Initial Impressions Report

Exercise Anakonda 16

Executive Summary

"The cooperation between American Soldiers and Polish Soldiers, in particular, is better now than I have ever seen it! We've been allies in Iraq, allies in Afghanistan, allies in the Balkans but during this exercise, it has reached a new level of teamwork and commitment. "

-LTG Frederick Benjamin "Ben" Hodges, Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe

(U) This initial impressions report (IIR) provides a summary of observations, insights, lessons, and best practices collected by the CALL Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) during Exercise Anakonda-16 (AN-16) from 7-17 June 2016. This collection report is based on key leader interviews and by direct and indirect observations during the conduct of the exercise. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) will publish an Anakonda-16 Special Study handbook by 2nd Quarter FY 2017. This handbook will contain key leader interviews, in-depth analysis by the actual participants and CALL observers, trends, and more refined lessons and recommendations.

Initial Observations

(U) Throughout this collection, the team observed various reoccurring themes that will require further detailed analysis which will be addressed in the Special Study. Some of these major themes include:

(U) A lack of a Common Operational Picture (COP) among allies and partners was very evident due to a lack of interoperable mission command systems. An example of this challenge was observed in the need for manual calls for fire, resulting in delayed fires actions. The lack of interoperable mission command systems was mitigated by the robust use of liaison officers which added an extra layer of complexity. It is necessary to have a standard for interoperability of mission command systems that is enforced across a multinational coalition, especially NATO.

(U) Freedom of movement challenges were experienced as units moved across international borders, as well as across the country of Poland. Units experienced difficulties due to the strict timelines of processing march credits and the inability to adjust these credits if movement timelines shifted. As units experienced deviations from their planned timelines, there was not enough support to handle these changes thereby risking the loss of their march credits altogether. In addition to detailed movement training and planning at the unit level, the addition of a U.S and NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) to the Polish National Movement Control Center (NMCC) could assist in the processing of large numbers of movement requests.

(U) Sustaining a large and multinational force is a tremendous challenge. Issues that emerged included the failure to ratify some host nations Acquisition Cross Service Agreement (ACSA)

orders and Statements of Requirements (SOR). The development of a Coalition Logistics Support Group (CLSG) as a permanent organization could serve as an excellent conduit to overcome most logistical and interoperability challenges.

(U) Electronic Warfare (EW) and cyber training opportunities were not realized at most levels of the exercise. This highlighted that Cyber Electromagnetic Activity (CEMA) considerations are not given the level of attention needed to be successful in a contested environment, despite the known CEMA threat in a peer or near peer conflict.

(U) The inclusion of the Total Army Force was critical to the success of this exercise. Reserve Component (RC) units held critical roles during AN-16, most notably as sustainment and fires headquarters. Despite their important role, Army Reserve and National Guard units had to execute their missions incredibly understaffed due to policy limitations of training days available to each Soldier. Units would subsequently have to rotate their personnel every 23 days, resulting in a lack of continuity that created integration friction. Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) must ensure that RC sourcing solutions reflect these limitations.

Background

(U) Anakonda-16 (AN-16), conducted 7-17 June 2016, was the largest joint exercise of the Polish Armed Forces with the international participation of allies and partners in the modern history of Poland. The exercise was first conducted in 2006 with the goal to improve the cooperation between the Polish military and non-military services such as the police, border guard and fire service. Since then, the biennial exercise has progressed into an allied exercise with increased participation of NATO countries. In 2012, Soldiers from the U.S. Army, Canada and the Multinational Corps Northeast participated in the exercise for the first time. Anakonda-14 highlighted the readiness and responsiveness of 12,500 Polish and 750 multinational forces from Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. The exercise almost tripled in size as AN-16 included approximately 31,000 troops (estimated 13,000 U.S.), 3,000 vehicles, 100 aircraft and 12 ships from 24 NATO and allied partner nations throughout Poland.

(U) AN-16 was prepared and led by the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command (AFOC) with the goal to test the ability, readiness, and interoperability of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) with allies and partners, while conducting a joint defensive operation on a large scale. The exercise combined with the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July of 2016 are a clear demonstration of Poland's essential role and contribution to NATO and its allies when it comes to the security and defense of Europe's eastern flank.

(U) U.S. Army Europe's (USAREUR's) participation in AN-16 provides a visible symbol of U.S. commitment to the region and our European allies while directly supporting the theater security cooperation objectives. AN-16 is viewed as a series of overlapping multinational, multi-echelon events executed under a multinational command as a demonstration of unity, resolve, readiness and ability to mass forces with speed. Active duty, Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) demonstrated the value of the Total Army with the rapid deployment and effective integration of 11 ARNG and 9 USAR units into the exercise. The Total Army was especially important during AN-16 where 25 percent of all U.S. Soldiers that participated in the

exercise were either ARNG or USAR. The commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, LTG Ben Hodges, mentioned on several occasions that he couldn't have met the expectations of the Polish-led, multi-national exercise without the support of the reserve components. The U.S. Army's training events included multinational air assault and airborne operations, air defense operations, bridging operations, live fire, command post operations and exercises, field training, cyber and electronic warfare and numerous other training activities led by the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division Headquarters.

(U) Exercises similar to AN-16 and the routine military and interagency activities that the U.S. Army performs to deter potential adversaries and solidify relationships with allies and partners are described as deterrence and shaping activities. These are Joint Phase 0 activities that set conditions in the theater across the range of military operations. Shaping the security environment in Europe and elsewhere is the most cost-effective way to ensure peace and stability and to prevent misunderstandings or conflict. The U.S. Army's relationship with international partners such as Poland are essential in protecting the U.S. and its allies' interests.

(U) AN-16 underscored a continued commitment by the U.S. and Poland to work as dedicated partners in support of NATO and for peace and stability in Europe. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is proud to be a small part of these efforts. CALL is working with its Polish counterparts from the Polish Armed Forces Doctrine and Training Centre to gather relevant lessons and best practices that will make future editions of the Anakonda series even more successful.

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Chapter 1

Mission Command

(U) TOPIC: Mission Command Systems Interoperability

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Allied units had to conduct call for fires manually due to incompatibility of mission command systems.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Due to lack of mission command systems interoperability among allies and partners, email and chatroom capabilities were used to conduct call for fire missions during the exercise. This process took excessive time and affected the ability to direct and manage fires in a timely manner. A challenge such as this during Phase III will certainly impact operations in a multination environment.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Mission command systems must communicate across coalition networks and systems to share critical information and perform critical mission (call for fires). Establish standards to share information in a multination environment to drive the development of networks and mission command system that are compatible to share information. Update and enforce NATO standards for information sharing, to include networks and mission command systems. Provide LNOs, to include a Digital Liaison Detachment (DLD) with appropriate mission command systems to our allied units.

(U) TOPIC: Mission Command Systems

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The Tactical Analysis Center (TAC) mission command systems on SIPR, versus Army Coalition Mission Environment (ACME), resulted in missing elements on the ACME TAC common operating picture (COP).

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is on SIPR in support of the live fire operations. However, TAC COP is on ACME, which means there is no digital path to add fires graphic control measures to the COP. This correlates with observations from the Operation Resolute Support Coalition Mission Thread review conducted in spring of 2016.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Identify “silos of SIPR” for Army mission command systems required to remain on SIPR to conduct operations, and determine impact of moving systems to coalition network.

(U) TOPIC: Army Service Component Command (ASCC) network requirements

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) ASCC network requirements include national (SIPR/NIPR) and multiple episodic networks. There is a challenge in rapidly standing these up and creating appropriate Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) and security guidance.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Signal leaders highlighted the requirement for the USAREUR COIC to potentially operate with multiple networks which include NIPR, SIPR, Enduring MPE, and the potential for multiple Episodic MPE networks.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) USAREUR should document these requirements and the Army integrates the requirements into approved documents. USAREUR includes these requirements in defining the COIC/TAC architectures and consider Multi-Echelon Computing (MEC) solutions being sought by USARPAC. The Army/Joint staff consider these requirements in developing DOD MPE solutions.

(U) TOPIC: Shared Common Operating Picture (COP) with Partners

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Interoperability and shared common operating picture with partnered nations.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) There is a lack of information sharing between the U.S. and our partners based on classification of information and information systems. This leads to friction and sometimes confusion when a partner nation is imbedded with the US units for a mission and we cannot share or display the appropriate information for everyone to have shared understanding. Depending on the U.S. units' SOP, they may share the common operating picture (COP) sterile, which does help the partnership, but hinders the unit in mission command. Other units will not display an open COP, but maintain it on an information system in the command post, which does not 100 percent facilitate trust and partnering. This can be exaggerated when two command posts are near each other and our partners go back and talk about the different interactions with the units they are assigned to.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Analyze current policies for information sharing with our partner nations and ensure we protect our nation's security interests, but afford the flexibility to truly partner and create shared understanding.

(U) TOPIC: Common Operational Picture (COP)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) U.S. COP System of Record versus the NATO Standard

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) 4th Infantry Division Headquarters deployed to Poland with U.S. computer equipment loaded with U. S. tactical systems of record. This is unusual since this is what the unit was utilizing in home-station training and what that specific unit is required to use in U. S. only training. However, this exercise, while a Polish National Exercise, was conducted on a Polish Mission (NATO Unclassified) network; one that is very capable of handling the NATO COP software and sharing NATO COP data. In fact, in Phase III of the exercise, the higher headquarters for 4ID, was Multi-National Corps-North East [MNC-NE]; located in Szczecin, Poland. It is a Corps level headquarters that habitually uses NATO hardware and software. During Exercise Anakonda 2016, MNC-NE used the NATO COP software. At the Lower Control (LOCON) level, 4ID subordinates were from Hungary, Latvia, and Poland; all three were response cells employing NATO systems. Despite higher and lower HQs using the NATO COP software to present a Common Operating Picture, 4ID used CPOF; populating tracks thru the less efficient method of sharing KMT files with lower and higher headquarters. 4ID was using the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) on the NATO Unclassified network (via the Polish Federate Mission Network/Szafron); a network perfectly suitable for using the NATO COP. As a result, interoperability was not seamless nor was the COP common across the exercise audience.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) U. S. forces operating in Europe need to migrate to the NATO COP system. This system is understood and utilized by most NATO Allies. Timeliness of decision demands a common COP; not air bridging of information that is prone to data entry errors. In concert with migrating to the NATO COP system; a formal training process needs to be immediately implemented to train all current operations COP technicians on how to use the NATO COP. Lastly, all U. S. Army regionally aligned forces (RAF) at all tactical levels, the priority going to Brigade and Division level echelons, need to be functionally proficient and manned/equipped to rapidly employ this software.

(U) TOPIC: Digital Mission Command Systems in the Decisive Action (Offense-Defense) and European Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) operational environments.

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Exclusive reliance and near complete dependence on our digital battle command systems ignores the limitations of these systems (decisive action offense/defense highly mobile OE) and adversaries ability to both easily disrupt these systems and target our command posts for destruction

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Considering our contemporary operating environment, it is apparent that the benefit gained by these systems in their current state does not justify the immense risk posed by the combination of the large electronic emission signature and the command post's physical size and lack of rapid mobility. It is clear that battalion and above organizations networked in our ABC systems present potential adversaries with both precise targeting of our command posts and/or the ability to easily disrupt or deny our communications abilities.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) HQDA study the suitability and capabilities of our current digital mission command systems in a hybrid or near-peer competitor operational environment (OE).

(U) TOPIC: Situational awareness, analog battle tracking.

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Units did not maintain accurate or uniform analog back-up of their COP.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Unit leaders recognize the need for a running analog back-up of their COP. Of the three observed in command posts, none were accurate and there was no common construct of these analog back-ups in the form of standard drops or even map series. In the event of a loss of power in the command post or denial of service due to enemy action, both situational awareness and understanding would be quickly lost. Fundamental tasks such as clearance of fires and understanding of enemy actions would be irretrievably lost in today's mobile battlefield.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The Army should establish Denied Degraded Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE) training as a requirement. Units need the ability to train in a D3SOE at home station. Units should add analog battle tracking as a mission essential task list (METL) task for battalion and above command posts together with a requirement to incorporate details into unit SOP.

(U) TOPIC: Mission Command Systems, Cell Phone Usage

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) During the exercise on a daily basis it was observed that junior Soldiers, NCOs, and Officers had to make use of their personal cell phones for business calls. This can take the form of normal reporting for accountability, coordination, Theater personnel accountability teams calling in reports, or in some cases a convoy reporting its location.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) A lack of planned communication methods, coupled by the need for constant communication in a dynamic environment meant that Soldiers and leaders had to use their personal cell phones to execute Army business. An over-reliance of this form of communication will be detrimental in future operations when cell phone service will be most likely unavailable.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: FOUO

(U) Examine the correct amount of cell phones on the battlefield that is necessary. While this type of communication has its place, technology discipline should limit it to those who require it when there are no secure means of communication available.

(U) TOPIC: Communications Issues During Movement

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Degraded communications while on the move

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) During operation DRAGOON RIDE II, 2CR established a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan of: (P) Tactical satellite (TACSAT); (A) Secure Iridium phone; (C) Global Rapid Response Information Package (GRRIPS); and (E) Cell phone. Due to high latitude of the U.S. Army 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) tactical operations center (TOC) in Tapa, Estonia, inclement weather, and constant movement of Squadron tactical analysis center's (TAC), the maneuver Task Forces had a difficult time gaining and maintaining long range communications. TACSAT was ineffective for the 2CR TOC due to the small line of sight angle in order to connect with the satellite. Cell phones, the emergency form of communications quickly became the primary form of communications in order to relay situation reports (SITREPs) and mission orders.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Incorporate high frequency (HF) into the PACE plan for future training events in order to gain proficiency. HF proficiency has atrophied as a skill in maneuver units due to the proliferation of TACSAT capabilities. Look at vehicle configurations and HF equipment densities to ensure long range communications can be maintained on the move. Recommend increasing HF support equipment and "on the move" trays to command vehicles.

(U) TOPIC: Maneuver Control and Fire Support Coordination Measure Graphics

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) During Anakonda 2016, there appeared to be a minimal use of maneuver control/fire support coordination measures as graphic overlays on operations maps and COP displays.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) In the age of Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and Command Post of the Future (CPOF) there is a tendency towards minimalist employment of maneuver control/fire support coordination measures on operations map overlays and COP displays. This observation was noted repeatedly both in planning and in execution of operations during Anakonda 2016. This trend is clearly related to COP interoperability. The full depth and breadth of a unit's area of operations and extending into the area of influence are areas in which operations (ground forces) and the effects of organic and support indirect fires systems can/may be required. The area of operations for which 4th Infantry Division was responsible during Anakonda was nearly the size of the state of South Carolina. Dividing this area into a forward and rear area based upon forces available was not all that difficult, however, developing meaningful maneuver control measures proved more challenging. Phase lines were used to delineate the successive defensive lines in the forward area, including a phase line that was also annotated as a "no penetration line" by division planners (not to be confused as a no-pen-line from HHQ). The depth of the forward area in the vicinity of the main line of contact was text book. It was clearly developed in keeping with the capabilities of direct and indirect fires weapons. But critical to this forward defensive zone was a division rear (managed by the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade) to support the orderly in-flow of reserves and reinforcements. This area was not well developed from a maneuver control perspective. There was no one source map containing the maneuver graphics, ground lines of communication (LOC) routes, and fire support control measures to fluidly manage this area and create options for the commander. If this had been a real fight there would have been unnecessary friction coordinating events between the division close fight and support from their rear area. Relegating this to a subordinate headquarters, which has less staff planning capability is not an option either (nor was that the case during Anakonda 2016). The full depth and breadth of an AO must be developed on a map in such a way to support operations at any point in that battlespace. The development of maneuver control graphics is an exceptional method towards ensuring that outcome. In a multi-national environment this concept becomes even more important as the sharing of this type of map overlay data is not easily transmitted over routine data communications systems. Interoperability between COP platforms is not assured in Europe. While there is common understanding on most operational maneuver control graphics, the manner in which they are shared isn't common. Map chips converted into PowerPoint slides with notes describing the exact MGRS or Latitude and Longitude positions is most likely the common software and means of sharing such information. Regardless, it needs to be fully developed and then shared broadly across the force.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The full use of maneuver control graphics and fire support control measures needs to be emphasized at all levels of officer and senior enlisted education and

within the military occupational specialty (MOS) certification programs for operations specialists (CPOF/C2PC techs). Furthermore, the use of these common graphics/measures needs to be reinforced during exercises and home-station training. Decisive action against a foe with a temporal superiority in numbers requires that a division and brigade can adeptly manage their battlespace. The proper use of graphics/measures will assure this in both planning and execution of operations.

(U) TOPIC: Mobility of Battalion and Brigade Command Posts

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Numerous leaders at both the battalion and brigade leadership expressed serious frustration at the inability to have a mobile command post that would allow for adequate mission command of their units.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Several field-grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers expressed that they lacked the equipment and vehicles to support a command post that would be mobile and still provide the necessary mission command of their units. All command posts (CPs) at the battalion and brigade level were large, immobile, and very time consuming in their setup/tear down. The large size, and lack of mobility of CPs is a major assumption of risk in a potential decisive action environment. Several NCOs also expressed concern in the lack of experience and training junior Soldiers and leaders have in CP setup and tear down as an entire generation of Soldiers are overly familiar with forward operating base (FOB) type operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Ensure that all units battalion and above are properly equipped to quickly assemble and disassemble command posts, and that these command posts are highly mobile. Headquarters must ensure that CP assembly, disassembly and movement are properly trained by their Soldiers and staff sections at home station, and they are not overly reliant upon large and immobile systems.

