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**UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**



***Total Army MISO Assessment
GOSC Results Info Paper***

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SUBJECT: Total Army MISO Assessment GOSC Results.

1. (U) Purpose. To provide an update on current status of HQDA G-3/5/7 directed Total Army Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Assessment and an Executive Summary (EXSUM) of the 2-star GOSC conducted 11 Feb 2016.

2. (U) Background and Discussion.

a. The overall purpose of the Total Army MISO Assessment was to address future PSYOP requirements across the entire force in the near (0-2 years), mid (3-7 years) and far (8-20 years) terms in support of the Army's vision for F2025.

b. Two working groups were held at Ft. Bragg, NC, 18-20 Aug and 17-19 Nov 2015. The analysis conducted during both working groups, as well as post-working group refinement, resulted in the identification of eleven (11) gaps – one (01) institutional and ten (10) operational – and twenty-three (23) recommended solution options across the DOTMLPF-P domains.

c. A General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) was conducted on 11 Feb 2016 to provide an overview on the outcome of the assessment, focusing on the four (04) solution options to the identified institutional gap. (Note: the institutional gap was moved to priority #01 (from priority #05) post-working group based on senior leader input from both USASOC and USARC.) Sitting members of the GOSC included: CDR, USAJFKSWCS - MG Linder; DCG, USARC - MG Conboy; CDR, USACAPOC - MG Ammerman; and DiCG, USASOC - Mr./SES Holcomb; other GO participants included DCG, USASOC - BG Stockel and MSG Director - BG Mason. Outstations via SVTC included 1st SFC(A)(P) – COL Leahy and USSOCOM. The purpose of the GOSC was to garner consensus on the four (04) solutions and hence the approval to continue the analysis in support of the further development and implementation of those solutions.

3. (U) EXSUM to Total Army MISO Assessment GOSC.

a. (U) **Capability Gap – Defining the Problem**. The institutional gap is defined as “The MISO Force Modernization Proponent and the Army lack the sufficiency and proficiency to perform the necessary range of Force Management functions in order to adequately organize, man, train, equip, educate, and sustain PSYOP forces to meet GCC requirements across the ROMO”. The root causes to this gap include:

1) Transfer of RC PSYOP from USASOC to USARC in 2006 and subsequent designation of those forces as conventional; CG USASOC / USARC 03 Mar 2015 decision to maintain current C2; confirmed by CG, USASOC's recent guidance Nov 2015.

2) Ambiguous and seemingly conflicting policy guidance defining Force Management responsibilities, i.e.

a) Title X Sec 167 gives USSOCOM authority to validate requirements for SO activities (which includes MISO) whether or not relating to “the special operations command”.

b) DepSecDef Memo Nov 2006: "For the purposes of Title 10 Section 167, RC CA / PSYOP will no longer be designated a Special Operations Force."

Note: The question then becomes, 'Does this relieve USSOCOM of all proponent responsibilities for the conventional PSYOP force or is MISO a Special Operations Activity even when conducted by CF?'

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3) USSOCOM lacks clear policy guidance articulating their Force Modernization responsibilities to the Army for the Total PSYOP Force.

4) SOCoE lacks the capacity to fully meet its AR 5-22 designated Army MISO Proponent responsibilities, including:

a) Force Modernization: Concept Development & Experimentation and Capability Development & Integration (i.e. DOTMLPF-P Requirements determination).

b) Branch Proponent functions: Personnel, Doctrine, and Training Domain Requirements for conventional PSYOP force.

5) Lack of personnel w/in Army organizations, systems, and processes to conduct the requisite MISO Force Management functions (i.e. organize, man, train, equip, educate, and sustain PSYOP forces). This specifically includes the following:

a) Lack of Army Secretariat, HQDA Staff, TRADOC, & FORSCOM counterparts to coordinate, integrate, & manage (conventional force) DOTMLPF-P requirements.

b) Lack of Army Center of Excellence (CoE) counterpart (i.e. MCCoE) to coordinate, integrate, & manage (conventional force) DOTMLPF-P requirements.

c) Lack of RC PSYOP advocacy / support for Army PPBES, JCIDS, DAS, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), etc.

b. (U) **Capability Gap – Defining the Solution.** The recommended solution options include the following three (03) Lines of Effort (LOEs):

1) LOE 1. Equip the Total PSYOP Force, specifically the conventional force.

a) Designate the existing six PSYOP-specific items of equipment as Army standard within the USSOCOM PoR.

b) Assign Army PSYOP Program Manager (i.e. dual hat an existing PEO / PM).

c) Establish the associated ILS system to perform the requisite material lifecycle sustainment functions.

d) Non-PSYOP specific conventional force requirements, i.e. C4I, previously provided by MFP-11 PoR(s), will be satisfied by Army MFP-2 program(s) that provides the necessary capability.

e) Clarify USSOCOM Responsibility / Authority as the Joint Proponent for the Total PSYOP Force (i.e. DOTMLPF-P Requirements validation for all Services).

f) USSOCOM, as the Joint Proponent, retains RDT&E and configuration management authority.

