Red Diamond
Threats Newsletter

TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise
ACE Threats Integration

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

TRADOC G-2 VIRTUAL OPFOR ACADEMY (VOA)

by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration and OE Training Support Center

The TRADOC G-2 Virtual Opposing Force (OPFOR) Academy provides users with information, tools, and resources to learn, apply, and replicate OPFOR countertasks that support US Army unit training objectives in a collective training environment. The collective training focus is at company and lower unit echelons. The Operational Environment Training Support Center (OE TSC) delivers this as one group of readiness-oriented products. Virtual OPFOR Academy products hosted on the OE TSC website include OPFOR countertasks with task, condition, standards, and performance measures. An instructional video of a tactical task or drill vignette complements the countertask narrative for understanding of OPFOR tactics and techniques. One additional enabler is an immersive VBS3 simulation video that visualizes execution of the particular countertask. Other VOA products hosted on the site include but are not limited to the US Army TC 7-100 series on OPFOR tactics and techniques, organizations, and force structure; the *Worldwide Equipment Guide*; and an exercise design tool.

ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) serves as the US Army lead for designing, documenting, and integrating threat OPFOR and OE conditions in support of all Army training, education, and leader development programs. The OE TSC delivers complex operational environments by leveraging real-world data, information, and knowledge in order to enable learning across training, professional education, and leader development domains. ACE-TI and OE TSC continue to develop additional OPFOR countertasks, instructional videos, and immersive VBS3 simulation videos that will be posted to the OE TSC website as they are approved. With common access card (CAC) entry, visit the VOA site in the "Operational Support" menu at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/g2/oetsc/.

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

This issue of *Red Diamond* opens with a guide on opposing force (OPFOR) use of smuggling—an activity inextricably linked to basic economic precepts that have transcended time. This article identifies and discusses four foundational principles of smuggling. It also provides a "how to" guide for such activities and discusses their potential impact on Army operations.

Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Warfighter (WFX) 16-5 was a distributed, simulation-supported, corps-level, command-post warfighter exercise conducted in June 2016. Training was focused on developing core warfighting competencies based on the unit's mission essential task list, and the World Class Opposing Force (WCOPFOR) provided a near-peer competitor to stress training objectives. An article describes the scenario design, training units, unique features of the WFX, and WCOPFOR execution of this DATE-based exercise.

The next article explains the OPFOR Augmentation Program available at MCTP. The purpose is to provide practical experience and insight into how MCTP's OPFOR conducts the operations process at the operational strategic command and division tactical group levels. Secondary to this purpose is developing relationships that support mutual trust, the integrity of the system, and insight into best practices. The overall objective is to enable training audiences to enter their warfighter exercise at a higher level of readiness in an efficient manner so they may maximize the training opportunity.

Units, staffs, and/or individuals will not learn "how to beat the OPFOR." However, they should gain insight into how to conduct the operations process more efficiently and effectively.

ACE-TI conducted the fall resident offering of its Threat Tactics Course (TTC) during August 2016 at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The student population was represented by 15 diverse organizations that included members from the joint sphere, along with coalition partners. One major change from the spring offering was that the classroom's organization was downsized from three classrooms to two, with a corresponding increase in annual offerings.

Terrorism is a tactic. Acts of terrorism by an OPFOR in US Army training demonstrate an intention to cause significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically long-term commitments to degrade the resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from him. The final article discusses this OPFOR countertask and includes a vignette of an OPFOR raid to kidnap enemy soldiers.

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An OPFOR Guide to Smuggling

by [CPT Nickolas Zappone](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

Smuggling is one of the world's earliest professions. Its genesis can be traced back to the leakage of silk technology in China during the Han Dynasty by Chinese rivals who were committed to avoiding the exorbitant price of importing the cloth.[1] Like most professions, as environmental conditions shifted and changed, so too did the art of smuggling. But regardless of how, why, or for what purpose one chooses to smuggle, the activity is inextricably linked to basic economic precepts that have transcended time. This article will attempt to identify and discuss the most foundational of those precepts as well as go into a slightly deeper "how to" analysis of smuggling and its potential impact on Army operations.

> "*Smuggling is the clandestine transportation of illegal goods or persons. It usually involves illegal movement across an international border. There are various motivations to smuggle. These include participation in illegal trade, illegal immigration or emigration, and tax evasion. Smuggling is often related to trafficking in persons, drugs, or arms.*"
>
> — [*Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces*](#)

The Economics of Smuggling

Rule #1: Demand creates supply. The concept of supply and demand is arguably the most fundamental axiom of market economies. In short, the relationship between supply and demand refers to how much of a product or service is desired by buyers (demand) and how much of that product or service the market can provide (supply). Price is a corollary of this relationship: as the equilibrium between demand and supply shifts based on market conditions, so too does price. Let's take a look at a historical example to lend perspective. In the 1990s there was a demand for high-quality, western-made cigarettes in European countries. However, because taxation on tobacco in these European countries was so high, so too was the price for a pack of smokes. Enter Montenegrin and Italian organized crime groups. According to Misha Glenny's book McMafia, this is how the cigarette-smuggling racket played out: two US tobacco companies would export cigarettes as duty not-paid items to Europe's two free trade zones, Rotterdam in Holland and Zug in Switzerland. From there they would be sold to a third country with endemic levels of corruption, such as Egypt or Uzbekistan. Those shipments bound for the European market would make a final stop in Montenegro before re-entering the European Union by speedboats, which would depart from the port of Bar, speedily traverse the 130-mile wide Strait of Oranto, and finally be offloaded at the sister port of Bari by the Italian Mafia group Sacra Corona Unità. These smuggled cigarettes would then be sold on the streets of European cities at half the price of legally-imported cigarettes. It was estimated that the cigarette-smuggling business was costing the European Union an estimated $6–$8 billion annually in lost tax revenue, not to mention the sunk cost of increased and/or diverted law enforcement and interdiction efforts as well as the legal and administrative costs of investigating and prosecuting the case.[2]

Rule #2: One fundamental principle of trade is to never travel empty. Transportation of goods—regardless of which of the big four (humans, weapons, drugs, or contraband [HWDC]) is being transported—costs both time and money.[3] And smuggling is just as much about meeting the demand of consumers as it is about doing so in a manner that optimizes supply chain efficiencies to minimize costs while simultaneously managing risk. The South Vietnamese Air Force in the 1960s provides an excellent example of how to capitalize on optimal environmental conditions that lend themselves to

the notion that efficient smugglers are always moving something. Nguyen Cao Ky was the prime minister of South Vietnam in a military junta from 1965–1967. Before that he was a ranking member of the South Vietnam Air Force who, at one point in his career, commanded the First Air Transport Group. Ky used his connections within the Air Force and at Tan Son Nhut Air Base (at the time a major focal point for the US military in South Vietnam) to orchestrate a major smuggling operation that involved transporting weapons, military equipment, and covert agents into Laos and Cambodia. On the return leg of the trip, the aircraft would come back loaded with opium and contraband gold. Once on the ground, airport staff at Tan Son Nhut would allow the smuggled material to pass through customs unsearched.[4] This injection may seem a bit non sequitur, but it's important to touch upon risk management here as well. Like any business, smugglers and smuggling networks must operate in the black. Losing shipments to theft by a rival, interdiction by law enforcement, or other setbacks, cut into their profit margin. To minimize these risks, smugglers such as Mexican drug trafficking organizations have adopted a four-pronged risk mitigation strategy: maintain constant surveillance of those that cannot be corrupted; brake large loads into smaller loads to avoid catastrophic loss; utilize decoys to divert law enforcement attention; and employ subcontractors to insulate members and leadership.[5]

Rule #3: The inverse proportion of weight to value is the golden formula of smuggling.[6] The larger the item or items one is attempting to smuggle, the greater the transportation and logistics considerations. In supply chain terms this is called the value-to-weight ratio. Examples of goods that have favorable value-to-weight ratios are pharmaceuticals—to include the counterfeit variety, electronics, pirated media, and, of course, diamonds. Here we look to western Africa: as a vicious civil war ripped the diamondiferous nation of Sierra Leone apart during the 1990s, one of the belligerents, a brutal rebel army by the name of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), cashed in on the cross-border smuggling of "blood diamonds." RUF rebels used Mandingo middlemen to sell or trade the diamonds in neighboring Guinea or Liberia to Lebanese buyers for cash, rice, fuel, medical supplies, and occasionally weapons— although at times they did this bit of work themselves. Then, complicit customs officials in these countries would falsify certificates of origin to obscure where the diamonds originated in order to side-step outside embargoes, such as a 2001 United Nations resolution that barred the import of "Liberian" diamonds.[7]

Rule #4: Conflict helps create conditions for profitability. The fog of war creates favorable conditions for smuggling operations. Nowhere is this more painfully evident than during the Siege of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995. There are far too many deeply-complex and interrelated factors that influenced the greater conflict in the Balkans to unravel in one

The Border Trade
Merchants in Cúcuta, Colombia, buy cheap Venezuelan goods from smugglers. Even after paying a markup, the city's merchants can offer shoppers lower prices than those in supermarkets in the capital, Bogotá.

