



INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT



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PACIFIC PATHWAYS 15-01

*Lessons and
Best Practices*



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Pacific Pathways 15-01 Initial Impressions Report

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Executive Summary

(U) This initial impressions report (IIR), the first in a series of three, focuses on the first operational phase of Pacific Pathways 15-01, consisting of the following exercises: Cobra Gold (CG) with Thailand, Foal Eagle (FE) with the Republic of Korea, and Balikatan (BK) with the Republic of the Philippines. Following the IIRs for Pacific Pathways 15-02 and 15-03, the Center for Army Lessons Learned will publish a newsletter in cooperation with the United States Army, Pacific Command (USARPAC), I Corps, and 25th Infantry Division (ID) containing key-leader interviews, first-person articles, and positive outcomes and trends to create a shared understanding of Pacific Pathways operations, facilitate the planning of future Pacific Pathways exercises, and inform Army leadership.

(U) Pacific Pathways 15 operationalizes exercises within the Pacific Command area of operations (PACOM AO). It sets assigned forces and regionally aligned forces in motion and demonstrates commitment and capability to U.S. partners and allies. Pacific Pathways 15 also utilizes two Stryker brigade combat teams (BCTs) of the 25th ID (post-combat training center [CTC] rotation units) as the basic task force building block, which further integrates components of the total force and unified action partners to support USARPAC's "set the theater" objectives. Pathways 15 transforms eight separate theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs) into one seamless campaign consisting of CG 15; FE; BK 15; Garuda Shield 15 with Indonesia; Keris Strike 15 with Malaysia; Khaan Quest 15 with Mongolia; Port Operations with Republic of Korea; and Orient Shield 15 with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force. Each deployed task force provides continuity and unity of message during the execution of each individual exercise event, plus the flexibility for responding to contingencies within the PACOM AO. U.S. Pacific allies and their partners are the bedrock of peace and security in the PACOM AO. Pacific Pathways, as a component of U.S. defense cooperation with new and emerging partners, helps to expand the U.S. Army's ability to stay engaged in the region.

(U) While Pacific Pathways is a new way of conducting operations in the Pacific, the U.S. Army has been engaged in the Pacific since 1898. Post-World War II, the Army has had a significant, permanent physical presence in Hawaii, Japan, and Korea. As the Army's presence matured, U.S. Army forces deployed regionally in single, discrete, bilateral exercises to ensure stability and cooperation. However, Pacific Pathways changes this single and sequential engagement process by linking several of these exercises together in an operational deployment lasting up to three months. This renewed U.S. commitment and shift in operational design have gained positive outcomes, but not without challenges.

(U) First, the single greatest value has been setting the theater. Pacific Pathways has set into motion a wide range of activities to build relationships from tactical to strategic, assuring in-theater presence/access, and broadening strategic communication on both sides of the international date line. Pacific Pathways further enables the USARPAC commander's end-state expectations — stay in Phase 0, return quickly to Phase 0, and be the strategic hedge in the Pacific. Linking several of these exercises into a coherent operation allows USARPAC, I Corps, and 25th ID (I Corps specifically) to extend mission command through a division headquarters in the theater and across the international date line, in real time and within an active theater of operations. Having an Army mission command node tied to a BCT-forward for an extended period of time provides the PACOM commander with additional options and assures U.S. allies of the U.S. commitment in the region. From a sustainment outlook, the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) is able to rehearse multiple iterations of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; seaport and aerial port of debarkation openings and closings; and provide logistics throughout the theater (which provides the 593rd ESC significant understanding of the AO in terms of port capabilities, host-nation infrastructure, and medical and hospital capabilities). All of this builds operational understanding of the theater and facilitates the repetitive operational deployment of Army forces in theater. These mission command and sustainment activities are crucial components to setting the theater in Phase 0.

(U) In addition, this has built readiness not necessarily in the traditional sense of a CTC, but at the operational level. Conducting multiple iterations of mission command planning and sea and airport activities; employing units and equipment in and out of different countries; gaining detailed understanding of the AOs; and working with diverse partner nations achieves an operational-level readiness not gained in a CTC rotation.

(U) Second, synchronizing the joint exercise life cycle (JELC) with Pacific Pathways is a challenge. The Pacific AO is a vast and diverse region of 36 sovereign nations comprising 50 percent of the world's population, several of the world's largest economies and militaries, and 3,000 distinct languages. Each nation has its own set of political-military interests, goals, and objectives. Five of these nations are allies of the United States through mutual defense agreements. Building a consensus in the region through multinational collaboration is a significant challenge that may take decades to attain. USARPAC staff noted that the largest challenge exists in aligning JELC conferences with host nations and U.S.-participating units to enable operational planning. One potential solution presented was to develop a Pacific Pathways operations planning conference (PP-OPC) that would encapsulate the strategic campaign planning and operation

development prior to the execution of each Pacific Pathways campaign. As Pacific Pathways becomes better known in the region and attracts more interest among regional partners wishing to join, a PP-OPC may be possible. A future conference should include all participating nations to establish desired end states, training objectives, TSCP requirements, and force structures for the Pacific Pathways exercise. Holding the conference prior to the start of the JELC would ensure unity of effort and understanding going forward into future planning that is inclusive of all JELC events. Additionally, the conference should deconflict JELC events between exercises to allow continuity, while planning the operation and reducing friction on subordinate units.

Pacific Pathways 15-01 Concept of Operations

(U) The graphic below depicts the Pacific Pathways 15-01 scheme of maneuver. It is followed by the United States Army, Pacific Command (USARPAC), 1st Corps, and 25th Infantry Division Commanders' purpose, methods, and end state for the operations; a description of mission command and control; and a brief summary for each exercise.




Figure 1. The Pathways concept of operations, executed in five phases.

USARPAC: Purpose, Methods, End State

(U) **Purpose.** To strengthen relationships with allies and partners while building a broader set of readiness outcomes for all participating forces and providing crisis response options to the combatant commander.

(U) **Methods.**

- Continue the enduring development of relationships with allies and partner nations.
- A tailored force meets exercise requirements to achieve specific theater effects.
- Foster a climate of regional interoperability and cultural understanding.

- Sustain U.S. forces' high readiness levels through exercises.
- Advance expeditionary ethos and experience within theater joint land component forces.
- Include United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and globally managed Army total forces and joint forces.
- Support USARPAC theater campaign plan creating a joint and/or Service-specific presence.

(U) Campaign End State. USARPAC advances USPACOM theater security cooperation objectives while validating elements of the Army operating concept. In the end, the Pacific Pathways campaign demonstrates U.S. commitment to the region and improves partner nation interoperability while enhancing U.S. readiness. Moreover, Pacific Pathways operations provide an option for USPACOM response to unforeseen contingencies.

I CORPS: Purpose, Methods, End State

(U) Purpose. The purpose of Pacific Pathways operations is to build readiness from tactical through theater levels with U.S. allies and partner Army forces (ARFOR) in support of theater security cooperation objectives while maintaining operational flexibility in the Pacific.

(U) Methods.

- Deploy expeditionary adaptive, responsive, and scalable task forces.
- Each Pacific Pathways operation serves as a platform for the following:
 - Rehearsing tactical to theater operations (United States, bilateral, and multinational).
 - Reconnoitering operational support locations within the Pacific.
 - Building technical and human interoperability (Army-Army, joint, and U.S. Government).
 - Strengthening Army-Army and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational relationships in the Pacific.
- Inculcate a deployment mind set, build agile training plans, and remain flexible to ensure successful accomplishment of training objectives.
- Leverage expeditionary mission command, ARFOR transitions, collective training events, and combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs) to build readiness at echelon.
- Leverage bilateral and multilateral training events to build Army-Army interoperability.
- Capture lessons learned, capability gaps, and interoperability challenges.

(U) End State. Trained and regionally tested forces ensure U.S. Army operational agility within the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR) and are prepared to respond globally. ARFOR increase response options within the Pacific by increasing fight-and-win capabilities with allies and partners. Pacific Pathways operations support sets the theater objectives in an expeditionary fashion without increasing permanently assigned forces to the PACOM AOR.

25th Infantry Division: Mission, Intent, Key Tasks, End State

(U) Mission. The 25ID deploys and conducts extended expeditionary military engagement operations in the Kingdom of Thailand, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Philippines from 19 DEC 2014 to 29 MAY 2015 to increase interoperability and strengthen relationships with allies and partners.

(U) Commander's Intent. Strengthen relationships and tactical interoperability with partner nations west of the international date line, while increasing response options available to the PACOM commander.

(U) Key Tasks.

- Ensure that all actions taken preserve, enhance, and support strategic relationships with regional partners.
- Exercise all deployment functions and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of Pacific Pathways personnel and equipment in Hawaii, Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines.
- Execute Cobra Gold, Foal Eagle, and Balikatan exercises to enhance tactical interoperability with the Army's regional partners.
- Synchronize all warfighting functions during transitions between all Pacific Pathways 15-01 phases and events.
- Operate a forward Army presence in motion west of the international date line.

(U) End State. The 25ID completes all bilateral exercises with its strategic partners, while increasing partner capacity and interoperability. Thailand, Korea, the Philippines, and other regional partners stand convinced of the division's commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. All 25ID units return to home station after completing the operation. The division is seen as a reliable, credible, and disciplined regional partner.

(U) USARPAC, the Army Service component command to PACOM, provided overall mission command. I Corps was the supported command and provided mission command for Pacific Pathways 15-01. In addition, I Corps managed the operational theater sustainment effort and facilitated a mission command transition to 8th Army, which assumed administrative and tactical control (TACON) of forces executing Foal Eagle on the Korean peninsula.




Figure 2. Mission command and task organization.