(U) TOPIC: DRASH Tents vs More Mobile Command Post Configuration

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The current DRASH tent command post configuration does not support the rapid nor seamless displacement of the Division Tactical CP.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) During Exercise Anakonda 2016, the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Poland bringing a DRASH tent system to house their Division Tactical Command Post (DTAC). 4ID was hosted by the Polish Army at a small installation in the town of Wegerzewo, Poland. This agreement did not include hard-stand nor fixed building infrastructure. As a result, the DTAC set up the division headquarters in a DRASH tent configuration that fit within a relatively

small footprint on the installation. There was no intention to displace the DTAC during this exercise due to a lack of transportation assets. Even if transportation assets were available, displacement would have been unlikely due to the amount of time required to move the CP and due to the inability to provide mission command to the division during the execution of the displacement,

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The current threat capabilities advertised by potential adversaries, recently referred to as hybrid and new generation warfare, are significant and must be taken seriously; especially when considering the security of a division level mission command node. It is reasonable to expect a new generation threat to have the cyber and EW capabilities needed to locate a division level CP. With a surge of UAS systems over the target area, it is also reasonable to expect that a stationary DTAC will not last long on the battlefield against a near pear threat. A DTAC will likely be listed near the top of any threat force high payoff target list, so there is a great need for mobility and frequent displacements. The amount of time and effort required to set up digital command systems is time consuming, and as a result, once a DTAC is in place, it tends to remain so. The institutional hesitance to rely upon mobility and a greater density of radio communications systems may prove to be the quick death of a division or brigade headquarters on the modern battlefield. Yet it will be these time proven capabilities that will improve the survivability of these crucial headquarters. Analog systems for battle tracking, with the right training, are quite suitable for managing mission command from within a more mobile command platform. Additionally, the task organization for a DTAC leaves very little spare manpower to put against the actual physical security of the DTAC in a contested/non-permissive theater. The division band previously was the manpower pool from which to draw to defend a division headquarters in the field. That element no longer exists for that intended combat function. So a dedicated source of manpower, assigned to the DTAC, needs to be identified (likely conducting a primary DTAC job with an alternate responsibility for providing security to the DTAC). To put this all together requires training and experimentation. The division of tasks between the DTAC and an alternate headquarters needs to be studied. In the case of 4ID there was no reach-back capability to tap into from the Division Main CP.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) In light of modern high end threats across the globe, brigade and division tactical command posts must seek mission command platforms that are more mobile and as a result much more survivable. It is recommended that these levels of headquarters adapt to analog and select digital systems that are easily transported and facilitate a very rapid tear down and set up configuration. Headquarters displacements need to be reinstituted, likely twice daily as a minimum, in order to protect these crucial headquarters. Additionally, testing on a menu of viable configurations needs to be conducted at the combat training centers (CTCs) with “best of breed” solutions developed into tactical standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rehearsed at home-station training and other exercise events. Forcing headquarters to rely 100% upon radio communications and analog battle tracking procedures needs to be reintroduced into training as a means of developing and maintaining a resilient DTAC.

(U) TOPIC: Current Operations Shift Change Brief versus Commander's Update Brief

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) There is a need for unique and discreet Shift Change and Commander's Update Briefs, they are not synonymous.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) During Exercise Anakonda 2016, the 4th Infantry Division G-3 Current Operations section busily supported sustaining its own situational awareness and managing execution level decisions for which the section was empowered to address. Simultaneously, the current operations section was also responsible for developing and presenting the morning Commander's Update Brief and the evening Warfighting Function Update brief to the Commanding General and primary staff.

(U) Due to a condensed battle rhythm the Chief of Operations (CHOPs) elected to forego the twice daily shift change brief in favor of achieving efficiencies of doing the same "cross leveling" of the COPS floor simultaneously with the Commander's Update Brief (CUB) and Warfighting Function Update (WFFU). The results were mixed at best. The two busiest episodes on the OPS floor each day were the presentations of the CUB and WFFU. As a result, these were the two timeframes in which foot traffic thru the OPS floor from NON-OPS staff was at its highest and noise levels within the structure were loudest. This was clearly not an environment conducive to facilitating a shared understanding of the operating environment across all COPS personnel. A casual bystander sitting in the OPS tent during these two busy periods would not have walked away from the brief with a suitable understanding of the current situation.

(U) Unfortunately, the entrance to the command post brought all visitors immediately to the rear of the COPS floor. As a result, the OPS floor was the epicenter for side-bar conversations that frequently inhibited its ability to focus on the fight. The division staff did rehearse these battle rhythm events during the home-station warfighter exercise prior to deploying to Poland; however, the physical venues were different in CONUS compared to the DRASH tent system utilized in Poland. The problem was not mitigated as the exercise progressed. Signage directing personnel to remain quiet on the watch floor frequently were ignored and later in the exercise were not even posted. A few times each day, a "7-Minute Drill" was conducted on analog maps to the rear of the COPS tent. As well intentioned as these iterations were in cross leveling the staff, they were largely ineffective at re-establishing a shared understanding across the entire OPS floor. During actual shift changes, desk personnel conducted discreet shift changeover pass-downs of critical information; however, there was no sequence of events to do the same for the entire watch floor.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) This begins with right sizing of the tents/facility in which the COIC floor is housed. The Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter (DRASH) tent configuration adjustments that suit the purpose for each staff section need to be codified in SOPs. Next, rigidly enforce noise and foot traffic discipline on the floor—ensure that all personnel and activities that takes place within the confines of the watch floor is for a related purpose; not casual conversation. Develop battle

rhythms that are fluid but maintain place holders for discreet shift change briefs. Lastly, exercise all of the above in home-station training, continental United States (CONUS) combat training center (CTC) rotations, and overseas exercise participation.

(U) TOPIC: Mission Command SOPs

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) During the exercise it was observed that the USAREUR TAC had a lack of codified mission command roles and responsibilities.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Successful employment of USAREUR's command post/COIC and development of a COP requires unity of effort and consistent processes. A SOP is needed to identify roles, responsibilities, priorities and procedures to include establishing the COP, significant activities (SIGACTS), reporting, boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WG), and mission command system guidance.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Begin a process of developing SOPs from a COIC perspective using the USAREUR Contingency Command Post (CCP) previous SOP and sample COP SOPs provided by the CIAV team. Once completed the SOP should be used to assess any COIC/TAC event or exercise to ensure it is updated and valid.

(U) TOPIC: Battle tracking of multinational combat power

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Larger units were challenged to maintain accurate battle tracking of their multinational weapon systems, personnel and logistics statuses.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Brigade level units had initial difficulty maintaining situational awareness of the status of their attached multinational units. Although issues tracking major weapon systems was easily overcome, personnel status report (PERSTAT) and logistics status (LOGSTAT) tracking proved to be more difficult. Although, commanders were able to maintain awareness of changes to statuses during major battle rhythm events (i.e. Commander's Update Brief's), there was no system to ensure staff had continuous awareness of status changes

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Units participating in RAF deployments develop implement and exercise staff process tracking tools that facilitate the tracking of MN coalition and alliance partners. These tools should be flexible so that they can rapidly incorporate rapid changes to task organization.

(U) TOPIC: DTAC Battle rhythm

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The division's battle rhythm was built to provide a logical flow to the DTAC staff operations.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The knowledge management (KM) officer developed a spreadsheet matrix to assist with the division in building an effective and logical flowing battle rhythm. The matrix laid out the timing of work groups/meetings and list the staff attendees as well as media used to conduct the meeting. The KM officer was able to develop a well maintain and effective battle rhythm that enhanced staff functions and provide flexibility to support the division DTAC operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Establishing and effective and efficient battle rhythm will enhance the ability of a staff to synchronize, collaborate, manage information, and provide the tool for the commander to conduct mission command over his unit. Maintain and continue to develop matrix to support and improve the division's battle rhythm and staff functions.

(U) TOPIC: Succession of Command in DA Operational Environment

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Succession of command between the Division Tactical Command Post and an alternate command post was not fully developed during Anakonda 2016.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The location and succession of key command and control nodes, a part of Mission Command planning, was identified during the planning for both phases of Anakonda. However, in Phase III, a phase designed to replicate decisive action against a peer adversary, there was not a plan for continuity and succession of command during planning and warfighting function updates.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Fighting a division who was controlling the fight solely from within the Division Tactical Command Post (absent any potential for the Division Main to act as a suitable back-up) means that this HQ will clearly be the focus of an adversary collections effort in order to locate and neutralize the Division TAC element. If that were to occur, there was no continuity of operations planning conducted to ensure the subordinate division elements had a suitable replacement HHQ at the division level.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Hybrid threats will seek to disrupt the Division TAC command post (CP) thru Cyber/Electronic Warfare (EW) or will ultimately seek to target for destruction/neutralization by kinetic fires this mission command node if possible. Additionally, in a real world contingency the Division TAC CP would need to displace periodically in order to assure survivability and protection of this key node; an event that reduces significantly its ability to command & control

the division using the robust CIS tools (i.e. digital platforms) that it heavily relies upon. This leaves a gap in command and control at the division level if this threat contingency materializes.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Suitable back-up HQs to assume the Division TAC CP responsibilities would normally devolve to command having suitable mission command assets and situational awareness to assume the tracking and management of the division fight. This could be the Division Artillery CP or could be a subordinate Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Once identified as a back-up to the Division TAC for continuity of operations, this element would need to conduct the appropriate planning and have dedicated resources to assume that Mission Command responsibility if in fact the Division TAC CP was compromised.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Incorporate continuity of operations and succession of command into home station warfighter exercises and pre-deployment academics. Furthermore, mandate this as a planning requirement within the G-3 with support from the G-6. Lastly, exercise this contingency within command post exercises through realistic MESL injects that force the Division TAC CP to designate a subordinate command to assume control of the division fight for a period of time. The current threat environment supports dedicating the time and resources towards accomplishing this objective.

(U) TOPIC: Foreign Disclosure of Digital Mission Command Systems

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Leaders expressed some frustration at their inability to share situational awareness and understanding with multinational coalition partners due to security classification and foreign disclosure prohibitions.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Army Battle Command systems (ABCS) throughout the brigade have a permanent SECRET banner on their displays. This necessitates review and approval to share any information with coalition partners.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Knowledge Management (KM) parameters for foreign disclosure must be established and clearly defined to facilitate rapid dissemination of data, information and understanding across the MN force to ensure the broadest possible situational understanding and force effectiveness.

(U) TOPIC: Knowledge Management

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Challenges were experienced sharing the knowledge management share point site

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) At the beginning of the exercise, the Knowledge Management Officer (KMO) could not establish a share point site on the Polish Mission Network (PMN) due to access and permissions. Permissions to the share point site were denied at the start of the exercise. The (U) KMO coordinated with the Polish military to gain access to their portal on the PMN during the planning conference. Once the exercise started, the person that made the agreement with the unit was not part of the exercise. The KMO sent a new request through the Polish military to gain access to the portal. This took time due to coordination and lack of understanding of the units requirements. The second request was approved and the unit received permission to access the portal and their share point site to share information.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) In a multination organization, information requirements must be identified, understood, coordinated, and tested prior to the exercise. Identify requirements early during the planning conference and re-verify/test prior to the exercise to ensure permissions and access to the PMN.

(U) TOPIC: Information Operations Working Group (IOWG)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) IOWG provided a good forum to synchronize Information Related Capabilities (IRC) in support of the operations

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The G7 conducted an organized and effective IOWG that synchronized IRC efforts to support the IO campaign in support of the exercise. The IOWG covered SIGACTs in the information environment as well as assessments to re-action to the IO incident. The IOWG included the partner LNO. The IOWG orchestrated activities and support in the information environment to include: G2 input on the enemy's activities and threats in the information environment, such as information to feed the PIRs and enemy's activities. The IOWG identified/assessed and fed the targeting working group for non-kinetic targets and resources to be applied.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Continue to develop the IOWG in support of the operations and commander's intent. An effective IOWG will provide the required information to support the commander's intent/requirements for the information environment as well as feed the targeting process.

(U) TOPIC: Information Operations (IO) website

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The unit developed an IO website to coordinate and share IO information supporting the exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The information operations officer established an IO website to share information on the information operations efforts. The website enabled the staff section as well as the LNO from the partner units to share information, conduct IRC running estimates, and IO efforts in supporting the commander.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Establishment of IO website is an effective tool to share, coordinate, and synchronize information related capabilities in support of the commander’s messages and shaping the information environment. Establish an IO website to share IO information and use as a tool for the IOWG.

(U) TOPIC: Staff Weather Officer (SWO)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Staff Weather Officer (SWO) integration in the USAREUR TAC.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) SWO integration is a challenging issue. Units are usually not aware of the SWO's capabilities and are not accustomed to utilizing weather intelligence data in their operations. In the USAREUR TAC, all units were very receptive to utilizing the services of the SWO and providing a detailed description of their operations so the SWO could understand their operations and tailor support to their needs. This allowed the SWO to fully integrate into all spectrums of operations in the Joint Operating Area (JOA) and positively impact final mission decisions.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Codify SWO integration into the exercise planning and execution phases to ensure this positive process is maintained.

(U) TOPIC: Medical SITREP

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Allied forces do not have access to the medical communications for Combat Casualty Care systems (MC4).

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Allied units did not access to the division's MC4 reporting systems. The allied units used email and excel spreadsheets to provide updates on unit's medical supply and medical facilities statuses. Joining reports, update reports, and running estimates on medical supplies as well as order tracking was done manually which took time. This created a challenge for the division surgeon in gaining situational understanding of the medical status of the division.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Sharing information with our partners is critical in a coalition environment. In order to plan and maintain medical supplies and services in support of the units operations requires interoperability/access with those digital systems that track medical statuses. A web site that can be shared with the allied units on the PMN or allied network will provide access to all units to update and track medical supplies and services throughout the operations.

(U) TOPIC: Engaging the Media

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) USAREUR produced an Engaging the Media pocket card for issue to each U.S. Soldier participating in ANAKONDA 16.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The USAREUR public affairs office provided an Engaging the Media pocket card (quadrifold about 2"X3" size) to every U.S. Soldier participating in Anakonda 16. The card discussed what to do and say when media visited. It provided a brief overview of Anakonda 16, some facts about the exercise, guidance on what to do if the media approaches you, guidance on what to discuss and what not to discuss, as well as some specific do's and do not's. Social media guidelines, command messages pertaining to the exercise, and messages to avoid were also covered. Contact information for the USAREUR Public Affairs Office (PAO) is included. The Anakonda 16 Engaging the Media card encapsulates the experience gained over the last two decades in dealing with the media. The card was printed on paper and folded into a 2"X3" size.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) This Engaging the Media card was a very good approach to ensuring all US Soldiers training in this multinational environment have been provided a minimum of information they could use in a practical application. As a quadrifold, it is pocket sized (actually 2"X3") and very thin. Use of this sort of information card when conducting multinational interoperability training or any other sort of training where Soldiers come in contact with the media can be very effective. It does require time to prepare and depending on the material, does have a cost to produce.

SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES

You are encouraged to post to social media regarding Anakonda 16 but:

Remember OPSEC, PERSEC and INFOSEC. Don't post or share sensitive information or details about troop movements or events until after they've occurred.

In the event of a serious incident remain professional online. Your social media posts can have far-reaching consequences.

Even if social media accounts are locked or hidden, it is considered world-wide release. Your online presence is a direct reflection upon you, your unit and the military.

Feel free to tag units or use relevant hashtags: @USArmyEurope, #Anakonda16, #StrongEurope.

COMMAND MESSAGES

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

• NATO allies and partners stand together to ensure a Europe that is whole, free, prosperous and at peace.

• The U.S. demonstrates our commitment to European security through various agreements, exercises, training events and community relations engagements.

ASSURE ALLIES

• Large-scale exercises such as Anakonda 16 send a clear message that the United States, allied and partner nations are capable of training and working together.

• Anakonda 16 demonstrates that NATO and partners can quickly unite under a unified command.

COMMAND MESSAGES

POLAND IS A STRATEGIC PARTNER

• The United States remains a loyal and dedicated partner of Poland.

• U.S. Army Europe's participation in Anakonda16 is just one indicator of our continued commitment to the government and the people of Poland.

MESSAGES TO AVOID

• Language that refers to the Cold War (Arms race, Brinksmanship, Fulda Gap, Soviet, ETC).
•Terms such as "largest", "biggest", and "most expensive".
•Messages that are escalatory or state an ultimatum against the Russian government.

#Anakonda16

Engaging the Media

Exercise Anakonda 16

When media visit, we are given an opportunity to highlight and publicize the great things we do. With any media encounter, refer them first to the unit PAO and inform your chain of command.

U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs
Com: +49 (0) 611-143-537-0020
DSN: (314) 537-0020
CELL: +49 (0)162-296-6213

About Anakonda 16

Exercise Anakonda 2016 is one of U.S. Army Europe's premier multinational training events. Anakonda 16 is a Polish national exercise that seeks to train, exercise and integrate Polish national command and force structures into a joint multinational environment.