Retail prices

Venezuela		Bogotá
Gasoline		
0.1¢/gal.		$3/gal.
Corn flour (1kg)		
5¢		$0.95
Vanish stain remover		
$2.40		$11.30
Dove deodorant		
7¢		$5.21
Laundry detergent (2.35kg)		
28¢		$5.90

Venezuelan soldiers look for smugglers

Sold in Cúcuta for $1.60

PHOTOGRAPHS BY ALEJANDRA PARRA/BLOOMBERG
GRAPHIC BY BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
DATA: COMPILED BY BLOOMBERG

Figure 1: The economic incentives of cross-border smuggling between Venezuela and Columbia

paragraph, so we will focus more specifically on the criminalized war economy that developed in the city as a result of the siege. It is important to note that regardless of the highly-criminalized political machinations that went on behind the scenes that kept the siege in place, suffering and destitution for the city's citizens was lessened as a result of cross-siege-line smuggling and black marketeering. Paradoxically, these activities alleviated the suffering just enough to give the international community the perception that things were tolerable within the city, making limited intervention more palatable. The most obvious forms of war profiteering involved the diversion of aid flown in by the United Nations and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the pilfering of fuel by United Nations Protection Force elements.

This was done via tolls/taxes imposed at the city's airport, the focal point for aid deliveries, and at siege-line checkpoints that controlled access to the city. At times, those that controlled mobility and access in and out of the city would stop aid convoys to drive up the price of provisions on the black market.[8]

The "How To" of Smuggling

The actual execution of smuggling can be fairly straightforward or bizarrely intricate depending on environmental conditions. There are, however, certain prerequisites that must be met in order to be successful. These are supplier-customer relationship; security and transport protection; facilitators such as document forgers, corrupt officials, and corrupt customs and border patrol agents; and, lastly, access to transportation networks. For visualization purposes, it may be helpful to trace the supply chain from beginning to end.

1. A supplier-customer relationship that is predicated on the precept of supply and demand
2. On the supply side, access to whatever good (HWDC) is to be smuggled
3. If necessary, gatekeepers (e.g. border patrol agents, customs agents, port authority employees, etc.) at the right locations that are bribed, co-opted, or coerced into acquiescence or compliance
4. Illegitimately-obtained or falsified documents, if required
5. Security along the length of the supply chain, from original location (e.g. narcotics cultivation area), to storage facilities, to staging areas, to transshipment points, to transaction locations
6. Access to transportation networks such as pedestrian border crossing points, line-haul, maritime shipping, and/or air and rail transportation
7. Demand-side access to exclusive buyers and/or distribution networks such as local black markets

Figure 2: An example of smuggling creativity—breast implants filled with 1.3 grams of cocaine

A few quick side notes: there are elements of creativity and ingenuity to smuggling that are, at times, entirely necessary, but they are closely tied to environmental considerations that are far from universal. These countermeasures can be integrated into the supply chain at any point to avoid detection by rivals, opportunistic hijackers, or the authorities. Additionally, porous borders, legal and jurisdictional gaps, cultural sensibilities about trade, and unenforceable restrictions and sanctions all influence smuggling to some degree.

Implications for Training and Army Operations

Black markets and smuggling networks that develop during conflict have the ability to persevere, and even thrive, in post-conflict areas. Again we look to Bosnia and Herzegovina as one example of how criminalized war economies can undermine the rule of law, frustrate law enforcement cooperation, stymie legitimate economic development, bilk state coffers of much-needed tax revenue, and fuel ethnic and/or nationalist fervor. As author Peter Andreas notes in his book Blue Helmets Black Markets,

> "In January 2000, the U.S. Special Representative to Bosnia told the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe: 'War-time underground networks have turned into [political] criminal networks involved in massive smuggling, tax evasion, and trafficking in women and stolen cars.'
> In the case of postwar Sarajevo, for example, entrenched political corruption—based on close relationships of loyalty and trust between nationalist politicians, the security apparatus, and criminals that were forged during the war—slowed the rebuilding of the city, eroded public trust in government, and impeded political reform efforts. In short, criminalized war problems soon turned into politicized crime problems."[9]

Although difficult to replicate during training—and, admittedly, more relevant to stability operations than combat training center rotations that heavily favor offense and defense—it would be helpful to somehow mimic these complexities to some degree to illustrate the double-edged nature of smuggling networks developed during conflict. That is to say that smugglers are just as capable of acquiring weapons to defend a city or sustenance to sustain a besieged civilian population

as they are of flipping the social order on its head, giving rise to criminal elites with shadowy connections and unscrupulous aims, which can be harmful to postwar reconstruction efforts.

Infrastructure built to facilitate smuggling can be dual-use as evidenced by the movement of weapons, ammunition, and fighters through tunnels built by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. While these tunnel networks have been used by smugglers to circumvent Egypt's and Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip, they have also been used by Qassam Brigade fighters to avoid detection, maintain freedom of movement, and move military material.[10] The fact that smugglers have shown a proclivity for using subterranean routes to move things about in a clandestine nature has technical implications for maneuver support units, particularly engineers and military police. Using criminal intelligence produced by military police units could help inform and focus the employment of exploitation tools like ground-penetrating radar, fiberscope electronics that enable full-motion video analysis, robotics, and sensors that detect seismic activity, magnetic anomalies, acoustic activity, and density anomalies. The outputs can help inform commanders and enable them to make tactical and operational decisions concerning smuggling within their area of operations. These outputs could also be stored in intelligence repositories for datamining at a later date.

Figure 3: Members of the Al Qassam Brigades in a tunnel

Regardless of whether smuggling has a pernicious or harmless effect on conditions within an operational environment, it is a criminal activity that must be understood, mapped, and monitored effectively to help create situational understand for commanders. It is an activity that can help create operating revenue for threat actors, enable the movement of material and personnel that perpetuates conflict, contribute to human-rights violations, and frustrate postwar reconstruction via the birth of new criminal elites. On the flip side, it can help sustain besieged populations, enable the economic advancement of lower socioeconomic demographics, and strengthen cross-border relationships. Appreciating the nature of smuggling and its interrelationship with other aspects of an environment within an area of operations has been, and will continue to be, an important consideration for US Army units.

Notes

[1] Simon Harvey. Smuggling: Seven Centuries of Contraband. Reaktion Books Ltd. 2016. Pg 11.

[2] Misha Glenny. McMafia. Alfred A. Knopf. 2008. Pgs 23–25.

[3] Russel Howard and Colleen Traughber. "The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype?" JSOU Report 13-6. October 2013. Pg 11.

[4] Simon Harvey. Smuggling: Seven Centuries of Contraband. Reaktion Books Ltd. 2016. Pgs 251–252.

[5] Nathan Jones. Mexico's Illicit Drug Networks and the State Reaction. Georgetown University Press. 2016. Pg 57.

[6] Simon Harvey. Smuggling: Seven Centuries of Contraband. Reaktion Books Ltd. 2016. Pg 16.

[7] Simon Harvey. Smuggling: Seven Centuries of Contraband. Reaktion Books Ltd. 2016. Pgs 292–294.

[8] Peter Andreas. Blue Helmets and Black Markets. Cornell University Press. 2008. Pg 45.

[9] Peter Andreas. Blue Helmets and Black Markets. Cornell University Press. 2008. Pg 119.

[10] Harriet Sherwood and Hazem Balousha. "Hamas tunneling again in Gaza as Israelis fear attack from below." The Guardian. 31 March 2016.

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Mission Command Training Program — Warfighter Exercise 16-5

by Patrick Madden, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA CTR)

Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 16-5 was conducted as a distributed, simulation-supported, corps-level, command post exercise. WFX 16-5 was held in Texas (Fort Hood) and Kansas (Fort Leavenworth) from 7–15 June 2016, with the final after action reviews conducted on the 16th. Each WFX is approximately 10 days in length. The majority of WFXs are based on the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and the Army Training Circular 7-100 series of publications.

MCTP conducts approximately five multi-echelon, multi-component, joint WFXs each fiscal year. MCTP supports the collective training of Army units, as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and scheduled by Forces Command, in order to train leaders and provide commanders the opportunity to train on mission command in unified land operations. Training is focused on developing core warfighting competencies based on the unit's mission essential task list. The World Class Opposing Force (WCOPFOR) provides a near-peer competitor to stress training objectives. Based on these parameters and timeline, the following discussion describes the scenario design, training units, unique features of the WFX, and WCOPFOR execution of this DATE-based exercise.