(U) The 25ID was the I Corps main effort throughout Pacific Pathways 15-01 and provided the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT)(-), 25ID, and all the enablers required to support the exercise. In addition, 25ID conducted mission command to facilitate the exercise from 15 FEB 2015 to 15 MAY 2015. Finally, the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command (ESC), the I Corps supporting effort, provided sustainment as required. However, in South Korea during Foal Eagle, the 593rd ESC transitioned sustainment support activities to the 19th ESC.

Exercise Cobra Gold

(U) Cobra Gold is a bilateral exercise hosted by Thailand. One significant event to mention just prior to the execution of this leg of the path was the running aground of the U.S. Naval Ship Kocak off the shore of Japan. While this was an unfortunate event, the actions and coordination by I Corps and




Figure 3. Task organization for Cobra Gold.

supporting agencies effectively resolved the issue, but not until the second leg and movement to Foal Eagle in Korea. The lessons from this event are discussed later in this report.

(U) The 25ID(-) deployed 01 to 20 FEB 2015 as the ARFOR headquarters executing mission command of all ARFOR within the territorial boundaries of Thailand and reporting to the joint exercise group under the oversight of Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC). The deployment involved 1,138 total U.S. personnel and was distributed over several areas:

- RSOI-Utapao (aerial port of deparcation)
- Laem (surface port of debarkation)
- Nkhon Nyok (ARFOR headquarters and staff exercise [STAFFEX])
- Lop Buri (BCT headquarters and aviation)
- Muang Khom (1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment [1/27 IN] field training exercise)

The military-to-military engagements consisted of a high-level staff training command post exercise, a humanitarian crisis-response exercise, and several field exercises and CALFEXs involving squad- to platoon-level forces. The STAFFEX focused on U.S.-host nation interoperability in multinational force planning around a United Nations Security Council resolution preparing to counter piracy and bolster maritime security in the vicinity of Isla del Sol. The 1/27th IN, 2nd Stryker BCT (SBCT), 25ID (as the main effort for the field and lane-training exercise) conducted bilateral training with the 31st Regiment in the vicinity of Lop Buri and Muang Khom, culminating in a three-day (plan, prep, and execute) CALFEX.

Exercise Foal Eagle




Figure 4. Task organization for Foal Eagle.

(U) Foal Eagle is a bilateral exercise in South Korea. Elements from the 25ID(-) torch party began to deploy from Thailand to South Korea 19 FEB 2015 in preparation for Foal Eagle. In coordination with 8th Army, I Corps transitioned mission command of 2/25 SBCT from 25ID and I Corps to 8th Army-Korea under TACON, and shared administrative control authorities in support of Foal Eagle operations. Sustainment support transitioned to the 8th Training Support Command, and 19th ESC provided RSOI for port support, contract support, classes of supply plans, and customs flow. The 2/25 SBCT provided mission command and overall support to the bilateral training. Task Force 1/27 IN (the main effort) provided the core of the forces executing military-to-military engagements with the Korean forces. The 2/25 Aviation supported the main effort with seven UH-60s, two CH-47s, and two HH-60s. The 25ID(-) conducted Stryker gunnery from 23 FEB 2015 to 8 APR 2015, employing the mobile gun system and infantry carrier vehicles on Chopri range.

(U) Other bilateral training included a convoy CALFEX; sniper, reconnaissance, and indirect-fire training; and air-assault operations. The training culminated in a company-level CALFEX, as well as cultural activities and senior leader professional development to the demilitarized zone.

Exercise Balikatan




Figure 5. Task organization for Balikatan.

(U) Balikatan is a bilateral exercise hosted by the Philippines. Elements from the 25ID(-) advance party began to deploy from South Korea to the Philippines on 6 APR 2015 in preparation for Balikatan. Mission command of the Pacific Pathways force transitioned back to I Corps from the 8th Army. In addition, the 593rd ESC reassumed the sustainment mission of RSOI, port support, contract support, all classes of supply, and customs flow.

The 25ID(-) deployed 13-30 April 2015 as the ARFOR headquarters executing mission command of all ARFOR within the territorial boundaries of the Philippines and reported to the joint exercise group under the oversight of MARFORPAC. This exercise spread across the islands of Luzon, Fort Magsaysay (2nd BCT headquarters), Camp Aquinaldo (ARFOR headquarters), and Palawan with 1,063 Army personnel participating.

Before arriving in April, the 25ID conducted the following senior staff-level engagements:

- First, an eight-man observer control (OC) team, led by the 25ID G-3, mentored and trained the Philippine Joint Task Force-National Command Region through a STAFFEX, 16-23 JAN 2015. The purpose was to train the newly formed staff and ensure a complete and comprehensive order was prepared and presented to the subordinate units to reduce the risk of exercise failure.
- Second, a 24-man OC team, led by the 25ID Deputy Commanding General-Operations, mentored and trained the Philippine Joint Task Force-National Command Region through an leadership training program 27 FEB 2015 to 06 MAR 2015. The purpose was to train the newly formed staff and ensure CALFEX guidance was clear, develop a field training exercise (FTX) battle rhythm, and identify reporting

and operational requirements for the staff to execute during the FTX while supporting the 2nd SBCT in its mentorship of Task Force (TF) Kalaya'an and 1/27 IN's mentorship of a battalion from the 3rd Infantry Division.

(U) The ARFOR also conducted military-to-military engagements, 13-30 APR 2014, that consisted of air mobile operations, marksmanship, medical, maneuver, mission planning, sapper training, and two major training events: the TF-NCR FTX/CALFEX and a capability exercise, which included four infantry platoons, a 155mm battery, and an Army aviation TF operating in support of TF-NCR with the integration of two Marine battalion landing teams (one conducting an air assault and the other an amphibious landing).

Chapter 1

Mission Command

Overview

(U) Many of the observations in this chapter focus on deliberate and crisis planning and network communications significant to setting any theater in Phase 0. Pacific Pathways provides an opportunity to test/use commercial communications capabilities in support of setting the theater. In addition, Pacific Pathways provides a significant ability to rehearse all the components of mission command.

The division G-6 identified the need for unit expeditionary communications in setting the theater and during Phase 0 operations. Expeditionary communication packages are easy to transport and provide non-secure Internet protocol router (NIPR) and secure Internet protocol router (SIPR) capabilities, which units establish as a baseline of communication support in early entry situations.

Planning is critical to ensure the unit identifies its communications and information requirements in support of the mission. Pacific Pathways provides a vehicle to train and educate leaders and Soldiers on expeditionary communication packages. The use of commercial communication packages (such as the ground-to-air transmit and receive [GATR] and the mission node extension [MNE]) was key in establishing a network that allowed information sharing with allied partners.

Issue: Operationalizing Pacific Pathways — Tension Between Individual Exercises and Pathways Operations

(FOUO) Discussion. Critical to the success of Pacific Pathways is connecting the individual exercises into a single operation and establishing an operational design prior to the joint exercise life cycle (JELC) events. Planning for Pacific Pathways 15-01 was conducted via discrete exercises in isolation from one another throughout the JELC events. Furthermore, identification of a vessel for transport, passenger limitations, equipment lists, and participating units continued to shift until after all JELC events concluded and country coordination was completed. The ripple effect created friction and affected transportation unit deployment lists, requirements, personnel, and budgets.

(FOUO) Recommendation. The United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) and I Corps should host a planning conference before the start of any JELC cycles for future Pacific Pathways exercises. This conference should include all participating units to create a shared understanding of desired end states, training objectives, theater security cooperation plan requirements, and force structures for Pacific Pathways across all echelons. Holding the conference prior to the JELC will ensure unity of effort and

understanding once planning begins for the JELC events. Additionally, the conference should align or synchronize JELC events between exercises to maintain continuity while planning the operation, thus reducing friction on subordinate units. USARPAC and I Corps should continue to conduct periodic work groups during planning and preparation to provide azimuth checks and synchronize staff across all echelons. Finally, USARPAC and I Corps should pilot an assessment session (with after-action reports) to determine levels of success in achieving operational objectives.

Issue: Partnership with Host-Nation Army

(U) Discussion. There was a requirement for the U.S. forces to work with their host-nation counterpart. The role and mission were not clearly defined, however, and the end state was not clear.

(U) Recommendation. Create a mission for the host-nation army and U.S. Army that requires resolution through mutual efforts, instead of instructing U.S. Army leadership only to provide guidance and instruction on how host nation personnel can complete a specific mission within the parameters of their own national policies and doctrine.

Issue: Synchronizing Pacific Pathways Planning — Lack of Internal and External Staff Synchronization Across Echelons

(FOUO) Discussion. A number of synchronization problems increase friction in Pacific Pathways planning. Staffs operate in a stovepiped manner within staff sections, within echelons, and within exercises. For example, there have been frequent observations of the USARPAC G-7 requesting exercise requirements that the USARPAC G-4 is unable to transport or the USARPAC G-8 is unable to fund. Also, echelons of command are skipped and taskings/details go directly from unit to unit. Orders are always published (the issue is timeliness), however, detailed exercise directives (that encompass agreed-to-actions and objectives) are typically not issued until after the final planning event and within 60 days of execution, which, in turn, is sometimes within 30 days of initial movement. Without published directives earlier in the planning process, conflicting guidance from various stovepiped staff sections creates confusion within units and leads to the expenditure of limited budgets, time, equipment, and other resources.

(FOUO) Recommendation. I Corps holds a weekly staff coordination meeting to operationalize and synchronize all requirements, functions, and resources across and between all exercises within a specific Pacific Pathways event; this should continue to occur. While the task to operationalize Pacific Pathways has been delegated to the USARPAC G-3/5 (operations/civil affairs) by the G-3 (deputy chief of staff for operations), the G-7 (training) continues to manage all exercise requirements. To ensure a unity of effort, the G-7 should be aligned under the G-3 to synchronize

planning efforts for operations in USARPAC. Currently, the G-7 answers directly to the chief of staff, not the G-3.