Anakonda 16 Fast Facts

• More than **30,000 service members** from more than 20 nations are participating.
• More than **13,000 U.S. service members** participating in Anakonda 16; of those **9,000 are based in the U.S.**
• Anakonda 16 training includes: **live fire, command post, field training, cyber and electronic warfare.**
• Anakonda 16 is a **Polish-led, bi-annual** training event. This is the largest iteration of Anakonda.

When Media Approaches

We want you to talk to the media but you do not have to talk to the media if you do not want to. Be courteous, professional and refer them to your Unit PAO.

You should discuss

• Name, unit, hometown, current duties.

• The Anakonda 16 exercise (in generalities), overall purpose and results.

• Your personal experiences during the exercise.

Do not discuss

• Ongoing operations, exact dates or details of future movement (OPSEC)

• Details of serious incidents/ accidents unless authorized.

• Politics. You represent the Army … remain apolitical. This includes U.S. politics (presidential race) and international relations.

Do

• **Be honest**, but remember OPSEC.

• Assume everything you say is on the record.

• Check your appearance. Be in proper uniform, remove sunglasses.

• Ignore the cameras. Speak to the reporter.

• Avoid Army acronyms.

• Relax, be yourself, and remain professional.

• Talk about personal experiences. Stay in your lane.

• Be enthusiastic but control emotions.

• Say, "I don't know" if you don't know. It's OK.

• Remember, your actions and responses are a direct reflection upon you, your unit and the military.

• Be brief and concise. You control the time limit.

• Listen … Pause … Think … Respond

Do Not

• DO NOT: Lie to the reporter.

• DO NOT: Speculate.

• DO NOT: Speak for the command or your friends.

• DO NOT: Discuss mission details that may endanger military members or civilians.

• DO NOT: Speak on behalf of other agencies.

•DO NOT: Let situation or reporter rush you.

• DO NOT: Say "No comment." Instead say, "I cannot speculate on …"

Remember

You are ALWAYS on the Record.

Rule of thumb

Treat any interaction with a reporter with the same integrity you'd display in front of a promotion board …

Figure 1-1

USAREUR PAO Engaging the Media Pocket Card

Chapter 2

Interoperability

(U) TOPIC: Coalition Liaison Officers (LNO) Organic Functional Area Services (FAS)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Coalition LNOs' organic Functional Area Services (FAS), which are NATO mission command applications and systems, were not integrated into the USAREUR architecture.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The Coalition LNOs FAS were not integrated into the architecture. The following questions/observations should be considered: how does the ACME/U.S. services interoperate with NATO FAS, what are the key integration tasks/steps; what are the Information Assurance considerations, requirements, and validate processes, how will organic FAS link back to their organic unit's authoritative data source?

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Develop a coalition LNO TAC integration plan that provides a checklist of key tasks, responsible organizations, and critical processes to provide better interoperability between allies and partners.

(U) TOPIC: Appropriate Use of Multinational Liaison Officers (LNOs)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) All headquarters (brigade and below), that either had multinational units attached or mission command over multinational units, successfully utilized liaison officers to establish interoperability between allies and partners.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The significant shortfall in the interoperability of mission command systems was mostly overcome by the use of highly qualified liaison officers. All maneuver and fires CPs had at least one liaison officer from each allied or partnered unit contributing to the mission. In general, every officer that was serving as a liaison officer was selected on their ability to speak English, their understanding of their unit's mission and tactical situation, and most importantly their ability to effectively communicate.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The use of LNOs was generally reciprocal, as was notably demonstrated with the 45th Field Artillery Brigade (OK NG). LNOs were exchanged between 45th FAB and its subordinate multinational batteries within 48 hours of arrival to the training area, therefore greatly contributing to a shared understanding during the initial fires planning.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) All units falling under a multinational coalition must understand that there will be a significant lack of interoperability in mission command systems. This can only be overcome by the successful use of LNOs to and from these units. LNOs must be carefully chosen as an individual who can effectively communicate and have an understanding of their unit's capabilities, limitations and tactical situation.

(U) TOPIC: Aviation LNO Integration

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Aviation LNOs were co-located at the Polish Aviation Operations Center (AOC)

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) LNOs co-located at the Polish AOC were able to able to gather Airspace Coordination Orders and rapidly disseminate information to aviation units. Their presence enabled them to coach personnel primarily concerned with fixed wing operations. Additionally, they were able to convey airspace concerns arising between the Polish Airspace Authorities and Army Aviation operations. Airspace coordination and communications in Polish Military Training Areas were a common problem.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Continue to provide LNOs at the AOC level during future operations that understand and can deconflict airspace coordination issues. Also, develop airspace coordination measures with Polish Air Operations Authorities to enable responsive and safe maneuver in Polish Military Training Areas. The existing communication methods in Poland is land line telephone for most active training areas as well as some published, but unmonitored, radio frequencies.

(U) TOPIC: Division LNO Support to Higher Headquarters

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) 4th Infantry Division Tactical Command Post employed a varied/mixed LNO team composition to support Division LNO requirements to the Polish LCC and MNC-NE.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) 4th Infantry Division Headquarters operated in support of two higher headquarters during Exercise Anakonda 2016. In Phase II (first half) of the exercise, the HHQ was the Polish Land Component Command (LCC); located in Krakow, Poland (over 360 miles distant from 4ID exercise location). It was mentioned by numerous 4ID staff officers, that the relationship between 4ID and the Polish LCC was excellent. Helping to explain the positive aspects of this critical relationship, key leaders amongst the 4ID staff conducted a visit with the Polish LCC in Krakow prior to the exercise. 4ID came away from those staff talks with a very positive impression of the capability of the Polish LCC and the understanding that their future

HHQ had of the division's capabilities. This positive relationship continued throughout the duration of Phase II of the exercise. 4ID did position a Digital Liaison Detachment in Krakow during Phase II. This was a DLD that had not had a recent previous relationship with the 4ID staff, but that did not appear to have had an adverse impact upon 4ID and their relationship with the Polish LCC during the exercise. The nature of the Phase II part of the exercise was much slower in terms of Master Event Sequence List (MESL) tempo, which did not tax nor stress the relationship between the Polish LCC and 4ID. During the change to Phase III of the exercise, 4ID elected to position one LNO to the Multi-National Corps North East [MNC-NE], located in Szczecin, Poland, which worked quite well. The 4ID LNO at MNC-NE proved invaluable as a conduit with the headquarters. Numerous injects in Phase III drove the need for 4ID to conduct planning to facilitate the passage of a friendly force through the division AO. Conversations between 4ID planners and the 4ID LNO at MNC-NE proved quite helpful and timely in fine tuning the coordination required to conduct such an event. It was clear that the 4ID LNO at MNC-NE was needed and fully employed. The question remains, how much longer could that one person have stood up to the demands and long hours required to perform his mission? From an economy of force perspective, 4ID's decision calculus in assigning only one LNO at MNC-NE was completely understandable; and it is fully expected that had this been an actual operation that more LNOs would have been sent to MNC-NE to cover down on critical functions.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Seek opportunities to forge habitual relationships with Digital Liaison Detachments during warfighter exercises in advance of major exercises and operations. Establish a LNO roster that includes candidates from all staff sections. Then train these individuals on what could/would be expected of them if they were selected to go to a HHQ to perform the functions of a LNO along a specific line of expertise for their parent unit. LNO assignments always hurt, so relegating this task to the last minute is not the preferred method. Forward thinking LNO selection and training will reap tremendous benefits when it really matters.

(U) TOPIC: Liaison Officer Communications

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) LNOs between partner nations in the command posts and their ability to communicate back to the parent nations units.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Many LNOs from partnered units had radios, but lacked the Communications Security (COMSEC) or clearances to operate secure back to their units or to US forces. Some units used wire communication platforms or went unsecure.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Work with our partner nations to ensure that we have shared COMSEC and help them ensure that LNOs have the necessary security clearances for the COMSEC.

(U) TOPIC: Partner Capacity

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Building partner capacity through field artillery units.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) On June 05, 2016, the command team from the 45th Field Artillery Brigade (FAB) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launcher crew from 5-133 FA participated in a static weapons demonstration with the Poland 11th Field Artillery Regiment at Drawsko Pomorski Training Area (DPTA) as part of Anakonda 16. Members of all organizations were given capabilities briefs on Polish WR-40 rocket launchers and 152MM Dana howitzers and the US HIMARS launcher system, while also sharing ideas for command post procedures. This demonstration was extremely successful in showing the similarities and differences between U.S. and Polish artillery and mission command systems.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Build training time into the schedule for these types of demonstrations and if feasible allow for Soldier exchange between units to build enduring relationships with our partners. It is critical that allies and partners understand each other's capabilities, and possibly more importantly, their limitations.

(U) TOPIC: Multination Information Program (MIP)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) MIP provided a good vehicle to share information with partner units during the exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The use of the MIP gateway was a way to get COP data to mission command systems as well as simulation data. Initially, the partner units did not have the same version of software (MIP software 3.1) which impact on their ability to share information. Once the units were on the correct version of software, the gateway was able to share COP and simulation information.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Incorrect version of software will impact the partner unit's ability to share information in a coalition environment and impact on the mission. The units must ensure they are operating on the same version of MIP software (3.1).

(U) TOPIC: Armor Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) management of a mass casualty (MASCAL) event

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The ABCT was challenged to manage a MASCAL involving multinational units. The ABCT medical officer (brigade surgeon) and brigade staff medical service officer effectively anticipated and planned for a mass casualty event involving multinational partners. As part of its planned training, the medical company effectively integrated multinational partners into its Role I, Role II, and Role III structure; determining roles and responsibilities and conducting rehearsals of a mass casualty incident. When the event occurred, the unit was a multinational maneuver unit with attached multinational medics. The number of wounded was 50 (35 US) and included several of the multinational medics; as a result, the attacked unit's first responders were also among the wounded. The initial report and call for medical evacuation was made by a multinational partner on an unsecure FM radio which was the primary means of communication among the multinationals. The brigade surgeon's medical support team in the brigade main command post received the medical 9-line request and confirmed the request with the brigade aviation section (air liaison officer) which was co-located in the main CP. As the first responders in the unit worked triage of the wounded and reported status to the brigade medical section, the response aircraft, which included both US and non-US helicopters, were prepared to receive designated numbers of wounded for designated locations (Role I, Role II, and Role III). In accordance with doctrine, the triage of wounded needed to be complete before the aircraft arrived so that designated patients were placed on correct airframes for flight to the correct medical treatment facilities. This mass casualty event was viewed in its entirety within the ABCT main command post via a video feed from a brigade controlled Shadow unmanned aircraft system. TIMELINE: The initial report of attack was received at 1441 hours. 11 June with a follow-up 9-line report received at brigade at 1452 hours. A MEDEVAC was approved at 1458 hours pending wheels-up on receipt of triage results. MEDEVAC wheels-up were at 1514 hours with wheels-down at the MASCAL location at 1522 hours. Wheels up to Role III was at 1551 hours. At 1611 hours all casualties had arrived at the proper casualty treatment facility (Role I, Role II, or Role III).

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The medical support company was challenged to integrate multinational partners quickly into its operation. Several medical company organic personnel, including at least one surgeon, were tasked out from the medical company and were not available in the Role I. A NATO and a non-NATO multinational medical team consisting of a doctor, nurse, and aid men were attached to the medical support company. When attaching multinational partners to US units, the US unit and the multinational partner must understand differences in staffing, equipment and operational readiness. Essentially, each unit must understand the capabilities and limitations of the other. It is essential to know who all the participants are; their communications, medical platforms, and their procedures. Some commonality among the participants, such as the use of the casualty evacuation 9-line report, provided a degree of standardization. Time for the conduct of rehearsals was valuable, but limited. Generally, medical procedures are standard regardless of the nation or culture, but there can be differences in terminology and there was inadequate time to work those out as the medical company integrated the non-US team into its operation. English language skills of the multinational medical partners was adequate for coordination, but

varied depending on the individual. According to the medical company commander, the rapid integration of the multinational teams into the Role I and Role II enhanced the capability to provide medical support by 25%. Both multinational medical teams supported the Role I when a mass casualty (MASCAL) training event occurred on 11 June. Each team was fully integrated and greatly enhanced the ability of the medical company to respond to the MASCAL, increasing the capacity of the Role I and the Role II. Only the US and the NATO teams participated in the after action review (AAR) for the MASCAL. A significant comment during the AAR was repeated emphasis on the need for identification of capabilities and limitations as well as roles and responsibilities before the exercise or operation begins.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) The brigade plan for mass casualty execution was sound. The brigade medical officer, his staff, and the medical support company adequately planned for integration of multinational medical personnel in all aspects of the MASCAL, including multinational medics within a maneuver unit, multinational medical personnel in the Role I, Role II, and Role III treatment facilities, multinational aircraft and personnel flying the MEDEVAC aircraft, and multinational representation on the brigade staff in the form of LNOs co-located with the brigade surgeon and his staff. The procedures for a MASCAL had been rehearsed and were executed according to plan. The medical support company was able to effectively integrate both a NATO and a non-NATO multinational partner into its plan for medical support by applying proven techniques for multinational integration. During reception (time dependent), the units discussed capabilities and limitations and roles and responsibilities. The English language skills of the entire non-US medical team combined with the similarity in medical procedures between the units facilitated the rapid integration of the multinational medical teams into the medical company operation. The medical company leaders facilitated integration of the non-US medical team through assignment of achievable tasks and purposes. Whenever possible, applying the recommended techniques of identification of capabilities and limitations and roles and responsibilities, no matter how condensed the timeline, based on candid discussions between leaders and staff from parent and attached units can help ensure success.

(U) TOPIC: Medical Units Interoperability

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Medical Interoperability Procedures within the Joint Operations Area (JOA)

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The USAREUR Officer in Charge, Surgical (OCSURG) directorate was responsible for synchronizing real-world medical support to the Trifecta of Exercises, including integration of multinational military and civilian medical infrastructure across 5 nations. The integrated concept of medical support worked well, and the medical community as a whole developed/briefed a COP encompassing Germany, Poland, and the Baltic nations. There were some significant challenges in regards to practical application in terms of both communications and procedures. First, during execution there were changes in the previously planned use of the multinational Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell (PECC). The PECC deferred cases of life, limb and eyesight (LLE) support to DRUs and focused on Strategic Evacuation (STRATEVAC). This

change created second-order effects to the PACE plan in practical application in terms of using the most appropriate civilian or military medical node nearby. Finally, a patient tracker was published prior to the exercise but not all units used the same version. Finally, sporadic communications issues exacerbated timely exchange of information and reporting.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Recommend a separate Multinational Medical ROC Drill, as the Sustain ROC Drill emphasized LOG functions. Topics to be addressed could include vignette-based Air and ground MEDEVAC scenarios using Trauma and DNBI patients to clarify PECC and DRU roles and procedures. This would then solidify a mutually agreed upon PACE plan.

(U) TOPIC: Interoperability in Air Defense Operations

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Sustain the Integration of air defense personnel and equipment (communication and data link) within host nation and NATO mission command elements

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) 10th AAMDC personnel with backgrounds in air operations, communications and data link architecture were integrated into specific planning and operational divisions within the Polish Air Operations Center (AOC). In addition, co-locating the 10th AAMDC TAC with the AOC provided an opportunity to test the interoperability between U.S. and host nation C4I systems. This integration of staff personnel and equipment facilitated the multilateral exchange of TTPs that result in smoother interoperability of both personnel and systems for future operations

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Continue to integrate both personnel and equipment into multinational operations. Reach out to joint and NATO entities to participate in future exercises in order to provide a more holistic set of tactical and operational experiences. This inclusion of Combined/Joint elements would allow our forces to more fully exercise our capabilities in a multi-domain theater. 10th AAMDC personnel were successfully integrated into specific planning and operational divisions within the Polish Air Operations Center. Additionally, co-locating the 10th AAMDC in the TAC provided an opportunity to test the interoperability between U.S. and host nation C4I systems. This integration of staff personnel and equipment facilitated the multilateral exchange of TTPs and provided the foundation for smoother interoperability in future operations.

(U) TOPIC: Interoperability during water crossing operations

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Interoperability with Allies and Partners and the use of doctrine during deliberate water crossing operations.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The use of Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2395: Deliberate Water Crossing Procedures created a common language between seven different nations which enabled Task Force 18 to be successful in Deliberate Water Crossing Operations. The doctrine created an environment in which all participants understood their clear task and purpose and how those tasks were to be accomplished. While the doctrine is descriptive in nature, it allowed the Task Force 18 Commander the flexibility to make decisions and adjustments based on the mission variables, such as terrain and weather, troop's available and civil considerations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Continue to utilize NATO doctrine when working with our Allies and Partners in order to create an environment enabled by a common operating picture, a common language, and common understanding. It is also critical to asses that STANAGs are available for all types of operations, and that NATO doctrine is sufficient for the current operating environment.

