U.S. ARMED FORCES
RECRUITING STATION

ARMY ★ NAVY ★ AIR FORCE ★ MARINES

ANTITERRORISM TACTICS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR STANDALONE FACILITIES

HANDBOOK

U.S. ARMY

January 2012

Contents

OVERVIEW

"There are no more vital interests than the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life." *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011*

In today's era of persistent conflict and asymmetric threats, protecting standalone facilities (SAFs) against a prospective terrorist attack presents a particular challenge. In most cases it requires thoughtful action beyond prescriptive instruction. It requires resourcefulness, initiative, and creativity—those bywords that represent the hallmark of the American Army.

Tackling unusual, unpredictable challenges is nothing new. Army policy and doctrine provide a basis for success, but this is often not sufficient in the case of SAFs. The words *resourcefulness*, *initiative*, and *creativity* apply emphatically to SAF-type situations so diverse that they defy a fixed code guiding templated solutions. This Handbook supports, without restricting, actions necessary when confronting the challenge of building a SAF antiterrorism (AT) program.

We cannot accurately forecast terrorist actions, nor can we design authoritative protective measures against this uncertainty. This *Handbook of Antiterrorism Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Standalone Facilities* provides guidance that can assist in building AT programs for those facilities. It supplements policy directives and tactical doctrine to help build viable defenses designed to prevent terrorist attacks, translating Army AT standards into meaningful suggestions. Moreover, it encourages innovative solutions. The fact that recent trends indicate an increased likelihood of attacks on SAFs makes the handbook particularly significant.

An inability to predict the future does not suggest incapacity to provide solutions. We must prepare in advance with well-conceived plans and programs. With this Handbook, hardened with instinctive Army resourcefulness, we can achieve the Army leadership vision of preventing successful terrorist attacks on SAFs.

Photo by: Civilian D. Myles Cullen / US Army

INTRODUCTION

"We will adapt deterrence principles to our efforts in countering extremists. Though terrorists are very difficult to deter directly, they make cost/benefit calculations …" *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011*

Purpose of this Publication: To provide to leaders of standalone facilities (SAFs) supplemental implementation guidance in executing antiterrorism (AT) responsibilities for their facilities and personnel.

Army AT Policy: Army AT policy "prescribes policy and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the Army AT Program … [it] provides guidance and mandatory standards for protecting Department of the Army personnel, information, and critical resources from acts of terrorism."[1] For SAF leaders, as with other Army commands, this is a command responsibility.

Definitions: There is no doctrinal definition for either "installation" or "standalone facility." This requires a definition by description. A comparison of installations to SAFs may help understand the challenge in drafting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for SAF leaders.

For the purposes of this Handbook, an Army installation is generally characterized by having a defined perimeter most, or all, of which is under U.S. Army control. Most installations have organic security and emergency response. Installations represent traditional support structures with specified lines distinguishing between the local community and Army equities residing on the installation.

The concept for SAFs is considerably more complex. As opposed to installations, SAFs are embedded in communities. While some have barriers that define an operational area, most are an integral part of their environment where they reside and have no organic security or emergency response. Most SAFs are dependent upon external community or military agencies for security and intelligence analysis.

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[1]   Army Regulation 525-13, "Antiterrorism," 11 September 2008, page i.

Some SAFs accommodate units or other organizations that have their own separate chain of command. AT planning on an installation follows the same standard format. Most installations have clearly distinguishable lines of responsibility and support, with a single point of contact and representation. SAFs can have a similar composition of commands and organizations, but with many of the subordinate elements located throughout the state or in different regions within the United States. The huge variety of SAF characteristics and their significance are described in Chapter 1.

Application: This Handbook applies to SAF leaders in general. It gives suggested guidance and examples to that effect. No two organizations or sites are alike. Each requires careful consideration of protective measures and application of resources specifically tailored to the existing threat. Thus the Handbook cannot apply specifically to all the different environments and categories of SAFs. It does provide to SAF leaders useful instruction that will help extrapolate protection measures from Army AT policy. A matrix in Army policy[2] (inserted in this Handbook as Appendix A) indicates that all Army standards "must be implemented." Taken literally, this is inaccurate. Many SAFs have too few personnel or insufficient capability to execute all of the standards precisely as delineated in Army policy. This requires a flexible application of the standards to complete the requirement. This Handbook provides considerations for that purpose.

Background

Most terrorist attacks occur in areas outside of traditional military barriers. Terrorist attacks mostly focus on more vulnerable targets within a community. Transportation systems, community gatherings, hotels, and other targets have absorbed recent attacks. Reports and actions also indicate a clear desire for some terrorists to attack U.S. military operations and activities, such as recruiting stations and Reserve or Guard facilities. Because SAFs are embedded in the community and represent the U.S. military, they could be the most likely and most vulnerable terrorist target in the U.S. Army.

Some might argue that protecting against a terrorist attack is a routine security requirement. Those same people might suggest that the possibility for attack is remote and that police and other security personnel serve as sufficient protection. The persistent possibility of terrorist attacks, limited authority over the targeted area, greater dependency upon community and other external security assets, and limited SAF capabilities require a more imaginative application of protective measures than that provided by an established installation security template or from local law enforcement alone.

The Department of the Army is committed to maintaining efforts and providing guidance to ensure availability of resources and mission success. Army headquarters can provide help to the challenged SAF antiterrorism officer (ATO) through funding and guidance. Higher headquarters (HHQ) can assist by providing TTP based on historical precedent, assigned legal constraints, and defined basic policy. These narrow the focus, and they frame potential solutions for SAF leaders. TTP prevent unnecessary and often ineffective responses and offer possibilities not included in more formal training venues. This Handbook is a short synthesis of considerations drawn from

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2   Ibid., Appendix F.

historical data and the experience of those who continue to face the challenge of developing protective measures aimed at preventing a terrorist attack. Moreover, it provides concepts and best practices that can be applied as the situation warrants.

The Handbook begins with four assumptions:

First, formal Army doctrine[3] provides principles for ATOs on a broad scale. This Handbook supplements that knowledge and offers a resource for a more specific and detailed application.

Second, the Handbook assumes the expectation that the ATO or AT focal point of a SAF will apply the principles herein situationally and resourcefully. No single resource can answer all the possible scenarios. Resources, location, authority, and threat, among others, demand a unique solution.

Third, the Handbook emphasizes the need for integrated solutions and creative application of doctrinal principles. A lack of assigned security forces, a primary dependence on local law enforcement organizations to provide security and immediate response, and an undefined operational area arguably represent the most outstanding, and challenging, feature of SAFs. It is also true that SAF leaders should, as much as possible, emulate techniques and principles employed by installations by integrating similar programs and policies (for example, safety and physical security) with the AT program. Actions such as implementation of force protection conditions (FPCONs), use of random antiterrorism measures (RAM), building a layered defense, and access can all be adapted for SAF.

The final and perhaps most important assumption in this Handbook is that a solution to the problem exists. In the Foreword to the Army's Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, "Tempering the Weapon," the then Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans, and Training, wrote, "Through constant awareness and vigilance, effective application of tactical principles and proven intelligence capabilities, we will succeed in our goal of preventing terrorist attacks." This holds true for SAFs as for any other Army organization or mission. The Army's antiterrorism "vision"[4] is to "… successfully prevent terrorist attacks."

Handbook Organization

The ultimate objective is to prevent a successful terrorist attack. Using Army policy, the "AT Tasks," and DoD and Army AT Standards, the Handbook offers suggested methods for accomplishing those standards that must be met by all Army organizations. Each chapter will provide the Task as outlined in AR 525-13 and then address methods to achieve solutions. Each facility has its own unique operational environment, and the SAF leader or ATO can refer to the principles delineated in the Handbook and adapt them in the most effective manner. How those principles are implemented remains the responsibility of the leader on the ground.

This publication is not designed to repeat extensive formats found in other doctrine, policy, and TTP. As appropriate, references will be highlighted to indicate where particular formats or

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[3]   Army Field Manual 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*, February 2011.
[4]   Taken from *AT Vision, Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan*, Phase II, "Tempering the Weapon," 10 March 2009 (revised 1 August 2009), page 9.

processes can be found. In most cases, all references indicated will be located on the Office of the Provost Marshal General, Army Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal (ATEP), on Army Knowledge Online.

> ***Primary references for formats***:
>
> Policy: AR 525-13, "Antiterrorism," 11 September 2008
>
> Doctrine: Field Manual (FM) 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*, February 2011
>
> TTP: *Unit Antiterrorism Officer Handbook*, September 2010
>
> Army Knowledge Online, Office of the Provost Marshal General, ATEP (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/605757)

The Handbook is divided into sections on planning, evaluation, and execution. These categories are subsequently divided in applicable Army AT Tasks annotated in the Army AT Framework, in AR 525-13, Chapter 4. Using the Tasks, the Handbook addresses each specific Army AT standard. The matrix of AT Tasks and associated Standards is lifted from Army policy and inserted in Appendix A.

For each Standard the Handbook represents definitive fundamental guidance to which an assessor or leader can refer. It also touches on the basic requirements of each of the five elements[5] that should be included in even the smallest SAF AT program. These elements offer some suggestions that can guide self-assessments of SAF. The Handbook is not designed to be complete, replace Army AT policy standards, or supply comprehensive assessment criteria or formats. Moreover, it represents some fundamentals where an assessor or leader should expect to see definitive evidence in writing or action.

Notes for HHQ That Oversee SAFs

The chain of command in AT is critical to success as a mission requirement. Within the framework of Army AT policy, HHQ guidance provides a license to operate creatively and, at the same time, constrains unlimited action. SAF leaders should look to HHQ for guidance, assistance, and perhaps material support. The method for doing this is an HHQ concern. Without HHQ guidance SAFs will struggle to develop and execute AT plans.

While many SAFs are located apart from their HHQ, this does not release HHQ from the responsibility of developing AT programs and providing oversight. Innovative solutions support HHQ guidance and provide the framework for subordinate action. Constant communication, periodic evaluation, and command involvement allow HHQ to provide the best possible support for each subordinate SAF. Moreover, prompt reporting and periodic evaluation will allow HHQ to refine policies and procedures and will improve the consistency and quality of support provided.

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5   AR 525-13, "Antiterrorism," 11 September 2008, page 13.

Notes for Using the Handbook

Army leadership emphasizes that every member of the Army community is covered under the Army AT Program. As members of the Army community, SAFs must develop relationships to achieve the level of protection necessary to prevent a successful terrorist attack.

Army policy guides and directs baseline requirements for all Army AT programs. This Handbook does not replace that instruction. As with all baselines, Army AT policy requires organizations to adapt that baseline to actual circumstances. In the end, every unit has a responsibility of protecting its personnel. This Handbook fills gaps in details for SAF leaders and offers suggestions for providing the best possible AT protection.

There is no substitute for leader involvement. This axiom may be even more significant for SAF AT programs. Because of the tremendous variety of SAF situations, much is left to SAF leaders to interpret and apply solutions as circumstance demands.

Chapter 1. A Review of the Threat

"I hope you have kept the enemy in the picture. War books so often leave them out." *T.E. Lawrence, February 9, 1928, Letter to Colonel A.P. Wavell*

Developing an AT program and building a corresponding AT plan must include an evaluation of the threat. That estimate represents the foundation of the AT program. In fact, without some assessment of the threat, plans and procedures would use "luck" as the guiding principle; a sure course for waste, inefficiency, and increasing vulnerability.

The threat of terrorism represents a particular challenge to the US Army. Terrorism is infrequent, unpredictable, yet can have devastating consequences if successful. This is especially true for standalone facilities (SAF) where circumstances rarely include substantial traditional security-related forces. Suggesting that each SAF constitutes a wholly unique challenge and must be addressed separately ignores the history and study of recent terrorist events. Moreover it is not an impossible task. Using past terrorist successes or aborted attempts does not offer a guarantee of success in building defenses against them. But it does provide depth to an analysis which, when coupled with site specific information, provides the best possible basis for anticipating and confronting a terrorist attack.

Since 9/11, a surge in homegrown Islamic terrorism has resulted in at least 33 plots and attacks against the U.S. military community. The methods have been diverse. Plans for attacks have considered use of homemade bombs, small arms, antiaircraft missiles, and even remote controlled aircraft. Targets have included recruiting stations, military processing centers, individuals, large groups of soldiers and civilians, and shopping malls. The breadth of targeting and the attack instruments reinforce the Army policy requirement for AT defensive measures through the Army community.

In orienting SAF AT programs and plans it is important to recall that in a recent review of all of the plots and attacks by homegrown violent extremists (HVE) since 9/11 (which includes plots and attacks against non-military targets) the majority of the plots and attacks involved military and government targets, as opposed to civilian targets. Military targets are selected primarily in

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retaliation for the killing of Muslims in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and because of policies perceived as hostile toward Muslims.

The majority of SAF are easily identifiable and located in areas accessible by the public, and for this reason, attack-planning against these facilities requires less time and fewer resources, making them a more attractive target. Recruiting stations are especially vulnerable because they are typically located in multipurpose, high traffic facilities and are necessarily open to the public. Practically speaking, this same concept applies to Corps of Engineers projects, Guard and Reserve facilities, and other SAF embedded in the community.

HVE or lone wolves as they are sometimes called, make up the majority of prospective terrorists arrested and charged with planning or executing terrorist attacks. Some include members of the Army community, so-called insider threats, like the Ft Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan. The radicalization process and targeting infers a close link between SAF and community law enforcement personnel in collective support to indentify terrorists before they strike.

In the end the threat is unknown. History is not a definitive indicator of the future. But it does offer some lessons that can guide SAF leaders in evaluating the type and probability of the threat. It will allow for a calculated emphasis based on that analysis. SAF leaders will set their defenses on that basis always looking to refine the threat estimate. The ability to collect and share information will complete the operational picture.

When using this Handbook to help build or sustain a SAF AT program, SAF leaders and ATO should emphasize the importance of the threat. Orienting a program in that way will ensure appropriate prominence to the standards that support a reliable foundation. It will provide necessary insight into terrorist intentions, drive useful change, and recommend targeted application of protective measures.

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Selected recent terrorist include

- Paul Rockwood July 2010, Anchorage, Alaska: Rockwood and his wife were arrested after he created and she unwittingly provided, a list of 20 prospective attack targets to a federal agent posing as a fellow jihadist; the list included 5 organizations and 15 individuals. Several military personnel were included in the list of individuals.

- Farooq Ahmed October 2010, National Capital Region, Virginia: Ahmed was arrested for his role in a plot to bomb the Arlington Cemetery, Courthouse, Pentagon City and Crystal City Metro stations, simultaneously. Ahmed chose those targets because he "wanted to kill as many military members as possible."