Issue: Development of Training Plans at the Company Level for Pacific Pathways

(U) Discussion. Throughout Pacific Pathways 15-01, the company training plan for each country occasionally had to be altered due to the partner nation's inability to conduct similar training. The adjustments to the training plan had to ensure that the goals of the partner nation were being met, as well as the goals of the U.S. units participating in Pacific Pathways. Ultimately, this rapid change to the training helped build leaders who were flexible and agile, instead of always operating in a static environment. Pacific Pathways allows for realistic training in real-world scenarios.

(U) Recommendation. To alleviate the rapid change in training plans at the company level, several company commanders should be given the opportunity to attend one of the planning conferences. This would enable company commanders to see what capabilities their counterparts might have or lack. Commanders also would have an opportunity to develop a company-level training plan that is realistic and meets the goals of both armies participating in Pacific Pathways. Additionally, junior leaders should research and develop relevant concurrent training plans that can be implemented during periods of down time.

Issue: Crisis Action Planning (U.S. Naval Ship Kocak)

(U) Discussion. During the second phase of Pacific Pathways 15-01, while transporting 25th Infantry Division (25ID) equipment from Okinawa, Japan, to Thailand, the U.S. Naval Ship Kocak ran aground. This unforeseen event, while it was a crisis and an inherent risk within the maritime environment of the Pacific, provided I Corps with a unique challenge and the following sustainable lessons:

- The power of the joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) team that came together to resolve the USNS Kocak grounding demonstrated the effectiveness of the joint and interagency force (Marine Corps Forces-Pacific; Pacific Fleet; USARPAC; I Corps; 10th Regional Support Group; 8th Theater Sustainment Command; U.S. Army-Japan; 8th Army and the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command; Army Materiel Command; and Military Sealift Command).
- Crisis action coordination at all echelons and under one mission command (MC) node was critical to mission accomplishment based on timely decision making (daily video teleconferences [VTCs]).
- Accurate information during the USNS Kocak incident was disseminated in a timely manner across the MC nodes.

- Designated assessment team at the division command level was crucial because it allowed for immediate evaluation of overall equipment status and what adjustments were required to continue the mission.

(U) Recommendation. It is critical for organizing response planners to understand the executive agency for crisis events. Further integrating all joint and interagency partners into Pacific Pathways planning helps highlight points of potential synergy gained within the JIIM. Joint communications capabilities and global command and control systems enable I Corps capabilities in the Pacific.

Issue: Redundancy in Communications

(FOUO) Discussion. Based on the USNS Kocak incident and damage to primary communications capability, the 25ID G-6 was tasked to re-engineer and employ expeditionary mission command communications. The GATR and TAMPA satellite communication systems are new additions to 25ID's communications equipment inventory. Although training was provided before implementation, each exercise provided new experiences ranging from actual operation of the equipment (ensuring proper site surveys are conducted) to developing a proper spares list for each communications package.

(FOUO) Recommendation. Sustain a contingency communication package that enables a redundant means of communications, readily available throughout Pacific Pathways (which services both division and brigade mission command nodes). The 25ID expeditionary mission command capability and communication in an austere environment have been continuously tested and proven flexible and reliable as a result of repeated Pacific Pathways deployments.




Figure 1-1. GATR and TAMPA satellite communication antennas transported by commercial air provide equivalent bandwidth to the satellite transportable terminal/joint network nodes at 8 megabytes (top photo). DTECH basebands provide NIPR/SIPR access locally on laptops and through network reachback (bottom photos).

Issue: Identify the Communication Requirements for Phase 0 of the Operation

(U) Discussion. Identify need (information requirements) instead of capabilities. Not all requirements are known, but a baseline of requirements can assist the G-6 in developing a network to support the mission and adjust with the changing mission. The G-6 used commercial packages to provide communications support during early entry and Phase 0 operations.

(U) The G-6 defined capabilities required for Phase 0 operations (services such as NIPR/SIPR, chat, email, telephone, Defense Connect Online [DCO], and VTCs). Some places require SIPR VTC capabilities. During Phase 0, the division did not use mission command systems. The units relied on NIPR/SIPR, email, chat, and voice services to operate with partner units. Mission command systems had challenges with interoperability/compatibility with partner units, affecting information sharing.

(U) Recommendation. The commander and staff should identify information requirements for Phase 0 operations in order for the G-6 to develop the network (commercial) to support the operations.

Issue: Units' Organic Communication Systems During Phase 0

(U) Discussion. The integration of tactical communications with strategic communications was a challenge. We do not normally use strategic communications during Phase 0 operations; we use our tactical systems, which creates challenges with interfacing with our partners. Incompatibility hampers our ability to share information.

(U) Units' organic communication assets are insufficient to support operations during Phase 0 in an expeditionary operation. The unit requires commercial services to operate and interface with military and civilian organization of foreign country. In addition, mission command systems had challenges with interoperability and compatibility with our partner units, affecting information sharing.

(U) Recommendation. Use Pacific Pathways to test expeditionary communication (commercial) packages to fill gaps during early entry operations. Use the Network Integration Evaluation efforts to validate expeditionary communication packages for the force.

Issue: Utilizing Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Communication Capabilities in Support of Early Entry Operations/Setting the Theater

(U) Discussion. DISA capabilities are not used in most exercises. Most units do not know how to request DISA resources or capabilities. The G-6 identified the need to use DISA capabilities to support communications networks during early entry operations. Regional hubs provided by DISA could provide a backbone to support commercial and expeditionary communication packages. The key to getting expeditionary communication to support early entry operations is to get DISA resources involved.

(U) Support for commercial communication systems (i.e., GATR and TAMPA) was enhanced after the G-6 developed a relationship with the 311th Signal Command and placed a liaison officer with the command to provide 24-hour access and assist with requirements and requests.

(U) Recommendation. Identify information requirements and support from external capabilities to support communications for early entry operations. Develop a relationship with organizations/DISA to gain access to capabilities to support early entry operations.

Issue: Submission of System Access Requests (SARs)

(U) Discussion. The brigade S-6 submitted SARs in advance of planned training. Knowing the timeline of events and planned activities assisted in getting SARs submitted in a timely manner. Assistance from the division also enhanced exercise events in which the brigade was involved.

(U) Recommendation. Continued engagement among the G-6, USARPAC, I Corps, division, brigade, and battalion will help mitigate late submissions and ensure units have satellite time.

Issue: Coordination for International Blackberry Access and Voice Communications

(U) Discussion. Ensuring that Blackberrys possessed a data plan and could make international calls was imperative. Additionally, having alternate communications (such as an Iridium satellite phone) provided an alternate means of communication when other systems were unavailable.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to coordinate for international telephone access (especially for key personnel) and take Iridium satellite phones forward with torch and advanced echelon (ADVON) teams.

Issue: Commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP)

(U) Discussion. The ability to access the Internet via a commercial ISP offered access to partner nation operations, when needed, and furnished Soldiers with morale, welfare, and recreation capabilities.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to coordinate for commercial ISP access for future Pathways exercises and operations when available.

Issue: Training on Equipment

(U) Discussion. Due to the grounding of the Kocak, the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team was unable to employ joint network nodes and command post nodes to support the exercise. The division fielded TAMPA satellite dishes, a GATR inflatable satellite antenna, and MNE small-form factor routers and switches. These provided some communications capabilities that otherwise would have been nonexistent. The limited amount of time to train on the equipment before Pacific Pathways deployment created a steep learning curve for Soldiers. This was mitigated by having commercial networking available to provide base services and already existing communications via the Wolfpack (a mini-router/switch package that is part of the torch team setup). The G-6 also provided reachback capability via DCO chat and DCO connect and phone.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to provide reachback capability for troubleshooting and assistance with setup. Improve the detailed information provided with the systems such as manuals, cut sheets, and option files (required for the TAMPA satellite system).

Issue: Signal Planner at Conferences

(U) Discussion. It is critical to have a signal planner from 25ID at the planning conferences for each of the discrete exercises that make up Pacific Pathways. The proposed construct is to have a division-level planner at the initial planning conference and during the preplanning stages for an exercise. A brigade or battalion representative should be present for the follow-on planning conferences. This allows overall concept development for 25ID's role in an exercise and identification of communications requirements.

(U) Recommendation. Allow the division, brigade, or battalion to also send a signal planner to planning conferences. Additionally, provide latitude for the brigade to identify the right representative to Pacific Pathways planning events.

Issue: Documentation with Wolfpack

(U) Discussion. The Wolfpack was a welcome capability providing NIPR and SIPR capability for the initial-entry personnel. It provided voice and data capacity for a small command node, which enabled the submission of regular reports to the rear. However, the documentation with the Wolfpack was incomplete or erroneous. The instructions to program the TACLANE device (tactical local area network encryption device) were not included, and the manual had to be sent via e-mail. Where to place the correct Internet protocols in the configuration for the TACLANE was confusing, and a new instruction sheet with step-by-step instructions had to be developed. The system was tested before deployment, but some issues with the NIPR phone were encountered. However, basic troubleshooting resolved it.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure that all the detailed information on configurations for each component is included in the package. Double-check that the correct version of TACLANE configuration information and all the steps for consoling into the system are present and all the appropriate components are available before deployment.

Issue: MNE and GATR

(U) Discussion. MNE and GATR worked well once established. It provided telephones and computer connectivity for key members of the brigade staff. The lack of bandwidth and only having time-division-multiple-access available created lack of redundancy. The frequency-division-multiple-access SAR continued to be developed while in country. Some of the constraint was due to short notice deployment of different systems from those originally planned.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to use expeditionary communication systems for deployments and exercises to test capabilities.

Issue: Transitional Times for Communications

(U) Discussion. Moving from the Cobra Gold exercise to the Foal Eagle exercise caused a lapse in satellite coverage because the Warfighter information network tactical equipment was on a ship and unavailable. This was not a major impact, however, because the 304th Expeditionary Signal Battalion (ESB), 1st Signal Brigade, was able to support communication requirements. Although communication flexibility was reduced during the transition and the location change required a new SAR submission (according to the Satellite Command [SATCOM] controller), the overall expeditionary communication package was actually an upgrade from the expected Wolfpack router/switch.

