JCISFA

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

Army GCC Marines Joint Staff DoD Air Force Navy Partner Nations

Security Force Assistance

Handbook

June 2012

US UNCLASSIFIED

Abstract: This JCISFA handbook provides a reference for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting Security Force Assistance (SFA). It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support partner efforts to build security force capability and capacity.

Electronic Version: Individuals can obtain electronic copies of this document at the JCISFA SFA knowledge portal at: https://jcisfa.jcs.mil JCISFA maintains limited hard copies of this document.

Cover Credits

Top Left Photo: Lieutenant General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of ISAF Joint Command and Fort Lewis, Wa.-based I Corps, walks with Dr. Ashraf Ghani, the head of Afghanistan's Transition Commission at the end of Security Transition Ceremony in Panjshir. (Photo by U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Brandon Pomrenke)

Top Right Photo: Sgt. Kenneth L. Krygier, with Security Cooperation Task Force, Logistics Combat Element, helps a Guatemalan marine with proper usage of a compass during a land navigation class he is instructing, Santo Tomas Naval Base, Guatemala. The class was a part of the subject matter expert exchange mission in support of Amphibious Southern Partnership Station 2011 (A-SPS11). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jacqueline Sanderfer)

Bottom Left Photo: Lt. Col. Rafael Paredes, deputy commander of U.S. Army Europe's 172nd Infantry Brigade (left), provides a training update brief to Romanian Brig. Gens at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The briefing took place in the brigade tactical operations center for its ongoing Mission Rehearsal Exercise in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Kris Eglin)

Bottom Right Photo: Rear Adm. Fernandez Ponds, commander, Navy Region Hawaii, tours the Indonesian tall ship KRI Dewaruci. Dewaruci is participating in the International Operation Sail 2012 as part of the commemoration of the War of 1812. (U.S. Navy photo by MC3 Sean Furey)

Intentionally Blank

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides a reference for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting Security Force Assistance (SFA). It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support partner efforts to build security force capability and capacity. The text of this publication has been submitted to the Joint Staff as a candidate joint publication.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth recommendations for the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in SFA operations. It discusses the basis for interagency coordination and for U.S. Military involvement in multinational operations while conducting or supporting SFA. It provides military recommendations for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objectives.

3. Application

a. Recommendations within this publication apply to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and defense agencies in support of joint operations.

b. The guidance in this publication is not authoritative. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, the Service publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with U.S. law, regulations, and doctrine.

c. For the purpose of this publication, the use of the word "advisor" refers to the SFA practitioner. In all situations involving interactions with foreign security forces (FSF), there are elements of national sovereignty. As such, the country's decision to select or implement suggested courses of action proposed by the advisor is the country's alone.

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ix

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General **I-1**

SFA Historic Context **I-1**

Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges **I-2**

National Strategic Guidance **I-3**

Relationship of SFA to Other Security Cooperation Concepts **I-3**

The Range of Military Operations (ROMO) **I-7**

The SFA Operational Framework and Instruments of National Power **I-9**

CHAPTER II

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

General **II-1**

Building Partnership Relationship Components **II-3**

Building Partnership Security Force Assistance Paradoxes **II-5**

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

General **III-1**

National Organization **III-2**

Security Force Assistance Guidance **III-6**

Relationship between Campaign Plan End States, Objectives, Effects, and Tasks **III-10**

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Security Force Assistance (SFA) Goals. **IV-1**

SFA Imperatives.. ..... **IV-1**

Functional Considerations in PN Security Force (FSF) Development **IV-2**

Foreign Security Force (FSF) Development Framework **IV-4**
General Theater Planning Considerations **IV-5**
Security Force Assistance Assessment **IV-7**
CHAPTER V
SELECTION AND TRAINING OF U.S. PERSONNEL FOR SFA
General **V-1**
Considerations for SFA Selection, Education, and Training **V-1**
Building-Block Approach to SFA Selection and Training **V-2**
Joint and Interagency Training and Exercises **V-8**
CHAPTER VI
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS
General **VI-1**
Employment Factors **VI-1**
Site Survey Considerations **VI-4**
Security Force Assistance Activities- Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, and Advise (OTERA) **VI-5**
Support to Civil Authorities **VI-6**
Support to Enabling Institutions **VI-6**
Operational and Tactical Levels of SFA Effort **VI-7**
Inter-Relationships of the Three Functional Components of FSF **VI-9**
APPENDIX
A LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS **A-1**
B REFERENCES **B-1**
GLOSSARY
PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS **1-1**
PART II TERMS AND DEFINITIONS **1-5**

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1. DOD SFA Capabilities (non-defense ministry security forces) I-4
Exhibit 2. DOD SFA Environmental Conditions I-4
Exhibit 3. SSR Program Support I-5
Exhibit 4. Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort I-8
Exhibit 5. SFA Activities in the Spectrum of Conflict I-9
Exhibit 6. Campaign Lines of Operation I-10
Exhibit 7. Aligning Common Interests II-2
Exhibit 8. Factors that Influence Partnership Strength II-3
Exhibit 9. BPC Component Characteristics and Desired Effect II-5
Exhibit 10. Partnership Paradoxes II-6
Exhibit 11. Security Force Assistance Coordination III-2
Exhibit 12. Department of State III-3
Exhibit 13. Country Team III-4
Exhibit 14. Strategy to Guidance to Plans III-6
Exhibit 15. Hierarchy of DOD Plans III-9
Exhibit 16. Overlaying U.S. Functions on Partner Nation Functions IV-3
Exhibit 17. Security Force Assistance Activities IV-6
Exhibit 18. SFA Elements IV-7
Exhibit 19. Foreign Security Force Assessment [workflow] IV-8
Exhibit 20. Building Block Approach to SFA Selection and Training V-3
Exhibit 21. Executive Direction VI-8
Exhibit 22. FSF Functional Requirements VI-10

Intentionally Blank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Overview of Security Force Assistance**
- **Discusses Building Partner Capacity**
- **Outlines Organization and Responsibilities for Security Force Assistance**
- **Discusses Planning for Security Force Assistance**
- **Covers Selection and Training of U.S. Personnel for Security Force Assistance**
- **Discusses Security Force Assistance Operations**

Overview of Security Force Assistance

Security Force Assistance (SFA) refers to activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions.

Throughout the history of the United States, military forces have served as part of multinational operations or engaged in bilateral arrangements with another country desiring to strengthen its national security. Security Force Assistance (SFA) has been part of many of these efforts.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is required to develop and maintain the capacity and capability to support partner nation (PN) security force development.

To be most effective, SFA requires unified and synchronized action through a whole-of-government approach, in conjunction with developmental efforts across the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) construct.

Security Force Assistance is a subset of DOD's overall Security Cooperation (SC) initiatives. SFA is an integral part of three key DOD activities; irregular warfare (IW), stability operations (STABOPS), and SC. The SFA activities of Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build and Advise (OTERA) are funded and enabled through SC initiatives.

Building Partner Capacity

Building Partner Capacity is a whole-of-government approach, and a central tenet of national policy and strategic guidance.

Security Force Assistance is one of the many activities that the DOD and USG may employ in an effort to build the capacity of a partner nation.

SFA is one of the many activities that the DOD and the U.S. Government may employ to build the capacity of a partner nation.

Before assisting with building partner security force capacity, it is necessary to establish a relationship with the country.

Cultural commonality and differing social orders between partners influence the strength and durability of partnerships.

There are several paradoxes encountered when developing foreign security forces: engagement does not always equate with agreement, democracy is not a pre-requisite to BPC, the decisive effect is political not military, compatible social order does facilitate building partnerships, and cultural commonality does matter.

Organization and Responsibilities for Security Force Assistance

The lines of organization and coordination during SFA operations are complex.

The whole-of-government approach requires close coordination between DOD, other governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and other countries.

One of the primary coordinating organizations for each country is the Department of State's country team. This team handles a myriad of issues, including commercial, defense, agricultural, and others.

The Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) is the military representative to international and U.S. national agencies. The GCC plans are contained in the theater campaign plan (TCP).

Service Component Commanders are the force providers for the GCCs, and as such, their efforts must be synchronized with GCC requirements.

The National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan all drive DOD plans. Using these documents as a guide, the GCC's develop a theater strategy, which is operationalized through a TCP.

Planning for Security Force Assistance

SFA planning is designed to create FSFs that are competent, capable, committed, and confident.

Effective Security Force Assistance planning involves basic imperatives.

There are three broad functional areas of partner security forces: executive function, generating forces, and operating forces.

The developmental tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) are used to develop, change, or improve the capability and/or capacity in a foreign security force (FSF).

General theater planning considerations include early planning and deliberate attention from SFA planners.

The elements of a SFA mission are force generation, force employment, sustainment, and transition.

Assessment of the foreign security force is required to identify capability gaps throughout the FSF development.

The inter-relationships of executive direction, generational forces,

and operational forces must be understood in the context of FSF capabilities.

Selection and Training

Proper selection and training of United States personnel performing SFA missions is imperative for success.

For SFA missions, the combatant commander determines the personnel requirements. The individual Services, as force providers, are responsible to ensure the readiness of their personnel to meet the combatant commander's mission requirements.

To be successful, U.S. personnel conducting Security Force Assistance operations must have certain skills and aptitudes, including certain technical, functional, advising and influencing expertise.

To capitalize on those skills and aptitudes necessary for Security Force Assistance, a rigorous selection process is necessary. Following selection, training is necessary to further refine and develop mission specific SFA skills.

Combatant commanders can enhance SFA joint and interagency coordination through scheduling training exercises.

Security Force Assistance Operations

Security Force Assistance operations emphasize close coordination between interagency organizations.

Security Force Assistance activities are part of the unified actions of the GCC and emphasize interagency coordination.

Several factors deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in SFA operations: information operations (IO) impact, intelligence support, force selection, public information programs, logistic support, operations security, and lessons learned.

Site surveys serve to determine suitability of the FSF for training, providing the units assigned to SFA operations with mission relevant information.

SFA makes a direct contribution to increasing capability or capacity of a FSF. Other activities, while not meeting the definition of SFA, have an impact on SFA operations.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides a reference for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting Security Force Assistance (SFA). It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support partner efforts to build security force capability and capacity.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends on diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries."

President Barack Obama
***National Security Strategy*, 27 May 2010**

1. General

a. The United States military exists to protect the American people and advance our nation's interests. It is also required to provide Support to Civil Authorities domestically and conduct Stability Operations to support civil authorities overseas. Prevailing in today's wars, preventing and deterring conflict, preparing to defeat our adversaries across a wide range of contingencies, and preserving and enhancing the all-volunteer force are key focus areas of the United States. Each of these four areas highlights the requirement for the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop and maintain the capacity and capability to support partner nation (PN) security force development.

b. Security Force Assistance (SFA) are DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions.

c. SFA supports the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of FSF, supporting institutions of host countries, and international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military operations during all phases of military operations. The joint force conducts these efforts with, through, and by foreign security forces.

d. Furthermore, SFA activities assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the DOD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institution.

e. SFA also contributes to DOD's role in USG security sector reform (SSR) initiatives and it is a subset of DOD's overall security cooperation (SC) initiatives. Other SC activities, such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities (like building a well) dedicated to the non-security sector; provide valuable engagement opportunities between the United States and its partners, but fall outside the scope of SFA.

2. SFA Historic Context

a. Throughout the history of the United States, there are hundreds of instances in which the United States has used its armed forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential military conflict. Eleven times in its history, the United States has formally declared war against foreign Nations and in many other instances involved extended military engagements that might be considered undeclared wars. The majority of deployments prior to World War II (WWII) were brief Marine or Navy actions used to protect U.S. citizens or promote national interests. However, many deployments, especially since WWII and the establishment of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have

been with U.S. Military Forces serving as part of multinational operations or in a bilateral arrangement with another country desiring to strengthen its national security. Security Force Assistance has been a part of many of these efforts.

b. Developing the capability and capacity of FSFs can be traced back to places like China with Claire Chennault and the Flying Tigers or Douglas MacArthur and the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary, but it was not until lend lease and WWII that this became a major effort for the United States.

c. Following WWII and through the 1980s, the U.S. Government adopted containment strategies to stop the spread of communism and to counter insurgencies by sending conventional and special operating force advisors to assist Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, and other partner nations to improve security forces. This assistance varied in size from small Marine Corps and Special Forces advisor teams to large scale and integrated transition, assistance, and advisor groups like the Korea Military Advisor Group (KMAG) and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).

d. During the 1990s, the U.S. Military conducted SFA activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, and the Philippines. More recently, U.S. national policy has reflected an increased emphasis on SFA as the primary activity to achieve United States security objectives. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the unified efforts of the Multinational Corps – Iraq (MNC-I), the Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) included Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines conducting Security Force Assistance to develop capability and capacity of Afghan and Iraqi security forces to meet their respective nation's security requirements.

e. To be most effective, SFA requires unified action through a whole-of-government approach in conjunction with developmental efforts across the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) construct.

3. Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges

a. **Strategic Environment.** Uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, which require persistent engagement, characterize the strategic environment. This environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing and disappearing. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of regional and global events. In addition to traditional conflicts including emerging peer competitors, significant and emerging challenges continue to include irregular threats, information operations (IO) directly targeting our civilian leadership and population, catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other threats to disrupt the nation's ability to project power and maintain its qualitative edge.

b. **Fragile, Failed, and Failing States.** Fragile, failed, and failing states often serve as havens for transnational criminal and extremist activities such as terrorism, piracy, and illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons. Globalization has brought about the rapid exchange of ideas, resources, and people; it has also connected and facilitated the expansion of the threats, such as those listed above, which do not stop at a nation's border. Such conditions link the world more than ever before. While nation-states remain the primary actor in the international system, movements, groups, and virtual communities have demonstrated their influence to achieve a strategic effect on their target audience. Such actors as these threaten regional stability and have global implications that result in both direct and indirect costs to the United States and our allies.

c. **Interest Alignment.** The strategic environment presents broad national security challenges likely to require the employment of joint forces in the future. These are not new challenges. They are the natural products of the enduring human condition, but they will exhibit new features in the future. None of these challenges is a purely military problem. Rather, all are national problems calling for the application of all the instruments of national power. It is in our interests to assist legitimate authorities to address these

problems in order to prevent or prevent the spread of conflict and to gain or maintain stability. The United States does this by building the capability and capacity of partner nations to conduct governance, maintain security, develop economically, and provide essential services for their population through a whole of government approach to stability. The Executive Branch of Government develops a whole of government approach to develop and protect national interests. The following section highlights documents, which provide guidance regarding the coordination of the instruments of national power.

4. National Strategic Guidance

a. **National Security Strategy (NSS).** Prepared periodically by the executive branch of the U.S. Government, the National Security Strategy guides the development, application, and coordination of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.

b. **National Defense Strategy (NDS).** The Secretary of Defense approves the National Defense Policy to apply the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with DOD agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. The NDS provides guidance for developing the National Military Strategy (NMS) and provides a foundation for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

c. **National Military Strategy (NMS).** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the NMS for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. The NMS provides the ways and means by which the military will advance our enduring national interests as articulated in the NSS and accomplish the defense objectives in the QDR.

d. **Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).** The QDR is a legislatively mandated review of Department of Defense strategy and priorities. The QDR is an important step in institutionalizing ongoing reform and reshaping of DOD to balance the urgent demands of today with the likely and lethal threats of the future, and provides input for the NDS.

e. **Theater Strategy.** Combatant commanders (CCDRs) develop a theater strategy and corresponding Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), which provides an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives.

See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of strategic guidance.

5. Relationship of SFA to Other Security Cooperation Concepts

a. **Security Force Assistance.** SFA is DOD's contribution to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of FSFs and their supporting institutions. These activities occur in support of the achievement of specific objectives shared by the USG. The purposes of SFA activities are to create, maintain, or enhance a sustainable capability or capacity to achieve a desired end state. These purposes distinguish SFA activities from other SC activities. SC activities undertaken to gain access, to influence diplomatic/political action, but which do not enhance the PN capability or capacity, are not SFA.

b. The U.S. Military engages in activities to enhance the capabilities and capacities of a PN (or regional security organization) by providing organizing, training, equipment, rebuilding/building, and advice to those FSFs organized in national ministry of defense (MOD) (or equivalent regional military or paramilitary forces). Other USG departments and agencies focus on those forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services.

c. **SFA is a subset of DOD's overall security SC initiatives.** Security assistance (SA) programs are critical tools to fund and enable the SFA activities of OTERA, which contribute to a host country's defense. SFA activities are prioritized using factors such as national interests in the region, the

willingness and ability of PNs to absorb United States assistance, and the level of risk for PNs to achieve their goals without U.S. assistance.

d. **SFA in non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions sectors.** If required to support the development of the capability and capacity of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions, and to the extent authorized by law, the DOD is prepared to apply the requisite task-organized capabilities to affect the following:

Exhibit 1. DOD SFA Capabilities (non-defense ministry security forces)

- Support and coordinate with other USG agencies leading USG efforts to support development of the capability and capacity of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions.
- Advise and support the training of foreign paramilitary security forces – such as border and coastal control forces, counterterrorist forces, and paramilitary or special police forces – at all levels, in conjunction with other USG agencies.
- Support the training of host-country civil police in individual and collective tasks in contested environments when other USG-agency trainers and advisors are unable to do so. Coordinate the transition of responsibilities for such training and advisory duties to other USG agencies as the security environment allows.

e. **SFA Personnel Considerations.** The DOD conducts SFA activities with the appropriate combinations of General Purpose Forces (GPF), Special Operations Forces (SOF), Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), Coalition Forces (CF), and contract personnel, which, collectively, provide capability to execute missions and activities under the following conditions:

Exhibit 2. DOD SFA Environmental Conditions

- Politically sensitive environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host-country government.
- Environments where a limited, overt U.S. presence is acceptable to the host-country government.
- Environments where a large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government.

f. **Nation assistance.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [FHA]) rendered to a nation by U.S. Forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation (such as Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama). Nation assistance operations support the Host Nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions.

g. **The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.** Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and other Title 10, United States Code (USC), programs. Collaborative planning between the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and inter-organizational and HN authorities can greatly enhance the effectiveness of nation assistance. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) can help facilitate this coordination. The U.S. ambassador's country plan integrates all nation assistance actions.

h. **Security Sector Reform.** SSR is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a

government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. From a donor perspective, SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; or reduction of armed violence. Governments also reference SSR as security system reform, security sector development, and security sector transformation.