- Jose Pimentel November 2011, New York: Pimentel was arrested for planning to build and detonate a pipe bomb in New York targeting the US Post Office, police stations, and/or American service members returning from Iraq.

- U.S. Marine Corps Reservist LCpl. Yonathan Melaku, June 2011 a naturalized U.S. citizen from Ethiopia, was allegedly motivated by Al Qaeda propaganda and ideology, has been charged with destruction of property and firearm violations after a series of five shootings at military installations in the Washington, D.C. area.

- Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, November 2009, a psychiatrist, killed 13 and wounded 32 during an attack on the Soldier Readiness Center at the Army's Fort Hood, where he was stationed. AQAP leader Anwar al-Awlaki said in a news media interview that he communicated with Hasan.

- Abdulhakim Muhammad, June 2009, born Carlos Bledsoe, a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, was arrested and charged with killing Army Pvt. William Long after attacking an Army recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas. Bledsoe allegedly specifically targeted the U.S. military to avenge its mistreatment of Muslims and he has claimed to be an AQAP operative.

- Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh, June 2011, were arrested on terrorism and firearms charges after they allegedly plotted to attack a Seattle military processing center. The defendants initially targeted Joint Base Lewis-McChord, a combined Army and Air Force Base in hope this would spur other violent Islamist extremists to emulate similar attacks on the U.S. military.

- Emerson Begolly, January 2011, a U.S.-born homegrown Islamist extremist in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, pleaded guilty in August 2011 to encouraging attacks on public and military facilities in collusion with convicted homegrown terrorist Colleen "Jihad Jane" LaRose.

- Antonio Martinez, December 2010, a U.S. citizen from Baltimore, Maryland, and a recent Muslim convert, was charged with attempting to use a WMD to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in Maryland.

- Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, September 2009, a Jordanian citizen a residing in Texas, "had become radicalized on his own, through the Internet," FBI Director Robert Mueller said in a speech last month. Inspired by Carlos Bledsoe's murder of Pvt. Long in Little Rock, he initially eyed attacks on military recruiting centers and then cased the Dallas National Guard Armory before settling on a bomb attack on an office building.

- The "Newburgh Four", May 2009, involved three U.S.-born plotters – James Cromitie, David Williams and Onta Williams – and a Haitian immigrant were arrested after plotting to attack Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, New York and Jewish sites in New York City.

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Chapter 2. Characteristics of SAFs

"… the art of command lies in understanding that no two situations are ever the same; each must be tackled as a wholly new problem to which there will be a wholly new answers." *Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, "Memoirs"*

Army AT policy has for some time emphasized installations as the focus of AT protection. This has allowed installations to build necessary AT programs resourced according to policy. Today installations, for the most part, have robust programs. Embedded in installation operations, they oversee necessary protective measures and processes that protect critical assets, evolve with changing situations, and respond to emergent and emergency requirements.

Installations may represent the foundation for Army AT, but other organizations and operations not on or associated with installations must build AT programs too. SAFs fall into this category. They must follow Army policy that uses installations as a baseline. From policy, SAFs must determine the specific application that fits the environment.

In practice this is no different than installations applying a baseline policy to their specific situation. The difference between SAFs and installations revolves largely around organic capabilities and often facility population. These differences have implications for chain of command oversight, assessments, exercises, coordination, resources, training, and many other aspects that must be addressed in SAF AT plans. Fundamentally, the absence of organic assets suggests a greater reliance on coordination and external support.

The differences between installations and SAFs pale in comparison to the differences among SAFs themselves. Some of the many distinctions for SAFs are listed below. The SAF range includes some, such as U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard enclaves, having capabilities similar to those of fully operational installations. Others, such as recruiting stations and Reserve Officer Training Corps detachments, may have fewer than 10 people at a given facility and be located within a leased space with no defined perimeters or access control measures. The wide range of differences makes a specific doctrine difficult to apply across all SAFs. For this reason basic plans and principles should guide SAF leaders in developing successful AT programs.

2

"Coordination, innovation, and flexibility" apply universally for all SAF. With these in mind, SAF leaders and ATOs can build AT plans. "The entire Army will be involved with this important endeavor so that every organization; every unit; every person that is part of the Army community understands their role and responsibilities."[6]

The list below represents some of the characteristics that call for unique solutions across SAFs. It paints a picture of the challenge for SAF leaders. In recent years SAFs have become the most common terrorist target. The knowledge and realization that terrorists will continue to change and alter their efforts to attack U.S. citizens and military personnel should spur work aimed at building flexible and effective AT plans that prevent terrorist attacks.

- Independent of a traditional fixed installation (no perimeter fencing or access control point).

- Associated with the surrounding community (located in the heart of the city or town and often required to blend aesthetically with surrounding buildings and infrastructure).

- Single or multiple buildings for responsibility.

- Support for primarily civilian employees.

- Multiple contracts for routine functions.

- Memorandum of understanding or memorandum of agreement (MOU/MOA) with civilian law enforcement and emergency response.

- Limited control of facility(s) (often shared with other agencies or Services).

- Many share buildings with other activities or organizations (such as DoD agencies or state organizations). No depth for defensive measures (leased property, often within strip malls). Having no direct control over property for extending the perimeter to achieve standoff.

- Limited or nonexistent assigned emergency response capability.

- Limited full-time manpower.

- Requires alternative interpretation of standard FPCON implementation.

- Missions dependent upon facility functioning.

- Frequently limited plans for continuity of operations.

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[6]   Taken from *Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan*, Phase II, "Tempering the Weapon," 10 March 2009 (revised 1 August 2009), page 9.

- Often lack SIPRNET and are unable to electronically receive or review classified threat information.

- Frequently do not meet Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) standards.

- Limited area of operations.

- Correspondingly large area of interest.

- No organic intelligence capability.

- Limited or no access to weapons.

- Demands a unique interpretation of AT standards.

- Leased facilities with multiple organizations (DoD and/or non-DoD).

- Government-owned facility.

- Public and private universities.

- Varying number of occupants, ownership, and command and control.

- Critical nodes.

- Unique, nontraditional missions.

- Not routinely manned on weekends or after normal duty hours.

- In many cases, house units with a chain of command different from the one managing the SAF.

This list indicates the difficulty in writing TTP that apply to all SAFs. It emphasizes the absolute requirements for situational application of all principles expressed in the Handbook.

2

Chapter 3. Planning

"The order must clearly express the will of the leader and must fit the situation." "Infantry in Battle," 1939

Section 1. AT Task 1: Establish an AT Program

Objective: Army policy requires all installations, units, and SAFs to have an AT program. Having protective measures focused on preventing or responding to a terrorist attack supports leader responsibilities to protect people and missions.

Challenge: As described in Chapter 1, SAFs' lack of protection capability and inextricable association with communities demand creative solutions.

Developing an AT program represents the first step for any ATO or AT focal point. Each AT program regardless of type must conform to the applicable AT Standards found in AR 525-13. The standards may have meaning only in the context of the situation. But they must be understood by the entire organization, including tenant units and assigned organizations. The eight standards that apply to establishing the program also supply the framework and foundation for building. Without these fundamentals the program cannot effectively plan and execute the necessary AT measures.

FM 3-37.2 describes the military decision-making process that leaders can use to develop options as it applies to AT-related problems. SAF leaders should apply a similar process in developing their own unique AT plans.

Becoming a target depends upon decisions made by prospective terrorists. AT programs provide a proactive strategy that emphasizes preparedness to defeat or deter any form of terrorist attack. The same principles[7] apply to accomplish this task at traditional installations, large Army units, or SAFs. Those principles provide the building blocks for AT programs in any environment and situation.

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[7] Principles found in FM 3-37.2, Antiterrorism, February 2011, pages 3-4.

AT integrates a variety of existing requirements, functions, systems, and programs. The AT plan is built on regulatory guidance and should include elements of the physical security, safety, operations security, and threat awareness and reporting programs that, together, combine to provide commanders with the foundation for developing an integrated and functional AT plan or program for preventing a terrorist attack.

Standard 1. AT program elements

SAF AT programs must include the five elements of any program: risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource application, and comprehensive program review. This applies to SAFs just as it does to programs guiding any Army situation and unit. Moreover, any given program must consider changes over time to improve protective measures and respond to changes in the environment with special consideration for prospective terrorist methods.

For SAF, these three fundamentals apply:

1. AT standards apply to SAFs in varying degrees. ATO and other staff members determine the exact application according to the situation. A mission analysis and vulnerability assessment (VA) is the first step in determining how standards can be implemented prior to developing a site-specific AT Plan.

2. Intelligence and information form the basis for decisions in any program. SAFs may not have a formal intelligence structure but must have a focal point for information. Nontraditional sources of threat intelligence must provide at least enough analysis to allow leaders to make decisions regarding necessary protective measures.

3. Successful programs include participation through the entire chain of command. HHQ participation in the overall program is critical to success at all levels. SAFs must seek guidance from HHQ to ensure effective and consistent reporting and support. Annual VAs are a necessity for any SAF.

> **Standard 1. Assessment consideration:**
> Does the SAF leader or ATO address risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource application, and program reviews in the SAF written AT Plan?

Standard 7. AT plan

AT Plans have two purposes. They provide guidance for standard and routine security procedures, and they set a basis for emergency actions in response to imminent threat of terrorist attack. All AT programs include the requirement to execute these plans. The challenge for SAFs is to accommodate the unique aspects of the facility. At least five elements may impede planning: manpower, experience, distance from the HHQ, resources available, and operating environment.

Often, lack of available manpower makes planning difficult. In many cases, where the facility is routinely manned by small numbers, the plan can be an annex of an HHQ plan or even, with agreement, of a nearby installation's plan. It need only include those elements necessary for that facility and be available to SAF personnel. Using prescribed formats can sometimes lead to a more robust plan than necessary. This Handbook will help determine planning requirements.

Lack of experience can also slow planning. Attending Level II AT Training provides basic skills in AT planning but may not be completely sufficient for a SAF ATO. The Army ATEP on Army Knowledge Online includes additional tips for planning, including the latest doctrinal manual and TTP publications.

Even though HHQ may reside some distance from the SAF, it should assign the minimum elements for the plan(s). This guidance will include specific direction and elaboration of Army and combatant command policies. Some considerations could be coordination with nearby Army (or other Service) installations, links with information sources such as local law enforcement, and access control procedures. The key is that the plan(s) must accept the unique needs according to the circumstances on site.

Facility leaders or commanders can determine the proper format for the AT Plan. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) or operations orders are most common. Some form of matrix can suffice, but commands and facilities should select the format most effective in distributing information and facilitating the required action.

The plan should be integrated in SAF exercises and reviewed periodically for continued applicability to threat and friendly situations.

> **Standard 7. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Does the SAF have a written AT Plan?

Standard 8. AT program coordination (see also AT Task 6, Standard 8)

Coordination represents the most critical element of building an effective SAF AT program. The ties with local organizations will assist SAF leaders in collecting information necessary to make decisions regarding appropriate protective measures. Information is the key. The chart below indicates some possible considerations for coordination.

Organization	Possible Assistance
Local law enforcement	Current local threat information; changes to the surrounding environment; many of these can be accessed online after application and approval
Local FBI	Current local threat information
902nd Military Intelligence Group	Regional threat information
Criminal Investigation Command office	Local threat
Nearby installation (all Services)	FPCON changes, threats, exercises, assistance
State Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)	Threat; exercises
Contract security guards on facility	Changes in instructions or observations
Mall security	Current situation or changes to the environment
U.S. Park Police	Threat
Local Army National Guard facilities	Coordination; support
Local Reserve facilities	Coordination; support
Other Services	Share threat information and situational awareness
Local Corps of Engineers facilities	Threats and coordination

Organization	Possible Assistance
Local medical facilities	Medical threat
Local vendors	Situational awareness
FEMA Region Training Coordinators	Crisis and consequence planning incident support

Some of the potential advantages of effective communication are timely changes to FPCONs at nearby installations, updated local threat info, and perhaps material assistance in managing necessary protective measures.

Standard 8. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have a formal updated list of supporting points of contact (POCs) for coordinating issues?

Standard 9. AT officer

A designated focal point for AT-related information flow expedites planning and assists the SAF leader during the decision-making process. A certified ATO, assigned on orders, can provide that focal point. For SAFs where policy does not require a certified ATO, SAF leaders should still assign an AT focal point or POC. Doing so facilitates information sharing and gives external organizations a consistent POC. SAF leaders should consider an alternative AT POC as well. Information sharing must be consistent. Even a short absence of an AT POC could give the impression that the SAF leaders are no longer interested in a continuing relationship.

In some cases policy does not require certification as an ATO. However, this should not deter a SAF leader from assigning at least one person in that role in order to facilitate terrorism-related information sharing. In some instances SAFs that have no policy requirements for an actual ATO position designate it an "AT POC." As an additional duty, that individual can obtain specific training from the local installation ATO or tap into some opportunities via ATEP.

Note: If an ATO position is warranted, place a formal request and be persistent. Provide justification based on the threat environment, mission requirements, criticality of assets, and upcoming events such as assuming AT duties for host unit deployments.

Standard 9. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have an assigned ATO or AT POC?

Standard 10. AT working group (ATWG)

Army policy directs the specific requirement for a SAF ATWG. Those SAFs with fewer than 300 personnel must still execute the function of the ATWG.[8] The purpose of the ATWG is to "oversee the implementation of the AT program, to develop and refine AT plans, and address emergent or emergency AT program issues." To execute this function, the SAF may not have to maintain an independent ATWG, but the requirement remains.

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[8]   AR 525-13, "Antiterrorism," para 5-11, page ____.

The function can often be integrated with routine command and staff meetings. In some cases, the function of ATWG information sharing can be integrated with other local Army installations or civilian agencies. Whether the SAF conducts its own discrete ATWG or integrates with another meeting, the critical objective is to ensure that the SAF has up-to-date threat info, tracks AT-related shortfalls, and plans for dissemination of requisite information. The ATWG is a vehicle for ensuring that AT principles are incorporated into planning efforts and a vital tool for managing and sustaining the SAF AT Plan.

The SAF ATO should participate in the ATWG of higher headquarters. The agenda below suggests the type of information that ATWG or integrated ATWG should cover.