Chapter 3

Freedom of Movement

(U) TOPIC: Diplomatic Clearances and March Credits

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Diplomatic Clearance and March Credits Processing at Baumholder, Germany.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) BMCT Baumholder does not have the staff to support a mass exodus movement. A USAREUR supported multi-national exercise such as Anakonda 16 requesting support from units stationed in Baumholder to include 421st MMB, 16th SB, 10th AAMC and 5-7 ADA is overwhelming for the one local national employee who processes diplomatic clearances and march credits in Baumholder AO.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Units located in Baumholder, Germany have a mission paramount to sustainment operations throughout Europe. In order to support our allies, partners, and rotational units forward deployed in Europe, assets located in Baumholder are routinely deployed. Diplomatic clearances and march credits for the Baumholder region are processed by one Local National Employee located in the BMCT Baumholder. Additional manning is recommended for the BMCT Baumholder to expedite the processing and approval of diplomatic clearance and march credits for operations requiring mass involvement. Reducing the processing time for diplomatic clearance and march credits facilitates the fluent deployment of multiple units at the same time.

(U) TOPIC: Host Nation and cross national boundary crossing and restrictions

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Units faced challenges in international boundary crossings.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Units crossing international boundaries experienced difficulty in executing crossing at precise times. In some cases, unit personnel did not seem to understand the importance of diplomatic clearances. March credits often typically take 5 or more days to process depending on the nation and convoys must adhere to strict timelines in order to arrive at “Remain Overnight sites” and Refuel sites. In some cases, units were required to cross up to 4 international boundaries. Not meeting timelines can cause issues such as an overflow of personnel at RON or ROM sites and loss of march credits.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: FOUO

(U) Units should plan well in advance, conduct some convoy training, and be prepared for impromptu stops.

(U) TOPIC: Deviations from approved routes

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Deviation of a planned route (Approved and planned with the National Movement Control Center (NMCC) six months prior to execution)

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) TF Saber's movement for 03 JUN 16, was originally planned for a 250 km movement. However, due to a variety of external factors, the Polish National Movement Control Center (NMCC) directed a significant detour adding an additional 200 km to the route. The extended route increased risk to the Soldiers due to an over extended movement timeline (TF planned a 6 hour road march that became a 14 hour road march). Four of the ten serials were forced to stop and rest their drivers at remain overnight (ROM) sites along the route overnight. The ROM sites are designed to quickly refuel vehicles and not as overnight rest areas.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: FOUO

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Add a U.S. and NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) LNO to the Polish NMCC to track specific operational requirements. The Polish NMCC was overwhelmed with AN-16 movements and therefore the DRAGOON RIDE movement was overlooked. NLT 72 hours prior to execution, the LNO conducts an EXCHECK with the NMCC to confirm route status.

(U) TOPIC: Freedom of Movement - Operational Movement vs. Administrative Movement

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The movement process in USAREUR is not conducive to enable Freedom of Movement (speed of assembly or speed of decision).

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The movement process in USAREUR is not conducive to enable Freedom of Movement (speed of assembly or speed of decision). The process is bottom up, meaning the units submit thru the lowest level their desires to move and the extremely bureaucratic process hampers CDRs in execution the movement to assembly areas. This is strictly an administrative move. Too many steps in the process and a lack of visibility are impeding speed of decision. Some requests go straight from the unit to EUCOM J43 for scheduling and there is no control throughout. This constrains the operational employment. Operational movement process does not exist.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Even if the system is automated, it is still driven from the bottom. The operational planning must direct movement windows by priority (similar to JOPES). This has to be done early on in the planning process. This coupled with the automation of the Transportation Movement Request (TMR), will make the process audit ready and visible. This will not fix the current lack of discipline in the system, but it will further enable one to assist the other.

(U) TOPIC: Real World North/South Avenue of Approach Analysis between Warsaw and Wegerzewo, Poland

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Unimproved roads would prove problematic in supporting the transit of forces/support between major east/west avenues of approach.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) One of the secondary collections focuses of Anakonda was to produce relevant regional perspectives to support the ongoing Russia New Generation Warfare study. The CALL team assigned to collect on the 4th Infantry Division arrived in Warsaw, Poland and had to travel north east about 175 miles to the exercise location in Wegorzewo, Poland; approximately ten miles south of the border with Kaliningrad. Most of the highly improved road networks in Poland run east-west and these roads, with the exception of construction zones, are similar to the German Autobahn. Connecting these east-west LOCs is an unimproved road network that is significantly less developed and not nearly as capable of facilitating dual use throughput of military and normal routine economic and civilian traffic flows. Per Google Maps the distance covered between Warsaw and Wegorzewo, taking into account the speed limits and traffic patterns, should have taken about 3.5 hours without any stops. Although inexperienced to the route, a factor that cannot be ignored (but what would be fairly common to a recently arrived US tactical formation), the CALL team, driving in a European mid-sized sedan, took almost five hours to cover the same route—using a GPS. This was a difference of about 1.5 hours, or a movement time factor of over 30% more time to cover the same route than what was planned. In numerous locations the width of the road network mandated that for the safe navigation of the route that one had to slow down considerably to allow for safe passage with opposing traffic. This could easily be expected with military forces flowing in the direction of the fight, and innocents departing the immediate zone of conflict heading in the opposite direction; causing significant congestion on roads that were not designed to handle this quantity of traffic. Additionally, the road conditions in numerous locations was quite poor, in that potholes were filled repeatedly over a long period of time such that the road network in some patches was just a perpetual series of corduroyed black top that necessarily resulted in slower road speeds. Many roads were marked at 90 kmph (55 mph), however, to prevent damage to the car, driving speeds much closer to 60 kmph (37 mph) were experienced. The impacts to major operations are obvious. In a coup de main supporting a Corps sized formation operating in Poland against an eastern conventional threat (with asymmetric threats in the rear), would experience degradation of connecting traffic between two major efforts; which would adversely affect mutual support considerations. Although the safe navigation of grounds LOCs was not prohibited, it was significantly slower than anticipated and this needs to be accounted for within any operations plan supporting a defense of the Baltics or defense of Poland scenario. This would affect any wheeled transportation support providing the sustainment for a larger combat arms force. Of note: the surrounding farmlands were relatively flat and could accommodate a tracked force with ease in tactically spread formations. The obvious implications are that the distance between echelons will grow as operations unfold over time.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Movement factors supporting any operation or exercise in Poland must account for these slower than anticipated north-south LOC networks in any CONPLAN/OPLAN development or supporting exercise requiring RSOM/RSOI sustainment support.

(U) TOPIC: Movement - 39th Movement Control Battalion

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) 39th Movement Control Battalion Movement Request Restructure

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The 39th Movement Control Battalion (MCB) made vital movement request changes mid-exercise to ensure visibility and sourcing of convoy, line haul and other requests. They conducted a Redeployment ROC Drill which enabled units to work through issues and have visibility of the process. The MCT established single entry point for all movement requests, this enabled tracking throughout JOA without contacting multiple regional BMCTs. Utilizing MCT personnel extended hours of operation and ability to accommodate movement requests and 24/7 feedback.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Leverage MCTs vice BMCTs for similar type exercises from the beginning. Ensure coordination between JOA and theater base to eliminate redundancy. Conduct movement training before exercise execution.

(U) TOPIC: CL VIII Funding and Movement

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) CL VIII Funding and MEDLOG Operations

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Units were directed to deploy with 30 Days of Supply (DoS) for Anakonda 16. However, funding approval for CL VIII resulted in delays in the delivery of CLVIII to the forward location. Some CL VIII deliveries arrived at the unit's rear location after they had already departed for the mission and in some cases, the other half of the order was delivered forward, but not until the unit was already established and seeing patients (sometimes in the wrong locations) This created a strain on the limited supply stock which was compounded as other Role I units were requesting supplies.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Ensure funding for CL VIII is approved, and units place orders well in advance. Ensure higher headquarters validate that subordinate units are adequately stocked with enough days of

supplies to sustain operations through the exercise. Deploy MEDLOG Forward Distribution Teams (FDTs) to assist in moving supplies to the correct locations.

Chapter 4

Sustainment

(U) TOPIC: Using a Coalition Logistics Support Group (CLSG)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The CLSG functioned to resolve logistics issues from partner nations. It provided a venue for other nations to tap into Polish resources. The CLSG also served to deconflict road movement and other issues that arose throughout the exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) One of the most critical assets orchestrating the integration of sustainment during AN-16 came in the formation of the CLSG. This CLSG, conceptualized by the USAREUR G-4 staff, offered an immediate yet effective solution to the sustainment mission command interchange void between the operational and strategic mission command levels experienced prior to commencement of AN-16 RSOI. The CLSG was bilaterally led by U.S. and Polish colonels as primary leadership. Its construct included teams of multinational participants to provide movement control oversight, asset and in transit visibility, commodities management, medical logistics management, sustainment distribution crisis response and interdiction. The CLSG further evolved into a centralized venue for U.S., host nation (HN), and multinational partners to work through logistics challenges resident in the CJOA. It also provided a mechanism to acquire critical resources and support from HN and multinational partners. The CLSG additionally served as the mission command bridge between the Polish Army's 10th Logistics Brigade and the U.S. Army's 16th Sustainment Brigade to facilitate Polish and American sustainment units and Soldiers opportunities to work closely together.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) This organization is an artificial construct, well used in Anakonda 16, which could easily become a model for other exercises and real world operations. It allows the U.S. and its host nation partner, as well as other nations, a venue to discuss and overcome logistical shortfalls. Although it was stood up just prior to execution, its usefulness in tapping into host nation resources is limitless. If used early enough, it can have the effect of reducing costs through early procurement and reservation of assets that will quickly become high demand as exercise execution approaches. The early use of this organization also allows for national caveats to be considered when procuring assets.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: FOUO

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Although most useful during an exercise, this body should either be made a permanent organization, or at a minimum, be stood up as much as a year or more out when exercise planning begins. This will allow the host nation time to help partner nations find resources required for support in a more cost effective manner. Through timely statements of requirement (SORs) the host nation can either resource internally or assist in procuring assets required.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Further exploration of a doctrinally standard CLSG construct and task organization for employment in scenarios/contingencies which may exclude the possibility of NATO integration and/or interdiction will significantly increase multinational force preparedness

in synchronization with Army Operating Force (OF) readiness across the continent of Europe. If established and employed early in planning cycles the CLSG can directly affect efficiencies in resource allocation and cost management through early procurement, reservation and mitigation of asset allocation, distribution prioritization and control, operational contract support oversight and national caveat enforcement of procurement actions.

(U) TOPIC: Sustainment Integration

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) U.S. Army Sustainment Integration in a Multi-National Force Operating Environment

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The sustainability of contingency operations within a multinational operating environment hinges significantly on not just specified event planning but continuous planning and coordination within any given theater of operations. Multinational operations sustainability coordination and engagement with the host nation is critical to the force to rapidly deploy, mass and organize; and, to effectively transition to close on all initial and follow-on objectives.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Not all Host Nation Acquisition Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) orders and Statements of Requirements (SORs) were completed and ratified prior to the commencement of operations. The delay in the ratification of many of the agreements created ramifications requiring on the spot negotiations and management at the tactical level of operations to prevent catastrophic disruption in sustainment distribution provided across the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA).

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Upon the first latest arrival date (LAD) of U.S. forces in the CJOA, Army movement control elements quickly engaged in navigating through the initial friction of port area capacity frustration which required adjustments in marshalling and staging unit equipment and cargo received at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD). Planning and coordination of U.S. Forces onward movement and integration was notably incomplete as evidence of movement control and operating force mission command elements not realizing Poland policy requires 30 days prior coordination of movement of units from the SPOD to assigned tactical assembly areas (TAAs). Coordination of movement into and throughout Poland is generated via movement request documentation submitted with required extensive detailed personnel and equipment information within the request. Immediate action on the part of both strategic and operational mission command activities provisioned the adjustment in HN policy to allow delivery of U.S. Forces movement requests no later than five (5) days prior to movement execution dates. The outcome of this particular friction point rendered the lesson of adequately and effectively engaging HNs and their policies well ahead of operations commencement to facilitate a permissive environment to achieve mass.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) HN and cross-national border crossing and restrictions were not adequately synchronized; especially in the case of enabling effective and efficient redeployment operations. Much of this friction results from long standing national foreign military interdiction and operations policies across Europe. Units crossing up to 4 international boundaries

experienced difficulty in executing crossing at precise times requested via HN and various foreign national military movement approval authorities. In some cases, unit personnel did not understand the importance of diplomatic clearances. In addition to threatened movement delays, failure of adherence to individual national policies potentially mandated monetary retribution to settle violations. Although the primary sustainment brigade was delegated operational authority for redeployment operations across the CJOA, there was no engaged strategic level combined joint authority designated to synchronize these movements with individual nations. U.S. forces convoy adherence to strict unsynchronized segregate national movement timelines to arrive at designated refuel nodes, maintenance nodes and release points threatens the ability mitigate U.S. resources supporting timely recovery and reset for future operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) COCOM engagement and oversight is imperative regardless of primary service component seizure of opportunities to exercise its capability with resident allied partners. COCOM engagement support should include:

- Leading civil to military planning and coordination of sustainment enablers via State Department and embassy liaisons to host nation representatives in order to generate and ratify implications of host nation Acquisition Cross Service Agreements (ACSAs) and Statements of Requirements (SORs).

- To regulate host nation policy bearing on freedom of movement throughout the CJOA.

- To facilitate host nation, multinational and U.S forces sustainment synchronization.

- To quickly resolve internal operational frictions and crises (i.e. immediate movement restrictions implemented by the host nation).

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Engagement across the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) span of geographic responsibility the aforementioned is an immense undertaking as a service component command. EUCOM's engagement and oversight critically enables USAREUR to effectively generate Army capability and transition strategic to operational actions; both in theater real-world, real-time operations and in theater exercises.

(U) TOPIC: Using contracts to fulfill military capability

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Bottled water was acquired when bulk water could have easily been provided through the use of organic equipment at significantly lower costs. Furthermore, the training provided to bulk water producers adds benefit to their participation in the exercise. This was also observed for the provisioning of showers. While these services were contracted a unit could have been activated to provide these services for almost the same cost. In yet another case trailers were contracted as recovery assets to follow convoys instead of using organic assets for recovery.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Contracting does make things easier, but at great expense to budgets and future readiness. The ease of contracted services also erodes skills that the Army clearly must relearn using its organic equipment, particularly in an expeditionary and direct action environment.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) The command leading the exercise should be more restrictive in contracting, carefully weighing what is required and what is truly not. Exercising sustainment units and taking full advantage of capabilities on ground will result in trained troops and requirements fulfillment. This will help bring the expeditionary mindset back into the Army as well.

(U) TOPIC: Field Ordering Officer (FOO) Action Coordination

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Field Ordering Officer (FOO) Action Coordination, FOO Manning and value added tax (VAT) exemption.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) FOO personnel are needed at all levels of command across the AO. Local vendors did not exclude VAT for FOO payments. FOO/paying agent (PA) training did not properly provide personnel with the knowledge or documentation for TAX exemption. AO specific process for drawing funds (Western Union) was unknown prior to entering AO. Process of drawing funds from Western Union was not synced; FOO/ PA made multiple unsuccessful attempts to draw funds wasting valuable manpower and leaving the unit without the funds needed to buy items forward.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) The 409th Contracting Brigade and USAREUR must adapt multifaceted training to ensure identified FOO/PA are prepared to pay with the proper transaction method. Provide HN specific VAT refresher training based on exercise location; additionally, ensure specified country will deduct VAT for FOO purchases. Specify proper funds receipt process for identified area prior to deployment.

(U) TOPIC: Host Nation Capacity

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) In discussions with planners it was noted that the host nation was pushed to its limits on buses, porta-potties, and escorts for convoys. A contract for bottled water had to be awarded to a Spanish company because none could be found closer. 3 fuel depots were emptied to support

Anakonda 16. It should be noted that while regional capabilities were tapped, this allowed us to realize what is available within Poland and the region.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The host nation has not hosted such an exercise with this construct in recent history. Conducting this exercise allowed both the U.S. and Poland to test capacity in Poland. This in turn will grow partner capacity in exercises to come.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Coordination is required well in advance of the exercise. Continue to develop host nation capacity through continued engagement. There will be no requirement to grow within the host nation if it is not readily used. Continue to use the CLSG as a construct for gaining access to resources within Poland.

(U) TOPIC: Host Nation agreements and Acquisition Cross Service Agreements

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Personnel on the ground in Poland were unaware of any agreements between the U.S. and Poland.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Within the EUCOM or USAREUR order an annex should be devoted to ACSAs and any other applicable host nation agreements. This allows commanders on the ground knowledge of agreements and rules they can leverage to support their organization or abide by as required.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: FOUO

(U) Publish any ACSA or other agreement information in orders well ahead of time in order to allow units to plan and leverage the agreement or in some cases not breach it.

(U) TOPIC: Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSOI)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) A lack of onward movement plan early on in RSOI resulted in general confusion at the port and within the U.S. Forces operating in Poland. Equipment was not paired with troops in a timely manner, and in many cases pushed the marshalling yard to its capacity.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Equipment was not paired with troops in a timely manner for onward movement. In some cases equipment could not use One Time Only trucking contracts due to unknown final destination. This wasted money as that truck was unable to be used. Furthermore, it allowed the marshalling yard to fill, creating congestion. This led to MAJs, CPTs, LTs and senior NCOs on the ground managing equipment piece by piece and using any available method to execute onward movement.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Ensure a senior staff G3 operationalizes the movement from start to finish. Develop an onward movement plan. Ensure all involved commands understand roles, responsibilities, and expectations. Rehearse movement plans. Have personnel available to execute when required in theater.