Exhibit 3. SSR Program Support

The DOD's primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum. In addition to building professional security forces, SSR programs support the:

- Establishment of relevant legal and policy frameworks,
- Improvement of civilian management, leadership, oversight, planning, and budgeting capacities,
- Enhancement of coordination and cooperation among security-related and civil institutions; and,
- Management of the legacies and sources of past or present conflict or insecurity.

i. **Security Cooperation.** SC is all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense (internal and external defense) and multinational operations, and provide U.S. Forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

(1) Developmental actions enhance a host government's willingness and ability to care for its people. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The GCC's security cooperation strategy provides a framework within which GCCs engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive U.S. Military intervention.

(2) Simply, SC enables the active engagement of the U.S. Military with another nation's security element in an open manner; it grants DOD access and influence as well as establish strategic partnerships. As a subset of SC, SFA is the set of military activities tied directly to the security capability and capacity of a FSF in relation to U.S. interests. Therefore, SC is an encompassing set of activities supporting not only peacetime military engagement but overlaps Irregular Warfare (IW) engagement. It incorporates elements of Security Assistance (SA), FID, and SFA.

j. **SA**. Security assistance refers to a group of programs, authorized by Title 22 USC, as amended, or other related statutes, by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The DOD does not administer all security assistance programs. DOD administered SA programs are a subset of security cooperation.

(1) Examples of U.S. security assistance programs are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International Military Education and Training

(IMET) Program, the Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

(2) As SFA is a set of activities to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise FSFs, it requires a combination of forces, authorities, and resources to execute these activities. As such, SA programs are one means to enable SFA activities via a group of Title 22 programs funded and authorized by the Department of State (DOS) that the DOD Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers. These SA program entitlements provide resources and authorities to conduct SFA activities.

k. **Stability Operations (STABOPS).** Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

l. As previously noted, the organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise tasks (OTERA) are the key tasks of SFA. SFA activities primarily assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the DOD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to effectively defend against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and/or advise another country's security forces and/or supporting institutions.

m. SFA is not just a stability activity, although it is a key contributor to the primary stability tasks of establishing civil security and civil control. This assistance could focus on improving the FSF of a host nation that is currently under no immediate threat, on paramilitary forces to counter an insurgency, or on advising FSF in major combat operations against an external threat.

n. **Foreign International Defense.** FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs, encompassing the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support, taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.

(1) U.S. Military support to FID should focus on the operational assistance to HN personnel and collaborative planning with inter-organizational and HN authorities to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development programs. Traditionally, U.S. Military involvement in FID has been to help a nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow its lawful government. United States FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of an HN, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. While FID is a legislatively mandated core task of SOF, conventional forces also contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct these activities.

(2) **Comparison of SFA and FID.** SFA supports the military instrument of FID, contributes to the legitimacy and eventual success in counterinsurgency (COIN), contributes to SSR/Security Sector Assistance (SSA), and is a subset of DOD security cooperation efforts. SFA is an element of USG building partner capability fully within the security sector.

(3) In the conduct of FID, the military's primary role lies in the security sector across both the military and civilian lines of effort. One can characterize tasks in support of FID as SFA, but many of the tasks in support of FID will fall outside the scope of SFA, as they will not specifically address capability or capacity within the HN security forces. All U.S. Military actions that support a host nation's internal defense and development (IDAD) are FID tasks; however, SFA are only those tasks that directly develop capability and capacity of the HN security forces.

(4) Understanding that all SFA activities done in support of FID are a subset of FID, SFA activities can also be conducted in support of a HN to enhance external defense, in support of a PN to assist in activities in a third country, or in support of regional security forces or even indigenous forces in support of an insurgency.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. *For further guidance on SOF involvement in FID, refer to JP 3-05,* Special Operations, *and JP 3- 05.1,* Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

o. **COIN.** Counterinsurgency is the comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances (JP 3-24). COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities of which security is only one. Successful COIN operations require unified action, and should include all HN, United States and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead U.S. efforts. Ideally, all COIN efforts protect the population, defeat the insurgents, reinforce HN legitimacy, and build HN capabilities. COIN efforts include, but are not limited to, political, diplomatic, economic, health, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, legal, informational, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions.

(1) **Comparison of SFA and COIN.** U.S. COIN doctrine includes aspects of "Clear, Hold, Build" and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Successful COIN operations require unified action, and should include all PN, United States, and multinational agencies or actors. Throughout U.S. COIN operations, the efforts to build PN security forces by OTERA tasks are SFA activities. SFA supports USG efforts to transition responsibilities to the PN and is the developmental activity of the security sector during COIN operations that would provide the PN a means of defeating future insurgencies within their own capacity. An example would be United States/NATO efforts in Afghanistan to train and equip the Afghan National Army. During U.S. COIN operations in a PN, all SFA activities support COIN objectives in the PN. However, SFA can take place where no insurgency or COIN operations are taking place. The focus of COIN is the population; the focus of SFA activities is security forces.

p. **Irregular Warfare.** A violent struggle can exist among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.

q. **SFA in IW.** SFA activities can occur within IW. Examples of SFA activities during the conduct of IW include certain aspects of FID activities and certain activities conducted in COIN operations. SFA activities can also occur outside of IW. Examples include activities to support an ally's capability to defend against an external threat (e.g., activities in Korea, or in Japan regarding Theater Missile Defense assets, or in Saudi Arabia regarding fighter aircraft).

6. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

a. Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power in a wide variety of activities, tasks, missions, and operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity. The *range of military operations* consists of three areas of *Operations*. In concert with Joint doctrine (Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations) and Army doctrine (Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations), SFA can occur during all phases of military operations within in any of the range of military operations: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence operations; Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations; and Major Operations and Campaigns.

(1) **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.** These are ongoing routine activities that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). Many of these activities occur across the conflict continuum, and usually continue in areas outside the operational areas associated with ongoing limited contingency operations, major operations, and campaigns.

(2) **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.** These can be small-scale, limited-duration operations, such as *strikes*, *raids*, and *peace enforcement*, which might include combat depending on the circumstances. Commanders conduct these operations individually, in simultaneous or

concurrent groupings, or in conjunction with a major operation or campaign.

(3) **Major Operations and Campaigns.** These are extended-duration, large-scale operations that usually involve combat. A *major operation* is a series of related tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes. The joint force can conduct a major operation independently, or a major operation can serve as an important component of a campaign. A *campaign*, in turn, is a series of related major operations. Both campaigns and major operations can achieve strategic or operational objectives, or both, within a given time and space.

b. Planning and execution for SFA occurs in all phases of combatant command operational, theater campaign, and concept plans. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff (JS) develop doctrine and policy that outline SFA imperatives and requirements; the services develop doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions that align with OSD and JS SFA concepts in support of combatant command SFA requirements.

c. Ideally, the timely and effective execution of relevant SFA activities in Phases 0 and 1 will prevent the requirement for U.S. Forces to conduct Phase 2 and 3 operations. In any case, execution of relevant SFA activities in Phases 0 and 1 provide PNs the organic capability to manage destabilizing events and provide an existing, effective PN security force for United States and coalition forces to partner with in the event that outside intervention is required to reestablish stability.

d. Phasing, which occurs in any operation regardless of size, helps the JFC organize large operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. **Exhibit 4** shows example operation plan (OPLAN) phases and the notional level of effort for each as the operation progresses. Working within this generic phasing construct, the actual phases will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation and the JFC's decisions.

Exhibit 4. Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort



e. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases occur sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. This is particularly the case with SFA activities that occur over a longer timeframe.

f. The Spectrum of Conflict is an ascending scale of violence from stable peace to general war that nests within the Joint doctrine ROMO construct.

g. Joint doctrine also recognizes military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns.

h. DOD conducts SFA in areas where it supports or protects U.S. interests and the interests of the legitimate authority whose security forces require development. As can be seen in **Exhibit 5**, joint forces must have the ability to conduct SFA across the entire spectrum of conflict, and from the tactical through the strategic and ministerial levels. All the OTERA tasks may take place at any of these levels with varying degrees of intensity and focus.

Exhibit 5. SFA Activities in the Spectrum of Conflict



i. The joint force conducts stability activities and missions across the entire spectrum of conflict, in both traditional and irregular environments. To accomplish U.S. national objectives, all Joint operations balance the elements of offense, defense and stability based on the operational environment. The proportion varies based upon the operation's phase and time, and applies to Civil Support Operations as well. Stability is not a standalone type of military operation but encompasses various military missions, tasks, and activities.

j. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5100.01 directs all services to develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for SFA operations, to conduct security cooperation, and to provide forces to build the capacity of partner states.

For more information on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

7. The SFA Operational Framework and Instruments of National Power

a. SFA requires a strategic perspective on the development of FSF, articulation of global objectives, linking of resources to overarching goals, and creation of operational roadmaps for persistent cooperation. This comprehensive, global approach to improving partner security capacity necessitates new concepts for manpower and organizational design and innovative strategies and authorities that provide lethal capability to FSF.

b. U.S. Armed Forces have an enduring requirement to protect the United States and its vital interests. In doing so, the DOD uses U.S. capabilities to aid other nations to prepare and/or conduct operations to mitigate threats relative to national, regional, or global security and stability. SFA is an essential activity for improving the military capacity and capability of partner nation's security forces and

their supporting institutions to prepare for and conduct a full spectrum of military, paramilitary, and security operations against regular and irregular adversaries.

c. SFA encompasses DOD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the FSFs and their supporting institutions as well as international and regional security organizations.

d. **Understanding SFA Environment/Framework.** SFA is one component of a unified action across the DIME-FIL construct. SFA occurs across the ROMO, takes place in any of the operational themes (peacetime military engagements, limited intervention, peace operations, IW, major combat operations), and may occur during offense, defense, and STABOPS.

Exhibit 6. Campaign Lines of Operation



8. Summary

a. SFA is an integral part of three key DOD activities; IW, STABOPS, and SC. IW includes STABOPS, COIN, FID, Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Counter Terrorism (CT). IMET, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and SA support interagency SSR efforts. STABOPS include activities such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Most of these activities include OTERA to FSF as some of their subtasks. Additionally, one may use SFA to train a FSF to conduct operations beyond its own borders in support of a third country's government, which is beyond the scope of IW activities. Therefore, SFA as a separate concept will streamline and unify a common task set as well as provide a doctrinal reference point beyond the scope of IW.

CHAPTER II
Building Partner Capacity

"In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States' safety and security—a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time."

Secretary of Defense Gates, Foreign Affairs *May / June 2010*

1. General

a. **Building Partner Capacity (BPC).** BPC is a whole of government approach and a central tenet of national policy and strategic guidance. Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) represent the pillars of U.S. national security. Although other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government certainly contribute to the nation's security, these "3Ds," represented by the Department of State (DOS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad. Each represents a critical component of national security with unique roles and responsibilities. The functions performed by each of the 3Ds provide greatest value to the nation when they are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

b. SFA is one of the many activities that the DOD and the U.S. Government may employ in an effort to build the capacity of a partner nation. Given SFA are DOD activities that build sustainable capabilities and capacities in a partner security force, it is therefore the DOD contribution to unified action to build partner capabilities and capacities. The DOD enables relationship building through sustained military engagement in security cooperation (SC) and security force assistance (SFA) in support of efforts to build partner capacity, shape the context of the environment, and create the conditions for successful wide area security. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the role of SFA in BPC, linking national level security objectives and guidance to realistic building partner capacity activities using the instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) in coordination with the DOS and the USAID.

c. **Background.** In 2008, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published the first Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF grouped SC activities into eight focus areas, one of which was *Operational Capacity and Capability Building* and defined it as "build usable, relevant and enduring partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and partner objectives." The GEF directed Geographic Combatant Commanders to focus roughly half of security cooperation resources in terms of time, funding, and level of effort on the Global Core Partners (GCP) identified in the GEF. Subsequent national level security documents have used this concept.

d. According to the *2010, National Security Strategy* (NSS), building this stronger foundation will support America's efforts to shape an international system that can meet the challenges of our time. *"...*We must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests such as combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease."

Exhibit 7. Aligning Common Interests



e. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), "Security cooperation activities include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. U.S. Forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners' security as an increasingly important mission."

f. Furthermore, strong regional allies and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating and reduces the possibility that large and enduring deployment of U.S. or allied forces would be required.

g. Galvanizing collective action and forging cooperative solutions is at the foundation of BPC and U.S. engagement with other countries is the starting point.

h. The U.S. relationship and engagement throughout the world is strongest with our close friends and allies with whom we share common values and with whom we closely align our interest. The United States continues to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence including China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, is no longer a zero sum game.

i. In addition, the United States seeks to expand "our outreach to emerging nations, particularly those that can be models of regional success and stability, from the Americas to Africa to Southeast Asia. And we will pursue engagement with hostile nations to test their intentions, give their governments the opportunity to change course, reach out to their people, and mobilize international coalitions."

j. **Relationship Building**. Before assisting with building partner security force capacity, the United States must have a relationship with the country. Developing partner relationships occurs through a series of activities that help the interested parties understand each other's functions and interests and find common ground on which to build a relationship. In some cases, this relationship will be transparent and durable, characterized by societal integration, the alignment of interests, and common policy statements and narratives.

k. In other cases, a partnership may be more superficial and limited to specific national interests; the partnership in this case will weaken and strengthen based largely upon the temporary alignment of

national interest priorities. As mentioned previously, DOS, USAID, and DOD develop engagement policies toward particular countries. Such development occurs through a number of documents and regional strategies implemented through DOS regional and functional bureaus, Embassy Country Teams, and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). **Exhibit 8** lists several factors that influence partnership strength.

Exhibit 8. Factors that Influence Partnership Strength

Strategic Necessity	• National Security threats and interests influence the effort countries expend on building and maintaining relationships
Institutional Restraint	• States that possess political attributes like adherence to the rule of law, electoral accountability, policy transparence, and division of authority, influence relationships and partner credibility
Compatible Social Orders	• Partner states with greater political and economic integration have involved contact with greater frequency and intensity
Cultural Commonality	• States with interlinked networks of practices and symbols based primarily on ethnicity, race, and religion facilitates initial engagement between the interested parties

2. Building Partnership Relationship Components

a. Strategic necessity, institutional restraint, compatible social orders, and cultural commonality influence the strength and durability of partnerships. Planners should keep these factors in mind when developing the partnership relationship and security force objectives associated with building a partner state's capabilities. The DOD achieves the desired end state of BPC through SFA. BPC success requires the use of gradually deepening and expanding components that strengthen partner security force capacity. Not intended to be authoritative or all-inclusive, the components and activities listed in **Exhibit 8** represent a road map to building security force capacity within the U.S. engagement strategy with a particular partner state.

b. **Engagement Initiation.** Military engagement occurs as part of SC and SFA activities with partner nation (PN) security forces. Support to military engagement may initially focus on specific mission areas such as coastal security or medical support. The intent of military engagement with a partner nation is to build rapport and establish an initial common understanding of the security environment. This common understanding of the security environment and initial military engagement contributes to building respect between the two countries and strengthens the foundations for future engagement and trust building SFA activities. The intended outcome of the initiating engagement component is a shared understanding of benign intent and routine communication between the partner nation and the U.S. Military.

c. **Reciprocal Trust and Assessment.** Both during and following engagement initiation, it is essential to develop reciprocal trust. Routine military engagement with the PN strengthens with more frequent and extensive contacts and a common understanding of the partner nation's security force needs. This common understanding of the PNs security force needs may contribute to the development of a Letter of Request (LOR) from the partner nation and an initial request for SFA. The LOR has no mandated format but usually takes into account the Joint Functions common to joint operations at all

levels of war; they fall into six basic groups – command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Developing an initial LOR by joint function is one way to build a common understanding of the PN's security force needs and assists in scoping a credible U.S. plan for providing SFA. It is important for the partner nation to communicate the country's long-range defense plans to the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO). The long-range plan should address the capabilities, capacities, or specific weapon systems that have been determined necessary to meet the country's defense needs.

d. The partner nation LOR, developed in coordination with U.S. Military engagement, assists with transparency and communication during the planning process for future SFA activities. The LOR also assists the SFA planners at the country team, service component, and combatant command (CCDR) level identify future SFA requirements (demand signal) and integrate these into the GCC Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) for future engagement. (Note: The SFA planning process is explained later in the planning chapter). The intended outcome for Phase II activities is a strengthened relationship built on transparency and trust with an initial SFA plan developed and limited on-going SFA activities contributing to enhanced partner state security force capability and capacity.

e. **Partner Goal Alignment.** In developing and aligning partner goals, the partner nation and the United States develop an SFA road map and assessment plan based upon the LOR and the U.S. Government's response, which provide the proposed ways and means associated with the requested capability and/or capacity. The United States and the PN may have different perspectives on the sequencing of SFA activities in support of joint functions. Therefore, it is essential that the SFA plan with specific SFA activities are in support of U.S. political objectives and legal/funding restraints. The priority effort and sequencing of U.S. SFA activities will normally focus on those critical vulnerabilities of the PN that prevent the partner nation from legitimately providing or promoting security and correspond to CCDR theater campaign plan security objectives.

d. High-level governmental official contact, joint public security partnership statements, and routine SFA contact at various levels throughout the government characterize the strengthening of the SFA relationship between the United States and the PN. U.S. allies and multinational/international government organizations may also contribute to the partner SFA activities; formal security agreements may also develop. The intended outcomes for partner goal alignment activities are shared security objectives, a formal SFA partner relationship and SFA plan (and assessment plan), and greater United States-PN security force linkages at various levels of government with partner security force capability continuously strengthening.

e. **Durable Partnership.** The Durable Partnership is the most developed SFA relationship. The United States and the PN have an enduring security partnership and aligned security interests. The PN has a legitimate, capable security force that has the capacity to contribute to national security objectives. The PN may also have the capacity and capability to contribute to a multination coalition as a troop contributing country. The intended outcome of establishing an enduring partnership is a transparent, durable relationship with credible commitments toward mutually shared goals and objectives. The United States continues to engage with the PN and may provide continued SFA activities through a variety of programs, to include International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military sales (FMS), and others during durable partnership development. It is essential to maintain sustained and routine engagement so as not to place the relationship at risk.