Scenario Design

The Road to War scenario leading up to the start of the exercise involves a dispute between Ariana and Atropia. Ariana accuses Atropia of stealing its oil reserves and threatens military reprisals. This is followed by the United Nations imposing two rounds of sanctions on Ariana and the US evacuating its embassy in Baku. Ariana responds by deploying its military units along the Ariana/Atropia border under the guise of conducting training exercises. The US, after consultation with Atropian leadership, responds by announcing the deployment of US forces to Atropia in order to deter Arianian aggression. US forces deploy and complete joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) that includes moving into tactical assembly areas along the Gorgas-Atropian border. Without warning, Ariana responds by invading Atropia with an operational strategic command (OSC) comprised of four division tactical groups (DTGs).[i] Ariana is initially successful in seizing most of Atropia, with the exception of the western half of the country and a smaller area in the northeast that contains the capital of Baku (see figure 1). Arianian forces also capture a significant portion of the Trans-Caucasus Petroleum Pipeline. In response, the US issues Presidential Decision Directive 35 to expel Arianian forces from Atropia.

As a result of US military force authorizations, shaping operations commence and Combined Joint Task Force-Caspian (CJTF-C) is created to intervene on behalf of Atropia. Led by US maneuver forces, the Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Command (CJFLCC) completes JRSOI and begins movement into western Atropia from Gorgas in order to attack, defeat, and force the withdrawal of the OSC back into Ariana. Also located in Atropia are remnants of brigades from Field Group Atropia defending terrain in order to buy time for CJFLCC forces to arrive. In the northeastern portion of Atropia, remnants of the Northern Region Command (NRC) and Capital Defense Command (CDC) also remain in order to defend against OSC attempts to capture Baku. When the exercise begins, ground forces from the CJFLCC initiate a forward passage of lines with two Atropian Army brigades. These two brigades transition with a "follow and support" mission of CJTF-C. The main effort is led by the 35th Infantry Division (ID) in the north and supported by the 1st Cavalry Division (CD) in the south.

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[i] Military unit names in this article appear in either red (OPFOR), blue (US), or green (host nation) text for readability purposes.

Figure 1. Atropia post-invasion

Training Units

The training divisions for this exercise were the 1st CD and the 35th ID from the Army National Guard. Supporting the 1st CD were three brigade combat teams (BCTs). Also supporting the 1st CD were the 354th Atropia Tank Brigade and three additional US brigades consisting of artillery, maneuver enhancement, and rotary wing aviation. Training objectives for the 1st CD were the following:

- Exercise mission command using the operations process to employ forces in unified land operations. Execute decisive action (offense, defense, and stability tasks) by means of combined arms maneuver and wide area security to defeat a hybrid threat.
- Synchronize and integrate Headquarters (HQ) staff. Enhance the battle staff's tempo and quality of operational planning, refine the division's battle rhythm for decisive operations, and utilize established procedures and have the ability to adapt to new ones.
- Conduct security force assistance with host nation forces.
- Plan and execute division sustainment operations in coordination with corps and theater plans.
- Protect the force.
- Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Exercise the intelligence process by managing information collection, supporting the targeting process, and providing intelligence support and situational understanding to the commander and staff.
- Integrate special operations forces and conventional operations throughout planning and execution.
- Conduct coordination with real-world interagency and intergovernmental partners.
- Employ joint operational firepower. Synchronize lethal and non-lethal assets using the targeting process in coordination with division artillery as force field artillery HQ, joint air ground integration cell, and higher HQ/joint assets.

- Conduct redeployment and retrograde operations in preparation for Phase IV and next operational mission.
- Refine division information and knowledge management systems and processes.
- Integrate the multi-component total force utilizing habitual and WFX Army Reserve/National Guard partners.

Three BCTs supported the 35th ID. Also supporting it were the 348th Atropia Motorized Infantry Brigade and three additional US brigades consisting of artillery, maneuver enhancement, and rotary wing aviation. Training objectives for the 35th ID were the following:

- Exercise mission command using the operations process to employ forces in unified land operations. Execute decisive action (offense, defense, and stability tasks) by means of combined arms maneuver and wide area security to defeat a hybrid threat.
- Enhance the battle staff's tempo and quality of operational planning for branches, sequels, and concept plans.
- Exercise the intelligence process by managing information collection, supporting the targeting process, and providing intelligence support and situational understanding to the commander and staff.
- Enhance the accuracy and efficiency of the intelligence process and products through the use of tiered intelligence assets at the national, theater, and corps echelons. Protect the force through active use of electronic and cyber defense operations.
- Synchronize lethal and non-lethal fires (including joint fires from Naval and USAF assets) using the targeting process in coordination with higher, lower, and adjacent unit fires.
- Plan and execute division sustainment operations in coordination with corps and theater plans.
- Plan and execute stability task partnering with host nation to establish a safe and secure environment.
- Refine division information and knowledge management systems and processes.

The training divisions' higher command was a notional VII Corps staffed by selected 3rd Infantry Division soldiers. VII Corps was dual-hatted as the CJFLCC. Above the CJFLCC was a scripted CJTF-C, portrayed as the Navy 6th Fleet. Also scripted as part of the CJTF-C was Joint Force Special Operations Command (JFSOCC). Other training units supporting the CJFLCC/VII Corps consisted of a military police brigade, engineer brigade, and two sustainment brigades. These brigades were also competitive, had training objectives, and were part of the formal after action review process. In addition to these units, the CJFLCC/VII Corps was supported by thirteen additional brigades and three battalions that included an artillery brigade, one cavalry regiment acting as the operational reserve, and a combat aviation brigade. These additional units all operated as competitive response cells but were not part of the training audience. Response cells from these respective units replicated their associated subordinate units.

The exercise for training units was planned as a four-phased CJFLCC operation. However, execution of the exercise was limited to Phase II and Phase III, the latter of which was divided into three sub-phases (see figure 2, which also includes supporting brigades). The majority of Phase II, Seize the Initiative, had already occurred prior to the beginning of the exercise. Phase II focused on setting the conditions to allow coalition forces to conduct successful ground offensive operations during Phase III. Phase II included reconnaissance, shaping operations from the Air Force, and other long-range fires. In Phase IIIA, Gain Access, the 35th ID and the 1st CD conducted forward passages of lines with Atropian forces. During Phase IIIB, Gain Positional Advantage, the mission of the 35th ID was to link up and establish lines of communication with Atropian forces in Baku, as well as conduct supporting attacks to isolate Arianian forces to compel their surrender or withdrawal. At the same time the 1st CD, supporting CJFLCC forces in the south, attacked in zone to defeat the opponent's defenses, interdict his lines of communication, and force a withdrawal or complete the isolation of Arianian forces in Atropia. Critical to the CJFLCC offensive throughout Phase III was the rapid seizure of key terrain to gain operational depth in order to create multiple dilemmas for Arianian forces. Also important during this phase for both divisions were successful wet gap crossings in order to seize final objectives. Phase IIIC, Compel Withdrawal, ended once the Arianian forces withdrew from Atropia and the southern Atropian border was restored. The CJFLCC would then transition to Phase IV, Stability Operations, which was the final phase of the operation.

Unique features of this exercise were the significant adjustment of the number of the division tactical groups (DTGs) used by WCOPFOR, continued development of the opposing force (OPFOR) synchronization group, and the use of chemical weapons. Normally there are four DTGs that are used during the exercise inside Atropia. During this exercise there were only two DTGs defending against the CJFLCC divisions. The other two DTGs remained in Ariana along its northern boundary with Atropia in tactical assembly areas. The rationale behind this change was to balance out the correlation of forces and

to encourage training units to attack earlier in the exercise. The challenge in this change was that WCOPFOR units, unlike training units, are generally not reconstituted. Losses during the exercise and the positioning of DTGs inside Ariana had to be closely watched in order to have sufficient forces in Atropia throughout the exercise.

Day #	1	2	3	4	MAAR	5	6	7	8	FAAR
Phase	II	III (ACCESS, GAIN POSITIONAL ADVANTAGE, COMPEL WITHDRAW)								COM
CJFLCC	DELIBERATE ATTACK					ATTACK TO PL BILL		ATTACK TO PL VICTORIA		
372 EN	MOBILITY SURVIABILITY		INFRASTRUCTURE RECON			WET GAP		COUNTERMOBILITY		
42 MP	AREA SECURITY, MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT OPS, DETAINEE OPS					AREA SECURITY, DETAINEE OPS, HOST NATION TRAINING AND SUPPORT				
1CD	RECON, FPOL		BREACH, PENETRATE, SEIZE KEY TERRAIN	ATK TO PL GARY		SEIZE NEAR SIDE	GAP CROSSING	COUNTER ATK	EXPLOIT	
1 DIVARTY	SHAPING FIRES		SEAD	CTR FIRES, SEAD, TST	MAAR	SEAD, X-B FIRES, CTR FIRES, TST				FAAR
35 IN	RECON, FPOL		ATK TO NEAR SIDE	CONDUCT WET GAP CROSSING		CONSOLIDATE FAR SIDE		ATTACK TO PL VICTORIA		
36 CAB	ZONE RECON		AASLT / HASTY/DEL ATTACKS			ISR	AASLT / HASTY/DEL ATTACKS			
196 MEB	MANEUVER SUPPORT, ASSURED MOBILITY, IDP					AREA SECURITY	EPW, IDP			
1CD SB	CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS					CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS/ESTABLISH FLE				
113 SB	CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS					CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS/ESTABLISH FLE				
LEGEND	CJFLCC		1CD		35th ID	ESC			AAR	

Figure 2. CJFLCC concept of phases

Key to maintaining this balance of forces are the daily OPFOR synchronization group meetings, which are facilitated by the Supreme High Command (SHC). This is a relatively new initiative from the WCOPFOR that continues to grow and significantly assists in reducing exercise confusion as well as synchronizing WCOPFOR future actions with all other applicable MCTP organizations. Other participants like media, irregular forces, Atropia leadership, and operations groups voice their issues, discuss solutions, and get a comprehensive picture of all sides of the ongoing conflict in order to help produce a cohesive exercise and achieve training objectives. Also unique was a chemical strike from OSC against one of 35th ID's brigade combat teams (BCTs). The persistent chemical warfare agent was delivered by OSC artillery units and caused significant damage. Normally chemical play during these exercises are relatively benign containment events such as chemical spills or facilities that are discovered to contain hazardous chemicals and are secured to prevent the site from being exploited. However, reacting to a chemical agent strike is an important training event and provides the units the ability to exercise decontamination and required chemical attack reporting.

