INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT/ COLLECTION REPORT

NTC Rotation 15-03
Decisive Action Training Environment
Initial Impressions Report
(IIR)
12 JAN-06 FEB 2015

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TRADOC Intent

TRADOC CoEs, AMEDD, and USASOC, in coordination with the Center for Army Lessons Learned, will during Decisive Action rotations at NTC (15-03) collect observations, insights, and lessons based on the DOTMLPF domains that will shape the Warfighting Functions.

CALL Collection Concept

- Collection involved observing AARs, conducting right seat rides (RSR), and interviewing selected observer/coach trainers (O/CT) and unit personnel
- CoEs/schools provided subject matter expert (SME) RSR proficient in current and emerging doctrine to observe the rotational unit's execution of key aspects of their WfF
- SME RSR focus during the rotation was OILs for use by their CoE/school/organization
- CoEs/schools/tasked organizations will forward all prioritized OILs and potential changes to the WfFs to CALL for consolidation, staffing, and distribution
- CoEs/schools/organizations will provide recommendations to enhance the CTC training experience to CALL
- CALL will disseminate OILs to the Army

Executive Summary

The report provides a summary of insights, observations, and best practices collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the TRADOC Centers of Excellence (CoE) from NTC Rotation 15-03, Decisive Action Training Environment. The purpose of the collection was to gather observations, best practices, and lessons from the experience of a Stryker brigade combat team conducting wide area security and combined arms maneuver during its rotation at NTC. The CoEs collected observations and lessons based on the DOTMLPF domains that will shape the Warfighting Functions. To date this was the first 18 day rotation and could result in the remaining rotations moving to this formula. Although invited to participate, Aviation COE did not participate in this collection effort on NTC Rotation 15-03. This report was collected and written by TRADOC Center of Excellence and CALL personnel and contains observations, opinions, and analysis of their observers. It does not reflect the observations and opinions of the observer-coach/trainers (OC/T) or the leadership of the NTC Operations Group. This report is organized by Warfighting Function and according to COE focus topics:

Some observers use Rotational Training Unit (RTU) when referencing the unit.

NTC Rotation 15-03 TRADOC Collection Team

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Chapter 1
Intelligence Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Unit Training Management Challenges

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Training Challenges within the MICO in a BEB

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Information within this observation were collected during an interview with the MICO Commander and First Sergeant. The BEB commander had difficulty in ensuring that the MICO was properly incorporated in the BNs training management program. Due in part to this difficulty, the MICO was not able to nest their METL properly within the BEB METL. As a result not all required training specifically for the MICO was conducted or they were not allocated resources properly, which inhibited their ability to be fully mission capable prior to NTC. In order to alleviate such matters from occurring again, Company Leadership must clearly outline training priorities/requirements to ensure resources/time are allocated properly within the BEB. This will also illustrate the need for specialty training such as Foundry training and the benefit of ensuring personnel are trained properly on those systems, if they are not available at home station.

The MICO in conjunction with the BDE S-2 had difficulty in forecasting joint training opportunities that would foster mutual understanding and cohesion needed during a DATE rotation. As a result they were only able to conduct one training event similar to NTC operational tempo prior to rotation 15-03. Furthermore all material that is required for training such as MDMP products needs to be produced/trained on by the rotational unit, prior to the arrival at NTC. This will enable personnel to fully grasp how to develop these products and the importance they have for clearly illustrating the battle field.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Subordinate unit METLs align with, nest with, and support their next higher unit's METL. Subordinate unit METLs usually do not change since they are based on the higher unit's METL and the unit's designed mission. Based on the unit's METL and the higher commander's guidance, the unit trains on the supporting collective tasks most important to the success of the mission and gives the unit the most flexibility to adapt to new missions. **(ADRP 7-0)**

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Training

(U) Unit/POC/contact info

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Intelligence Architecture Challenges

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Building and maintaining situational understanding.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: THE RTU did not have a 353T Warrant Officer assigned. I Corps sent a CW3 353T to the RTU for the rotation. The 353T did not have the opportunity to train with the rotational unit at their home station. This challenged the 353T, specifically with the inner workings of the DCGS-A architecture and the maintenance status of the MICOs equipment. The RTU had difficulty with clearly outlining their SOP on how their Intelligence Architecture was supposed to be setup, which limited personnel from clearly understanding how the knowledge management plan worked.