(U) Recommendation. Extend the satellite time to provide overlapping coverage in order to prevent a communications blackout during transition between Pacific Pathways phases. It is essential that the SATCOM controller, regional hub node, etc., understand the overall concept early on so that satellite time can be coordinated.

Issue: Communications Security (CX-K) Use

(U) Discussion. Determining which network will be used for services is important to plan for a system authorization access request and equipment connectivity. It was a late determination that CX-K was to be used for authority to operate and bi-lateral communication. Although prepared for this eventuality, identification of requirements at planning conferences and intent enables a smooth transition.

(U) Recommendation. Identify network and system requirements early to enable mission requirements.

Issue: External Signal Support

(U) Discussion. Due to time lag of the ship's arrival, coordination for external support from the 304th ESB, 1st Signal Brigade. This proved valuable when equipment was destroyed after the ship ran aground. While the use of organic equipment is preferable, ESB systems provided resident expertise, alleviated stress on equipment, and provided training opportunities on expeditionary systems.

(U) Recommendation. Consider use of ESB support for the Foal Eagle exercise if the construct for Pacific Pathways remains the same, with the Cobra Gold exercise preceding Foal Eagle, followed by the Balikpapan exercise. This provides time to troubleshoot the systems or conduct maintenance. Alternatively, if strategic connections are available and the unit sets up a tactical operations center in buildings where connections are available, make use of these connections for the same reasons.

Issue: Use of Hot Spots

(U) Discussion. Hot spot capability (wireless Internet connectivity) provided significant flexibility to the brigade. During transitional periods in particular, the network hot spots provided continued connectivity and supported Wolfpack capabilities. Access to hot spots also enabled the issuance of a TAMPA satellite dish to another battalion while providing equipment support to the commander. The only drawback was significant increased costs due to international roaming charges.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to use hot spots for network connectivity in transitional periods. Investing in a high data-rate capability, specifically for deployments or adding capability when the unit is involved in an exercise, provides the commander greater flexibility. Also, build in additional funding for overages and increased international roaming costs. If Pacific Pathways becomes an enduring mission, planners should include unlimited data and/or higher data rates in the annual contract to avoid overage fees. If possible, identify key times to turn this feature on and off, as required.

Issue: Global Broadcast Services (GBS) Use

(U) Discussion. The GBS hub starts tracking when GBS systems launch, even if the systems are just pulling standard services. Submitting a ground mobile radar as a matter of process should be done. This ensures a reference mission for the GBS when an issue transpires. Additionally, practicing the use of the classified encryptors and capability of the GBS during training builds proficiency with the system.

(U) Recommendation. GBS should be set up at least every quarter to ensure the system remains active. Otherwise, after six months the internal card will be placed in a fault status and the satellite will be inaccessible. Additionally, use classified information systems during field exercises.

Issue: Key Material

(U) Discussion. The joint key for communications systems was non-usable.

(U) Recommendation. Prior to deploying, ensure the electronic joint communications security key is the correct edition and segment for the specific Pacific Pathways events to which it applies.

Issue: Additional Duty Designation

(U) Discussion. The network operations noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC) was the designated unit movement officer (UMO) for the company. While the primary use of this NCOIC was during out-load and download, it was also a critical time for communications establishment and de-access. This created a deficit of a senior NCO for day-to-day operations, who should have oversight of various components of the section and the ability to coordinate support.

(U) Recommendation. The NCOIC of any section should not be the designated UMO. This affects operational capability of the section and draws the senior NCO away from his primary job. Choosing a subordinate-level noncommissioned officer, however, would provide both service to the organization and valuable training experience for a junior leader.

Issue: Field Support Representative (FSR)/Logistics Assistant Representative (LAR) Support

(U) Discussion. Coordination should be conducted early for systems needing additional support and/or familiarization.

(U) Recommendation. The FSR/LAR should coordinate for support systems that require subject-matter experts (i.e., Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, tactical integration system, tactical operations center network, long-haul communication, joint capabilities roadmap). Any additional equipment projected for use in future Pacific Pathways missions also should be issued early to Soldiers to facilitate home-station training. Early access provides Soldiers with an opportunity to practice on the systems and find ways to troubleshoot any problematic issues without having to rely on FSR/LAR support.

Issue: Wireless/Virtual Private Network (VPN)

(U) Discussion. Many users did not have wireless capabilities and VPN enabled on their laptops. During transitional periods, wireless connectivity is often the only means of connectivity. Furthermore, as the tactical operations center/tactical command post collapses, space becomes limited and use of wireless (in areas where it is available) alleviates constraining conditions and facilitates redundant transmission paths.

(U) Recommendation. Add all personnel to the VPN and wireless operational unit before departing for a Pacific Pathways event.

Issue: Hand-Held Radios

(U) Discussion. Line units had a shortage of chargers and batteries for AN/PRC-152 Harris radios.

Recommendation. Be sure to pack or order additional chargers needed for these hand-held radios and ensure enough batteries are available.

Issue: TAMPA Satellite Dish

(U) Discussion. A number of issues arose with the TAMPA when first employed, such as a wrong option file, failure of the iSight software to access the modem, and accessibility of only half the bandwidth. These issues eventually were resolved but affected initial operational capability.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure the correct option file is taken and the means of receiving new option files is available (the file tends to corrupt). Verify the correct modem and feed horn for the type of shot being terminated. Also, be sure to bring enough extension cords to power the TAMPA from a distance (the system comes with only a 4-foot cord).

Issue: Joint Communications-Electronic Operations Instructions (JCEOI)

(U) Discussion. The JCEOI were received after arrival at the Balikpapan exercise, impeding early dissemination of the communication card. The JCEOI contained all the same units from the previous year. In the case of the infantry battalion, a one-for-one swap was possible, but high frequency (HF) requirements were not allocated in the JCEOI. As a result, the Marine Corps forces provided the HFs needed to support the exercise.

(U) Recommendation. The JCEOI should be distributed at least 30 days before execution of the exercise so communication cards can be built and discrepancies between requested capability and received frequencies resolved.

Issue: Power Converters

(U) Discussion. Power converters/power conditioners are essential for deployments to areas where 220v power is in use. Some sensitive equipment is not capable of using 220v, and having converters is a requirement. Additionally, a combination power conditioner or uninterruptible power supply (UPS) helps protect sensitive equipment that could be damaged by dirty power sources.

(U) Recommendation. Purchase power converters/power filters and UPS for connecting systems to local power sources to protect equipment.

Issue: Commercial Internet Installation

(U) Discussion. The last phase of Pacific Pathways had a short timeline from setup to execution. A deficit of time and delays in installation of the commercial ISP affected the ability to collaborate with partners. Commercial ISP access facilitated transitional periods during setup and reverse reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Another issue was that the commercial satellite access was expensive and slow. Line-of-sight connectivity was available and was put in place, but was unreliable 50 percent of the time during the Balikpapan exercise. Digital-system-specific language was the cheapest and most reliable source of commercial Internet. Commercial ISP availability facilitated communication during transitional periods (such as arrival and departure).

(U) Recommendation. Continue to utilize commercial ISP vendors to support collaboration with host nation partners. To facilitate assured, timely availability of the commercial network, installation should begin one week before arrival of the main body.

Issue: Cooling Equipment

(U) Discussion. Two generators failed during the Balikpapan exercise. One was replaced and the other repaired. The ability to keep equipment cool in hot climates and prevent failure due to overheating is essential. Maintenance must be performed regularly on these systems. During the early stages of the exercise, U.S. forces occupied a building that was extremely hot, which often caused the Wolfpack to overheat. After about 20 minutes of cool-down time, the Wolfpack was able to resume normal operation.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure generator and electronic control unit maintenance is performed regularly, especially before deployment, to mitigate system failure. Continue to identify ways to cool equipment in dynamic environments. Use of fans and air conditioning will increase the life span of equipment and maintain functionality.

Issue: Pacific Pathways Funding

(U) Discussion. Pacific Pathways needs to be funded as a continuous operation, not three distinct exercises. Pacific Pathways requires units to deploy, sustain, and execute as a single continuous operation. However, Pacific Pathways funding remains separate and distinct by exercise, which creates serious funding gaps. Funding for Pacific Pathways 15-01 remained unresolved for every leg of travel, beginning with Cobra Gold — funding was provided incrementally after travelers had departed. The funding gaps forced the division to use its operational funds for the entirety of the Pacific Pathways exercise, as cost transfers cannot be completed until after travelers return. Tying up operational funds restricted the division's buying power and risked degrading readiness.

Using division operational funds requires reimbursement and cost transfers in the General Fund Enterprise Business System (the U.S. Army's financial system) after travelers return, convoluting division auditability. Army financial systems require a line of accounting (LOA) for each exercise leg of travel for Pacific Pathways prior to departing on the travel. Each time a new line of accounting is applied, it forces the bottom-line traveler to adjust his voucher in the Defense Travel System. Corrected LOAs require temporary-duty voucher corrections for every Soldier who attended Pacific Pathways 15-01, a labor-intensive demand on returning units.

(U) Recommendation. Early planning, requirement validation/approval, and published orders drive funding. Plan and fund Pacific Pathways as a continuous operation instead of three separate exercises. Funding for all three legs of Pacific Pathways must be provided a month before the ADVON departs for the first leg of Pacific Pathways. This offers three separate LOAs for each leg of travel and ensures division operations and maintenance are not hampered. This also prevents cost transfers that dilute funding application and hinder clean auditability.

Chapter 2

Movement and Maneuver

(U) Summary

During the Pacific Pathways 15-01 exercise, there was tactical movement and maneuver at company and below — live fires, air assaults, and artillery raids. However, the significant movement and maneuver activities for Pacific Pathways centers around Phase 0, which includes host nation military-to-military engagement, partnering/partnership, and capacity building. In addition, there was a substantial gain in building Army readiness at echelon.