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Possible Agenda for ATWG-Type Info
• Update on threat assessment
• Review of progress on tasks assigned at the last meeting
• Training status—Level I, area of responsibility (AOR), Level II, etc.
• Review of priorities and future events
• Changes to FPCON status or other protective measures (RAM)
• Plans for AT-related exercises, special events, change of command, holiday periods
• Review of guidance from HHQ
• Tasks for future progress
• Review recent AT and force protection–related incident reports from the SAF or HHQ
• Discuss upcoming and completed VAs (higher or Internal requirements)
• Upcoming and completed physical security inspections
• Changes to unit ATO or law enforcement liaison local response POCs
• Address higher regulatory reporting requirements established by operation orders and command guidance

How SAFs execute the ATWG function should be codified in the facility SOPs. Moreover, a written record of the meeting results will help guide subsequent ATWGs and allow new personnel to understand the evolution of the AT Plan.

Although many SAFs do not require an ATWG, regulatory requirements apply to HHQ. The SAF POC should make an effort to attend the HHQ ATWG in person or virtually as distance, cost, and time constraints allow.

Fundamentally SAF ATWGs should consider substance rather than name for the ATWG. By executing the ATWG function, SAFs will improve their AT program.

> **Standard 10. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Has the SAF conducted an ATWG in the format designated in the AT Plan?

3

Standard 12. AT executive committee (ATEC)

Army AT policy does not require SAF leaders to conduct a discrete ATEC.[9] But the concept is important, and applying the principle can provide the guidance necessary to a cohesive AT program.

The ATEC concept is nothing more than leader involvement in the program. Providing the SAF leader with an opportunity to review the status and progress of the SAF AT program can be accomplished without traditional prescribed meetings. Most SAF HHQ conduct ATEC meetings. SAF leader participation in the HHQ ATEC links the SAF leader to the larger program, clarifies HHQ guidance, allows for information sharing, and facilitates timely support. SAF participation in the HHQ ATEC provides a substantial support structure for a resource-constrained SAF.

Although there is no policy requirement for a SAF, the leaders may choose to receive and convey AT-related information and direction in routine meetings of SAF personnel. Most do not have sufficient resources to conduct a traditional ATEC complete with functional staff members. Moreover, SAF leaders will normally conduct their version of an ATEC in conjunction with routine or periodic "command and staff" meetings. That fundamental principle ensures an active AT program. In terms of current television advertisements, this may be called ATEC-light. SAF leaders must tailor an ATEC-light to fit their particular situation. This integration should not suggest random meetings or information passed sporadically. The SAF should include ATEC-light on its long-range planning calendar, assigning the concept and the meeting with which it will be integrated.

Some information SAF leaders can consider for ATEC-light guidance:

- Review threats (current and future)

- Review ATWG recommendations

- Issue guidance for continued progress

- Track indicators of an effective program (that is, Level I AT training, ATO training, assessment results, POC listing for local coordination, etc.)

- Senior leaders' command emphasis

- Serve as a platform for identifying and solving issues involving multiple commands or jurisdiction issues that affect SAF AT efforts (for example, Title 10 verse Title 31)

- Address AT funding priorities and resource requirements

Standard 30. AT resource requirements

Executing and maintaining an effective AT program depends, to a large extent, on adequate resources such as funding, personnel, and material. As Army AT policy indicates, this is executed

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[9]   AR 525-13, "Antiterrorism," Appendix_____.

through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. Guidance from HHQ will determine timelines to accommodate this. The SAF ATO or AT focal point must document resource requirements and forward them to the next HHQ. In addition to providing a basis to mitigate AT shortfalls, the "list" informs or reminds HHQ of existing shortfalls at the SAF.

It is important to submit requirements in a form that indicates all associated costs.[10] Most Army funding for antiterrorism falls in four HQDA Management Decision Packages (MDEP). A short explanation of the MDEP and requirements that are funded by each MDEP are listed below:

VTER: Provides resources for AT program management (personnel), AT training and awareness, protection for high risk personnel, AT-related assessments, intelligence support to AT, AT exercises, FPCON system support, and random AT measures.

QLPR: Provide resources for law enforcement (LE) activities/services provide for the protection of people and property, enforcement of laws, and maintenance of order. QLPR MDEP covers, but is not limited to; all personnel and operating costs associated with LE operations, salaries, overtime, benefits, material and supplies, equipment, vehicles leases (special LE Mission /MWD Support when GSA vehicles are not available), training and management for LE response forces (Department of the Army Civilian Police (DACP) and military police (MP)).

QPSM: Provides resources for Army physical security programs, access control, and equipment to protect personnel, assets, facilities, and installations at moderate risk to the Army mission. This program procures and sustains equipment to include barriers, blast mitigation devices, communication systems, explosive detection devices, intrusion detection systems, personal protection, and sensors. It also provides for site improvements, management/planning, and security forces and technicians.

VIPP: Resources an integrated emergency management program to provide emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery assets and services to protect Soldiers civilians, and their families from all hazards, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) incidents.

Although PPBE represents the fundamental resourcing process, SAFs frequently are constrained by location, size, and other circumstances that make it unlikely that all AT shortfalls can be mitigated by funding from Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA).

To overcome this shortfall, the first step is still to determine what resources will contribute to building and sustaining the SAF AT program. That determination occurs during HHQ assessments, exercises, execution of RAM, and direction from HHQ. Participation in community exercises, for example, could help determine resources necessary for a particular

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
[10]   The VTER Requirements Handbook assist the SAF ATO or AT focal point by providing detailed guidance for submitting AT requirements

AT program. It is important to maintain a record of these instances for use during resource development processes.

The PPBE process occurs annually. But often resources are available from other sources, such as

- HHQ

- Facility owners

- Civilian communities (for example, barriers)

- U.S. Government realty agents (through the chain of command)

- Regional Support Commands

- Core VA Management Program (CVAMP) input and the command AT resource prioritization process

Some examples of mitigating funding shortfalls:

- Participation in community exercises to replace funding for a discrete annual AT exercise

- Use of community training opportunities that build upon formal Army training requirements

- Using an MOU/MOA with a community for barriers

- Coordinating with local law enforcement for routine patrols to help after-hours security

Legal considerations may constrain use and sharing of resources. Ensure a legal review before decisions are made.

> **Standard 30. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Does the SAF maintain a list of requirements for funding?

Standard 34. Terrorist threat and/or incident reporting

HHQ provides requirements for reporting. All combatant command AOR requirements are built into HHQ procedures.

Terrorist threat and/or incident reporting is composed of three types of reports.[11] The threat report indicates the possibility of a threat. It represents credible information concerning an imminent, planned terrorist attack. This type of report will generate consideration for a change in FPCONs. Incident response planning will provide the basis for effective and immediate adjustment as the situation demands.

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[11]   HHQ procedures will define SAF report formats and requirements.

If the SAF leader becomes aware of a known or suspected terrorist attack, then the date, time, location, and nature of the attack should be reported through HHQ.

Notes to prepare SAF for effective reporting include these:

- Stress the importance of terrorist threat reporting and terrorist incident reporting

- Coordinate requirements to HHQ for commanders' critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs)

- Determine the reporting sequence and chain (military and civilian)

  - Chain of command

  - Federal, state, and local law enforcement

  - Coordinate with all nearby DoD activities

- Develop a minimum distribution list

- Exercise the reporting system in conjunction with HHQ

- Include terrorist incidents on a serious incident report

- Build reporting requirements into AT SAF procedures[12]

- Ensure that a procedure for reporting suspicious activity is developed not only between SAF and law enforcement organizations (for immediate response) and higher HQ, but laterally within the SAF to ensure that all tenant units are informed

- Consideration must be given to how information is reported and exchanged when different Services or commands are present in the SAF

Standard 34. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF AT Plan have formats for AT-related reporting?

Section 2. AT Task 2: Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Threat and Intelligence Information

Objective: AT programs must have supporting systems that provide information necessary for leaders to make AT-related decisions.

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[12]   For information, Army-required reports are delineated in AR 525-13, Appendix C. DoD directs use of the "Blue Dart Threat Warning Procedures" format expressed in Army Service component commander instructions. The exercise version of that is "White Pinnacle/Blue Dart." HHQ will convey the necessary elements to SAF leaders through normal chain of command instructions.

Challenge: SAFs often have no inherent intelligence or information collection capability. Developing a system to execute the collection requirement relies on building relationships based on mutual trust and understanding between SAF personnel and local law enforcement and regional intelligence centers.

Standard 2. Intelligence support to the AT program

In most cases, SAFs have no organic intelligence capability. Establishing and maintaining information-sharing relationships with outside organizations provides timely threat information, paying dividends for the entire organization. In the past, ATOs typically received intelligence that was too general and not specific to the ATO's location or region. With the establishment of state and regional fusion and intelligence centers, ATOs can request and receive local time-sensitive threat and intelligence information, meet command intelligence requirements, obtain local threat assessments, and enlist support in preparation for mobilization. These nontraditional sources of threat intelligence form the basis for AT planning. (For examples, see Appendix B.)

By establishing and maintaining local intelligence contacts and support, the SAF ATO ensures continuity and prevents constant gaps in collection. Since email frequently supplies the framework of communication, using a "group" email will support continuous information sharing with the various liaison contacts. Access to law enforcement intelligence information can require additional security measures and an awareness by the command of the different types of information messages (For Official Use Only, Law Enforcement Sensitive–For Information Purposes Only) and handling requirements. Examples of typical information provided are alerts, advisories, "be on the lookout" notices, requests for information, and officer safety bulletins. Caution must be applied: Information-handling mistakes could have an adverse affect on the SAF and intelligence center's relationship or jeopardize an ongoing investigation and result in the public release of sensitive or private information.

- Prior to establishing relationships with outside organizations, create a group email for the SAF that includes the HHQ ATO; using a group email to correspond with and receive products from all outside organizations will ensure that all members of the unit, along with your HHQ ATO, receive timely, area-specific threat information regardless of whether the ATO is present. The email should be updated with assigned frequency according to the AT Plan.

- Every state has at least one fusion center, and some have several; there are also regional fusion centers that can be leveraged. Establishing a relationship with multiple organizations will ensure that the SAF leader obtains the necessary information to protect the organization and assemble the SAF local threat assessments. Many law enforcement intelligence centers have Regional Watch Programs or terrorist reporting procedures posted on their websites. These are useful tools that can add to the level of awareness and level of protection provided to the SAF. Additionally, it is best to make the initial meetings in person and to communicate SAF intelligence requirements and purpose. Human nature is a factor that applies to all relationships. Individuals are more likely to respond after meeting face to face rather than receiving a request online or receiving an

MOA or MOU through the mail. As this implies, the sources of SAF information will likely ask the same "sharing" of information gathered by the SAF in return.

- Businesses and organizations adjacent to or near the SAF often provide information as well. If, for example, the SAF is located in a strip mall, create a relationship with the business owners and their employees. Commercial, other military, and government personnel are force multipliers; the SAF leader or ATO can sensitize them to the necessity for reporting and sharing observations of suspicious activity. "Every soldier a sensor" is a phrase-reminder that every person, not just soldiers, has something to add to the threat and intelligence picture; that said, SAF leaders may help guide civilian neighbors on what to look for and how to report it.

- Other force protection personnel in your area may also improve the SAF networking efforts. At recruiting stations, for example, frequently the Army is collocated with other military recruiters. The same may be true for nearby installations whatever the Service. Working together with the other Services, sharing liaison points of contact, and meeting jointly with outside organizations and co-located tenants will foster cooperation and information sharing among organizations.

- For rapid response or immediate assistance, the most important liaison officer contact is the one established with local law enforcement. SAF ATOs can get area-specific information and statistics by networking with local law enforcement. Additionally, law enforcement officials are generally connected with the fusion centers and JTTF field offices. In many cases, the local police department contact can provide an introduction to key information-sharing contacts.

Example: The Army Corps of Engineers Administrative Offices comprise 300 to 1,000 personnel. Field offices comprise 5 to 25 personnel. Neither the administrative nor the field offices are located on military installations; the administrative offices are located in space owned by the Army, owned by the Federal Government (General Services Administration), or leased commercially by the General Services Administration. The field offices are normally embedded within the community. Army Corps of Engineers security elements at all locations are required to establish liaison relationships with the law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies in their AOR, at all levels of government. Examples are local and state police, the FBI, the JTTF, the Federal Protective Service, the closest military installation, military intelligence (any nearby military Service), the nearest Criminal Investigation Command, Air Force Office of Special Investigations and Naval Criminal Investigative Service offices, and the state fusion centers. Additionally, when located in a multi-tenant facility, whether it is owned by the General Services Administration or is in commercially leased office space, the organization is a member of the Building Inter-Agency Security Council, which is composed of personnel representing the security interests of other co-located agencies. This allows for the receipt of intelligence information from the security representatives of other tenants in the facility—other federal agencies, state or local government agencies, and/or private-sector companies or corporations.

Note: SAF leaders must have a clear understanding of the parameters regarding distribution of Law Enforcement Sensitive information. A violation of those parameters could damage the relationship with the providing source.

Suspicious Activity Reporting

There are documented instances in which SAFs in proximity to each other did not share a suspicious activity report. Incidents like this illustrate the importance of establishing procedures to ensure that information is shared locally. There have also been instances in which a shared report was subsequently entered into eGuardian by two Services located close to each other.

To facilitate the timely reporting and sharing of suspicious activity reports, establish an email distribution list to be used exclusively for sending SAF suspicious activity reporting. The distribution list should include SAF personnel, collocated tenants, HHQ, local law enforcement with eGuardian access, and local civilian law enforcement and the fusion center. Law enforcement with eGuardian access may include the local installation Provost Marshal's office or Department of Emergency Services; if not, reports should be sent to a servicing Criminal Investigation Command office. Finally, a distribution that all office members can access and use may ensure that suspicious activity reporting is properly disseminated in your absence. As required by HQDA ALARACT message 145/2011 - EXORD 171-11 Law Enforcement Suspicious Activity Reporting, suspicious activity reporting must be forwarded to the nearest law enforcement entity with eGuardian access.

The importance of establishing a personal relationship with an Intelligence Fusion Center analyst cannot be overstated. Even though information is submitted through eGuardian, the time between validating, inputting, and dissemination (up to 24 hours) could be the difference between initiating actions to successfully mitigate the event or becoming the victim of a terrorist attack. Having a well-developed relationship often results in receiving an after-duty phone call or other "above and beyond the ordinary" efforts taken to contact and inform the SAF representative of a developing situation or threat.

- Most ATOs add themselves to a variety of distribution lists in order to receive threat warnings and products that are mailed out daily by the Homeland Security Department, fusion centers, HHQ, etc.; keeping up on the HHQ's PIRs will help the ATO or AT POC identify the incidents and products that pertain to the HHQ's PIRs. Forward PIR-relevant material to your HHQ for situational awareness, and save those items in a folder to be used for the local or annual threat assessment along with other products that apply. When coordinating with the Fusion Centers, provide a list of PIRs and commanders' critical information requirements and/or action trigger points for immediate contact and dissemination to the unit POC. When informed of the specific requirements, most Fusion Centers will go to great lengths to keep military SAFs included in the information process.