Prior to the Rotation two of the five 35Ts assigned were working as a DTS clerk and unit armorer. Many of the MICOs intelligence systems were not being maintained, due to additional tasks for key essential personnel. As a result the 35Ts had to conduct rapid maintenance protocols on key systems once they arrived at NTC to systems such as the Trojan, prophets and T-Lite.

The rail movement of intelligence systems were not overseen by 35T/353T. Example: the Trojan was shipped via rail operations and it was stripped of equipment thought to be CCI. The result was too many parts were removed and once it arrived to NTC for operations parts were missing and the 353T had to order/create parts to get the Trojan operational. It appears as though operator level maintenance challenged the RTU and inhibited their ability to troubleshoot specialty equipment properly. As a result operators were not able to clearly articulate maintenance issues to the maintainers, instead 35Ts would have to start from ground zero to locate the issue with the equipment.

When the Brigade main jumped TOC it lost intelligence capability (UAS Feed) because the GCS moved with the main. There was no FMV fed established in the TAC. SOPs were not developed for jump TOC operations.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: As the Army continues to transform, the challenges of integrating new technology, information processing systems, sensors, and communications networks will continue to evolve and become more complex. Units must continuously train and rehearse on establishing the intelligence architecture and integrating intelligence into the mission command network at all echelons. As a part of that effort, intelligence leaders must continuously train on and plan for establishing an effective intelligence architecture across all phases of contingency operations. We must regain our proficiency in accomplishing these vital tasks in all operational environments.

The measure of success in employing, maintaining, and sustaining an effective intelligence architecture is directly related to the strength of a unit's electronic maintenance plan and its successful implementation. The 35Ts and 353Ts assigned to the unit are trained and equipped to fix automated equipment and conduct electronic maintenance. However, the key to executing an effective maintenance plan resides mostly in the operator's vigilance in proper use and maintenance. Leaders ensure the necessary time, supplies, and resources are available to execute the unit electronic maintenance plan.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Training

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Battle Tracking to Enable Synchronization and Decision Making

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Unit Challenges associated with Battle Tracking

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The Brigade S2 section had difficulties with consistently updating the enemy threat information into the Common Operational Picture located inside the TOC. Products including Enemy Courses of Action (Most Likely, Most Dangerous), PIRs, Event Template, NAIs overlays, and BDA tracker were not posted in the TOC.

The RTU was challenged by effectively tracking Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) effectively. Subordinate units were not reporting BDA in a timely manner and in turn the Brigade did not clear understanding of the COP.

The RTU was challenged by with articulating a shared understanding across all organizations inside the RTU. The RTU had multiple systems which displayed the Common operating Picture (COP), such as FBCB2, CPOF and an Analog Map to track the COP. However, there were some difficulties with nesting of all materials across the multiple systems.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Intelligence for the BCT supports the conduct of operations. Timely and accurate intelligence throughout an operation is vital if commanders are to make good decisions and retain the initiative. Accurately predicting what the threat will do is one of the most significant contributions of the intelligence 1-4 ATP 2-19.4 10 February 2015 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Overview warfighting function. The task of determining the most likely and most dangerous threat COAs during planning is codified in the IPB process and the MDMP. However, this task is perhaps more important during execution, when there is less time available to formulate a recommendation and more uncertainty surrounding the situation.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Training

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

Chapter 2
Maneuver Focus Areas
TCM–SBCT Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Fire Direction Center

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Stryker vehicle as an Fire Direction Center (FDC).

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Leaders within the Field Artillery Battalion supported an ongoing effort to utilize a Stryker vehicle as the FDC. This conversion would allow the organization to conduct a hip shoot faster and with greater protection. However, the Field Artillery Battalion did not support efforts to utilize the Stryker as a prime mover for the M777.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: This topic has been discussed in previous post-combat and post-NTC lessons learned sessions. TCM SBCT has conveyed the formation desires regarding the Stryker vehicle as an FDC to the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE). Furthermore, TCM BCT Fires has drafted and forwarded a memorandum that outlines the following order of precedence relative to Field Artillery Battalions desire for additional Strykers in the FA; 1) Battery CASEVAC w/Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), 2) Battery FDC, 3) S3 – BN FDC, 4) Battery Commander, and 5) M777 prime mover. The memorandum is currently being staffed at the FCoE and is pending the Fire Center of Excellence (FCoE) Commanding General's approval. When TCM SBCT obtains more fidelity on the outcome of the memorandum, we will share our findings with BCT and FA Battalion Commander. The prioritization and issuance of additional Strykers ultimately rests with HQDA.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Potential addition of the Stryker vehicle as an FDC will warrant doctrinal, organizational, and training changes. This change will enable more responsive fire support and improve protection across the maneuver elements within the BCT.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: None

