drives subsequent steps. See CALL Handbook 11-19 for more detailed information on MDMP.

Step 1	Receipt of mission
Step 2	Mission analysis
Step 3	Course of action development
Step 4	Course of action analysis
Step 5	Course of action comparison
Step 6	Course of action approval
Step 7	Orders production

Figure 2-1. Seven Steps of MDMP

• Design Methodology - Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Planning consist of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. The conceptual component is represented by the cognitive application of design. The detailed component translates broad concepts into a complete and practical plan. During transition planning, these components overlap with no clear delineation between them. Design methodology is continuous throughout planning and evolves with increased

understanding throughout the operations process. Design underpins the exercise of mission command, guiding the interactive and often cyclic application of understanding visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept is forged.

During the planning for the consolidation of headquarters to USF-I, the planning team determined and the Chief of Staff (COS), agreed that an operational design would be created in order to better determine the scope and to frame the problem of conducting a very diverse and complex merger of units, people and functions while in the midst of fighting a war. The purpose of the design work was not academic in nature, but rather purposeful and focused towards insuring that subsequent work would not be wasted upon something other than the core issues. Red Team members participated as well as subject matter experts from throughout the commands. The design work would remain informative throughout the merger process, but its most critical impact was in helping the team understand that the most difficult aspect of this merger was creating an unprecedented headquarters that could function at all three levels of war.


Figure 2-2. Design Methodology Concept

A campaign quality Army requires versatile leaders – critical and creative thinkers who recognize and manage not just friendly transition but those of adversaries, as well as the operational environment (OE). Design provides the cognitive tools to recognize and manage transition by educating and

training the commander. Educated and trained commanders can identify and employ adaptive, innovative solution, create and exploit opportunities, and leverage risk to their advantage during these transitions.

Setting Planning Timelines

Based on the commander's initial allocation of time, the COS may develop a staff planning timeline that outlines how long the headquarters can spend on each step of the MDMP. The staff planning timeline indicates what products are due, who is responsible for them, who receives them and when they should be completed. It includes times and locations for meetings and briefings. It may be advantageous to use a collaborative process of developing supporting plans at the same time you are working the main Transition Plan.

Assumptions

An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist during the execution of the transition. It is important that these assumptions are as accurate and realistic as possible during transition planning. Commanders should use Red Teams to challenge the assumptions periodically during the planning process. Assumptions must continually be reviewed and updated as the situation on the ground changes or when sufficient information or intelligence is received that would invalidate the assumption. If an assumption involves an outside agency, the staff may want to send them a request for information to thus converting the assumption to a fact. The staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the OPORD.

Understand the Guidance

The commander and staff must analyze all available sources of guidance. These sources include written documents, such as the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), National Military Strategy (NMS), written directives, oral instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other interested organizations, Strategic Communication (SC) guidance, and higher headquarters' orders or estimates. Strategic guidance from the President, SecDef or CJCS provide the basis for developing the transition plan. This guidance provides the long-term and intermediate or ancillary objectives.

A good example of U.S. policy guidance in Iraq was set by President Obama's 2009 speech at Camp Lejeune, which reaffirmed the 2008 Security Agreement, calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces by December 31,

2011, and the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which lays out a long-term strategic relationship between the U.S. and Iraq in the fields of diplomacy, economics, energy, security, and rule of law. It stated that the goal of the President's policy was to promote security and prosperity in Iraq, transition responsibility for security to the Iraqis, and cultivate an enduring strategic relationship with Iraq based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Achievement of strategic objectives should result in attainment of the strategic end state—the broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation.

Importance of Agreements

As military forces draw down and the HN and other US Government agencies assume increasing responsibility, the importance of having agreements in place cannot be emphasized enough. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Security Cooperation Agreements play a pivotal role in a successful transition. Operating without a security agreement will force the reliance on a rule of law that is being interpreted by different echelons and different organization.

Identification of Tasks to be Transferred, Transformed, or Eliminated

Before tasks can be transferred, transformed, or eliminated, they must first be identified. This will be a very difficult process but all subordinate units must determine what tasks they are currently performing. This will be a very time consuming requirement for commanders and staffs that are already very consumed with current operations. It will also be necessary to establish a matrix or other tracking mechanism to ensure that tasks are not dropped.

Tasks must be identified that apply to all units such as setting conditions for transitions of responsibilities to other entities or conducting advise and assist missions.

Specific tasks for subordinate units must also be identified and promulgated. An example might be for medical units to assess risk and adjust capabilities in order to mitigate gaps as units consolidate and redeploy.

Task for supporting commands must also be identified such as coordination of capabilities to support the withdrawal of forces and equipment.

When the military transitions tasks and responsibilities to civilian agencies, there may be certain tasks that are unique to the military and may be lost or severely diminished. These risks should be considered when developing transition plans. Some of these are:

- Recovering killed and wounded personnel

- Recovering damaged vehicles

- Recovering downed aircraft

- Clearing travel routes

- Operations center monitoring of private security contractors

- Private security contractor inspection and accountability services

- Convoy security

- Explosive-ordnance disposal

- Counter rocket, artillery, and mortar notification

- Counter-battery neutralization response

- Communications support

- Tactical-operations center dispatch of armed response teams

- Maintaining electronic counter-measures, threat intelligence, and technology capabilities1

Establishing a massive sync matrix may be useful to lay out all the functions to the staff and track the progress of transition. Other day-to-day services that the military depends on may disappear as a named mission transitions to a civilian lead or unnamed mission. This may affect such things as mail, AAFES, purchases of supplies, moving cargo in and out of country, and movement around the country. People coming into country will also require visas which may overload the Embassy in supporting that effort.