Exhibit 9. BPC Component Characteristics and Desired Effect

Component	*Phase Characteristics*	*Desired Effect*
Engagement Initiation	• One party makes an initial gesture of good will with respect to building a partner's security force capacity or a state specifically asks for assistance building security force capacity	• The United States and the partner country discern benign intent with security force cooperation
Reciprocal Trust and Assessment	• Contact between partner states grows with enhanced liaison, initial security force assistance roadmap framework, and limited security force assistance activities initiated	• The partner country is motivated and begins pragmatic cooperation leading to confidence in the partnership with (limited) enhanced partner state security force capability
Partner Goal Alignment	• Higher level official contact, greater security force linkages, combined partner security force assistance plan (and assessment plan) implemented with partner security force capability strengthening	• Security Force Assistance programs reinforce shared security objectives and partner relationship strengthens and formalizes perhaps leading to security agreements
Durable Partnership	• Partner country security force capabilities are mature and the United States and partner nation conduct security related operations on various levels (tactical, operational, regionally)	• Transparent, durable relationship with credible commitments toward mutually shared goals and objectives

3. Building Partnership Security Force Assistance Paradoxes

a. **Engagement is not agreement.** Developing PN security forces and sequencing trust-building activities does not necessarily signify agreement with the partner nation's policies or current form of government. When engagement between the United States and the partner nation begins there may be a specific common interest that serves as the catalyst for the relationship. It is important to keep this in mind when developing the engagement strategy and for managing expectations as to the overall effect of SFA activities with the partner nation.

b. **Democracy is not a pre-requisite to BPC.** A representative or democratic form of government tends to have institutionalized and transparent checks on the power of governmental officials, which strengthens a nation's credibility and commitment; other forms of government can exercise restraint and be credible partners when building security force capacity and capability.

c. **The decisive effect is political not military.** Building PN security forces' capacity and capability are the focus of SFA activities. However, planners must remember that the decisive effect of security force activities is political and linked to U.S. national security objectives. SFA activities with a partner nation, however, may influence other branches and policies of the PN government—both positively and negatively.

d. **Compatible Social Order does facilitate building partnerships.** A social order of a country consists of how political power is distributed among different social classes and among the various ethnic and racial groups and organizing principles of economic production and commercial activity. Similar social order between partner nations does facilitate building partnerships.

e. **Cultural commonality does matter.** Culture commonality, like a nation's social order, also plays a role in promoting a durable and stable relationship between partners. Cultural commonality refers to the interlinked networks of practice and symbols based on ethnicity, race, and religion. **Exhibit 10** lists the paradoxes of building partner capacity and capability.

Exhibit 10. Partnership Paradoxes

Paradox	***Description***
Engagement is not agreement	Security force engagement with a country does not mean the United States agrees with the country's policies or practices
Democracy is not a pre-requisite to building partnerships	While liberal democracies tend to have institutionalized checks on power, other forms of government can exercise restraint and be credible partners
The decisive effect is political not military	The SFA activities are a means to achieve a political effect.
Compatible Social Order does facilitate building partnerships	The following social order characteristics assist serve to maintain the pattern of authority within the partner states and facilitates building partnerships: • The distribution of political power among different social classes, • The distribution of political power among different ethnic and racial groups, • The organizing principles of economic production and commercial activity influence the
Cultural commonality does matter	Culture commonality with respect to interlinked networks of practices, and symbols based on ethnicity, race, and religion does play a role in promoting a durable and stable relationship between the partners.

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

"Diversity of capabilities, capacities, and responses to any challenge should be seen as a strength, not a weakness, but only if the actions and tools can be used synergistically. This can only happen when all the interested parties adopt a common vision for security built on the foundation of trust and confidence and achieved through coordination, cooperation, and partnering."

Admiral James G. Stavridis,
SACEUR
15 August 2011

1. General

a. **Scope.** This chapter describes the Security Force Assistance (SFA) relationship among the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. Government organizations, primarily at the country team level. It also provides background on the various sources of SFA guidance that serve to influence not only SFA activities but also the overall engagement strategy with the partner nation.

b. **Whole of Government Approach.** Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support other governmental agencies (OGAs) and cooperate with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g., United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. These activities generally occur continuously in all geographic combatant commanders' (GCC) area of responsibilities (AORs) regardless of other ongoing contingencies, major operations, or campaigns. SFA activities that strengthen the capability and capacity of a partner nation's (PN) security forces occur within the overall engagement strategy.

c. The DOS is frequently the major player in these types of activities. The DOD, the GCC's, and military attaches work with the chiefs of the U.S. diplomatic missions around the world and with the U.S. DOS regional and functional bureaus, and other government branches and departments, to coordinate activities in support of National Security Objectives.

d. While the executive branch of the U.S. Government (USG), under the authority of the President, has the responsibility for conducting foreign policy and defending the country, the U.S. Congress has constitutional mandate and authority to fund and legislate. Consequently, the U.S. Congress provides oversight of SFA activities and allocates resources under strict guidelines and implementation instructions. As a result, the funding authorities (the means) for SFA activities constrain departments and governmental bureaus on how, where, and under what circumstances SFA activities occur. **Exhibit 11** depicts SFA coordination.

Exhibit 11. Security Force Assistance Coordination



2. National Organization

a. **Department of State.** The DOS is the agency of the USG responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States. As the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, the DOS coordinate, represents, and implements U.S. foreign policy. The Secretary of State (SECSTATE), the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for United States representation abroad.

b. The DOS is organized into regional and functional bureaus. Figure III-2 depicts a simplified organization of the DOS. The six regional bureaus, responsible to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, formulate and implement regional foreign policy and bilateral policy toward each individual country of the world. These bureaus are headed by six Assistant Secretaries for:

(1) African Affairs

(2) East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(3) European and Eurasian Affairs

(4) Near Eastern Affairs

(5) Western Hemisphere Affairs

(6) South Asian Affairs

c. The Assistant Secretaries of the geographic bureaus and offices advise the Under Secretary and guide the operation of the U.S. diplomatic missions within their regional jurisdiction. Deputy Assistant Secretaries, office directors, post management officers, and country desk officers assist them. These officials work closely with U.S. embassies and consulates overseas and with foreign embassies in Washington, D.C.

Exhibit 12. Department of State



d. Headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs, a seventh bureau responsible to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs formulates and implements multilateral foreign policy toward the agencies of the UN.

e. The other bureaus in the DOS are functionally oriented, and their assistant secretaries are responsible to other under-secretaries for specific matters these bureaus include: Administration; Diplomatic Security; Consular Affairs; Human Resources; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs; Political-Military Affairs; Population, Refugees, and Migration; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and Economic and Business Affairs.

f. **The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs** (PM) is the DOS's principal link to DOD. The PM Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade. The PM Bureau's primary counterpart in DOD is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). Joint force planners may engage the PM Bureau through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff (JS).

g. While combatant commands are authorized to plan operations and activities directly with affected chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions and USAID Mission Directors and/or State and local authorities, they should refer all issues with DOD- or USG-level policy or resource implications through the JS to OSD for decision. Combatant command representatives who encounter these sorts of issues during routine plans coordination and information passing will not pursue them without guidance from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)).This will ensure that the appropriate DOS bureaus are involved.

h. **Chief of Mission.** The Chief of Mission (COM), typically the Ambassador, is the principal officer in charge of U.S. diplomatic missions and U.S. offices abroad, which the Secretary of State has designated as diplomatic in nature. As statutorily mandated, the COM directs and supervises all activities in country and coordinates the resources and programs of the USG through the Country Team with the exception of employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander, and other exceptions consistent with existing statutes and authorities.

i. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review reaffirms that the COM is both empowered and held accountable for directing and coordinating coherent, comprehensive bilateral engagement that harnesses the work of all USG actors in-country.

j. Joint force planners may have to wrestle with the organizational dynamics of the COM's relationship to the DOS and the executive branch. The Ambassador's response to a crisis will depend upon the countries in question, the crisis in question, and events in the rest of the affected region and around the world at the time. Ambassadors routinely coordinate with the assistant secretaries responsible for State Department regional bureaus, under the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The State Department organizational structure and functional execution of foreign policy in effect constrains the Ambassadors' actions in many dimensions and links him or her to career foreign policy experts in Washington, DC. SFA planners should understand the operational environment and interaction between the Country Ambassador and the regional bureaus.

k. In addition to the COM and his regional bureau, DOS's Functional Bureaus also bears consideration, as the preponderance of State Department effort at the senior levels goes to functional rather than regional concerns.

l. Conflicts between DOD and Ambassador's objectives occasionally arise. The joint force planner must remember that disputes between the joint force commander and the Ambassador should be elevated to and resolved by the secretaries of State and Defense.

m. **U.S. Embassy Country Team.** The Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at each U.S. embassy head the team of USG personnel, collectively known as the "Country Team." DOS members of the team, in addition to the Ambassador and the DCM, are heads of the Political, Economic, Administrative, Consular, and Security sections of the embassy. The remainder of the team encompasses the senior representatives of each of the other USG agencies present at the embassy. A country team's organization is dependent on embassy size and the nature of U.S. interests in a country, with some including over forty agencies. **Exhibit 13** notionally depicts a country team.

Exhibit 13. Country Team



Each country team handles the following issues:

(1) **Commercial, Resource and Financial Issues.** Department of Commerce (DOC) commercial officers advise U.S. businesses on local trade and tariff laws, government procurement procedures, and business practices; identify potential importers, agents, distributors, and joint venture partners; and assist with resolution of trade and investment disputes. DOC resource officers counsel U.S. businesses on issues of natural resources — including minerals, oil, and gas and energy— and analyze and report on local natural resource trends and trade policies and their potential impact on U.S. interests. DOC financial attaches analyze and report on major financial developments as well as the host country's macro-economic condition.

(2) **Defense Issues.** Defense attaches from DOD analyze and liaison with military forces of the host government on behalf of the United States and U.S. defense industry. These include security assistance officers (SAOs), who are responsible for Defense Cooperation in Armaments and foreign military sales. DOS political officers also analyze and liaison with their foreign ministry counterparts on military issues. Depending on the size of the embassy, officers may serve multiple roles. As an example, the SAO may also serve as the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO). Within the embassy, there may be several military offices. The Defense Attaché Office provides military advice to the Ambassador, and collects information on and liaises with the host country military. A separate office, such as the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), Military Assistance Advisory Mission, or Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), typically handles military assistance and training.

(3) **Agricultural Matters.** Department of Agriculture (USDA) agricultural officers promote the export of U.S. agricultural products and report on agricultural production and market developments in their area. USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officers are responsible for animal and plant health issues that affect U.S. trade and the protection of U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases. They also expedite U.S. exports affected by technical sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.

(4) **Legal and Immigration Matters.** Legal attachés, primarily Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, serve as Department of Justice (DOJ) representatives on criminal matters such as extradition of fugitives and coordination of criminal justice matters. Immigration and Naturalization officers are responsible for administering the laws regulating the admission of foreign-born persons (aliens) to the United States and for administering various immigration benefits.

(5) **Developmental and Humanitarian Aid Matters.** USAID mission directors are responsible for USAID Programs including dollar and local currency loans, grants, and technical assistance. USAID also provides humanitarian assistance abroad during times of natural or man-made disasters.

n. **Geographic Combatant Commander.** The authority of the combatant commanders is established in Chapter 6 of Title 10 (10 United States Code (USC) §161-168). The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands and establishes their geographic AOR. Accordingly the geographic combatant commander is the U.S. military representative to international and U.S. national agencies and is the single point of contact for military matters within the AOR. He or she is responsible for planning, conducting, and assessing SC activities; and for planning and conducting military support to Stability, Support, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, as directed.

o. Planning by a GCC is contained in theater campaign plans. Depending on the preferences of the GCC, the theater campaign plans (TCP) can be subdivided into regional campaign plans and further into country campaign plans.

p. **Service Component Commands.** GCCs have a service component command from each of the armed services. The service component commands provides service specific support and activity proposals and assists the GCC with service-specific forces/equipment/resources that are available in the

proper timeframe. Component commands also interact with parent Services or units to inform and influence training and preparation of forces to conduct specific missions. Synchronization between GCC requirements and SCC resources is critical in meeting GCC objectives and desired end-states. The SCC also has the responsibility to ensure their Title 10 role is both applicable and useful to all CCDRs.

q. Subordinate Unified Commands are commands that conduct a specific mission within the GCC's AOR, or provide support to a Functional Combatant Commander (FCC). Examples of GCC Subordinate Unified Commands include U.S. Forces, Afghanistan (USFOR-A), U.S. Forces, Iraq (USFOR-I) and U.S. Forces, Korea (USFOR-K). Examples of FCC Subordinate Unified Commands include the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Subordinate Unified Commands coordinate resource requirements and execute missions in support of the GCC TCP.

r. In cases where the SFA/SC effort is large-scale and enduring, the combatant commander may establish an additional subunified command, JTF, in a particular country or region. Examples include Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and the Combined Joint Task Force One (CJTF-1).

3. Security Force Assistance Guidance

a. General. SFA guidance begins at the national level through a series of documents, which aim to prioritize engagement efforts in accordance with national security objectives. The level and type of SFA activities that are required depend on that specific partner nation. The National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) drive DOD plans, as depicted in **Exhibit 14**, Strategy to Guidance to Plans.

Exhibit 14. Strategy to Guidance to Plans

a. The ***National Security Strategy*** (NSS) outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and the manner in which the Executive Branch plans to deal with them. The document is purposely general in content and its implementation relies on elaborating guidance provided in supporting documents (such as the NDS, GEF, and NMS). Joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs can derive the broad overarching U.S. policy from the NSS, but must check other DOD and military sources for refined guidance. Other strategic documents may supersede the NSS, even though the NSS is an annual requirement and typically not updated for several years at a time.

b. **Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).** Published every four years as mandated by legislation, the Quadrennial Defense Review provides guidance to focus DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces on operations of today and tomorrow.

c. The ***National Defense Strategy*** (NDS) serves as DOD's capstone strategic document. It flows from the NSS, informs the NMS, and provides the foundation for building the legislatively mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which focuses DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces on operations of today and tomorrow. The NDS addresses how the Armed Forces will fight and win America's wars and describes how DOD will support the objectives outlined in the NSS. It also provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance, specifically on deliberate planning, force development, and intelligence.

d. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides strategic direction to the military through the ***National Military Strategy*** (NMS) on how the Joint Force should align the military ends, way, means, and risks consistent with the national interests and goals established in the QDR and the NDS. Reviewed annually (updates issued as needed), the NMS identifies trends in the strategic environment, explains how the military will address them, and articulates regional and functional capability priorities.

e. The ***Guidance for Employment of the Force*** (GEF) provides two-year direction to combatant commanders for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. Through the GEF, the Secretary of Defense translates the strategic priorities set in the NSS, NDS, and QDR into implementable direction for operational activities. The GEF consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching guidance document.

f. The ***Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*** (JSCP) is the primary vehicle through which the CJCS exercises responsibility for directing the preparation of joint plans. The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance and direction to Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, combat support agencies (CSAs), and applicable defense agencies for preparation of contingency plans, campaign plans, and campaign support plans based on current military capabilities. It serves as the link between strategic guidance provided in the GEF and the joint operation planning activities and products that accomplish that guidance. In addition to communicating to the combatant commands specific planning guidance necessary for deliberate planning, the JSCP also translates strategic policy end states from the GEF into military campaign and contingency plan guidance for Combatant Commanders and expands guidance to include global defense posture, security cooperation, and other steady-state activities. The JSCP is described in detail in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01G, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2008*.

g. **Theater Strategy.** Using national strategy as a guide, GCCs develop a theater strategy focused on achieving specified ends for their theaters. A theater strategy is a broad statement of the commander's long-term vision for his area of responsibility. It is the bridge between national strategic guidance and the joint operation planning required to achieve national and regional objectives. Specifically, it links combatant command activities, operations and resources to USG policy and strategic guidance.

h. The theater strategy should describe the regional end state, ways, and means to achieve it. There is no prescribed format for a theater strategy, although it may include the commander's vision, mission, challenges, trends, assumptions, objectives, and resources. GCCs employ theater strategy to align and focus efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies in their area of responsibility and support and advance U.S. interests. Theater strategies typically employ military and regional engagement, close cooperation with DOS, embassies, and other federal agencies as ways to achieve theater objectives. The means or resources available to support the accomplishment of designated end states inform the theater strategy. GCCs publish the theater strategy to provide guidance to subordinates and supporting commands/agencies and improve coordination with other federal agencies and regional partners. Campaign plans outline the detailed execution of the theater strategy.

KEY TERM: *A **theater strategy*** is an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. (JP-1.02)

i. **Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs).** TCPs operationalize GCC theater strategies by integrating all its directed steady state (actual) and contingency (potential) operations and activities comprehensively and coherently. Campaign plans are developed within the context of existing U.S. national security and foreign policies and are the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing SC activities and routine military operations, integrating their posture and contingency plans, and synchronizing these DOD plans and activities with U.S. development and diplomatic efforts. Campaign plans are designed to achieve prioritized strategic end states and serve as the integrating framework that informs and synchronizes all subordinate and supporting plans and operations.

j. Combatant commanders pursue strategic end states by continuously implementing and executing their campaign plans through their numerous security cooperation activities and other military activities. While the campaign plans are mainly focused on the application of military power, the combatant command must integrate all elements of national power – and perhaps elements of power from other actors outside the U.S. Government – to achieve military objectives. When unable to harness adequate resources to support the activities contained in the campaign, commanders must make difficult decisions on resource allocation, which may not match the priorities of other USG departments and agencies operating in the same region.

k. **Hierarchy of DOD Plans. Exhibit 15** is a graphical depiction of the hierarchy of plans. Implemented through the theater campaign plan, the Commander's vision, theater objectives, priorities, and strategic approach informs the regional campaign plans. Country campaign plans inform and are informed by the appropriate regional campaign plan and contains steady state engagement programs, activities, and tasks. Each plan is part of a series of strategies and plans that cover differing functions, levels, and degrees of detail, all stemming from national strategic guidance.