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Safety

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Gunner Restraint Harnesses.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: During the rotation Soldiers within BCT stated that the RTU had difficulties with ensuring all vehicles had the proper Gunner Restraint Harnesses and retractors installed. As a result maintenance personnel fabricated install points, with PM oversight, prior to the rotation in order to install the restraint system. PM SBCT confirmed that GRS harnesses and retractors were shipped to the unit in 2013, however, not all GRH systems were installed across the entire fleet, prior to NTC 15-03

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: TCM SBCT, PM Stryker, and Rapid Equipping Force (REF) worked hard to get the Gunner Restraint Harnesses and retractors for the requisite number of Strykers in each SBCT. These harnesses need to be checked and inspected regularly to ensure they are being properly utilized by Stryker organizations.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Although this is material centered, the required material solution has already been provided to SBCTs. As a result training and leadership need to emphasis proper inspection and usage of the equipment.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: None

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Maintenance

(U)/(FOUO) Description: HMS manifold failure in cold weather.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: BDE XO expressed his concern over a higher than normal failure of Stryker HMS.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The HMS incorporates nitrogen gas (N2) over hydraulic fluid, separated by a piston. The interdiction of water contamination to N2 would obviously freeze affecting the manifold system. Maintainers must pay close attention to servicing procedures. Cold ambient temperature decreases N2 pressure and in turn illuminate the low N2 indicator.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training, Leader Development:** The unit should have sound maintenance procedures and cover operations under unusual conditions in unit SOP's. Crews, leaders, and 91S training on the effects of extreme cold weather on Stryker vehicles must take place every autumn or as new personnel arrive in the unit. Leaders at all levels across the SBCT must have a full understanding of extreme cold weather on all equipment.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:
Recommend PM SBCT contact maintainers in SBCT and identify the exact issue. PM needs to review POL stocks, maintenance procedures, proper function of HMS, and possible malfunction of sensors in extreme cold weather.

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Mission Command Systems

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Mission Command/RSOI - TCM SBCT comments

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Subordinate units within the brigade consolidated their computer systems in the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) for validation into the network. The basic network initialization does not take into consideration the systems performing all of the required capabilities needed when they move from the TAA into the operational/maneuver box for their brigade exercise. Checking that the system can access the network does not adequately provide commanders with the understanding of communication limitations with respect to Mission Command systems functioning to meet commander's operational requirements.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Units should validate access the network as well as their ability to operate all networks systems to appropriately identify issues and ensure all of the critical C4 systems are 100% operational.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training**: Units need to test all of their C4 systems in the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA)/facility prior to moving to their respective TOCs. This approach would provide the unit with the prime opportunity to have all available signal assets (Signal Soldiers, FSRs, etc.) collocated, facilitating a more effective method of identifying and eliminating potential problems.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: None

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Stryker tires in the desert

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Stryker tires continue to be an issue in desert environment.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: 1/25 SBCT experienced increased tire damage during the rotation. Improving the current tires resistance to puncture damage would alleviate stress on logistics supply chain. It is unknown at this time how the unit is utilizing Tire repair kit NSN 5120-00-308-3809 from TM 9-2355-311-10-2-3.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The Stryker formation is not authorized vehicle issued spare tires due to the possession of tire run flats. Desert environments have proven difficult when it comes to tire reliability, as they have caused an increased rate of tire damage. The tire damage being caused is beyond what the current Central Tire Inflation System (CTIS) can overcome without a tire patch installed.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Materiel:** Increasing tire puncture resistance would reduce strain placed on logistics system.