Identification of Materiel, Services, Bases to Transfer

Identifying materials, services, and bases to transfer to the HN requires close coordination and prioritization from subordinate units. Clearly communicating this to the gaining HN agency or commander early on in the process can avoid misunderstanding or distrust at the critical point of transfer of the base or outpost. Host-nation forces may be particularly interested in keeping the following types of property:

- Force protection barriers

- Power generation units

- Light sets

- Containerized housing or security units

- Furniture

Commanders must comply with specific regulatory requirements when disposing of government property of any type. The HN may expect U.S. forces to leave significant amounts of property behind for their use. Regulations clearly dictate the type and dollar amounts of U.S. government property that can be given to the HN government upon departure of U.S. forces. Commanders of units serving jointly with HN forces or combat outposts must clearly communicate to the gaining forces what property and equipment can and cannot be left behind at the location. Commanders should ensure they understand current policies and consult a judge advocate general if they are unclear on what property and equipment can and cannot be left behind.

When closing military bases and transferring material to the HN or local population, consideration should be given to the short term effect it will have on the economy and political situation. The local population may have been dependent on a U.S. base to provide jobs or other services. Handing over bases, material or services must be part of an overall transition plan that includes a strategic communication plan to minimize any adverse effects on the local population.

The plan should also examine what the effect of closing a base will have on the ability of the remaining U.S. forces to function. Once a base is turned over to the HN, the U.S. military will lose a source of intelligence, communication, and other forms of support for that area. (See Appendix B)

Maintaining Situational Awareness

You can't make good decision unless you have good information and can separate facts from opinion and speculation. One of the first casualties of U.S. or Coalition forces engaging in transition operations will be the loss of situational awareness. As U.S. and Coalition forces scale back local operations, contact with the population will be drastically reduced and an associated reduction in situational awareness will result.

Innovative approaches will be needed to maintain situational awareness of the operational environment during the transition. By using previously cultivated relationships, the challenges of maintaining situational awareness during security transitions can be largely overcome. The key is to undertake the planning steps and resource investments early so as the traditional types of military intelligence begin to be reduced, a nontraditional and local information capability can make up for some of the reductions of capability.

Knowledge Management

During transition operations Knowledge Management (KM) becomes the commander's critical path to support his decision making. The sequence of meetings and the quality of inputs and outputs of those meetings is critical.

As forces are drawn down and functions are transferred to other partners or the host nation, it becomes more important to manage the information acquired before and during the transition period. Knowledge management during transition operations may be broken out in three perspectives:

- **Management** focuses on capturing, organizing and facilitating knowledge. This may include information obtained during earlier phases of the operation which may be critical in planning a seamless transition.

- **Application** focuses on effective retrieval of relevant content through advanced searches and mining to conduct knowledge-related work and tasks and on the use of the results for discovery. Access to this information by other partners as well as the host nation becomes an important consideration. Effective access, search and dissemination are critically dependent on the organization of knowledge, whether in technological or traditional systems.

- **People.** This perspective focuses on learning, sharing and collaboration. This is the education component of the cycle. Technology may aid them, but in the end, it is their ability to use and innovate with what is available that will create the value realized in KM.

The knowledge management process must be very adaptable with venues that are able to give guidance, receive assessments, give directions, and then follow up. Effective management of information and knowledge can help to increase commanders' and their staff's situational awareness, enabling them to make better decisions with a greater understanding of the transition environment.

Merging Headquarters

As missions change, agreements implemented, and force numbers reduced, it becomes necessary to merge headquarters to increase efficiency and effectiveness. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), a Command and Control Transition Tiger Team (C2T) was established to develop a plan to merge six diverse war fighting headquarters into one headquarters, U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I), with one commander and one staff that could function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The C2T focused on the critical missions and functions that needed to remain intact throughout the merger process and after merger completion.

USF-I's initial operations capability was to be in effect by 1 January 2010 with a potential for earlier mergers. Full operational capability was to be achieved no later than 15 March 2010. As part of this capability, III Corps would conduct a Relief In Place /Transfer Of Authority with I Corps in

February-March 2010 into an established USF-I. Conceptually, an army corps headquarters staff would provide the nucleus for the USF-I staff with the remainder coming as individual augmentees from throughout the U.S. military. Additionally, it was necessary to minimize transition time without losing functionality; this would be accomplished by staying proactive. Planners must factor in force protection, sustainment, and information technology for the residual staff. The CG would exercise his span of control through deputy commanding generals (DCGs), consisting of DCG (Operations), DCG (Advising and Training) and DCG (Support). USF-I would build a security assistance office and institutional advising and training elements in a modular fashion to facilitate transition to the US Embassy Baghdad. It would be necessary to establish SOPs and procedures for USF-I standup and support of III Corp train up in August-September 2009 and their subsequent mission rehearsal and exercise. Finally, seek a ballpark 40 percent personnel savings target including military, civilian, and contractors by analyzing the future force structure to identify necessary scope and types of missions. These guiding principles would be a constant source of reference as the C2T team progressed through design, analysis, and planning.

