

Scouts in Contact

Tactical Vignettes for Cavalry Leaders

**Foreword by MG Joseph Martin,
Commanding General, The National Training Center**



LTC J. Frederick Dente
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Foreword


The Cavalry Leader shoulders a huge responsibility—the Scout's purpose will not be fulfilled without him making contact with the enemy. In most cases, the Scout will do so with little to no notice, under the cover of darkness, over difficult terrain—all in the name of setting conditions for the success of the formation as a whole.

Cobra Team has developed *SCOUTS IN CONTACT* to provide commanders a tool to train young Scouts to think through complex tactical problems and communicate clear, concise, and executable orders. This is not a guide on 'what to think' but a series of exercises to train our doctrinal fundamentals, in ambiguous, rapidly changing tactical situations. In the end, it increases our junior leaders' ability 'how to think' while building their experience base in a low-overhead training environment.

The scenarios are real and diverse. They will challenge commanders at every level and enable meaningful learning as the Scouts undertake a planning effort to deconstruct the problem set. Furthermore, they provide the opportunity to shape and improve the audience's understanding of our reconnaissance and security fundamentals.

I suggest that the commanders incorporate this text into their overall training methodology in the crawl phase to ensure our Cavalry leaders understand the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. Reps and sets today will improve subsequent live performance and, more importantly, potentially save lives on the battlefield.

TRAIN THE FORCE!



Joseph M. Martin
Major General, US Army
Commanding General
The National Training Center and Fort Irwin

Introduction

Someone must go forward and make contact with the enemy. They will do it while enablers are not in position to support. They will do it on short notice. Invariably they will do it in the dead of night on the most difficult terrain. This complex task falls to the Cavalry Squadrons of the Brigade Combat team. At the cutting edge of these Squadrons are the Scout Sections and Platoons that will do the work of gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. With *SCOUTS IN CONTACT* the Cobra Team has given us a tool to train Cavalry Leaders to think through these tactical problems and communicate clear, correct, and executable orders.


This Tactical Decision Exercise (TDE) book is designed to allow Squadron Commanders to facilitate repetitive, imaginative and effective training. If employed as intended it will allow Commanders to train, assess and certify Scout PLs, PSGs and Senior Scouts. It should help commanders to teach and assess comprehension of those core fundamentals that must be mastered by all Scout Leaders and Cavalry Officers. They are intended to be executed in a classroom environment on a table top. Digital maps and placards are included in this product to facilitate that training venue. As Platoons gain confidence, these exercises can easily be expanded to Sand Tables or Terrain Models to increase the size and scope of the training audience.

Why are these low-tech table-top TDEs still valid in an environment where a Commander can leverage powerful live, virtual and constructive systems like CCTT and MILES? The answer is simple, these TDEs allow the commander to observe and assess how his scouts think. Strip away all distractions from virtual training environments. Strip away the pressures of time and space in live force-on-force training. Slow down the tempo of the operation, and watch a young leader think through a complex tactical problem.

While each TDE is carefully designed to focus on a specific fundamental of reconnaissance or security, they should not be interpreted as a how-to manual. Commanders should stress in the application of these exercises that there is not a correct answer to the tactical problem. Our doctrine should guide our tactical decisions, but the problem solving process and the team work of the PL, PSG and Senior Scout are the real measure of effectiveness. Commanders should allow and reward trial and error. If a Leader makes a decision that causes tactical failure—let it play out, teach the lesson, then reset the placards and begin again.

Finally, while this product has been prepared by the Cobra Team and is heavily informed by our observation of innumerable Squadrons, it must not be interpreted as a primer for an NTC rotation. It is designed to increase the effectiveness of scout leaders in combat.

SCOUTS OUT!



J. Frederick Dente
LTC, AR
Senior Cavalry OC/T
Operations Group, The NTC

Fundamentals of Reconnaissance and Security

An Army Professional is Soldier or Army Civilian who meets the Army Profession's certification criteria in character, competence, and commitment. The profession of arms requires that professional Soldiers establish and uphold the discipline and standards of their art and science, including the responsibility for professional development and certification. (ADRP 1)

Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to effective execution of unified land operations. (ADP 3-0)

The United States Cavalry performs reconnaissance and security operations. The core competencies of Cavalry forces are to conduct reconnaissance and security in close contact with enemy forces and civilian populations. (FM 3-98) Professional cavalrymen require professional certification from the Squadron Commander on their ability to make competent and fast decisions — grounded in thorough understanding of the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS. There are seven fundamentals that govern planning and executing reconnaissance tasks. (FM 3-98)

Ensure continuous reconnaissance. BCTs require continuous information collection throughout all phases and critical events of all operations. Commanders direct information collection throughout all operations and task organize Cavalry assets to collect required information leading to more informed identification and execution of branches and sequels. Continuous reconnaissance provides commanders with a constant flow of information in close contact with the enemy and civilian populace to identify and seize key terrain, confirm or deny enemy composition, disposition, strength and courses of action, and provides reaction time and maneuver space for unpredicted enemy actions.

Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Continuous and focused collection efforts require an efficient mix and redundancy of reconnaissance assets; however, this does not mean to employ all assets simultaneously. Commanders maximize employment of their reconnaissance assets to answer their commander's critical information requirements. BCTs task and position reconnaissance assets at the appropriate time, place, and in the right combination (human, sensor, and technical means) to maximize their impact, allow for timely analysis of information, and aide decision making at the appropriate echelon.

Orient on reconnaissance objectives. Commanders direct reconnaissance efforts by establishing reconnaissance objectives with a specific task, purpose, and focus. Reconnaissance objectives can be a combination of terrain features, geographic areas, threat, enemy, adversaries, or civil considerations that provide commanders the necessary information to answer priority intelligence requirements. Cavalry formations, task organized to effectively

THIS WORKBOOK
GIVES SQUADRON
COMMANDERS A TOOL
TO DIVE INTO THE
WEIGHTY FM 3-98
DEFINITIONS OF THE
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WITH PLATOON
LEADERS. WHAT DOES
"GAIN AND MAINTAIN
ENEMY CONTACT"
REALLY MEAN TO A
SCOUT PLATOON
LEADER? HOW DOES
HE ACUALLY DO IT?
WHAT HAPPENS IF HE
DOESN'T DO IT?

accomplish their objectives, develop their scheme of maneuver to maximize their capability to collect the required information within assigned objectives.

Report all information rapidly and accurately. Commanders develop plans and make decisions based upon the analysis of information collected by subordinate units. Quick and accurate reports are required for the commander to make informed decisions on the proper application of his forces. Rapid reporting allows staffs maximum time to analyze information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information requirements tied to decision points with a LTIOV date-time group provide focus for units collecting information and ensure units report information to facilitate timely decisions.

Retain freedom of maneuver. Tactical mobility and maneuver fundamentally drive the success of reconnaissance tasks. Commanders and staffs consider task organization, movement techniques, and scheme of maneuver to retain the unit's ability to maneuver. Reconnaissance tasks confirm or deny assumptions about terrain and enemy made during mission analysis and IPB to identify opportunities and maintain agile freedom of maneuver for the BCT. Effective counter reconnaissance operations retain freedom of maneuver by denying enemy collection efforts and identifying opportunities for the command to seize, retain, and exploit initiative. Commanders change movement techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the smallest possible element and avoid becoming decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by avoiding decisive engagement with a superior force and develop the situation further—consistently balancing the requirement to maintain contact with retaining freedom of maneuver.

Gain and maintain enemy contact. Cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy on terms and conditions of their choosing. Using at least one of the eight forms of contact, commanders and staffs plan for and integrate aerial and ground sensors, manned platforms and unmanned systems, dismounted operations, SIGINT, image intelligence, HUMINT, and visual observation to gain contact with the enemy using the smallest element possible. Intelligence units can provide a wide array of support to assist cavalry forces in detecting and tracking the enemy such as: imagery and full motion video provided by UAS or geolocation provided by signals intelligence collectors. Once units make contact, Cavalry forces maintain contact until specific orders are given, a change of mission occurs when disengagement or displacement criteria dictate, or the unit conducts reconnaissance handover with another unit. Maintaining contact with the enemy provides real-time information of the enemy's composition, disposition, strength, and actions that allow staffs to analyze and make recommendations to the commander based on current intelligence.

Develop the situation rapidly. Cavalry forces act instinctively and urgently to increase the commander's situational understanding of the terrain, enemy, and civilian populace. Effective Cavalry forces understand how time impacts movement (both friendly and enemy) and how timely collection of intelligence requirements impacts the commander's decisions. The reconnaissance scheme of maneuver and tempo matches the requisite urgency to answer the necessary information requirements. Cavalry forces collect on directed reconnaissance objectives in close contact with civilian populations while selectively choosing to fight enemy forces to determine intent, disposition, composition, and strength.

SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS. The fundamentals of security, like the fundamentals of reconnaissance, provide a framework for security operations. Reconnaissance operations, because they are continuous throughout all operations to develop the situation through information collection, are essential to successful security operations.

The fundamentals of reconnaissance are applicable to security operations and are necessary to ensure successful execution. There are five fundamentals of security.

Provide early and accurate warning. The squadron or protecting unit detects, orients upon, and observes threat forces that can influence the brigade combat team. Early detection and warning through rapid reporting enables the BCT commander to make timely and well-informed decisions for the proper application of his forces on the observed threat.

Provide reaction time and maneuver space. As with “provide early and accurate warning,” the ability for the cavalry squadron to gain and maintain contact and report accurately and rapidly affords the BCT commander the time and space to make an informed decision to employ forces. Reaction time and maneuver space relates to decision points driven by information requirements and indicators given LTIOV parameters to ensure the commander makes decisions that place maximum firepower at the decisive point in a timely manner.

Orient on the protected force, area, or facility. While reconnaissance operations orient on the reconnaissance objective, security operations focus on the protected force by understanding their scheme of maneuver and follow-on mission. By understanding BCT’s required actions and movement, the squadron maneuvers to best provide reaction time and maneuver space that allow for timely decisions.

Perform continuous reconnaissance. Squadron or maneuver battalions continuously seek the enemy and reconnoiter key terrain. Through continuous reconnaissance, forces continue to gain and maintain enemy contact, develop the situation, report rapidly and accurately, and retain freedom of maneuver to provide early and accurate warning and provide reaction time and maneuver space to the protected force. Thus, the fundamentals of reconnaissance are implicit in all security operations. Commanders use the same reconnaissance methods, management and techniques.

Maintain enemy contact. Real-time and accurate information requires Cavalry forces to gain and maintain contact with the enemy to rapidly report their actions and provide reaction time and maneuver space. Like the reconnaissance fundamental “gain and maintain enemy contact,” maintaining enemy contact through one or more of the forms of contact enables the staff to make recommendations to the commander, generate options, identify opportunities, and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

How Cavalrymen Decide

Chapter One

Decision making skills are developed through practice. The lower the level of command, the simpler, faster, more direct, and accelerated the decision making process. The ability to rapidly develop solutions to new problems is based on pattern recognition.

DECISION MAKING PROCESSES (Chess Player versus Boxer).

Analytical Decision Making (Chess Player). The classical model of decision making is a rational and systematic process of analysis based on a comparison of multiple options. If all information is accurate and all pertinent information is known, the analytical decision making process guarantees the best possible decision is made. This analytical decision-making model works well if the facts are not variable, the decision-making environment is held constant, there are no time constraints, and human factors are limited to our personal values. This is your squadron's deliberate MDMP and the TLPs in your troops and platoons. During Cavalry operations, this perfect analytical decision-making process is challenged by a constantly changing environment where not all the information is available, fatigue and other stress is normal, and time is always limited. This workbook focuses on the second, more intuitive process.

Intuitive Decision-making (Boxer). The essential factor in intuitive decision-making is experience. Experience allows recognition of similarities to previous situations. A pattern of typical cause and effect develops to allow a decision that does not require extensive analysis or reason. The more experience gained in applying a variety of patterns, the more likely the Cavalry leader will know what to do. This workbook aims at giving platoon leaders more experience through (albeit) low-tech simulations.

TACTICAL DECISION EXERCISES (TDEs) AND DECISION MAKING.

TDEs provide a simple, adaptable, and effective method of repeatedly challenging a Cavalry leader with tactical situations that include limitations of time and information. By requiring a decision regarding the situation and the ability to communicate it in the form of clear instructions (OPORD or FRAGORD), the scout leader will gain precious experience and skill in actual tactical decision-making.

There is no substitute for the experience of live training. However, simulations provide low-cost repetitions for decision making in times of limited resources. Pattern recognition skills can be improved, and tactical decision-making can be practiced and refined. Tactical Decision Exercises are role-playing exercises designed to place individuals in a contested, ambiguous decision space.

Reasons for conducting TDEs include:

- 1) Practice the decision-making process
- 2) Practice communicating decisions to others
- 3) Ready-made or easily adaptable professional certification vehicle

Because the purpose of TDEs is to build breadth of experience in decision-making and communication, it is important to employ this process frequently at the platoon leadership level. In addition to developing individual decision-making skills, the practice allows platoon leaders to learn from each other and to gain an understanding of how each leader makes decisions. Each wargame conducted, like every live zone reconnaissance, will add to the collective reservoir of experience in the squadron's platoon leadership.

How SCOs Certify Platoon Leaders with TDEs

Chapter Two

Tactical Decision Exercises are inherently simple...keep them simple.

Role Playing. The platoon leader is put into the role of leading his own platoon, in a given situation, with given resources, and a concise scenario. Add to or subtract elements as needed. If schoolhouse instructors are using this workbook, assign leadership roles and resources as necessary.

Limited Information. The platoon leaders will not have as much information about the scenario as they might like. This is an important feature of the TDEs—uncertainty. Confusion and complications are basic characteristics of tactical decision making. Cavalrymen thrive in ambiguity.

Limited Time. The platoon leaders will have limited time to make decisions and communicate those instructions.

Face a Dilemma. Platoon leaders will face situations requiring actual decisions—a problem requiring a solution. His framework is the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. Despite above limitations, he must work out feasible, suitable, and acceptable solutions inside the framework.

After-Action Review (AAR). AARs are the dynamic link between task performance and execution to standard. They provide commanders a critical assessment tool to plan soldier, leader, and unit training. Through the professional and candid discussion of events, Soldiers can compare their performance against the standard and identify specific ways to improve proficiency. (A Leader's Guide to After-Action Reviews)

Rules and Basics of TDEs.

Time limit. Cavalry operations often contain time limitation pressures. Therefore, a time limit during these simulations is appropriate. Leaders should to feel they have less time than they need to make decisions.