(U)/(FOUO) Leadership & Education: Increasing the unit's use of the Tire Repair kits IAW TM 9-2355-311-10-2-3 Work Package 0397. Use of this kit should be reinforced/trained during drivers training.
(U)/(FOUO) Doctrine: The addition of language requiring the crew to attempt to patch the tire prior to replacing the entire tire assembly would reduce unit tire expenses.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

- TM does not require the replacement of tire after a tire patch has been applied. Language would need to be added to all variant specific TMs and work-packages for wheel and tire assembly replacement.
- Language recommendation; "prior to replacing wheel and tire assembly, attempts should be made to patch IAW Tire puncture repair work package"
- Determine if improved ECP tire can be applied to DVH / FBH vehicles

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Tracking sensitive items

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Prioritization and tracking of sensitive items/mission essential equipment.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: BCT was delayed in their RSOI procedures due to sensitive items and mission essential equipment arriving late. As of RSOI day three, BCT was still waiting on radios and COMSEC to verify successful operation of the unit's lower Tactical Internet (TI) systems. Late arrival of critical equipment was said to be a result of frustrated cargo during shipment from home station to Fort Irwin. It is likely that this problem will also be carried over into the unit's EPLRS and SINGARs network checks. TCM SBCT was not able to determine the extent of the issue and how it will ripple through the unit's preparation, because we departed NTC prior to the unit entering the operations box.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Unit Movement Officers (UMOs) need to be cognizant of the fact that sensitive items and networking equipment plays critical role in the overall readiness and performance during rotation. UMOs need to prioritize and meticulously track sensitive equipment from point of departure to arrival and issue. It is understandable that units may not always be able to fully control movement of equipment; however, they can most certainly prioritize how these items are shipped and develop a timetable to help them better understand and manage this effort.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Organization:** Development of sound movement SOPs should support a more fluid deployment process and facilitate methodical shipment procedures.

(U)/(FOUO) Training: Home station training should not exclude or underestimate the importance of UMOs and AMOs and the establishment of redundancies.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: None

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Airspace deconfliction

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Additional capability to de-conflict airspace.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Units require enhanced airspace information at multiple locations. The TAIS (tactical airspace integration system) provides automated airspace control and planning and enhanced airspace control and planning and enhanced airspace control with execution with tactical displays.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The current BOI does not meet the commander's requirements of situational awareness/understanding, visualization, and de-confliction of airspace and airspace users.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Material:** The current BOI for the system is 1x per HHC Fire Support, ADAM, BAE section. Units need additional systems inside the BDE TOC and also systems allotted to the BDE TAC.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: None

Chapter 3
Fires Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: ART 3.2 Provide Fire Support

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Fire Support Rehearsal

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The BCT FSO led a scripted sequential back brief that covered each fire support task by phase for each task force. Positioning of counter fire radars and the RDO were only briefly discussed. Synchronization of fires with intelligence collection and observer plans could have been discussed in greater detail.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The rehearsal is an opportunity to ensure that task and purpose for each fire support task is understood. Combining the IC rehearsal and FS rehearsal can identify friction points and weaknesses in the observer plan.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training**: Move away from a scripted back brief towards a combined IC/FS rehearsal with adequate leadership representation from across the brigade.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: ART 3.1.1 Conduct the Targeting Process

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Brigade Targeting Workgroups and Meetings

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The BCT conducts daily WGs with participation from across the staff. Meetings are normally attended by the BCT Commander. Targeting guidance is reviewed at each meeting and products are tailored for each phase of the operation. Lethal and non-lethal effects were addressed.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The BCT does a good job with planning and produces good products for use by the Brigade.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: None

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: ART 3.3 Integrate Air Ground Operations

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Conduct of Air Space Control

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The BCT utilized a HIDACZ and Air Corridors to manage their airspace. The task forces were able to clear air and ground for their organic 120mm mortars by ensuring the HIDACZ was active and that the rounds would not pass through any of the ACAs or violate any NFAs. This did facilitate timely fires for the TFs, however, the BCT was challenged by a lack of any organic air surveillance radar to back up the procedural controls they put in place to integrate surface to surface fires with air operations. The ADAM/BAE's only source of an air picture was via an IP based network connection to division that often went down and had significant latency.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The BCT would benefit from organic radars for their air picture. Additionally a feed delivered to the BCT via the MIDS radios (LINK 16) would improve the quality of the air picture available to the BCT.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Material**: Sentinel radars for the BCT. Robust, low latency network communications to share air picture across the division.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: Replication of a LINK 16 feed to provide the BCT with an air picture they would expect to get over their organic systems would improve the quality of training for the ADAM/BAE section.