Presidential policy guidance and direction is paramount to the decision making that leads to the merger of these headquarters. Understanding the long term goals, time lines, troop levels, and other political dynamics becomes critical information for conducting the planning. First, conduct a detailed review of all personnel and functions that exist across all the headquarters to be merged.

Merging headquarters into one may be problematic for the staffs. They may not be trained, experienced, or organized to plan and conduct tactical through strategic issues simultaneously. Although manning documents may designate planners to be of certain grade, education, or service, the reality is that those positions may not be filled with the required skills needed. If that is the case, it may be necessary to bring in an external team with the necessary skills to augment the staff. There may be a need to establish a Forward Headquarters near the Embassy or other location that requires constant collaboration to plan and execute the transition. A Tactical Command Post also may be required to keep focus on operations during the actual merger period.

Security Cooperation Organizations

The security cooperation organizations (SCO) within U.S. Embassies are normally charged with advising, training, and equipping HN forces; supporting professional military education; and planning joint military exercises. These tasks entail administration of U.S. foreign assistance provided to the HN military through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

account and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account. In addition to foreign assistance, SCOs facilitate other forms of bilateral military engagement, most notably the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

As U.S. Military forces are reduced as part of the transition plan, it may be necessary to consolidate the remaining forces within the SCO. (See Annex C) This may necessary as a result of not having a Status of Forces Agreement from which U.S. Forces can operate or it may be needed to consolidate forces to gain efficiency. Either way, it may create some situations that must be planned for. The SCO operates under the authority of U.S. Code Title 22 and is the security assistance element of the Embassy's Country Team responsible for managing the military's requests, sales, and deliveries of U.S. defense equipment, training, and services. In addition to statutory limitations on troop strength, operating under Title 22 authority also restricts the military from conducting security cooperation tasks and the resources to conduct them. One example that was identified in Iraq was the inability of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) to conduct mil-to-mil training or even request a Mobile Training Team to conduct staff training. In addition, it may be necessary for all SCO personnel to obtain passports and visas if they do not already have them. Understanding the operations of the Embassy and their culture becomes critical when transitioning to an SCO type organization. Although transitioning functions to a SCO is one option, the Embassy is not designed, funded, equipped, or trained to continue with the missions that the military has been previously conducting and attempting to do so would result in frustration and possibly failure.

In 2009, the USF–I Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability directed U.S. forces to synchronize their efforts with interagency partners to strengthen Iraqi political, economic, diplomatic, and rule of law institutions while avoiding temporary "quick fixes" that could undermine long-term institutional viability. While strategies, orders, key staff organizations, and processes were developed to support this at MNF–I and Embassy levels, the forces on the ground faced many challenges in further expanding this civil-military unity of effort.

Capacity Building

Societies emerging from conflict often have debilitated or corrupted governance institutions, lack professional capacity for governance, and require new or reformed legal frameworks for political engagement. When the government cannot provide for the population, people will do whatever it takes to put bread on the table and ensure their own security, even if it means supporting opponents to the peace process or engaging in criminal activity. It is critical that the transition process enables the HN to continue

with security, rule of law, economic, and other governmental programs that will provide the cornerstone of a stable government.

 Security Force development – Security Force Assistance (SFA) aims to establish conditions that support the host nation's end state, which includes competent, capable, committed, and confident security forces. This includes bringing their military up to a professional level that will minimize the potential for a military coup or other disorder within the government. Even the best trained and professional force will wither without the institutional systems to recruit, pay, supply and equip, train and employ, and sustain them.

 Economic development / PRTs – Good governance and sustainable economical development are crucial to any successful transition. As the transition time to HN officials arrives, it becomes important to close out all existing projects or begin to transition them to the proper HN or non-governmental organization that can sustain them. It is critical to not leave any project undone or in a state that requires continued support without that ability in place.   It is better to start early, get the HN as self-sufficient as possible, and back out as the draw down comes to a close.

 Whole of Government – A successful transition is interdependent on the maturity and parallel development of each governmental element of the host nation. The transition plan must ensure that U.S. Governmental agencies and key stakeholders are included in the planning process to achieve coordination of all the departments of the host nation.

Chapter 3

Staffing, Verification, Wargaming (Planning)

Training the Staff

As staffs consolidate and missions change during transitional periods, the potential to have untrained personnel in key positions increases. Many of the duties may be unique to the situation, yet there may be very little formal training available to prepare the staff before they arrive in theater or assume their responsibilities. Creative training opportunities may be required for the staff to be prepared to work with HN officials or other U.S. Government agencies. Understanding the HN customs and governmental procedures as well as knowledge of State Department and other agencies culture, and procedures can be very useful as operations transition. Some training recommendations that would be useful for all staff members would include:

- "Embassy 101"

- Training in contracting

- Extensive cultural training

    ○ Understand the culture and apply it to your normal leadership, problem solving, and critical thinking skills

    ○ Understand how the HN government works

    ○ Understand what the religious, tribal, and political impact will be on the day-to-day operations of the HN

- Foreign Military Sales

If possible, the planning staff should have sufficient time left on their tour in theater to allow them to complete the planning process as well as participate in the transition. This will help in making sure the plan is realistic and the planners are able to make adjustments to the plan as needed.