(U) TOPIC: Limited Port Capacity at SPOD

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The Port of Szczecin is relatively small for large SPOD operations.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The port of Szczecin is rather small, but workable. It will suffice for future operations of this size, but the onward movement plan must be well synchronized so as to clear the port of vehicles and equipment. The marshaling yard nearby allows this port to be used easier by U.S. forces. For large movements through the port, the onward movement from the port must be precisely synchronized so as to empty the marshaling yard as the ship offloads.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Continue using the Port of Szczecin. Explore and document the capacity and limitations of other Baltic ports, such as Gdansk and Gdynia, as possible alternatives. In the future ensure the onward movement plan is coordinated with all players at the port and units flowing into theater.

(U) TOPIC: European Activity Set (EAS) Maintenance, Sustainment and Future Readiness

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) This is the fifth time since the spring of 2014 that the EAS has been drawn and exercised under very aggressive operations tempo (OPTEMPO) requirements. The amount of time between Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) rotations for in-theater maintenance personnel working at fixed sites, some of which are yet to reach full operational capability, to perform scheduled services remains a major equipment readiness challenge.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) At the conclusion of 1/3 ABCTs RAF rotation in October 2016, the complete EAS will enter a period of recovery to enable the systems to undergo scheduled maintenance services and procedures, complete painting in woodland camouflage for platforms still camouflaged in desert tan, and prepared for short or long term storage. Between previous RAF rotations, maintenance personnel at EAS sites have averaged 60 work days between turn in and the next issue period. Within this 60 day period, they have been required to perform

services, repairs and inventories on a BCT (+) set of equipment that a full unit would normally have a year to complete. This has created strains on the supply system.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) HQDA, FORSCOM, and USAREUR have realized that continuing similar OPTEMPO on the EAS could limit its future readiness capability and capacity. 3/4ID from Fort Carson, Colorado is the next scheduled CONUS-based ABCT to fulfill USEUCOM RAF mission requirements, and will ship its home station equipment set from Fort Carson in its entirety for use in theater.

(U) TOPIC: Over-forecasting

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) It was observed several units clearly over estimated their requirements.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) An over-estimating of requirements resulted in units receiving more fuel or food than required. This caused other problems such as re-routing contracted fuel to other locations or filling tankers that were intended for other missions. In one observation it resulted in fresh fruits and vegetables being returned to the CL I break point and the CSSB having to work out disposition with few good options. It also resulted in another load being left until another convoy could move it.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: FOUO

(U) Improve unit forecasting ability through logistics training in the career courses, online, and in smaller scale exercises prior to large one. At higher echelons, closely review unit requirements prior to submission.

(U) TOPIC: Effects of austere field conditions on uniforms and OCIE

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Many Soldiers participating in Exercise Anakonda found themselves running short on serviceable uniforms due to the increased wear and tear of field conditions.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) As Soldiers lived and worked in austere field conditions for relatively long durations, the serviceable life of uniforms and OCIE was greatly reduced. Many Soldiers found that they did not have an adequate amount of uniforms to sustain them throughout the duration of the exercise.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Ensure that Soldiers are issued a greater quantity of uniforms prior to deployment to austere field conditions. Also ensure that the theater sustainment channels can adequately support resupply of uniforms for Solders. It would also be beneficial to conduct a study on the serviceability of field uniforms.

Chapter 5

Fires

(U) TOPIC: Clearance of Fires in DA operations

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Clearance of fires needs to be pushed to the lowest tactical levels possible.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) During the Phase III portion of Exercise Anakonda 2016, the processing of fires missions was made complicated by MNC-NE retaining the added step of deconfliction of airspace management in support of artillery fires at their level. This resulted in the unnecessary delay of fires missions by the added step of deconflicting airspace with max ordnance of the various artillery and rocket munitions by the MNC-NE Air Operations Center. The 4ID Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) had the organic capability to do the same much quicker and far more efficiently, all from the current operations watch floor. It was clear that MNC-NE was unfamiliar with the 4ID JAGIC and the inherent capabilities that this fires cell had on hand. Had MNC-NE and 4ID fires staffs conducted face-to-face introductions, even with a limited staff composed of key players, this would have yielded huge dividends during the actual exercise as staff processes would have been truncated and less duplication of efforts would have taken place. 4ID had made a visit to the Polish LCC that was the HHQ during Phase II. This visit clearly improved each sides understanding of each other's capabilities and staff organization. This did not occur before the exercise between MNC-NE and 4ID, but should have.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) As a regionally aligned division with Europe, 4ID needs to seek opportunities to conduct staff talks with each NATO Force Structure Corps Headquarters. Priority should be with MNC-NE and those Corps HQs slated for NRF assignment. These staff talks should focus on battle staff capabilities and watch floor laydown. Additionally, these engagements need to center on permissions and authorizations at each level; especially those related to the smooth and efficient clearance of fires (ground and air). Lastly, these discussions need to focus on CIS systems as they relate to the clearance of fires process; seeking a better understanding of systems conflicts and sorting thru viable work arounds where system incompatibilities are evident.

(U) TOPIC: Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Joint Air Ground Integration Cell at the Division Level

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Exercise Anakonda 2016 was the first time (outside of CONUS) that a division employed the JAGIC concept within the Current Operations watch floor. While not without a few start up adjustments, the JAGIC performed exceptionally well as a cohesive and

responsive fires execution team. The JAGIC previously resided at the Corps Headquarters level. Within the past few years this concept has been introduced down to the division level with mixed results. 4ID stressed the functionality and proficiency of the JAGIC at the home-station warfighter in the lead up to Exercise Anakonda 2016. Once on the ground, and after making a few necessary adjustments to watch floor seat positions, the JAGIC coordinated the execution of fires for the current operations cell quite well. Of note, this is not a planning cell. There are lethal and non-lethal fires planners within the fires/effects cell of the division to manage planning responsibilities. The JAGIC only handled the execution of current fires. There was adequate depth across artillery, air defense, rotary wing fires, and Air Force fixed-wing fires (including airspace management), to rapidly deconflict fires and deliver intended effects on target. While the exact arrangement of desk spaces may not suit every division headquarters, the conceptual template demonstrated by 4ID is quite worthy of being imitated. Of note, with Alliance officers present on the watch floor, the JAGIC footprint on the watch floor had to be adjusted in order to protect systems that were connected to the SIPR network. 4ID handled this exceptionally well which enhanced team building between the JAGIC and the international officers on the staff.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) It is highly suggested that other U. S. Army division headquarters Fires Cells review the 4ID JAGIC TACSOP. It is an excellent starting point for a sister division to implement and make adjustments from to suit the unique needs of their own division JAGIC.

Figure 5-1

4ID JAGIC Seating Chart, 4ID TACSOP

(U) TOPIC: Allied and U.S. Airspace Control and Clearance of Fire doctrine

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) There are significant differences between Allied and U.S. Airspace Control and Clearance of Fire doctrine.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Allied Doctrine calls for airspace control to remain at the air component command level (combination of the CAOC/AWACS/CRC-all under positive control). US Joint Doctrine delegates airspace control from surface to coordinating altitude to the Air Support Operations Center, resident in the Division Joint Air to Ground Integration Center. This difference in mission command structure is critical to the success or failure of land forces on the modern battlefield. With airspace control authority also comes the requirement to clear that airspace for Army Indirect Fire. US major exercises have shown that co-locating the ASOC with the Division Fires Element allows rapid execution of both tasks, facilitating the simultaneous execution of rapid IDF clearance while maintaining 100% deconfliction of CAS and ISR assets. The withholding of airspace control at higher air component echelons cripples the ability of the Division to prosecute timely Indirect Fires.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Recent 4ID experience has illustrated the difference between Allied and U.S. Doctrine in action. In February 2016, the 4ID executed a WARFIGHTER exercise in which it was delegated airspace control for the entire Division AO from surface to the coordinating altitude. During this exercise between Counter-fire and Call for Fire missions, the 4 ID JAGIC cleared on average almost 200 fire missions daily, averaging less than two minutes per fire mission for airspace clearance. In June 2016 the 4ID participated in a similar exercise, Anakonda 16. During this exercise the Airspace Control Authority was retained at the Polish Air Component Command initially for all airspace above 300 feet, but later for all airspace above 3000 feet. This meant that of the 45 Counter-fire and Call for Fire missions executed daily, 100% of them had to go to POL ACC for clearance, and the response time was 15 times longer than when airspace control is retained at the division level. The delay when airspace control is retained at higher levels is the difference between a hit and a miss, success and failure, life and death.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Allied Doctrine should call for two major changes: First, there should be a requirement for an Airspace Control Authority co-located with the Land Maneuver Forces HQ to execute the function of Airspace Control simultaneous with Fires Clearance. Second, the echelon of command where this Airspace Control Authority is placed should be dependent upon capability-any Allied unit which can show it has the capability to control its own airspace (systems, training, qualification) should be delegated Airspace Control Authority and given the maximum reasonable amount of airspace where a majority of IDF fires will remain inside of (usually surface to FL200). In the case of most US Army units, this capability rests within the Division JAGIC, which has the proper systems, training and qualifications and has proven its effectiveness

(U) TOPIC: Manual Fire Mission Processing between Multinational Forces

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Manual fire mission processing led to an overwhelmed JAGIC

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) While the manual processes put into place by Multinational Corps-Northeast (MNC-NE) and the 4ID worked with negligible delay during sporadic mission processing and airspace clearance, both 4ID JAGIC and MNC-NE became overwhelmed during higher OPTEMPO times in the battle. In a phase three type conflict with a peer or near peer competitor, this system would become unmanageable and fire support would be ineffective due to manual processing times. Having to manually process fire missions and airspace clearance from chat, and through email cannot be the long term solution to interoperability between U.S. and allied fire support elements.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Allied Doctrine should call for two major changes. First, there should be a requirement for an Airspace Control Authority co-located with the Land Maneuver Forces HQ to execute the function of Airspace Control simultaneous with Fires Clearance. Second, the echelon of command where this Airspace Control Authority is placed should be dependent upon capability-any Allied unit which can show it has the capability to control its own airspace (systems, training, qualification) should be delegated Airspace Control Authority and given the maximum reasonable amount of airspace where a majority of IDF fires will remain inside of (usually surface to FL200). In the case of most US Army units, this capability rests within the Division JAGIC, which has the proper systems, training and qualifications and has proven its effectiveness.

Chapter 6

CEMA and Communications

(U) TOPIC: Electronic Warfare Training

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Despite there being numerous electronic warfare training injects planned for Exercise Anakonda that were supposed to provide opportunities to react to EW attacks at the brigade level, none of the training events occurred. Exercise Anakonda was one of the few exercises in which EW could be trained, and the lack of this training was a tremendous lost opportunity.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Electronic Warfare will be a major portion of the next major conflict we will encounter in a peer or near peer operating environment. Despite this being a known threat, units continue to not seek or take advantage of opportunities to train on how to react to an EW attack or operate in a denied or degraded electronic environment. This, coupled with a heavy reliance on electronic mission command systems, puts us at a major disadvantage going into this environment. Brigades are assigned an EW cell that needs the ability to train for this environment, and there is limited ability to train this at home station and even CTCs.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Units must seek training opportunities for reacting to EW attacks and operating in a denied or degraded electronic environment. The lack of training on how to respond to these attacks, compounded by a reliance on systems that will not be available following an EW attack, mean we are already disadvantaged going into a known contested electronic environment.

(U) TOPIC: Challenges detecting Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) during Electronic Attack (EA) training Events

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Units have difficulties to detect EMI during EA training events.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Units experiencing difficulties detecting EMI during EA training events. This failure to detect is due to lack of experience or knowledge with EA. Many times a unit will begin their troubleshooting procedures and not complete these procedures before the EA event has ended. This is presenting a false outcome for the event. A unit may conduct a step in their troubleshooting at the same time the EA event ends, leading the unit to think that their actions (new cable, system reset) solved the issue. This is leading to an instance of “training to time and not training to standard.” If we conduct an EA event for one hour and the unit never realizes the EMI was from EA…they will never have been trained on the proper EMI resolution tasks. If the

unit never realizes and never executes the proper EP procedures, the training was in a sense a waste of resources and time.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) While training units for a contested EMS environment, we need to provide specific MOP's and MOE's for those training events. Measures of Performance (MOP) = Perform EA against training unit. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) = Units exercise proper EP procedures, the end result should be the submission of a MIJI or other EMI report. The injected EMI should not stop until the unit adequately resolves the issue. Controls should be built into the training to ensure that the unit has other means to contact the higher HQ. This is something we should move forward with for future CTC/HST events. The resultant change from this training should be an update to the unit's SOP's and battle drills.

(U) TOPIC: Electronic Warfare (EW) Planning

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Due to the complexities of training on electronic warfare (EW), planners at all levels need to be involved in the organization and implementation of training from the initial planning conference (IPC) to the after action review (AAR). This will ensure training objectives are received and all participants understand their roles during the exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) It was very difficult to understand how the training objectives provided by 4th ID were going to be met with the plan that was presented. The appearance was that the focus was on receiving a Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Inference report (MIJI) report. There was no information provided for how the effects would be assessed or if the mitigation plans in place were being effective. The communication architecture for the SEWOC lacked the detail needed for a tactical operation (e.g. TACSAT Freq, TransVers window, NIPR/SIPR numbers). There were opportunities missed to conduct extensive EW planning and integration with real world assets both coalition and U.S. No EW planners from 82nd ABN DIV were tasked to attend any planning conferences prior to execution of the exercise. The attempts to meet over VTC was met with conflicting schedules and unanswered request to support. There was conflicting information/guidance in regards to the MIJI and the Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) report. Working interoperability within the forces is a difficult task to begin with, then adding EW information sharing makes it nearly impossible.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Training objectives need to be codified and synced to the overarching plan as early as possible. This will help mitigate last minute issues and confusion for those personnel not familiar with EW/Cyber operations. Both recommendations above could alleviate missed opportunities for good training. (E.g. EW professionals training with live air assets, training with NATO EW equipment). A discussion between EUCOM and USAREUR to decide best practices, TTPs, and SOPs for dealing with interference reporting would be helpful for any future exercise to understand the requirements and standards.

(U) TOPIC: Network Operations (NETOPS)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) G6 established effective NETOPS

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) DTAC NETOPS and its trained personnel enhances the G6's ability to manage the network and provide help desk service to the DTAC and subordinate commands in a partnership environment. The NETOPS managed a different version of chat used by the partner units. Within the NETOPS area, G6 could synchronized support to KMO operations, cyberspace monitoring, help desk services and network management. The NETOPS uses SMMP for the view and monitoring of the network to include the PMN, this helped the NETOPS identify outages throughout their network. The G6 installed a radio cow (VHS/HF/TACTSAT radios) in the DTAC to minimize radio foot print in the operations tent. Language barriers created a challenge for the NETOPS in setup and troubleshooting procedures. Use of partner LNOs on the staff assisted in the interface with the host nation in setup.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Organized and trained NETOPS will enhance the command in managing multinational organization, operating on various networks. Continue to refine and build on the NETOPS to manage the network in a coalition environment.

(U) TOPIC: CEMA: Defense of Cyberspace Operations (DCO)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Defense Cyberspace Operations (DCO): Cyberspace Warrant Officer (255) monitoring the networks for cyberspace activities, identifying any cyberspace activities.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Division NETOPS conducted routine monitoring with different tools, from Big Fix/HBSS to traditional procedures (i.e. going through logs to search for any abnormal cyberspace activities). The signal/cyberspace personnel did not receive any training on Big Fix application. In addition, the unit did not request or receive any cyberspace support from the regional cyberspace center (RCC). Coordination/collaboration with the network warrant officer provided an effective early warning method in providing a first line of defense for the network. Unfortunately, little cyberspace activities during the exercise limited the NETOPS's ability to test processes and procedures as well as identify shortfalls in the units DCO.

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) A well trained NETOPS can assist the unit in identifying the cyberspace intrusions and coordinated the desire defense measures to mitigate the effects to the network. Missed opportunities to exercise procedures and processes in support of cyberspace operations. Cyberspace threats are a part of the battlespace and must be exercise during any training event, especially in a multination environment.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Continue to develop cyberspace defense SOP to ensure the division has a well-coordinated plan to address defense of cyberspace operations and protection of the network. G6 request cyberspace protection team (CPT) from the regional cyber center to enhance unit's ability to defend the network from cyberspace threats.

(U) TOPIC: Planning offensive cyberspace operations

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) CEMA officer planning OCO activities for the unit in support of the exercise

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Prior to the exercise, the CEMA officer coordinated and planned cyberspace and electronic warfare capabilities in advance to ensure the capabilities were available for the operations. The planning process is critical for identifying CEMA requirements and coordinating the effects with higher headquarters and the regional cyberspace center to ensure cyberspace capabilities are available for the operations. The CEMA officer understands the timeline in obtaining permissions and authorities to employ offensive cyberspace capabilities as well as the request process. The lack of cyberspace injects into the exercise limited the CEMA officer and his team to conduct cyberspace and EW operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Ensure the division has a trained CEMA officer on the staff to plan/conduct cyberspace operations. A trained CEMA officer on the staff can assist the unit in identifying the cyberspace requirements and coordinated the desire effects to support the operations and commander's intent.

(U) TOPIC: Cyber-attacks

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Several simulated cyber-attacks occurred at subordinate units. Upon further evaluation, the units acknowledged attack (e.g. phishing, malware); however, the reports were never reported up the chain of command.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Any incidents occurring on the battlefield should be considered SIGACTS and reported as such (e.g. Cyber /EW events).