- When reviewing information received via intelligence and law enforcement contacts, look for patterns or trends in criminal or suspicious activity reporting. There are several documented instances in which, for example, TTP used at one base or on one individual are later observed at another, separate location. If or when you think you've identified a pattern or trend, share your observation with your HHQ and your intelligence and law enforcement contacts. Remember, immediate reporting procedures and follow-on guidance must be clearly understood and followed by all tenants and SAF occupants. Suspicious activity reporting is a critical step in AT planning and high on the list of SAF immediate action drills and exercises.

Standard 2. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have a focal point to receive and share AT-related information?

Standard 4. Terrorism threat assessment

A local threat assessment or statement is an annual requirement of the Army AT Program. In the past, most were nonspecific, with fill-in-the-blank templates. These provided little practical help to SAF leaders in their AT programs. With the advent of state fusion centers and the integration of Criminal Intelligence Analysts in all FBI offices and most police departments, the situation has improved. ATOs have begun obtaining these local threat assessments and information from local, state, and federal and law enforcement offices and fusion centers. This emerging resource varies from region to region, depending on the resources (personnel) and level of cooperation between the units and law enforcement organizations. Making the effort to locate these products will ultimately conserve time and effort. That said, success in receiving support from any external organization depends on developing and maintaining a good working relationship and ensuring that, as much as possible, the information sharing goes both ways.

Example: ATOs were conducting a pre-deployment VA of a hotel when a police officer pulled up. The officer asked the ATOs what they were doing and the ATOs explained. The officer then offered to help them by providing a briefing to them detailing the incidents and crime in the area. Lesson learned: when planning an assessment, contact the first responders in the area to learn whether they can provide similar assistance.

Standard 4. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have a threat assessment of its area on hand?

Standard 11. Threat working group (TWG)

For many ATOs servicing SAFs, there is no requirement to activate a TWG. However, it may be beneficial to ensure the functions of a TWG.

- Rather than creating a TWG, something like a neighborhood watch group may be more fitting for an SAF. Often SAFs are located in a building shared with a variety of tenants,

such as DoD and Federal organizations and commercial interests, and access is controlled to part of the building by contract security guards. In that case gathering representatives from the other organizations, including the commercial business owners, and supervisory contract security guards quarterly may prove valuable. Gathering in this manner provides all concerned with the opportunity to discuss security and protection issues, share liaison contact information and best practices, develop a consensus on implementing RAM, and offer informal training on how to recognize surveillance and report suspicious activity. The meetings provide the opportunity to become more knowledgeable, work together, and tackle issues that could otherwise derail efforts to protect personnel and assets from terrorism.

- Another alternative to executing a TWG is to join TWGs conducted by other organizations in the area. Established relationships with your fusion centers, the FBI field office, the Homeland Security Department, local law enforcement, and the other military in your area let SAF leaders address mutually concerning local threats.

Example 1: An ATO working at an Army SAF in Florida attends monthly working groups at his local JTTF and MacDill Air Force Base's force protection working groups. Additionally, the ATO works closely with local law enforcement, the state fusion center, and the Central Florida Intelligence Exchange to gather the local threat picture. This ATO also conducts his own TWG and ATWGs together with collocated tenant units, his facility manager, and representatives from the Air Force, Navy, Marines, FBI, and Central Florida Intelligence Exchange.

Example 2: An ATO working in the Northwest has found that the best way to establish an information-sharing relationship is to identify the organizations that might share information contributing to a SAF threat assessment. Meeting with leaders of those organizations to explain the goals and requirements of the SAF AT Program and illustrate how cooperation and even combined training (conducting exercises, etc.) can benefit both parties. This ATO cautions that when working with outside organizations, it is imperative that procedures for handling information received from these organizations be clearly delineated before dissemination. This is necessary to avoid the mishandling and/or leaking of information that could damage or destroy the liaison relationship.

> **Standard 11. Assessment consideration:**
> How does the SAF leader or ATO incorporate principles of a TWG?

Standard 22. FPCON measures (see AT Task 5)

Section 3. AT Task 7: Terrorist Threat Incident Response Planning

Objective: All Army organizations must develop both procedural actions and plans associated with an immediate and identified threat.

Challenge: A SAF AT Plan must address both procedures and operations plans, avoiding confusion between everyday routine and emergency requirements. The former may be likened

to traditional SOPs, while the latter is more appropriate for an operations order format. Both concepts may be embedded in the "AT Plan," but the two scenarios should be formatted for their practical use.

Standard 20. Terrorist threat incident response planning

There are many considerations when planning for actual response to a terrorist threat. Presumably, in the event, the SAF would have a specific report defining the actual threat. This will drive the actions based on the specified threat as adjustments to standard procedures.

FPCON measures represent the foundation for quick response. That gives emphasis to ensuring that those measures are current, applicable to the SAF, coordinated with necessary agencies, and familiar to SAF personnel. SAF leaders should include review of these procedures during annual and periodic assessments. A matrix format might suffice for most small SAFs. The example under Standard 27 indicates a possible format and some considerations for measures at higher FPCON levels.

FPCON measures must be site specific. SAF leaders should keep the actual measure as an assigned task but not include it in the SAF site plan if it is impossible to implement. For example, when required to increase standoff and you have no authority or control over the adjacent area or assets, consider other mitigation. If during the AT planning phase or while conducting a VA, identify the lack of standoff as an issue, submit the waiver request through channels, and ensure that HHQ is aware of the problem. Most important, the command is still required to develop and implement a measure or procedure or to acknowledge the action to replace the original, ensuring mitigation of the threat.

It is important that the SAF leaders rehearse the series of actions through exercises and drills to facilitate operations in the event of an emergency. It should cover both pre-event and post-event activities. Some considerations for terrorist threat and/or incident response (TTIR) planning:

- Ensure easy access to plans related to the threat

- Establish procedures for accountability of personnel, using the Army Disaster Personnel Accountability and Assessment System (a method for the Army to account for, assess, manage, and monitor the recovery process for personnel and their families affected and/or scattered by a widespread catastrophe). The system provides valuable information to all levels of the Army chain of command, allowing commanders to make strategic decisions that facilitate a return to stability.

- Review the local written plan and SOPs (situational response)

- Develop a Crisis Action Team Plan

- Anticipate a rapid fragmentary order as necessary

- Exercise the TTIR plan

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- Conduct a post-exercise after-action review (AAR), tracking corrective actions

- Exercise the MOA/MOU

- Plan for continuity of operations

- Prepare for damage assessment

- Practice reporting requirements (HHQ, nearby "partners")

  - Prospective or imminent threat

  - Terrorist incidents

- Evaluate sheltering in place versus moving operations to another location at higher FPCON levels

- Exercise communications—mass notification (threat info), including contractors and family members as applicable

- Create a desk reference for responses (checklist)

- Develop an evacuation plan

- Consider potential threats that might drive FPCON change

- Combine various plans (for example, physical security and AT)

- Determine the best format: SOP vs. operation order

- Practice response to an active shooter and insider threat

- Maintain a link for notification and awareness of the SAF community as events unfold

- Plan to capture resource expenditures to ensure clear understanding of requirements

- Ensure that requirements are conveyed to HHQ in annual budget requests

- Identify how long higher FPCON can be sustained

- Evaluate the effect on operations and training

Standard 20. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have a TTIR Plan?

Standard 21. Terrorism consequence management measures

This standard bears close association with Standard 20. The distinction is that this standard is designed to cover response to an actual terrorist attack that has already occurred. Effective response preparations will help reduce the impact and facilitate return to normal operations.

Additional considerations for response:

- Flexibility—consider possible events with response requirements

- MOA/MOU

- Incorporate risk management

- Include all operational environments

- Public affairs guidance and response

- National Incident Management System if applicable

- Identification of local shelters if needed (Ready Army)

Standard 21. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have an incident response plan?

3

Chapter 4. Evaluating

"He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils for time is the greatest innovator."
Francis Bacon, Essay, "On Innovation," 1597

Section 1. AT Task 3: Assess and Reduce Critical Vulnerabilities (Conduct AT Assessments)

Objective: The ultimate goal is to prevent a terrorist attack. It is a tactical problem. Assessments shape the foundation for providing a solution. They estimate the potential threat against the friendly situation. Assessments form the essential elements of the friendly situation and, when coupled with the threat, allow leaders to judge risk when applying resources. An inactive assessment program will provide a static situation, allowing prospective terrorists plenty of planning time and increasing the possibility of a successful attack.

Challenge: Manpower, insufficient expertise, and time may represent the biggest challenges for SAFs in conducting assessments. As with most SAF concerns, successful assessments depend upon effective coordination and disciplined planning.

Standard 3. AT risk management

Risk management is the process to contrast enemy and friendly situations. It posits prospective threat courses of action developed in Chapter 3 against the SAF mission(s). It is a cyclic process that is used to continuously identify and assess hazards, develop and implement controls, and evaluate outcomes.

For this process to become successful for SAF, the SAF leader must formalize expectations in the SAF AT Plan. Those procedures must include the threat assessment, criticality assessment, and VA. The following characteristics suggest the critical elements of risk management for SAF leaders:

- Commander or senior representative must approve the assessment

- Site-specific assessment process

- Integrate into the HHQ risk management process

- Apply the risk management process to determine those assets most critical to the SAF mission

- Wargame potential terrorist threats against prospective SAF courses of action

- Risk management drives the AT plan

4

Standard 3. Assessment consideration:

Has the SAF leader or ATO conducted wargaming against possible terrorist threats?

Standard 5. Criticality assessment

A criticality assessment identifies, classifies, and prioritizes mission-essential assets, facilities, resources, and personnel. As an example, this critical assessment list could include specific facilities in a larger complex or even people with low-density, high-demand skills. SAF leaders must execute this assessment according to each unique situation. This list enables the leader to make decisions, request additional resources, and eventually determine where to accept risk. The site-specific list can be as long as necessary, with the understanding that the leader's priorities and capabilities will determine how AT protective measures will be applied.

SAF critical assets must be integrated with those of HHQ but not constrained by them. Moreover, SAF critical assets should orient first to those elements that sustain the SAF mission.

For some SAF leaders, critical elements may include assets not fully under control of the leader's authority. Some assets contribute to the SAF mission but are owned by another organization. This demands careful integration of responsibilities and priorities. This will require HHQ approval and coordination with the asset owner to ensure that the critical asset receives the proper consideration for AT protection.

FM 3-37.2 delineates specific formats that might assist SAFs in developing critical assets lists.[13] Those assessment formats will aid in evaluating criteria to determine and compare criticality. Some criticality criteria are the importance of the asset, effect of terrorist attack, potential for recovery, relationship of the facility to the mission, potential for substituting the facility, and possibility and speed of repair. Whatever the SAF leader determines should result in a prioritization of listed assets. The prioritized list can help when later building site-specific FPCON measures in support of the SAF mission and personnel.

Standard 5. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have a critical assets list?

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[13]   FM 3-37.1, *Antiterrorism*, February 2011, page 5-3.

Standard 6. Vulnerability assessment

VAs provide a "vulnerability-based analysis of mission-essential assets, resources, and personnel that are susceptible to terrorist attack." Every SAF, regardless of size or situation, must have a periodic VA as directed by Army policy. It may be that the VA is a part of another, larger organization's assessment. Practically, the SAF leader will not know the vulnerabilities without it.

VAs determine potential weaknesses. They can be conducted for an organization, facility, special event, exercise, or network. And, while the results suggest weaknesses, more important, they identify areas necessary for improved protection.

The unique aspects of each SAF drive the best method to conduct a VA. The policy requirement does not demand a specific formula. Moreover, policy requires that a VA be conducted; format and timing are the SAF leader's responsibility. One possible format and methodology for executing a VA is found in FM 3-37.2.[14] This comprehensive format may serve as a guide in SAFs where all the benchmarks may not apply. SAFs, regardless of size, should have a VA on record. For reasons mentioned in Chapter 1, SAFs may require assistance in conducting the VA. HHQ or nearby Army installations may assist.

The completed VA is the basis for developing a course of action to develop AT protective measures. Tracking the shortfalls identified during the VA in ATWG and ATEC is a critical component of the process.

> **Standard 6. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Has the SAF leader or ATO conducted a vulnerability assessment?

Standard 31. Comprehensive program review

An AT plan contains all the specific measures taken to establish and maintain an AT program that meets Army standards. The target of a program review: evaluate all aspects of the SAF AT program.

Program reviews evaluate the effectiveness and adequacy of the SAF AT programs. They determine the ability to protect personnel, information, and critical resources. And, although SAF leaders may not be required to have formal program review teams,[15] the concept of evaluating the AT program is indispensible to effective, timely implementation of AT measures.

In fact, other functional programs, such as physical security and operations security, have a similar goal. SAF program reviews can often be combined with one of these programs.

Formats for conducting a program review can differ according to the situation. Army policy provides a "Management Control Checklist"[16] that provides a base to develop a unique SAF program review checklist. Besides a separate SAF program review, SAF leaders might consider fitting the program review into the organization's Command Inspection Program. In the case of

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[14]   Ibid., page E-7.
[15]   Army Regulation 525-13, "Antiterrorism," 11 September 2008, page 9.
[16]   Ibid., page 43.

smaller SAFs, HHQ program reviews may incorporate the SAF AT program review along with other functions.

The pitfall inherent in using other programs as the format for an AT program review is the possibility of emphasizing something other than AT. The program review checklist for AT should be formalized in the AT Plan and used accordingly.

Although formal program reviews are required only of "SAF populated by 300 or more personnel,"[17] all SAFs need a process to evaluate their program that is codified in their AT Plan. SAFs should have the capability of self-assessing the fundamentals of their AT program as expressed in that plan.

4

> **Standard 31. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Has the SAF leader or ATO conducted a program review?

Standard 32. Comprehensive program review teams

SAFs are not required to have formal program review teams (see Appendix A, Army AT Policy Matrix). In most cases, limited manning precludes this. Normally SAF leaders can conduct the necessary program review with organic assets. If a specific expertise is necessary, however, SAF leaders can coordinate for assistance to ensure expert analysis of requisite processes and technical areas. HHQ can help guide the SAF to appropriate assistance where necessary. Nearby installations offer another possibility. Keeping HHQ informed is critical regardless of the approach taken.

SAFs frequently host other organizations within the confines of their facility(s). SAF leaders should ensure that the tenants fulfill required AT measures and, as appropriate, are included in the program reviews.