Decisions as Instructions. OPORDs and FRAGORDs are the correct way to express tactical decisions in addition to combat reporting—so TDEs solutions should take the same form. There is a difference between “briefing the boss on ‘what I would do’” and tactical orders and reporting. Leaders will be expected to explain their decisions afterward, in the AAR, but the rule during the TDE is “decide first, give an order or report, and explain later at the AAR.”

Reward Creativity. There are a number of ways to solve tactical problems. The Army Training Network (ATN) and Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) resources are the baseline for Training and Evaluations Outlines. Creativity is a prized trait of Cavalrymen. Assess platoon leaders' ability to translate the T&EO standards into real solutions. The O/CTs of Cobra Team have included “Exercise Controller Instructions” in this workbook only to assist squadron commanders in conducting these simulations. Cobra Team has emphasized key points in the T&EOs in those instructions for squadron commanders' consideration.

Stay in Character. For realism, everyone participating simply plays his role. In most cases the role assigned is the tactical role held by those participating. Simply react to the situation and communicate as you would in combat.

How to Facilitate Tactical Decision Exercises

Chapter Three

The squadron commander might want to facilitate this vignette training personally. But as the senior trainer of platoon leaders, he also may choose to assign the troop commander to facilitate his platoon leaders' missions. This gives the SCO the freedom to observe, assess, and certify without having to 'run' the exercise. Depending on who is responsible for the tactics portion of the SCO's Platoon Leader Certification Program, the SCO might also assign facilitator duties to the S3 or other staff officer. ABOLC, ARC, SLC, ALC and other instructors may facilitate themselves in their classrooms.

Facilitator's Responsibilities. Facilitating these TDEs or any vignette is a skill. It is a dynamic learning tool and can be demanding on the facilitator. Remember, we are not getting to the Deliberate Planning training objectives of the squadron with this tool; this is vignette training. Small, snippets of tactical situations given to platoon leaders to force decisions with best known information.

Prepare for the Simulation. Facilitator must have a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of recon and security. He must understand the objectives the SCO wants to accomplish and the standards (T&EO, squadron SOP, or other) used for evaluation. He must be prepared to address a variety of possible decisions made by the platoon leaders.

Establish Delivery Platform. Print out the included 'one-sheet scenario,' enemy/friendly placards, and establish the exercise table with the plotted large map. He has any necessary squadron products ready to use such as squadron TACSOPs, reporting formats, etc. If for official certification, ensure the platoon leader submits his certification checklist to the SCO before the exercise.

Explain Rules. Issue the simple rules of the exercise, such as 'communicate decisions as instructions' (no "well I would...")

Orient the Participants. Orient the group to the map and explain the meaning of all props. The facilitator should answer questions about the scenario layout which the platoon leaders would reasonably have knowledge of, but the facilitator should not eliminate all uncertainties. "That is unknown" is a reasonable answer to many questions. "That's a good question. I'll assign a specially trained, organized, and equipped scout platoon to figure that out" is slightly more passive aggressive, but gets the point across to a resisting platoon leader. The SCO may choose to personally give some Commander's Intent to enhance the vignette's given scenario slightly.

Prepared and Tactically Knowledgeable. In order to lead the discussion and provide a useful AAR, the facilitator must know the subject matter. This skill is especially important since there will be several ways for platoon leaders to solve their tactical dilemma. The facilitator must be familiar with the particular scenario and be able to discuss it intelligently. While recognizing that there may be several right answers that could actually work on the ground, facilitators must be able to identify plans that would obviously fail or are not safe or tactically sound. Preparing discussion points for common solutions and for obviously unsound or unsafe solutions is recommended.

Adapt to the Unexpected. Since these vignettes are ‘free play’, the facilitator must be able to maintain his/her own situational awareness in order to adapt to unexpected changes. Cavalrymen will invariably come up with unexpected questions or solutions. The discussion will present unexpected opportunities to provide impromptu lessons about key tactical concepts. The facilitator must be able to adapt quickly to unforeseen circumstances resulting from platoon leader developed plans or contingencies. The facilitator must be prepared to provide additional inputs (either constraints, additional objectives, or the SCO could refine his commander’s intent) if necessary to gain the training objective.

TDEs are time compressed scenarios. Provide frequent “time tags” to keep the clock ticking. It is a good practice to remind platoon leaders ‘how much time’ has passed through the phases of his vignette. The facilitator uses his experience and the laws of physics to assist him. (A 15 KM route reconnaissance takes more than 20 minutes. Facilitator can keep the platoon leader abreast of the timing as he moves through zone: “That’s one hour expired, that’s two hours expired, etc.”)

“Timeouts” or Suspension of Battlefield Effects. They might be necessary, at times, to keep the group focused on the learning objectives. This technique should not be frequently used. The facilitator should clarify the situation and resume action as quickly as possible.

How to Conduct After-Action Reviews

Chapter Four

Effective AARs are a reflection of the commander and his role in training. AARs foster an environment of trust, collaboration, initiative, and a co-creation of context necessary among Soldiers and leaders in decentralized operations. Soldiers learn and understand the commander's intent and act decisively while accepting prudent risks.

AARs during training include the same four parts as AARs during operations.

Review what was supposed to occur. The facilitator, along with the participants, reviews what was supposed to happen. This review is based on the commander's intent, training objectives and tasks to train. This information is usually found in the operations order or on the training schedule.

Establish what happened. The facilitator and participants determine to the extent possible what actually occurred during the training event, phase or the operation. The leader attempts to gather as many views or perspectives (OPFOR, squad leader, team leader, rifleman, etc.) as feasible and possible. This helps to establish a common understanding and instill operational adaptability. Leaders then understand the complexity of an event and work to solve complex, ill- defined problems quickly.

Determine what was right or wrong with what happened. Participants then establish the strong and weak points of their performance based on the commander's intent and performance measures. The facilitator guides discussions to ensure maximum input; is operationally sound and relevant to the training event.

Determine how the task should be done differently next time. The facilitator guides the unit in determining how the task(s) might be performed more effectively in the future. The unit identifies problems and provides solutions as well as identifies who will make those solutions. Additionally, the facilitator guides the discussion to determine if there is a more effective way to train the tasks to achieve the commanders' intent.

A Leader's Guide to After Action Reviews (AAR). September 2011. US Army Combined Arms Center – Training, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027

Reconnaissance and Security Vignettes

Appendix A

Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance	01
Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve	02
Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective	03
Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately	04
Retain Freedom of Maneuver	05
Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact	06
Develop the Situation Rapidly	07
Provide Early and Accurate Warning	08
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Perform Continuous Reconnaissance	11
Maintain Enemy Contact	12


CAVALRY VIGNETTE 01:


“Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance”

You are a scout platoon and your troop commander tasked your platoon with conducting reconnaissance of NAIs 5050 and 5052 which affects an expected Avenue of Approach for the enemy’s exploitation force. You must also confirm or deny the enemy’s use of AoA DODGE and to identify composition, and strength of the enemy’s exploitation force. You need to gather information about the utility of AoA DODGE as a viable attack route. You also need to provide composition, disposition, strength, and orientation of enemy exploitation force using AoA DODGE. The purpose of your mission is to prevent the enemy from surprising the BCT before, during, and after its defensive operations

The enemy recently moved south from their defense and is expected to attack the BCT. The enemy has two templated courses of action and one is the use of AoA DODGE. Within AoA DODGE, MSR BUD travels through a small pass and is canalizing terrain for forces using the pass. The enemy wants to gain a foothold on the pass to allow the exploitation force to breach the BCT’s obstacles. The enemy’s decisive point is breaching the BCT’s obstacles. The enemy is supported by two 120mm mortars, and engineers to reduce obstacles. Observation posts consist of four to six individuals with medium machine guns and anti-tank weapon systems. The enemy has a company in reserve 10KM to the north of PL JETS.

Your BCT is defending east of PL CHIEFS in order to generate combat power to transition to the offense. It is important that you identify the exploitation force so that the BCT can confirm the enemy’s timeline and prepare its defense. The BCT Shadow is flying in support of the squadron decisive operation north of PL JETS, so you will only have the organic troop Raven. Your platoon is second in the priority of troop mortars and is tasked with providing two troop mortar targets. Your BCT is depending on your reconnaissance to determine the enemy’s course of action. You have 10 minutes to issue an order to your platoon. ACT NOW!





16-01 ENSURE CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

CAVALRY VIGNETTE 01:

What Does “*Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance*” Mean?

“BCTs require continuous information collection throughout all phases and critical events of all operations. Commanders direct information collection throughout all operations and task organize Cavalry assets to collect required information leading to more informed identification and execution of branches and sequels. Continuous reconnaissance provides commanders with a constant flow of information in close contact with the enemy and civilian populace to identify and seize key terrain, confirm or deny enemy composition, disposition, strength and courses of action, and provides reaction time and maneuver space for unpredicted enemy actions.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Commander conducts reconnaissance before, during, and after all operations to provide the commander with updated information that verifies the enemy's composition, dispositions, and intentions as the battle progresses.

When current operational information is adequate, reconnaissance elements gather information for branches and sequels to current plans. As a minimum, reconnaissance is conducted continuously as part of all security missions, including the conduct of local security for forces not in contact.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader plans for long duration observation. Mixing mounted and dismounted OPs for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- Platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- Platoon dedicates appropriate assets and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- Observation posts have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- Platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through the zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.
- Although he does not make contact with his templated enemy, the platoon leader continues his reconnaissance, even as the BCT begins its defense in order to create space and time and prevent the surprise of the BCT through his assigned area.
- Understands the often competing demands of ‘risk to mission’ versus ‘risk to his unit.’

Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader does not prioritize recon guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- Platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations
- Platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- Does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.
- Observation posts are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- Platoon leader’s understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- Repositions to positions that cannot prevent the BCT from being surprised by a force using MSR BUD.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“*Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance*”

- PL CHIEFS: Engage the platoon with cannon delivered indirect fire from the north at PL CHIEFS at LD by using a placard against one of the sections. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance in order to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing the artillery.
 - He should to continue mission or issue a fragmentary order to address the new information if necessary. As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal enemy OP vic TAI 5050 to the section who is able to make visual contact by placing placard in/around NAI 5050.
 - The platoon leader must assess that this LP/OP is an inferior force and maneuvers the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, the enemy breaks contact (remove placard). Redo this scenario at PL RAIDERS.
 - Once the contact with the LP/OP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL RAMS: Platoon crosses PL RAMS, enemy dismount team engages a scout section with an ATGM and destroys one vehicle. The enemy ambush is not identified by remaining vehicles.
 - ***Cavalry Leadership Dilemma***: Now the platoon leader must quickly assess the ATGM ambush and its threat to the platoon and the mission. The platoon leader must wrestle with spending precious time regaining contact with the enemy ambushing forces or moving forward in zone to orient on the reconnaissance objective. These competing demands are complicated by possible CASEVAC and other factors. The platoon leader must pursue continuous reconnaissance however.
 - If he assesses that the ambush is a like/superior force, he may direct suppressive direct and indirect fires against suspected enemy locations and request smoke to screen his bypass and advance further into zone. He may request that the troop deploy its UAS to surveil the suspected enemy locations. This action indicates that the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to unit by bypassing an enemy ambush to accomplish his mission.
 - If he assesses that the ambush is another inferior force, he may also maneuver to gain local superiority to destroy the threat with a sound form of maneuver and multiple forms of contact. This action indicates that the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to his mission as he works to preserve his combat power.
 - Once the contact with the ambush is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL RAIDERS: Platoon establishes observation of MSR BUD from multiple vantage points to find enemy exploitation force moving south along MSR BUD. Platoon leader may conduct route reconnaissance of MSR BUD, if in his fragmentary order.
 - Platoon leader synchronizes the observation plans of scout mounted and dismounted OPs. He reports dead space and his procedures for conducting reconnaissance handover between scout sections.
 - Once established, his platoons has negative contact with the suspected enemy exploitation force. The enemy does not use AoA DODGE but takes an alternate route to the BCT’s defense.
 - *Troop commander reports, “Squadron S2 assesses that the exploitation force advanced along AoA CHEVROLET north of PL JETS. The enemy had success along AoA CHEVROLET, but was stopped at the BCT main defensive area up north. The squadron has negative contact with any enemy reserve formation yet.”*

- The enemy exploitation force bypassed this scout platoon’s reconnaissance, but failed to breach the BCT’s defenses. Assess the platoon leader as he develops “negative contact.” No contact with the expected enemy creates uncertainty and a common leadership dilemma.
- ***Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:*** Now the platoon leader must quickly assess his situation. The platoon leader knows that his templated enemy used another route into the BCT defense. He also knows that the enemy committed at least one LP/OP supported with tube artillery and at least one anti-armor ambush to AoA DODGE, indicating that the enemy values this route also. He must now wrestle with continuing his mission along MSR BUD or repositioning closer to PL JETS to support the BCT defense. He may assess an opportunity to exploit repulsed enemy formations near PL JETS. These competing demands are complicated by the troop commander’s report that the squadron has not gained contact with the heretofore unplanned enemy reserve formation. The platoon leader must pursue continuous reconnaissance however.
- Allow the platoon leader to issue a fragmentary order and conduct any maneuver required in that order.
- Un-templated Reserve: Reveal four tanks, eight BMPs moving south along MSR BUD from RP towards SP to the first scout section capable of making visual contact by placing appropriate placards. Steadily move the enemy formation along MSR BUD towards and through PL CHIEFS.
 - Platoon leader must direct reconnaissance handover between scout sections.
 - Platoon leader must fight and report simultaneously
 - Platoon leader disrupts within his capability.
 - Platoon leader issues a complete report to his higher headquarters, ensuring the BCT is not surprised by this unexpected enemy armor formation. (The BCT has time to address this threat).
- If the scout platoon is moving away or is out of position, the platoon leader cannot provide the requisite information to his BCT commander. This demonstrates that he focused on his task more than accomplishing his purpose (prevent the enemy from surprising the BCT before, during, and after its defensive operations.) This indicates failure, by the platoon leader, to demonstrate mastery of the fundamental conduct continuous reconnaissance.

NOTES:


CAVALRY VIGNETTE 02:


“Do not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve”

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is tasked to conduct an area reconnaissance of NAIs 3030 and 3032 to identify the enemy’s defensive preparations, to include obstacles, battle positions, and general locations of key weapon systems. Your platoon is currently executing a screen south of PL BULLS.