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Develop an incident response plan and ensure that it is distributed. Ensure that the G2, G3, and G6 are synchronized when executing cyber events. For example, usually a G6/S6 Soldier will see events first. They must report to G2 to analyze the value in the

target. This analysis will go to the G3 and the decision is made to possibly watch/exploit or destroy/kill.

(U) TOPIC: Polish Mission Network (PMN) Challenges

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The G6 had to coordinate and request support from the Polish Network Operations Center (NOC) to overcome issues during the initial setup of the PMN in order to operate mission command systems.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) An event functional test was conducted on fiber in March and did not represent the communications used during the exercise, which caused delays in the initial setup of the network. The G6 had to request access to firewalls in order to allow operations/connectivity for mission command systems (CPOF) which caused delays in establishment of communication in the DTAC. Firewall permissions were request during the planning conference for email, was not allow at the start of the exercise. Once sorted out with the host nation, the unit was able to bring their systems up and operate. The G6 encountered call messenger challenges due to version of transit codex software on the router.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) A communication network not properly configured to support mission command systems can cause delays in setting up the unit's TOC and executing mission command. During the planning phase units must ensure that their communications requirements are understood by the host nation. In addition, they must follow up with the host nation to re-enforce those requirements prior to the testing of the exercise network. This will ensure gaps are identified and address prior to the start of the exercise

(U) TOPIC: Polish Mission Network (PMN) event functional test

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Units encountered challenges with PMN setup at the start of the exercise due to a less than thorough network event functional test

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) At the start of the exercise, the PMN experienced challenges with interoperability, configuration, firewalls and version of systems used on the network. Prior to the exercise, the network went through an event functional test (commex/test) with the Polish military to ensure connectivity. Event functional test was conducted on fiber in March and did not represent the communications used during the exercise. This did not test the actual communication architecture supporting the exercise. The event functional test also did not test the actual load, systems, routers, switches used or stress the network to identify issues/gaps in

communications. The G6 re-engaged the Polish military to workout configuration and permissions/authorities issues.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) A tested and coordinated multinational communication network used for an exercise/multinational operations will ensure connectivity and allow for timely establishment of a network. The communication network used for the exercise/operations in a multinational environment must go through the commex/ network to work out the gaps and shortfalls of interoperability.

(U) TOPIC: Polish Mission Network (PMN) email naming convention

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Different email naming convention between partner units caused delays in setting up email accounts.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The unit (G6) coordinate naming convention during the planning conference to ensure email accounts/chats rooms could be setup for the exercise. NETOPS managed three different version of chat during the exercise. The G6 had to work through the different naming conventions to ensure accounts setup properly. The main control setup was different which affected email and chat rooms. The Polish military uses position identity and the U.S. used names. This needed to be sorted out in order to enable email and chat room operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) A communication network not properly configured to support mission command systems can cause delays in setting up the unit's TOC and executing mission command. During the planning phase units must ensure that their communications requirements are understood by the host nation. In addition, they must follow up with the host nation to re-enforce those requirements prior to the testing of the exercise network. This will ensure gaps are identified and address prior to the start of the exercise

(U) TOPIC: Simulation feed over Polish Mission Network (PMN)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The PMN had challenges with passing simulation data for the exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) During the initial part of the exercise, simulation feeds were limited due to configuration and software versions over the network. The different version of JCATS simulation systems caused some delays. The unit (with the help of the Polish military) worked

through the differences to provide the limited (delays with tracks) simulation feed for phase III of the operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Limited simulations for exercise will impact the unit's ability to achieve desire outcome for partner units. Identify simulation requirements and discuss those requirements at the planning conference to gain agreement for simulation. During the planning phase units must coordinate with partners and use the version of simulation program identified for the exercise. In addition, units must follow up with the host nation to re-enforce those requirements prior to the testing of the exercise network/simulation feeds. This will ensure gaps are identified and address prior to the start of the exercise.

(U) TOPIC: Communication Expeditionary Communication Package

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Communication Expeditionary Communication Package provided early entry communications for the unit moving into country.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) To address the challenges of supporting movement into country, the G6 used an expeditionary communications construct to establish a communication network to build on as communication assets arrived into the units AOR. The communication expeditionary communication package provided quality NIPR/SIPR and voice communications for the DTAC moving into location. The expeditionary communication package provided capabilities/features that supported the division' mission during Anakonda 16.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) A mobile communication package will enhance unit's early entry operations and ensure reach back to services required for operations. In addition, it provides a stable platform to build the communications network for follow on missions. Integrate expeditionary communication systems/package into units for early entry/expeditionary missions and operations.

(U) TOPIC: Use of Over-the-Horizon (OTH) or reach back support of network service

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Use of Over-the-Horizon (OTH) or reach back support of network services. The use of OTH has become a common solution to gain efficiency and mobility.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Pushing services from a higher echelon is also a tenant of MPE's use of the Virtual Data Centers. USAREUR utilized this concept during this event by pulling all common services from their headquarters in Wiesbaden for all 3 domains of SIPR, NIPR, and ACME networks. This provided USAREUR the benefits of a faster setup/teardown, reduced

manpower forward, and increase security of assets. It also added significant risk with the necessity of an extremely large and reliable communications link. During this event, weather events disrupted services almost daily, and the latency of the network degrade systems and operations effectiveness. Although there were a few simulated Electronic Warfare (EW) events, the full effects of a contested and congested environment were not realized.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) The comprehensive risk to continuous operations with this design requires further assessments and may be unacceptable. If this is true, then analysis on manning of organizations providing support to increasing network requirements is essential given the continued trend of reduced manning and the elimination of the Contingency Command Post (CCP) structure for ASCCs.

(U) TOPIC: Building relationships with communications support agencies

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) WIN-T provided NIPR and SIPR network to support operations at the tactical level. During the exercise, limited reach back to services affected operations. G6 worked through the limited service through its relationship with the RHN

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) WIN-T provided NIPR and SIPR networks for the DTAC to operate which was affected by the weather at the regional hub node (RHN) in Germany. G6 worked through the outage and limited service through troubleshooting and relaying an understanding of the unit's requirements with the RHN.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Relationship building is key in sharing information on unit's requirements and ensures priorities are understood. In addition, relationship with supporting agencies enhance the unit's ability to conduct troubleshooting. Continue to build relationships with those agencies that provide communication support to the unit during exercise or operations. Those relationships ensure that all parties understand the unit's requirements and enhance the support agency's ability to work through troubleshooting. The unit providing an LNO to the RHN to work links in and help troubleshoot issues at the start of the exercise

(U) TOPIC: WIN-T Communication Issues

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) WIN-T Integration Delays

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Several units experienced transportation delays due to the WIN-T integration timeline, causing additional mission command nodes to be simultaneously installed,

straining the Regional Hub Node (RHN) and RCC-E troubleshooting and configuration teams. The effected unit did not inform the G6 team or Lightning NETOPS (Forward/Rear) of their expected delays until late into the execution window. Without accurate integration timelines, the NETOPS Fwd/Rear, RHN and RCC-E teams may not have been able to successfully integrate multiple nodes causing commanders to be without critical mission command capabilities.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Ensure all signal units inform the USAREUR TAC G6 OIC and/or NETOPS Fwd of any and all integration delays. This allows for modifications to the integration timeline to be synchronized across all teams; ensuring the right personnel are available to support warfighters.

(U) TOPIC: SPACE Operations

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Lack of space activities in the exercise limited the Special Technical Operations (STO) team's ability to train on space and EW support to the division

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) Prior to the exercise, the STO officer coordinated and planned space and electronic warfare capabilities in advance to ensure the capabilities were available for the operations. The planning process is critical for identifying space requirements and coordinating the effects with higher headquarters to ensure space capabilities are available for the exercise. The STO officer developed a plan to address space and EW activities, unfortunately there was little space and EW play during the exercise. The lack of space and EW injects into the exercise limited the STO team to conduct space and EW operations and train.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Missed opportunities to exercise procedures and processes in support of space operations. Space and EW threats are part of the battlespace and must be exercised during any training event, especially in a multinational environment. Include space and EW events in exercises to exercise the division's space SOP/processes/procedures dealing with space activities.

Chapter 7

Miscellaneous Observations

(U) TOPIC: U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard Sourcing and Employment Synchronization

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Limited time available for Reserve Component personnel affected continuity of operations.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) U.S. policy limits the amount of time individual members may serve continuous active duty during National, Joint, and/or Army exercises. Army Reserve (USAR) and National Guard (NG) units must rotate personnel every 23 days. Such policy requirements interfere with the continuity of operations. USAR and NG Units employed in the AN 16 CJOA for multiple consecutive months had to manage personnel with significant scrutiny to avoid exceeding mobilization limitations. Consequently, commanders and personnel managers needed to ensure the correct personnel with the appropriate skill sets are sourced, mobilized, deployed and employed in synchronization with impending vacancies. The loss in continuity subsequently created personnel integration friction which increased the learning demands of current situations and gained situational understanding.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: FOUO

(U) Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) via respective COCOMs must ensure sufficient accurate planning and coordination is conducted to capture USAR and NG sourcing solutions against validated COCOM capability requirements. Use the processes established within the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) not only to source USAR and NG solutions but to generate continuous planning and synchronization of USAR and NG personnel rotations that include and account for personnel integration and transitions in and out of operations.

(U) Also, current policy limitations on USAR and NG units should be assessed to determine if this is an undue hindrance to RC integration with the total force.

(U) TOPIC: Rear Area Security performed by a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Resourcing the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade to perform rear area security requirements in a hybrid/new generation warfare threat environment requires adequate depth and breadth to assure mission accomplishment.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) During exercise Anakonda 2016, the CPX scenario developed into a situation that exposed the division to conventional threats to the front (decisive action) simultaneous with unconventional/asymmetric elements within the remaining depth of the division area of

operations (wide area security). Due to the near peer potential threat to the front, the division appropriately allocated all combat arms brigade and battalion formations to defend against that decisive threat. This left the remaining rear area (a very large area in terms of square mileage and significant distances in terms of total miles of LOCs) to be protected by a relatively small Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. The MEB was left with a busy task to troop list, one that drove the prioritization of tasks for the very small force that composed the MEB; essentially 2 x EN battalions, 2 x MP battalions, 1 x CH battalion, 1 x FA battalion, 1 x ADA battalion, and 1 x Transportation battalion.

(U) The actual area that the MEB was responsible for protecting was nearly the size of the entire state of West Virginia. While local police, para-military, and National Guard forces would also be located in this area to provide security and ensure the peace, these forces were not TACON to the MEB, nor where they directly assisting the division effort. The task proved daunting to the protection WFF planners, and nearly paralyzed their collective abilities to plan. This type of scenario is not all that unlikely in the event of a short-notice/no-notice incursion into eastern European states by a new generation warfare threat. This aspect of the exercise and planning were largely subsumed by the significant conventional threat that was also portrayed in the exercise. Additionally, priority for the employment of reserves was focused on the conventional threat with no prioritization assigned to the reserve for the rear area. Risk analysis could have identified a few additional forces (combat arms capabilities) that could have rounded out the MEB more effectively. Lastly, absent a vocal proponent for the rear area (likely the Deputy Commanding General for Support), which was not present during the exercise, equities for MEB resourcing to the rear area were not articulated forcefully; not enough at least to realize changes.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Rear area security will always compete unevenly for limited resources to accomplish the mission. Hybrid/new generation warfare will strive to set conditions in the rear area such that the main effort of the threat conventional force will have greater potential for success. This aspect of the duality of effects found in hybrid/new generation warfare needs to be more fully exercised such that planning and experience more fully informs decision making related to the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. Simultaneity of Decisive Action and Wide Area Security taking place in the same AO at the same time drives making difficult choices on force distribution while enforcing resource priorities. A home station warfighter designed to tease out these issues is likely the perfect venue and event to enhance/improve MEB planning in this type of operational environment.

(U) TOPIC: Medical Evacuation

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) There were no strategic MEDEVAC (STRATEVAC) policies or procedures published, including the number of days a patient remain admitted to a medical facility prior to being a candidate for evacuation out of the joint operating area (JOA).

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Units evacuated Soldiers to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) through the Transportation Command Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES) for medical reasons without proper reporting or coordination through medical channels. Medical C2 had no visibility of the evacuated personnel and thus, were not able to notify LRMC, which created confusion upon patient arrival.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Ensure that within the medical annex there is an exercise MEDROE and evacuation policies which reflect the requirement to report all evacuations out of JOA, in addition to the number of days a patient can remain in the JOA before being evacuated. All evacuations to LRMC should be input via TRAC2ES through a Patient Movement Request (PMR), which will also aid in the notification to LRMC. Published medical annex must include procedures for use of Non-Med Attendants (NMAs), unit personnel to apply for TRAC2ES access, and contact information of key personnel that should be notified in the event of an evacuation to LRMC.

(U) TOPIC: Officer in Charge, Surgical (OCSURG) Composition/Configuration

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Currently, MED is located at the rear of the TAC along with Sustainment/Special staff. OCSURG also has no dedicated multinational component for a function that is heavily supported by HN integration of assets.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) There is multinational integration at most C2 medical nodes. The PECC is controlled by POL counterparts as part of its composition. In addition, HN civilian air MEDEVAC 112 and most MTFs also have English-speaking capabilities. However, in the case of the TAC, the POL AN-16 Surgeon is not collocated with U.S. counterparts. Effective collaboration and situational awareness would likely improve if the two surgeon cells were collocated or if there was a POL Medical LNO in the event of a real-world contingency. The OCSURG also requires timely crosstalk between aviation and battle captain in the event of medical emergencies such as URGENT air MEDEVAC, MASCAL, or similar situations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) In the event of real-world contingency operations, reconfigure the TAC to have a multinational medical component by collocating an LNO from the Host Nation Surgeon. Specifically, in the case of OCSURG, place one MEDOPs rep forward in TAC next to Aviation for immediate coordination (e.g. the case of the towed jumper and air MEDEVAC). Sustain the rest of the OCSURG co-located next to Safety and LNOs (364, 173, 82, 4ID, 2CR) for crosstalk. TAC configuration is such that select staff representatives actively battle-tracking are forward in the TAC while Sustain and Special Staff are maintained to the rear of TAC.

(U) TOPIC: Medical Reporting

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Medical SITREP (MEDSITREP) and related processes require revision.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Reporting formats and systems must be better synchronized across the medical community. Units are submitting redundant reports, using different formats, or do not have access or training on the necessary systems. The MEDSITREP has not been standardized and requires more guidance to synchronize actually wants to see versus collecting for the sake of collecting. The process for receiving and disseminating the disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) information was unclear. Also, there were no staff processes to ensure medical serious incident reports were completed.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) As part of the MEDICAL ROC Drill, review the MEDSITREP/DNBI Report and clarify what is required and how the data collected is linked to a purpose. Ensure the reporting method is simplified so that can be accessible from any communication system/network and that the mechanism can be adapted to a multinational operation in line with NATO doctrine. Also, ensure that there is a clear understanding of the commander's intent for the collection. Publish the standardized report within the Reporting Annex and ensure personnel have access to the required systems such as the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) and the Transportation Command Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

(U) TOPIC: Deployed Theater Accountability System (DTAS) and Personnel Accountability Teams (PATs)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) There is a requirement for mobile access to the Deployed Theater Accountability System (DTAS) for Personnel Accountability Team (PATs) at various entry points into Poland.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) During RSOI, personnel accountability teams (PATs) could not submit translation support files directly into DTAS using DTAS mobile. As a result, PATs submitted translation support (TRN) files to 230th SB using AKO FOUO folder file sharing, for Human Resources Operations Branch (HROB) to submit to DTAS. VPN + Wi-Fi access to DTAS was tested and validated in CONUS prior to deployment. PAT teams purchased local Wi-Fi hotspots and SIM cards as their primary means of communication (NIPR). The teams discovered that they could access most DoD services (AKO, OWA, MyPay, etc.) but could not access DTAS. The only consistent method to access DTAS was using VPN access through Tactical Communications (JNN). All other means were inconsistent/unreliable. Most PAT teams deployed to theater without VPN accounts which prevented teams from inputting TRN files directly into DTAS even if they had access to tactical communications assets.

(U) RECOMMENDATION

(U) PAT teams need to submit and validate VPN accounts prior to deployment for all exercises as well as future validation within the country of the exercise. Additionally, all PAT teams need to have a viable PACE plan for submitting personnel information for input to DTAS.

(U) TOPIC: Tactical Personnel System (TPS) and Deployed Theater Accountability System (DTAS)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Tactical Personnel System (TPS) and Deployed Theater Accountability System (DTAS) were not interoperable with coalition personnel accounting systems.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The process of tracking Soldiers begins with TPS by scanning CAC Cards then uploading into DTAS. Manual process allows for importing of manifest as well. There are two issues with coalition IOP. First, systems are not technically interoperable (data incompatibility). Second, security policies do not allow passing of any Personal Identifiable Information (PII) to coalition forces.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Synchronize issue with CIAV DTA (ORML # 2016USA-09) on Global Air Transportation System (GATES) and Logistics Functional Area Service (LOGFAS) interoperability to provide HQ RS In Transit Visibility (ITV) of cargo and ensure PAXs seamlessly travel across the CJOA-A.