> **Standard 32. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Does the SAF assess all AT-related functions in program reviews?

Standard 35. Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program

Most SAFs do not have the SIPRNET capability to use CVAMP. However, this does not mean that the results of assessments and exercises do not require entry into CVAMP. HHQ will guide the process and format for manual reporting through the chain of command. In many cases, that format, by design, will facilitate entry into CVAMP at the headquarters level.

There remains the responsibility of the SAF leader to prioritize entries before sending them to higher commanders. Moreover, the concept of CVAMP is a system to track vulnerabilities. SAFs should integrate tracking through their AT planned system of SAF-specific ATWG and ATEC.

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[17]   AR 525-13, paragraph 5-32.

Standard 35. Assessment consideration:

How do the SAF and its HHQ use CVAMP?

Section 2. AT Task 8: Conduct Exercises and Evaluate and Assess AT Plans

Objective: Exercises are the most effective method of testing plans. The evaluations resulting from exercises represent important evaluations of the program and plans that lead to improvements.

Challenge: Many SAFs lack manpower and time to execute plans that truly test AT protective and response measures. Finding the best way to test procedures could require creative solutions to the Army requirement.

Standard 23. AT training and exercises

Exercises provide rehearsals that expedite action in the event of emergencies and identify potential gaps and seams within the plan. SAFs are no different than any other Army enterprise. But for SAFs, manpower, time, and location may constrain how exercises are conducted. In some cases, tabletop or command post exercises may suffice. In others the exercise can be part of the university or community exercise. SAF leaders should receive guidance from HHQ but in many cases will have to decide the best form of exercises based on their own situation.

Training increases readiness. It provides the experience and technical expertise to build and improve the SAF AT program. In addition, SAFs can use training to build relationships with the local community. Frequently civilian agencies such as FEMA offer opportunities that will provide training that emphasizes community coordination and broadens the SAF scope of expertise. Training can become an element addressed at scheduled community coordination meetings. Online courses also provide opportunities.

Technique: When using drills or exercises to assess AT plans, employ the Army's "crawl, walk, run" methodology by testing individuals' skills, testing collective tasks, then conducting the full-scale training event or exercise. Before each drill, conduct a "walk-through, talk-through" to ensure that leaders and key personnel understand critical tasks or special requirements to help identify issues and eliminate shortfalls prior to conducting the exercise.

Army AT policy requires an annual AT exercise. For SAFs this can be accomplished through a specific exercise at the SAF. More often this requirement can be integrated into other exercise requirements locally. Nearby DoD installations or the civilian communities sometimes conduct appropriate exercises sufficient to execute the SAF AT plans.

Practical exercise in reporting and response will provide SAF leaders with evidence of the effectiveness of their AT programs. This can be done in part through notification and response drills. AARs will provide collective knowledge of results.

Part of training is the improvements resulting from the experience. SAF ATO should record results of exercises and actual events and forward them to HHQ for inclusion in CVAMP. SAF

leaders should use the recorded results to track improvements to their programs through ATEC and ATWG.

Additional considerations for conducting exercises:

- Coordinate with all required agencies (including local agencies)

- Define exercise expectations and goals

- Scale to the situation to meet the intent of Army policy and HHQ guidance

- Translate shortfalls into resource requirements

- Schedule on the long-range SAF calendar

- Conduct no-notice exercises

- Include the possibility of an active shooter and insider threat

- Conduct an AAR and record the results

- Track corrective actions

- Track budget requirements and submit them to HHQ

- Integrate where appropriate with community exercises

Standard 23. Assessment consideration:

Has the SAF leader or ATO integrated an AT exercise with all concerned parties (Federal, local, etc.)?

Chapter 5. Executing

"Subordinate commanders provide such additional security as required for their own local protection. The measures adopted are appropriate for the hostile threat. As the danger becomes greater,.., when contact is imminent, security measures are increased." *US Army Field Service Regulations, "Operations," 1941*

Section 1. AT Task 4: Increase Awareness in Every Soldier, Civilian, and Family Member

Objective: Awareness is arguably the most important element of any AT program. It improves actions that can best prevent a terrorist attack and leads to reporting that supports improved measures aimed at preventing an attack.

Challenge: SAF leaders must include awareness in an already full operational schedule. However, training and awareness are critical to successful procedures aimed at protecting people from terrorist attacks.

Standard 16. AT measures for high-risk personnel (training requirements)

This is not normally required of SAFs. If the occasion does arise, a request for high-risk personnel will be directed through the chain of command.

Standard 23. AT training and exercises (see AT Task 8)

Standard 24. Formal AT training

The U.S. Army Military Police School provides formal AT training for prospective ATOs. For most SAF ATOs, the ATO Basic Course will suffice where formal training is required. This is executed primarily by mobile training teams. ATEP carries the schedule for the ATO Basic Course, or requests can be forwarded through the chain of command. AT Level IV training also represents more formal training and will be addressed below.

> **Standard 24. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Does the SAF leader OR ATO take advantage of formal AT training?

Standard 25. Level I AT awareness training.

It is through awareness that SAF leaders collect information leading to improved protection. It is also through awareness that you teach effective response to members of the entire SAF community.

Level I AT training, in a formal sense, is given either by a certified ATO or through web-based training[18] with a link found on ATEP and easily located on the web. This requirement is expressed in the Army policy and is a requirement all Army employees and some contractors and family members. It also directs face-to-face training for all new civilian hires.[19] SAFs should use their own certified ATO to execute this or coordinate for support with HHQ or nearby Army organizations.

Level I AT training does not supply all the necessary AT awareness that SAF leaders will expect from their personnel. Level I training should be supplemented through the Command Information Program. Routine scheduled briefings and/or periodic messages can provide important updates on AT concerns to SAF members. The purpose of these information sessions is to convey elements specific to SAF leaders' concerns. It can incorporate information collected from coordination as discussed above and should improve SAF response and reduce vulnerabilities.

The Army iWatch program is a simple concept similar to a neighborhood watch program. It can be usefully employed even at the smallest SAF. But SAF leaders must build the necessary structure to do so. Common tasks such as providing an iWatch focal point for phoned-in suspicious activity and coordinating with HHQ to pass along the information can start the program. ATEP provides a supply of posters and handouts that can increase awareness and improve chances of finding prospective terrorists before they strike.

An effective awareness program will help avoid complacency. Some considerations for awareness training at SAF:

- Online web-based Level I

- iWatch products on ATEP

- Site-specific base awareness

- Drills and rehearsals

- Training for family members through family support groups or other means

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[18] Link for Level I training: http://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at/.
[19] Slides for this training are located on Army Knowledge Online, ATEP.

- Leverage local command information program

- Local relationships

- Training and Doctrine Command Intelligence Support Activity products provide detailed information on terrorist methods and tactics

- Building teamwork for information collection

- Video teleconferencing as face-to-face training

  - New employee orientation

Standard 25. Assessment consideration:

Has the SAF leader or ATO executed an iWatch program?

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Standard 26. Level II ATO training

Army policy in AR 525-13 directs the requirement for formal ATO training.[20] Some SAFs may be exempt from this requirement based on facility numbers. But, in those cases, the SAF leader should still consider formal AT training. HHQ may determine the requirement. The duties of a formal ATO could reside in HHQ, but an AT focal point will provide necessary collection and distribution for AT-related information. Formalizing this position regardless of name will ensure the proper functioning of AT processes.

HHQ should provide some form of SAF-specific ATO or AT focal point training. This should address the AT requirements and responsibilities for SAF ATOs and leaders.

Even if not required for formal training, there are opportunities that a SAF leader can take advantage of with a smaller investment in time than TDY to the formal course. ATEP offers opportunities to expand AT knowledge. Local ATO Basic Course mobile training teams will often allow assigned SAF AT focal points to attend the course at little expense. Also, the online ATO refresher course (instructions are on ATEP) can update formerly certified ATOs.

SAF leaders should consider the characteristics required for an ATO or an AT focal point. A background in planning and some experience in law enforcement and/or intelligence will provide a good foundation for prospective ATOs. Most other requirements can be taught by the HHQ or the local installation or unit ATO.

Standard 26. Assessment consideration:

Has the SAF leader assigned a certified ATO or an AT focal point?

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[20] The ATO Basic and Advanced Courses are taught by the U.S. Army Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The basic course is taught mostly by mobile training teams around the world. The schedule is posted on ATEP, including contacts for the Military Police School.

Standard 27. Level III pre-command training

Some SAF commanders and leaders will have had some AT training in their pre-command course prior to assuming command of the SAF. This training may have instructed them in concepts specifically oriented to building a SAF plan related to the commander's assignment. In this case the leader will have been instructed in the fundamentals of AT but not the SAF-specific requirements of his assigned position.

Regardless of the formal instruction in pre-command courses, leaders must seek guidance from HHQ in managing their SAF AT programs. The HHQ AT plan and ATEC will provide that guidance for SAF leaders. The assigned SAF ATO or AT focal point can assist by organizing practical ATEC meetings and submitting previous assessment and program review results for the incoming SAF leader review. A written AT Plan will inform the SAF leader of the current program continuity.

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Standard 27. Assessment consideration:

What does the SAF HHQ do to assist in training the SAF leader for AT?

Standard 28. Level IV AT executive seminar

The Level IV Executive Seminar is for SAF leaders in grades O6 to O8 and civilian equivalents. It offers an overview of strategic and operational considerations for AT. Army policy recommends this course for SAF leaders in those grades. Requests for attendance should be forwarded through the chain of command. Priorities for training rest first with the HHQ, then ultimately with HQDA.

Standard 28. Assessment consideration:

Has the HHQ developed a standing list including SAF O6 or above for Level IV training?

Standard 29. AOR-specific training for Army personnel and in-transit forces

Some SAFS are stationed overseas. Others have personnel that travel overseas as a part of their responsibilities. In both cases AOR-specific training is required. The source of the training is the combatant command that commands the AOR. But most often HHQ are expected to have developed the requisite training. In either event, this requirement must be filled before travel.

AOR training creates awareness. It is particularly significant when traveling to restricted or higher-FPCON areas. SAF leave policies should consider this as well as official travel. Some considerations:

- Coordination with HHQ and the theater POC

- Use the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide

- Travel-restricted areas

- Included in leave policies for leisure travel

- Training family members for travel outside the continental United States (in addition to training required by Army policy)

- AOR training for contractors for travel outside the continental United States

> **Standard 29. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Does the SAF leader or ATO ensure that personnel traveling overseas have AOR training prior to travel?

Standard 33. Incorporation of AT into the Command Information Program

SAF Command Information Programs (CIPs) must include AT considerations. The CIP increases awareness and builds interest in the SAF community. HHQ should provide guidance on information provided, but SAF leaders should apply considerations specific to their situation. Fundamentally, SAF CIPs should convey information that supports protective measures for each individual and assists in collecting information for SAF protection.

ATEP has resources for assisting CIPs in presenting useful and interesting topics. The tools on ATEP include posters, handouts, historic vignettes, leader aides, briefing slides, and cards for individual preparedness. These tools can be reproduced by the SAF or requested through HHQ.

Some considerations for AT in CIP:

- Coordinated with HHQ (senior HQ responsibility)

- Communication from SAF to everyone

- Use ATEP resources (website) and communities

- Include household information

- Use to disseminate best practices

- Work with the public affairs officer

> **Standard 33. Assessment consideration:**
>
> How does the SAF leader or ATO disseminate AT information and build awareness?

Section 2. AT Task 5: Maintain Defenses in Accordance With FPCONs

Objective: All Army organizations must employ necessary measures to protect personnel, information, and material from terrorist threats. This applies to all SAFs regardless of size or situation. These routine procedures form the foundation of the SAF AT Plan. Army standards guide this concept.

Challenge: Regulatory FPCONs frequently don't fit SAF resources or the environment. It may require considerable thought to make FPCONs that apply to the specific situation of any SAF.

Standard 13. AT physical security measures

A variety of physical security measures can help protect the SAF. As with other standards, this must be placed in the context of the SAF situation. In most cases this will require detailed coordination with agencies not under control of the SAFs or their HHQ. This can be on a mutually supporting basis or integrated with a larger plan of the associated city, university, host facility, or nearby installation. Some considerations for building that physical security protection:

- Develop a list of contacts that provide services not assigned to the SAF (emergency medical services, fire, police, etc.). This list may be primarily civilian agencies, but other Army organizations and nearby DoD agencies may also offer to assist.

- Build and document a site-specific barrier plan if applicable. Ensure that it is coordinated with any affected agency. Execute through an MOU/MOA where possible. Obtain a legal review before execution.

- Prioritize placement of the barriers. Exercise implementation of the barrier plan in conjunction with other affected agencies. Make adjustments as necessary. Consider partial barriers as a part of the SAF RAM.

- Research procedural considerations. Not all organizations use the same methods when implementing orders, giving instructions, and notifying associated agencies. Close coordination will overcome the different operating procedures of the potential variety of organizations that may be involved.

- Integrate Army AT and physical security concepts. These closely allied functions often overlap in execution. In fact, SAF leaders have on occasion assigned physical security and AT to one and the same officer. By conducting an integrated assessment and submitting mutually supporting requirements, SAF leaders may improve the possibilities of effective physical security protection and resource application.

- Assessments and security inspections represent an important measurement of the physical security elements of SAF AT protection. Scheduling assessments, combining assessments with like functions, and coordinating with associated agencies will give the SAF leadership a comprehensive review of the status of the AT program. Tracking and

mitigation of assessment-identified shortfalls completes the cycle and sustains the AT protection.

A checklist for consideration:

- Develop a POC list (emergency medical services, fire, police, etc.)

- Integrate AT and physical security to ensure that plans are mutually supporting

- Document a barrier plan if applicable

- Prioritize and coordinate actions

- Integrate with the local community (MOA/MOUs as necessary)

- Exercise plans

- Procedures

- Integrate AT and physical security concepts

- Review of current mitigation procedures through assessments and security inspections

Standard 13. Assessment consideration:

What physical security measures has the SAF leader incorporated into the protective scheme?

Standard 14. Random Antiterrorism Measures

Principles of war stress the importance of using deception in planning defensive measures. This means denying the enemy knowledge about the nature of the defense. Without solid information the prospective enemy cannot plan effectively, frequently deterring him from the attempt. But even should the enemy choose to attack without complete information, he increases the risk of failure in random untargeted attacks. This concept is true for AT in SAFs as well as more traditional defensive situations. Presenting a fluid defensive posture is the AT practitioners' application of deception. In many ways RAM are the SAF form of deception.