The enemy has recently conducted a series of attacks north of the BCT AO. These attacks have pushed the BCT south of PL BULLS. The enemy is anticipating that your BCT is building combat power and will attempt to attack. The enemy has established a deliberate defense three kilometers north of PL BUCKS and is actively improving their position. The enemy’s defense is supported by two to three observation posts to provide early warning; a section of 120mm mortars; and engineers to provide fighting positions and obstacles. The enemy has a company in reserve 10KM northeast of their defense. The reserve will be dispatched when a battalion loses three or more platoons or two platoons and one their engineer assets.

Your BCT commander does not know the location of the enemy obstacles, battle positions, and any AT weapon systems. The BCT will attack in 24 hours and you have 12 hours to develop the situation and identify the obstacles and the enemy battle positions to enable the BCT to destroy the enemy. You are priority of fires for troop mortars and are allotted two mortar targets. You have the troop Raven and a dismounted engineer reconnaissance team that you can employ to support your platoon. You also have a prophet team consisting of three HMMWV mounted systems that can directionally find the enemy based on intercepting radio transmissions. You have ten minutes to issue a FRAGO and begin your reconnaissance. ACT NOW!





CAVALRY VIGNETTE 02:

What Does “*Do not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve*” mean.

“Continuous and focused collection efforts require an efficient mix and redundancy of reconnaissance assets; however, this does not mean to employ all assets simultaneously. Commanders maximize employment of their reconnaissance assets to answer their commander’s critical information requirements. BCTs task and position reconnaissance assets at the appropriate time, place, and in the right combination (human, sensor, and technical means) to maximize their impact, allow for timely analysis of information, and aide decision making at the appropriate echelon.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Reconnaissance assets are never kept in reserve. When committed, reconnaissance assets use all of their resources to accomplish the mission. This does not mean that all assets are committed all the time.

The commander uses available reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations to achieve the maximum coverage needed to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). At times, this requires the commander to withhold or position reconnaissance assets to ensure that they are available at critical times and places. Commanders consider all reconnaissance assets as committed assets with specific missions at all times.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon use a combination of dismounted and mounted observation posts to gain tactical depth.
- Platoon leader briefed a plan that gives every maneuver unit and attachment a task and purpose.
- Platoon organic and attached observation platforms are given a task and purpose, not necessary for all to be used at the same time, and are positioned in a manner that gives the platoon its best observation.
- Observation post establishment and priorities of work are accomplished and allows for maximum observation.
- Coordination with adjacent units to cover dead space.
- Integrated fires plan to support his maneuver.

Indicators of Failure

- Platoon leader does not use dismounts.
- Platoon uses a linear screen and does not gain all vantage points necessary to answer information requirements.
- Platoon leader does not assign reconnaissance task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- Platoon and sections does not execute priorities of work or OP establishment in a timely manner and removes observation assets from the fight.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Do not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve”

- Prior to crossing PL BULLS: Platoon receives indirect fire on any one attachment he did not give a task and purpose to. Place an IDF placard on those elements and inform the platoon leader that due to the lack of guidance they received they were vulnerable to enemy and spotted by an enemy OP.
 - The platoon leader should identify any other asset or attachment that he did not plan for an assign a task and purpose. If he does not assign task and purpose to all elements continue to destroy his attachments with IDF.
 - If the platoon leader assigns a task and purpose to all assets and attachments then he does not come into any contact as he begins his maneuver.
- PL BULLS: Platoon leader does not receive any enemy contact. Allow the platoon leader to emplace his sections without enemy contact. Once he is set evaluate how he maneuvered and established his sections and his attachments.
 - If the platoon leader properly emplaced the prophet teams to directionally find the enemy then reveal a company size battle position in NAI 3032. Place an enemy company size battle position placard in NAI 3032 and six tanks and three BMPs. The platoon leader can continue to develop the situation with his other enablers, he can maneuver to engage with direct fire, or engage with indirect fire.
 - If the platoon leader maneuvers on the enemy armor then destroy half of the platoon.
 - If the platoon leader engages with indirect fire then remove the enemy vehicle placards and inform the platoon leader that the tanks and BMPs moved to their hide site.
 - If the platoon leader flies the Raven over NAI 3030 then reveal an enemy OP consisting of enemy dismounts and one BRDM. Place placards vic NAI 3030.
 - If the platoon leader engages with IDF then destroy the OP, flip the placard over.
 - If the platoon leader properly uses the ERT and they are in a position to observe NAI 3032 then place an obstacle placard on the map. The platoon has identified the enemy’s obstacle belt and write on the placard the type, four corner grids, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a BLUE 9 obstacle report.
 - If the platoon leader fails to employ these enablers then he will not identify the enemy battle positions or obstacles.
- PL BUCKS: If the platoon leader fails to employ his enablers prior to crossing PL BUCKS then place four tank and two BMP placards in NAI 3032 and destroy half of the platoon from direct fire from the enemy armor. If the platoon leader displaces then remove the enemy armor placards showing the platoon leader broke contact.
 - If the platoon leader remains decisively engaged and attempts to engage with direct fire and not displace then destroy the remaining of the platoon and the platoon leader fails to achieve his reconnaissance objective.


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
“Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective”

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting a zone reconnaissance from PL HOUSTON to PL MIAMI in order to allow the BCT freedom of maneuver. The troop commander has identified the following as key tasks: neutralize enemy recon, identify enemy defensive positions along AXIS COPPER, and conduct FPOL with BCT DO along AXIS COPPER. Your reconnaissance objective is to identify the enemy obstacles.

The squadron S2 estimates that the enemy reconnaissance screens between PL LOS ANGELES and PL MIAMI in order to identify the BCT DO's axis of advance. NAIs 1040 and 1045 coincide with templated enemy observation posts. The S2 asserts that the enemy main body will develop engagement areas along AXIS COPPER in the vicinity of either NAI 1065 or NAI 1070, consisting of a mechanized infantry battalion supported by counter mobility and survivability engineering assets. The enemy will likely emplace fixing and disrupting obstacles.

The squadron has priority of fires in the BCT until the main body crosses the LD and your troop has priority of fires in the squadron. Your platoon has priority of fires in the troop. You have 10 minutes to issue an order. ACT NOW!





CAVALRY VIGNETTE 03:

What Does “*Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective*” mean?

“Commanders direct reconnaissance efforts by establishing reconnaissance objectives with a specific task, purpose, and focus. Reconnaissance objectives can be a combination of terrain features, geographic areas, threat, enemy, adversaries, or civil considerations that provide commanders the necessary information to answer priority intelligence requirements. Cavalry formations, task organized to effectively accomplish their objectives, develop their scheme of maneuver to maximize their capability to collect the required information within the assigned objectives.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Cavalry formations set conditions for successful operations of the unit for which they conduct reconnaissance.

They accomplish this by providing the information requirements that drive decisions about how the maneuver commander will deploy his formation. Cavalry leaders possess the understanding of the maneuver commander’s potential decision points and aggressively seek to inform and make recommendations towards them.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader plans observation plan on observation on NAIs rather than key terrain with superior line of sights.
- Platoon leader adjusts scheme of maneuver to ensure that the platoon has observation of NAIs or to answer PIR.
- Platoon leader issues obstacle report IAW unit SOP.
- Platoon leader answers intelligence requirements concerning enemy EAs.
- Platoon leader recommends refinement to FPOL graphic control measures based on understanding of enemy defenses.
- Platoon leader does not make enemy contact and continues to orient on the reconnaissance objective.
- Platoon leader continues reconnaissance and requests to move past his LOA to achieve the reconnaissance objective.

Indicators of Failure

- Platoon leader becomes fixed and indecisive at lack of indicators on NAI, halting his formation’s reconnaissance operation.
- Platoon leader allows enemy contact to distract him from orienting on the reconnaissance objective.
- Platoon leader does not identify enemy obstacles.
- Platoon leader stops at his LOA and does not identify the enemy obstacles.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective”

- PL HOUSTON: The platoon comes into contact with a section of BRDMs in NAI 1045. Place a placard in the NAI to show the platoon leader he has observation of two BRDMs. The platoon leader now has to react to the contact.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must assess that this LP/OP is an inferior force and maneuvers the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, the enemy breaks contact (remove placard).
 - Once the contact with the LP/OP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL LAS VEGAS: If the platoon leader did not destroy the BRDMs then as the platoon crosses PL LAS VEGAS the platoon receives IDF called from the BRDMs that displaced. Place an IDF placard on one of the platoon leader vehicles. The vehicle is destroyed. The platoon leader still does not have observation of the BRDMs.
 - The vehicle that was destroyed by IDF is a catastrophic kill and there are no casualties to evacuate.
 - If the platoon leader destroyed the BRDMs at PL HOUSTON then the platoon leader will not come into contact as he crosses PL LAS VEGAS.
- PL LOS ANGELES: The platoon leader can observe NAI 1070 and does not come into contact with any enemy.
 - The platoon leader now should develop the situation and understand that he has confirmed that there is no enemy east of PL MIAMI (LOA). He needs to recommend that he continue his zone reconnaissance past PL MIAMI IOT achieve his reconnaissance objective and identify the enemy obstacles.
 - If the platoon leader fails to orient on the reconnaissance objective and fails to recommend to continue his zone reconnaissance then stop the platoon leader and inform him of the following consequence: *“The troop failed to identify the enemy’s defensive positions. Following conduct of FPOL with the troop vic PL LOS ANGELES, the BCT DO attacked into engagement area of the enemy’s southern-most MIBN. Not understanding where the enemy obstacles or battle positions were, the friendly maneuver battalion’s support by fire position and suppressing indirect fires were ill-positioned and ineffective at preventing the massing of enemy fires against the breach effort. The friendly breaching operation was destroyed without achieving a point of penetration, resulting in the failure of the BCT’s attack.”*
- PL MIAMI: If the platoon leader recommends to continue his zone reconnaissance past PL MIAMI then grant him permission. As the platoon leader crosses PL MIAMI he identifies a platoon of BMPs in a battle position three kilometers west of NAI 1070. Place a placard three kilometers west of NAI 1070 of a platoon size battle position and three BMPs.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must understand that he has located the enemy battle positions. He has identified the enemy and it is likely the enemy has not identified him because he is not being engaged. He now can decide to engage the enemy with direct fires, indirect fires, or maneuver his sections to gain better observation to identify the obstacles.
 - If the platoon leader maneuvers into the engagement area to attempt to engage with direct fires then place a company battle position placard south of the BMPs and place six tank placards showing he just maneuvered into an enemy tank company engagement area. Destroy half of the platoon.

- If the platoon leader calls for indirect fire on the enemy then remove the BMP placards as they moved into a hide site until the enemy scouts can identify and destroy the platoon.
- If the platoon leader uses the terrain well and attempts to gain multiple vantage points on the enemy battle position and surrounding area attempting to identify the obstacles then place an obstacle placard south west of NAI 1070. Write on the placard the type, four corner grids, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a BLUE 9 Obstacle Report. The vignette ends with the platoon leader accomplishing his mission.

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
CAVALRY VIGNETTE 04:

“Report all Information Rapidly and Accurately”


Your scout platoon is the decisive operation for your troop. Your mission is to conduct an area reconnaissance of NAI 2005 to determine enemy presence and determine if it suitable for a combined arms battalion to pass through. The BCT attacks in 24 hours and the engineer platoon assigned to this pass currently has one MICLIC and needs to have a description of any obstacles present within eight hours to prep additional MICLICs. This will give the engineer platoon 16 hours to finish preparations for a breach if necessary. The squadron has priority of fires in the BCT until the main body LD. Your troop has priority of fires in the squadron. Your platoon has priority of fires in the troop. Your platoon is currently arrayed in multiple OPs east of PL AVALANCHE overlooking the eastern opening of the pass.

The enemy scouts have conducted reconnaissance in zone for the past 24 hours. Winds have been minimal and optimal conditions exist for UAS employment. During your planning, you are able to watch the Shadow feed on your troop’s OSRVT. You identify one wheeled vehicle in the pass behind an obstacle you estimate to be 75M in depth with the OSRVT.

You have eight hours to paint the enemy picture for the BCT and determine the suitability of the pass or the CAB could potentially be out of the fight without a viable point of penetration. You have 10 minutes to issue an order and execute. ACT NOW!



16-04 REPORT ALL INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY



CAVALRY VIGNETTE 04:

What “*Report all information Rapidly and Accurately*” means:

“Commanders develop plans and make decisions based upon the analysis of information collected by subordinate units. Quick and accurate reports are required for the commander to make informed decisions on the proper application of his forces. Rapid reporting allows staffs maximum time to analyze information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information requirements tied to decision points with a LTIOV date-time group provide focus for units collecting information and ensure units report information to facilitate timely decisions.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Scout platoons directly contributed to the BCT planning cycle (can a CAB use this approach march route) and BCT CDR decision.

As a result of scout platoons not reporting all information rapidly and accurately the BCT plans in a vacuum without the information needed and the BCT commander is forced to make command decisions without the appropriate level of detail needed.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader plans for long duration observation. Mixing mounted and dismounted OPs for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- Platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- Platoon dedicates appropriate assets and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- Observation posts have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- Platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through the zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.
- Understands the often competing demands of ‘risk to mission’ versus ‘risk to his unit.’
- Platoon leader issues a route report in unit format or at a minimum the platoon leader reports trafficability, enemy situation, and identified hazards.
- Platoon leader reports BLUE 9 and BLUE 10 obstacle and bypass report IAW unit SOP.
- Platoon leader understands the latest time the information is of value.
- Tempo aligns with the amount of time the platoon leaders has after he conducts his time distance analysis.


Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader does not prioritize recon guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- Platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations
- Platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- Does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.
- Observation posts are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- Platoon leader’s understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- Platoon leader fails to properly describe the obstacle; as a result the engineers do not prepare a second MICLIC.
- Platoon leader makes no attempt to locate a bypass.
- Platoon leader makes no attempt to conduct reconnaissance on key terrain to identify enemy overwatch.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Report all Information Rapidly and Accurately”

- PL AVALNCHE: As the platoon crosses PL AVALNCHE, display an enemy dismounted OP with AT weapon in NAI 2005. Destroy one of the platoons vehicles from the dismounted AT engagement. The platoon leader now has to react to the contact.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must assess that this LP/OP is an inferior force and maneuvers the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, the enemy breaks contact (remove placard).
 - Once the contact with the LP/OP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL BRUINS: The platoon receives cannon delivered indirect fire (place IDF placard on a section). Do not reveal where the enemy observer location to the platoon leader. The IDF does not destroy the vehicle but will cause the platoon leader to react.
 - The platoon leader must assess his location. He can continue to maneuver and attempt to locate the enemy OP, he can request UAS, rotary wing or fixed wing aviation support, or he can keep his forces in position. Based on his actions the following will happen:
 - If he continues to maneuver west to locate the enemy then once he maneuvers within observation range of PL CANADIANS displace a dismounted OP by placing a placard vic PL CANADIANS within observation range of the platoon. If the platoon leader engages with IDF or a sound form of maneuver then destroy the enemy OP by turning the placard over. If the platoon leader becomes fixed or does not use a sound form of maneuver (i.e. frontal attack) then display a dismounted AT weapon system with the dismounts by placing a placard and destroy one of the platoon’s vehicles. Continue to destroy one vehicle each time the platoon leader makes a tactically unsound decision. If the platoon leader breaks contact then remove the OP placard. Continue this if the platoon comes into direct fire range until the enemy threat is destroyed.
 - If the platoon leader requests UAS or some kind of asset display the OP placard vic PL CANADINAS. Inform the platoon leader that UAS has spotted a three man dismounted observation post.
 - If the platoon leader remains in position then the platoon receives another volley of indirect fire, place another IDF placard and destroy the OP. The platoon leader just had his section destroyed by indirect fire and should begin maneuvering and developing the situation rapidly.
- PL CANADIANS: As the platoon crosses PL CANADIANS, he identifies an enemy obstacle east of his RP.
 - If the platoon leader uses the terrain well and attempts to gain multiple vantage points once he identified the obstacle then write on the placard the type, four corner grids, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a BLUE 9 Obstacle Report.
 - The platoon leader should then try to locate a bypass and generate a BLUE 10 Bypass Report.
 - If the platoon leader becomes fixed by the obstacle then do not provide him any information about the obstacle. Inform the platoon leader that based on his location he does not have good observation of the obstacle. This should prompt him to adjust his locations to gain better observation. As the platoon leader gains better observation then write on the placard the type, four corner grids, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a BLUE 9 Obstacle Report.



- Advanced platoon leaders will understand that the depth of 140M is very important information because it will cause the engineers to prepare an additional MICLIC. This will cause the platoon leader to report this rapidly and accurately.
 - The platoon leader should then try to locate a bypass and generate a BLUE 10 Bypass Report.
 - Once the platoon reaches the RP, the platoon leader should identify that the pass is suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles, no width or overhead clearance issues and the ground can support a CAB attack through the pass. This should generate a rapid and accurate report.
- Once platoon leader has completed maneuvering and reporting and is established: As the platoon is stationary vic RP display three tanks and three BMPs five kilometers west of the RP.
 - This will generate action by the platoon leader and a detailed accurate report. This is one more instance for the platoon leader to succeed; report all information rapidly and accurately. Along with the report of enemy activity he should understand that the enemy is further east than template. An advanced platoon leader will put emphasis on the fact that a CAB is attacking through the pass and there are enemy right at the western opening.

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
CAVALRY VIGNETTE 05:


“Retain Freedom of Maneuver”

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting reconnaissance from PL BUDWEISER to PL FOSTERS in order to allow the BCT’s decisive operation freedom of maneuver. The BCT commander decided that MSR GEORGIA is his primary attack axis for the decisive operation maneuver battalion in 18 hours. You must destroy enemy reconnaissance within your capabilities, identify enemy defensive positions along MSR GEORGIA, and you are the executor for the FPOL with BCT DO along GEORGIA when the BCT attacks. Your reconnaissance objective is to shape the enemy disruption zone around MSR GEORGIA to make it suitable for at least one maneuver battalion to use to reach the enemy defensive obstacles to conduct breaching operations at PL FOSTERS.

The enemy is screening from PL COORS to PL FOSTERS in order to protect his eastern flank. The screening force will fight your scout platoon to retain key terrain vicinity NAIs 1005, 1006, and 1008. The enemy will use dismounted observation posts and hasty battle positions consisting of ATGMs. NAI 1010 likely contains an enemy battle position and disruption obstacle along MSR GEORGIA. Presence of the disruption obstacle, two or more tracked vehicles, and/or greater than a squad of dismounted infantry in NAI 1010 indicates the enemy main defensive area.

Your BCT is preparing to attack and is assembled well west of PL BUDWEISER. It is important that you confirm or deny the utility of MSR GEORGIA as a viable attack route. The BCT Shadow is observing further in depth, attempting to locate the enemy TAA, but you have your troop Raven. The BCT commander wants to limit exposure of his fires battalion until the decisive operation, but your platoon is priority for troop mortars. Planning mortar targets will assist the troop FSO in positioning mortar firing points to support you. Your BCT is depending on your reconnaissance to pull the BCT into a position of advantage, unhindered by the enemy disruption zone. You have 10 minutes to issue an order to your platoon. ACT NOW!





CAVALRY VIGNETTE 05:

What Does “*Retain Freedom of Maneuver*” mean?

“Tactical mobility and maneuver fundamentally drive the success of reconnaissance tasks. Commanders and staffs consider task organization, movement techniques, and scheme of maneuver to retain the unit’s ability to maneuver... Commanders change movement techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the smallest possible element and avoid becoming decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by avoiding decisive engagement with a superior force and develop the situation further – consistently balancing the requirement to maintain contact with retaining freedom of maneuver.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

To conduct effective reconnaissance, Cavalry formations require the ability move around the battlefield to gain a position of advantage and/or develop the situation rapidly.

The formation cannot become fixed or decisively engaged such that it is unable to maneuver. Commanders and Cavalry leaders ensure they retain the freedom to maneuver by analyzing the enemy situation and employing the proper movement techniques and formations to make contact on their terms. Additionally, they seek to make contact with the smallest possible element, employing all IC assets available to do so.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader requests products or intelligence from BDE-level information collection assets operating in the platoon’s AO.
- Platoon leader employs UAS to make contact with smallest possible element.
- Platoon leader utilizes dismounts to make contact with smallest possible element.
- Platoon leader employs fires to retain freedom of maneuver.
- Platoon leader seeks to employ long-range sensors in overwatch positions to gain visual contact.
- Platoon leader uses formations and movement techniques to reach a position of advantage.
- Platoon leader develops graphic control measures to control his formation and prevent becoming decisively engaged at same place and/or time.

Indicators of Failure

- Platoon leader fails to employ dismounts, and UAS if possible, to make contact with smallest possible element where EN contact is likely.
- Platoon leader attempts to maneuver entire platoon using traveling or traveling overwatch within direct fire weapons range of NAIs where enemy is templated and uses the wrong formation.
- Platoon leader attempts infiltration without overwatch within direct fire weapons range of NAIs where enemy is templated.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Retain Freedom of Maneuver”

- Platoon Leader order: Assess platoon leader’s planning. During planning, he should work out where enemy disruption forces are going to fight. He should determine where the key terrain is and understand the enemy wants to retain it. His order should deliver a deliberate scheme of maneuver against those locations. He may assess a BRDM/dismounted OP at NAI 1005, for instance. Later in his order, the platoon leader should address his maneuver plan when approaching NAI 1005. It may be a hasty attack with two or three scout sections. This indicates that he recognizes the threat, wants to create overmatch (make contact on his own terms) for short periods, dominate the fight with multiple forms of contact, and deny the use of the key terrain by the enemy scouts (fighting for positions of advantage, fighting for information for short periods). Setting conditions to gain local superiority for short periods indicates firm grasp of Cavalry maneuver. Vee or Line formations and only ‘traveling’ his platoon into contact indicates failure to maneuver.
- PL BUDWEISER: The platoon LDs with no contact with the enemy. Assess movement technique and formation. He could choose traveling or traveling overwatch as his movement technique. The platoon leader’s IPB may reveal that PL BUDWEISER to PL COORS is space where he can accept some risk because enemy contact is not likely. Predicting PL COORS as the probable line of contact indicates platoon leader understands the relationships between the METT-TC mission variables. He may still choose bounding overwatch from LD if he assesses that the disruption zone OPs will include long-range AT missiles. No considerations of the mission variables, however, demonstrates low competence in planning Cavalry maneuver.
- PL COORS: Engage the platoon with cannon delivered indirect fire from the east at PL COORS by using a placard against one of the sections, only with suppressive effects. These fires are observed by an enemy OP in NAI 1005, but it remains hidden and out of visual contact. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance in order to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing the artillery. If he did his SITEMP correctly, he needs to start confirming his assessment.
 - NAI 1005: As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal enemy mounted OP (BRDM) supported by a team of dismounted scouts in NAI 1005 to the section who is able to make visual contact by placing placard.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must quickly assess that enemy scouts are applying multiple forms of contact against his platoon. The cannon fires complicate his understanding of the situation. The platoon leader must decide if his current scheme is sufficient to address the contact or if a platoon battle drill (platoon hasty attack) must be initiated. Either way, applying two or three scout sections and multiple forms of contact against the enemy hasty positions indicates that the platoon leader understands how to fight to establish local superiority for short periods while applying available enablers. This is the key to retaining freedom of maneuver.
 - While massing against this inferior force, assess the risk the platoon leader is taking elsewhere in his zone. He should be able to describe the risk in a manner that demonstrates that ‘he understands he is accepting risk in the south, while addressing the threat in the north’ until he resolves the contact—so he can retain FOM. Advanced understanding is demonstrated if he applies Raven or some small force (one scout vehicle, for instance) on the southern flank of his hasty attack to protect the maneuver by providing early warning, if he calculates he can spare the combat power from the hasty attack.
 - The platoon leader must assess that the BRDM/Dismounted LP/OP is an inferior force to his platoon and maneuver the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact.

- If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the BRDM and dismounts, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placards). Accurate and timely reporting should be delivered.
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (he just plunges ahead in frontal assault), the enemy BRDM breaks contact (remove placard) and the OP engages with indirect fire until out of visual range. Redo this scenario at NAI 1006.
- Once the contact with the enemy screen is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately to re-gain its positions across his zone, mitigating earlier risk. He needs to demonstrate that his fight was short, on purpose, for a specific reason, and he can transition back to the fundamentals of reconnaissance after a quick, well-resourced and controlled offensive operation.
- You have just seen the successful platoon leader transition seamlessly and make contact on his terms. This skill is imperative to the Cavalry leader: cognitive ability and agility to know when to use offense and defense, and to know when to immediately transition to back to reconnaissance. This preserves the freedom (and the gumption) to maneuver to achieve purpose. When all scout platoon leaders become great at this—it generates enormous capability for the squadron to move fast and exploit fleeting opportunities.
- Unsuccessful scout platoon leaders cannot lead transitions between reconnaissance and security and offense, defense and stability without being explicitly ordered to do so. This indicates a ‘task’ oriented leader who fails to consider the importance of his ‘purpose’ as well. A squadron full of these platoon leaders is slow and is usually out of position to exploit anything.
- NAI 1006: Repeat above scenario with the enemy now revealed in NAI 1006. This engagement should to be even better than the first. Assess casualties as necessary, but the key is retaining the FOM by gaining local superiority against the inferior enemy (another BRDM supported by team of dismounts) in NAI 1006, maneuvering on purpose with a good form of maneuver (most likely envelopment) while accepting prudent risk elsewhere for short periods. Must use multiple forms of contact and report.
- PL DOS EQUIS: After resolving contact at NAI 1006 the platoon, again, immediately redeploys across the width of the zone, resuming all fundamentals of reconnaissance. The northern scout section makes contact with an enemy bulldozer digging a tank ditch in NAI 1010 (reveal tank ditch and bulldozer placards). Engage the southern section with cannon delivered indirect fire from the east by using an IDF placard, only with suppressive effects. These fires are observed by a dismounted OP in NAI 1008. The enemy is late with this tank ditch, still trying to dig it in. Their engineers are overwatched by another enemy scout section (BRDM with dismounts) in NAI 1008. Reveal the enemy in 1008 when a scout section is in visual range.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** Now the platoon leader has contact with an enemy obstacle and engineers. He also has contact with their security force. His scout sections are likely abreast and he likely has no clear local superiority to the security section. He is also in indirect fire contact. Assess his ability to understand, decide, direct, and lead his platoon through this scenario.
 - The platoon leader must assess that the BRDM LP/OP is an inferior force to his whole platoon. However, he must address templated enemy engineers and obstacles in NAI 1010 as well. Advanced platoon leaders will recognize a fleeting opportunity may exist in NAI 1010. He might assess that destroying the enemy’s ability to emplace the obstacle in 1010 may give the BCT commander an unexpected advantage and achieve the platoon leader’s purpose (create maneuver space for DO).
 - He may choose to address these problems sequentially. This indicates that he wants to ensure he applies enough combat power to attack to destroy the BRDM security section, then deal with the engineers later in time. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the BRDM and dismounts, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). However, the engineers in NAI 1010 manage to break contact and escape further east. This COA indicates a good, basic understanding of this fundamental of reconnaissance. This COA is easiest to control and addresses the ‘perceived most

dangerous' threat first, reducing risk to his unit, thus retaining FOM. Timely and accurate reporting should be delivered.

- He may choose to address these problems simultaneously. He might maneuver a section or two against the BRDM section while maintaining contact with the dozer with his remaining section. This indicates that he assesses that his platoon has enough combat power for both problems and the requisite higher mission command competency to handle contact across his entire front. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment of the "BRDM section" and frontal attack against the enemy bulldozer) and employs multiple forms of contact against both forces, the enemy is destroyed (turn over the BRDM and dozer). This COA, if purposefully executed (not just allowing two or three section sergeants to 'develop the situation' on their own) is advanced and is the most difficult to control. Reporting is likely more difficult with contact reports coming from across his formation simultaneously.
- Reveal the tank ditch obstacle placard in the lane to allow BLUE 9 obstacle report and BLUE 10 bypass report.
- The platoon leader renders the reports IAW your unit SOP or ATP 3-20.98 BLUE 9 and BLUE 10.
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (remaining on PL DOS EQUIS, gathering no information of value to the BCT) or the platoon is essentially 'fixed' by the enemy contact across its front, the platoon has lost FOM. This indicates failure, by the platoon leader, to demonstrate mastery of the fundamental retain freedom of maneuver.


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
“Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact”

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting a zone reconnaissance from PL HOUSTON to PL MIAMI to gather information about AXIS COPPER. The BCT commander is considering using AXIS COPPER during his attack in the next 24 hours. You must also neutralize enemy reconnaissance within your capabilities, identify enemy defensive positions along AXIS COPPER, and you are the executor for the FPOL with BCT DO along AXIS COPPER if the BCT uses this route. The purpose of your mission is to create maneuver space for the BCT decisive operation. Your reconnaissance objective is to find an axis of attack suitable for at least one maneuver battalion to use to reach the enemy defensive obstacles to conduct breaching operations.