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: ART 3.2.2 Conduct Counter fire Operations

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Counter fire Battle Drill

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The BCT had a good plan for their counter fire battle drill, but was challenged to execute counter fire in a timely manner. Average time for a counter fire mission was around 30 minutes early in the rotation, improving to around a 20 minute average by the end of the rotation. Communication between sections in CUOPs and understanding of what is needed to execute the mission needs attention in order to improve responsiveness. Counter fire did not appear to be a priority for the BCT and the staff had difficulty with conducting a counter fire fight. Retransmission of digital fires nets needs attention for the fire support system to work properly. Correct setup of the AFATDS at both Brigade and FA Battalion can improve responsiveness of fires.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Digital system sustainment training incorporating the entire FS system will improve Soldier's confidence in operating their systems. Exercising battle drills during DSST will improve the responsiveness of the staff. DSST should incorporate retransmission of the digital nets at extended range to build confidence and proficiency.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training**: Digital sustainment training and battle drills.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 3.3 Integrate Air-Ground Operations; Management of Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: The unit was challenged in creating FSCM for ground and air units to allow rapid and responsive fires.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: FSCM's are developed to minimize friendly fire incidents and to control AOR's (Area of Responsibility) for battle tracking. FSCMs are also used to deconflict and synchronize joint fires and other military operations in the operational area. Effective FSCM's will not conflict with clearance of fires and should not make the clearing of fires longer then what it needs to be. For example, if boundaries of the battle field and ACM (Air Control Measures) are implemented this will control movement of ground and air assets from having certain areas to move. This will assist the maneuver task force with its ability to control their AOR (Area of Responsibility).

Enabling FSCM's and distributing them down to subordinate units will help units to track the battle field and assist with the clearance of fires. FSCM's need to be reviewed on a daily basis.

The RTU received multiple FSCMs without being reviewed. This caused issues with processing fire missions. At one point, subordinate FDC's were told to delete all FSCM's from the AFATDS. Battalion sent current FSCMs, a total of 251, from the previous count of over 300. The battalion lost valuable planning time as it took several hours to verify all units had the same FSCM's.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons:
Key Leaders should be familiar with reference materials:

Joint Publication 3-09, Joint Fire Support, Appendix A for types and planning of FSCM's.
FM 6-20-40, Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy)
FM 6-20-50, Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light)
ADP 5-0
FM 3-09.21 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battalion

Training- Conduct Fire support rehearsals and TOC operations with the Brigade Fires Cell.

- Enforce and conduct DSST (Digital System Sustainment Training) with all elements of the Fires Cell.
- Conduct FDC academy with Fires Cell on FSCM Management.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training**: Review 13D, 13F and BOLC POI's to ensure sufficient FSCM related classes are included.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 5.2.1.3 Establish or Revise Standard Operating Procedures; Communication (PACE Plan)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: The unit was challenged in having a contingency and emergency means of communication.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The RTU had primary and alternate means of communication, both means were FM Radios (SINGARS or ASIP's radios). During the rotation the RETRANS section came in contact with the OPFOR, resulting in a compromise of COMSE. At that point FM radios were no longer secured and now the opposing force had the means to listen and gather information on the RTU. Units inside of the RTU had no additional means of communication other than FM Radios.

Normal contingency and emergency assets of having communication on the battle field is the TACSAT (satellite radio) and the HF (High Frequency) radios, which work beyond the line of sight. The RTU had these additional assets, but had difficulty maintaining the equipment throughout the rotation, due to lack of spare parts.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Include communication training as part of a routine schedule event at home station. Performing maintenance and communication checks will ensure that all system are fully mission capable. Additionally personnel need to ensure they conduct PCI/PCCs throughout the roatation to ensure equipment is maintained.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Material**- Review MTOE equipment for the TACSAT and HF Radio systems.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 3.2.1 Employ Fires;
DA 4504 Record of Fire

(U)/(FOUO) Description: DA 4504 Record of Fire is a recorded document of detailed information that is filled out by the Fire Direction Center (FDC).

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Unit was challenged in completing necessary data on the DA 4504. While observing the unit, the Record of Fire was reviewed by the Observers Controllers and noticed several records were incomplete lacking essential information. Information missing was range, type of projectile and end of mission time. This is critical data to verify computational information.