Issue: Echeloned Readiness and a Model for Extended Readiness

(U) Discussion. One of the positive outcomes of Pacific Pathways is building readiness at echelon. What Pacific Pathways does is build operational mission command and sustainment readiness, which is critical to setting a theater of operations in Phase 0.

(U) The Pacific theater is vast — 36 nations ranging from small islands to countries the size of China. It encompasses about half of the earth's surface, 50 percent of the world's population, several of the world's largest militaries, and two of the three largest economies. I Corps conducted real-time mission command and operational maneuver (i.e., planning, preparing, and executing mission command in a real theater over extended periods, three months per pathway, over time and space). I Corps also rehearsed transitioning mission command to U.S. Army, Alaska; U.S. Army, Japan (I Corps-Forward); 8th Army in Korea; and between the U.S. Marine Corps and back to I Corps. This is significant because these echelons are not replicated in integrated training environments such as warfighter exercises or combat training center (CTC) rotations, and the ability to seamlessly conduct mission command throughout the Pacific is key to readiness and setting the theater.

(U) From a sustainment perspective, after I Corps and the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) rehearsed multiple iterations of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), rehearsed surface and aerial port of debarkation openings and closings, and provided logistics throughout the theater, the 593rd ESC gained significant understanding of the area of operations such as port capabilities, nuances of host-nation infrastructure, and medical/hospital capabilities. All of this experience provided I Corps with a new and better understanding of the theater.

(U) These operational activities were repetitive. During Pacific Pathways 15-01, I Corps; 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 25th Infantry Division (25ID); and Task Force/1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (1/27), loaded, unloaded, moved by sea and ground, and conducted exercises in several countries within the regionally aligned AOR a minimum of eight times. The U.S. Naval Ship Kocak also presented the additional opportunity for an iteration of ship loading and off-loading. This experience built readiness at echelon and across warfighting functions.

(U) **Recommendation.** How is this echeloned readiness captured and applied? What are the metrics and how can it extend a unit's readiness? I Corps developed a readiness model to capture the Pacific Pathways readiness picture at echelon that could be used as a model for future Army readiness.

(U) This readiness model provides a crucial feedback loop for I Corps and United States Army, Pacific Command (USARPAC) to understand how the Army builds, maintains, or extends unit readiness outside of the normal readiness model that relies heavily on combat readiness center rotations.

(U) The Pacific Pathways Readiness Model Concept is a multi-echelon report, which enables I Corps to build readiness. This report outlines operational objectives and metrics for evaluating success. The BCTs provide an initial report before deployment that outlines training linkage during Pacific Pathways to mission-essential task list (METL) development and military-to-military engagements that are conducted during transition phases, which also contribute to METL development. Subsequent reports after each Pacific Pathways activity validate or update training realities, providing qualitative assessments on relationship building and lessons learned. These BCT reports also include home-station units.

(U) Major subordinate command headquarters include Pacific Pathways task force assessments and the Army forces in theater. These augment the report with their assessment of the traditional unit readiness there or in theater, based on the training conducted. I Corps provides the operational assessment (based on trends over time) of Pacific Pathways holistically against the combatant command's security program and objectives.




Figure 2-1. Pathways readiness model.

Issue: Advancing Readiness and Junior Leader Development

(U) Discussion. The Pacific Pathways exercise provided the following lessons:

- Strong emphasis on the ability to move assets both by sea and air. This process was a forcing function, which developed skills throughout the exercise and improved the overall readiness of deployment activities.
- Soldiers' exposure to cultures with which they normally do not interact.
- Professional development of junior leaders by putting them in positions to which they were not accustomed due to force-flow restrictions.
- Improvement in the ability of the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) to operate in and around ports, both for loading and off-loading equipment in a timely manner. Pacific Pathways built an expeditionary mindset that cannot be mirrored at a CTC rotation. Consequently, 25th CAB developed new tactics, techniques, and procedures, plus standard operating procedures for deployment operations in the Pacific, which further enhance its capability to respond to a crisis in the Pacific AOR in a hasty manner.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to incorporate enablers that can be force multipliers not typically found in a BCT. The use of multifunctional brigades may provide better mission capabilities than the traditional BCT.

Issue: Military-to-Military Engagements and the Partnership of 25ID with Joint Task Force-National Capital Region (JTF-NCR) during Balikatan 2015

(FOUO) Discussion. During the Balikatan 2015 exercise, the JTF-NCR served as the primary Army forces unit under the development of the National Maneuver Force Concept as designed and approved by the general headquarters staff, Department of Defense. The JTF-NCR was neither manned nor equipped to accomplish the tasks assigned, which created unnecessary simulations and reduced the training value of the exercise. In addition, Task Force Kalaya'an was created solely for the exercise out of Army staff personnel, which reduced the retainability and benefit of the training. The Philippine military also failed to relieve the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion, which provided the requirement for U.S. Stryker participation during the exercise. These participation issues significantly reduced the overall value of the exercise to include all levels of U.S. participation and Philippine military unit training, thereby lowering the value gained by the expenditure of U.S. resources in the exercise.

(FOUO) Recommendation. The 25ID should establish a habitual relationship with the 7th ID, Philippine Army. An enduring partnership with the 7th ID would provide 25ID with a division-level partner and access to Fort Magsaysay's ranges and resources. It also would set conditions for the 25ID to partner at a near-peer level with a much better manned, trained, and equipped Philippine Army unit that has a clear task and purpose versus that of JTF-NCR.

Issue: Opportunity Partnership and Persistent Engagement

(U) Discussion. One of the unintended consequences of the grounding of the Kocak was the reduction in the 225th Aviation Brigade's participation with its aircraft in direct support of the 2nd Stryker BCT (SBCT), 25ID, as it executed its engagement with the Thai military. Initially the 225th Aviation footprint was an aviation lift company of 120 leaders, pilots, and Soldiers, primarily looking for an opportunity to engage with the Thai infantry conducting combined air-assault training. The 225th Aviation had minimal time planned to partner with Thai aviation. When the ship ran aground, it actually afforded the aviators time and opportunity to send a small contingent of subject matter experts (going from 120 personnel down to 30) to Thailand. The 225th Aviation commander adjusted plans and focused on engaging with the Thai aviation center in the areas of maintenance and mission planning, in which it was very interested. Thailand's military has the same airframes as 225th Aviation —

UH-60 Blackhawks. This contingent of personnel went to Thailand (minus their equipment), which enabled them to focus on their partner nation's needs. This dynamic proved advantageous for both countries and helped foster future relations with the aviators from Thailand. As a result, a true partnership was developed and Thai aviation sent representatives to Hawaii to receive additional training on aviation platforms, maintenance, and staff/mission planning. Thai aviation also routinely calls 225th Aviation for advice in a reachback capability that is building trust and partnership with 225th Aviation and developing a complementary capability in the region.

(U) While the grounding was unfortunate and caused some changes in the deployment, it helped meet the USARPAC commander's intent of "strengthening relationships with allies and partners while building a broader set of readiness outcomes for all participating forces and providing crisis response options to the combatant commander." This also is a good example of what the USARPAC commander has coined "persistent engagement." This idea engages units to provide additional support in the time between exercises, which is sometimes as much as three to five weeks. One discussion has been centered on small echelon engagements at a relatively low cost with the forces in country that are waiting to deploy to the next country or exercise.

(U) Recommendation. Much of Pacific Pathways is centered on an SBCT as the core unit that deploys and does a significant amount of the host-nation engagement. Partnering enablers tend to have a dual support role to the BCT and partner when possible. In some cases it might be more beneficial to deploy a multifunctional BCT as the core unit with enablers (i.e., maintenance, aviation, medical, engineers, mission command training packages for staff, and planning) who have a primary role of host-nation engagement.

Issue: NCO Corps of the Partner Nations

(U) Discussion. During Pacific Pathways 15-01, 2nd SBCT, 25ID, deployed to three countries whose NCO corps had varying degrees of expertise. It was apparent that the responsibility and independence commonly found in the U.S. NCO corps was not equivalent in the partner armies. However, all three partner nations eagerly awaited the opportunity to learn the duties and responsibilities that U.S. NCOs conduct on a daily basis. The partner nations were more officer-centric in all areas of the military, with the NCOs holding little or no responsibility for training management.

(U) Recommendation. Have an NCO-led training program developed and ready to implement as soon as U.S. forces hit the ground. Ensure that American NCOs are linked with the partner NCOs immediately to foster partnership and a meaningful relationship with the host-nation army.

Issue: Emphasis on Partnership by the Chain of Command

(U) Discussion. Pacific Pathways was a mechanism for establishing and fostering a partnership with three distinct partner nations. Throughout the operation, 1/27 IN demonstrated this partnership by ensuring that all opportunities were exercised to foster a partnership by including allies in such activities as physical training and dining together between training activities. The 1/27 IN also conducted bilateral training by cross-task-organizing its units. This action placed Soldiers from each army in every squad, which enhanced the partnership between the armies at the lowest level and improved sharing and teaching of techniques and procedures among Soldiers. As a result, this type of training increased the overall knowledge base of junior enlisted personnel, because they were leading classes that they typically would not have an opportunity to do during home-station training.

(U) However, at times the partnership conflicted with the overall readiness of the U.S. organization. This was due in part to the partner nation's inability to conduct similar training without crossing the threshold of risk mitigation. As a result, training had to be altered so that the partner nations could participate.

(U) Recommendation. Integrate with the partner nations from day one of the operation. The best way to foster this type of partnership is to ensure that the partners participate in everything the U.S. Army is conducting. Ensure squads are bilateral, which increases the partnership rapidly among the Soldiers. Empower junior enlisted personnel by allowing them to develop training plans for the partner nations, which also increases their expertise in the material being taught. Develop training that is realistic but also allows for full participation by the partner nation.