(1) **KEY DOCUMENT:** CJCSI 3141.01D, *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans*, governs the formal review and approval process for campaign plans and Level 1–4 plans.

l. **Country Campaign Plans (CCPs).** CCPs, which are typically annexes to a theater campaign plan, link GCC goals and objectives for a particular country to military activities and resources. The structure, contents, and review of country campaign plans are at the discretion of each GCC and are developed by the Command's in-country representative — usually the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) or its equivalent — or the country desk officers at GCC headquarters, or both. Currently, country plans are in the process of maturing to meet the needs of each Combatant Commander's theater strategy.

(2) **KEY TERM: Country campaign plan** is the generic term for country-specific plans. It is also known as Country Work Plan (U.S. Africa Command [USAFRICOM]), Country Security Cooperation Plan (U.S. Central Command [USCENTCOM]), Country Cooperation Plan (U.S. European

Exhibit 15. Hierarchy of DOD Plans



Command [USEUCOM]), Country Plan (U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM]), and Country Campaign Plan (U.S. Southern Command [USSOUTHCOM]). For the purposes of this publication, country-specific plans will be referred to as country campaign plan (CCP).

m. **Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP).** At the country level, the Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) developed by the embassy's interagency country team, is the primary planning document for the Department of State. The MSRP is the primary planning document within the USG that defines U.S. national interests in a foreign country and coordinates performance measurement in that country among USG agencies.

n. The MSRP creates a framework for all federal agencies, including DOD, to define priorities, to articulate the goals and objectives of their programs, and to relate program accomplishments to agency-specific and government-wide strategic goals. MSRPs must reflect the embassy's program to support the DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Strategic Plan. Once approved by the Ambassador, the MSRP is sent to Washington for interagency review. For countries that receive appropriated foreign aid, including security assistance (SA) through such vehicles as the foreign military financing program (FMFP), Economic Support Fund (ESF), and international military education and training (IMET), the MSRP also acts as the conduit to transmit that request to DOS.

o. The MSRP focuses on out-year diplomatic and assistance planning. For each country that

receives U.S. foreign assistance, the new Mission Operational Plan compliments the MSRP, which ensures that all foreign assistance resources are coordinated, appropriately linked to foreign policy objectives, and supportive of an integrated country strategy.

p. **USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS).** A CDCS is a five-year strategy (although it may be shorter for countries in transition) that focuses on USAID-implemented assistance and related USG non-assistance tools. USAID Missions work closely with host country governments and citizens, civil society organizations, the private sector, multi-lateral organizations, other donors, the State Department, and other USG agencies to develop a CDCS that: supports U.S. foreign policy priorities; ensures strategic alignment with host country development priorities and promotes mutual accountability.

4. Relationship between Campaign Plan End States, Objectives, Effects, and Tasks

a. Similar to how DOD plans nest within one another, the goals and objectives contained in these plans are hierarchical. The Strategic End States drive the Military End States and Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO) contained in the TCP, which in turn drive the regional and country-level objectives and tasks that are components of combatant commander plans. Measured for their effectiveness and performance, activities conducted within a country should contribute to the achievement of country-level objectives.

b. It is important to remember that in country-level objectives drive country-level plans, which in turn, support regional and theater objectives. Tendencies to directly link tasks at the country level to effects, objectives, and military end state at the operational level – without first linking them to country-level objectives and mission – may create problems. During the Vietnam War, for example, number of enemy killed was an adequate metric at the tactical level, but was wholly inaccurate in measuring the progress of the war. Furthermore, the attention of senior military and civilian leaders on this tactical metric produced a variety of unintended consequences. For example, subordinate commanders of one division allegedly had to meet body count quotas, which beg the question whether the division's operations were designed to maximize kills at the expense of more important, long-term goals.

c. The partner nation must develop and maintain an integrated approach to facing threats to its security, balanced against its national resources and capabilities. Only when this approach is reasonably defined and specific can the United States bring to bear its security cooperation and SFA programs to have the greatest impact on the partner nation's national security.

d. Many countries publish an unclassified version of their defense plans or procurement strategies on Internet sites such as the Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN). Reviewing a country's plans with the partner nation as the GCC level plans are developed ensures United States and partner nation goals are in harmony.

e. Development of a Country Plan (or in some cases a Regional Plan) for SFA activities should include specific elements. The purpose of SFA is to build capability and capacity within FSF and their supporting institutions. Therefore, the plan must begin by clearly stating what capability the host nation (HN) security force requires at a given future time horizon. The recommended time horizon for these capability/capacity end states is five years or more to align with resource planning. Always state desired capability in real terms: Country X requires a riverine force able to patrol and control illicit shipping traffic along 200 miles of Y River continuously, 24/7/365. This specific capability statement provides inherent measures against which assessments can be made.

f. The next step in the Country Plan should be an assessment of the HN current capability to meet that specific desired capability end state. This is not necessarily a formal assessment as result of inspections, visits, examinations, tests, or exercises, though all those techniques may well contribute to the assessment. In many cases, however, this may be limited to subjective inputs from U.S. Military members familiar with the HN, such as security cooperation officers (SCOs) and defense attachés

(DATTs), as well as allied counterparts. An example might be the current riverine patrol capability is limited to no more than 50 miles of river at any given time and can only be conducted for 30 days before ceasing all operations for refit and maintenance.

g. Comparison of the specific future capability end state with the assessment of current capability will result in a capability gap analysis. In other words, the Country/Regional planner will be able to propose a series of graduated, progressive SFA activities that should move the current capability toward the desired end state over the appropriate time horizon. This will result in a program of activities and milestones (POA&M) that can include periodic intermediate objectives. These intermediate objectives can also serve as the basis for periodic progress reviews to determine whether SFA activities are achieving the desired effect and making satisfactory progress toward the specific capability end state. This periodic review supports the ability of the combatant commander (CCDR) to make GO/NO GO decisions of continuation of SFA activities or to reallocate SFA resources to address shortfalls.

h. Ideally, country campaign plans provide the roadmap of specific engagement activities that a JFC plans to conduct with the country in the coming one-to-three years. It should be used to provide guidance to service components and other DOD implementation planners and should inform – and be informed – by the U.S. Embassy's MSRP and by USAID's development strategy for the country.

i. **Country Campaign Plan.** Country campaign plans, which are typically annexes to a theater campaign plan, link GCC goals and objectives for a particular country to detailed list of military activities and resources. In theory, the country plans should establish the concepts by which GCC objectives for each country are to be achieved through integration of the many security assistance and security cooperation authorities and funding streams, which are often planned and executed in isolation from one another, as well as other activities such as exercises and ongoing operations. In reality, there is a good deal of work to bring the country plans up to a more integrated level. Currently, country plans are in the process of maturing to meet the needs of each Combatant Commander's theater strategy. The structure, contents, and review of country campaign plans are at the discretion of each GCC.

j. The command's in-country representative develops the country campaign plan – usually the SAO or its equivalent – or the country desk officers at GCC headquarters or both. In addition, it is not desired or necessary for a planner to develop a country campaign plan from scratch. While authorship of the country campaign plan currently resides with the J5 staff, it should include active participation by the other J-directorates, the Component Commands, and – to the maximum extent practical – the Country Team, other USG agencies, the host nation, and intergovernmental activities. Formalizing the contributions made by these other elements is a means of creating buy-in, as well as facilitating unity of effort.

k. **Target Audience.** The country campaign plan, as part of the theater campaign plan, provides guidance to various DOD elements who implement and support planned steady state activities. These elements include the geographic and functional combatant commanders and staff, Service components, and the security cooperation officer (SCO). Indeed, the SCO becomes the unofficial point man for the development and execution of most of the security cooperation portion in a country.

l. When initially developing, or updating the country campaign plan, joint force planners must keep the information needs of the target audience in mind and should ensure these needs are addressed appropriately. Employing the country campaign plan after its development determines what information it contains. Due diligence by planners is imperative ensure effective plans are generated. Each iteration of planning requires dedicated time and effort to each step of the process.

m. **Scope.** The primary purpose of a country campaign plan is to provide the roadmap of DOD steady state activities that the geographic combatant commander plans to conduct with a country in the coming one-to-three years. These activities include day-to-day presence missions, military-to-military exchanges, combined exercises, and normal increases in readiness during the season exercises of potential

adversaries. Typical steady state activities and operations include, but are not limited to, emergency preparedness; arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament; combating terrorism; DOD support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight; nation assistance; protection of shipping; show of force operations; support to insurgency; and counterinsurgency.

n. Subordinate unified commands and service component commands will prepare supporting plans to the GCC TCP. Depending on the GCC, these supporting plans may include a wrap-up of country-specific support to GCC Country Plans, or separate supporting plans developed for each Country Plan. Regardless, the component is responsible for developing the Service-specific activity proposals that meet the vision in the POA&M of the Country Plans. When the component develops its activity proposals, it will provide them to the GCC planners for review to ensure they meet the vision, intent, and objectives established by the GCC. The GCC then performs a detailed review of each proposed activity to identify the appropriate authority or authorities that enable that activity. Each identified authority is then reviewed for adequate levels of funding, as well as consideration of the timeline required to process the activity under the identified authority. Appendix A addresses a more detailed discussion of authorities.

o. Once the CCDR has accepted the proposed SFA activities, identified appropriate authorities, determined adequate appropriations are available under that authority, and determined that the associated timelines will fit the desired POA&M, the component then assists the CCDR by identifying Service-specific forces/equipment/resources that are available in the proper timeframe. When such resources are not available, the component assists in developing Requests for Forces and conducts liaison with parent Services to enable them to allocate and provide appropriate resources. Components may also interact with parent Services or units to inform and influence training and preparation of forces to conduct specific SFA missions. During deployment, execution, and redeployment, components will exercise Title 10 functions related to oversight, support, and command and control (C2) of SFA forces, as directed by the Combatant Command (COCOM) authority.

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

"[*Security Force Assistance] becomes a core competency for our force in the future, as part of our effort to prevent conflict. I think that we've made some dramatic and very successful adaptations at the tactical level...I think where we probably have room to grow and room to learn is in how we partner with institutions, how we accomplish what we formerly called security sector reform at ministerial level, because it's not simply enough to partner with inter-national partners at the tactical level; we have to ensure that they have the systems and the institutions that support them so they become viable partners into the future."*

General Dempsey
Nominee, Army Chief of Staff
Congressional Testimony
US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, March 2011

1. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Goals. The ultimate goal of SFA is to create foreign security forces (FSFs) that are competent, capable, committed, and confident and that have a security apparatus that supports U.S. policy; usually tied to regional stability. We may achieve regional security, in partnership with country *x*, by developing its ability to deter military aggression by its neighbors. Actions that provide country *x* with a defensive capability contribute to that goal, while creating an offensive capability may be counter-productive and actually destabilize the region. Foreign security forces must be:

(1) **Competent…**
  (a) Across all levels, ministerial to the individual soldier/police officer
  (b) Across all functions [Combat, Combat Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS), Institutional]

(2) **Capable and Sustainable…**
  (a) Appropriately sized and effective enough to accomplish missions
  (b) Sustainable over time
  (c) Resourced within partner nation (PN) capabilities

(3) **Committed…**
  (a) To security of all the people and survival of the state
  (b) To preservation of the liberties and human rights of the citizens
  (c) To peaceful transition of power

(4) **Confident…**
  (a) In themselves to secure the country
  (b) The citizens trust that the FSF will provide security and be professional
  (c) The PN government is confident they have the correct FSF
  (d) The international community believes the FSF is a force for good

2. SFA Imperatives. It is essential to consider basic SFA imperatives during planning. If practiced, these imperatives do not guarantee success; however, if ignored, they virtually guarantee failure.

a. **Understand the Operational Environment –** An in-depth understanding of the operational environment including the available friendly PN forces, the opposing threats, and especially the human geography aspects, is critical to planning and conducting effective SFA operations. Knowing all of the actors influencing the environment and their motivations will help SFA planners and practitioners define the goals and methods for developing PN security forces. It is equally important to understand the

regional players and transnational actors who may influence the security environment in order to prioritize and focus the SFA effort. There are a variety of processes/tools available, including areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) that can help frame the operational environment.

b. **Provide Effective Leadership –** Leadership, a critical aspect of any application of military combat power, is especially important in the inherently dynamic and complex environments associated with SFA. The SFA environment places a high premium on effective leadership at all levels, from the most junior noncommissioned officer (NCO) to the most senior general/flag officer or agency director. The leadership imperative is multifaceted. Leadership on both sides, coalition and PN, must fully comprehend the operational environment, and be prepared, engaged, and supportive in order for the SFA effort to succeed. Productively engaging the leadership on both sides requires extensive effort throughout the campaign.

c. **Build Legitimacy –** SFA develops security forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the PN population. This is done by developing FSF that are competent, capable, committed and confident, not only in the eyes of the United States/coalition and PN governments, but more critically, in the eyes of the PN population. This perceived legitimacy is a critical objective of SFA. SFA leaders, planners, and practitioners at all levels must consider how each operation affects popular perceptions and gear operations to build legitimacy of the PN government and security forces. While it is important to assist PN forces to develop professionally, a mirror image U.S. model may not be the optimum solution for organizing security forces.

d. **Manage Information –** Managing information encompasses the collection, analysis, management, application, and preparation of information both from an information operations perspective as well as in ways internal to the SFA operation, like lessons learned integration. Effective management of information is a powerful enabler in the complex and dynamic environment typical of SFA operations, and requires synchronization between the SFA effort and the overall campaign. This sets the conditions for success and may serve to mitigate the ability of destabilizing influences to propagandize SFA efforts and potentially damage the PN government.

e. **Ensure Unity of Effort and Purpose –** The SFA effort includes U.S., coalition, and PN forces. Effective command relationships warrant special consideration. Unity of command is preferable, but often impractical. Unity of effort and purpose however, are imperative. SFA command and/or control relationships may range from very simple to very complex and military commanders may answer to non-military personnel such as an Ambassador or a special appointee. Whatever the relationship is, clear delineation and understanding of command lines and control lines is essential. Additionally, it is often advisable to establish coordinating boards and/or centers to ensure unity of purpose and effort among the coalition and the PN to ensure operations are synchronized and contributing to the overall effort.

f. **Sustainability –** Sustainability consists of two major components: the ability of the United States / coalition to sustain the SFA effort throughout the campaign, and ultimately, the ability of PN security forces to sustain their operations independently. Often, the first component is predicated on maintaining legitimacy; while the second component is something that must be considered holistically as we work the PN to build their security forces. It is important to consider the culture, infrastructure, and education level of prospective partners when fielding weapons systems and organizations.

3. Functional Considerations in PN Security Force Development

a. **Functional Areas.** SFA capabilities reside in the U.S. Force's ability to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) three broad functional areas of partner security forces. These functional areas include executive, generating, and operating force functions. The executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight, policy, and resources for the PN security force operating and generating force functions. Partner nation generating forces equate to elements that support

force generation and capability development, of the operating force, through Title 10 like functions of recruit, organize, train, equip, and build. Partner nation operating forces form operational capabilities through use of concepts similar to U.S. Joint Functions to achieve PN security objectives. Of note, generating and operating forces have some overlap in terms of requirements and responsibilities.

b. While few FSF will organize themselves in exactly the same way we do, all FSF have organizations and forces that fulfill the functions of executive direction, the generating force and the operating force. In many FSF, the same organization tasked with executive direction will fulfill functions in the operational force as operational and tactical headquarters (HQs); and operating forces will be organized to fulfill the organization's generating requirements. The SFA planner requires some knowledge of how both their own executive direction, operating forces, and generating forces work in order to recognize what SFA capabilities are required to conduct those SFA tasks that will support development of specific FSF capabilities. **Exhibit 16** provides an example of how we *could* overlay our forces on a PN's in order to ensure we provide a holistic ability to build a FSF.

Exhibit 16. Overlaying U.S. Functions on Partner Nation Functions



c. **Executive Direction.** All security forces apply some level of executive direction, which empowers a generating and an employing or operating function. Those activities direct, develop national policy for, and resource the FSF. Executive direction justifies, authorizes, and directs the parameters for generating and employing FSFs. Basic Executive direction functions include advising political leadership, developing and implementing policy, conducting strategic planning, assessing readiness, conducting current and future capability review and analysis, and forecasting and budgeting current and future requirements.

d. **Generating Forces.** Those SFA capabilities required to develop the generating force of a FSF logically reside in U.S. generating forces. These are the capabilities necessary, for the FSF, to fulfill Title 10-like requirements such as recruit, organize, train, equip and rebuild/build. These SFA capabilities also include:

(1) The development of current and future force concepts and doctrine

(2) The design of organizations to meet operational requirements

(3) Capability Development and Integration

(4) Materiel requirements

(5) Leader development needs and education

(6) Personnel policies

(7) Experimentation, research, and systems analysis

(8) Force development, policy

(9) Budgeting and resourcing

(10) Installation management and the building and maintaining of facilities and infrastructure

(11) Other functional area expertise that is designed to support development of capabilities in the operating force

Ideally, U.S. generating force would lead the SFA effort to develop FSF capability and capacity in their generating force; however, that often proves impractical as we optimize our generating force to provide that capability for the U.S. Military and often does not have excess capacity and personnel to conduct this in support of FSF. As discussed in the operating force paragraph above, U.S. operating force units often assume this mission. The U.S. joint operating force can mitigate risks in this particular aspect of SFA by developing generating force like capabilities or enablers in a respective U.S. operating force unit through augmentation, training, and education.

e. **Operating Forces**

(1) U.S. operational forces employ capabilities through application of the joint functions to complete tasks and achieve assigned objectives. Those operating forces have limited capability to train and sustain (generating force capabilities) themselves as it relates to their operational role. As such, operating forces have some inherent SFA capabilities to support development of like capabilities in others. This means U.S. operating forces are more suited to develop FSF operating forces or operational capabilities than they are to developing FSF generating forces of generating capabilities.