Opposing Force

WCOPFOR continues to plan and operate competitively during WFXs as an OSC with four subordinate DTGs and approximately three separate brigades. The SHC is part of the MCTP Exercise Control Group and is not a simulated unit, with the exception of its strategic reserves. The SHC writes and publishes its strategic campaign plan for WCOPFOR implementation. It also operates as a "white hat" organization that not only hosts the OPFOR synchronization group meetings, but also attends white cell meetings, receives guidance from MCTP leadership, and coordinates with the OSC. The OSC and SHC are intentionally separated during exercises since the WCOPFOR is competitive.

During this exercise the OSC opposed VII Corps, functioning as the CJFLCC and its two subordinate divisions. Constituent maneuver units from the OSC were four DTGs consisting of the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th. Also constituent was the 306th Reconnaissance Brigade, as well as the 302nd Mechanized Infantry and 304th Tank Brigades. The 302nd and 304th served as the OSC reserve. In addition, the 3241st Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) and 995th Commando Brigades were constituent

and dedicated units, respectively, for the OSC (see figure 3). Included in this force structure was the Integrated Support Command (ISC) with transportation, sustainment, and two militia brigades in order to provide protection in the OSC support zone. The OSC also utilized an integrated fires command (IFC) that included long-range artillery, air defense artillery, and rotary wing aircraft.


Figure 3. OSC maneuver and support forces

The mission of the OSC was to conduct a defense in order to defeat coalition forces in the battle zone, compelling coalition forces to cease military operations. On order, the OSC would also attack north to seize Baku in order to retain critical hydrocarbon resources. Operational objectives were to seize and retain Baku, Sangachal Oil Terminal, the Trans-Caucasus Petroleum Pipeline, and bridges over the Kura River.

At the beginning of the exercise, the overall strength of OSC units was approximately 70%, resulting from previous attrition from the invasion into Atropia. Once OSC maneuver units were in place, they used defensive tactics throughout most of the exercise since the coalition forces were attacking with units at approximately 100% strength. However, given the availability of complex terrain throughout eastern Atropia, the OSC did plan and execute counterattacks in order to block or disrupt the coalition offensive.

OPFOR Defense

The OPFOR divided its OSC area of responsibility (AOR) into disruption, battle, and support zones. The key task for the 306th Reconnaissance Brigade in the OSC disruption zone was to disrupt and delay coalition forces as well as, on order, conduct counterreconnaissance. To the east of the 306th disruption zone were the 19th and 20th DTGs. Both divisions were tasked to conduct a defense, as well as seize key bridges in their AORs, in order to retain key terrain and deny coalition wet gap crossing sites along the Agshu and Aras Rivers, respectively.

Located south of the 20th DTG battle zone was the OSC support zone. Positioned in this zone in assembly areas were the 17th and 18th DTGs. The primary "on order mission" for the 17th DTG was to reinforce the 19th or 20th DTG area defenses, with a secondary enabling mission of isolating Baku in the northeast. The 18th DTG mission was to function as an action force and attack to seize Baku once the conditions of its commitment were set. Also located in the support zone were the 304th Tank Brigade and 302nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which functioned as the OSC reserve. The ISC, with its two militia brigades and one motorized infantry brigade, was tasked with providing freedom of movement of sustainment forces by conducting counterreconnaissance and securing lines of communication, major supply routes, and bridging sites. The purpose of this task was to prevent US forces from interdiction and targeting. The IFC was tasked to shape second-echelon coalition forces.

The WCOPFOR also created an assault force from other OSC units with an on order mission to attack north in order to isolate Baku. This reserve force's primary mission was to conduct counterattacks or reinforce units that were being depleted and needed reinforcement. This assault force was centrally located in a tactical assembly area located just south of the Kura River near the coastal highway, and consisted of the 172nd Brigade Task Group (BTG) from the 20th DTG, the 194th BTG, and the Naval Infantry Regiment.

In addition to the WCOPFOR regular forces described above was an extensive effort throughout the exercise to employ SPF, commandos, and irregular forces throughout the coalition area of operations. Irregular warfare continues to be an

effective affiliated asset to WCOPFOR. The most effective organizations are the South Atropia Peoples' Army (SAPA) and the commando units. Although the commandos sustained heavy casualties during this exercise, their efforts enabled SPF to focus on other missions, such as operational reconnaissance, without having to be used exclusively for direct action missions. WCOPFOR continues to use its SPF to support SAPA and closely coordinates operations. SAPA and commando direct action attacks are focused on soft targets, such as logistical units along major supply routes, maneuver enhancement brigades, airfields, and forward arming and refueling points, all of which have a significant impact on training units' ability to conduct wide area security. Attacks were planned and executed throughout Atropia during the exercise. This combined support assisted the WCOPFOR in focusing on the maneuver units attacking it.

OPFOR Defensive Operations

At the beginning of the exercise, the 35th ID and 1st CD conducted a forward passage of lines with the Atropia 348th Motorized Infantry Brigade and the 354th Tank Brigade, respectively. Once completed, the two Atropian brigades conducted follow and support missions. The 35th ID and 1st CD began their offensive with all of their BCTs simultaneously attacking abreast. Unlike previous exercises, both divisions committed all of their BCTs in the first echelon. The rationale given for this array was to find weak areas across the front, then mass and exploit the weakness. However, this also raised a dilemma for VII Corps over when and where it would commit the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2nd CR), which was its operational reserve, since the Kura River initially separated the two divisions.

As the coalition forces attacked eastward, the 306th, 19th, and 20th also moved into their defensive positions. In the past the WCOPFOR was already set in defensive positions at the start of the exercise. This is a recent change by the WCOPFOR in order to encourage the training divisions to attack at the beginning of the exercise. This technique works, but the downside on this exercise was the VII Corps divisions advanced too fast. Within less than 24 hours the OSC disruption zone had collapsed and the 306th sustained heavy causalities from fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Nevertheless, it did provide enough time for the 19th and 20th DTGs to move into their defensive positions. Remnants of the 306th withdrew south, with the 19th and 20th DTGs engaging the two divisions in their respective disruption zones.

As a result of the aggressive attack by the 35th ID and the 1st CD, both divisions also suffered heavy losses, primarily from OSC fires. Although these divisions swiftly reached their river crossing sites with unusual speed, they were unable to exploit their success. Both divisions were forced into hasty defensive positions just east of the Agshu (north) and Aras (south) Rivers. Their offensive was delayed for approximately 24 hours while they reconstituted in order to conduct their respective river crossings.

The OSC also suffered losses, primarily from fixed wing aircraft. The 19th DTG in the north lost one of its battalions from 192nd BTG. The 20th DTG in the south was also effectively targeted and had to withdraw the remnants of its two disruption zone BTGs back to the east side of the Aras River. During this time period the 1st CD destroyed deception decoys from the OSC's 9th Information Warfare (INFOWAR) Brigade, which was portraying itself as the 172nd BTG, in the 20th DTG sector. However, this deception unit held up the 1st CD for 18–24 hours and consumed a significant amount of effort from indirect and attack aviation efforts. As mentioned earlier, the real 172nd had already been detached by the OSC as part of a separate assault force. This is just one of many successful examples of deception used throughout the OSC AOR during WFXs. Also active were INFOWAR electronic warfare (EW) units that conducted GPS jamming to disrupt precision guided munitions and protect IFC assets. Additional EW communications jamming by the 9th was aimed at degrading and disrupting ground systems, especially maneuver BCTs attempting to conduct wet gap crossings.

Once both US divisions had been reconstituted, they once again attempted to cross their respective wet gap crossings. In the north, the 35th was successful in crossing the Agshu River in its northern sector with one BCT. As this BCT continued east to establish ground lines of communication with Atropian units near Baku, the OSC fired chemical persistent rounds in the middle of its advancing formation. Effects of these rounds were set for four hours, which included reacting to a chemical attack. To the south, the two remaining BCTs from the 35th were not as successful in crossing the Agshu. The BCT in the center of the sector was able to cross, but culminated on the near side of the river and was not able to exploit its limited success. The other BCT on the 35th's southern flank, near the border with the 1st CD, did not cross the Agshu, leaving the BCT in the far north contaminated, exposed, and potentially vulnerable to counterattacks.