2) LOE 2. Establish the requisite manning across the Army to perform the necessary range of Force Management functions for MISO.

a) Rescind Policy Memorandum that prohibits AC PSYOP from competing and serving in (O1A) Branch immaterial positions in order to enable the requisite Branch 37 representation w/in Army organizations, systems, and processes to conduct MISO Force Management functions as appropriate (i.e. organize, man, train, equip, educate, and sustain PSYOP forces).

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b) Man positions at ASA-MRA, HQDA Staff, TRADOC, and FORSCOM to enable PPBES, JCIDS, DAS, ILS, and DOTMLPF-P requirements management.

3) LOE 3. Enable the proponent with the requisite manpower leveraging USASOC internal as well as external resources.

a) "Matrix" support from the USASOC DCS G-9 to support SOCoE Force Modernization responsibilities, i.e. Concept Development and Experimentation & Capabilities Development and Integration for the Total PSYOP Force (i.e. DOTMLPF-P Requirements determination).

b) Increase manpower (5 positions) within the PSYOP Commandant to conduct Personnel, Doctrine, and Training Domain functions for conventional forces.

c. (U) **GOSC Results**. The briefing was well received by all participants, and following a few questions and some limited discussion, all GOSC members concurred with all the solution options within the 3 LOEs as briefed.

1) Institutional Gap. All participating GOSC members concurred with all recommended solution options within the three (03) LOEs to address the institutional gap.

2) Operational Gap. With regard to the remaining operational gaps, to fulfill CG, USASOC intent to focus on operational issues post "Institutional"-focused GOSC, all ten (10) operational gaps and nineteen (19) solutions will be incorporated into the USASOC Strategic Planning Process for further development, resourcing as appropriate, and implementation via the USASOC Guidance for Development of the Force and "Roadmap to 2022 & beyond" process.

4. (U) Way Ahead. The way ahead for the Total Army MISO Assessment includes the following steps:

a. (U) Provide an EXSUM post-GOSC and schedule any required and/or requested outbriefs.

b. (U) CDR, SOCoE, MG Linder, will out-brief GOSC results to HQDA G-33, MG Piatt EOM Feb 2016.

c. (U) Prepare a memorandum for CG, USASOC and CG, USARC signature to HQDA G-3 capturing the recommended way NLT EOM March 2016.

d. (U) HQDA G-3 tasks HQDA, AMC, TRADOC, FORSCOM, etc. to participate in the MISO Solution Development IPT until all solutions are implemented.

e. (U) All GOSC approved solution options will be incorporated in the USASOC Strategic Planning Process (SPP) for command oversight through implementation.

Encl.

Appendix A – Project Milestones

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Appendix A – Project Milestones.

(U) Project Milestones.

- Jul 2015: HQDA G-33 directs a Total Army MISO Assessment to define the role of MISO in support of the Army's vision for F2025.
- HQDA G-3 SOD designated as Project Lead; USASOC DCS G-9 assumes OPR for planning and coordination, with the PSYOP Commandant taking lead for content and execution.
- 18-22 Aug 2015: WG #01 focused on framing the future operating environment and defining MISO required capabilities and concluded in an out brief to the HQDA G-33, MG Piatt, and the USACAPOC Commander, MG Ammerman.
- 17-19 Nov 2015: WG #02 focused on identifying capability gaps (operational and institutional) and DOTMLPF-P solutions to close or mitigate those gaps. The WG concluded with an O-6 level out brief to HQGA G-3 SOD, USASOC DCS G-9, USAJFKSWCS PSYOP Commandant, USACAPOC CoS, USARC DCG(O), USARC DCG(S), and USSOCOM Joint MISO Proponent.
- 18 Dec 2015 – 15 Jan 2016: O-6 Level staffing of DRAFT Report for MISO WG #02. Received comments from 6 of 6 stakeholders – all concurred with comment.
- 05 Feb 2016: Adjudication of all comments to DRAFT Report for MISO WG #02 completed (Final Report for MISO WG #02 pending).
- 11 Feb 2016: General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) conducted.
- 26 Feb 2016: Out brief GOSC results to MG Piatt (HQDA G-33).
- EOM Mar 16: Memorandum from CG, USASOC and CG, USARC to HQDA G-3 capturing the recommended way.
- TBD: HQDA G-3 tasks HQDA Staff, AMC, TRADOC, FORSCOM, etc. to participate in USASOC/USAJFKSWCS led Solution Development IPTs until all solutions are fully implemented.