(2) This does not mean the pairing of U.S. operating forces with FSF operating forces is a one to one match but where specific FSF requirements drive U.S. operating force capabilities and alignment to the FSF. Understanding these differences to include for example, issues in military culture such as the roles of officers and NCOs, or the use and availability of military technologies, will help planners better understand which SFA Capabilities are most applicable. Further, understanding that using an operational force to conduct SFA employs it in a different role, one that more closely resembles that of the generating force developing capabilities for a force other than its own.

(3) Employing operational forces to fill the SFA capabilities associated with developing the FSF's generating force (FSF tasks such as "*develop FSF doctrine*" or "*stand up a staff officer's college*"), and possibly in the FSF's executive direction (e.g. ministries) would likely be beyond the inherent capability of the operating force, and would require special training and augmentation.

4. Foreign Security Force (FSF) Development Framework

a. General. Developmental tasks of OTERA serve as SFA capability areas and are functional in nature. Think of each element of OTERA as a tool to develop, change, or improve the capability and / or capacity in a FSF. By assessing the FSF and looking at the FSF through the lens of U.S. interest and objectives, we can determine which area or areas within the OTERA construct to use to get the FSF to the proper capability and capacity level. In essence, we conduct assessments of the FSF against a particular

set of capabilities quantities we would like the FSF to possess, and then develop an OTERA-based plan to get the FSF to that level.

(1) **Organize –** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit/organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting / manning.

(2) **Train –** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.

(3) **Equip –** All activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This may include new equipment fielding, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization.

(4) **Rebuild / Build –** All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

(5) **Advise –** All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSFs while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit/organization. Advising will occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.

5. General Theater Planning Considerations

a. **General.** Training FSF and building supporting PN institutions in the midst of insurgency and/or major combat operations has proven to be a difficult challenge for the U.S. Military and its interagency and coalition partners. While SFA is not always conducted in a threat environment, the inherent cultural, political, leadership and other complexities associated with *any* SFA mission still demand careful and deliberate attention from SFA planners. SFA operations must be a critical part of planning from the very beginning for every phase of a campaign, and not an afterthought for the transition, stability or reconstruction period following combat operations. Early planning should involve joint and interagency planning teams to marshal and focus the vast capabilities of the United States and bring to bear the full capabilities of the nation and its allies.

(1) **Phases 0 and 1 –** Execution of relevant SFA activities in phases 0 and 1 provides PNs the organic capability to manage destabilizing events and provide an existing, effective PN security force for U.S. and coalition forces (CFs) to partner with in the event that outside intervention is required to reestablish stability.

(2) **Phases 2 and 3 –** Execution of relevant SFA activities in phases 2 and 3 provides PNs the support they need to continue to fight, and ensures PNs' ownership for the defense of their country.

(3) **Phase 4 –** Execution of relevant SFA activities in phase 4 prepares the PN to assume full responsibility for internal and external security. Phase 4 SFA activities generally focus on building the essential capabilities and capacities in PNs security force for transition to phase 5.

(4) **Phase 5 –** In phase 5 the PN government is conducting security operations with minimal direct U.S. assistance, and is continuing to work with the United States through normal DOS and DOD channels to access U.S. security assistance programs. The focal point for phase 5 SFA activities is normally an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), or a Security Assistance Office (SAO).

b. **Methodology – Ends, Ways, Means.** Grand Strategy is the purposeful employment by the USG of all instruments of power; Ends are the desired strategic outcomes or end states; Ways are the methods, tactics, and procedures used to achieve the ends; and Means are the resources required to achieve the

ends, such as troops, weapons systems, money, political will, and time. All strategies are subject to risk; which is usually most closely associated with the means allocated against the particular way.

c. Model interactions: WAYS + MEANS → ENDS; as such, the model is really an equation that balances what you want (ENDS) with what you are willing and able to pay for it (MEANS) and what tactics you can or are able to employ to get what you want (WAYS). Another way to look at this construct is to liken end-ways-means with the legs of a stool, with the strategy itself being the seat of the stool. The legs must balance for the strategy to be effective and to have a decent chance for success. The ENDs must be reasonable given the MEANs and WAYs available. **Exhibit 17** depicts a model for SFA activities.

Exhibit 17. Security Force Assistance Activities



d. **SFA Elements.** The elements of a SFA mission are force generation, employment, sustainment, and transition. These elements serve to identify and synchronize the DOD and interagency actions with PN efforts to achieve the desired campaign objectives for SFA. **Exhibit 18** illustrates a logical breakdown of the major SFA actions within mission elements required to achieve the commander's objectives. Integrated in the SFA elements are the OTERA tasks. The task to advise the PN FSF, identified in OTERA, occurs throughout all LOEs to support the SFA plan.

Exhibit 18. SFA Elements



(1) **Force Generation –** SFA actions to generate the desired security force include authority to generate the force and the actions required to recruit, equip, train, and provide command and control over the force.

(2) **Force Employment –** The force employment LOE pertains to how the force is used. It includes the process for transitioning forces from initial operational capability (IOC) through final operational capability (FOC) as well as the actual processes that are required to employ a force. A good lens to look at the processes required to employ a force through are the operational functions – maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and force protection.

(3) **Sustainment –** The sustainment LOE pertains to establishing the overarching institutional capability to maintain the entire force. It includes such things as establishing and maintaining infrastructure, force modernization, professional schools, budgeting, and materiel acquisition.

(4) **Transition –** Plans must set the conditions for successful independent operations by the FSF. By thinking through transitions at the outset of planning, we better prepare PNs to assume full responsibility for their own security.

6. Security Force Assistance Assessment

a. **Nesting FSF Assessments at Echelon.** The need to assess the FSF and its functional components should precede development in order to verify FSF capability gaps; assessment continues throughout FSF development to determine if developmental efforts are effective. FSF organizational assessments should categorize which organizations fulfill FSF executive direction, generating force, or operating force roles and functions. It is imperative to assess these organizations in the context of one another. The measure of

success for the generating forces is how well the operating forces achieve their objectives, while in order for the generating force to serve its purpose the operating forces must communicate their requirements back to the generating forces. Assessments should include FSF generating and operating functions within context of the executive direction function; for each, provides insight as to the will and capability of the FSF to generate, employ, and sustain itself.

b. Echelon conducts assessments. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) initially conducts strategic assessments in coordination with the country team to determine what overarching gaps in capability or capacity need addressing within the context of U.S. country and regional interests, objectives, and goals. This strategic assessment forms the basis for the SFA plan and for future, more detailed assessments at the ministerial, operational, and tactical levels. This process helps to ensure nesting of SFA activities within the larger context of U.S. strategic interests.

c. **A process for FSF Assessment Workflow.** Before assessing the FSF, understanding the requirements of the FSF is essential. This assessment axiom holds true at all echelons. For example, when assessing a typical FSF infantry company, different things will be looked at if the basic requirements of the FSF infantry companies consist of independent light infantry operations than if the requirements include complex, combined arms, airborne infantry operations as part of an airborne infantry battalion. Following an understanding of requirements, the FSF assessment takes place in terms of the tasks required of the FSF, the conditions the FSF will operate under, and the minimum standards required for achieving successful outcomes.

d. The FSF assessment enables the SFA organization to establish the right developmental objectives. Individual unit specific FSF assessments allow for the alignment of feasible developmental tasks; collectively, the comprehensive FSF assessment provides a thorough understanding of the FSF and presents a baseline in FSF capability requirements within the context of the operational environment. The FSF assessment – task flow consists of five (5) steps. **Exhibit 19** illustrates the workflow of the FSF assessment.

Exhibit 19. Foreign Security Force Assessment [workflow]



e. Continuous application of the FSF assessment provides measurable feedback in the developmental progress for a specific FSF and collectively across the FSF. It answers what a FSF is currently doing and how well it is currently doing it. In parallel, it identifies what the FSF must do and how well it must be able to do it, and what factors are impeding the FSF from accomplishing its objectives.

f. Planners and Advisors can apply this FSF assessment workflow methodology as a primary developmental tool in day-to-day activities as well as broader campaign development to synchronize development objectives of foreign security generating and operating forces. Further, when standardized amongst SFA organizations, the FSF assessment provides a collective understanding of trends and progress across the FSF.

CHAPTER V

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF U.S. PERSONNEL FOR SFA

"You can surge troops and equipment, but you can't surge trust. That has to be earned."

MajGen Larry Nicholson, Garmsir, Afghanistan, 2009

1. General

a. **Planning, Preparation, and Employment.** The combatant commander must determine the requirements for a given SFA mission in terms of the overall capabilities required of the unit or personnel who will perform SFA. In accordance with their Title-10 responsibilities, Services providing the forces for deployment must ensure the adequate preparation of individuals and units comprising the force for employment by the CCDR in the execution of the SFA mission. The decisive point of any SFA mission may very well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for deployment.

b. **Definition of the Term *Advisor*.** For the purposes of brevity and clarity, this text refers to all personnel who perform SFA tasks as "advisors." The five categories of SFA tasks include *organize, train, equip, rebuild/build,* and *advise* (OTERA). While personnel who perform SFA tasks could be classified as generalists or specialists in one or more of the SFA tasks, this text will employ the term "advisor" to refer to anyone directly participating in any SFA mission.

2. Considerations for SFA Selection, Education, and Training.

a. **Selection of Advisors.** Depending on the nature of the SFA mission, COCOM-level planners must clearly identify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes that the advisors must possess in order to successfully accomplish the designated OTERA tasks. Rigorous vetting and selection of advisor personnel by the Services is critical to ensuring that those personnel directly engaged in SFA possess not only the required knowledge, skills, and abilities, but also the right temperament and attitude required to work closely with foreign military personnel, often for extended periods without respite.

(1) Identification of personnel with the required technical or functional skills is the critical first step in forming advisor teams, or selecting individual augments for SFA missions. For example, if the mission requires a physician to advise FSF doctors on trauma medicine, the supporting Service cannot fulfill the requirement by sending a physician's assistant (PA) or a nurse. Likewise, if the requirement is to form, train, and equip a team to advise an FSF artillery battalion, the team as a whole must have the collective capabilities required to develop the FSF along all lines of doctrine, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) appropriate for that type of unit and echelon of command. Additionally, the senior members of the team must meet the rank and grade requirements identified by the CCDR in order to build rapport and a healthy dynamic between the advisors and the FSF artillery battalion commander and his staff.

(2) As discussed in Chapter IV, the SFA tasks will take place in the executive direction, generating force, and operating force categories of the FSF. As such, personnel or teams designated to advise the FSF must have the requisite expertise to advise their counterparts within those categories. The supporting Services must ensure the training and educating on all requisite force generation functions required for the SFA mission of personnel sourced to advise FSF generating forces. The trend for the Services to draw a vast majority of its advisor personnel from the operating forces complicates requirements where tactical expertise does not equate to institutional-level competence.

(3) Often, selection of the right personnel for the SFA mission implies a de-selection of the wrong personnel. A significant percentage of U.S. Military personnel demonstrate exceptional professional merit; they are competent, courageous, and dedicated to the profession of arms. However,

not all of these personnel have many of the personal traits that make an effective advisor: empathy; the ability to work through FSF counterparts; patience; the ability to generate influence without formal authority; and the ability to work "within shades of gray." No matter how competent they are in their branch or military occupational specialty (MOS), avoid selecting personnel who cannot adopt these principles, as well as personnel who do not show a genuine interest in other people irrespective of cultural differences.

b. **SFA Skills Integration into Professional Military Education (PME).** Formal PME, from basic Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) schools to the Senior Service College levels should integrate SFA skills into their curricula. By educating leaders at all levels in SFA skills appropriate for their rank and level of responsibility, the Services can enhance the baseline of SFA knowledge among all Servicemen and women, which will improve the effectiveness of mission-specific SFA training, while reducing the length of time required for SFA pre-deployment training programs.

c. **Tracking of Individual and Collective SFA Skills.** The selection process for advisors is made much more efficient and streamlined if the Services and other USG agencies identify, track, manage, and certify individuals who possess all or a portion of the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes required to perform SFA tasks. Department of Defense Directive 5160.41E makes the Defense Language Program (DLP) responsible for the "Management of Regional and Language Capabilities." Leveraging the DLP and Service-level language, culture, and advisor skills databases when selecting personnel for advisor duty can significantly improve SFA mission performance, while potentially reducing the amount of time and resources required to train advisors.

3. Building-Block Approach to SFA Selection and Training. **Exhibit 21** illustrates a building-block approach to SFA selection and training. The logic of this approach assumes that technical or tactical competence in a given field, coupled with the professional values of integrity, duty, selfless service, loyalty, respect, honor, and courage, form the bedrock foundation of this Nation's military, and make it worthy of emulation. The apex of the pyramid in **Exhibit 21** represents the advisor's leadership and organizational competence that again makes the advisor a personal example of the capabilities and attributes his or her FSF counterparts seek to develop. From the foundation to the apex lies a continuum of selection and training. Personnel are selected based upon their values and technical competence, and those attributes are refined through training and education to prepare the advisor for his or her specific set of duties in a particular time and place.

Profession.
"the development of formal qualifications based upon education, apprenticeship, and examinations, the emergence of regulatory bodies with powers to admit and discipline members, and some degree of monopoly rights."

Bullock and Trombley,
The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought

a. **Military or Corporate Professionalism.** In the context of SFA, advisors represent the Armed Forces of the United States or their respective USG agencies, and should behave in a manner that reflects the highest standards of professionalism. "Formal qualifications based upon education…" implies that the advisor demonstrate a level of competence that meets or exceeds a set of established standards, such as those established by the Services or USG agencies. The United States' status as a world leader in technology, the rule of law, economic power, and military might confers upon the individual advisor a level of prestige that is theirs to lose the moment they begin interacting with their counterparts. Military or corporate professionalism is the foundational attribute that qualifies military personnel or members of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) to advise their FSF counterparts.

b. **Technical or Functional Expertise.** As stated above in Paragraph 2.a, the CCDRs will determine the requirements for individuals assigned to SFA duty based upon rank, military occupational specialty

(MOS), and other technical or functional qualifications. In rare instances, Services do not formerly codify or track certain qualifications, but in most cases, specific MOS codes or skill identifiers define the technical or functional requirements for a specific job. In certain circumstances, the combatant commander may have a requirement for an advisor to perform a duty for which there is no United States equivalent, such as an Mi-17 instructor pilot. In such cases, the Services may have to select a candidate advisor based upon prior experience and exceptional performance, and then re-train him or her in the specific technical qualifications for the job. However, the Services' respective advisor training programs cannot be the venue for technical or functional training. Selection criteria for SFA duty should normally include technical or functional expertise.

Exhibit 20. Building Block Approach to SFA Selection and Training



c. **Advise and Influence Skills.** If technical or functional expertise represents the "science" of SFA, then human influence skills represent the "art" of SFA. However, there are ample scientific research papers and peer-reviewed studies that suggest that some individuals are innately savvy in building rapport and generating influence, while others are not.

(1) The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and The Attentional and Interpersonal Style (TAIS) inventory are just two examples of personality assessment tools to identify personnel who might be better suited for SFA duties.

(2) Take into consideration personal preferences when selecting personnel for SFA duties. Those who volunteer to be advisors often do so because they thrive in the SFA environment, and do not have a rigid "black-white" view of the operating environment.

(3) Human influence techniques must be an integral component of any advisor training program. Myriad studies on power and influence in the fields of leadership and management have yielded a distillation of power and authority into five general forms: *legitimate authority, reward authority, coercive authority, referent authority, and expert authority*.

(a) Legitimate authority derives from rank or position. Since FSF personnel are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and since the United States generally conducts SFA at the invitation of a sovereign state, the advisor will have a very limited ability to influence his or her FSF counterparts through legitimate authority.

(b) Reward authority is the ability to reinforce desired behavior in others through rewards. Since the specific parameters for material assistance to the FSF are established by specific funding sources and authorities, the ability to reward FSF counterparts is usually limited to praise and approbation. The ability to leverage an approving nod to one's counterpart in order to induce a desired behavior can be considered a high art, but one that can be trained and cultivated in the advisor.

(c) Coercive authority is the ability to induce desired behavior through overt or implied threats of negative consequences. Coercion may occasionally induce compliance, but never commitment from one's FSF counterparts. Never use threats of force or violence against one's FSF counterparts. Threatening behavior against one's counterparts will usually result in anything from poor FSF performance to consequences for the advisor under the UCMJ. This behavior could also trigger violence against the advisor at the hands of FSF personnel (sometimes referred to as the "insider threat").

(d) Referent authority is the power of charisma. Some people just seem to have charismatic, attractive personalities, while others seem less so. Attempting to cultivate charisma within oneself may seem difficult or futile. However, there are steps advisors can take to make themselves more likeable to their counterparts. Start by making a serious effort to learn and speak the FSF's native language, even just a few words, phrases, and informal pleasantries. Even more important, every advisor is capable of reading up on the local culture as practiced by the FSF, and showing sincere respect for their customs, traditions, and mores. Demonstrating sincere gestures of respect toward the FSF is the best way to enhance one's referent authority.

(e) Expert authority is the advisor's best strategy for generating influence over his or her FSF counterparts. People take comfort in knowing that they are receiving guidance from someone who truly knows what they are doing. Furthermore, the advisor's tool-kit with respect to reward and coercive authority is usually very limited, while the limits of the advisor's ambition, work ethic, and natural abilities define the advisor's ability to cultivate expert authority.

(4) Enabling skills are those human influence skills that set the conditions for mission success while dealing with FSF counterparts and local nationals. Examples of enabling skills include rapport building, influencing, and negotiating.

(a) *By, With, and Through* – the ultimate goal is the develop FSF to conduct independent operations as a legitimate part of the host nation government.

(b) *Empathy Leads to Understanding* – While the advisor may or may not agree with them, he or she must be able to identify with the situation, feelings, and motives of the FSF. This ability to identify with the FSF will make it easier for the advisor to understand the requirements of the FSF.

(c) *Success Is Built Upon Personal Relationships* – In order to influence FSF leaders the advisor must establish a relationship built upon mutual respect, trust, and understanding.