In the south, the 1st CD also culminated in its attempts to cross the Aras River to continue attacking east, with the exception of the BCT on its northern flank. This BCT executed what was initially perceived as an unusual movement north

across the Kura River into the 35th area of operation, then turning east and crossing over the Agshu. What the WCOPFOR did not know at that time was that a formal change of boundaries had been made between the 1st CD and the 35th ID, the purpose of which was to outflank the 20th DTG and seize key terrain.

At this point in the battle both sides suffered significant casualties. The 19th only had two battalions left, with only two tubes of artillery. The 192nd BTG was completely destroyed. The 20th in the south also suffered severe losses. It had only three battalions remaining and seven tubes of artillery left. At the tactical assembly area, all three units were destroyed by fixed wing aircraft or were combat-ineffective. Remnants of the 172nd BTG withdrew east of the Kura and set up defensive positions. The Ariana Naval Regiment also withdrew south to a tactical assembly area in the OSC support zone. OSC loss percentages were 81% from attack aircraft: 70% from Air Force fixed wing aircraft and 11% from Army rotary wing assets. The remainder of the losses (19%) was due to theater-level long-range fires. Had the OSC not supported both divisions with long-range artillery, the warfighter could have prematurely ended.

As an effort to shore up the OSC, SHC provided each of the DTGs a battery of Primas and a battery of 9A52s and G6s, as well as an addition of four Hind-Ds dedicated to its IFC. The 191st BTG replaced the 192nd, which was combat ineffective. The OSC also provided the 211th Mechanized Artillery Brigade from its IFC to the 19th DTG. All these provided units were competitively moved into their respective units.

VII Corps' units resumed their offensive once the reconstitution was complete. The 2nd CR operational reserve was also committed and successfully crossed the Agshu River in the north. The 2nd CR then attacked east to exploit the initial success of the 1st CD BCT, but were successfully repulsed. Remnants of the regiment then crossed the Kura and attacked south. Also in the north, the 35th ID BCTs generally remained near the Agshu River with the exception of the northern BCT. This BCT succeeded in linking up with Atropian units near Baku in order to establish ground lines of communication between VII Corps and remnants of the Atropian maneuver forces. In the south the 1st CD's two BCTs were also initially successful in their attacks, but culminated with some of their units on the east side of the Aras River. The 1st CD's BCT in the north followed the 2nd CR east, but remained on the northern side of the Kura River. The BCT that had partially crossed the Kura River earlier completed its crossing and maneuvered south to join other 1st CD forces to attack east. At this point it was clear that the VII Corps main effort was in the north.

The results of this offensive for the OSC were significant losses. Both DTGs were reinforced by a BTG from the 17th DTG, which remained along the Ariana border. Nevertheless, the 19th DTG was left with only two functioning BTGs at approximately 25% strength and had lost a substantial portion of its AOR. The 20th DTG suffered severe losses, rendering its overall strength at less than 10% equivalent to one battalion's worth of combat power. The 20th DTG later received the 300th Motorized Infantry Brigade from the 18th DTG and the 602nd Militia Brigade from the OSC's IFC to reinforce its defensive operations. This additional combat power prevented the 1st CD from penetrating Arianian forces and severing ground lines of communication along the eastern AOR in Atropia. The 304th Tank Brigade remained centrally located, under control of the OSC, and was combat-capable. Movement was also decided by SHC and the OSC to move the strategic reserve (92nd Mechanized Infantry Division) up to the Atropia/Ariana border for reinforcement. The 17th DTG and 18th DTG also remained postured for offensive operations along the same border in defensive positions.

The final attack by VII Corps focused on massing its forces in the north in order to isolate and prevent OSC forces from achieving their operational objective of seizing Baku. In addition, two of 1st CD's BCTs in the south were attacking east and then south in order to also isolate and prevent OSC forces from reinforcing their units. The attack in the north included two BCTs from the 35th and one BCT from the 1st CD. Their focus was to destroy remnants of the 19th DTG that consisted of four battalions defending the Sangachal Oil Terminal southwest of Baku, including reinforcement from the 172nd, which was part of the 20th DTG. As part of this attack plan it was assumed that the Atropian forces, located just north of the Sangachal Oil Terminal, would assist them in this attack. To their surprise they refused, since it was a night attack and they did not have night-fighting capabilities. The Atropian forces were concerned that they could encounter significant fratricide since their weapon systems were basically the same as those of Ariana. After prolonged discussions, the 35th ID decided to attack without their support.

Despite this setback, VII Corps forces attacked across their front with success. Unlike previous efforts, both divisions attacked at the same time. The 35th attacked east and then south with its two BCTs and was successful in destroying most of the 19th DTG units at the oil terminal. This was coupled with the 1st CD in the southern sector, which also attacked east with two BCTs in order to isolate 20th DTG forces and prevent reinforcement from the 17th DTG. It successfully destroyed

remnants of the 201st and 203rd BTGs and the 602nd Militia Brigade between the Aras River and eastern edge of the battle area. Both divisions continued the offensive to drive the OSC units back across the Atropia/Ariana border. At approximately the same time, fixed wing air strikes were focused on the 18th DTG, resulting in significant damage. What resulted was a delaying effort by remnants of the OSC units, which included the 304th Tank Brigade and the 300th Motorized Infantry Brigade, in order to facilitate a phased withdrawal across the border. The 302nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade (OSC Reserve) and the 17th DTG were also defending along the Ariana border by integrating their defenses, in order to protect withdrawing OSC units from being pursued into Ariana and attacked.

Conclusion

The OSC essentially lost its ability to fight in the north and had to withdraw. It was unable to assess the critical need to move the 304th Tank Brigade reserve unit to Sangachal in time to reinforce and retain this key objective against a significant attack. What followed was a phased withdrawal to Ariana. It was also reluctant to reinforce its two DTGs in the battle zone with the 17th DTG, assuming that it could force yet another VII Corps culmination or isolate Baku in the east. Instead, it piecemealed units from the 17th and 18th DTGs, which were OSC enabling and action forces. However, it is important to mention that most of the OSC forces began the exercise with much lower percentages of strength relative to the training units. The OSC's ability to delay or halt repeated offensive attempts by VII Corps with units below 30% is commendable. The WCOPFOR also went to great efforts during planning sessions prior to the exercise to ensure that it did not overwhelm the training units with excessive power and prevent them from achieving their training objectives. Most, if not all, of the evaluated training units achieved their training objectives. As mentioned in previous reports, it is important that close coordination continues between MCTP leadership and the WCOPFOR, exemplified by the OPFOR synchronization group daily meetings, as these exercises continue to grow in size and complexity in an ever-changing and challenging training environment.

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Use US Army TC 7-100 Series for Threats and OPFOR: Training for Readiness

Mission Command Training Program — OPFOR Ride Along

by **LTC Matthew Morgan**, MCTP OPFOR Commander, and **Patrick Madden**, TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI (BMA CTR)

The opposing force (OPFOR) from the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) welcomes "ride along" opportunities, also known as OPFOR Augmentation. This is not augmentation like the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center, as this augmentation is designed to observe. The purpose is to provide practical experience and insight into how our OPFOR conducts the operations process at the operational strategic command (OSC) and division tactical group (DTG) levels. Secondary to this purpose is developing relationships that support mutual trust, the integrity of the system, and insight into best practices. The overall objective is to enable training audiences to enter their warfighter exercise at a higher level of readiness in an efficient manner so they may maximize the training opportunity. Units, staffs, and/or individuals will not learn "how to beat the OPFOR." However, they should gain insight into how to conduct the operations process more efficiently and effectively.

This program is dynamic. The utility is based on multiple factors and will be reviewed periodically, such as at the changing of an OPFOR commander or the commander of an operations group. The value and utility will obviously change with operational philosophies, varying exercises, and training audiences.

Current Focus

The current focus is based heavily in the operational philosophy of the OPFOR Commander. This philosophy is founded in the operations process, deliberate planning at the appropriate depth, decision point tactics, and efforts that enable finding the "sweet spot" for a training audience and challenging it appropriately.

Transparency is foremost and nothing is off limits to OPFOR Augmentation. However, based on the level of operations the OPFOR conducts and the nature of exercise design, a certain level of maturity is required of OPFOR Augmentation participants. The program is of little value to enlisted personnel or junior officers (e.g. lieutenants and pre-command captains). This is based on the level of operations conducted and the nature of exercise control.

MCTP will take every measure to ensure participants are provided information that is useful in their current duties and does not detract from the larger picture. An example of the latter is a division analysis and control element (ACE) chief learning about the physical employment and "pucking" of a maneuver element in the warrior simulation (WARSIM), which is nice, but not necessarily relevant to staff processes and operational planning.