As staff members are nearing their end of tour, their replacement should be identified as soon as possible and contacted to guarantee a smooth transition. Because the staff may be reduced, there may be very little time for train-up making it imperative that receive as much training as possible before arriving to their assignment.

Methodology

Past transition planning has highlighted several TTPs that have proven to be extremely effective and should be considered.

- Wargaming - Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist. Wargaming is a primary means to conduct analysis of these assumptions and determine the viability of COAs. It is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the area of operation (AO), and other aspects of the OE. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction. Wargaming also enables rapid comparison of the hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions, and force requirements of the transition plans. When planning for transition, wargaming can assist in synchronization, help identify key tasks and functions and determine who should perform them. Although wargaming is more commonly referred to as Table Top Exercises within other agencies and organizations, it will help determine which tasks should be transferred to these entities and which one are no longer required.

- Red Teaming - Red teaming provides an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the OE and from the perspective of adversaries and others. Commanders use red teams to aid them and their staffs to provide insights and alternatives during design, planning, execution, and assessment to:

  - Broaden the understanding of the operational environment

  - Assist the commander and staff in framing problems and defining end state conditions; and challenge assumptions

  - Consider the perspectives of the adversary and others as appropriate

  - Aid in identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities

  - Assist in identifying areas for assessment as well as the assessment metrics

  - Anticipate the cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and others

  - Conduct independent critical reviews and analyses of plans to identify potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

- Use of Human Terrain System (HTS) Teams – When wargaming a transition plan, it can be very valuable to utilize HTS assets if they are available. They can provide critical insight in how the local population will react to each COA. You may want to ask them: What

are people going to see? What are they going to hear? What's the media going to tell them? How is it going to affect their lives? What kind of feedback are you getting from your teams?

Assessment and Verification

As the transition plan is developed, a continued assessment should take place to determine weaknesses, security risks, validity of assumptions, and accuracy of timelines. The assessment should examine the likelihood of attaining the conditions laid out in the plan, an assessment of the extent to which such conditions have been met, information regarding variables that could alter that plan, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that plan. The assessment should continue to determine the preparedness of HN security forces, the maturity of HN government agencies, and the ability of US agencies to assume responsibilities.

Transition planning is normally conducted at the strategic level and executed at the operational and tactical level. Any assessments must come from the unit level to get a true picture of the progress being made in the actual transition. Commanders must continue to emphasize planning for current operations while planning and executing transition. As the drawdown continues tactical level commanders may find themselves in a position to address strategic level issues such as Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) that Division Commanders had been responsible for in the past. It is imperative to maintain these relationships and to continue to conduct other activities with the local population as long as possible to maintain situational awareness. If you don't have 'boots on the ground', you may lose the key nodes of information. In Iraq, a deliberate decision was made to keep a disproportionate number of general officers in country for KLEs and other strategic level issues to help maintain the situational awareness.

Adjustments and Execution

As the transition plan continues to develop, regular meetings should be conducted with the Chief of Staff (COS), Deputy Commanding General (DCG), Deputy Ambassador, and other key staff members to inform them on the status of the plan development, present unresolved issues, develop COAs, and resolve as many issues as possible at that level. These meetings should be followed with brief-backs to the Ambassador and Commanding General (CG) to report progress and any changes or adjustments that have been made to the transition plan. More critical issues can also be presented as decision briefs and any adjustments to the overall plan can be made at this time.

The execution of a general transition must start early to facilitate a seamless handoff. It is much like taking the training wheels off, "Someone must be there to help the new government when they fall off and help them back

on." Constant meetings will be required with different sections to report on the status of their progress. At some point you have to get past the hypothetical and get to the execution. As functions are transitioned from the U.S. Military to the HN you must keep in mind that you are weaning people from the most capable force in the world.

The HN and other countries may not share the same timeline that you are working from. The timeline may become a forcing function to keep everyone on track. This forcing function cannot be lost.

Accountability and Reporting Progress

Measuring progress allows continuous adjustments to strategy and implementation to improve success. Ongoing measurements should contribute to adjusting the goals, plans, and activities of all actors. It is important for subordinate units to continue to coordinate and report progress on their individual transition plan development.

Chapter 4

Engaging Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational Players (Planning)

> "Unity of effort and cooperation are not optional."
>
> — GEN David Petraeus (COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance, 1 August 2010)

Building Partners

"Partnering tends to be more mindset than skill set" LTG Caldwell, (A Call to Action: Command Philosophy, June 2010)

Every effort should be made to include other U.S. agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and multinational players in the planning process and keeping them informed. Some actions that can develop partnerships and facilitate communication are:

- Build strong relationships and unity of effort with military, civilian, and HN partners. The quality of partnerships drives effectiveness and the ability to influence.

- Military organizations need to learn how the State Department functions in order to serve the Chief of Mission properly. This will avoid duplication of effort, information fratricide, and fiscal competition.

- Consider having "transition briefings" where all personnel, regardless of organization or section are briefed on key elements of the planned transition.

- Form a civilian-military team synergy, leveraging the strengths of each to facilitate the development of the HN capacity.

Close and Continuous Coordination with Host Nation (HN) and Allies

Understanding of the HN language, culture, and history can be one of the most valuable things you can do when preparing to transition operations to the HN military or civilian players. This will help you better predict the behavior and actions of the people you will be working with.