Enemy reconnaissance screens between PL MIAMI and PL HOUSTON in order to protect his eastern flank. NAIs 1040 and 1045 are templated enemy observation posts. The enemy main body will develop engagement areas along AXIS COPPER in the vicinity of either NAI 1065 or NAI 1070, consisting of a motorized infantry company supported by counter mobility and survivability engineering assets. The enemy will use blocking and disrupting obstacles.

Your BCT is preparing to attack and is assembled east of PL HOUSTON. It is important that you confirm or deny the utility of AXIS COPPER as a viable attack route. The BCT Shadow is refitting, but you have your troop Raven. The fires battalion is repositioning and is currently not ready to fire, but your platoon is priority for troop mortars. Templating priority mortar targets will assist the Troop FSO in positioning mortar firing points to support you. Your BCT is depending on your reconnaissance to pull the BCT into a position of advantage. You have 10 minutes to issue an order to your platoon. ACT NOW!





CAVALRY VIGNETTE 06:

What Does “*Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact*” mean?

“Cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy and conditions of their choosing... Once units make contact, Cavalry forces maintain contact until specific orders are given, a change of mission occurs when disengagement or displacement criteria dictate, or the unit conducts reconnaissance handover with another unit. Maintaining contact with the enemy provides real-time information of the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength, and actions that allow staffs to analyze and make recommendations to the commander based on current intelligence.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Scout platoons gain and maintain contact to deny the enemy the initiative and prevent the enemy the ability to maneuver out of contact to a position of advantage.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader plans for long duration observation. Mixing mounted and dismounted OPs for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- Platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- Platoons dedicates appropriate assets to each phase, and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- Observation posts have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of objective.
- Platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through the zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.
- Platoon leader maneuvers to destroy the inferior force and makes contact with multiple forms of contact.
- Platoon leader analyzes the enemy he is facing and understands that he has not made contact with the ‘main defensive area’ and continues his reconnaissance.
- Platoon leader attempts to launch the troop’s Raven IOT seize the initiative and attempt to gain and maintain contact with the enemy.
- Platoon leader reaches his LOA and does not make contact with the enemy. He requests to continue his reconnaissance IOT achieve his reconnaissance objective.
- Understands the often competing demands of ‘risk to mission’ versus ‘risk to his unit.’
- Platoon leader reports obstacle report and bypass report IAW unit SOP or BLUE 9 and BLUE 10 format.

Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader does not prioritize recon guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- Platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations
- Platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.

- Does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.
- Observation posts are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- Platoon leader puts no threshold into maneuver and executes frontal attack.
- Platoon makes contact with AT systems and does not understand how inferior the force is and reports he has identified the enemy's 'main defensive area'.
- Enemy reconnaissance fixes the platoon and he cannot gain the initiative.
- Platoon allows graphic control measures to dictate his execution and not the reconnaissance objective. He stops at PL MIAMI and does not gain and maintain contact with the enemy's main defensive area.
- Platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- Platoon leader does not report obstacles or bypass or does so in incorrect format or missing information.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact”

- PL HOUSTON: Engage the platoon with cannon delivered indirect fire from the west at PL HOUSTON at LD by using a placard against one of the sections. These fires are observed by a dismounted OP in NAI 1040, but it remains hidden and out of visual contact. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance in order to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing the artillery.
 - As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal enemy mounted OP (BRDM) on the eastern edge of NAI 1045 to the section who is able to make visual contact by placing placard.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must quickly assess that enemy scouts are applying multiple forms of contact against his platoon. The cannon fires complicate his understanding of the situation. The platoon leader must decide how to maintain and resolve the contact with the known BRDM while maneuvering to gain contact with other suspected observers in his zone.
 - The platoon leader must assess that the BRDM LP/OP is an inferior force and maneuver the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. However, he must address templated enemy in NAI 1040 as well.
 - He may choose to address these problems sequentially. This indicates that he wants to ensure he applies enough combat power to attack to destroy the BRDM (and potential unidentified wingmen), then deal with the possible OP in NAI 1040 later in time. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the BRDM, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). However, the OP in NAI 1040 continues to engage his platoon with indirect fires until they maneuver to find and kill him. This COA indicates a good, basic understanding of this fundamental of reconnaissance. This COA is easiest to control and addresses the ‘perceived most dangerous’ threat first, reducing risk to his unit. Timely and accurate reporting should be delivered.
 - He may choose to address these problems simultaneously. He might maneuver a section or two against the BRDM while hunting for the OP with his remaining section. This indicates that he assesses that his platoon has enough combat power for both problems and the requisite higher mission command competency to handle contact across his entire front. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with “BRDM sections” and area reconnaissance by the “NAI 1040 section”) and employs multiple forms of contact against both forces, the enemy is destroyed (turn over the BRDM, reveal and turn over the dismounted OP in NAI 1040). This COA, if purposefully executed (not just allowing two or three section sergeants to ‘develop the situation’ on their own) is advanced and is the most difficult to control. Reporting is likely more difficult with contact reports coming from across his formation simultaneously.
 - If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (he just plunges ahead in frontal assault), the enemy BRDM breaks contact (remove placard) and the OP engages with indirect fire until out of visual range. Redo this scenario at PL INDIANAPOLIS.
 - Once the contacts with the enemy screen are resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately to gain and maintain contact with enemy main body forces.
- PL INDIANAPOLIS: Platoon crosses PL INDIANAPOLIS, enemy dismount team engages a scout section with an ATGM and damages one vehicle (mobility). The enemy ambush is identified by the damaged vehicle. Reveal enemy ATGM placard in NAI 1065.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** Now the platoon leader must quickly assess the ATGM ambush and its threat to the platoon and the mission. He must demonstrate that he understands that he has lost the initiative to this ambushing force. Is this the enemy main body? Have I found the enemy

- EA? Where are the obstacles I was expecting? The platoon leader must maintain his current contact to confirm/deny the SITEMP. These competing demands are complicated by possible CASEVAC, vehicle recovery, and other factors. Platoon leader must regain the initiative.
- If he assesses that the ambush is a like/superior force, he may direct suppressive direct and indirect fires against enemy ATGM ambush (support by fire) with the degraded scout section in contact and advance his other scout section(s) further into zone (finding an assailable flank to assault). Platoon leader must realize that “negative contact” by his southern section(s) is important. He reports that the ATGM is a small enemy force (likely still disruption forces) and that the platoon still has freedom of maneuver in the zone based on no contact in the south.
 - He must realize and report that he has not made contact with the ‘main defensive area’. The SITEMP might be wrong.
 - He may request that the troop deploy its Raven to surveil the enemy locations or to ease assault forces’ maneuver. Indicating deeper thinking, the platoon leader may direct the Raven further in zone, to NAI 1070, to add depth to his reconnaissance while he addresses his current contact with a hasty attack.
 - These (or similar) actions indicate that the platoon leader understands that he does not have the initiative and must wrest it from the enemy through action. It also indicates that he can organize all of his efforts, assets, and capabilities (while mitigating his limitations) towards accomplishing the recon objective by seeking to gain and maintain enemy contact through the depth of his zone. He clearly understands how to establish advantageous conditions for maintaining enemy contact. He fights on his own terms (that he created on purpose).
 - If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the ATGM ambush, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard).
 - If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (bumbling, frontal assault), the enemy ambush breaks contact (remove placard after firing more missiles and killing more scouts). The ambush accomplished its mission of gaining time for the defensive prep. These (non)actions indicate the platoon leader’s failure to understand how to gain and maintain enemy contact on his own, favorable terms. The enemy dictated these terms.
 - Once the contact with the ambush is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately. Where are those obstacles (and other indicators of the defense)?
- PL MIAMI: Platoon makes no further contact and reaches PL MIAMI. Platoon leader is likely establishing observation from PL MIAMI, but continues to have negative contact with enemy main defensive area. Renders initial route reconnaissance report IAW your unit SOP or ATP 3-20.98 BLUE 7.
 - Platoon leader synchronizes the observation plans of scout mounted and dismounted OPs. He reports dead space and his procedures for conducting reconnaissance handover between scout sections. Once established, his platoons has negative contact with the suspected enemy defense.
 - The enemy is defending further west than anticipated, but he cannot observe west of the mountain mass along his northern/western boundaries. Assess the platoon leader as he develops “negative contact.” No contact with the expected enemy creates uncertainty and a common leadership dilemma.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** Although his chosen or given tasks (ie. zone, route, or area recon) seem to be complete, he must realize he has not achieved the recon objective (*find an axis of attack suitable for at least one maneuver battalion to use to reach the enemy defensive obstacles to conduct breaching operations*). He has not gained or maintained contact with the enemy obstacles. Here is where Cavalry leaders must demonstrate disciplined initiative.
 - If the platoon leader reports clearly that he has not yet achieved the recon objective, he may recommend to the troop commander that he needs to maneuver a few hundred more meters west or north to gain vantage points for observation west of the significant mountain masses in the northwest and southwest of his zone, along his boundaries.
 - The troop commander responds positively to proactive recommendations and his dialogue might include, “Permission granted. PL MIAMI was the LOA based on indirect fire supporting range.

The FSO is repositioning the mortars to support your movement. The troop mortars can range 500 meters west of PL MIAMI. I can also establish a hasty Raven ROZ west of PL MIAMI wherever you want it to extend your tactical reach. The platoon to your north is staying at PL MIAMI. Move when ready, the BCT commander is closely monitoring your reporting.”

- Allow the platoon leader to issue a fragmentary order and conduct any maneuver required in that order. If he puts scouts in a good position to observe the maneuver corridor west of the mountain in the northwest (north of NAI 1070), reveal a wire-mine-wire obstacle placard in the lane. Provide platoon leader with type, four corner grids, dimensions, orientation, and composition of the obstacle.
- The platoon leader renders Obstacle and Bypass reports IAW your unit SOP or ATP 3-20.98 BLUE 9 and BLUE 10.
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (remaining on PL MIAMI, gathering no information of value to the BCT), the platoon failed to accomplish the recon objective. This indicates failure, by the platoon leader, to demonstrate mastery of the fundamental gain and maintain enemy contact.

NOTES:


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
“Develop the Situation Rapidly”

Your platoon is the decisive operation for your troop that is tasked to conduct an area reconnaissance of NAIs 2020, 2025 and 2035 to identify the enemy’s defensive preparations, to include obstacles and battle positions. The BCT has created two separate COAs and needs the squadron to identify a point of penetration and pull the BCT to execute the COA that will facilitate the most successful breach.

The enemy attacked and was defeated 48 hours prior and is now executing a deliberate defense with wire and mine obstacles, tank ditches, and dug-in battle positions. Winds have been extremely high and all UAS have been grounded for the last 48 hours. Scouts currently identify dozers operating south of hill 680 and can observe dust signatures to the southwest of hill 980. You are at the max range of your optics and cannot identify what they are digging and you cannot identify any other enemy vehicles.

The BCT attacks in 24 hours and will publish the OPORD in 12 hours. The squadron has 10 hours to pull the BCT to a certain COA; after that the commander will select COA 1. The squadron has priority of fires in the BCT until the main body LD. Your troop has priority of fires in the squadron. Your platoon has priority of fires in the troop. Your platoon is currently arrayed in a screen oriented west in a series of mounted and dismounted Ops east of PL ASTROS. You have to confirm or deny BCT COA 2. You have 10 hours to paint the enemy picture for the BCT or the BCT could potentially attack an enemy prepared defensive position in restricted terrain. You have 10 minutes to issue an order and begin movement. ACT NOW!





16-07 DEVELOP THE SITUATION RAPIDLY

CAVALRY VIGNETTE 07:

What “*Develop the situation rapidly*” means:

“Cavalry forces act instinctively and urgently to increase the commander’s situational understanding of the terrain, enemy, and civilian populace. Effective Cavalry forces understand how time impacts movement (both friendly and enemy) and how timely collection of intelligence requirements impacts the commander’s decisions. The reconnaissance scheme of maneuver and tempo matches the requisite urgency to answer the necessary information requirements. Cavalry forces collect on directed reconnaissance objectives in close contact with civilian populations while selectively choosing to fight enemy forces to determine intent, disposition, composition, and strength.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Scout platoons that develop the situation rapidly allow BCT CDR to make informed decisions and provide the BCT staff with actionable information for the BCT to capitalize on.

When units do not develop the situation rapidly then a window of maneuver space and time is available for the enemy to gain a tactical advantage. As a result contact will not be made on friendly terms by the smallest element possible and all success up to that point can be lost.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader plans for long duration observation. Mixing mounted and dismounted OPs for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- Platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- Platoon dedicates appropriate assets and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- Observation posts have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- Platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through the zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.
- Platoon leader understands latest time the information is of value.
- Understands the often competing demands of ‘risk to mission’ versus ‘risk to his unit.’
- Platoon leader demonstrates a clear understanding of the decision that the BCT commander has to make.
- The tempo aligns with the amount of time the platoon leader has after he conducts his time distance analysis.

Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader does not prioritize recon guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- Platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations
- Platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- Platoon leader sends up report with recommendation of “continuing to observe” and not maneuvering to a position of advantage.
- Observation posts are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.

- Platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- Platoon movement technique and formation contradict tempo.
- Platoon leader does not understand the decision that the BCT commander has to make.
- Platoon leader does not understand adjacent unit's task and purpose.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Develop the Situation Rapidly”

- PL BRAVES: As the platoon crosses PL BRAVES, place an ATGM placard (within five kilometers of the vehicle it destroys) southeast of NAI 2020 that engages and destroys one vehicle from the platoon. It is a catastrophic kill and there are no casualties alive that need to be evacuated. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance in order to account for the enemy AT threat.
 - *Cavalry Leadership Dilemma*: Now the platoon leader must quickly assess the ATGM ambush and its threat to the platoon and the mission. The platoon leader must wrestle with spending precious time regaining contact with the enemy ambushing forces or moving forward in zone to orient on the reconnaissance objective. The platoon leader must develop the situation rapidly.
 - If he assesses that the ambush is a like or superior force, he may direct suppressive direct and indirect fires against suspected enemy locations and request smoke to screen his bypass and advance further into zone. He may request that the troop deploy its UAS to surveil the suspected enemy locations. This action indicates that the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to unit by bypassing an enemy ambush to accomplish his mission.
 - If he assesses that the ambush is an inferior force, he may also maneuver to gain local superiority to destroy the threat with a sound form of maneuver and multiple forms of contact. This action indicates that the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to his mission as he works to preserve his combat power.
 - Once the contact with the ambush is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- Established first observation post: Once the platoon establishes their first observation post, that OP receives cannon delivered indirect fire (place IDF placard on the OP. Do not reveal where the enemy observer location to the platoon leader. The IDF does not destroy the vehicle but will cause the platoon leader to react.
 - The platoon leader must assess his OP location. He can continue to maneuver and attempt to locate the enemy OP, he can request UAS, rotary wing or fixed wing aviation support, or he can keep his OP in position. Based on his actions the following will happen:
 - If he continues to maneuver west to locate the enemy then once he maneuvers within observation range of NAI 2025 displace a dismounted OP by placing a placard in the NAI. If the platoon leader engages with IDF or a sound form of maneuver then destroy the enemy OP by turning the placard over. If the platoon leader becomes fixed or does not use a sound form of maneuver (i.e. frontal attack) then display a dismounted AT weapon system with the dismounts by placing a placard and destroy one of the platoon's vehicles. Continue to destroy one vehicle each time the platoon leader makes a tactically unsound decision. If the platoon leader breaks contact then remove the OP placard. Continue this if the platoon comes into direct fire range until the enemy threat is destroyed.
 - If the platoon leader requests UAS or some kind of asset to deny him. Tell him due to the winds nothing is flying. Make the platoon leader maneuver.
 - If the platoon leader has the OP remain in position then the OP receives another volley of indirect fire, place another IDF placard and destroy the OP. The platoon leader just had his OP destroyed by indirect fire and should begin maneuvering and developing the situation rapidly.