Experience indicates that a defense that has few static features maintains the best chance for preventing a successful terrorist attack. Army policy directs "RAM without set pattern, either in terms of measures selected, time, place, or other variables." RAM, employed effectively, can keep prospective surveillance from identifying potential weaknesses. RAM reminds observers of AT protective measures and should be employed with considerations for the prospective terrorist point of view. This can disrupt terrorist plans and deter threats.

The primary objective for RAM is to portray a "robust, highly visible, and unpredictable security posture." For SAF leaders, RAM suggest a coordinated effort. Limited resources, confined space,

and a small operational area imply assistance from and coordination with outside agencies. They presume a creative application of security measures.

Site-specific FPCON measures (Standard 22) represent a menu for possible RAM. But the possibilities are not limited by FPCON. The potential measures are limited only by imagination, legal constraints, and the policy concept of a robust, highly visible, unpredictable portrayal of security measures.

Threat assessments from HHQ or local installations can help determine the actual threat. Building RAM according to the likely threat methods will guide effective procedures. Moreover, RAM should be kept as simple as possible within the context of the standard.

Some fundamentals:

- If using FPCON measures, make them site specific

- Plan for RAM during exercises

- Schedule RAM while balancing operations security and necessary coordination

- Plan ahead for resources necessary to execute RAM

- Use different measures to ensure that RAM do not become static

- Conduct an AAR of RAM

- Where appropriate, include tenants

- Employ RAM at the home station facility (during deployment SRP, etc.)

> **Standard 14. Assessment consideration:**
> What RAM have been conducted, related to the SAF, in the past month?

Standard 15. AT measures for off-installation facilities, housing, and activities

For most SAFs, no housing exists on the facility. This does not mean that personnel should not be aware of possible threats. Consider this type of discussion for CIP briefings and information conveyed to SAF members and their families.

Activities represent potential vulnerabilities for terrorist attack. Fourth of July celebrations, city commemorations, political rallies, graduations, and the like could pose concerns for nearby SAFs. These events may require consideration during ATWG and/or ATEC (as discussed earlier). But prior planning will reduce the possibility of last-minute adjustments to a security posture.

Standard 15. Assessment consideration:

What considerations does the SAF leader make for off-SAF activities?

Standard 16. AT measures for high-risk personnel.

See Chapter 4.

Standard 17. AT construction and building considerations

Army buildings must meet DoD standards expressed in UFC 4-010-01, "DoD Minimum AT Standards for Buildings." Under some circumstances the UFC were considered before leasing SAF buildings. More often buildings were occupied before UFC standards.

There are few exemptions[21] to the UFC (for example, recruiting stations in leased spaces). However, a UFC waiver process exists through the SAF chain of command. An HQDA message ALARACT 254/211, SUBJECT: "UFC Requirement Waivers and Exception Procedures," dated 121812Z Jul 11, detailing the waiver criteria is available on ATEP. Noncompliant SAFs should consider application for a waiver where appropriate through the chain of command.

In the event that the SAF does not meet the DoD UFC standards, the SAF should consider measures to mitigate the lack of standoff distances and shortfalls in structural protection by

- Evaluating the factors to determine necessary mitigation

- Developing a plan for implementation

- Submitting resource requests

- Coordinating with the local community where necessary to supplement resource shortfalls

- Implementing procedures

- Integrating procedures into the SAF AT Plan

- Developing a personnel relocation plan within the impacted SAF

Consider RAM as a supplement to add practical measures of protection and add to the perception of robust security measures. In some cases landscaping can help build standoff. In a long-term scenario, SAFs can consider contract negotiations to change structural and standoff requirements or even relocation.

Standard 17. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF building meet the UFC?

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[21]   UFC 4-010-01, "DoD Minimum AT Standards for Buildings," 8 October 2003, paragraph 1-6.8.

Standard 18. AT measures for logistics and other contracting

Contracting represents a potential vulnerability. Recent experience indicates that prospective terrorists have investigated this as a possible way to gain access to Army installations and facilities. Cleaning, mowing, and cooking contracts all represent possible avenues for prospective terrorists to attack or survey SAFs. But the possibilities are not limited to these types of contracts.

As the requiring activity,[22] SAFs must make their concerns known to the contracting agency. It may require coordination with HHQ, but if the SAF awards a contract, it must ensure that appropriate AT mitigation is embedded before the contact in awarded. Some considerations for those procedures:

- Coordinate with HHQ

- Use the contracting cover sheet found in FM 3-37.2 or "Integrating Antiterrorism and Operations Security Into the Contract Support Process Desk Reference" (found on ATEP)

- Ensure a link between the contracting agency and SAF operations for AT considerations

- Verify whom (contractors) you are dealing with (for example, cleaning contractors)

- Review necessary SAF access and limit it as required

- Consider background checks as part of a contract

- Consider escorts and badging to track contract personnel

- Insert considerations about potential impact on a contract during FPCON changes

- Address delivery procedures

- Consider AT assistance in the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan

> **Standard 18. Assessment consideration:**
>
> Does the SAF leader consider AT in all contracting?

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[22] Requiring activity: The organization that requests a specific contracted support requirement and is responsible to assist the contracting organization with contract management.

Standard 19. AT measures for critical asset security (see Risk Mitigation, Chapter 2)

All Army commands are required to implement "mitigation measures designed to reduce vulnerabilities to critical assets, facilities, resources, and personnel and integrate these measures into the overall AT program." This could include computer networks, buildings, personnel, or other assets that, if inactive, would jeopardize the SAF mission.

SAF leaders should consciously consider those assets. In one sense it assists SAF leaders in assigning priorities for mitigation and resource application. While it does not, by itself, suggest allocation of mitigating procedures, it does give SAF leaders a start point for wargaming against possible terrorist threats. The comprehensive listing of critical assets will suggest vulnerabilities and show where coordination is necessary to protect both people and the SAF mission.

Some of the considerations for the critical assets listing and uses:

- Orients on the SAF mission

- Allows for deliberate risk management decisions

- Provides the basis for AT procedural courses of action

- Points to recommended mitigation

- Defines resource requirements

- Builds in continuity of operations considerations and alternate work locations

Standard 19. Assessment consideration:
    What measures has the SAF leader taken to reduce vulnerabilities to critical assets?

Standard 22. Force Protection Condition measures

The FPCON system describes the progressive level of protective measures implemented by all DoD components in response to terrorist threats. FPCONs are sometimes construed as the final authority on protective measures against terrorist attack. Essentially, the FPCON system directs basic actions. These instructions should be used as a guide. In the state of policy they offer little in the way of concrete orders for many SAF leaders. Moreover, until the FPCON measures are translated into ones that fit the particular circumstances of a specified SAF, their usefulness is questionable. This requires SAFs to make necessary adjustments to Army and HHQ FPCONs to fit actual circumstances.

In developing appropriate FPCONs, SAF leaders should evaluate the criteria listed below. Executing the measures necessary to oppose the given threat depends heavily upon mission requirements weighed against assets available. The threat drives the FPCONs. This is reflected in the progression of the levels. Beginning with a "general global threat" at FPCON Normal, the subsequent measures become progressively more stringent to an "imminent" threat at FPCON

Delta. The examples highlighted below suggest possible measures should circumstances progress to FPCON Delta. However, some SAF leaders may determine that inadequate assets dictate closing the SAF and executing the mission off-site or stopping all work as early as FPCON Charlie. The SAF leader must coordinate this decision with HHQ.

There are several versions of FPCON, including specific FPCON for recruiting stations and individual travelers. However, the basic version, found in AR 525-13,[23] represents the baseline for most SAFs. HHQ will frequently have adjusted the HQDA basic measures to provide additional guidance for SAF FPCON measures.

Using the FPCONs directed by Army policy and HHQ as a framework, SAFs should assign their own directives. The resulting SAF FPCONs are often referred to as site-specific FPCONs. Because of the unique considerations of SAFs, the adjustments from basic policy FPCONs may be considerable. Moreover, the principal concern is the best possible protection as the threat potential increases. Site-specific FPCONs should also include supplementary FPCON measures that may not have any basis in the standard measures. These measures reflect resourceful and innovative SAF solutions.

The final SAF FPCONs must be coordinated with HHQ. The selection of measures may require waivers from the general ones in Army or HHQ directives. HHQ will specify the expected process for waivers in the AT Plan.

Coordinate with HHQ to authorize closure of facilities, as a force protection measure, when those facilities cannot execute the required measures at elevated FPCON levels. Closure of facilities not able to accomplish elevated FPCON measures does not indicate cessation of work—a Defense Continuity Plan must be part of the AT Plan to accommodate missions considered essential regardless of FPCON (key personnel moved to a nearby facility or other arrangements).

Every FPCON measure listed in AR 525-13 applies to every location. For those FPCON measures that are applicable but not attainable, the organization may have to submit a waiver request up through its chain of command. All other FPCON measures are incorporated into the organization's AT Plan as written, while other measures are modified for application at the respective sites to meet the intent of the measure.

Some special fundamentals of FPCONs for SAFs:

- Include coordination with the host installation, facility, or community

- Coordinate for special access (for example, boat units in local docks, university security patrols)

- Account for critical functions (for example, power, computer networks, maintenance, water, communications) at higher FPCONs

- Ensure continuous mission operation

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[23]   AR 525-13, "Antiterrorism," 11 September 2008, page 30.

- Explain adjustments to contracts at FPCON changes

- Provide for implementation of barrier plans

- Measures for travel, airfields, ports, and recruiting stations

- Coordinate with HHQ

- Consider MOU/MOA at various levels of FPCONs

- Distinguish mail and parcel screening levels

- Submit waivers as required for exceptions to policy-based FPCONs

- Account for personnel access work requirements at higher FPCONs

5

MOU/MOAs can be established with local law enforcement to help implement some FPCON measures. This action must be coordinated according to HHQ AT requirements. Additionally, contracts for security guards may in some cases supplement routine security (increased personnel, transition from unarmed to armed guards, etc.) as needed.

The table below provides an example of how Army FPCONs can translate into site-specific measures. Those below are not a complete list and should not be relied upon as precise measures for any specific situation. That remains the responsibility of the SAF leader with support of the assigned ATO or AT focal point.

Army Task	Small SAF Site-Specific	Larger SAF Site-Specific
Measure Normal 2: Verify the identity of all personnel entering Army installations in accordance with AR 190-16. Security personnel will inspect identification cards, security badges, or other forms of personal identification approved by the commander.	Require presentation of Government-issued identification for all personnel desiring entry to government property or entering buildings. Upon entry, record the person's information in a visitor log.	Require presentation of Government-issued identification for all personnel desiring entry to government property or entering buildings. Upon entry, record the person's information in a visitor log.
Measure Normal 3: Secure and randomly inspect buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.	Coordinate with local facility security management officials to ensure that random inspections are conducted in areas adjacent to military office areas.	Coordinate with local facility security management officials to ensure that random inspections are conducted in areas adjacent to military office areas.

Army Task	Small SAF Site-Specific	Larger SAF Site-Specific
Measure Alpha 2: At regular intervals, remind all personnel, including family members, of the general situation. Ensure that personnel arriving for duty are briefed on the threat. Also, remind them to be alert for and report suspicious activities, such as the presence of unfamiliar personnel and vehicles, suspicious parcels, and possible surveillance attempts.	Schedule periods to remind all personnel of the general situation and to remain alert for and report suspicious activities, such as the presence of unfamiliar personnel and vehicles, suspicious parcels, and possible surveillance attempts. Encourage members to share this information with their families, reminding all personnel of the situation and current security measures. Include a local threat briefing as part of personnel in-processing. Share information with local authorities.	During monthly training meetings and special events, remind all personnel of the general situation and to remain alert for and report suspicious activities. Encourage members to share this information with their families. As a measure of procedure, in all meetings, including Family Readiness Groups, remind all personnel of the situation and current FPCON level. Include a local threat briefing as part of personnel in-processing. Inform all visitors to the center of the local FPCON level. Share information with local authorities.
Measure Alpha 6: Test mass notification system.	Test the mass notification system periodically as scheduled.	Test the mass notification system quarterly and report the system status on situation reports provided through the chain of command.
Measure Alpha 9: As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.	At a minimum, consult with local authorities and facility managers to review the threat. Review expected execution of AT measures and the response to terrorist incidents. Specifically coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, postal and parcel delivery services, and emergency response activities. Implement mail-screening procedures to identify suspicious letters and parcels.	At a minimum, consult with local authorities to review the threat. Review MOU/MOAs for the execution of AT measures and the response to terrorist incidents. Specifically, coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, postal and parcel delivery services, and emergency response activities. Implement mail-screening procedures to identify suspicious letters and parcels.
Measures Alpha: Site-Specific.	Establish contact with nearby DoD facilities and installations.	Establish contact with nearby DoD facilities and installations.

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Army Task	Small SAF Site-Specific	Larger SAF Site-Specific
Measure Bravo 2: Enforce control of entry onto U.S. infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment, lucrative targets, and high-profile locations; and randomly search vehicles entering these areas. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large IED (cargo vans, delivery vehicles) sufficient to cause catastrophic damage or loss of life.	Coordinate for daily security spot-checks of vehicles parked at facilities. Conduct daily security checks of all persons entering the facilities. Ensure positive identification of the individuals and randomly inspect packages, bags, or containers being brought into the facility. Coordinate with local officials to limit access points for vehicles commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic. Implement barrier plans to limit vehicle access. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large improvised explosive device (IED)— cargo vans, delivery vehicles— sufficient to cause catastrophic damage or loss of life. Ensure that all exterior doors and windows have adequate locking devices. Randomly check to ensure that locking devices are not disabled or otherwise circumvented. Coordinate with local facility security management officials to review considerations for vehicles accessing near-facility parking.	Conduct daily security spot-checks of vehicles parked at facilities. Security spot-checks will consist of visually inspecting the passenger and trunk or cargo area of the vehicle. Conduct daily security checks of all persons entering the facilities. At a minimum, security checks will consist of positive identification of the individual and an inspection of any packages, bags, or containers being brought into the facility. Coordinate with local officials to limit access points for vehicles commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic. Further limit or reduce the number of personnel and vehicle access points to the facility. Implement barrier plans to limit vehicle access. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large IED—cargo vans, delivery vehicles— sufficient to cause catastrophic damage or loss of life. Ensure that all exterior doors and windows have adequate locking devices. Conduct random checks to ensure that locking devices are not disabled or otherwise circumvented.
Measure Bravo 13: Conduct random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.	Coordinate for the conduct of daily random police patrols around facilities. Conduct daily internal security checks of random visual inspections of the passenger and trunk or cargo area of select vehicles. At irregular intervals during the day, conduct random security spot-checks of persons entering the facilities for positive identification of the individual and random inspection of any packages, bags, or containers being brought into the facility.	Coordinate for the conduct of daily random police patrols around facilities. Coordinate for daily internal security patrols. Security patrols will consist of random visual inspections of the passenger and trunk or cargo area of select vehicles. At irregular intervals but not less than twice daily, conduct random security spot-checks of persons entering the facilities. At a minimum, security spot-checks will consist of positive identification of the individual and an inspection of any packages, bags, or containers being brought into the facility.
Measure Bravo: Site-Specific.	Contact nearby DoD facilities and installations. Share information concerning threat and facility actions.	Contact nearby DoD facilities and installations. Share information concerning threat and facility actions.