The behavior of the host nation and its people may change as the transfer of responsibilities to the host nation and to the U.S. Embassy occurs. The

lessons that the host nation and its security forces have learned from the U.S. will only be apparent when we examine what they have chosen to retain, discard, or transform. U.S. influence diminishes once the transfer of responsibilities has taken place.

Overcoming Choice of Words, Language Barriers

Many terms or phrases that the military use on a daily basis may not be understood or acceptable by other agencies. For example, the State Department does not normally use "campaign phases" when discussing an operation and "end state" is not a term they use. The military normally speaks in bullets, while the DoS speaks more in well fleshed-out paragraphs. The DoS has a much longer term perspective that does not lend well to the U.S. military's notion of phases or "end states."

Failing to write a plan that all the players can understand causes them to get caught up in verbiage and runs the risk of derailing the transition process. Consider creating a "common lingo" site which helps cross-train military and civilian in terminology and could be populated with organizational charts, telephone lists, etc.

As forces are drawn down and staff size is reduced, it becomes critical that each staff position is effective and that each multinational staff member selected to fill a staff positions must possess the necessary language skills to communicate effectively with the rest of the staff. Military terms can be found in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 while U.S. State Department terms may be clarified in the Foreign Affairs Manual found at http://www.state.gov/m/a/dir/regs/fam/.

General Rules for Interacting with Non-U.S. Military Players

Transition operations will almost always mean working with organizations or agencies outside of the U.S. Military. Therefore, establishing good relationships with the HN and Coalition partners as well as other U.S. Governmental Agencies cannot be over emphasized. The Embassy neither perceives of itself as a continuation of the U.S. military force before the transfer of responsibilities nor does it see the transfer as a relief in place. Because each transition may be unique and not have a textbook solution, many of the details will consist of ad hoc solutions and require patience and understanding of all the players. The locations of offices and headquarters should be planned to facilitate the establishing of relations. Coordination of effort and ideas between different organizations is important to leverage each other's programs.

Chapter 5

Implementation/Passing the Baton

> "As a military force, this transition should be transparent and seamless — we should have sought it where the operating environment allows it. There is no red star cluster that goes up that says we are now out of combat operations ... We learned that it is better to make that a transparent distinction, so tactically you are not allowing the enemy to take advantage of your change in mission, which is not [necessarily] based on change of condition, but based on policy."
>
> — LTG Jacoby, Commander, I Corps (DCG-O, USF-I), 12 Feb 2010

Shaping the Operational Environment

In order to successfully conduct transition operations, and maintain stability operations, there are five actions to consider in shaping the environment:

- Maintain Situational Awareness: Maintaining situational awareness despite reduced resources and decreasing access resulting from the drawdown of US forces will require innovative approaches.

- Retain Influence with the HN: Partnerships and personal relationships are crucial to retain necessary influence and enable continue progress in building HN capacity.

- Execute Non-lethal Targeting: Use of non-lethal targeting can be used to solve complex problems encountered in the operational environment that affect the drivers of instability.

- Conduct Mission Preparation: It is critical that personnel have the proper training and mindset for the phase of the campaign. Some personnel may be returning to conduct stability operations that were previously conduction COIN or combat operations. Units need to conduct home station training, joint and Service training and in-theater training to be mentally and physically prepared to conduct stability operations.

- Master Transitions: Understanding transition and the impact on operations is important at all levels to plan, execute, assess, and adjust to the changing complex operational environment.

Synchronization of Staff and Command Activities

Conducting a handoff with the incoming staff during a transition period can be extremely difficult. Maintaining synchronization of staff and command activities becomes very important especially when each staff will have a different focus. This may take place at the same time the staff is learning to work with the State Department or another agency and becoming familiar with a foreign culture at the same time.

Redeploy Forces

One of the responsibilities of the military during a transition period is to provide and preserve options and COAs for our decision makers. If we reduce the number of troops or capabilities too soon, we limit the number of COAs. Transition of responsibilities must be started well in advance of any redeployment of major forces.

During the planning process for drawdown, planners should use the minimum number of forces that may be left after combat operations and troops leave. In most cases the actual number of forces remaining in country will be determined at the national level and it will be easier to determine task distribution and assignments if the lower end of the planning range is used.

Base Disposition

The Base Transition Process encompasses a series of actions to prepare, document, execute and finally close or transfer bases. The entire process can take between 90 to 365 days. The individual tasks are broken down into four parallel lines of effort that lead to the end state of Documentation and Final Transfer. The four parallel processes are;

- Real Estate Management

- Environmental Oversight

- Property Distribution

- Contracting

Additional processes applicable to some bases include the Army and Air Force exchange Service (AAFES) transition, HN Business Industrial Zone (ABIZ) coordination, and Memorial Disposition, which occur in parallel with these processes. Estimated Regional Commands (RC's) transition timelines for planning purposes are 365 days for a Strategic Base (SB), 180 days for an Operational Base (OB), and 90 days for a Tactical Base (TB).

Once a base is opened, there are three types of disposition:

- Closure is the complete removal of all base function, removal/ destruction of all structures and equipment, remediation of all environmental hazards and a return of the real estate to the owner.

- Transfer involves turning over all or portions of the personal and real property of the base to an official entity within the HN for their occupation and use. In the case of transfers, the personal and real property to be "donated" to the HN is negotiated, approved, and documented by the appropriate executive agents of the countries involved.