(U) TOPIC: Staff Judge Advocate in a JFLCC

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Requirements need to be identified and documented for The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate to effectively perform in a JFLCC.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) In order to effectively perform in a JFLCC, current Army Component Command manning for OJA personnel needs to be followed. Currently the OJA organization is designed to function in a multitude of command structures. Judge Advocates specialize in specific legal fields, and in order to run effectively, the entire OJA personnel, including civilians, must be deployed and ready to provide legal guidance on topics related to international and operational law, UCMJ, legal assistance, claims, contract and fiscal law, and military and civil law.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) OJA JFLCC manning should mirror the current OJA ACC manning.

(U) TOPIC: Rules of Engagement

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Difficulties were experienced in receiving approval and guidance from higher U.S. headquarters on updated rules of engagement.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(FOUO FVEY, NATO) The 4th Infantry Division initially operated off of Standard Rules of Engagement starting in Phase II of Exercise Anakonda 2016. Early in the exercise additional ROE guidance was promulgated to 4ID from the Polish Land Component Command. 4ID legal advisors took the appropriate action by forwarding the supplemental ROE guidance to their higher U.S. headquarters, USAREUR. It is quite reasonable to expect a tactical U.S. echelon to receive NATO and/or Multi-National ROE guidance from a higher tactical or operational level headquarters in the middle of an operation. It is also expected that the division level headquarters to forward that ROE guidance to the service component and/or U.S. combatant headquarters to seek approval and additional guidance on those ROE as they relate to U.S. interests. That did not occur in this case because the appropriate HICON response cell was not equipped to manage/take action on this RFI. As a result, 4ID remained in keeping with SROE for the duration of the exercise. This is not realistic and leads to lessons learned that are not in keeping with the dynamics of a NATO/Multi-National exercise/operation.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Ensure that the manning of a USAREUR HICON response cell includes the appropriate LEGAD expertise that is needed for future iterations of Anakonda type exercises. This needs to begin with U.S. exercises crafting the appropriate MESL items to force this as an exercise objective (such as Exercise Austere Challenge). Additionally, each nation contributing to a U.S./NATO exercise that is attached subordinately to a U.S. tactical formation will come with a different ROE based on national caveats. This needs to be addressed in exercises as well. Any brigade attachment to a U.S. division will likely bring unique ROE restrictions and national caveats that may force the division to employ them only as those national directives allow, possibly limiting the manner in which that unite may be employed.

(U) TOPIC: Special Security Office (SSO)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Special Security Office (SSO) tasks were being accomplished by the G-2.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The plan for access into the USAREUR TAC was to place a guard at the door in front of the TAC. An access roster would be created prior to arriving at the TAC with the bulk of people on the list who would need to gain access into the TAC. After the USAREUR SSO was not backfilled, two remaining Foreign Disclosure Officers (FDOs) filled in to conduct SSO duties. The FDOs planned to provide reach back support from the COIC by working 12 hour day shifts and to be on call during weekends. Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) accounts were

given to G2 TAC leadership to facilitate checking clearances forward as necessary. After main bodies arrived, a list of authorized personnel was produced with and given to a door guard. A large volume of personnel arrived from a variety of units who needed to be added to the list. In addition to preparing briefs and conducting regular G2 Operational responsibilities, the G2 acted as a SSO. A consistent stream of personnel requesting clearance verifications required by Polish units and personnel requesting access to the TAC were processed by the G2 Operations in the TAC. These personnel came from a variety of active duty and reserve units for the first several days.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Send an SSO forward and require participating units to identify personnel requirement TAC access and/or access to foreign facilities, and pass appropriate clearances for the personnel to the USAREUR SSO using JPAS.

(U) TOPIC: Soldier's Field Card

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) USAREUR produced a Soldier's Field Card for issue to each U.S. Soldier participating in ANAKONDA 16.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The USAREUR public affairs office provided a Soldier's Field Card (quadrifold, printed on Tyvek) to every U.S. Soldier participating in Anakonda 16. Topics on the card included: an "ANAKONDA Top 10", Exercise Strategic Objectives, Training Area Do's and Don'ts, Camouflage, Vehicle Movement, Accident guidance, Safety guidance, Policing the Training Area, Hazardous Materials and POL guidance, Media Engagement Guidelines, Social Media Guidelines, Training Phrase Translations (English and Polish), Emergency POC's, MEDEVAC nine line request with Polish and US Medevac Frequencies, and a chart showing Polish Army Ranks. The back of the card has a U.S. Training Activity Map of Poland showing the major locations of training activity.

(U) This Soldier's Field Card was a very good approach to ensuring all U.S. Soldiers have been provided a minimum of information they could use in a practical application.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Continue the use of the Soldier's Field Card in future exercises.



TRAINING PHRASE TRANSLATIONS

	ENGLISH	POLISH *(Phonetic)*
GENERAL	Hello/ Greetings/ Good Day	Dzień dobry *(Jean Dough-bree)*
	Do you speak English?	Czy mówisz po angielsku? *(Chy mowish po angielsku)*
	Yes	Tak *(T-ah-k)*
	No	Nie *(Nee-eh)*
	Thank You	Dziękuję *(Jen KOO yeh)*
RANGE OIC	Lock and load	Ładuj *(Waduj)*
	Open fire	Ognia *(Oknia)*
	Cease fire	Przerwij ogień *(Psherv okien)*
	Clear weapon	Zabezpiecz broń *(Sabee -peich bron)*
	Remove magazine	Odłącz magazynek *(Odaron-sch Maga-zin-ek)*
	Change magazine/weapon	Zmiana magazynka/broń *(Zmeana Maga-zin-ka/ Bron-e)*
DIRECTIONS	Stop	Stój *(Stue-y)*
	Lie down	Padnij *(Pand-ny)*
	Advance	Naprzód *(Nap-shoot)*
	Follow me	Za mną *(Zam-no)*
	Go left/ right/ straight	Idź w lewo/ w prawo/ prosto *(Idch v le-volora-vo/ pro-sto)*
	Slow down	Zwolnij *(Zvol-ny)*
MEDICAL	Are you hurt?	Czy jesteś ranny? *(Chy yestesh ron-ny)*
	Can you help me?	Czy możesz mi pomóc? *(Chy moshesh mi po-mootz)*
	I am hurt	Jestem ranny *(Yestem ron-ny)*

MEDIA ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES

Soldiers participating in Exercise Anakonda 16 are ***authorized*** and ***encouraged*** to engage the media. Here are some do's and don'ts to consider before speaking to journalists:

Do:	Don't:
Be honest, but remember OPSEC.	Lie to the reporter.
Assume everything is on the record.	Discuss details of serious incidents/ accidents, or speculate.
Check your appearance.	Speak for the command or your friends, or on behalf of other agencies.
Avoid Army acronyms.	Post sensitive or classified information.
Talk about personal experiences.	Let the situation or reporter rush you.
Stay in your lane.	
Say, "I don't know" if you don't know.	
Remember you control the interview.	

SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES

Soldiers, civilian and contractor employees are encouraged to use their personal social media accounts while participating in AN 16.

Remember OPSEC, PERSEC, and INFOSEC. Don't post sensitive information or details about troop movements or events until after they've occurred.

Even if your social media accounts are locked or hidden, it is considered world-wide release. Your posts, photos, and comments are a direct reflection upon you, your unit, and the military.

Feel free to tag units and use relevant hashtags:(@USArmyEurope on Facebook, Instagram,Twitter; #Anakonda16, #StrongEurope).

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Anakonda 16 demonstrates the ***solidarity*** between Poland and her allies from across Europe and North America. All are committed to the defense of security and stability in Poland and the region.

Anakonda 16 is a clear demonstration of ***readiness*** with a credible collective defense scenario that includes cyber, electronic warfare, and joint fires. This exercise leverages NATO Force Integration Units, the 4th Infantry Division TAC, and NATO's Multinational Corps NE.

The United States is one of many allies and partners prepared and willing to assemble rapidly in the event of a crisis. The deployment of the Global Response Force, ARNG, and USAR from the United States plus the Regionally Allocated Force and military capability from 21 European nations clearly demonstrate this ***speed of assembly*** and the requirement for improved ***freedom of movement.***

The United States will utilize the ***Total Army*** - Active, Guard, and Reserve - to support allies and partners when called. Anakonda 16 demonstrates the value of the Total Army force with the deployment and effective integration of 11 ARNG and 9 USAR units into the exercise.

Interoperability of people, processes, policy, and technology continues to improve. The effective integration of allies and partners who know one another, can talk securely, and have interoperable mission command systems remain a priority.

Transparency is integral to everything we do.

SOLDIER'S FIELD CARD
Training and Terrain Protection
ANAKONDA 16
POLAND

ANAKONDA Top 10

1. Enhance the Alliance every day! Form multi-national teams early and train at the lowest level.
2. We are guests in Poland; be respectful and courteous to our hosts.
3. Ensure all training is tough and realistic. Fight to improve daily!
4. Focus on improving unit readiness and interoperability with every mission.
5. Conduct AARs following every event; never miss an opportunity to be a learning organization.
6. Every Soldier is a Safety Officer. Make sure we are utilizing daily, mission specific safety briefings at all levels.
7. Uniform and load plan discipline is paramount. Our Soldiers must be in the right uniform and our vehicles must be loaded safely and securely.
8. Maintain good order, discipline and morale throughout the mission. I am counting on our NCO Corps to enforce the standard.
9. Be good stewards of the environment. Take all precautions to minimize our impact.
10. Army Strong, Strong Europe!

POLISH ARMY RANKS

EMERGENCY POC's

Medical Emergencies: 112 or 999
TRICARE INTERNATIONAL:
+44 (0) 22-8762-8133
Polish National Police/Fire: 997 / 998
POL/US National Movement Control Center: +48 (0) 261-855-954 or +49 (0) 175-931-2794

MY CHAIN OF COMMAND

1SG: ____
CO CDR: ____
CSM: ____
BN CDR: ____

MEDEVAC

1. Location of Pick-up Site.
2. Call Sign and Radio Frequency.
3. Number of Patients by Precedence:
   A – Urgent
   B – Urgent-surgery
   C – Priority
   D – Routine
   E – Convenience
4. Special Equipment:
   A – None
   B – Hoist
   C – Extraction Equipment
   D – Ventilator
5. Number of Patients by Type:
   L – Litter
   A – Ambulatory
6. Security of Pick-up Site:
   N – No enemy troops
   P – Possible enemy troops
   E – Enemy troops in area
   X – Enemy troops in area (armed escort required)
7. Method of Marking Pick-up Site:
   A – Patients
   B – Pyrotechnics
   C – Smoke
   D – None
   E – Other
8. Nationality of Patients:
   A – US military
   B – US non-military
   C – Non US military
   D – Non US civilian
   E – EPW
9. NBC Contamination:
   N – Nuclear
   B – Biological
   C – Chemical

MEDEVAC FREQUENCIES:
POL FREQ: 47.350 SC / PT
US FREQ: M73.600 SC/PT
M73.875

TRAINING AREA DOs AND DON'Ts

- Immediately report all safety/environmental issues, emergencies, incidents, spills, injury, fire etc. to the Duty Officer or Chain of Command.
- Unexploded shells or misfires should be immediately located and reported to the Range Manager after firing. Do not touch/approach.
- Use of laser devices is permitted in designated areas only.
- Do not approach, touch or disturb wildlife.

CAMOUFLAGE

- Use of vegetation for camouflage should be kept to an essential minimum.
- Use camouflage netting when possible.
- Do not mark, damage, or attach signs to trees.

VEHICLE MOVEMENT

- Stay on established roads and trails within the training area.
- Remain inside the training area boundary.
- Avoid unnecessary destruction of vegetation.
- Turn off vehicle engines when not moving.
- Be aware of potential risk of collision with wild animals.
- Observe posted traffic signs and obey speed limits. Factor in catchup speeds.
- Wear seat belts; no riding in back of cargo compartments; and slow down to under 15 kph on corners.
- Drivers must be licensed for the equipment they operate. Follow exercise procedures for driving outside training areas.
- Keep headlights on at all times while driving.
- Wear safety equipment (seat belts, gunner restraints and PPE).
- Do a "360" check around vehicle prior to movement.
- Use drip pans, chock blocks, and antenna tie downs.
- Ensure all loads are secure and cargo covers are fully tied down.
- Do not travel alone. Use the buddy team rule.

WHAT TO DO IF YOU GET IN AN ACCIDENT

- Turn off your vehicle and make sure everyone is safe. If someone is hurt, contact the authorities and render first aid.
- Secure the area, do not leave. Call your Chain of Command. If you cant reach them, contact the National Movement Control Center at +48 261-855-714 (They may start in Polish. Ask for a U.S. representative).
- Follow the instructions on your Vehicle Claims Packet. Do not make any promises!

SAFETY

- Do not sleep on, in, or around vehicles or heavy equipment.
- Turn off, ground, and bond vehicles and generators prior to refueling.
- Take cover from lightning strikes. Be alert for flash flooding.
- Turn off vehicle engines when not moving.

POLICING THE TRAINING AREA

- Military units are responsible for cleaning/repair of damage caused by training.
- All waste must be segregated and disposed of in designated areas.
- Burning or burying trash or human waste is prohibited.
- Refill, compact and level foxholes and other excavations after exercise.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND POL

- Hazardous waste must be collected and marked seperately.
- Chemical training must be conducted at least 300 meters from water bodies.
- In the event of POL spill, use sorbent and secure the scene. Inform the chain of command.
- For any spill greater than five (5) gallons, call 112.

Figure 7-1

USAREUR Soldier's Field Card front



Figure 7-2

USAREUR Soldier's Field Card back

(U) TOPIC: MOS 25E - Electromagnetic Spectrum Manager

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) MOS qualified 25E's (Electromagnetic Spectrum Manager) are being utilized as platoon sergeants and first sergeants.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Although it is important for all MOS's to have the opportunity to fill leadership positions and advance their careers, this is creating a self-induced shortage of qualified personnel in low density MOS's. Electromagnetic Spectrum Managers fill a very important role in operations and are needed to ensure successful mission accomplishments. A 25E can't perform the duties of a Spectrum Manager if they are filling a leadership position. If they are filling these position the unit is unable to request a back-fill for that position.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Consider coding Electromagnetic Spectrum Manager leadership positions as a "Zulu" (25Z). This would enable HRC to send an additional MOS qualified soldier to that organization in order to perform those duties.

(U) TOPIC: Lack of MOS 255N—Network Management Technician- personnel

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) There was only one MOS 255N (Network Management Technician) at USAREUR HQ

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) There is only one authorized 255N at the USAREUR HQ. This creates an issue with overlap in coverage and an environment that lacks expertise to sufficiently provide mission coverage. One 255N is not sufficient to fulfill mission requirements and causes mission fatigue for the single Network Management Technician on hand.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Review the MTOE allocation USAREUR for MOS 255N's and conduct a study to determine if additional 255N's (number and rank) should be allotted for this organization.

(U) TOPIC: Range Construction and Preparation for use by U.S. Army ABCTs and Participating Multi-National Allies and Partners during Anakonda 16

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The 1/3ABCT partnered with Training Support Activity Europe (TSAE), attached Army National Guard (ARNG) fire support units, and several multi-national military and governmental authorities to prepare multiple large and small caliber ranges for training and live fire activities. Planning and preparation included, but was not limited to: analysis of all direct and indirect fire weapon systems (to include field artillery impact areas) for the development of standardized surface danger zones (SDZs); establishment of firing baselines, emplacement of left, center, and right range fans, and identification of towers and locations for command and control; construction and emplacement of standard NATO and U.S. targetry that enabled both day and night fire utilizing approved linear dispersion and depth (range); capability, emplacement and use of available target lifting devices (both U.S. and host-nation), and RF control devices for target presentations; construction of individual vehicle fighting positions for defensive engagements; identification of appropriate locations for employment of obstacles for use of live mine clearing line charges (MCLC), and Bangalore torpedo's; target scenario building (steps) that met or exceeded commanders' training objectives

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) In most of the items listed above, this was the first time that personnel assigned to the U.S. element(s) were provided the opportunity and subsequently executed the requirement for developing range capabilities that supported such a large contingent of disparate military forces. Three primary range facilities were prepared at Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area (DPTA) in Poland; Konotop, Bucierz, and Mielno, all with their own impact areas. Some of the key issues the unit encountered and de-conflicted are as follows: DPTA doesn't belong to the Polish Army; it is owned by a Polish government forestry management agency. As the host nation, Polish military forces do not routinely conduct training here, so much of the range infrastructure had to

be completed from scratch; of the seven nations with forces participating in live fire, the German, Dutch, and U.S. were the only nations with system master gunners or equivalents. This created myriad issues pertaining to standardized SDZs as the nations without master gunners had no one to provide technical input on weapons' capabilities. Creation of SDZs that incorporated all weapons to be fired was challenging. Polish ranges are generally smaller and U.S. standard SDZs were in some cases larger than the available land. U.S. business rules regarding safe peripheral angles and distances have higher standards and less risk, especially for lateral safe zones for adjacent vehicles and dismounts (e.g. petals from tank main gun rounds), and procedures for handling duds and UXOs; Select multi-national partners arrived with service ammunition only; this affected adjacent ranges and placement of tactical assembly areas as ricochets have the ability to travel greater distances, potentially outside range fans and SDZs.; Host nation targetry already on-hand was not to U.S. standards or specifications in scale (size, dimension) or shape. 1/3ID provided Polish range support personnel with the required dimensions and drawings illustrating correct sizes and shapes, and they were constructed for use. Live fire at night presented a predictable set of challenges, and limited night fire training took place. Range fans were not effectively lit. Course roads were difficult to identify. The difference between non-standard defensive battle positions and the course road was hard to delineate. Targets were not heated; reverse-polarity tape on the target periphery was used. Because Polish targets are smaller, their associated lifting devices have less capability than U.S. devices. TSAE provided a number of appropriate Standard Armor Target (SAT) and Standard Infantry Target (SIT) lifting devices, but more would have been helpful; there were only enough target lifters and Radio Frequency (RF) target control devices to support one range at a time. There were few/no problems with target hit sensors. Batteries for target lifters were limited in supply. Each lifter required two (2) large car-type/sized batteries. Fully charged batteries had an acceptable number of hours of operating capabilities, but to conduct full dry runs one day and expect them to retain power for live runs the next day was outside their capability. This required a time consuming exchange with a rather large range detail during mandatory down time; MN -vs- U.S. risk mitigation for unreliable ammunition (mostly MN shoulder-fired-munitions), duds and UXOs was covered extensively. MN standards for safety are much more liberal, for example they will closely bypass an unexploded mine clearing line charge and continue to use the lane before disposal. The 1/3ID Brigade Master Gunners, both Abrams and Bradley, drew irreplaceable experiences from their involvement and participation in preparing ranges for this event; they should document their best practices and forward to the Master Gunner Course branch chief at Fort Benning, Georgia to convey to future course students.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) The 1/3 ABCT shares lessons learned by unit personnel with 3/4ID, III Corps, and the Armored Warfighting Forum. The likelihood that some sort of exercise similar in scope to ANAKONDA 16, especially the live fire activities, will repeat itself during 3/4ID's RAF rotation.