- PL CUBS: As the platoon approaches PL CUBS reveal an obstacle in NAI 2025. Place the placard in NAI 2025 but do not give the platoon leader information about the obstacle until he maneuvers sections to gain multiple vantage points.
 - As the platoon leader maneuvers to gain multiple vantage points on the obstacle then write on the placard the type, four corner grids, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a BLUE 9 Obstacle Report.
 - The platoon leader has now accomplished half of his tasks. He should assess the situation and realize that he needs to identify battle positions. A successful Cavalry leader does not stop his reconnaissance and develops the situation rapidly to allow the BCT DO to accomplish it's mission.
 - If the platoon leader establishes OPs and fails to continue to maneuver to identify the enemy battle positions then end then end the vignette and place three enemy company battle positions two kilometers west of the obstacle. Ask the platoon leader what his reconnaissance objective was. He should then realize that he did not identify the enemy battle positions and has learned a valuable lesson.

If the platoon leader continues to maneuver to try to locate the enemy battle positions then once he has executed a sound form of maneuver and has positioned OPs on advantageous terrain then display the enemy battle positions by placing the three company battle positions two kilometers west of the obstacle. This should generate a detailed report from the platoon leader and he has accomplished his mission.


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
“Provide Early and Accurate Warning”

You are a scout platoon and your troop commander tasked your platoon to screen from PL AUSTIN to PL DALLAS oriented on NAIs 2000, 2005, and 2010 in order to provide reaction time and maneuver space to the BCT preparing the defense. Your platoon is currently arrayed on the high ground west of PL CHICAGO oriented northeast. You must also confirm or deny the enemy’s use of the AoA SEGA and to identify composition, and strength of the enemy. Your key tasks are to destroy enemy observation posts in zone, find observation post locations that provide good observation along AoA SEGA, and to report composition and strength of any enemy. The purpose of your mission is to identify the enemy as far out as possible in order to provide the BCT with two hours of reaction time so the engineers can finish their current task and move behind the defense.

The enemy has recently moved south from their defense and is expected to attack the BCT. The enemy has two templated axis of advance; AoA SEGA or AoA ATARI. The enemy wants to handrail the terrain as much as possible to allow for a concealed movement to the BCTs obstacle effort and will travel at approximately 20KM/hr. The enemy’s decisive point is breaching the BCTs defensive belt vic PL AUSTIN. The enemy is supported by two 120 mm mortars and engineers to reduce obstacles. The enemy has the capability to emplace observation posts consisting of four to six individuals with medium machine guns and anti-tank weapon systems.

The BCT is defending south of PL AUSTIN in order to protect the northern flank of the division. The squadron S2 is uncertain of the enemy’s timeline. The BCT is preparing obstacles and will need two hours early warning of the enemy attack IOT pull the dozers back behind the defense. It is important that you properly identify enemy vehicles because the assault force will have engineer breaching assets. The assault force will follow the fixing force and there is not templated enemy armor within the fixing force. The S2 templated that the first formation you observe with tanks is the formation that will have the breaching assets. The exploitation force will follow the assault force. Your platoon is second in the priority of troop mortars. You have two M180 demolition cratering kits, two Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS), you have priority to direct your troop’s Raven and you have priority of FM jamming asset (jams for 15 minutes and response time is 10 minutes to be on station). Your BCT is awaiting your reconnaissance to determine the enemy’s course of action. You have 10 minutes to develop your Fragmentary Order. ACT NOW!





16-08 PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING

CAVALRY VIGNETTE 08:

What Does “*Provide Early and Accurate Warning*” Mean?

“The squadron or protecting unit detects, orients upon, and observes threat forces that can influence the brigade combat team. Early detection and warning through rapid reporting enables the BCT commander to make timely and well-informed decisions for the proper application of his forces on the observed threat.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

The BCT commander and staff rely on the cavalry squadron to provide information and intelligence to fill holes in the plan and pull the commander toward a decision. The squadron must analyze reports from the troop to ensure accurate reporting to the BCT.

When the cavalry squadron cannot provide the information that the BCT requires to make a decision then the squadron has failed. Early reporting is not always the most accurate so initial reports need to be validated at every level as they come up from the scout in the OP. The BCT is blind without the squadron and entire maneuver plans often hinge on early reports from the squadron.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader plans for long duration observation. Mixing mounted and dismounted OPs for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- Based on the rate of march of the enemy, the platoon leader can figure out how much time he will need to delay the enemy. (Enemy has to move 20 KM which will take an hour) platoon leader needs to delay the enemy for an additional hour to be successful.
- Platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- Platoon dedicates appropriate assets to each phase, and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- Observation posts have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- Platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation and gains observation east of NAI 2000 to observe deep into AoA SEGA.
- Directs Raven employment to identify enemy east of PL DALLAS.
- Employs MOMPS, cratering charge, and jamming capability to delay the enemy. Develops an obstacle plan to emplace obstacles that are well thshould out to ensure his platoon retains freedom of movement and a displacement plan.
- Platoon leader uses depth to engage with multiple forms of contact (direct fire, indirect fire, electronic warfare, Raven)
- Although he does not make contact with his template enemy, the platoon leader continues his reconnaissance, even as the BCT begins its defense in order to create space and time and prevent the surprise of the BCT through his assigned area.
- Understands the often competing demands of ‘risk to mission’ versus ‘risk to his unit.’

Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader does not prioritize recon guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.

- Platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations
- Platoon leader does not assign task and purpose to all organic units or attachments.
- Does not maneuver sections to gain multiple vantage points on AoA SEGA.
- Observation posts are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- Platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- Repositions to positions that cannot prevent the BCT from being surprised by a force using AoA SEGA.
- Platoon leader only maneuvers in a line formation.
- Platoon leader only attempts to engage with one form of contact.
- Platoon leader does not employ all assets (cratering charge, MOPMS, jamming, raven).

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Provide Early and Accurate Warning”

- PL CHICAGO: Engage the platoon with cannon delivered indirect fire from the northeast as the platoon crosses PL CHICAGO using a placard against one of the sections. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance in order to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing the artillery.
 - He should continue mission or issue a fragmentary order to address the new information if necessary. As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal enemy OP vic NAI 2005 to the section who is able to make visual contact by placing placard in/around NAI 2005.
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must assess that this LP/OP is an inferior force and maneuvers the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, the enemy breaks contact (remove placard). Redo this scenario at PL DALLAS if the platoon leader fails to destroy the enemy and loses contact.
 - Once the contact with the LP/OP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL DALLAS: Platoon leader should be establishing observation posts in the vicinity of PL DALLAS and PL CHICAGO to establish observation east and in depth. After the platoon is set the platoon leader reports to troop what he can observe and has no contact with the enemy.
 - Once the platoon is established show a placard of eight BMPs and eight BRDMs in NAI 2010 confirming the enemy is using AoA SEGA. If the platoon leader is utilizing the troop Raven then show the enemy further east of AoA SEGA and tell him he observed the enemy 10 minutes prior with the Raven than he would have with his own observation. This will key the platoon leader to the fact that he now has to delay the enemy for only 50 more minutes to be successful.
 - The platoon leader now has the opportunity to provide early and accurate warning to the BCT. His reports should clearly articulate that he has not identified breaching assets or tanks.
 - The platoon leader can attempt to engage with direct or indirect fire in an attempt to delay the attacking enemy to provide more reaction time and maneuver space. If he has failed to emplace his MOPMS or cratering charges prior to observation of the enemy and he attempts to then they will be mildly effective and only delay the enemy 10 minutes total. If he planned where to emplace the cratering charges and MOPMS prior to observation of the enemy then they are more effective and will delay the enemy 25 minutes.
 - If the platoon leader employs the jamming asset then delay the enemy 10 minutes due to the jamming.
 - If the platoon leader has emplaced dismounted anti-tank positions with Javelins or AT-4s in depth then he will delay the enemy 10 minutes at PL DALLAS and 10 minutes at PL CHICAGO.
 - If the platoon leader plans and integrates the troop mortars then he will delay the enemy five minutes with each mortar mission he calls on the enemy, providing he has calculated a trigger based on the enemy's rate of march.
 - The platoon leader has enough assets to delay the enemy 85 minutes. He only has to delay the enemy 60 minutes so there is ample room for him to be successful.
 - Move the enemy placards south of PL BOSTON. The platoon leader should have passed the targets back and continue to observe NAI 2010 as more enemy is template to follow.
 - After the fixing force is south of PL BOSTON show an enemy placard in NAI 2010 with six tanks, eight BMPs and two dozers. This should generate a very detailed report from the platoon leader as he has identified the assault force and the enemy's breaching assets. The platoon leader

should have exhausted all demolition and only has troops mortars and his direct fire to engage the enemy if he chooses to.

- Platoon leader issues a complete report to his higher headquarters, ensuring the BCT is not surprised by this unexpected enemy armor formation. (The BCT has time to address this threat).

CAVALRY VIGNETTE 09:

“Provide reaction time and maneuver space”


You are the platoon leader in a troop currently positioned along PL INDIANAPOLIS, tasked to screen in order to provide early warning to the BCT’s decisive operation. To your west, the BCT’s DO defends to fix the enemy in order to protect the division’s eastern flank. The squadron is uncertain of where the BCT plans to establish its defensive positions and develop engagement areas.


Your platoon must screen in order to provide early warning to the BCT’s decisive operation. Your troop commander identified four key tasks: defeat the enemy reconnaissance in order to prevent the enemy from identifying friendly defensive positions, disrupts the enemy fixing force in order to prevent the enemy from massing combat power against the BCT DO, screen to provide early warning of the enemy exploitation force’s axis of advance, conducts a RPOL with the BCT DO in order to allow it to attack to fix the enemy.

The BCT Commander must make two decisions based on the information provided by the troop. The BCT Commander seeks to prioritize and employ FASCAM and indirect fires along the enemy assault force’s axis of advance. Additionally, the BCT Commander seeks to commit the BCT reserve to reinforce the battalion in contact with the enemy assault force.

The enemy assault force likely consists of nine tanks, 22 BMPs, a company-sized element of ATGMs, two 2SA6s, and engineering assets to conduct of a mechanized breach of obstacles. The anti-tank, air defense, and engineering assets are likely to be unique to and indicators of the enemy assault force.

You are responsible for screening, focused on identifying enemy attack. NAIs 3005, 3010, and 3015 correspond with likely enemy mounted OPs, while NAI 3020 and 3025 correspond with likely avenues of approach by the enemy fixing, assault, and exploitation force. The squadron’s LOA is PL MIAMI, but the troop commander has stated his confidence in your ability to establish your platoon’s OPs where you deem appropriate to accomplish your platoon mission. You have 10 minutes to issue your order to your platoon. ACT NOW!





CAVALRY VIGNETTE 09:

What does “*Provide reaction time and maneuver space*” mean?

“As with ‘provide early and accurate warning,’ the ability for the cavalry squadron to gain and maintain contact and report accurately and rapidly affords the BCT commander the time and space to make an informed decision to employ forces. Reaction time and maneuver space relates to decision points driven by information requirements and indicators given LTIOV parameters to ensure the commander makes decisions that place maximum firepower at the decisive point in a timely manner.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

The Scout platoon leader understands the relationship between intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), information collection, and the decision-making by commanders within the BCT.

Applying his understanding of the EVENTEMP, the information collection matrix, and the BCT decision support matrix, he seeks to answer information requirements in a manner to provide the BCT commander the time needed to commit combat power to defeat the enemy plan.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader conducts IPB to identify mobility corridors, refine NAIs, and template potential enemy.
- Platoon leader provides security guidance to his platoon.
- Platoon leader plans mounted and dismounted OPs to maximize effectiveness of their screen.
- Observation posts are provided cover and concealment while maintaining good observation of their assigned NAI.
- Platoon leader positions OPs to answer information requirements in NAIs that best provide sufficient reaction time and maneuver space for the BCT commander to employ fires to disrupt the enemy and commit additional combat power (i.e. the BCT reserve) to achieve the desired effect on the enemy.
- Observation plan contains depth and redundancy to facilitate continuous reporting as the enemy attacks west into the BCT DO’s engagement area.