- A form of transfer is the Partial Transfer in which only portions of a base are transferred to the HN while other portions are closed or remain active.

Figure 5-1. Base Transition Process

Base closures and transitions should not be hasty and should be well planned to avoid the appearance that we are abandoning the local population. There should be a well thought out strategic information plan incorporated in the overall base closure plan.   If there is to be a base closure ceremony, it should be conducted well ahead of the planned closure date with a gradual phasing of the closure.

Property Disposition

The identification, accounting, disposition, and final transfer of real property and excess personal property comprise a large portion of the time and process required for the responsible transition of facilities and areas to the HN. This process needs to begin as early as possible and progress until final transfer. Property distribution starts with inventory, so the base Mayor gains visibility of what is on-hand. Then the property will be accounted for and receive final disposition. The majority of property on transitioning bases will receive disposition through the Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP) Process. This process may end with the approved transfer of real and personal property to HN in conjunction with final base transition.

Returning property to pre-conflict owners may seem like the logical and just thing to do but it may involve evicting families or business that took up occupancy during the conflict and may be destabilizing if not carefully planned. Coalition forces, the HN government, and international agencies must plan for property dispute mechanisms, compensation arrangements, and other means to address this issue.

Property disposition may become complicated during transition periods especially with security forces that are engaged or conducting missions and may have difficulty in complying with property disposal and turn-in timelines. Other units may just be reluctant to turn in their equipment until the last minute creating a burden on the J4 staff. Transition planning must take into consideration this situation during non-permissive environments and explore ways to maintain security while maintaining accountability of property.

Security/Risk

Risk is inherent in transition periods. While end-states can be clearly defined, policy-dictated deadlines and operational constraints limit courses of action to mitigate drivers of instability and reacting to miscalculations while transferring responsibility to fragile or immature host nation institutions. Planning for base closure, hand-off, or reposition of US forces in a non-permissive environment must emphasize operational security and deception. Innovation will be needed to mask or create uncertainty about base closure actions that must occur like release of contract employees, cancellation of services, or other tell-tale signs of an impending departure. Some challenges during transition periods that should be considered are:

- Maintaining situational awareness and an in-depth understanding of the drivers of instability

- Managing perceptions

- Retaining necessary influence

- Developing a legitimate CT enterprise

- Determining the appropriate pace of transition

- Tackling complex problem sets

- Training and developing the right mindset

- Doing different with less

Monitoring Timelines and Reporting Progress

As well as outlining the conditions for each stage of the transition, the plan must also include the metrics used to measure each condition. These metrics will need to be developed in more detail as they get closer to the point of delivery. It is likely that each condition will have a number of metrics that will be used to measure the conditions. It is to be expected that the measurement of progress will include both objective and subjective metrics. Ideally there should be more objective measurements as any subjective measurements can be misinterpreted and are subject to the personal bias. However, objective metrics can be misleading. For example, the HN may have trained the defined number of security forces in the OPLAN but they may not be equipped or ready to perform their mission. Using the right metrics and interpreting them correctly will provide the commanders with an awareness of how far it has progressed towards preparing for the next phase of the transition.

The success of a transition is directly correlated to actions and accomplishments of the HN. The military cannot be successful by themselves. They are part of a team of HN, US Agencies, NGOs and other agencies working towards a common goal. The military may need to request a third-party assessment /analysis team to study the effectiveness of the transition effort (i.e., what success looks like in one year, two years, three years, etc.). The military will not have time to devote the resources to study that issue.

Strategic Communications

Transition must be accompanied by a detailed and multifaceted influence campaign that starts well in advance to indicate the rationale for the transfer and to support the establishment of HN institutions and agencies as legitimate, credible entities. Effective communication will help shape the environment and demonstrate the HN government's improving capacity and competence. Expectation management is an important aspect of the overall transition plan:

- Aggressively seek to control the narrative.

- Clearly articulate intentions to U.S. forces, civilian partners, host nation partners and population, regional audiences, and the American public.

- Use specific, clearly defined language to avoid miscommunication.

- Consistently engage host nation leadership at strategic/national through tactical/local levels.

Information sharing, using a wide range of traditional and non-traditional entities facilitates a broader understanding of the OE.

Virtual Staff Concept

As forces are drawn down and consolidated to reduce the footprint or comply with force caps, valuable manpower and expertise will be lost. One concept to make up for this loss is to create a reach back capability or "virtual staff" that is dedicated to supporting the remaining staff in country. Today's communication and collaboration capabilities make the virtual staff a realistic and reliable concept during stability operations. The virtual staff would be responsible for researching information, preparing reports, and other duties to free up the in-country staff to maintain situational awareness, conduct on-the-ground coordination, and implement the strategy of the commander.

A virtual staff could be a core staff at a central location dedicated to full time support of the deployed forces or it could be a network of identified personnel with specific expertise or skills from multiple organizations who support the deployed staff in addition to other responsibilities. The virtual staff can provide access to increased amount of expertise, increased flexibility, and less risk while requiring less logistical effort to deploy, maintain, and move. Staff members in reach back must be well informed with the situation on the ground, preferably someone who has worked in country and in a similar position in which he is supporting.

Reconciliation and Reintegration

Reconciliation is defined as strategic diplomatic efforts by respective leaderships to arrange an overarching political settlement that ends the fighting. The goal of these efforts is to persuade insurgent leaders and groups to terminate their armed resistance and assume a legitimate role in the future of the country.