Issue: Interoperability When Conducting Certification with Partner Nations

(U) Discussion. Fires developed a certification program that mirrored Training Circular 3-09.8, *Field Artillery Gunnery*. The digital material in the field manual was removed to enhance implementation with the partner nation's artillery. As a result, both nations used manual gunnery, which allowed interoperability. Another area that could not be replicated with the partner nations was the ability to pull meteorological data; instead, fire techniques were adjusted to accommodate the shortfall. This tactic may produce some issues, however, during the management of a Joint Fire Detection Center (FDC).

(U) Recommendation. In the future, attempt to cross-train on a Joint FDC to ensure true partnership and troubleshoot issues.

Issue: Predeployment Training for Pacific Pathways

(U) Discussion. Before departing for Pacific Pathways 15-01, 2nd SBCT, 25ID, conducted several days of information briefings pertaining to the AOR in which the team would be operating. The material was presented at a level that most Soldiers could not understand, and it did not reflect the overall audience. As a result, many personnel lacked appreciation for the AOR they would be operating in during their Pathways rotation.

(U) During predeployment training, at no time was the use of interpreters discussed. This caused significant friction at the company level because many personnel had never worked with interpreters before and were unaware of the proper way to employ them as combat multipliers. The lack of available interpreters at the brigade also limited the effectiveness of communication between the two partner nations. Additionally, some of the interpreters hindered communication between partner nations because they were not completely or accurately conveying the conversation.

(U) Recommendation. Before deployment to a Pacific Pathways exercise, units should conduct an RSOI week similar to a CTC rotation, providing information and training on the use of new equipment, interpreters, and AOR briefings. The AOR briefing should reflect the history of the country, the political status, and capabilities of the partner military force. The interpreter instruction should mirror key-leader engagements and interactions that could commonly occur during a Pacific Pathways exercise. This would enable junior leaders to hone their skills prior to the real-world interaction.

Chapter 3

Intelligence

Summary

(U) Understanding the area of operations (i.e., friendly, enemy, or threat capabilities; topographical terrain, manmade and human; nuances; patterns; and activities) along with a wide range of other pertinent information is significant in setting the theater for stability operations or, in a worse-case scenario, a transition to combat operations. The intelligence warfighting function plays an important role in providing the needed information to understand the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR).

Issue: Setting the Theater — Regional Situational and Intelligence Preparation in Pacific Pathways

(FOUO) Discussion. In reference to echeloned readiness and setting the theater in Phase 0, one important aspect is gaining and understanding the environment. As Pacific Pathways matures, it is vital that a comprehensive intelligence picture across the region, and specific to each country, contains the following information:

- Composition, disposition, strength, and capabilities of each nation.
- Terrain/topography and seasonal meteorological data.
- Infrastructure.
 - Airports: Major, minor, and remote usable airstrips.
 - Seaports: Major, minor, and identified amphibious landing sites. In a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation, major seaports or airports might be damaged to the point that amphibious landing sites might have to be developed initially to project immediate support or to augment contingencies into remote regions.
 - Road, bridge, and, where applicable, rail networks.
 - Major usable river networks.
- Medical threats such as disease and poisonous animals, insects, or plants.

(FOUO) Recommendation. Develop digital or hard-copy databases in the form of battle books for each country, to include ready-made tactical intelligence preparation of the battlefield products. Additionally, unit intelligence sections should contact the Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Center of Excellence, and the Training and Doctrine Command's Intelligence Support Activity to obtain relevant material on a specific country or region.

Issue: Contingency Map Sets

(U) Discussion. While there was not a negative issue identified with providing maps for Pacific Pathways operations, as these exercises mature contingency map sets should be provided down to the company and platoon levels. The challenge is to provide map sets for every country in the Pacific AOR. Also, providing contingency map sets down to every platoon may not be feasible, but prioritizing by country is a start. Extra map sets for lower-priority countries can be held at division or higher levels and distributed as needed.

(U) Recommendation. Establish a country priority list for contingency map sets and begin to stock at division or higher, as appropriate, for later distribution.

Chapter 4

Sustainment

Summary

(U) The ability to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide-area security can be realized only if the force is sustainable over extended distances in remote, austere conditions for prolonged periods. The Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) is vast and challenging in all the aspects described above. Consequently, Pacific Pathways provides an excellent environment to rehearse sustainment at the operational level.

Issue: Property Accountability

(U) Discussion. A split hand receipt was used by several organizations that participated in Pacific Pathways. The intention was to have a forward and rear unit identification code (UIC) before departure for Pacific Pathways. Other elements did not split the hand receipt; instead, the rear hand receipts were produced with DA Form 2062 (Hand Receipt/Annex Number), which ensured the property was signed down to the end user for proper custodial responsibility. For the organizations that decided to split property books, some issues were encountered due to the time that elapsed before the actual property book was split. This required several months of joint inventories using DA Forms 1750 (Packing List), 2062, and 3161 (Request for Issue or Turn-In). As a result of this time lapse in establishing the additional UICs, supplies had to be ordered in the rear and shipped forward.

(U) Recommendation. The general consensus was not to split the property book, specifically because the deployment window is typically 90 to 120 days. Rather, establish a rear-deployment commander to sign for equipment left behind as elements deployed for Pacific Pathways. Another recommendation that came from company leadership dealt with the positioning of supply sergeants and clerks. The general agreement was to have the supply clerk go forward, while the supply sergeant remained in the rear to ensure the property book remained intact and supplies were ordered properly.

Issue: Sustainment Objective in Pacific Pathways

(U) Discussion. Expeditionary sustainment is too reliant on contracting versus using innovative technology to improve tactical logistics expeditionary sustainment capabilities. The Pacific Pathways sustainment concept of support uses a blend of tactical logistics (classes of supply deployed by the executing unit), contracting, and host-nation support (using acquisition and cross-servicing agreements). Under the current structure of Pacific Pathways operations, most sustainment functions are contracted through the host nation. The current design does not open the aperture on expeditionary sustainment. Historical data indicates a reliance on “exercise

oriented” logistics through contracts and host-nation support. Although host-nation support can help build relationships and improve the local economy, it does not encourage improvement of expeditionary sustainment capability.

(U) Recommendation. Focus Pacific Pathways sustainment away from contracting and host-nation support to reduce costs and improve expeditionary sustainment capability within the Army and Department of Defense (DOD). The 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), in conjunction with the Logistics Innovation Agency, champions expeditionary sustainment technology for Pacific Pathways to reduce the logistics footprint while sustaining the ability to endure with what is available.

Issue: Port of Embarkation and Debarkation — Port Management Mission Command

(U) Discussion. Based on lessons learned from Pacific Pathways 14, deliberate planning occurred in support of Pacific Pathways operations. Mobility teams from across the formation were sent on joint exercise life-cycle events to inspect the aerial and sea ports of debarkation and discuss customs procedures with the host nation.

(U) Pacific Pathways 15-01 incorporated a separate sustainment rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill on port operations to ensure that the deploying unit, adjacent, and higher commands had the same common operating picture. The port planning and ROC drills enabled a multi-echelon approach crossing different headquarters, major subordinate commands, and enabling commands (i.e., United States Army, Pacific [USARPAC]; I Corps; 593th Expeditionary Support command (ESC); 8th TSC; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command [SDDC]; Combat Sustainment Support Battalion; and the brigade mission command).

(U) Recommendation. Continue to invest in mobility teams to conduct reconnaissance of ports throughout the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR. The reconnaissance team can create smart books for future applications and use.

(U) Continue to incorporate port operations in each Pacific Pathways sustainment ROC drill for situational awareness. The Pacific Pathways 15-02 sustainment ROC drill merged port operations, additional sustainment enablers (i.e., G-1, G-8, surgeon), and outside agencies into one standardized briefing. SDDC’s involvement throughout port operations in Pacific Pathways was efficient and effective.

(U) Continue to utilize SDDC as the single-port manager. Consider building the joint meteorological and oceanographic coordination cell from the Army force’s (ARFOR) logistics representative headquarters (593rd ESC), with additional personnel from the division/task force (TF) to supplement the team. The division/TF must continue its mission command node, reception,

staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) operations and provide Soldiers for port support activities.

Issue: Class V Management — Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) Allocation and Elimination of Tracer Rounds

(FOUO) Discussion. All training ammunition was allotted by the STRAC. Due to training throughout the fiscal year, the brigade had to request additional ammunition to meet Pacific Pathways training objectives. This required additional paperwork, and the ammunition was transferred into the infantry battalion's account. Enabler ammunition is typically not supported using the brigade training account. Explosive ordnance disposal demonstrations, engineer demonstrations, and field artillery (FA) rounds are not organic to the infantry battalion's STRAC account. This requires installation ammunition managers to transfer the ammunition to Pacific Pathways TF accounts with approval from USARPAC.

(FOUO) Recommendation. Forecast training for home station and request approval for additional ammunition, to include enabler units. Conducting multiple live-fire exercises during Pacific Pathways requires ammunition managers to increase the STRAC allocation in addition to the standard yearly allotment. Instead of using the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment (1/27 IN) STRAC account, create a separate Pacific Pathways STRAC allocation in the Training Ammunition Management Information System whereby units can rotate use based on the "operational design" conference requirements.

(FOUO) Non-tracer ammunition should be used during the dry season. Most countries forbid the use of tracers, which are commonly used for training in Hawaii. Eliminating tracers will prevent the shipping of ammunition that cannot be shot or could cause fires, which hinders training.