5

Army Task	Small SAF Site-Specific	Larger SAF Site-Specific
Measure Charlie 2. Recall additional required personnel. Ensure that armed augmentation security personnel are aware of current rules of engagement and status-of-forces agreements. Review types of weapons and ammunition issued to augmentation security personnel; heightened threats may require employment of different weapons capabilities.[*]	Coordinate directly with the facility manager and local law enforcement agencies. If you are in a jointly occupied building, consider consolidation of assets with other tenants. Know and understand the use of force and rules of engagement. Review communications procedures. Know area evacuation procedures. Consider moving the mission if the facility cannot be protected and the mission is critically impaired. Depending on the situation, evacuate equipment and or personnel.	Review local policies and procedures requiring the arming of guards. Coordinate directly with local law enforcement agencies. Plans must be reviewed by the staff judge advocate. Determine whether the current guard level can sufficiently protect the facility. If you are in a jointly occupied building, consider consolidation of assets with other tenants. At a minimum, ensure that guards are qualified with weapons being issued; receive training on search procedures for briefcases, packages, and vehicles; know and understand the use of force and rules of engagement (reviewed by the staff judge advocate); and have communications and other equipment available. Know area evacuation procedures. Review types of weapons used by guards (it may be more appropriate to issue a handgun or shotgun instead of a rifle in highly populated areas). Not all guard personnel require arming; Mace, an MP club, a riot baton, or other approved devices should be considered as a means of force if the commander is unwilling to accept the risk of using deadly force. Guard force personnel must be adequately trained and qualified in the use of their issued weapon. Consider facility closure if personnel or assets cannot be protected. Depending on the situation, evacuate equipment and/or personnel.

[*]   At FPCON Charlie the SAF leaders might consider the practical necessity to close the SAF. The threat and SAF capabilities are the main determinants for that decision.

Army Task	Small SAF Site-Specific	Larger SAF Site-Specific
Measure Charlie 7. Increase standoff from sensitive buildings based on threat. Implement barrier plan to hinder vehicle-borne attack.	Coordinate with the facility manager for implementation of a local barrier plan as required for sensitive buildings (high-risk targets or mission-essential vulnerable areas). Deny parking adjacent to or around the facility by the placement of barriers at predetermined locations as outlined in local barrier plans. If the standoff distance cannot be increased, consider closing the parking area, consolidating parking in an area away from the building, allowing personnel to be dropped off, or having them use public transportation if possible. Consider the impact of the threat on the mission. Consider evacuating critical items to a prearranged location, depending on the situation. Consult with HHQ prior to movement.	Implement a local barrier plan as required for sensitive buildings (high-risk targets or mission-essential vulnerable areas). Deny parking adjacent to or around the facility by the placement of barriers at predetermined locations as outlined in local barrier plans. If the standoff distance cannot be increased, consider closing the parking area, consolidating parking in an area away from the building, allowing personnel to be dropped off, or having them use public transportation if possible. Consider closing the facility if a reasonable amount of security cannot be achieved. Consider evacuation of weapons and equipment to a prearranged location depending on the situation. Consult with HHQ prior to closure.
Measure Charlie: Site-Specific.	Execute support requirements with nearby DoD facilities or installations as described in an MOU/MOA.	Execute support requirements with nearby DoD facilities or installations as described in an MOU/MOA.
Measure Delta 4. Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation. Selected prescreened and constantly secured vehicles used to transport escorted very important personnel are exempted.	Move the mission requirement to a more secure location. Ensure control of vehicular traffic at the new location. Notify HHQ. Coordinate with local law enforcement to ensure necessary protection.	Increase security and execute searches of all vehicles before they enter the facility. Coordinate efforts with local law enforcement.
Measure Delta 5. Control facility access and implement positive identification of all personnel—no exceptions.	Identify personnel and assign entry credentials necessary to execute mission requirements.	Identify personnel and assign entry credentials necessary to execute mission requirements.
Measure Delta: Site Specific.	Execute procedures to reduce the profile of personnel entering the facility. Conduct periodic messaging to all personnel updating the situation. Notify HHQ periodically.	Ensure awareness updates to the chain of command and facility leaders.

Standard 22. Assessment consideration:

Does the SAF have a site-specific FPCON system?

Section 3. AT Task 6. Establish a Civil-Military Partnership for a Terrorist Incident Crisis

Objective: As stated earlier tin this document, forming partnerships is, for SAFs, indispensible for an effective and practical AT program. In smaller SAFs, those partnerships may represent the bulk of AT protective measures. Circumstances may demand a course of action initiating contact, developing appropriate relationships, and maintaining a record of POCs and associated

coordination. With proper legal review and HHQ sanction, community integration will improve AT protection for all SAF personnel and missions.

Challenge: Limited SAF capabilities suggest in most cases a heavy dependence on external support for the AT program. This demands a rigorous effort to coordinate with agencies necessary to provide that support.

Standard 8. (see also AT Task 1, Standard 8) AT Program Coordination

Establishing civil-military partnerships may be the most significant element distinguishing traditional installations from SAFs. SAF characteristics suggest an inextricable link with the community where they reside. Often with no fences separating SAFs from civilian concerns, the links formed with civilian elements characterize the only way to practically sustain a SAF AT program.

- MOU/MOA considerations

- Execute legal reviews

- Consider a memo for the record vice an MOU/MOA

- Maintain relationships with periodic scheduled coordination

- Include civilian authorities in SAF exercises

- Participate in local exercises (for example, hazmat teams support in the local area)

- Practice with the host nation where possible

- POC list as a part of the SAF AT Plan

- Validate and synchronize jurisdictional authorities

Standard 8. Assessment consideration:

What agencies does the SAF coordinate with for AT-related support?

Appendix A. Army AT Policy Matrix

The matrix below, lifted from Army AT policy (AR 525-13), indicates the comparative responsibilities of various Army type-commands. It identifies the tasks required of SAFs. As stated earlier in this Handbook, the standards must be applied as the situation dictates. Attendance to the spirit of the standards is mandatory, but site-specific application is expected and encouraged. Moreover, waivers to the standards must be submitted through the chain of command.

A

Table A-1: AT Standards/Command-level Matrix

AT Standard	Army command, Army Service component commander, Direct Reporting Unit	Installation and Garrison	Unit	Tenant	Standalone Activity
Standard 1, AT Program Elements	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 2, Intelligence Support to the Army AT Program	X	X	X		X
Standard 3, AT Risk Management	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 4, Terrorist Threat Assessment	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 5, Criticality Assessment	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 6, Terrorist Vulnerability Assessment	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 7, AT Plan	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 8, AT Program Coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 9, Antiterrorism Officer	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 10, Antiterrorism Working Group	X	X			X
Standard 11, Threat Working Group	X	X			X
Standard 12, AT Executive Committee	X	X			
Standard 13, AT Physical Security Measures	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 14, Random Antiterrorism Measures	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 15, AT Measures for Off-Installation Facilities, Housing, and Activities	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 16, AT Measures for High-Risk Personnel	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 17, AT Construction and Building Considerations	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 18, AT Measures for Logistics and Other Contracting	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 19, AT Measures for Critical Asset Security	X	X	X		
Standard 20, Terrorism Incident Response Measures	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 21, Terrorism Consequence Management Measures	X	X		X	X
Standard 22, FPCON Measures	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 23, AT Training and Exercises	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 24, Formal AT Training	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 25, Level I AT Awareness Training	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 26, Level II Antiterrorism Officer Training	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 27, Level III Pre-Command AT Training	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 28, Level IV Executive Seminar	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 29, AOR-specific Training for DOD Personnel and In-transit Forces	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 30, AT Resource Requirements	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 31, AT Program Review	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 32, AT Program Review Teams	X				
Standard 33, Incorporation of AT into Command Information Programs	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 34, Terrorist Threat/Incident Reporting	X	X	X	X	X
Standard 35, CVAMP	X	X	X	X	X

Appendix B. Resources and References

AR 525-13, "Antiterrorism," 11 September 2008

AR 190-13, "Physical Security," 25 February 2011

Army FM 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*, February 2011

Army FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 26 March 2010

Army FM 3-0, *Operations*, 27 February 2008

Unit ATO Handbook, September 2010

AT Card, "Planning Considerations," November 2010

Senior Leaders' Role in Antiterrorism (Primer), November 2011

Army Antiterrorism, Small Unit Leaders' Card, November 2011

Army Leaders' Guide: Preventing the Escalation of Violence, November 2011

Integrating Antiterrorism and Operations Security Into the Contract Support Process Desk reference, Jan 12

Antiterrorism Strategic Communications Plan (HQDA publication), Oct 10

VTER Requirements Handbook (HQDA publication), Oct 10

Training and Doctrine Command G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C2, *A Soldier's Primer to Terrorism TTP*, August 2010

UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, 8 October 2009

UFC 4-010-02, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances, 8 October 2003

National Fusion Center Association at http://www.nfcausa.org/

Army Knowledge Online, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal, https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/605757

B

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Intelligence Assessment: 2010 National Threat Assessment: Domestic Terrorism, 9 June 2011

Jerome P. Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, Congressional Research Service, 15 November 2011

AT Level I Awareness web-based training; http://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at/

Department of Homeland Security: Assessment: (FOUO) Incidents Directed Against Military Recruiting Stations and National Guard and Reserve Facilities in the United States, 31 May 2011

ALARACT 110/2010, Subject: Army Implementation of iWatch (Terrorist Watch Program), 151912Z Apr 10

eGuardian (Threat and Suspicious Activity Reporting) Information and Users Guide, 20 May 2010

ALARACT 145/2011 – Subject: EXORD 171-11 Law Enforcement Suspicious Activity Reporting (eGuardian), 131536Z Apr 11

ALARACT 254/2011 – Subject: Unified Facilities Criteria Requirements Waivers and Exception procedures, 121812Z Jul 11

B

Photo by: Chris Craygarcia / US Army Corps of Engineers

Appendix C. Terms and Acronyms

AAR	After-action review
AOR	Area of responsibility
AT	Antiterrorism
ATEC	Antiterrorism executive committee
ATEP	Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal (see Appendix B for url)
ATO	Antiterrorism officer
ATWG	Antiterrorism working group
CBRNE	Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
CCIR	Commander's critical information requirements
CIP	Command Information Program
CONUS	Continental United States
COOP	Continuity of operations
CVAMP	Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program
eGuardian	Federal Bureau of Investigation's unclassified, law enforcement–centric reporting system (see Appendix B for associated Army message)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPCON	Force protection condition
HHQ	Higher headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters Department of the Army
HRP	High risk personnel
iWatch	Army program to educate the Army community about indicators of potential suspicious activity to military police or local law enforcement for investigation (see Appendix B for associated Army message)
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LE	Law enforcement
LNO	Liaison officer

MDEP	Management Decision Package
MOA	Memorandum of agreement
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MTT	Mobile training team
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OPMG	Office of the Provost Marshal General
PAO	Public affairs officer
PIR	Priority intelligence requirements
POC	Point of contact
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
PS	Physical security
QASP	Quality assurance surveillance plan
RAM	Random antiterrorism measures
Requiring activity	The organization that requests a specific contracted support requirement and is responsible to assist the contracting organization with contract management assistance
SAF	Standalone facility
SAR	Suspicious activity report
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SIR	Serious incident report
SOP	Standard operating procedure
TTIR	Terrorist threat incident reporting
TTP	Tactics, techniques, and procedures
TWG	Threat working group
VA	Vulnerability assessment

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APPENDIX D. SAMPLE TTIR FORMAT

TTIR is the rapid and efficient adjustment to standard procedures in response to a known or at least more specific threat. It is different from an SOP, which is formed on a general notion of a threat rather than specified information related to that threat. Although the distinction is sometimes blurred by a more general but still vague threat, SAF ability to transition to a higher protective level has particular significance.

A general plan for tightening AT measures requires a basis for rapid and efficient execution of instructions. The FPCON system provides that basis. But FPCON alone is insufficient to convey the necessary instructions to increase SAF personnel awareness and initiate specific actions.

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Terrorist Threat and/or Incident Response Operations Order		Date
Threat	Reports of surveillance and recent activities suggest the increased possibility of a terrorist attack by (that is, apply measures according to reported threat: for example, vehicle bomb, small arms intruder). Time of attack is unknown but could be executed within the next two weeks. Law enforcement officials indicate that a prospective terrorist may conduct surveillance of possible targets prior to final approach and attack.	
Friendly	Local police will increase patrols in the vicinity of our SAF. The security teams for our … (shopping mall, university, building, etc.) will increase random checks in the area and stop in our facility for informal reports. Nearby installation X has implemented FPCON Charlie.	
Attachments or Detachments	None.	
Mission	Deter or prevent a terrorist attack on our SAF. Support friendly operations working in the same effort.	
Execution	Increase awareness and integrate SAF security measures of FPCONs Bravo and Charlie along with standard procedures already in progress. We will also implement RAM to frustrate prospective terrorist attempts to draft concrete plans.	

Measure	POC for Execution	Frequency and Timing
Bravo 2 • Conduct security spot-checks by visually inspecting the passenger and trunk or cargo area of the SAF member vehicles. • Conduct daily security checks of all persons entering the facilities (that is, positive identification and inspection of packages, bags, or containers being brought into the facility). • Implement barrier plans to limit vehicle access. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles capable of concealing a large IED (cargo vans, delivery vehicles). • Ensure that all exterior doors and windows have adequate locking devices. • Conduct random checks to ensure that locking devices are not disabled or otherwise circumvented.	Lead = Name Support = Name	Twice daily
Bravo 3		
Bravo 4		
Bravo 5		
Charlie 2		
Charlie 3		
Charlie 4		
Charlie		
Charlie		
Charlie		

Coordinating Instructions	Coordination
• Coordinate for daily security spot-checks of vehicles parked at Army Reserve facilities.	Local law enforcement, facility security
• Coordinate with local officials to limit access points for vehicles commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.	Facility security
• Reports to HHQ will occur at (insert time or period)	
• Command and control	
• Leader responsibilities	
• Communication system	

D

APPENDIX E. SAMPLE FPCON WAIVER REQUEST

MEMORANDUM THRU (send through chain of command)

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver of Specific FPCON Level (that is, Bravo, Charlie, etc.) Individual Measures

1. Reference (for example, HHQ directives, HQDA policy)

2. (Name SAF) implemented measures under FPCON (Bravo) as per reference a and b above; however, I request a waiver to modify the full implementation of FPCON (Bravo 6), "implement screening procedures for all incoming mail." This waiver is submitted for two reasons: there is no credible threat towards this SAF and the SAF does not control mail at the entry point.