Coordination

Interested parties should submit their request thru e-mail and follow up by phone to the POCs listed below. This should be done as soon as possible in the exercise planning cycle in order to enable the appropriate coordination. Requests should include the following:

- Unit name,
- Warfighter exercise number (the one you are participating in as a training audience),
- Requested exercise (the one you desire to conduct a ride along/augmentation in), and
- Full names, ranks, and positions of personnel requesting participation.

Once intentions are understood by MCTP OPFOR POCs, OPFOR will make a recommendation to the Commander, Operations Group X-Ray, and subsequently to the MCTP Commander for approval. The potential exists that the desired

exercise might not work well for the intended purpose. MCTP reserves the right of refusal if the conditions are not appropriate for the ride along/augmentation. OPFOR has a limited capacity each exercise to absorb augmentation without distracting from the exercise and training objectives. Once approved, the augmentation personnel will likely be handed over to one of the OPFOR staff for final coordination.

Approval Authority

Staffing authority is the MCTP OPFOR, approval authority is the Commander, Operations Group X-Ray, and awareness is required from the MCTP Commander.

Services Offered

OPFOR provides hybrid threat briefings collectively, dialogs with specific sections such as fires, ride along during planning, and a ride along during an exercise. All of these are available, within reason, if the appropriate amount of notice is provided. The OPFOR exercise calendar is set two to three years in advance. The planning calendar, which includes the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), is drafted 9–12 months in advance and locked in approximately six months out. Early coordination increases the chances that OPFOR is able to meet the unit intentions and needs.

The OPFOR planning cycle (MDMP) is a three-week process that does not last all day every day. OPFOR conducts MDMP as outlined in Army doctrine. The three weeks includes OSC- and DTG-level MDMP. At the end of the three weeks, the OSC produces an operations order (OPORD) with appropriate annexes. The DTG produces a simple OPORD that includes mission, intent, concept sketch and statement, and a decision support matrix.

Augmentation personnel should be able to get a firm understanding of operations over any five-day period of a warfighter exercise. This is not to limit time, but during a five-day period in an exercise, OPFOR will cycle through all rhythm events, the operations process, and enough problem sets for someone to observe the entire process.

It is recommended that the greatest value comes from augmentation during an exercise and not the planning process. This is based on the fact that during planning MCTP may be working a number of priorities and not focused entirely on a given exercise. During the execution of an exercise, OPFOR focuses entirely on that exercise and time is not spent working other items of interest.

Logistics / Funding

MCTP is not responsible for funding, travel, logistics, lodging, or anything else that would be considered life support. OPFOR MCTP will coordinate for building access and operations inside the building. Units the augmentation comes from are responsible for all travel and logistics. Although the dining facility and other meal options exist in the area, it is recommended that augmentation personnel plan to pack their own lunch meals. This provides the maximum amount of flexibility during an exercise. The National Simulation Center, where the OPFOR operates during warfighter exercises, does have a break room with a refrigerator, microwave, snack machine, and soda machine.

Duties

In general, OPFOR will not specifically task augmentation/ride along personnel with duties other than to observe. This ensures that the responsibility for stimulating exercise training objectives is retained with the formal OPFOR chain of command. Additionally, it enables the maximum amount of freedom of maneuver for augmentation personnel to observe without any requirement to produce a product or effect.

POCs

For additional information or to request a ride along, please contact MAJ Toby (Arthur) Jimenez at 913-684-8477 or arthur.e.jimenez.mil@mail.mil (primary), or LTC Matt Morgan at 913-684-8715 or matthew.t.morgan4.mil@mail.mil (alternate).

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After Action Review

August 2016
Threat Tactics Course

by Kristin Lechowicz, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC)

The TRADOC G-2's ACE-TI Threat Tactics Course (TTC) conducted the fall resident offering (15–19 August 2016) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The student population was represented by 15 diverse organizations that included members from the joint sphere, along with coalition partners. Each classroom normally holds 15–16 students, which conforms to the Army learning model. One major change from the spring offering was that the classroom's organization was restructured and downsized from offering three classrooms to two; however, there will now be three offerings a year, equating to the same throughput for students. The reduced number of classrooms allows for less demand on ACE-TI personnel during these high-tempo periods, while the increase in scheduled offerings assists individuals via greater availability of the course.

A number of the students were stationed locally at Ft Leavenworth from organizations such as the Army Center for Lessons Learned and the Mission Command Training Program. Numerous students also traveled from other installations, including Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Peterson Air Force Base, Ft Rucker, and Caserma Del Din, Italy. Reserve elements and the National Guard were also represented from across the United States, along with international students from Japan and Brazil. Figure 1 illustrates the TTC student breakdown by organization.

Figure 1. Threat Tactics Course attendees

The objective of the course offering was to deliver a professional 40-hour block of instruction focused on threat doctrine. The students defined threat actors and reviewed tactics and techniques based on the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series of products on opposing force doctrine. The doctrine was supplemented and supported with both past and present threat examples taken from the strategic environment. The following examples are derived from previous TTC and mobile training team (MTT) missions to various locations.

Figure 2. Student product examples from previous MTTs and TTCs

The August TTC content was no different than past classes and included topics that are important to a broad audience throughout the training community. This type of instruction block is key to scenario developers at the combat training centers, centers of excellence, or home station training, and helps S-2/G-2s to understand the threat in training or deployment. Figure 3 illustrates how ACE-TI creates doctrine using real-world examples that are included in the TTC.


Figure 3. ACE-TI's support products to the Training Community

Discussion topics included the following:

- Threat concepts and functional tactics
- Operational environment (OE) variables and sub-variables
- Hybrid threat in complex and persistent conflict
- Threat actors: regular and irregular forces and elements
- Offensive and defensive tactics and techniques
- Emerging threats

The Threat Tactics Course, much like the threat itself, will continue to evolve and develop. The TTC block of instruction is on the pathway to be submitted for review as a course within the Foundry catalog during fiscal year 2017. The next TTC offering will be held at Ft Leavenworth in spring 2017, and is limited to 32 students. The TTC is also offered as a mobile training team (MTT) under the condition that instructor(s) travel expenses are funded by the hosting unit. To receive information about future course offerings, or to request an MTT, please contact Kristin Lechowicz at (913) 684-7922 or kristin.d.lechowicz.civ@mail.mil.

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To Access the ACE-TI website on ATN:

by Jon H. Moilanen, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC)

Terrorism is a tactic. Acts of terrorism by an opposing force (OPFOR) in US Army training demonstrate an intention to cause significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically long-term commitments to degrade the resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from him. International conventions and law of war protocols on armed conflict are not necessarily a constraint on terrorists.

Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and psychological effects can diminish the confidence of a relevant population in its key leaders and governing institutions. Social and political pressure, internal or external to a relevant population and its governing authority, is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time social media coverage in the global information environment.

Terrorism
The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.
JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (as amended through 15 February 2016)

Threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland.
ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (2012)

Hybrid Threat
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.
ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (2012)

The local, regional, international, and/or transnational attention on acts of terrorism by state and non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from his relevant population and foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can increase anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually defeat an enemy. Knowing the tactics and techniques of the threat is essential to planning against and combating its capabilities in a training mission.

When a specified threat exists in a US Army deployment order, that actual threat force is represented or replicated in training and pre-deployment evaluations. However, when training is not focused on a particular real-world threat, US Army activities use an opposing force as stated in Army Regulation 350-2. This regulation is a 2015 update on the operational environment (OE) and OPFOR program. As a *hybrid threat*, the OPFOR can represent or replicate diverse and dynamic combinations of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.[1] OPFOR tactical doctrine, tactics, and techniques are in Army Training Circular 7-100.2 and Army Training Circular 7-100.3.[2]

Opposing Force (OPFOR) Countertasks

The TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element, Threats Integration Directorate (ACE-TI) serves as the US Army lead for designing, documenting, and integrating threat OPFOR and OE conditions in support of all Army training, education, and leader development programs.[3] A key aspect of these descriptions is OPFOR countertasks and drills. These tasks and drills are being updated by ACE-TI in conjunction with the Operational Environment Training Support Center (OE TSC) and presented in a user-friendly group of training e-resources on the TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise portal.

The Virtual OPFOR Academy (VOA) site on the OE TSC portal provides users with OPFOR information, tactical narratives, visualization battlespace simulation vignettes, and other resources to learn, apply, and practice OPFOR countertasks and drills that support US Army unit training objectives in a collective training environment. The collective task training focus is company and lower unit echelons. The OE TSC delivers these products to enable adaptive learning across training, professional education, and leader development venues.

VOA products hosted on the OE TSC portal include an increasing number of OPFOR countertasks with:

- Task, condition, standards, and performance measures for an OPFOR mission task,
- An instructional video as a vignette example to understand OPFOR tactics and techniques, and
- An immersive VBS3 video that visualizes execution of a particular OPFOR countertask or drill.

Other VOA products include but are not limited to the US Army Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series on OPFOR tactics and techniques, organizations, and force structure; *Worldwide Equipment Guide*; and an exercise design tool.