Issue: Class IX Management — Support and Shipment During Pathways

(FOUO) Discussion. There was a lack of shared understanding of responsibilities between the brigade and its higher headquarters about how requisitions for repair parts would be submitted and shipped. As a result, only one commercial shipment (via FedEx) to the Pathways unit occurred. The 1/27 IN was able to receive Class IX (repair parts) support from the 302nd Supply and Support Activity (SSA) in Korea. However, because the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A) does not check local SSAs for referrals, the status on repair parts showed as "back ordered," even when the parts were available in Korea. The original concept requires the unit to complete the walk-through paperwork and get the parts funded with the G-8 (financial management). The repair parts were resourced from Support Base-Hawaii (SBHI) or within the PACOM AOR. Unit personnel

responsible for ordering the parts also were not aware that they had to take the parts to the 8th TSC for customs weight and dimensional data, and if necessary, arrange for parts to be shipped either to SBHI or forward, which increased lead time and lowered the operational readiness rates.

(FOUO) Recommendation. Assign responsible agents at each USARPAC SSA (i.e., Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Alaska, and Korea) to act as the exercise support group Class IX integrator and execution agent for all shipments. Before leaving home station, establish internal roles and responsibilities ensuring a shared understanding of the off-line or GCSS-A ordering and shipment process. During sustainment, practice a Class IX parts shipment. Explore all means of transportation to maximize speed and efficiency (channel or flights). Provide a single point of contact responsible for finding Class IX parts at the supporting SSAs and directing a materiel release order referral.

Issue: Sustaining Equipment Readiness

(FOUO) Discussion. Equipment readiness of TF 1/27 IN was not sustained at 90 percent during Pacific Pathways. The operational readiness rates dropped below 80 percent for TF 1/27 IN at the echelons above brigade (EAB) level during Pacific Pathways for the following reasons:

- Confusion about ownership of EAB-level maintenance actions created a lack of proactive measures to locate needed repair parts in a timely manner.
- The logistics integrator (593rd ESC) was not enabled with a tactical command post code or funding to ship Class IX repair parts in a timely manner.

(FOUO) Recommendation. EAB began conducting meetings after the issues with repair parts became apparent. These meetings ensured that Pacific Pathways had the entire enterprise working together to facilitate the TF maintenance requirements. This weekly maintenance meeting brings the needed focus and unity of effort on Pacific Pathways. This should be continued in future Pathways. In addition, based on Pacific Pathways 14 and 15-01, the 593rd ESC should:

- Serve as the logistical integrator and responsible agent for Class IX repair parts management for Pacific Pathways 15-02.
- Assist the supporting unit after all internal resources are exhausted.
- Embed its ARFOR logistics representative in the operation to serve as the conduit for logistical issues and concerns.
- Manage the funding code to transport critical Class IX during Pacific Pathways 15-02.

(FOUO) Weekly maintenance meetings conducted by the TF with attendance by strategic enablers (i.e., Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], Army Materiel Command [AMC], 593rd ESC, and 8th TSC) focus the effort to identify any issues before a reduction in the operational readiness rate.

Issue: Passport and VISA Processing (Personnel Services and Support)

(U) Discussion. The Pacific Pathways concept requires personnel to conduct exercises and operations in countries without a Status of Forces Agreement. That means personnel must have passports and visas. Pacific Pathways units and enablers need to identify a battle roster six to eight months before deployment to meet the timelines associated with obtaining passports and visas. Additionally, units need to identify at least 10 percent above the battle roster authorization to react in time for last minute changes.

(U) Recommendation. Send brigade representatives to attend DOD passport agent training, which is a two-day course certifying personnel to process passport and visa applications. This can expedite the application process. Most DOD passport agent training courses are held at Fort Belvoir, VA.

593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command

Logistics Planning and Synchronization

Issue: Synchronization of Enterprise Partners in Planning and Executing Pacific Pathways

(U) Discussion. The 593rd ESC conducts weekly synchronization meetings via Defense Connect Online with all partners involved in supporting Pacific Pathways. This includes the following:

- SDDC/599th Transportation Brigade/836th and 837th Transportation Battalions
- 404th Army Field Support Brigade
- AMC
- DLA
- DLA Energy
- I Corps
- 25th Infantry Division (25ID)

(U) This synchronization meeting has evolved into a forum to discuss past, current, and future iterations of Pacific Pathways. This methodology allows for lessons learned from past and current operations to be integrated into plans for future operations. The significant improvements in synchronizing Pacific Pathways 15 was due to the ability of the partners to share and integrate lessons from Pacific Pathways 14.

(U) Best Practice. The weekly synchronization meeting held with enterprise partners greatly enhances current and future operations by sharing lessons from previous operations.

Issue: Army Capabilities Versus Contracted Services

(U) Discussion. Several capabilities that the Army can provide to the force were instead contracted out during Pacific Pathways 15-01. Those capabilities included commercial Internet access, laundry service, and water distribution. During 15-01, the sustainment brigade was not aligned to provide any additional enablers for Pacific Pathways. These enablers would have enhanced the unit's ability to operate in an austere and immature environment. As Pacific Pathways is operationalized, these exercises are the only opportunity for organizations like the sustainment brigade to train in a real-world scenario. Also, having forward-positioned activity sets will eliminate the need for contracted supplies and services. As a result, reaction time for humanitarian missions or other real-world scenarios would be reduced. The use of additional enablers provides a reliable force that is capable of producing subject matter experts able to perform whenever the mission requires, rather than using contractors, who may or may not be as reliable and are capable of working only for a certain period of time.

(U) Recommendation. Not all missions for Pacific Pathways require the use of brigade combat teams (BCTs). In certain aspects, the use of multifunctional brigades or sustainment brigades enhances the overall capability of Pacific Pathways. Those enablers could be task-organized to fall under a BCT for mission command and provide the commander more flexibility and limit his reliance on contracts.

Issue: Logistics Status Reporting (LOGSTAT)

(U) Discussion. LOGSTAT reporting is an internal organizational requirement to pass to higher headquarters a unit's logistics status. Normally done daily, this report allows higher and supporting units to gain visibility of the status of units and respond to shortages or impending requirements. During Pacific Pathways, the LOGSTAT process became virtual with a logistics synchronization meeting conducted daily to review status and synchronize supporting efforts to resupply or support units engaged in the operations. This meeting was conducted by the exercise unit's parent organization, with participants from across the enterprise. This meeting greatly improved responsiveness for the exercise units.

(U) Best practice. Daily logistics status meetings to review LOGSTAT data greatly improved readiness for participating units.

Issue: Challenges to Logistics Planning

(U) Discussion. Logistics planning is challenging in any environment, but is very difficult when long lead times associated with Pacific Pathways are factored into the planning process. In many cases logistics requirements must be identified and processed 90 to 180 days prior to operations. The following factors make identifying accurate requirements difficult:

- Changes to task organization, unit movement list, and headcount.
- Lack of historical consumption data for vehicle types and geographic locations.
- Lack of experience of unit-level personnel.

These factors required planners at higher levels to use general planning assumptions and plan for worst-case scenarios.

(U) Best Practice. Logistics planners at division, ESC, and corps levels should develop comprehensive historical usage data from all Pacific Pathways exercises and maintain records for use in future operations. Planners should attempt to lock in personnel and vehicle numbers 180 days prior to operations.

Issue: Crisis Management

(U) Discussion. The U.S. Naval Ship Kocak ran aground off the Philippines on 22 JAN 2015 while carrying vehicles, equipment, and personnel supporting Pacific Pathways. This incident seriously affected Pacific Pathways and caused units throughout the theater to exercise crisis management skills. The 593rd ESC had placed a liaison officer (LNO) aboard the Kocak to report progress of the vessel as it transited the Pacific. This LNO was provided communication equipment that enabled him to contact the 593rd ESC within minutes of the grounding and report on actions to refloat the vessel over a two-week period. The prior planning and training provided to the LNO and personnel at the 593rd ESC main command post resulted in excellent communication and support between pertinent agencies and leadership throughout the crisis.

(U) Best Practice. The crisis management processes used throughout the Kocak incident were exceptional. Prior planning and the placement of an LNO with proper communication equipment on board the vessel was a best practice.

Issue: Class I Procedures

(U) Discussion. Planning for and delivering rations and bottled water in support of Pacific Pathways required extensive synchronization between unit logisticians, planners at the ESC, and DLA. Ensuring that units were supported with Class I (rations) along the various stops of Pacific Pathways was challenging. DLA supports all DOD unit requirements for food and bottled water worldwide. The DLA offices in Hawaii, working with the Class I section of the ESC, were able to deliver rations to support all phases of Pacific Pathways because of prior planning and participation in weekly synchronization meetings. There are some challenges with delivery of rations, primarily due to the absence of dual Department of Defense Activity Address Codes (DODAACs) for units. The DODAAC is the method used to ship supplies to units and capture costs. Since unit DODAACs are the home station address, if units split to deploy, the deploying force is left without a DODAAC for shipping in theater. This issue requires work-arounds that often delay delivery of supplies. DLA, working with the 593rd Class I section, were able to ensure delivery of rations by developing alternate ship-to addresses for units participating in Pacific Pathways.

(U) Best Practice. Close working relationships between the ESC staff and partners such as DLA allows for mission success, even when faced with systemic challenges such as use of DODAACs.

Issue: Class III Bulk Procedures

(U) Discussion. Planning for resupply of bulk Class III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) during Pacific Pathways was thorough and provided uninterrupted support during all operations. The key to success was the close working relationship developed between the ESC Class III cell and DLA-Energy, whose Pacific office is in Hawaii. The ESC Class III cell did a thorough analysis of all available DOD fuel sources in the Pacific. Figure 4-1 depicts these sources and capabilities. By doing this analysis, the ESC, working with DLA-Energy, was able to align exercise locations to existing Class III locations and arrange for support. This type of thorough knowledge of capabilities within the area of operations results in success when setting the theater for operations and future contingencies.

Best Practice. This practice should be shared with all Army Service component command/TSC/ESC planners.




Figure 4-1. The ESC Class III cell depicts available DOD fuel sources in the Pacific.