Political reintegration is the process of the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the country. In Iraq, political reintegration was a particularly important challenge, relating both to the armed forces of the disposed regime and

to the Kurdish and Shia militias eager to play a role in the new political system.

Reintegration is a social and economic process in which ex-combatants return to community life and engage in livelihood alternatives to violence. Reintegration is enabled by local agreements, where communities (supported by the government) reach out to insurgents, work to resolve grievances, and encourage them to stop fighting and rejoin their communities peacefully and permanently. Integrating ex-combatants into civilian life gives them a stake in the peace and reduces the likelihood that they will turn to insurgent or criminal activity to support themselves if they cannot find gainful employment. It is important to have a reintegration in place early so that when the time is ripe, it can provide an effective exit from conflict for those who are willing to take it. An effective reintegration program brings lasting reintegration through three stages.

1. Social Outreach

    ○ Strategic communications

    ○ Negotiation and grievance resolution

    ○ Sub-national governance and outreach

    ○ Detainee release

2. Demobilization

    ○ Vetting, registration (intent form, survey, biometrics)

    ○ Weapons management and community security

    ○ Transition Assistance and Disengagement Training

3. Consolidation of Peace and Community Recovery

    ○ Community and district small grants

    ○ Agriculture, infrastructure, and demining programs

    ○ Literacy, religious, and vocational education and training

It may be difficult to get communities to accept ex-combatants, especially perpetrators of atrocities. Most will have little to offer by way of education, employment, or training. Successful reintegration depends on the support of communities, families, local leaders, and women's and youth groups. Encourage these groups to get involved in planning for the return of ex-combatants. Implement a strong public information campaign to spread awareness about the goals of reintegration.

What the End State May Look Like

The end state of transition cannot be imposed by U.S. or Coalition forces alone and must reflect local solutions and agreed upon standards. Even when conflict comes to an end, the U.S. Government and the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. Because the strategic end state may be general or broad in nature, it may be difficult to determine whether and when military operations should be terminated. It should also be noted that "End State" is a term that the State Department does not use because of their enduring presence.

A continuing relationship such as an Army National Guard State Partnership program may be a concept to consider in certain situations to maintain a strong relationship with the HN and ensure that programs are able to continue. To facilitate enduring positive effects and improved quality of life for the host nation, a seamless transition of functions is required to ensure security, justice, reconciliation, infrastructure and economic development.

The relationships established in the initial stages of operations, coupled with accurate assessments of progress achieved in civil-military implementation, are critical in affecting a smooth transition to civil authority. Successes in providing security and essential public services as well as visible progress in stimulating economic development are essential to gain the popular support and perception of legitimacy needed to create the new representative forms of governance.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Transition is a shared responsibility and collaborative act among the supporting nations and organizations as well as the host nation government. Transition at any level or in any area always involves the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources, and influence), and accountability. The better the transfer is integrated and negotiated at the various levels and among the various internal and external actors, the higher the probability of a successful transition. The goal of any transition should be the peaceful and prosperous stability within the host nation and in that state's relationships within the international order.

Appendix A

Sample Checklist for Transition Planning

____ Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

____ Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?

____ Who will fund the transition?

____ What is the new mission?

____ What U.S. forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?

____ What will be the command relationship for U.S. forces that remain behind?

____ What will be the communications requirements for U.S. forces that remain behind?

____ Who will support U.S. forces that remain behind?

____ Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?

____ Will new rules of engagement be established?

____ Will ongoing operations (e.g. engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?

____ Will the United States be expected to provide communications capability to the incoming force or organization?

____ Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility as the joint force?

____ What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?

____ Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who provides it?

____ How will the turnover be accomplished?

____ Who will handle public affairs for the transition?

____ Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been approved and passed to the U. S. Transportation Command?

Appendix B

DOD Personnel Footprint at OSC-I and Shared Outlying Sites

DoD Personnel Site Footprint 01 Jan 2012					DoS Outlying Site Locations = BLUE Boxes SAT = Security Assistance Team Personnel DoD Site Locations = GREEN Shaded Boxes	
(s) = shared sites	**Erbil (s)**	**Sather (s)**	**Basra (s)**	**Shield (s)**	**Kirkuk (s)**	**TOTAL (s)**
OSC-I	1	6	0	4	3	
SAT (Sec Ass't Team)	2	40	4	23	107	
DoD Support Pers	10	33	10	10	575	
TOTAL	**13**	**79**	**14**	**37**	**685**	**828**
DoD SITES	**Tikrit**	**Taji**	**Umm Qasr**	**Union III**	**Besmaya**	**TOTAL (s)**
OSC-I	4	12	7	107	13	
SAT (Sec Ass't Team)	51	237	47	53	199	
DoD Support Pers	375	966	244	867	465	
TOTAL	**430**	**1,215**	**298**	**1,027**	**677**	**3647**

OSC-I CATEGORIES		OSC-I Footprint	TOTAL (s)
		OSC-I Assigned	157
		SAT	763
OSC-I Total Personnel	157	DoD Support Personnel*	3,555
		Grand DOD TOTAL	**4,475**

*DoD Support Personnel (military, civilians, or contractors)	
Personal Security Detail	387
Tactical Support Team/Quick Reaction Force	160
Static Security	1,302
Base Operations Support – Iraq	34
Base Defense Operations Center, Surveillance and Warnings, BioMetrics	209
Base Life Support	1,463
Grand Total	3,555

Appendix C

Terms and Abbreviations

Corrective Action Plan (CAP) - The plan generated by the Environmental Control Officer and the Boss Operations Support - Integrator after the Initial Environmental site Closure Survey (ESCS) and subsequent ESCSs, as necessary, which detail the cleanup process necessary to correct any environmental issues identified.