Indicators of Failure

- Platoon leader fails to conduct IPB.
- Platoon leader fails to provide security guidance to his platoon.
- Platoon leader fails to assign primary and alternate observers for each NAI, does not disseminate PIR or indicators for each NAI, and does not assign times to observe each NAI.
- Platoon positions OPs to answer information requirements in NAIs that provide insufficient reaction time and maneuver space, resulting in the BCT commander unable to employ fires or commit additional combat power in a timely manner.
- Observation plan lacks depth, resulting in the platoon’s inability to report on enemy movement through the BCT AO once bypassed or engaged and destroyed.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Provide reaction time and maneuver space”

- Platoon is arrayed along PL Indianapolis, screening west and has limited observation of NAIs 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3020. The troop commander informs the platoon leader that the squadron S2 estimates that the enemy fixing force will be identified by a division asset east of AO in the next 12-24 hours. The fixing force consists of least four tanks and nine BMPs. The report should initiate internal communication and the platoon maneuver plan may change.
- The platoon leader must decide whether to adjust the observation plan based on his ability to observe the NAIs within his AO. He may choose to remain arrayed along PL INDIANAPOLIS or he may execute a movement to contact, zone reconnaissance, or infiltration to establish subsequent screens vic PL LAS VEGAS or PL MIAMI. Provide the platoon leader the following injects based on his decision on where to establish his screen:
- PL INDIANAPOLIS: Vehicles and personnel of a quartering party for the BCT TAC occupy a position in a draw west of PL INDIANAPOLIS. The BCT S3 made linkup with one of your scouts and told him the BCT DO intends to emplace battle positions on the hill mass occupied by his section. Further, that battalions’s engagement area will extend approximately three kilometers east of PL INDIANAPOLIS.
 - If the platoon leader decides to adjust his observation plan by positioning further east, continue to next inject.
 - If the platoon leader decides to maintain his position along PL INDIANAPOLIS, inform him that the BCT DO conducts EA development and place friendly battle position placard. The squadron S2 reports that a division asset identified a battalion-sized element moving rapidly west into the BCT AO. Place a placard of the enemy fixing force, consisting of five tanks and 12 BMPs in NAI 3025, continuing to move the placard west to establish a support by fire position on northwest of NAI 3025. Once the friendly and enemy placards are within three kilometers of one another, place placard depicting enemy assault force in NAI 3025, continuing to move west. Place a smoke placard indicating obscuration fires vic PL INDIANAPOLIS. Place placard of enemy exploitation force in NAI 3035, moving west into position to exploit breach conducted by assault force. Indicate successful breach and/or penetration of friendly defensive positions.
 - Platoon Leader should not receive effects with IDF, as there is insufficient battle space to allow for the development of tactical and technical triggers for fires against such a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - FASCAM should fail to separate enemy echelons.
 - Place placard to indicate commitment of BCT reserve to reinforce the BCT DO committed too late, the enemy exploitation force engages and destroys the reserve in open terrain in a movement to contact.
- PL LAS VEGAS: Note whether the platoon leader has arrayed his OPs to allow for depth in his screen and provide the appropriate inject.
 - Depth: The platoon should have observation of NAIs 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3025 and limited observation of NAI 3030.
 - Platoon leader should receive effects with IDF between PL INDIANAPOLIS and PL LAS VEGAS, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force. East of PL VEGAS, indirect fires have limited effect due to a lack of observation.
 - FASCAM separates enemy echelons, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - Place placard to indicate commitment of BCT reserve to reinforce the BCT DO. Committed too late, the enemy exploitation force engages and destroys the reserve in open terrain in a movement to contact.

- Lack of Depth: The Platoon should have observation of NAIs 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3025 and limited observation of NAI 3030.
- PL MIAMI: Note whether the platoon leader has arrayed his OPs to allow for depth in his screen and provide the appropriate inject.
 - Depth: The platoon should have good observation of NAIs 3005, 3010, 3015, 3025, 3030, and 3035.
 - Platoon leader should receive effects with IDF, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - FASCAM separates enemy echelons, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - Place placard to indicate commitment of BCT reserve to reinforce the BCT DO. Committed in a timely manner, the BCT reserve occupies battle positions and contributes to the destruction of the enemy fixing and assault forces.
 - Lack of Depth: The platoon should have observation of NAI 3030 and limited observation of NAI 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3025.
 - Platoon leader should receive effects with IDF against target east of PL LAS VEGAS, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force. Once west of PL VEGAS, the platoon is unable to effect the enemy through the employment of fires due to a lack of observation.
 - FASCAM separates enemy echelons, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - Place placard to indicate commitment of BCT reserve to reinforce. Committed in a timely manner, the BCT reserve occupies battle positions and contributes to the destruction of the enemy fixing and assault forces.

NOTES:

CAVALRY VIGNETTE 10:


“Orient on the protected force, area, or facility”


You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is tasked with conducting a screen along PL BILL (LOA) to provide early warning for a deliberate defense south of PL CINDY. Your platoon is currently arrayed between PL CHRIS and PL BILL oriented west. This will allow the BCT to prevent enemy forces from penetrating PL CINDY and seizing key terrain to the south. The BCT expects an enemy fixing force to attack along AoA HOUSTON in the next 48hrs. It is comprised of an armored reconnaissance platoon followed by two tank companies.

Your platoon’s mission is to screen along PL BILL (LOA) to identify the enemy fixing force in order to provide early warning for the BCT. The purpose of this operation is to provide early warning to the combined arms battalions (CAB) established in battle positions along PL CINDY. Key tasks of this operation include: observe NAI 2030 and NAI 2035 for enemy movement along AoA HOUSTON; confirm/deny enemy composition/disposition; disrupt enemy forces in TAI 3000 and TAI 3005; and maintain 75% combat power.

Your platoon is first in priority for troop mortars. You have been allotted two mortar targets for planning. You possess the troop’s organic Raven UAS. Additionally, there is one sortie of AH-64 Apaches operating south of your platoon. It is in support of an adjacent unit but may support your troop if the enemy force is larger, or attacks earlier, than expected.

It is imperative that you correctly orient your platoon. This enables you to incorporate all IC systems to rapidly and accurately identify the enemy as well as disrupt the enemy within your capabilities. You must provide the BCT with time to prepare its defenses. You have 10 minutes to develop your fragmentary order. **ACT NOW!**





CAVALRY VIGNETTE 10:

What does “*Orient on the protected force, area, or facility*” mean?

“While reconnaissance operations orient on the reconnaissance objective, security operations focus on the protected force by understanding their scheme of maneuver and follow-on mission. By understanding BCT’s required actions and movement, the squadron maneuvers to best provide reaction time and maneuver space that allow for timely decisions.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

“The reconnaissance platoon focuses all of its actions on securing the protected force or facility, and providing maximum early warning of enemy activity. It operates between the protected force and known or suspected enemy elements. The reconnaissance platoon moves as the protected force moves.”

ATP 3-20.98 Reconnaissance Platoon

The commander arrays his platoons to best protect the security objective. Platoons may be oriented to the front, on the flanks, or around the security objective. The commander uses width and depth to maximize early warning and provide the BCT with the greatest amount of reaction time and maneuver space. Proper force array enables the commander to observe, disrupt, neutralize, and/or destroy an enemy force before reaching the security objective.

Indicators of Success

- Provides a coherent FRAGO with clear instructions.
- Security guidance is disseminated: focus, tempo, engagement criteria/disengagement criteria.
- Subordinate elements are arrayed forward of PL CINDY to observe NAI 2030, NAI 2035, TAI 3000, TAI 3005.
- Platoon leader plans mounted and dismounted observation posts (OPs) to create depth. He delineates long or short duration OPs and develops a plan to sustain them.
- OPs are provided cover and concealment and have good observation of their assigned area.
- Platoon leader screens to provide early warning of the enemy for the BCT.
- Platoon leader does not violate ROE.
- Platoon leader coordinates with adjacent units to maintain visual contact with the enemy.

Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader does not array forces to protect his/her security objective.
- Platoon leader does not plan mounted and dismounted observation posts (OPs), does not create depth.
- OPs are not provided cover and concealment or cannot observe their assigned NAI/TAI.
- Platoon leader fails to maintain screen; changes mission to civilian protection or detainee operations.
- Platoon leader does not coordinate with adjacent units to maintain visual contact with the enemy.
- Platoon leader fails to report rapidly and accurately.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“Orient on the force, area, or facility to be secured”

- Platoon LDs from PL CINDY to occupy a screen IVO PL BILL (LOA). Upon LD the platoon leader is given intelligence that an enemy force has been identified west of the AO, traveling east at a high rate of speed. Enemy composition is reported to be three to four BRDMs and four tanks.
 - The report should invoke concern and the platoon leader should reassess his maneuver plan.
 - The platoon leader should disseminate the information to the platoon. If the platoon leader requests additional information, inform the platoon leader *“UAS is off station at this time.”*
 - Direct and indirect fire planning/coordination should adjust to ensure adequate SDZs.
- PL BILL: As the platoon is setting in the screen a civilian vehicle is identified in vicinity of NAI 2035. The civilian vehicle appears non-hostile but moving semi-erratically (display placard). Inform the platoon leader *“You have observed civilians dismounting the vehicle. They appear to be having a discussion and may be lost. You now observes the civilian reentering the vehicle and resume travel east, towards the platoon.”*
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must assess the situation and determine if the civilians are a threat. The platoon leader may engage the vehicle (turn placard over), interdict it, or allow the civilians to pass freely through the screen (move placard to PL CINDY and remove). If the platoon interdicts the vehicle the platoon leader must determine how much time to allocate towards the civilians and other associated actions.
 - The platoon leader cannot violate ROE but may interdict the vehicle. The platoon leader must avoid changing mission to civilian protection or detainee operations. He must establish a screen to provide early warning for the BCT. He should not warn the civilians of friendly battle positions. This would violate EEFI and OPSEC.
 - If the platoon leader temporarily detains the civilians the platoon must provide sustainment and security to the civilians.
 - He should report the contact to his higher headquarters and must adhere to ROE.
- NAI 2035: The enemy force identified moving east along AoA HOUSTON. The platoon identifies an armored reconnaissance element with one tank company moving behind them (display placards).
 - The platoon leader collects information on enemy composition /disposition and reports.
 - The platoon engages the enemy in accordance with its engagement criteria. The enemy reconnaissance element returns fire but is disrupted (turn placard over).
 - Upon disrupting the enemy reconnaissance element, the first tank company enters NAI 2035 and engages the platoon. The platoon loses 25% combat power (turn placards over). The second tank company then appears west of NAI 2035 (display placard) and is observed changing direction north, towards PL AMANDA (remove placard as it crosses PL AMANDA).
 - **Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:** The platoon leader must assess the situation and determine when to disengage the enemy. The platoon should not displace but remain in covered and concealed positions to observe the enemy as it travels east and north. The platoon should allow the first tank companies to pass through the screen and report. The platoon should conduct a reconnaissance handover (RHO) with its adjacent platoon to maintain observation on the second tank company. The desire to engage the enemy may overwhelm the platoon leader but this will result in the platoon losing excessive combat power. In doing so, they will lose critical observation, denying them the ability to provide early warning for the BCT.


CAVALRY VIGNETTE 11:


“Perform continuous reconnaissance”

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting a screen to disrupt enemy elements east of PL IRON. Your platoon is currently occupied in a screen vic PL IRON. The BCT is establishing a hasty defense 10KM west of PL IRON and requires time to complete its defenses. The troop must provide observation forward of the BCT until battle positions are prepared and occupied in order to provide reaction time and maneuver space for the BCT. You must observe NAI 1020 and NAI 1030 to identify enemy forces and determine likely enemy avenues of approach. You must also destroy enemy reconnaissance elements to disrupt a potential attack.

The enemy has established dismounted OPs west of PL STEEL to disrupt friendly security efforts with indirect fires. A mounted reconnaissance element is conducting a zone reconnaissance along AoA JUPITER to identify a suitable route for an enemy deliberate attack. There are two to three dismounted OPs established in the AO with one platoon of armored reconnaissance moving along AoA JUPITER. Two enemy tank companies are expected to follow the reconnaissance element to conduct a deliberate attack in the next 24hrs. There are platoon sized mobility corridors running north to south along PL GRANITE that the enemy may utilize to infiltrate your AO. Additionally, there is one enemy helicopter operating west of PL TITANIUM.

It is important that you destroy the enemy reconnaissance element and identify any potential attack routes. You possess the troop’s Raven UAS. You are first in priority for troop mortars and have two targets for planning. You have 10 minutes to develop your Fragmentary Order. ACT NOW!





16-11 PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

CAVALRY VIGNETTE 11:

What does “*Perform continuous reconnaissance*” mean?

“Squadrons and maneuver battalions continuously seek the enemy and reconnoiter key terrain. Through continuous reconnaissance, forces continue to gain and maintain enemy contact, develop the situation, report rapidly and accurately, and retain freedom of maneuver to provide early and accurate warning, and provide reaction time and maneuver space to the protected force. Thus, the fundamentals of reconnaissance are implicit in all security operations. Commanders use the same reconnaissance methods, management, and techniques. .”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

“Security comes from detailed knowledge about the enemy and terrain within the assigned AO. This comes from ongoing reconnaissance that supports the overall unit surveillance and reconnaissance plan. As it attempts to determine enemy COAs by focusing on the enemy and key terrain, the platoon uses combinations of OPs, Army aviation, UAS, patrols, and other intelligence collection assets to perform continuous reconnaissance.”

ATP 3-20.98 Reconnaissance Platoon

The commander employs all assets available to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance and never ceases collecting information about an enemy or the terrain. He continuously strives to gain better understanding of the AO to improve decision making within the BCT.

Operating environments are constantly changing. The enemy and terrain will continuously present new threats, obstacles, and challenges to the brigade. Reconnaissance elements must actively seek information to improve situational awareness, update assumptions, and create a complete picture for the brigade.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader conducts IPB to identify mobility corridors, refine NAIs, and template potential enemy.
- Platoon leader provides security guidance to his platoon.
- Platoon leader plans mounted and dismounted OPs to maximize effectiveness of their screen.
- Observation posts are provided cover and concealment while maintaining good observation of their assigned NAI.
- Platoon leader incorporates all information collection assets available to observe their assigned zone.
- Platoon leader provides a task and purpose for each platform and incorporates redundancy, mixing, and cueing in his observation plan.
- Platoon leader continuously collects information about the enemy and terrain; disseminates to higher headquarters (HHQ).

Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader fails to conduct IPB.
- Platoon leader fails to provide security guidance to his platoon.
- Platoon leader fails to assign primary and alternate observers for each NAI, does not disseminate PIR or indicators for each NAI, and does not assign times to observe each NAI.
- Platoon leader fails to allocate assets through all phases of the operation.
- Platoon leader fails to assign a task and purpose to each information collection platform.
- Platoon leader fails to coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be observed by the platoon.
- Platoon leader fails to report information about the terrain and enemy to the HHQ; fails to update information as it becomes available.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:

“*Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance*”

- PL IRON (occupation of screen): As the platoon leader occupies the screen, the platoon is engaged with cannon delivered indirect fire from an enemy OP vicinity PL STEEL (display placard briefly). IDF contact causes the platoon leader to reassess the plan to account for enemy OPs.
 - Platoon leader should continue mission but issue a fragmentary guidance to address the threat. Once the platoon is in observation range of NAI 1020 display dismounted OP placard.
 - The platoon leader should coordinate indirect fire to disrupt them. If the platoon leader fails to coordinate activity the enemy repeats their fire mission and displaces to an alternate OP (display placard again and remove).
 - If the platoon leader coordinates indirect fire rapidly, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). The platoon should continue its mission immediately.
- NAI 1030: Motorized enemy infantry squad attempts to infiltrate screen from the south. Enemy elements engage the platoon with direct fire weapons then withdrawal out of visual range (reveal placard and remove). Assess the platoon with two casualties one URGENT, one PRIORITY (turn over friendly placard). This forces the platoon leader to coordinate CASEVAC, disrupting continuous reconnaissance.
 - ***Cavalry Leadership Dilemma***: The platoon leader must evacuate casualties while maintaining security and performing continuous reconnaissance. The platoon leader must move a CASEVAC vehicle to the casualties and determine if pre-planned CCPs are sufficient. If CCP locations are insufficient or do not have adequate cover and concealment, the CASEVAC vehicle must move to a CCP directed by the EXCON. This will waste time, endangering the casualties and preventing the CASEVAC vehicle from returning to its mounted OP site. This causes gaps in the screen, obstructing continuous reconnaissance.
 - The platoon leader must assess the situation and determine if he/she needs to reposition elements/assets to maintain observation of assigned NAIs.
- AoA JUPITER: An enemy armored reconnaissance platoon is identified conducting a zone reconnaissance along AoA JUPITER. The enemy element maneuvers west and attempts to engage the platoon (display placard). The platoon leader is forced to engage the enemy.
 - The platoon leader reports all information to HHQ.
 - As the enemy force moves towards NAI 1020, increase its rate of march.
 - ***Cavalry Leadership Dilemma***: The platoon leader must determine when to engage the enemy. This will exercise his engagement criteria. He/she should report the situation to HHQ and begin making coordination. When he may engages the enemy (turn over placard). If he does not engage the enemy allow the enemy to move uncontested through the AO.
 - Determine if the platoon leader is reporting rapidly and accurately and if he is adhering to the engagement criteria.
- AoA JUPITER: An enemy armor company is identified moving west along AoA JUPITER (reveal placard). Upon reaching NAI 1020, the enemy tank company changes direction north, and maneuvers out of visual range with the use of obscuration fires. Place a smoke placard and remove the tank placards.
 - Platoon leader must coordinate a reconnaissance handover (RHO) with adjacent units.
 - Platoon leader must report rapidly and accurately.

NOTES:


CAVALRY VIGNETTE 12:


“Maintain Enemy Contact”

You are a scout platoon and you are part of a squadron guard along PL BREWERS. Your troop has been ordered to occupy the western flank of the guard and your platoon is the western platoon in your troop. You have been tasked to disrupt enemy forces along AoA RUTH and in NAI 1031 and TAI 1033. The purpose of this operation is to allow the BCT to set conditions for the defense. Your key tasks are to: locate enemy composition in NAI 1031 and TAI 1033, determine the AoA the enemy exploitation force is using to attack the BCT, conduct reconnaissance handover with the battalion scouts vic CP1, and be the primary observers for indirect fires in TAI 1033.

The enemy has recently moved south from their defense and is expected to attack the BCT's defense, south of PL BREWERS in 48 hours. The enemy has three template courses of action and one is the use of AoA RUTH. Within AoA RUTH there is key terrain that will allow the enemy to set SBF positions to allow the main body to pass. The enemy wants to gain a foothold in the pass vic PL BREWERS to allow the exploitation force to breach the BCT's obstacles. The enemy's decisive point is seizing the high ground near NAI 1031. The enemy is supported by two 120mm mortars and engineers to reduce obstacles. The enemy support by fire is a platoon with six vehicle mounted heavy machine guns, and vehicle mounted anti-armor weapons.

An infantry battalion is defending to secure southeast of PL GIANTS in order to maintain decisive terrain that is vital for communications throughout the AO. The infantry battalion has sent its scouts north to conduct a reconnaissance handover vic CP1. It is important that you identify the exploitation force so that the BCT can confirm the enemy's timeline and prepare its defense. You are the squadron's main effort and have priority to direct the BCT Shadow and the troop Raven. Your platoon is priority of troop mortars and is tasked with providing two troop mortar targets. You have 10 minutes to develop your Fragmentary Order. ACT NOW!





CAVALRY VIGNETTE 12:

What Does “*Maintain Enemy Contact*” Mean?

“Real-time and accurate information requires Cavalry forces to gain and maintain contact with the enemy to rapidly report their actions and provide reaction time and maneuver space. Like the reconnaissance fundamental “gain and maintain enemy contact,” maintaining enemy contact through one or more of the forms of contact enables the staff to make recommendations to the commander, generate options, identify opportunities, and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”

FM 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break unless the main force commander directs it, and continues to collect information on the enemy’s activities to assist the main body in determining potential enemy COAs

The individual security asset that first makes contact does not have to maintain contact, if the entire security force maintains contact with the enemy. The security force commander ensures that subordinates hand off contact with the enemy from one security asset to another. This compels the security force to have visual contact, use direct or indirect fires, and maneuver freely, which requires the security force have depth in space and time.

Indicators of Success

- Platoon leader plans for long duration OPs. Mixing mounted and dismounted optics and UAS for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- Platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- Platoon develops engagement areas and assign weapon systems to enemy capabilities using echelon of fires.
- Platoon dedicates appropriate assets to each phase, and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- Platoon leader uses higher echelon assets (i.e. Shadow) to make enemy contact and queues movement of additional observation assets.
- Platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation, and moves subordinate elements based on enemy scheme of maneuver.
- Platoon leader uses assigned assets to cover any dead space and provide for early warning.
- Platoon leader fails to handover reconnaissance to the infantry defense to the rear.

Indicators of failure

- Platoon leader does not prioritize weapon systems and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- Platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations, and fails to provide additional assets when queued to do so.
- Platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- Does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.

- Observation posts are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective or has not established subsequent, or alternate battle positions to cover dead space.
- Fails to use appropriate direct or indirect fires to disrupt enemy's advance on the BCT.

Exercise Controller (EXCON) Instructions:







“Maintain Enemy Contact”

- PL TIGERS: Engage the platoon with cannon delivered indirect fire from the north of PL TIGERS at enemy LD by using a placard against one of the sections. This actions should force the platoon leader to find cover and shift observation focus to enemy OPs.
 - He should to continue mission or issue a fragmentary order to address the new information if necessary. As scout sections continue to observe, reveal enemy SBF vic TAI 1031 to the section who is able to make visual contact by placing placard in/around NAI 1031.
 - The platoon leader must assess that this SBF not an inferior force and maneuvers the platoon to destroy the SBF with multiple forms of contact. If platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (ie. envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard, and skip to scenario three). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, move to scenario two.
- PL INDIANS: An enemy company crosses PL TIGERS, enemy SBF engages the platoon with heavy machine guns and anti-tank weapon systems and destroys multiple vehicles.
 - ***Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:*** The platoon leader must quickly and determine if the enemy threat is greater than the platoon can disrupt. The platoon leader must use multiple forms of contact to disrupt the enemy SBF or report to the troop for additional assets. The platoon must then regain focus on its purpose and gain contact with the main body.
 - If he assesses that the exploitation force is a like or superior force, he may report to higher and request additional assets or use direct fire. If the platoon leader conducts a reconnaissance handover with the infantry scout platoon, he has executed one of his key tasks. If platoon leader hesitates to react to tries to engage with organic systems continue to assess vehicle damage and casualties.
 - If he assesses that the SBF is an inferior force, the platoon leader should engage with multiple forms of contact and maneuver on the enemy SBF.
- PLINDIANS: The enemy company crosses PL TIGERS, and engages your platoon with accurate direct fire weapons. The exploitation force begins to maneuver on your position.
 - Platoon leader assess whether the maneuvering element has superior forces than the platoon. If so the platoon leader report situation to higher and requests additional assets to complete his mission. The platoon leader should call for indirect fire on the enemy.
 - If the maneuvering force is inferior, the platoon leader should maneuver his forces using sound movement formations and techniques to disrupt enemy forces. If the platoon leader’s decisions are sound and timely destroy the enemy and move to next scenario. If the platoon leader hesitates to act, the enemy engages a section with mortar fired indirect fires and destroys one vehicle. Assess the actions that the platoon leader now takes.
- PL BREWERS: The enemy exploitation force has bypassed AoA RUTH and has committed to a different route to the east of your position. The enemy exploitation force has not been sufficiently disrupted and is now moving toward the assault position.
 - ***Cavalry Leadership Dilemma:*** Now the platoon leader must quickly assess his situation. The platoon leader knows that his templated enemy used another route to the BCT. He must now wrestle with continuing to observe along AoA RUTH or maneuver his forces to complete his task of disrupting the exploitation force. He must report to higher the change in enemy situation and then maneuver to maintain enemy contact. If he does not report that the enemy main body has changed course or has contacted the infantry scout platoon for handover, then the platoon leader has lost contact with the enemy and failed his mission.
 - If platoon leader decides to maneuver to maintain contact with the exploitation force, allow the platoon leader to issue a fragmentary order and conduct any maneuver required in that order.

NOTES:

Scout Platoon Formations







ABCT Scout Platoon

<p>LAUN GREN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM M240L 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-104(V)6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE</p>  <p>1LT 19A00 PLT LEADER M5/M4 SGT 19D2G TM LDR / CFV GUNNER M5/M4 PFC 19D10 CFV DRVR M5/M4</p>	<p>LAUN GREN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM M240L 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-104(V)6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE</p>  <p>SFC 19D40 PLT SGT M5/M4 SPC 19D10 CFV GUNNER M5/M4 PFC 19D10 CFV DRVR M5/M4</p>	<p>LAUN GREN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM M240L 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-104(V)6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE</p>  <p>SSG 19D30 SQUAD LDR M5/M4 SPC 19D10 CFV GUNNER M5/M4 PFC 19D10 CFV DRVR M5/M4</p>	<p>LAUN GREN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM M240L 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-104(V)6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE</p>  <p>SGT 19D20 TM LDR M5/M4 SPC 19D10 CFV GUNNER M5/M4 PFC 19D10 CFV DRVR M4</p>	<p>LAUN GREN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM M240L 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-104(V)6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE</p>  <p>SSG 19D30 SQUAD LDR M5/M4 SPC 19D10 CFV GUNNER M5/M4 PFC 19D10 CFV DRVR M5/M4</p>	<p>LAUN GREN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM M240L 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-104(V)6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE</p>  <p>SGT 19D20 TM LDR M5/M4 SPC 19D10 CFV GUNNER M5/M4 PFC 19D10 CFV DRVR M4</p>
4 X CLU JAVELIN					

SBCT Scout Platoon

<p>MG 7.62 MM M240L MG 50 CAL DVE ANVAS-5 AN PRC-119 2 X AN PRC-154 ANVRC-104 ANITAS-8 SHOTGUN ANVRC-32F(C) JBC-P ANUYK-128B(V)3</p>  <p>2/0/22/1/24</p> <p>LT 19C00 PLT LDR M4 ANPSQ-20 SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 ANPSQ-20 PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV M4 NVG SPC 19D10 SCOUT/IGNR M4 ANPSQ-20 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 ANPVS-14 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4 NVG</p>	<p>MG 50 CAL SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANITAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F(C) 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANUYK-128B 2 X ANPRC-154</p> 	<p>MG GREN 40MM MK19 MOD SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANITAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F(C) 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANUYK-128B 2 X ANPRC-154</p> 	<p>MG 50 CAL SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANITAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F(C) 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANUYK-128B 2 X ANPRC-154</p> 	<p>MG GREN 40MM MK19 MOD SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANITAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F(C) 3 X ANPSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANUYK-128B 2 X ANPRC-154</p> 
<p>MG 7.62MM M240L MG 50 CAL DVE ANVAS-5 2 X AN PRC-154 ANVRC-104 AN PRC-119 ANITAS-8 SHOTGUN ANVRC-32F(C) JBC-P ANUYK-128B(V)3</p>  <p>SFC 19D40 PLT SGT M4 ANPSQ-20 SPC 19D10 SCOUT/IGNR M4 ANPSQ-20 PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV M4 NVG SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 NVG ANPSQ-20 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 ANPVS-14 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4 NVG</p>	<p>SSG 19D30 SQD LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT/IGNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV M4 SGT 19D20 TM LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>	<p>SSG 19D30 SQD LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT/IGNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV M4 SGT 19D20 TM LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>	<p>SSG 19D30 SQD LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT/IGNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV M4 SGT 19D20 TM LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>	<p>SSG 19D30 SQD LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT/IGNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV M4 SGT 19D20 TM LDR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>




















IBCT Scout Platoon

<p>MK-19 LRAS3 ANITAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-32F ANVRC-104 PRC150-HF ANPRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128(V)3 RADIO SET HH 201320 2 X NVG</p>  <p>1LT 19C00 PLT LDR M4 PFC SCOUT DRIVER M4 SPC 19D10 JAVELIN GNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>	<p>MG 50 CAL LRAS3 ANITAS-3 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F JBC-P ANUYK-128(V)3 RADIO SET HH 201320 2 X NVG</p>  <p>SSG 19D30 SEC LDR M4 SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 SPC 19D10 JAVELIN GNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>	<p>MG 50 CAL LRAS3 ANITAS-3 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F JBC-P ANUYK-128(V)3 RADIO SET HH 201320 2 X NVG</p>  <p>SSG 19D30 SEC LDR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 SPC 19D10 JAVELIN GNR M4</p>
<p>MK-19 LRAS3 ANITAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-32F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANPRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128(V)3 RADIO SET HH 201320 2 X NVG</p>  <p>SFC 19D40 PLT SGT M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 SPC 19D10 JAVELIN GNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>	<p>TOWITAS CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F JBC-P ANUYK-128(V)3 2 X NVG</p>  <p>SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 SGT 19D20 TOW GNR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 PFC SCOUT 19D10 M4</p>	<p>TOWITAS CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-31F JBC-P ANUYK-128(V)3 2 X NVG</p>  <p>SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 SGT 19D20 TOW GNR M4 PFC SCOUT DRIVER 19D10 M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4</p>

30 X NVG ANPSQ-20
6 X ANPVS-14
4 X PISTOL 9MM
4 X LAUNCHER GREN M320A1
MG 7.62MM M240L
8 X SHOTGUN T39223


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Enemy Placards




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Obstacle Placards




Obstacle:
 - **Composition:**
 - Grids to 4 corners:

 - **Dimension:**
 - **Orientation:**



Obstacle:
 - **Composition:**
 - Grids to 4 corners:

 - **Dimension:**
 - **Orientation:**









Obstacle:
 - **Composition:**
 - Grids to 4 corners:

 - **Dimension:**
 - **Orientation:**














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