Executing an OPFOR Act of Terrorism in US Army Training

As an example of a collective task, consider the task: Execute an OPFOR act of terrorism. For descriptions of conditions and standards for the task, consider the following:

CONDITIONS: The OPFOR is conducting operations independently or as part of a larger element or force and receives an operation order or fragmentary order to conduct an act of terrorism at a location and time specified. The order includes all applicable overlays and/or graphics. Task organization provides the combat power capabilities to accomplish the task. The OPFOR has communications with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting elements. Friendly force and enemy coalition forces, noncombatants, government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and local and international media may be in the OE. The OPFOR is not constrained by standardized rules of engagement and does not necessarily comply with international conventions or agreements on the conduct of warfare.

STANDARDS: The OPFOR conducts terrorism in accordance with (IAW) TC 7-100.2 and/or TC 7-100.3, the order, and/or higher commander's guidance. The OPFOR, IAW the mission order, considers a full range of regular and irregular force capabilities in order to erode an enemy's power, influence, and will. Stay-behind elements, on order, conduct varied follow-on tasks that can include but are not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance, disruption, delay, information warfare (INFOWAR), and/or subsequent threats or acts of terrorism. The OPFOR typically breaks contact or exfiltrates from an attack site and occupies a safe haven. An exception is an act of terrorism that involves suicide while conducting the act.

Motivations for conducting an act of terrorism can include but are not limited to—

- Spotlight attention on unresolved grievances with an enemy.
- Disrupt an enemy's ability to continue actions against the OPFOR.
- Champion causes of a suppressed and/or disenfranchised segment of a relevant population.
- Demonstrate regular and irregular force capabilities.
- Obtain active and passive support from relevant population.
- Receive overt and covert support from a state or non-state actor.
- Deter continued enemy military operations in a particular geographic area.

- Dissuade enemy governmental influence over a relevant population.
- Cause an enemy to overreact to acts of terror and correspondingly alienate a relevant population.

Conduct of a task typically includes several subtasks. Besides plan and prepare subtasks, typical subtasks include infiltration to an attack site, isolation of a kill zone or objective, conduct of the attack, and follow-on actions to continue a mission. Any number of actions can be used to conduct an act of terrorism. Examples include but are not limited to threat hoax, extortion, human trafficking, assassination, hostage-taking, kidnapping, and murder. These types of actions can be categorized typically as assault, ambush, or raid.

Raid and Kidnapping as an Act of Terrorism

The following tactical vignette is a small unit raid with the purpose of kidnapping enemy soldiers. The vignette describes and displays how individual acts of terrorism can compel a desired response from an enemy, cause significant psychological effects on a relevant regional population, and promote goals of a terrorist organization agenda to a regional and global audience.[4]

> **Raid**
> A *raid* is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding element to safe territory.
> US Army Training Circular 7-100.2, *Opposing Force Tactics* (2011)
>
> **Kidnapping**
> *Kidnapping* is the seizure of a person in order to compel an actor or organization to do or abstain from doing particular actions as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the person being detained.

> *Note.* Descriptions throughout the vignette use threat terms and symbols from the US Army TC 7-100 series. Task-organized irregular forces are described in TC 7-100.3. Organizational structure and weapon system capabilities are presented in TC 7-100.4 and its Threat Force Structure e-folders of units. Another unclassified source for equipment and weapon capabilities is the *Worldwide Equipment Guide*.

Operational Overview

The insurgent organization continued a persistent conflict spanning decades with an enemy it declared must be eradicated from the region. A state racked in civil war and a brokered ceasefire among belligerents provided a relative safehaven in the region and staging area for infiltration and periodic small-scale attacks across an international border. More importantly, state sponsors assisted the insurgent organization in establishing a significant defensive array in depth from the border trace ranging deep into the territorial interior.

Previous lessons learned in the prolonged conflict convinced the insurgents that defenses must be constructed as an extensive hardened underground network of concealed or covered fighting and support positions, grouped combined arms battle positions using natural and urban terrain, semiautonomous small cells shielded or embedded in the regional population, and defensive kill zones designated on the limited number of enemy axes of attack, reinforced with obstacles, in case of any enemy ground maneuver into the safehaven/defensive areas.

State sponsors provided insurgents with military training, modern weapons and equipment, sophisticated technology, and other support that resulted in a trained and combat-experienced paramilitary force of light infantry or commando-like force structure. A vast arsenal of short-range, medium-range, and long-range rocket systems complemented integrated plans for small arms, antitank rockets and guided missiles, and direct and indirect fires for tactical operations.

The insurgent organization used recurring acts of terrorism to intimidate the enemy and attempt to provoke a reaction of enemy aerial and ground attack across the international boundary. Insurgents believed that such a reaction would be prompted if enemy soldiers were kidnapped in a raid. Kidnapped soldiers would also be a significant negotiation aspect for return of key insurgents already captured by the enemy. Information warfare with a regional and global scheme of perception manipulation was key to strategic support and operational campaign actions.

Tactical Plans and Preparation

The insurgent cell leader had a developed reconnaissance and surveillance system in his assigned area of the disruption zone along the international boundary. He also had an effective counterintelligence apparatus of infiltrators operating in enemy territory and an active reporting network of civilians on both sides of the border.


Figure 1. Raid-kidnap terrorism planning and preparation (vignette example)

Months of observation, regular reports, and periodic ambushes on enemy patrols along the boundary had identified patterns of enemy operations, the reaction time of enemy quick reaction elements to an ambush or indirect fires, and when enemy units transitioned in tours of duty at the border. Probes along the border were sometimes conducted to deceive the enemy on infiltration points or to test enemy recognition of insurgent patrols and observation. Local civilians confirmed that several small units in ambush positions had vacated the area, and the only enemy presence in a selected

objective area were stationary observation posts, some entrenched stationary fighting positions, and the regularly-timed vehicular patrols along the boundary trace.

Small insurgent cells conducted feints along the border fenceline but received no overt responses from the enemy. Some of these probes verified that a series of enemy observation posts did not have visual coverage of a depression area along a particular length of the border trace. The cell leader selected an objective area for a raid to kidnap enemy soldiers, and direct action cells rehearsed for an ambush to be followed immediately by a raid. Other enabling elements of the cell practiced for direct and indirect fires that would fix any response from the observations posts or a quick reaction force. A direct action cell emplaced an improvised explosive device (IED) in this visual deadspace near an enemy patrol route and primed the munitions for command-detonation.

Reports to the insurgent cell leader stated that alert conditions had lessened along the border from recent high levels and enemy patrols had returned to a normal cycle. Of special note, intelligence confirmed that enemy units at the border were about to rotate, and that tactical procedures and patrol preparations and checks had become very lax with the enemy elements. The cell leader ordered the date and timing of the raid to insurgents already located in nearby tunnel complexes, concealed observation posts, and staging areas. The tactical actions involved sequential action elements of an ambush element and a raiding element, augmented with several support elements. Security elements were already in position and sustained visual surveillance and electronic monitoring of enemy radio and cell phone nets.

A raid is typically organized into three elements: a raiding element, security element(s), and support element(s).[5] In this particular direct action, the ambush was a task assigned within the support elements. The insurgent cell leader would command detonate the IED to initiate the ambush and other support elements would simultaneously engage the enemy patrol with direct fires.

- The *raiding element* executes the major task as the *action* element, ensuring the success of the raid. This element accomplishes its task of seizing the objective site and kidnapping enemy soldiers with rapid, violent combat action. The combination of surprise, deception, and massed fires overwhelms the enemy in the objective, and aids in the immediate withdrawal from the site once soldiers have been seized.
- The *security elements* in a raid are *enabling* elements and are primarily focused on fixing enemy security and response forces or inhibiting the enemy's escape from the objective area. The security element is typically equipped and organized to detect enemy forces and prevent them from contacting the rest of the targeted enemy element. The security element also protects the withdrawal of the raiding element
- The *support elements* provide several types of support and are *enabling* elements. Support capabilities can include reconnaissance, armor, fire support, air defense, engineer support, logistics, and INFOWAR. The command and control element typically positions with a support element unless a different location provides an improved ability to direct the raid.

The Raid and Kidnapping

The insurgent cell leader knew the two-vehicle patrol was approaching the kill zone from security element reports, and kept his binoculars focused on the crest he knew enemy dismounts would cross before signaling the two vehicles to come forward. He was surprised when both vehicles crossed the crest very close to each other and moved into the depression without any dismounts for security. As the two vehicles entered the kill zone, the IED fireball engulfed both vehicles with the full force of the explosion. Simultaneously, support elements attacked the two vehicles with antitank guided missiles. The multiple warhead hits on the vehicles and the damage already caused by the IED killed three soldiers and wounded four others in the vehicles.

The raiding element was already out of its concealed positions and rushing the enemy vehicles. Even the burning vehicles and ammunition cooking-off in the vehicles due to the fire did not stop the insurgents from pulling two wounded enemy soldiers from the vehicles.