(d) *Advisors Are Not "Them"* – Advisor must ensure they remember that the advisor is NOT part of the FSF. The advisor's task is to establish a relationship, to influence FSF leaders to change their attitudes and values in order to enable them to conduct independent operations in the future.

(e) *You Will Never Win…Nor Should You* – Successful advising is about the FSF achieving their tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. If the FSF "wins," the advisor is successful.

(f) *Advisors Are Not Commanders* – advisors provide command and control over only the subordinates within their advisor team. They do not command or lead FSF.

(g) *Advisors Are Honest Brokers* – advisors provide honest assessments of FSF capabilities both to FSF leaders and to HHQ.

(h) *Living With Shades of Grey* – advisors operate between two cultures and systems. They must be able to operate with the "grey" area that overlaps both cultures while maintaining legal,

moral, and ethical standards of both. Because of the great autonomy and independence advisors have, the advisor mission call for leaders of enormous character, moral courage, and intellect.

(i) *Talent Is Everything, But Understand Rank* – FSF often reward rank over talent. Advisors will frequently advise FSF leaders who are senior in rank; ways around obstacles associated with rank are relationships and talent. Competent advisors who develop and nurture a positive relationship with FSF leaders will find rank less of an obstacle.

(j) *Make Do* – advisors will rarely have all of the resources and support they want. The advisor's presence alone is a step in the right direction, be creative and do the best with the personnel and resources available.

(5) Developing skills are those skills employed at the interpersonal level to develop the capabilities of the advisors' FSF counterparts. They include teaching, coaching, and mentoring. Teaching may be defined as providing instruction or education to the FSF in order to develop skills or knowledge required to do a particular job. Coaching may be defined as assisting the counterpart to reach the next level of knowledge or skill through practice or building on previous teaching. Coaching differs from teaching when the FSF begin to accept more responsibility for success, while the advisor provides support or assistance as required. Mentoring involves providing expert opinions or counsel to assist the FSF in making decisions.

(6) Negotiation skills are critical to mission success and must be included in SFA training. Most cultures outside of the United States view negotiation as a healthy aspect of relationship building, almost like a courtship ritual. Formal training in negotiation theory and practice will enable the advisor to cultivate a healthy transactional relationship with the FSF counterpart, without entering into unauthorized agreements.

d. **Foreign Language and Culture.** Interpersonal communications and cultural awareness are critical to mission success across all OTERA tasks. Most SFA missions will take place in countries where a majority of the FSF personnel do not speak English fluently, and will not be able to furnish interpreters. Employment of contract linguists as interpreters is a viable way to facilitate communications between the advisors and the FSF. However, selection of U.S. personnel who speak the FSF language or training personnel to speak the FSF's language yields numerous benefits. First, reducing the number of contract linguists required for the mission lowers costs and reduces the number of "boots on the ground," leading to reduced force protection and life support requirements. Second, elimination of linguists as the "middle man" may reduce misinterpretation of the message. Third, the language of a partner nation and its FSF is integral to its culture. U.S. personnel who are native speakers of the target language have greater awareness of the FSF and host nation's culture. Even non-native speakers who learn the FSF language through formal training will inevitably gain insights into the FSF and host nation's culture because of the inseparable linkages between language and culture. In either case, greater cultural acuity on the part of the advisor will improve performance in the execution of the SFA mission.

(1) Department of Defense policy states that foreign language and regional expertise are critical competencies essential to the DOD mission, and shall be managed to maximize the accession, development, maintenance, enhancement, and employment of these critical skills. All DOD personnel shall be screened upon accession for foreign language capabilities and regional expertise, and tested for proficiency; the results of those tests will be permanently entered into the individual's personnel record. DOD policy goes on to state that the Services shall organize, train, and equip a level of language professionals and personnel with regional expertise (military and civilian) to meet operational requirements and maintain a plan to meet surge requirements and that the Services shall staff military units with an appropriate capability to communicate in the language of any foreign territory to which they deploy. The CCDRs shall determine what capability is appropriate.

(2) The Defense Language Program provides strategic direction and programmatic oversight to the combatant commanders and Services on present and future requirements related to language, regional expertise, and culture. All of the CCDRs and Services have a designated Senior Language Authority (SLA) who fulfills the role of the language, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities advocate (LREC) within their respective organization, and who also serves as a member of the Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC). The Defense Language Program has three primary goals:

(a) Identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities, and generate accurate demand signals in support of DOD missions.

(b) Build, enhance, and sustain a Total Force with a mix of language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities to meet existing and emerging needs in support of national security objectives.

(c) Strengthen language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities to increase interoperability and to build partner capacity.

(3) Services tasked with providing forces to conduct SFA missions, and the respective Service-level SFA training programs should leverage that Service's Senior Language Authority (SLA) in order to work the manpower management and assignment process in such a way that matches individual Service-members' language and cultural capabilities with mission requirements. In cases where certified language professionals cannot be selected from the ranks, personnel with an aptitude for foreign language skills as demonstrated on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) should be selected for advisor duty and requisite language training if all preceding selection criteria have been met.

(4) Training should occur in cross cultural communications skills for all personnel conducting SFA tasks. Training and education should focus on developing the advisor's ability to identify and discern cultural differences; to interpret the nonverbal behavior of individuals from the FSF and the local population; the application of social perspective taking; and applied knowledge of the local customs in order to build rapport and enhance communication. Training should also imbue the advisor with an ability to detect manipulation and deception while interacting with the FSF. While proficiency in these skills may be difficult to measure, training can be most effectively evaluated through scenario-based vignettes with experienced observer-controllers driving the training objectives, and qualified role players (preferably personnel born and raised in the country to which SFA personnel will deploy) acting as the FSF and in other key roles.

e. **Personal Security Skills.** Deploying personnel must be capable of performing SFA across the range of military operations or spectrum of conflict, throughout all operation plan phases. The CCDRs must define the threat conditions based upon the unique circumstances in the country where SFA will take place. In some instances, advisors may arrive in-country via commercial airlines and stay in hotels due to the relative permissiveness of the operating environment. At the other end of the spectrum, combat advisors conducting SFA during the *domination* operation plan phase against a determined enemy may require extensive training in close combat skills, tactical combat casualty care, etc. In all cases, personnel deploying to conduct SFA must receive training in the following skills:

- SERE Level A, required for all advisors.
- Theater- and Service-specific force protection and anti-terrorism (FP/AT) training.
- Advisors identified as high-risk of isolation or high-risk of capture (HRI/HRC) must be SERE Level C qualified and current.

In order to conduct SFA across the range of military operations, Service-level SFA training programs should also maintain the capability to train advisors on the following tasks:

- Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and practice.

- Foreign internal defense (FID) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
- Mounted and dismounted movement TTPs (with FSF).
- Fire support planning and terminal control of supporting arms (surface-delivered fires, close air support, etc).
- MEDEVAC planning and execution.
- Tactical combat casualty care and emergency first aid.
- Tactical communications (VHF, UHF, SATCOM, Blue Force Tracker, etc).
- Preventive maintenance of combat vehicles and other major end items.
- Individual and crew-served weapons employment.
- Planning and coordination of sustainment (supply, transportation, maintenance, etc).
- Planning for the conduct of personnel recovery operations.

The above list is not all-inclusive, nor is it directed or prescriptive with respect to the Services' respective SFA training programs. The above list is merely illustrative of the breadth and depth of the skill set that advisors may require when deploying to conduct SFA in a non-permissive environment.

f. **Foreign Security Force Assessment and Development.** FSF assessment and development represents the fusion of all OTERA tasks that may be conducted at a given echelon, within a given type of foreign security force. Techniques and procedures for assessment and development of a foreign air force's airframe maintenance programs in a permissive environment will be different from the techniques and procedures employed to develop a foreign local police force while engaged in counterinsurgency operations against a determined foe. The guiding factor in training advisors to conduct FSF assessment and development is that all SFA tasks – *organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise* – must be performed in such a way that supports the *sustainable development of the capability and capacity of the foreign security force.*

(1) Organization of FSF includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, mission command and staff processes, and methods and policies for recruiting and manning the FSF.

(2) Training of FSF includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.

(3) Equipping FSF includes all activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This may include new equipment fielding, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization. Advisors involved in the SFA task of equipping FSF should be thoroughly competent in assessing the FSF's equipment and materiel requirements based upon the threat, as well as conducting gap analysis to determine shortfalls based upon the FSF's existing equipment set. Advisors must then be able to advise their counterparts on the employment, accountability, maintenance, and sustainment of all equipment and resources. Advisors must perform these functions while complying with all appropriate U.S. laws, authorizations, and policies for information and equipment transfer, utilization of funds, property accountability and disposition, and policies for all other relevant activities (FOO, CERP, SA, FMS, etc).

(4) Rebuilding/building the FSF refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate FSF facilities. This may include physical infrastructure such as bases and stations, lines of communication,

ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures. As with equipping, advisor selection, education and training must comply with applicable funding authorizations, etc.

(5) Advising the FSF refers to all activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to foreign security forces while carrying out the mission assigned to the individual, unit, or organization being advised. Advising will take place across the range of military operations, at the executive direction, generating force, or operating force levels, and in support of individuals or organizations. Advising is also an integral component of all OTERA tasks. Various techniques for advising, often referred to as teaching, coaching, or mentoring, are situation dependent based upon the needs and capabilities of the FSF.

FSF assessment and development is a holistic concept. Personnel or teams conducting SFA must be able to assess FSF current capabilities, required capabilities, and identify institutional gaps. Advisor training and education must include the proper methods for determining the success or failure of the SFA mission, by employing measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. The advisors must demonstrate the agility to continually refine their efforts across all SFA tasks in order to support the *sustainable development of the capability and capacity of the foreign security force*.

g. **Foreign Security Force Counterpart's Job.** The culmination of the proper selection, education, and training of U.S. personnel to perform SFA should be where every advisor is fully capable of performing their FSF counterpart's job in a way that enables the flow of ability and expertise from the advisor to the FSF counterpart in order to enhance the performance of the FSF. If the CCDRs state the SFA requirements imprecisely, or the Services fail to select and train the right personnel to standard, this state will not be achieved, the effectiveness of the advisors will not meet expectations, and the performance of the FSF organization will not achieve its full potential.

4. Joint and Interagency Training and Exercises.

a. Combatant Commanders should schedule joint and interagency SFA coordination training as a part of routine staff training and joint, interagency, and multinational exercise participation; during live, simulated, or virtual training or rehearsals for a specific operation; or as part of war-gaming exercises in support of a specific contingency plan.

b. The training audience for large-scale SFA training exercises should include the JFHQ staff, supporting service and functional component commands, international or coalition partners, and representatives from other USG agencies. These joint training exercises should focus on identifying and assessing military and USG agency SFA capabilities and core competencies, and identifying procedural disconnects. Such training also serves to build personal relationships and interoperability factors critical to success in SFA.

CHAPTER VI

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

1. General

a. Thus far, the discussion of Security Force Operations (SFA) has generally centered on the strategic and operational levels. This chapter transitions to a more focused examination of the employment principles, tools, and techniques used in conducting SFA operations.

b. **SFA activities are part of the unified actions of the combatant command and emphasize interagency coordination.** Even small tactical operations will usually require interagency coordination, most likely through the security cooperation officer (SCO).

2. Employment Factors

a. As in planning, several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in SFA operations.

b. **Information Operations (IO) Impact.** IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems. Information Operations apply across all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations. IO and related activities affect the perceptions and attitudes of adversaries and a host of others in the operational area. The integration of IO disciplines in all aspects of planning and execution is essential during SFA operations.

c. **Psychological Impact.** Considering the psychological impact of SFA operations is essential regardless of where or when the operations take place. The impact of these efforts may occur incidentally, because of another unrelated operation, or may be the result of an operation specifically executed for its psychological effect.

d. **Intelligence Support.** A thorough intelligence analysis must focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic aspects of the area as well as on an analysis of hostile elements. Active intelligence support must continue through to the end of the employment of military forces. This continuous intelligence effort will gauge the reaction of the local populace and determine the effects on the infrastructure of U.S. efforts as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area.

e. **Force Selection.** U.S. Forces in general have some ability to assess, train, advice, and assist foreign forces. The degree to which they can be tasked to do so depends on their preparation in terms of language, other skills, and the knowledge necessary to function within the operational environment. Employing operational designs that provide a combination of general purpose forces (GPF) while leveraging the unique capabilities of special operation forces (SOF) achieves success most effectively. The selection of the appropriate ratio of SOF and GPF must be a deliberate decision based on thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. The most important factor informing this decision is the capability and expertise required rather than the size of the force required. Additional factors include the political sensitivity of the mission and requirements for cultural and language experts or other special requirements. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must be aware that operations may change rapidly in character, and that their force structures may need to adapt as well. Both the integration of SOF with GPF and vice versa are increasingly the norm.

The Department of Defense shall conduct SFA activities with the appropriate combinations of SOF, GPF, CEW personnel (in accordance with DODD 1404.10 (Reference (h))), and contract personnel that are collectively capable of executing all missions and activities required under these conditions:

- Politically sensitive environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host-country government.
- Environments where a limited, overt U.S. presence is acceptable to the host-country government.
- Environments where a large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government.

DODI 5000.68

(1) **Special Operations Forces.** SOF may conduct SFA activities unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of CF.

(a) SOF units possess specialized capabilities for foreign internal defense (FID), including support for counterinsurgency (COIN) and, when applicable, for unconventional warfare. These FID skills are largely consistent with SFA tasks: organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise/assist. Other support includes civil affairs operations (CAO), MISO support, and training in specific areas, typically with host nation (HN) SOF. However, the typical SOF role in both SFA and FID is to train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces.

(b) In addition to the specific capability requirements that may call for selection of SOF, the nature of the SFA mission itself may dictate the use of SOF. SOF's unique capabilities for language, cultural awareness, regional focus, etc. may be required when the environment involves particular political sensitivities. Additionally, SOF's ability to conduct short-notice missions, with only modest support, makes them adept at initiating programs for hand-over to GPF.

(c) U.S. Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) provides SOF in support of geographic combatant commanders (GCCs). SOF contribute to the SFA effort normally under operational control (OPCON) of the theater special operations commander (SOC), which has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations in support of the GCC. SOF also provide dedicated theater forces. When planning for use of SOF, assessments of, command, control, communications, and computers requirements among the combatant command, the country team, and SOF must take place. Communications requirements for command and control (C2), administration, logistics, and emergencies must be clear.

(2) **General Purpose Forces.** When the SFA effort requires broader action to support HN security capability and/or capacity development efforts, the JFC may predominantly employ GPF in the SFA mission. This may include serving as military advisors, conducting mobile training teams (MTTs), embedding U.S. units into HN units, conducting joint/multinational exercises with HN units, and assisting in the development of supporting institutions. GPF units and personnel may also be more appropriate in SFA activities focused on higher echelon units (Divisions, Corps, Wings,), or on Service/Ministry-level efforts. Upper echelon commanders must provide unit commanders with clear guidance on unit mission requirements that include the need to prepare their forces to conduct SFA. United States Coast Guard (USCG) training teams, personnel, and platforms are well suited to support the development of stable, multi-mission maritime regimes to respond to many transnational threats. USCG SFA activities reach beyond normal military-to-military relations to a broader HN maritime audience, including, but not limited to, law enforcement agencies, maritime administrations, and transport ministries.

(3) **Public Information Programs.** Public information is important during all phases of any SFA mission. While it is important to correctly portray the SFA effort to HN personnel through military information support operations (MISO), it is also important to employ an effective public affairs (PA) program to inform HN and U.S. publics of current SFA actions, goals, and objectives. History has shown that without popular support, it may be impossible to develop and sustain an effective SFA campaign. At the U.S. national level, public diplomacy programs will accurately depict U.S. efforts. The President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) supports this national program through the combatant commander (CCDR) or subordinate JFC's information programs designed to disclose the maximum amount of information possible within applicable security restrictions and the guidelines established. Coordination is essential between the PA staff and the media, the country team, the MISO element, and other information agencies within the HN and region.

(4) **Logistic Support.** Logistic operations in support of SFA **support both U.S. Forces and primary operational missions** (supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities). General guidelines for logistic issues in support of U.S. Forces conducting SFA operations include:

(a) There may be a ceiling imposed on the number of U.S. Military personnel authorized to be in the HN to conduct SFA activities. Commanders should determine how sea-basing forces affects this decision. Maximum use should be made of host nation support (HNS) capabilities, but where reliance on the HN is not feasible, minimizing logistic support requirements is essential. SFA and its support may include contractor personnel, which could complicate legal, diplomatic, administrative, budgetary, and logistical issues. Efficient use of throughput of supplies (an average quantity that can pass through a port on a daily basis), airlift resupply, and inter-Service support agreements should also be considered.

(b) Commanders must carefully balance the advantages of using HNS with the danger of establishing dependence on potentially unreliable sources.

(c) The type of mission determines logistics operations. Integrated into the overall joint force are the Service logistic support elements. Logistic support for the deployed forces, however, will remain a Service responsibility.

(d) HNs often require support beyond their organic capabilities. Accordingly, **when conducting SFA with multinational partners, there becomes a need to establish multinational logistic support agreements.** Identifying the need for such non-organic support must occur during the planning phase of SFA support and arranged for prior to participation in SFA activities. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) negotiated with multinational partners are beneficial to the SFA effort in that they allow U.S. Forces to exchange most common types of support. The SecDef delegates authority to negotiate these agreements to the GCC. Authority to execute these agreements lies with SecDef, who may or may not be delegate.

For further information on international logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Multinational Logistics.

(5) **Operations Security.** A major problem in all SFA activities is denial of critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile elements. The nature of SFA implies that many HN officials and populace will know of certain U.S. activities as they occur. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members or sympathizers within HN institutions that could be informants. U.S. and foreign personnel involved in SFA activities and programs should be provided extensive operations security (OPSEC) training to ensure effectiveness of their operations.