3. Strict compliance with this measure is outside the authority of this SAF, and an attempt to execute the measure will limit our ability to manage the SAF mission-related activities daily. We have taken the following measures to mitigate the risk:

    a. Coordinated with the local mail distribution point to ensure that screening is accomplished sufficient for mail coming to the SAF.

    b. Include mail awareness discussions in command information sessions, posted information around the SAF, and periodic coordination with local law enforcement to check for possible increase in the threat.

    c. Established a central location for mail entry into the SAF.

4. My staff have implemented the above actions and will continue to monitor changes to our threat assessment. POC for this waiver is (name, phone, email).

SAF Leader

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Appendix F. CONUS Unified Facilities Criteria Waivers for Standalone Facilities

Army Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) Waiver and Exception Process

Reference: ALARACT 254/2011 - Subject: Unified Facilities Criteria Requirement Waivers and Exception Procedures, 121812Z Jul 11

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment (ASA(IE&E)) is the approval authority for granting Army waivers and exceptions to the requirements contained with UFC 4-010-01 and UFC 4-010-02 for construction of new facilities and major renovations (see Appendix B, References/Resources). As specified in AR 525-13, para 2-6.B., The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) is responsible for mandating compliance with UFC for construction of new facilities and major renovations. This process will be incorporated into the next revision of AR 525-13, Antiterrorism, scheduled for the 4th Qtr, FY 2012.

Note: The Army UFC Waiver and Exception Process does not apply to buildings located OCONUS, where the geographic combatant commander (GCC) has sole waiver and exception authority.

All SAF commanders/leaders seeking waivers and exceptions to requirements contained in the UFC for any building or portion of a building - permanent, temporary, or expeditionary - owned, leased, privatized or otherwise occupied, managed or controlled by DoD) will submit requests IAW the procedures below.

Waivers and exceptions will be considered individually. Blanket waivers and exceptions are not authorized. Requests for waivers and exceptions will be made by responsible SAF commanders/leaders, endorsed by HHQ commanders and the chain of command (responsible Army Command (ACOM), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), Direct Reporting Unit (DRU), or Army National Guard (ARNG)) to the ACSIM for HQDA coordination. Upon completion of HQDA coordination, ACSIM will prepare recommendation and forward waiver

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requests to ASA(IE&E) for final approval. ACOM, ASCC, DRU, ARNG will provide a copy of the approved waiver or exception request to U.S. Army North.

Waivers. Temporary relief from specific regulatory standards issued while pending completion of actions that will bring the matter into regulatory conformance. Compensatory measures are required.

May be requested where UFC AT Standard(s) not being met can be corrected in no more than 5 years. Waivers will be granted for a period of 5 years and may be extended after a review of the circumstances necessitating the extension.

Waivers require justification. Wavier extensions will state first extension, second extension, and so forth.

Exceptions. An approved permanent continuation of a deviation from policy in which the requirements are not being met and the approving authority determines it is inappropriate to meet the requirements. Compensatory security measures are required to provide adequate security for the deviation.

- May be requested where UFC AT Standard(s) not being met cannot be corrected in less than 5 years.

- Approved exceptions are considered permanent but must be reviewed at least every 5 years (or earlier) if a significant change occurs in the threat, occupancy level or use of the building.

- Reviews verify the need for exception extensions.

- Reviews will be conducted by SAF commanders/leaders (or equivalent civilian position) and endorsed by HHQ and the chain of command (responsible ACOM, ASCC, DRU, or ARNG).

- Exceptions are granted when meeting the UFC AT Standard(s) is not possible and when the security afforded is equivalent to that afforded under the standard criteria.

- For new construction or existing buildings undergoing major modifications/ renovation, approval for exceptions will be rare. However, where a particular standard cannot be met, requesting officials must provide specific and strong justification and mitigating measures, affording equivalent security to those facilities under the standard criteria.

- Requests for waivers and exceptions will contain compensatory measures currently in effect or recommended. Approvals for waivers and exceptions will specify required compensatory measures. Equivalent protection exceptions do not require compensatory measures.

- Requests for waivers or exceptions to requirements within UFC will be coordinated between the antiterrorism officer (ATO), supporting engineer, supporting Judge Advocate

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General (JAG), Director of Emergency Services (DES), Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security (DPTMS) and Provost Marshal Office (PMO), or equivalent positions, of the SAF.

Waiver and Exception Requests for Transitional Buildings

- Will only be considered where it is impractical to bring such a building into compliance with UFC AT Standards due to short-term occupancy or when it is impractical to vacate a non-compliant building during renovation.

- Remaining occupied during renovation must include a mitigation plan for bringing the buildings into compliance, which has been coordinated and certified by the U.S. Army Corps Engineers (USACE) Protective Design Center.

- A request for a waiver or an exception will include:

  - A statement identifying problems/deficiencies constituting standards below those cited in UFC 4-010-01 and UFC 4-010-02.

  - Compensatory measures planned for the building(s) to make up for noncompliance with required UFC AT Standards.

  - Completed risk assessments and mitigation plans for bringing the building(s) into compliance with UFC AT Standards.

  - Reasons the activity or installation cannot comply with the requirements of the UFC including engineering analysis (where applicable).

  - Documentation of coordinated efforts with the affected staff agencies (ATO, DPTMS, DES/PM/security officer, supporting JAG and supporting engineers or equivalent positions of the SAF).

  - The commander/leader's statement of corrective action taken or planned to meet UFC AT Standard(s) requiring the waiver or exception.

  - Each successive command's recommendation and endorsement.

- The installation/activity and the endorsing headquarters will retain the approved waiver or exception, including documents listed in paragraph h above.

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CONUS Army Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) Waiver and Exception Process

Request	Endorsement	HQDA Review / Approval
SAF Leader / Commander	**HHQ**	
• Execute Vulnerability assessment • Review UFC[1] • Determine requirement for a waiver / exception • Review past waivers • Coordinate with key staff functions • Submit waiver / exception request • Develop mitigation plans and procedures	• Review for accuracy / necessity • Assess mitigation measures • Approve / Disapprove • Forward through chain of command	
	ACOM, ASCC, DRU, ARNG	**Army Staff**
	• Review • Recommend approval / disapproval	• Review • Approve / Disapprove

Note: Applicable only in CONUS. OCONUS, Geographic Combatant Commanders are the UFC waiver authority within their AOR.

[1] **Unified Facilities Critieria (see Appendix B, References)**

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Appendix G. AT in Contracting for SAF

Preventing a terrorist attack means preparation for a wide range of terrorist methods. Contracting represents one of the possibilities.

Standalone facilities often execute contracts as the "requiring activity." Contracts represent a vulnerability that could be exploited by terrorists. Terrorists have been known to enroll as contractors to either gather information or execute an attack. Additionally, OCONUS, contracted support could itself become a target for terrorist attacks.

Mitigating the possibility of terrorist attacks through contracting demands that SAF leaders and ATO insert the necessary protective measures before a contract is awarded. The chart below provides an overview of how AT and OPSEC personnel should be inserted into the contracting process and some of the elements SAF leaders should consider for any contract initiated by the SAF. Integrating early into the process helps ensure visibility of necessary AT/OPSEC considerations.

In some instances contracts HHQ actually award contracts affecting the SAF but not initiated by the SAF. In these cases SAF leader might consider coordination with the HHQ to help build measures that provide necessary protection to the SAF. It is the same process as indicated in the chart below but requires careful coordination to guarantee the required support.

More detailed information is available in the Desk Reference noted in Appendix B, References.

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AT & OPSEC Contract Support Process

Initial planning
Review for consideration
• Determine specific requirements that cannot be provided by organic or other non-commercial means
• Conduct initial risk assessment to determine if commercial sector support is appropriate
• Estimate current and future potential threat on contract performance
• Develop an OPSEC critical information list.
• Integrate current AT/OPSEC and operational contract support policy and procedures
Requirements Development
1. Develop requirements package
2. Perform AT/OPSEC-related risk analysis
• Review draft performance work statement (PWS) to determine appropriate protective measures, facility access, contractor verification and physical security are sufficient to mitigate identified AT risks.
3. Finalize AT/OPSEC related measures in the requirements package
• Ensure inclusion of AT-related requirements in PWS, Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP), and solicitation criteria
• Ensure review of personnel identification, reason for access validated, type of access and privileges are appropriate
• Sign AT/OPSEC Cover Sheet
Contract Solicitation and Award
• Ensure AT/OPSEC Cover Sheet is part of requirements package
• Incorporate AT/OPSEC into QASP as appropriate
Contract Execution
• Conduct post-award analysis as threat levels change
• Assist contracting element in assessing the QASP as requested.

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Photo by: Jorge Gomez / US Army Recruiting

# Appendix H. Active Shooter Response

Information

Call 911 (or other local emergency number) when it is safe to do so.

You should provide the following information to the Police or the 911 Operator:

- Location of the shooter

- Number of shooters

- Physical description of shooters

- Number and type of weapons the shooter have

- Number of possible victims

Coping with an Active Shooter

- Be aware of your surroundings and possible dangers

- Take note of the nearest exists in any facility you visit

- If you are in an office at the time of an attack, stay there and secure the door

- Only as a last resort should you attempt to take action against the shooter

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
Profile of an Active Shooter

An Active Shooter incident is when one or more subjects participate in a shooting spree, random or systematic with intent to continuously harm others. (Source: U.S. Army Military Police School, Active Shooter POI)

An Active Shooter may be a current or former employee associated with the U.S. Army (Soldier, Department of Army Civilian, Government Contractor, or Family Member).

An Active Shooter could also be an individual not directly associated with the Army who gains access to an Army installation, stand alone facility, or unit.

Characteristics of an Active Shooter Incident

- The event is unpredictable and evolves rapidly

- Victims are generally targets of opportunity

- Military Police or Law Enforcement direct action is usually required to end an Active Shooting incident

Recognizing Signs of High-Risk Behavior

Indicators of potential violent behavior may include one or more of the following (not all inclusive):

- Increased use of alcohol or drugs

- Unexplained increase in absenteeism or vague physical complaints

- Depression or withdrawal

- Increased severe mood swings and noticeably unstable or emotional responses

- Increasingly talks about personal problems or problems at home

- Increase in unsolicited comments about violence, firearms, and other dangerous weapons or violent crimes

How to Respond

When Shooting Begins

1. Evacuate

- Have an exit route and plan in mind

- Leave your belongings behind

- Keep your hands visible

2. Hide

- Hide in an area out of the Active Shooter's view

- Lock doors and block entry to your hiding place

3. Take Action

- As a last resort

- Only when your life is in imminent danger

- Attempt to incapacitate the Active Shooter

When Police Arrive

- Try to remain calm

- Obey all Police instructions

- Put down any items in your hands (such as backpacks, phones, jackets)

- Raise your hands, spread your fingers, and keep hands visible to Police at all times

- Avoid quick or sudden movements

- Avoid pointing, screaming, or yelling

- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction while evacuating

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Appendix I. Baseline SAF AT Program Checklist

The wide variety of size, scope, manning, and missions of SAF detailed in Chapter 1 recommends a unique assessment checklist for each. Based on Army policy, HHQ will guide the specific requirement. Below are basic considerations for each standard applicable to any SAF. SAF leaders can use this as a fundamental benchmark for their AT program.

SAF AT Program Review Checklist

Standard 1. Does SAF leader/ATO address risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource application, and program reviews in the SAF written AT Plan?

Standard 2. Does the SAF have a focal point to receive and share AT-related information?

Standard 3. Has the SAF leader/ATO conducted wargaming against possible terrorist threats?

Standard 4. Does the SAF have a threat assessment of their area on hand?

Standard 5. Does the SAF have a critical assets list?

Standard 6. Has the SAF leader/ATO conducted a vulnerability assessment?

Standard 7. Does SAF have a written AT Plan?

Standard 8. Does the SAF have a formal updated list of supporting POC for coordinating issues?

Standard 8. What agencies does the SAF coordinate with for AT-related support?

Standard 9. Does the SAF have an assigned ATO or AT POC?

Standard 10. Has the SAF conducted an ATWG in the format designated in the AT Plan?

Standard 11. How does the SAF leader/ATO incorporate principles of a TWG?

Standard 12. Does the SAF leader conduct an ATEC or ATEC-light to review AT considerations affecting the SAF?

Standard 13. What physical security measures have the SAF leader incorporated into the protective scheme?

Standard 14. What RAM has been conducted, related to the SAF, in the past month?

Standard 15. What considerations does the SAF leader make for off-SAF activities?

Standard 16. N/A

Standard 17. Does the SAF building meet the UFC criteria?

Standard 18. Does the SAF leader consider AT in all contracting?

Standard 19. What measures has the SAF leader taken to reduce vulnerabilities to critical assets?

Standard 20. Does the SAF have TT/IR Plan?

Standard 21. Does the SAF have an incident response plan?

Standard 22. Does the SAF have a site-specific FPCON system extant?

Standard 23. Has the SAF leader/ATO integrated an AT exercise with all concerned parties (Federal, local, etc.)?

Standard 24. Does the SAF leader/ATO take advantage of formal AT training?

Standard 25. Has the SAF leader/ATO executed an iWatch program?

Standard 26. Has the SAF leader assigned a certified ATO or an AT focal point?

Standard 27. What does the SAF HHQ do to assist in training the SAF leader for AT?

Standard 28. Has the HHQ developed a standing list including SAF O6 or above for Level IV training?

Standard 29. Does the SAF leader/ATO ensure that personnel traveling overseas have AOR training prior to travel?

Standard 30. Does the SAF maintain a list of requirements for funding?

Standard 31. Has the SAF leader/ATO conducted a program review?

Standard 32. Does the SAF assess all AT-related functions in program reviews?

Standard 33. How does the SAF leader/ATO disseminate AT information/build awareness?

Standard 34. Does the SAF AT Plan have formats for AT-related reporting?

Standard 35. How does the SAF and its HHQ use CVAMP?