Personnel/Human Resources (HR)

Issue: Daily Personnel Accountability Reports Had Many Discrepancies

(U) Discussion. The Deployed Tactical Accountability Software (DTAS) was being used only by the Army Deputy J-1 at the Joint Personnel Reception Center (JPRC). No other HR personnel representative was using DTAS to report accountability numbers to eliminate discrepancies. The Marine Corps J-1 representative stated that Marines in HR positions attended the weeklong DTAS class hosted by the 8th Human Resources Sustainment Center before the execution of the Balikatan 15 exercise, but failed to implement the reporting process.

(U) Recommendation. In order to meet the commander’s intent for expeditionary operations in an austere environment, DTAS helps with more accurate, timely accountability; movement of personnel arriving; movement between locations; and personnel redeployment operations. The higher command’s operation order should require each Military Service accountability representative to use DTAS and have hands-on training timelines and DTAS software available. The JPRC worksheet might be effective at the reception of arriving exercise personnel, but it is not effective for redeployment when units’ original departure dates change.

Issue: JPRC Had a “Hands-Off” Approach Toward the Redeployment Plan During the Redeployment Conference, Recommending Every Unit Find Its Own Transportation to the Airport or Vessel Staging Area

(U) Discussion. The Joint Movement Coordination Center (JMCC) liaison, embedded with the JPRC, left before the redeployment conference and redeployment operations. Most bus and van contracts lasted until 10 MAY 2015, so not utilizing this transportation wastes resources and spends unnecessary money. Plus, service members would have been reimbursed for taxi expenditures, at an unnecessary expense to the military. The G-1 representative (embedded at the JPRC) took charge and coordinated with each service JPRC representative, the bus drivers, and van drivers to have morning and afternoon transportation from 01 to 10 MAY 2015. Hundreds of joint main body commercial departures were achieved. Mass transportation was critical for successful redeployment operations.

(U) Recommendation. Keep the JMCC liaison through the redeployment operations to maintain smooth redeployment of personnel.

Issue: There Was No Task Organization Clearly Established and Communicated

(U) Discussion. The 25ID early-entry command post team did not have an established task organization before the execution of Balikatan 15. This was clearly demonstrated when the ARFOR commander questioned the G-1 representative about the Balikatan 15 task organization’s existence.

(U) Recommendation. In order to meet the commander’s intent, task organization must be established during the Balikatan 15 planning phase and disseminated through the higher command’s operation order for everyone to understand proper chain of command channels and points of contact.

Issue: Personnel Accountability Before Arrival

(U) Discussion. As additional enablers and contractors joined units that were supporting Pacific Pathways 15-01, they were tracked only by Army LNOs. This created confusion because of the difficulty in tracking personnel effectively, and it resulted in faulty personnel status reports. Personnel outside 25ID control need to enter and exit through one control point as they join the deployed force. This enables personnel sections to efficiently track all individuals who are forward in support of Pacific Pathways.

(U) Recommendation. To alleviate this issue, G-1 personnel need to deploy earlier and possibly in split operations to establish an acceptable level of confidence that facilitates entry and exit from theater. This reduces the friction of accountability caused by enablers and contractors joining the deployed force.

Issue: G-1 as a Joint Billet Position

(U) Discussion. The G-1 representative is co-located with Army headquarters. This allows the G-1 to perform the roles specific to the needs of the Army headquarters, but not the roles unique to joint billet or roles in support of units, enablers, contractors, or civilians working with or in support of the Army headquarters.

(U) Recommendation. The G-1 should send two representatives — one representative to serve in a joint billet located/working in the JPRC and one representative located/working in the Army headquarters. This enables the G-1 representatives to provide effective personnel support in lodging, transportation, tracking, and reporting.

Issue: Medical Readiness, Supply, Evacuation, Hospitalization, and Customs

(U) Discussion/Recommendations. The following areas were identified as medical issues to be improved as Pacific Pathways matured:

- **Medical Readiness.**

- Vaccination: Confirm the vaccination series requirements for each country to backward plan a Soldier readiness processing date(s).
- Rabies vaccine: Pre-order vaccine and immunoglobulin; order the correct dose to complete the series in-country in the event a Soldier is exposed.

- **Class VIII (Medical Supplies).**

- Begin establishing a Class VIII account early (six months out) if a resupply method is available. Elevate the issue to higher headquarters if there is a resistance to authorizing the account.
- Coordinate cold-chain management of blood with blood bank in route and ensure the blood issued does not have a short shelf life.

- **Evacuation.** Obtain the strategic medical evacuation plan from higher headquarters and conduct a ROC drill of the process, to include patient accountability, before deployment.

- **Hospitalization.**

- Ensure a guarantee of payment is established through TRICARE (health insurance) for each host-nation hospital being utilized.
- Have a U.S. physician inspect the host-nation hospitals to assess their capabilities during the pre-deployment site survey.

- **Customs.** Validate customs requirement for narcotics and vaccines going in and out of each country.

Chapter 5 Protection

(U) Summary

Protecting the force and mitigating risk are crucial to success. From safety measures to the physical risks of conducting combat operations to the daily exposures of the different environments throughout the Pacific area of responsibility, understanding, assessing, and developing protective measures to prevent or counter these threats are vital. Reliance on networks for mission command and reachback must be a priority to protect against cyber attacks. Preventive medicine and field sanitation to safeguard against sickness and disease are also components of protection as U.S. forces deploy in and out of multiple countries and environments. This initial impressions report (IIR) touches on only a few protection observations, but the intent is to get into more detail in the subsequent Pacific Pathways IIRs 15-02 and 15-03.

Issue: I Corps and 25th Infantry Division (25ID) Need Stronger Presence During Planning Conferences

(U) Discussion: As primary executors of the Pacific Pathways mission, I Corps and 25ID, certainly from a protection planning standpoint, must have an early planning presence both with key host nation (HN) and embassy country teams during the planning conferences at the respective Pathways locations. Decisions affecting force protection must be made at these levels with the respective country teams. Especially with the geographic and time-zone dispersion of the headquarters, it is not good enough to share information after the planning conferences — concrete decisions and plans must be solidified on the ground. These include port security, convoy security, and medical evacuation to HN hospitals in the event of a vehicular accident. The devil is in the details, and the division needs to know which hospital to transport casualties to and when, without hesitation. This is very difficult to arrange without a proper presence at the planning conferences. Consistent presence also builds continuity and “country books” to carry over to future exercises or contingency operations.

(U) Recommendation: Send a protection representative from each echelon (United States Army, Pacific [USARPAC], I Corps, and 25ID) to each leg’s planning conferences, to ensure real-time planning and coordination with the HN and country teams on protection, prevention, and response. If money and slots are few, prioritize and weigh in order — 25ID, then I Corps, then USARPAC — so those detailed arrangements may be planned in a timely manner.

Issue: Positive Power of On-the-Ground Planning at Division Level

(U) Discussion: Once on the ground at Pacific Pathways 15-01, 25ID effectively coordinated assessments with the Marine Corps forces. Hospitals were surveyed for specific capabilities and proximity to planned convoy routes. The protection cell worked closely with the division surgeon on this, and together the cell members and surgeon analyzed threats ranging from snake bites to vehicular accidents. Aerial ports of debarkation, sea ports of debarkation, and training areas (including alternates) were thoroughly surveyed, to include assessing the effects of adverse weather on safety and access.

(U) The HN militaries and embassy teams provided excellent support, including vetting hotels, coordinating routes and escorts from the airport, and generating positive media coverage as a show-of-force (part of the information operations (IO) plan). As alluded to with corps planning, the division planned safety in excruciating detail (i.e., eliminate animal-bite level, conduct assessments at smaller airports, and war gaming with the embassy team and HN as to where/what Soldiers might go/do against biggest safety and IO hazards). As a result, the division was successful in mitigating safety threats during 2,000-plus “risky operations” with temperatures of 97 to 99 degrees Fahrenheit. Tight cross-coordination on the ground with the public affairs office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the HN chief of police (and other key HN members), and embassy teams; providing detailed surveys; and posting results on a well-known portal were all keys to success on the ground despite limited involvement during, or information gained after, the planning conferences.

(U) Recommendation: 25ID, or any division headquarters, needs to have this on-the-ground presence early in the planning process as the lead executor, and I Corps should provide the primary oversight and support. At minimum, send a protection representative from each echelon (USARPAC, I Corps, and 25ID) to each leg’s planning conferences, but if money and requisite slots are few, prioritize and weigh in order (25ID, then I Corps, then USARPAC) so the personnel planning and executing tangible plans can make detailed arrangements in a timely manner.

Issue: Required Resiliency of the Protection Coordinators

(U) Discussion: Protection is everyone’s business. Safety certainly is, without question. The protection cell must be resilient to synchronize safety and protection across the staff (aviation with personnel recovery; G-2X and the intelligence network; G-9 with governmental, insurgent, and tribal impacts; Air Missile Defense; Logistics-Sustainment; Fires; etc.) and with subordinate units (such as maneuver enhancement brigades [MEBs] helping to secure the rear area). Conducting a formal safety synchronization team or working group (WG) is a worthy effort while preparing to enter any

country in any operation. The safety annex should have contributions from across the staff to foresee hazards and identify mitigating actions. A safety synchronization effort, in conjunction with a protection WG, should be parallel to the military decisionmaking process, affecting course of action development, and not just an afterthought once the plan is complete. The I Corps protection effectively integrates safety and exercises some cross-sectional authority through injection into the effects working group (EWG), where critical assets can be identified among a larger body of staff. Tight integration with the EWG also helps ensure that protection and safety affect every WG and also affect the decision-making cycle. The effect is the commander can ask the protection chief, with this corporate view: “What do you see threatening our force protection?” The answer can help identify protection gaps at the division level.

(U) Recommendation: I Corps is integrating safety and force protection effectively with a protection cell that has limited direct positional authority by exercising practices described in this discussion. This is a potential best practice that other units should consider emulating or adapting to their own conditions.

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
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