Contractor Managed Government Owned (CMGO) - US Government owned property managed by the contractor during the execution of their contract. CMGO includes Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) provided by the government to the contractor to perform their duties, and Contractor Acquired Property which was purchased by the contractor with US Government funds to execute the contract, this is also called Contractor Acquired Government Owned (CAGO) property.

End State - The broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation.

Environmental Site Closure Survey (ESCS) – A process that identifies a base's environmental areas of concern within a base footprint.

Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP) - Any U.S.- owned personal property determined to be excess and no longer required by the owning DOD activity which is located outside the United States, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Virgin Islands.

Foreign Excess Real Property (FERP) - Any U.S.- owned excess real property located outside the United States, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Virgin Islands. When DOD ceases contingency operations in the area and no longer needs the property for use, the property becomes excess.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - That part of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted using formal agreements between the U.S. Government and an authorized foreign purchaser or international organization.

Knowledge Management (KM) – A strategic approach to achieving defense objectives by leveraging the value of collective knowledge through the processes of creating, gathering, organizing, sharing and transferring knowledge into action. It requires processes that are robust and reliable within operational contexts, content and intellectual assets that are focused, precise, reliable, with suitable levels of recall, and knowledge creation and conversion processes that match the pace of operations.

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) – National or multi-national organizations of private citizens active in the Area of Interest. Non-governmental organization may be professional associations, religious groups, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in supporting humanitarian assistance activities.

Permissive Environment - Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

Non-permissive Environment - One in which some level of lawlessness or heightened risk is assumed due to a breakdown in host country military and law enforcement capability.

Reconciliation – The process of bringing two or more opposing groups to agreeable terms for future cooperation.

Reintegration - The process of the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the country.

Security Assistance – A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Security Cooperation - All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. They are designed to support a combatant commander's theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan."

Strategic Communication - The focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power

Transition – A multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms.

Appendix E

References

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011.

Joint Publication 3-57, Civil Military Operations, 8 July 2008.

Joint Publication 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 15 August 2001.

Iraq: The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-Led Effort, A report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 2 January 2011.

Transition to Stability Operations in Iraq, Final Report, US Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 14 March 2011.

Base Transition Smartbook, United States Forces – Afghanistan, January 2012.

Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability, Raymond T. Odierno, May 3, 2009.

ABCA Transition Planning Handbook, 2012.

A Guide to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), Force Reintegration Cell HQ ISAF, March 2012.

Responsible Drawdown: Brigade: Brigade Combat Team Redeployment, Center for Army Lessons Learned, March 2010.

Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan, Joseph A. L'Etoile, PRISM Magazine, September 2011.

Assessment of the DoD Establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, Report No. DODIG-2012-063, Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General, 16 March 2012.

PROVIDE US YOUR INPUT

To help you access information quickly and efficiently, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) posts all publications, along with numerous other useful products, on the CALL website. The CALL website is restricted to U.S. government and allied personnel.

PROVIDE FEEDBACK OR REQUEST INFORMATION

<http://call.army.mil>

If you have any comments, suggestions, or requests for information (RFIs), use the following links on the CALL home page: "RFI or a CALL Product" or "Contact CALL."

PROVIDE OBSERVATIONS, INSIGHTS, AND LESSONS (OIL) OR SUBMIT AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW (AAR)

If your unit has identified lessons learned or OIL or would like to submit an AAR, please contact CALL using the following information:

Telephone: DSN 552-9569/9533; Commercial 913-684-9569/9533

Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

NIPR e-mail address: call.rfimanager@conus.army.mil

SIPR e-mail address: call.rfiagent@conus.army.smil.mil

Mailing Address:
> Center for Army Lessons Learned
> ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50
> Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

TO REQUEST COPIES OF THIS PUBLICATION

If you would like copies of this publication, please submit your request at: <http://call.army.mil>. Use the "RFI or a CALL Product" link. Please fill in all the information, including your unit name and official military address. Please include building number and street for military posts.

PRODUCTS AVAILABLE "ONLINE"

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Access and download information from CALL's website. CALL also offers Web-based access to the CALL Archives. The CALL home page address is:

<http://call.army.mil>

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

- **Combat Training Center Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends**
- **Special Editions**
- *News From the Front*
- **Training Techniques**
- **Handbooks**
- **Initial Impressions Reports**

You may request these publications by using the "RFI or a CALL Product" link on the CALL home page.

COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
Additional Publications and Resources

The CAC home page address is:

<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp>

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal/index.asp>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.usapa.army.mil> or the Reimer Digital Library <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx> (requires AKO password and ID).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)

CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid/index.asp>.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Center acts as an advocate and integrator for COIN programs throughout the combined, joint, and interagency arena. Find the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

> *Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.*

Center for Army Lessons Learned
10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

US Army
Combined
Arms Center

"Intellectual Center of the Army"

www.leavenworth.army.mil

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA
For Official Use Only