For further information on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(6) **Lessons Learned.** It is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify future operations and activities to fit the special circumstances and environment as SFA activities occur. It is essential to conduct comprehensive after-action reviews and reports, focusing on the specifics

of the SFA activities, to gather this information as soon as possible after mission execution. The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), the Services, and other government agencies' (OGAs') lessons learned programs provide readily available sources of information to SFA planners and operators. In addition, USSOCOM's Special Operations Debrief and Reporting System, an internal USSOCOM-only program, also can provide additional information on peacetime SFA missions.

For further information for specific reporting procedures, refer to CJCSI 3150.25D, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

3. Site Survey Considerations

Units assigned a SFA mission must implement procedures to help DOS and the country team vet HN forces before they can receive training. Removal of all unvetted personnel from training is imperative. The primary purpose of vetting is to ensure the identification of personnel with a history of human rights violations. The "Leahy Amendment," first enacted in the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (DoS Appropriations Act)12 prohibits the USG from providing funds to the security forces of a foreign country if the DoS has credible evidence that the foreign country or its agents have committed gross violations of human rights unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. Ideally, a site survey team gathers this information. Such teams should include a counterintelligence (CI) representative, preferably a force protection detachment (FPD) or foreign area officer (FAO) asset. To properly conduct the training, units assigned to SFA operations need to determine or identify:

- The HN unit mission and its mission-essential task list and its capability to execute them.
- The organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment and for personnel and equipment actually on hand.
- Any past or present foreign military presence or influence in doctrine, training, or combat operations.
- The unit's ability to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs or foreign training missions.
- The organization and leadership level that is responsible for training the individual soldier. Does the HN have institutional training established? Is it effective?
- Any operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in joint or multinational exercises with U.S. personnel.
- The maintenance status to include maintenance training programs.
- The language or languages in which instruction will take place.
- The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces (notably the differences between HN forces and the local populace).
- The potential security concerns with employing U.S. members (and allies) in the HN training areas.
- The local infrastructure and possible positive or negative impacts of training on the local populace.
- The local populace's attitudes toward U.S. Military and government personnel, as well as ordinary U.S. citizens (to include presence and behavior of expatriate U.S. populations).
- The local populace's prejudices or fears.

- Any key local leaders, communicators, and potential spoilers.
- The presence, agendas, capabilities, influence, and attitudes of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

4. Security Force Assistance Activities- Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, and Advise (OTERA)

a. Defense Security Sector SFA

(1) Within the OTERA construct, especially those related to train, equip, and advise, activities that are conducted with recognized military forces organized as part of a partner nation's Ministry of Defense clearly fall within the ***direct*** contribution to increasing ***capability*** or ***capacity*** and therefore are clearly SFA activities. Within these partner nation forces, this applies to all three components previous described: Executive Direction, Operating Force, and Generating Force.

(2) The Joint Force Commander will also conduct other activities with partner nation Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces that do not so clearly provide a ***direct*** contribution. These might include military-to-military contacts whose purpose is simply to negotiate access or status agreements. Many senior leader engagements, wherein senior U.S. Military leaders visit and meet with senior officers of the partner nation military, MOD, or other officers of the partner nation government, are certainly Security Cooperation activities in that they establish or reaffirm relationships or enhance U.S. access to partner nations militaries. In most cases, however, these SC activities will not be considered as SFA, since they do not make a direct contribution to development of capability or capacity within the partner nation's security force.

(3) Despite their classification as something other than SFA, it is essential to consider these security cooperation (SC) activities as part of the effort by the JFC to move toward achieving the intermediate military objectives or end states expressed in the Country Campaign Plan.

b. Non-Defense Security Sector SFA

(1) Included within DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.68 is a provision that addresses "… development of the capability and capacity of ***non-defense ministry*** security forces and their supporting institutions." In general terms, existing U.S. statutes prohibit DOD participation in these developmental activities, unless otherwise specifically authorized by law. This restriction poses a significant challenge to the Joint Force Commander. Not all partner nations have chosen to organize themselves in strict accordance with U.S. organizational concepts. Some partner nations do not even include a Ministry of Defense, yet they certainly field security forces. Examples of these non-MOD security forces include:

- Paramilitary police (Gendarmerie, *carabinieri*)
- Border Guards
- National police
- Coast Guard
- Customs agents

(2) The U.S. DOD has many skills that are or can be of significant use in developing the capability and capacity of these non-MOD security forces. As combatant commanders develop regional and country plans to support their theater campaign plan (TCP) objectives, they must identify capability/capacity gaps in these non-MOD forces and include proposals to address those gaps.

(3) In most cases, another U.S. Government (USG) department or agency will have primary responsibility and legal authority to work with partner nations to develop capability and capacity of these non-MOD security forces. With proper coordination and approval, the joint force commander can provide

DOD personnel and units with unique skill sets not available to other agencies to assist in this development activity under the supervision and/or authority of the lead USG agency. In some situations, other USG agencies may have specific skills to develop non-MOD security force capabilities/capacities, but do not have sufficient personnel available to meet the demand. Again, with proper coordination and authorization, this effort can involve tasking DOD personnel to assist in this effort. Finally, in some nations, other agencies may have the appropriate skills and personnel, but existing security conditions may be tenuous or contested. In those environments, again subject to proper coordination and authorization, developing non-MOD security capabilities and/or capacity may involve deploying DOD personnel and units. As a part of the coordination process, the joint force commander should make provision for transition of responsibilities to other USG agencies as the security situation allows.

5. Support to Civil Authorities

a. There are activities that are a part of overall DOD cooperation efforts that provide valuable opportunities for engagements between the United States and partner nations, but fall outside the scope of SFA. Nevertheless, these additional activities will be planned and executed by combatant commands (CCDRs) using DOD individuals and units, and will have significant impact/effect on SFA activities. In some cases, these SC activities may provide support to military/MOD security forces, but do not contribute directly to building capability or capacity within the foreign security force (FSF). Possible examples might include drilling wells, building roads, or constructing barracks.

b. Other activities by U.S. DOD personnel and units fall into the category of Support to Civil Authorities. Example activities might include:

- Participation in Demobilization, Disarmament, & Reintegration (DDR). DDR is a Department of State (DOS) function that might proceed better with participation by military personnel. This function likely contributes to stabilizing the security environment, but is not a direct contribution to capability and capacity.
- Humanitarian Assistance (HA).
- Medical civil action program (MEDCAP) exercises. These likely can enhance the health of the population from whom recruits are drawn, but do make direct contribution to capability and capacity.

c. The common thread throughout these activities is that other USG agencies have lead responsibility to coordinate them with host nations non-MOD, even non-Security forces. The role for U.S. DOD personnel and units is only to provide support (skills, logistics, transportation, etc.). These activities can contribute to the success of other SFA activities, but are not SFA activities themselves. Nonetheless, the JFC must consider such support to civil authorities, as it will have an impact on success of SFA and will affect availability of resources to perform SFA.

6. Support to Enabling Institutions

a. Building capability and capacity of security forces, including their ministries and supporting institutions, cannot be successful as an isolated, stand alone program. The JFC must participate or provide support to other USG efforts to create or modify conditions within the partner nation to support increased capability and capacity within the security sector.

b. Adequate rule of law must exist. Systems for enforcing civil order, courts, laws, enforcement, penal, correctional, investigational must exist and function. Example: in one country, U.S. Forces worked to train a coastal defense unit to patrol and enforce their economic exclusion zone waters, including fisheries. This partner nation unit successfully boarded a trawler with an illegal catch worth millions of dollars and escorted that detained trawler into port. However, adequate legal systems were not in place to charge and try the crew, nor to deal with the cargo of the trawler. Months later, the trawler remained in

port, with the full catch on board, but no ice or other refrigeration. Result: a rotted catch, initially very valuable, with the potential for preserving, selling, or otherwise used to feed the local populace.

c. Other elements of government functions must also exist at a level appropriate to support the increased capability and capacity of FSF and their supporting institutions. Adequate money supplies and economic/banking processes must exist and function to allow for financial support of the security sector. Adequate transportation systems must function. Air traffic control, airfield navigation device (24 hour, all-weather) might be required. Road/rail/river distribution systems might be required to support adequate logistical support of security forces. The JFC must consider these and other developmental sectors and coordinate with the Country Team.

7. Operational and Tactical Levels of SFA Effort

a. SFA will reside in a range of acceptability of the nation receiving the support and acceptability of the nation providing the support. The United States conducts SFA where it meets U.S. interests and the interests of the legitimate authority of the developing security forces. SFA activities focus instead on the operational and tactical fundamentals of putting policy into action. Primarily, this requires an understanding of what FSF capabilities require development in order to address a legitimate authority's political problems. The FSF problems will reside in one of three areas – Executive Direction, Generate, or Employ:

(1) **Executive/Ministerial/Service Direction**. Those activities that develop national policy for the FSF. This guidance forms, justifies, authorizes, and directs the parameters for the generating and employment of FSFs.

(a) All security forces apply some level of executive direction, which empowers a generating and an employing or operating function. The United States separates these functions, with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and elements of the services providing the executive direction. The services are also responsible for the majority of the generating function and the Combatant Commands are responsible for employing the operational forces. Subsequently, the ability to deploy resides primarily in the operational forces while the expertise to generate resides in fixed facilities and installations run by the services.

(b) Executive Functions regulate and resource both the Operating Functions and the Generating Functions:

1. *Advise Political Leadership* are those practices, processes, and structures that ensure the political leadership have the best understanding of problems and solutions as they relate to security force issues. These may include, but are not limited to force employment options, operational requirements, or military and political consequences of pending decisions.

2. *Policy* consists of those practices, processes and structures that support and/or establish the regulation of security forces in the context of the political purpose that department, agency, organization, service, or unit serves.

3. *Strategic Planning* are those practices or processes that support formulating security force plans to achieve a desired political end. Strategic planning encompasses not only the delivery and employment of operational forces, but also considers the required capabilities which must be generated and sustained to achieve those ends, as well as the associated second and third order effects.

4. *Assess Readiness* are those practices or processes that support identification of capability or capacity gaps as they relate to the functions, roles and missions which security force departments, agencies, services and organizations must do in order to achieve a political purpose.

5. *Review and Analysis* are those practices, processes or structures that provide insights into current or future capability and capacity gaps as they relate to fulfilling known or anticipated

roles and missions for the security force. As a function, it requires a capability to collect and process relative information from operations, exercise or experiments and then package and distribute the analysis in a manner useful to decision makers.

6. *Forecasting and Budgeting* are those practices or processes that support looking at future requirements in both the operating and generating functions and request and/or allocate resources to meet the anticipated priorities.

Exhibit 21. Executive Direction



(2) **Generating Forces**. Primarily, this function includes organizing, recruiting/manning, training, equipping, mobilizing, servicing, and supplying security forces. Fundamentally, this core function requires identification, resourcing, and resolution of capability gaps in the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and service and DOD equivalent policy of the security forces.

(a) As U.S. generating force's staffing is generally singular and not deployable by design, this creates a major problem for the operational force, which is often tasked especially during large scale operations, to provide all the U.S. capability to develop every aspect of a FSF. By understanding the demands being place on the force conducting SFA, commanders can take steps to mitigate shortages in generating expertise through training or augmentation.

(b) Generating Functions are employed to develop and sustain capabilities in the Operating Functions

1. *Recruiting* consists of practices, processes, and structures that support the selection and integration of non-security force personnel from outside a service, agency, or organization into its system to become a security force member. Usually, recruiting is the first step for a prospective member and precedes an accessions compatibility examination, and the some form of individual training, which further integrates them into the security force. Recruiting is a key force generation function as it sustains the organization with the personnel required to maintain its force levels.

2. *Organizing* consists of practices, processes, and structures that support mobilization/demobilization, force management, resourcing, distribution, or other efforts that support the forming or reforming of units and supporting organizations required to generate and sustain capabilities that meet operational requirements.

3. *Training* consists of those practices, processes, and structures that support the development and sustainment of systems that provide the resources (doctrine, materiel, funds, terrain, time, personnel, regulations,) required to identify, achieve, and sustain a level of training readiness to meet operational requirements.

4. *Equipping* consists of those practices, processes and structures that develop, test, field, distribute, and maintain the materiel required for security force personnel and organizations to train and execute those tasks associated with their roles and missions.

5. *Building* consists of those practices, processes, and structures that develop and maintain the physical infrastructure required to generate forces. This could include installations, ranges, buildings, road networks, airfields, shipyards, or other security force related infrastructure.

(3) **Operating Forces.** Employ or operate as it applies to military security forces, includes collective training and carrying out the missions assigned to the unit. This includes the integration of the FSF's operational functions such as the Joint Functions, which consist of *maneuver*, *intelligence*, *fires*, *force protection*, *sustainment*, and *command* and *control* during actual operations. Employment, as it applies to police security forces, may include training and actual operations with the integration of *patrolling*, *forensics*, *apprehension*, *intelligence*, *investigations*, *incarceration*, *communications*, and *sustainment*.

8. Inter-Relationships of the Three Functional Components of FSF

a. For illustrative purposes, this discussion uses the U.S. Military Joint Functions found in JP 3.0 as a way to look at FSF operating functions. There are two primary reasons the Joint Functions were chosen. First, they are broad enough to be applicable in part or in whole to any security force which are employed to achieve political ends; second, use of familiar terms provides a common standardized means to communicate capabilities. This does not mean that it is a perfect fit, but it is a place to start. Planners may use other functional descriptions if their command sees fit, or if the situation requires it, but they need contain sufficient detail to eventually associate the tasks and supporting capabilities, which the FSF will require to address its problem(s).

b. It is essential to understand all three functions in the context of the development of FSF capabilities. All three functional areas perform tasks that sustain the generation and employment of those capabilities. **Exhibit 22** illustrates a way to consider the relationship between the functional components and gain understanding of how the security force works. The objectives assigned to the functional components define both the purpose each serves, and a desired condition in relation to the broader objective of security force that can sustain the generation and employment of its forces and capabilities.

Exhibit 22. FSF Functional Requirements



c. Within the context of how the three functions support a broader objective, it is now possible to visualize and describe the relationships between the three functional areas. The executive function encompasses and runs in the background as it regulates and resources both the generating and operating functions. The executive direction functions provide leadership in the context of the political purpose the security force serves. The generating functions exist to support the operating functions with the capabilities required to conduct the range of tasks associated with its missions. The operating functions however should provide feedback, which informs and supports needed changes in the generating functions by informing the process based on changes in objectives and conditions.

d. Assessment of the FSF and its functional components should precede development in order to verify FSF capability gaps, and continue throughout development to determine if developmental efforts are effective. FSF organizational assessments should categorize which organizations fulfill FSF executive direction, generating force, or operating force roles and functions. The organizational assessments should take place in the context of one another. The measure of success for the generating forces is how well the operating forces achieve their objectives, while in order for the generating force to serve its purpose the operating forces must communicate their requirements back to the generating forces. Ensure assessments of both the generating functions and operating functions take place in the context of executive direction, as the function(s) it provides are indicative of the will and mechanisms to generate, employ, and sustain capabilities in the FSF.

e. It is worth noting that a given security force may combine some or all of three functions in a given organization, or they may be separated. It all depends upon the nature of the security force, and the political purpose(s) they serve. It may be that functional relationships change given geography, over time, due to political realignment or other circumstances. This framework provides a conceptual understanding of SFA as it relates to developing FSF capabilities and capacities. The intention is not to develop a campaign design or planning template. Rather, it is a tool for visualizing and understanding relationships in a FSF.

APPENDIX A

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Overview

Law and policy govern the actions of the U.S. Forces in all military operations, including Security Force Assistance (SFA). For U.S. Forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly influences many aspects of the operation. It affects the rules of engagement (ROE), how U.S. Forces organize and train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the host nation (HN), and the authority of U.S. Forces to detain and interrogate. The President is Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or Secretary of Defense to a combatant commander (CCDR) provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, as well as treaties to which the United States is party. Policies are executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other authoritative statements issued by government officials. No summary provided here can replace a consultation with the unit's supporting staff judge advocate (SJA). This appendix summarizes some of the laws and policies that bear upon U.S. Military operations in support of SFA.

2. Legal Authority for Security Force Assistance

Without a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. Forces may have authorization to make only limited contributions during operations related to SFA. If the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) requests and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approves, U.S. forces can participate in operations. The request and approval may go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22, United States Code (USC). Among other programs, Title 22, USC, contains the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Programs under Title 22, USC, authorize security assistance (SA), developmental assistance, and other forms of aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions in Title 10, USC. Title 10, USC, authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of Humanitarian and Civic Action (HCA) in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the HN. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance to police by U.S. Forces is permissible, but generally not with the Department of Defense (DOD) as the lead government department.

a. **Distinguishing Sentiment, Policy, and Law.**

The underlying international sentiment as to what is acceptable behavior in conflict and war often rapidly outpaces formal treaty adoption and ratification. In short, the collective, largely unwritten will of a majority of the international community can become customary international law. In addition, the U.S. Government (USG) often formulates and champions this emerging law and policy. The legitimate nation-states of the world continue to debate the fight against terrorism, contemporary operational environment, international policy and sentiment, while terrorist forces and sympathizers attempt to shape and exploit that debate to their advantage. Joint forces performing SFA activities face similar conditions unless and until international law codifies terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of violent lawlessness. Even as such codes, laws, and conventions emerge, joint forces conducting SFA activities will likely always face disinformation and propaganda that vilifies legitimate military, reconstruction, and law enforcement efforts as violations of what the adversary will refer to as *international law*.

b. **Planning Concerns**

(1) Those planning and conducting SFA operations may often need a detailed knowledge of international law, such as the Geneva Conventions, for two principal reasons. The first is to educate HN

military staffs and forces. The second is to counter very specific points of adversary disinformation and propaganda. Advisors and trainers may have to build either a knowledge base on international law in HN military personnel or an adherence to portions that the HN military has routinely ignored in the past. In addition, this may carry over to transgressions of their own HN laws or building acceptance of new HN laws safeguarding civil liberties. Basic human rights also include other rights, such as the right of free speech, freedom of worship, and freedom of the press that HN soldiers must uphold while participating in SFA activities, because of the concerns of international and U.S. law. U.S. personnel who notice suspected violations of basic human rights must report the facts to their chain of command. Under U.S. law, the President must cut off SA to any country with a documented pattern of human rights abuses.