(U) TOPIC: Training Aides, Devices, Simulations and Simulators (TADSS) in support of Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) operations executing USEUCOM Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) mission requirements.

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Between April and October 2016, 1/3 ABCT had various subordinate maneuver and support elements performing operations in no fewer than eight separate countries across EUCOM. This geographic and wide-spread continental dispersion of its forces puts a strain on the ability to have adequate mobile 'system' TADSS support at the point of need for combat vehicle crewmen in more than one country at a time, primarily the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) and the Abrams Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS); secondarily, laser-based TADSS (MILES or CV-TESS). CONUS-based ABCTs (in part or in their entirety) have been deploying to USEUCOM for RAF mission requirements for the past three years, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Since 2014, the number of central and eastern European countries that ABCT subordinate battalion's and companies deploy to in support of OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) has grown with each iteration.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Abrams and Bradley crew readiness standards (IAW TC 3-20.31, Training and Qualification, Crew) dictate that crews qualify their systems every twelve months. Due to very quick turn times between their redeployment from EUCOM in OCT/NOV 2015, and subsequent deployment back to EUCOM in MAR/APR 2016, some elements in 1/3 ABCT deployed to EUCOM in April 2016 still needing to qualify their systems; this was completed at the Joint Multi-national Training Center (JMTC) at Grafenwoehr, Germany. Still other elements will need to qualify/re-qualify crews again prior to redeployment in October. This will be problematic due to the unavailability of crew simulators and gaming suites for Table II, and laser-based devices for Table III in more than one country across the AOR. Additionally, 1/3 ABCT will have to meet crew/system readiness requirements for a very quick deployment to NTC Rotation 17-05 in mid-March 2017. There are mobile units (one each) of BATS and AGTS positioned in the EUCOM Theater to support gunnery training of the RAF unit. They are normally positioned at JMTC to support ABCT elements executing gunnery training there. When requested by the RAF unit, the system devices are re-located to a priority location in the Baltic/Balkan nations to support subsequent or separate unit gunnery training activities. Prior to their most recent deployment, 1/3 ABCT forecasted that more simulators would be required to meet crew readiness levels while they were deployed, and submitted a request thru HQ-3ID, and FORSCOM to transport one Bradley and one Abrams trainer to EUCOM. The request made its way through decision approval channels, but instead of shipping the unit owned devices from Fort Stewart, Georgia, Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) as the material provider, arranged for trainers available from another CONUS location to be used, and pre-positioned them in Orlando. As of 15 June, the trainers have not shipped to EUCOM, likely due to resource constraints.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) As the next CONUS-based ABCT to deploy in support of the EUCOM RAF requirement, 3/4ID (Fort Carson, CO) has been advised by the Training Support Services (TSS) community to plan for either shipping their own Bradley trainer (BATS) from FCCO, or perhaps one that

PEO-STRI has available. For an additional Abrams trainer (AGTS), PdM Abrams has agreed to have one fielded in EUCOM by 1QFY17. If both of these measures are completed, 3/4ID should have adequate resources to train and sustain qualified crews.

(U) TOPIC: Use of camouflage for concealment

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The unit chain of command emphasized the use of camouflage for Soldiers, vehicles, and command posts throughout the exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Effective use of camouflage for concealing military operations has reemerged as a training objective at all layers of command as the FY 17 FORSCOM Command Training Guidance requires units to employ camouflage on command posts. U.S elements were observed taking this guidance several steps further by requiring individual Soldiers to apply face paint, and by applying natural vegetation from the surrounding area to fighting positions in assembly areas, and to vehicles conducting tactical movement (see figure 7-3 below).

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A great tactic, technique and procedure (TTP) to employ is to inspect their AOs concealment by flying UAS with a data feed over their own CPs.

Figure 7-3

1ABCT, 3ID Camouflage and Concealment at the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area

(U) TOPIC: Exercise Lower Control (LOCON) Response Cells

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Multi-National attachments at the brigade level and below were played by small response cells during the exercise; and not by fully functioning brigade level staffs.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) During Exercise Anakonda 2016, the 4th Infantry Division was reinforced with separate brigades from Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. These attachments were designed to reflect the reality of a NATO contingency where national force contributions, limited as they may appear on paper, are value added to the larger effort. Due to the exceptional reputation U.S. Army divisions bring to a NATO task organization, it is understandable that some countries may even ask that their brigade force contributions be tucked up under the able leadership and mission command of a U.S. Army division. When they do, their nationally unique style of mission

command, leadership, and staff interactions will differ with that of our own. Exercises like Anakonda introduce exercise audiences to those realities. For most Army divisions, this is expected based upon experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. 4ID welcomed LNOs from each brigade attached to the division. They were positioned on the watch floor and were frequently brought into planning sessions and other battle rhythm events where their expertise and advice on their specific capabilities were important to timely decision making. Unfortunately, the full experience of working with their subordinate staffs was absent. Each force contribution was only represented by small 5-member response cells, not nearly enough to replicate the counterpart relationships necessary to manage a multi-national force. Instead of reaching down to a unit counterpart, which would happen regularly in a real world contingency, the division was reliant solely on the feedback (mostly scripted) by a response cell that lacked staff depth and appeared inexperienced. This is unrealistic and in future iterations of Anakonda needs to be changed.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Add multi-national brigade staffs to the CPX audience in future iterations of Anakonda. Additionally, mandate that organic mission command systems be employed to facilitate staff actions between division and their brigade subordinate staffs. This will have the added effect of stressing mission command systems while individual staff officers develop work arounds thru actual dialogue. This will elevate the realism of the exercise and enhance relationship building between US and Allied tactical formations at the staff officer level.

(U) TOPIC: Army Component Higher Control (HICON) Response Cell

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) During the exercise Anakonda 2016 there was a notable absence of a USAREUR HICON response cell supporting subordinate US Army formations (4th Infantry Division) during the exercise CPX.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) In the case of exercise Anakonda 2016, the CPX scenario involved a US preventative deployment of an Infantry Division in support of bolstering deterrence and increasing assurance to a NATO member nation (in this case Poland) pre-Article V. In the scenario, the 4th Infantry Division was chopped TACON from USAREUR, the Army Service Component Command and Theater Army, to the host nation land component command. It would be fully understood that the theater army or service component would retain a formal command relationship with the division and would be providing lead nation common user logistics to support this tactical division. Additionally, there would be normal and recurring reporting requirements from a US national perspective that would need to be serviced daily. This was not replicated neatly during exercise Anakonda 2016. In fact, there was no evident higher command (HICON) response cell to replicate USAREUR; although if this scenario were to play out in real world, there would have been guidance coming from USAREUR and useful discussions taking place between both staffs. This was not replicated and left a gap in this crucial relationship during the entirety of the exercise. There were a few occasions where request for information (RFIs) from the Division to the Host Nation Higher HQ could not have been answered, since the issue was that of a national policy or directive (example ROE). Additionally, the US Embassy was not replicated

either. Issues of rules of engagement, US logistics, and matters unique to the US were not addressed in this scenario and need to be in future iterations of this type of European exercise.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Resource the HICON with a functioning and situationally alert USAREUR response cell and add to the exercise MESL (MEL/MIL) script US related injects that would force the necessary coordination between USAREUR and subordinate US tactical elements that are operating outside of the Theater Army's direct control.

(U) TOPIC: Phasing Construct (absence of Stages/Parts)

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) There was a de-emphasis on the stages/parts of each phase within the overall exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Division planners within 4th Infantry Division, particularly within Phase III of exercise Anakonda, were exposed to a "time jump" into the scenario at a point in Phase III, Stage C. This was a necessary artificial insert into the script of the exercise in order to emphasize certain exercise objectives for the primary training audience; the Polish Land Forces. Multi-National Corps-North East planners posted exercise fragos supporting Phase III of "exercise play", to which 4ID was a primary subordinate tactical echelon. Very little mention was made of which stage in Phase III was being addressed in staff actions. Upon further investigation it was quite apparent that planners understood the staging construct, which was necessary to gain context of where the division had been previously over time; however, that staging construct was not fully utilized to inform critical future division objectives in the exercise. Additionally, division centric subordinate "parts" were not employed as an aid to planning and execution of operations. This was a missed opportunity. While this clearly did not risk mission failure for the division within the broader execution of an unfolding of Phase III exercise play, the wider employment of stages and subordinate parts within Phase III could have added emphasis to key events and reinforced the necessary rank ordering over time of those events as they would have occurred had this been a real-work contingency.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Reinforce phasing constructs, especially the use of stages/parts at a unit's specific echelon, in future home-station training CPXs, warfighter exercises, and at all future major CPXs in theater. Additionally, this planning building block needs to be retained in officer education curriculums at the Captains Course and CGSC.

(U) TOPIC: Conducting Joint Capabilities Review Board

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Conducting a joint capabilities review board at the tactical level assisted in developing the Brigade Support Area as well as assisting the BCT Commander in familiarizing their capabilities.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Early in an operation a Joint Capabilities Review Board must be conducted. This should include all units as well as joint and multinational. It allows for identification of capabilities units have, requirements that they need, and what units can give to support other missions.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) This was a best practice re-discovered during Anakonda 16. Conducting this board soon after units arrive quickly allows the BCT Commander to know what capabilities they may have through other units that they are not familiar. It further allows the commander to plan for use of those capabilities as well as overcome any requirement shortfalls in using them.

(U) TOPIC: Assessments

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Development of a Phase II (Seize the Initiative) Assessment Program is Different than a Phase IV (Stabilization) Assessments Program.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The scenario in which 4th Infantry Division headquarters staff found themselves in at the beginning of Anakonda 16 was a Phase II build-up in Eastern Europe. The scenario resembled a formal preventative deployment designed to bolster deterrence along the NATO eastern flank. Staff officers from within the G-35 were tasked with developing an assessments program for the phase in which they found themselves in the exercise. All staff officers in this case were OIF/OEF veterans and reached back to known experiences from their past that informed their efforts in developing an assessments program. Inevitably lexicon/verbiage that would be easily identifiable within a stabilization/reconstruction (read: OIF/OEF Phase IV) were immediately found. As well intentioned as their initial work was, it was not completely on target, nor did it properly address the Commanding General's decision requirements within the context of the exercise. It is quite easy to see how educated officers with a significant depth of expeditionary experience could make such judgments in the heat of an exercise. Examples were used that measured "building partner security capacity", "essential government services", and "reduced insurgent actions". In OIF/OEF, these measures would have been very appropriate, unfortunately, this was not the case in this scenario; nor would they have been in the event of a US reinforcement of a NATO member nation under an Article IV preventative deployment of forces. The assessments also did not consider the assessments "questions" of the next higher headquarters; in this case the Polish Land Component Command. The measurements, as depicted earlier, assumed a Department of State (supported by USAID) lead in support of a

broader reconstruction/stabilization mission. This was clearly not the case. In the scenario, Poland was the framework nation lead for its own internal security, with an apparatus that was perfectly functioning with internal governmental structures that were operating in good order. Critical to the assessment program was the ability to inform the division CG (and higher) if the deterrence & assurance effect of their preventative deployment had been effective at their level and if so, how. If deterrence/assurance was failing, the assessments needed to make recommendations on how best to shore up deterrence or when best to transition to the offensive based upon predictive analysis on when a threat incursion would occur in the host nation (Poland). Fortunately, the initial efforts developing a Phase II assessments program were corrected. This was a very useful lesson and one that likely needs to be reinforced in future exercises. It is also a lesson that needs to be understood by the Theater Army/Army Service Component Command in Europe.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) This unit participated in a home station warfighter exercise prior to arrival in Europe for exercise Anakonda 2016. The warfighter scenario was different from Anakonda, but should have driven an initial cut on an assessments program for a Phase II scenario. As future Anakonda-like exercises are planned, warfighter exercises (to include home station academics on phase II assessments) needs to be conducted. Since a Phase II preventative deployment will like involve the reinforcement of a properly functioning host nation military/para-military establishments (read: MOD/MOI); the US corps/division will need to develop an assessments program that answers the question of the effectiveness of their operations against the objective of deterrence (threat focus) and assurance (host nation focus). The higher HQ in each case will be two fold; the host nation land component command AND USAREUR. Both will be actively interested in the quality of deterrence & assurance that the division's operations are providing and what subsequent actions need to be taken if any. Forethought also needs to be paid to the transition from a host nation LCC to a NATO/multi-national land force operational HQ as it relates to assessments; incorporating HHQ assessments questions within the parent unit assessments program.

(U) TOPIC: Training with Multinational Partners

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The 1/3 ABCT conducted company-level Situational Training Exercises (STX) with multinational partners.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) The Raider Brigade began ANAKONDA 16 by conducting company-level Situational Training Exercises (STX) in partnership with the armed forces of several European allied nations. The successful exercises illustrates the brigade's commitment to improving readiness at the platoon and company levels, sustaining readiness at the battalion and brigade levels, and enhancing interoperability with allied nations in order to support ANAKONDA 16 and demonstrate the ability to conduct effective training in Europe.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Continue combined, collective training exercises with partnered allied forces in order to promote tactical knowledge transfer and enhance the ability of NATO forces to function together as a cohesive team.

(U) TOPIC: Effects of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) deployments on Soldiers and their families.

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) The current employment of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) in the European OE puts many unique burdens on Soldiers and their families.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Leaders and Soldiers expressed unspecified negative effects of RAF deployment on Army families. Separations due to frequent and relatively short RAF deployments, followed by long and frequent separations for home station training in preparation for follow RAF missions creates significant family stress and is sometimes viewed by families as without a clear justification. Currently, units deployed in support of RAF are not treated as deploying units. Soldiers must personally file their own travel vouchers upon return to station. Basic Allowance for Subsistence is being paid to all Soldiers, only to be retroactively taken away upon return to home station. Soldiers currently deployed in support of RAF do not have a reset of their dwell time. Many Soldiers who are finishing their tours with a unit assigned to RAF are leaving with a large amount of dwell time that does that accurately reflect their separation from families. This is leading to many Soldiers being assigned to deploying units, or subsequent RAF units upon their PCS.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Regionally Aligned Forces are deployed to their OE for a continuous and predetermined amount of time. All Soldiers that are sent on RAF missions are deployed to their AO with a reset of their dwell time as well as automatic pay and entitlements provided without the necessity of travel vouchers following return to home station. Conduct a survey of Soldiers and their families to assess the legitimacy of the family burdens and to ensure that the correct messaging is being received.

(U) TOPIC: Field Grade Duties in the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) deployment.

(U) OBSERVATIONS:

(U) Some field grade officers expressed frustration that they were not able to devote sufficient time to their normal duties.

(U) DISCUSSION:

(U) Some field-grade officers expressed frustration at their inability to focus most of their time on their unit and their assigned mission. With the absence of a division and corps headquarters above the brigade level, field grade officers and commanders spend significant time and effort planning and resolving issues that would normally be in the domain of the more robust division and corps staffs that would normally be present. Acute issues mentioned were sustainment, sustainment interoperability with multinational forces, command and control and ABCS system connectivity. Associated with this issue but seldom directly commented on by field grade officers this observer noted a great deal of effort and resources devoted by units to support distinguished visitor requirements associated with this mission. Perception is that many of these requirements would be drastically reduced if a division or corps headquarters were present. There is a general belief that the scope and requirements of the RAF mission are most appropriate for the division/corps headquarters.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

(U) A study be conducted on this issue to clearly identify the headquarters over match associated with this observation and mitigate with additional theater staff or division headquarters support more appropriate to the scope of the brigade level RAF mission.