As this action was occurring, direct and indirect fires were landing on local observation posts to fix any possible response from those positions. Mortars and rockets targeted probable routes for enemy quick reaction forces, and indirect fires also landed in villages in the enemy-occupied area to cause additional confusion during the raid. Insurgent antitank missile and sniper fire across the border added to the intended confusion.

The raiding element extracted two wounded enemy soldiers from the vehicle wreckage, placed them on the backs of two insurgents as an expedient-carry method, and quickly withdrew across the border without any loss of insurgents. The tactical raid and kidnapping was a complete success for the insurgents in a combat action that took 15–20 minutes. The raiding element used its pre-arranged withdrawal route and occupied its initial safe haven. With no immediate pursuit by enemy elements, insurgent stay-behind elements had no need to detonate IEDs along the withdrawal route or provide support by fire to disrupt a pursuit.


Figure 3. Conduct of raid and kidnapping terrorism task (vignette example)

Support elements disengaged their fires once they were informed of the success of the raid. The insurgent cell leader had his support elements displace back to protected positions; security elements maintained their concealed positions to

report on enemy reactions to the raid. When an enemy armored element crossed the border about two hours after the raid and maneuvered toward the suspected withdrawal route, an IED detonated under an enemy main battle tank, destroying the tank and killing its crew. This prompted a subsequent small-unit firefight between insurgents and the enemy, but had no impact on the successful kidnapping of enemy soldiers.

> *Note*. The above tactical vignette is based generally on Hizballah actions near the village of Zarit on 12 July 2006. This action prompted an escalation that became the 2006 Hizballah-Israeli War. For more information, see *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War* (2008) by Matt M. Matthews and *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD* (2009), with Scott C. Farquhar as general editor.

Training Implications

This article illustrates the value of individual skills proficiency and effective execution of small unit drills and tactical tasks based on quality training, teamwork, and leadership. Continuous security and use of active support from local civilians aided in the surprise and success of the raid. Insurgents used a combined arms approach to the mission task.

Surprise and deception are enablers to confuse the enemy and limit his response to a raid. The reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance tasks are a normal complement to each other unless constraints are placed on a mission to preclude counterreconnaissance actions. Using available cover and concealment with camouflage during an engagement provides a degree of protection, as well as supporting the coordinated withdrawal actions directly after the raid to a rally point or safe haven.

Preparations for this raid included mission briefs and rehearsals, cover and concealment measures, interlocking sectors of fire among fighting positions of the fixing elements, camouflage, improving fields of fire without overtly disturbing the natural foliage or terrain appearance, and integrating antipersonnel mines, antitank mines, or IEDs with natural obstacles. Assigned directions of fire, targets, and fire control measures for the raiding element and support elements enhanced massing combat power effects with a rapid and violent group of primary and enabling actions near and in the kill zone.

These types of threats and considerations can be replicated or represented in an OPFOR in US Army training. The US Army defines an opposing force (OPFOR) as a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment) used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces.[6] The OPFOR can represent a particular threat, hybrid threat, and/or adversary that can morph in capabilities and influence within a relevant population and operational environment.

For training, conduct of a raid has several primary tasks and numerous subtasks. Planning and preparation precede mission execution of a raid. Key tasks during execution include infiltration and positioning of the mission elements and isolation of the enemy target or objective. The primary action seizes or destroys the target in the objective. The concluding action of exfiltration moves or maneuvers the mission elements to the next tasks and/or continuation of the mission. Tasks and subtasks in conducting a raid include:

PLAN

- Identify enemy element or force capabilities and limitations to be raided.
- Conduct analysis to determine the type of raid to be conducted.
- Identify raid objective(s).
- Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success, and consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, fix, contain, breach, defeat, and/or destroy.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action and enabling elements.
- Identify situational understanding requirements for collection and analysis.
- Task-organize elements for the raid task by function in accordance with TC 7-100.2 and TC 7-100.3.
- Determine how and when functional elements act or enable the raid, and/or transition to other tasks/subtasks.

PREPARE

- Conduct continuous reconnaissance and surveillance to provide situational understanding of enemy and operational environment required for success.
- Conduct continuous counterreconnaissance to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of OPFOR intentions.
- Conduct mission and task rehearsals.
- Execute INFOWAR.

INFILTRATE

- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by *security* elements through and/or into an area occupied by enemy elements to occupy a position(s) in order to fix enemy security or response elements.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by *support* elements through and/or into an area occupied by enemy elements to occupy a position(s) in order to isolate the raid objective.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by *support* elements through and/or into an area occupied by enemy elements to occupy an indirect fires position(s) in order to suppress, disrupt, or contain enemy at raid objective.
- Conduct undetected movement by a *raiding* element(s) through and/or into an area occupied by enemy elements to occupy a position(s) in order to seize or destroy enemy and/or enemy materiel in the raid objective.
- Determine if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the raid.

ISOLATE

- Employ reconnaissance and surveillance with security elements to sustain situational understanding and provide early warning of enemy activities that can influence the raid.
- Employ continuous counterreconnaissance with security elements to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of OPFOR intentions.
- Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, and/or exploit) enemy tactical decisionmaking before and during execution of the raid through INFOWAR technical and psychological capabilities.
- Isolate the enemy in the raid objective with support element(s) using indirect fires, nonlethal suppression means, and/or direct fires.
- Fix enemy security element(s) and/or response element(s) to prevent or slow support to enemy at the raid objective.

SEIZE / DESTROY

- Attack with sudden and massed combat power of raiding (action) elements and support (enabling) elements to contain enemy at the raid objective and suppress effective defenses.
- Assault to breach enemy obstacles with a breaching (enabling) element, if required, when seizure is required in the raid mission task.
- Assault to penetrate into raid site perimeter with an assault element(s), when taking possession of a designated area is required in the raid mission task.
- Attack with sudden and massed effects of raiding, security, and support elements, to *destroy* enemy elements and/or combat systems, without seizure of the raid site, when physical control of the raid objective is not assigned in raid mission purpose and intent.

- Support the raid with appropriate enabling task functions that may include but are not limited to: deception, disruption, suppression, fixing, breaching, clearing, and/or employment of reserve elements.
- Assault with fires and maneuver as sudden and massed combat power of the raiding, security, and support elements to *seize* the raid objective.
- Secure selected information, equipment, materiel, and/or enemy prisoners.
- Consolidate the objective in its temporary seizure and defend while the site is exploited by OPFOR elements.
- Exploit the raid objective site when designated in the mission task and intent.
- Reorganize OPFOR elements to minimize the impacts of combat losses and functional capabilities.

EXFILTRATE

- Distribute the reorganized OPFOR elements quickly into small elements for exfiltration along designated exfiltration lanes.
- Conduct timely undetected movement from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.
- Execute tasks after raid success with stay-behind elements, when required, that can include but are not limited to: surveillance, disruption, delay, suppression, neutralization, defending, defeating, and/or destroying tasks.
- Continue the mission.

In 2016–2017, ACE-TI is reviewing and revising the OPFOR tasks found in US Army TC 7-101, Appendix B. An updated list of tasks and subtasks, with conditions, standards, and performance measures are being added to the Virtual OPFOR Academy of the OE TSC. This group of OPFOR countertasks addresses tactical training environments for primarily company and lower unit echelon challenges and opportunities in US Army training readiness for an era of persistent conflict now and for the foreseeable future. ACE-TI and OE TSC continue to develop additional OPFOR countertasks, instructional videos, and immersive videos that will be posted to the OE TSC portal as they are approved. With common access card (CAC) entry, visit the TRADOC G-2 VOA site in the "Operational Support" menu at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/g2/oetsc/.

Notes

[1] Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1-02, Military Terms and Symbols. 2 February 2015. Pgs 1-42. Also see ADRP 3-0.

[2] Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Also see Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 17 January 2014.

[3] Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Regulation (TR) 10-5-1, Organization and Functions. 20 July 2010. Para 18-8c(1).

[4] Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Paras 3-174 to 3-192.

[5] Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Paras 3-177 to 3-185.

[6] Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Regulation 350-2. Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program. 19 May 2015 with effective date 19 June 2015. Para. 1-5b.

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What ACE Threats Integration Supports for YOUR Readiness

- Determine Operational Environment (OE) conditions for Army training, education, and leader development.

- Design, document, and integrate hybrid threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine for near-term/midterm OEs.

- Develop and update threat methods, tactics, and techniques in HQDA Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series.

- Design and update Army exercise design methods-learning model in TC 7-101/7-102.

- Develop and update the US Army *Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)*.

- Develop and update the US Army *Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE)* products.

- Conduct Threat Tactics Course resident at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

- Conduct Threat Tactics mobile training team (MTT) at units and activities.

- Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness in threat models and OEs.

- Research, author, and publish OE and threat related classified/unclassified documents for Army operational and institutional domains.

- Support Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Home Station Training (HST) and OE Master Plan reviews and updates.

- Support TRADOC G-2 threat and OE accreditation program for Army Centers of Excellence (CoEs), schools, and collective training at sites for Army/USAR/ARNG.

- Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on threat and OE issues.

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