(2) Internal threat propagandists increasingly use factual, partially factual, or entirely fictitious violations of international law, policy, or even sentiment to discredit HN governments. These attempts are frequently graphic to have the maximum incendiary effect. They often address third countries or international agencies and may cite specific articles of the Geneva Conventions. Citing specific portions of the Geneva Conventions accomplishes two goals for them. If successful, they appear to have legitimate status as a state actor, and they make the HN look like a nation that ignores civil rights and the laws of war. SFA forces must infuse an acceptance of the basic tenets of international law among the HN personnel they work with, advise, and train.

3. Existing United States Law

a. The United States Constitution. The Constitution divides the power to wage war between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. Under Article I, Congress holds the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out those responsibilities. Balancing that legislative empowerment, Article II vests the Executive power in the President and makes him the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This bifurcation of the war powers created an area in which the different political branches of government exercise concurrent authority over decisions relating to the use of Armed Forces overseas as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

b. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI) states, in part, that all treaties made by the United States are the "supreme law of the land." Therefore, ratified treaties, such as the United Nations (UN) Charter and the Geneva Conventions, create legal obligations on U.S. Forces regarding their ability to perform various types of missions and functions.

c. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973. The stated purpose of the WPR is to ensure the "collective judgment" of both the Executive and Legislative branches in order to commit to the deployment of U.S. Forces by requiring consultation of and reports to Congress, in any of the following circumstances:

(1) Introduction of troops into actual hostilities.

(2) Introduction of troops, equipped for combat, into a foreign country, or greatly enlarging the number of troops, equipped for combat, in a foreign country.

d. *Note.* The President is required to make such reports within 48 hours of the triggering event, detailing the circumstances necessitating introduction or enlargement of troops, the Constitutional or legislative authority upon which the action is based, and the estimated scope and duration of the deployment or combat action. Since the WPR passed over the veto of President Nixon and became law, no President has either conceded the constitutionality of the WPR or complied fully with its mandates.

4. International Law and Treaties

a. The UN Charter became effective on 24 October 1945 after ratification by the United States and a majority of other signatories. The UN Charter mandates that all member states resolve their international disputes peacefully and requires that they refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of

force. The UN Charter also provides that all nations have the right to use self-defense to combat acts of aggression against them until the Security Council shall take action.

b. The UN Charter provides the essential framework of authority for the use of force, effectively defining the foundations for a modern *jus ad bellum* (the law governing a state's resort to force). Inherent in its principles are the requirements for *necessity* (which involves considering the exhaustion or ineffectiveness of peaceful means of resolution, the nature of coercion applied by the aggressor state, objectives of each party, and the likelihood of effective community intervention); *proportionality* (i.e., limiting force in magnitude, scope, and duration to that which is reasonably necessary to counter a threat or attack); and an element of *timeliness* (i.e., delay of a response to an attack or the threat of attack attenuates the immediacy of the threat and the necessity to use force in self-defense).

c. U.S. Forces obey the law of war during all armed conflicts, whatever the characterization of the conflict, and in all other military operations. The law of war is a body of international treaties and customs, recognized by the United States as binding. It regulates the conduct of hostilities and protects noncombatants and civilians. The main laws of war protections come from the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

d. During SFA operations, commanders must be aware of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the status of insurgents under the laws of the HN. Common Article 3 is contained in all four of the Geneva Conventions, and specifically applies to internal armed conflicts. Common Article 3 states the following: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the high contracting parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed "hors de combat," taken out of the fight, by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; and

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees, which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.

5. Application of Criminal Laws of the Host Nation

The final sentence of Common Article 3 makes clear that insurgents have no special status under international law. They are not, when captured, prisoners of war. Prosecution of insurgents as criminals for bearing arms against the government and for other offenses may occur; so long as they are accorded the minimum protections described in Common Article 3. U.S. Forces conducting SFA should remember

that the insurgents are, as a legal matter, criminal suspects within the legal system of the HN. Counterinsurgents must carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at the scene. This evidence will be used to process the insurgents into the legal system and thus hold them accountable for their crimes while still promoting the rule of law.

6. Host Nation Law and Status-of-Forces Agreements

a. The military leader must be aware of and consider the impact of other bodies of law that impact the planning and execution phases, including HN law and any applicable status-of-forces-agreements (SOFAs).

b. SJAs and planners must be familiar with any SOFAs or other similar agreements that may be applicable. In any given mission, there may be agreements short of SOFAs, such as diplomatic notes, on point. Relevant international documents affecting military operations may be difficult to locate. Several sources are available in which to locate applicable international agreements governing the status of U.S. Forces or affecting military operations. Department of State (DOS) publications, such as Treaties in Force, contain unclassified international agreements. Both the relevant combatant command's legal office and the defense attaché (DATT) or military assistance group at the embassy should also have access to host national or international agreements affecting the military operation.

c. SOFAs and other international agreements establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries. Topics typically covered in a SOFA include criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the HN, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to HN laws. It is essential that all personnel understand status of U.S. Forces in the area of operations and receive training accordingly.

7. Legal Constraints on the Security Force Assistance

U.S. law, regulations, and policy play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may conduct SFA missions. These factors tend to constitute constraints on the activities of military units. They range from the ROE in combat situations to the ability to spend government funds for a training or support mission.

8. General Prohibition on Assistance to Police

Usually, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. DOS is the lead when U.S. Forces provide SA – military training, equipment, and defense articles and services – to HN military forces. The FAA specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive. When providing assistance to training, the DOS's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides the lead role in police assistance. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies.

9. Training and Equipping Foreign Forces

All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. U.S. law also requires DOS to verify that the HN receiving the assistance does not commit gross violations of human rights. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man hours and materiel requested by DoS under the FAA. The President may authorize deployed U.S. Forces to train or advice HN security forces as part of the mission. In this case, DOD personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental benefit to those security forces. Funds appropriated by Congress pay for all other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces by DOD. Moreover, the President gives specific authority to DOD for its role in such "train and equip" efforts. Absent such a directive, DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting an HN in training and equipping its security forces.

10. Rules of Engagement

ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. Forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with opposing forces. Often these directives are specific to the operation. If there are no operation-specific ROE, U.S. Forces apply standing rules of engagement (SROE). When working with a multinational force, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly.

11. Fiscal Law Considerations

a. In SFA missions, like all operations, commanders require specific authority to expend funds. The DoD Appropriations Act provides this authority. As a rule, operations and maintenance (O&M) funds may not be used for SFA missions. Congress may appropriate additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of conducting more complex stability operations that are not typically covered by O&M. Examples include the commander's emergency response program, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund , and Commander's Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction.

b. FAA, Title 22, USC, Section 2151 describes the legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance.

c. There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring the use of Title 22, USC funds for foreign assistance:

(1) Interoperability, Safety, and Familiarization Training. DOD may fund the training (as opposed to goods and services) of foreign militaries with O&M dollars only when the purpose of the training is to enhance the interoperability, familiarization, and safety training. It is prohibitive to use O&M funds for SA training. This exception applies only to interoperability training.

(2) Congressional Appropriation and Authorization to Conduct Foreign Assistance. DOD may fund foreign assistance operations if Congress has provided a specific appropriation and authorization to execute the mission.

d. The "Leahy Amendment" contains additional constraints on government funding of SFA missions. The law, first enacted in the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (the annual DOS appropriations act), prohibits the USG from providing funds to the security forces of a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence that the foreign country or its agents have committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice.

e. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22, USC. In addition, provisions of Title 10, USC, authorize the appropriation of small amounts of funds annually for commanders to provide humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. Although narrowly defined, these standing authorities generally require significant advance coordination within DOD and DOS.

f. The Coast Guard has specific authorization to assist other federal agencies in the performance of any activity for which the Coast Guard is especially qualified. As a Service, the Coast Guard has very limited organic legislative authority to unilaterally provide training and technical assistance to foreign countries. With few exceptions, the Coast Guard is generally a service provider to other USG funding agencies whose international engagement authorities convey to the Coast Guard with the transfer of funding, for the specific mission. In accordance with the Economy Act, Title 31, USC, Section 1535, the costs incurred by the Coast Guard while delivering international training and technical assistance are reimbursable whenever the training/assistance is funded by or through another USG or foreign government agency.

KEY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDING PROGRAMS

The following programs have funds appropriated by Congress to allow the Department of State (DOS) to conduct its foreign assistance mission:

- Foreign Military Financing Program
- International Military Education and Training Program
- Economic Support Fund
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Antiterrorism Assistance
- Global Humanitarian Demining
- Refugee Assistance
- Personnel Details

The following programs are administered by DOS, but do not have funds appropriated to sustain them:

- Foreign Military Sales Program
- Foreign Military Lease Program
- Economy Act Security Assistance
- United States Government Commodities and Services Program
- Direct Commercial Sales Program

There are additional special programs created by law to assist in the foreign assistance mission. These programs include:

- Excess Defense Articles
- Presidential Drawdowns

DOS directly, or indirectly through the United States Agency for International Development, (USAID), finances numerous development assistance programs to address the following needs:

- Agriculture and Nutrition
- Population Control
- Health
- Education
- Energy
- Environment Improvement

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

CERP is an example of a targeted humanitarian assistance fund program. CERP's primary purpose is "[to enable] military commanders in Iraq [and Afghanistan] to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi [and Afghan] people." CERP was originally funded with seized Iraqi assets, but Congress later appropriated US funds for the purpose. CERP is a program established to assist in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not applicable to missions outside of those countries. Future missions, though, may have similar funding sources established to facilitate a humanitarian assistance mission. Consult with the servicing judge advocate to determine the availability of funding.

Recently Passed Authorities

Congress has recently passed a number of special foreign assistance authorities that are not made permanent law within the USC, but rather are stand-alone authorities contained in annual

authorization and appropriation acts. These special authorities often contain "dual-key" or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, (or in some cases, with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission [COM]). Examples include the following:

- Section 1206 also known as Global Train and Equip and Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries. This program was initially authorized by National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY 2006, Section 1206. 1206 authorized SecDef with the concurrence of the SecState to:
    - Build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to:
        - Conduct counterterrorism operations; or
        - Participate in or support military and stability operations in which the US Armed Forces are participating.
    - Build the capacity of a foreign country's maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.
- Special Operations Forces (SOF) Support. This program originally Section 1208, so often referred to as "1208 funds"). This authorization is the SOF equivalency of "Section 1206". Its purpose is to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX B
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-XX is based upon the following primary references.

1. Federal Statutory Laws

a. Title 10, *United States Code*
b. Title 22, *United States Code*

2. Strategic Guidance and Policy

a. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*
b. *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*
c. *National Military Strategy*
d. *The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*
e. *The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations*
f. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*
g. *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*
h. *National Response Framework*
i. *The Quadrennial Defense Review*
j. *Unified Command Plan*
k. *Guidance for Employment of the Force*
l. *Defense Planning and Programming Guidance*
m. *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*

3. DOD Publications

a. DODI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*
b. DODI 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance*
c. DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*
d. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Charter*

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
b. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*
c. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*
d. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*
e. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*
f. JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*
g. JP 3-12.1, *Psychological Operations*

Intentionally Blank

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

3D	diplomacy, development, and defense
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AOR	area of responsibility
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
BPC	building partner capacity
C2	command and control
CAO	civil affairs operations
CCDR	combatant commander
CCP	Country Campaign Plan
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program
CEW	civilian expeditionary workforce
CF	coalition force, conventional force
CI	counterintelligence
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CLS	combat life saver
CMO	civil-military operations
COCOM	combatant command
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
CS	combat support
CSA	combat support agency
CSS	combat service support
CT	counterterrorism
CWMD	combating weapons of mass destruction
DATT	defense attaché
DCM	deputy chief of mission
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DIME-FIL	diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, facilities
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency

ESF	Economic Support Fund
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FAO	foreign area officer
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual (Army)
FMF	foreign military financing
FMFP	foreign military financing program
FMS	foreign military sales
FOC	full operational capability
FP	force protection
FPD	force protection detachment
FSF	foreign security force
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GCP	global core partners
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GPF	general purpose forces
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HHQ	higher headquarters
HN	host nation
HNS	host nation support
IDAD	internal defense and development
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IMET	international military education and training
IMO	intermediate military objective
INL	Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IO	information operations
IOC	initial operational capability
ISA	international security affairs
IW	irregular warfare
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JFC	joint force commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIIM	joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JP	joint publication
JS	the Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Advisory Group
LNO	liaison officer
LOE	line of effort
LOR	letter of request
MAAG	military assistance advisory group
MEDCAP	medical civic action program

MERLN	Military Education Research Library Network
MISO	military information support operations
MOD	Minister (Ministry) of Defense
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOS	military occupational specialty
MSRP	mission strategic resource plan
MTT	mobile training team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
O&M	operations and maintenance
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
OGA	other government agency
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
OSC	office of security cooperation
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTERA	organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise
OUSD(P)	Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy
PA	public affairs
PM	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PN	partner nation
POA&M	Program of Activities and Milestones
QDDR	quadrennial diplomacy and development review
QDR	quadrennial defense review
ROE	rules of engagement
ROMO	range of military operations
SA	security assistance
SAO	security assistance officer, security assistance office
SC	security cooperation
SCO	security cooperation officer, security cooperation organization
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SFA	security force assistance
SME	subject matter expert
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOC	special operations commander
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement

SROE	standing rules of engagement
SSA	security sector assistance
SSR	security sector reform
SSTR	security, stability, transition, and reconstruction
STABOPS	stability operations
TCP	theater campaign plan
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UN	United Nations
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCG	Untied States Coast Guard
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USG	United States Government
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
UW	unconventional warfare
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WPR	War Powers Resolution
WWII	World War II

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Activity – 1. A unit, organization, or installation performing a function or mission. 2. A function, mission, action, or collection of actions. Also called **ACT.** (JP 3-0)

Building Partner Capacity – Assisting domestic and/or foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities—for mutual benefit—to address U.S. national or shared global security interests. Also called BPC. (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, Joint Capability Areas). An outcome of SFA activities, it is the development of capabilities and capacities among foreign partners for the mutual benefit of the partner and U.S. national or shared global security interests. (Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework)

Capability – The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (DOD Dictionary of Military Terms)

Capacity – The measurement of an organization to employ a capability.

Chief of Mission – The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission's direct responsibility. Also called **COM**. (JP 3-08)

Civil Military Operations – The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. (JP 1-02 SOURCE JP 3-57) Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated civil affairs, other military forces, or a combination of civil affairs and other forces may perform civil-military operations. Also called **CMO**. (Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework)

Counterinsurgency – Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called **COIN**. (JP 3-24)

Counterterrorism – Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Also called **CT.** See also **antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism.** (JP 3-26)

Country Team – The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. Also called **CT**. (JP 3-07.4)

Criminal – (unofficial) Individuals or groups who engage in activities that are in violation of their Government's or international laws. U.S. Military cannot interdict criminals without interagency support under U.S. Code unless the criminal is linked to terrorism, insurgency, or militarism.

Dominion – (unofficial) Organized entities that can enforce the will upon the population.

Ends – desired strategic outcomes or end states

Ends-Ways-Means – A strategic model that balances what you want (ENDS) with what you are willing and able to pay for it (MEANS) and what tactics you can or are able to employ to get what you want (WAYS).

Executive Direction – activities direct, develop national policy for, and resource the FSF.

Foreign Internal Defense – Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **FID.** (JP 3-22)

Foreign Security Forces (FSF) – All organizations and their personnel (other than U.S. assets) that are under governmental control with the mission of protecting a government, an organization or people from internal and/or external threats. Elements of the security forces include, but are not limited to, military forces, police, corrections personnel, and border guards (to include the coast guard) at the local through national levels.

Foreign military sales – That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called **FMS.** (JP 1-02) Under this authority, the United States Government sells at full cost defense articles and services to foreign governments and international organizations. (Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework)

Generating Force – elements that support force generation and capability development, of the operating force

Guerrilla warfare – Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called **GW.** See also unconventional **warfare**. (JP 3-05.1)

Insurgency – The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

International military education and training – Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called **IMET.** (JP 1-02)

Internal Defense and Development – The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **IDAD**. See also foreign internal defense. (JP 3-22)

Irregular Warfare – A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called **IW**. (JP-1)

Letter of Request – A letter of requirements or assistance a partner nation submits to the United States. There is no standard format. (DISAM, The Management of Security Cooperation, 30th Edition January 2011)

Means – the resources required to achieve the ends, such as troops, weapons systems, money, political will, and time.

Militant – (unofficial) Individuals or groups who seek to exert their control over a particular geographic region, population group and/or economy through the use of force or intimidation.

Military Information Support Operations -Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of military information support operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **MISO.** (JP 3-13.2)

Mission – 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the required action to take and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0) 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 3-0) 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 3-30)

Mission Strategy & Resource Plan – Each mission's (including the DoS and other U.S. Government agencies located in the country) annual strategic plan outlining the intended goals, priority initiatives, and performance indicators with targets for the country team. (DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, FY07-12)

Security Assistance – Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency funds and authorizes security assistance, an element of security cooperation. Also called **SA.** See also **security cooperation.** (JP 3-22) Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by DOS to be administered by DOD/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework)

Security Cooperation – Activities undertaken by the DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD- administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operation; and provide U.S. Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. Also called SC. (Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework)

Security Force Assistance – The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called **SFA.** (JP 3-22)

Security forces – Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22)

Security Sector Reform – A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. Also called **SSR.** (JP 3-07) The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. From a donor perspective, SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament; demobilizations and reintegration,; or reduction of armed violence. The DOD's primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the

armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum. (Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework)

Separatist – (unofficial) Individuals or groups who actively try, through violent and non-violent means, to separate and area from a sovereign state into its own self-governed state.

Stability Operations – An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

Terrorist – The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. See also **antiterrorism; combating terrorism; counterterrorism; force protection condition.** (JP 3-07.2)

Transnational threat – Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens United States national security or interests. (JP 3-26)

Unconventional Warfare – Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called **UW.** (JP 3-05)

Underground – A cellular organization within the irregular movement that is responsible for subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and other compartmentalized activities. (FM 3-05)

Ways – The methods, tactics, and procedures used to achieve the ends.