Required information consists of the target grid, type and number of projectiles are to be fired (Fire Order), observer calling in the fire mission, any special instructions that are requested for the fire mission. Although different fire missions might require more data, there is minimum information that has to be annotated. The information of data that is sent to subordinate FDC's and to the howitzers assigned to the artillery batteries has to be recorded to provide justification of the sending unit. The purpose is to protect the element if a firing incident arises.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: All FDC's need to be trained on the DA 4504 and know where information is annotated on the document. FDC personnel need to know required information for a fire mission to be sent to a subordinate FDC or to a howitzer section. FDC section to cross train with howitzer section to better understand how the information provided by the FDC effects the projectile and the performance of the howitzer section.
Reference FM 6-40

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Training- Review 13D PME Record of Fire related classes to ensure sufficient training.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 5.2.1.1 Organize People, Information Management Procedures, and Equipment and Facilities

Communication Personnel

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Battalion authorized number of qualified Staff Sergeants for support of firing batteries.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The RTU had an adequate amount of assigned and qualified personnel to maintain communication equipment with in the Batteries. All the Batteries were assigned a Staff Sergeant to maintain and train personnel on all communication equipment. The same Staff Sergeant stayed with the battery and is familiar with all communication issues within the unit, due in part to the habitual relationship that was established at home station. The assigned individual coordinated through the Battalion S-6 for further support that was required during the rotation and kept BN informed of the status of communication equipment. Assigned personnel ensure maintenance is conducted and performed to standard.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Ensure appropriate grade/MOS personnel are assigned to firing batteries.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 3.2.1 Employ Fires
Data Distribution in the AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Data Distribution must be set within the system to keep all AFATDS in line and allow flow of information among all AFATDS systems within the Brigade Combat Team.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The unit was challenged in receiving and distributing information from the Brigade Fires Cell. This is important because all AFATDS systems must be able to have enough information for battle tracking that could affect any Fire Mission given to the artillery battalion or any Fires Asset. For Example, if a maneuver task force sets up an NFA (No Fire Area) within their sector, this information must be tracked not only at brigade but at the Fires Battalion. If the data distribution in the AFATDS is set up correctly, the NFA is established and entered into the AFATDS then it is automatically sent to the Brigade as well as subordinate elements within the Brigade that is tied into the Brigade Fires Cell AFATDS.

The unit found it difficult to disseminate essential information to subordinate AFATDS and Fires Cell AFATDS, because the data distribution was not built correctly in the system. It is recommended that once the data distribution is established, don't disable it. When working correctly, the data distribution will cause many low level alerts. These alerts only inform the operator that there were changes done automatically in the system.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Enforce and conduct DSST (Digital System Sustainment Training) for all AFATDS within the Fires Cell and the Fires Battalion. Update Digital SOP to ensure all Fires AFATDS can talk to each other. Digital SOP needs to have URN, station rank of all elements with the AFATDS. Conduct AFATDS academy to teach the setup of Data Distributing to all personnel within the Fires Cell and the FDC's. Reference TM 11-7025-297-10-1 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) Operational System Software Version 6.4.0.1

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Training- Review CATS and PME to ensure Data Distribution tasks are incorporated in AFATDS training.
Training: Consider vignettes to establish data input into the AFATDS for Data Distribution.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 3.2.1.1 Conduct Surface –to- Surface Attack

Attack Guidance in the AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Unit had challenges in setting up Attack Guidance matrix within the AFATDS to facilitate the delivery of fires.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The unit was challenged in having Attack Guidance set up in the AFATDS. Data for the Attack Guidance is based off the commander's intent of the current operation order. If the Attack Guidance is set up in the AFATDS this establishes guidance for the subordinate elements on how to attack the target based off the location and target size and description of the target. Data in the Attack Guidance in the AFATDS will prompt the system to default the projectiles and number of rounds and the size of the firing unit to be fired for a particular fire mission. This will assist the FDC's when establishing a Fire Order on how to engage the target. Having information in the Attack Guidance will also manage your firing unit information within the system by tracking the current type of ammunition for each battery by type and quantity. This information in the Attack Guidance is critical and helps the crew drill of any Fire Cell and FDC section. Attack Guidance needs to be reviewed once a day to ensure all entries are met by all commanders' intent.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Enforce and conduct DSST (Digital System Sustainment Training) for all AFATDS within the Fires Cell and the Fires Battalion. Conduct AFATDS academy to teach the setup of Attack Guidance to all personnel within the Fires Cell and the FDC's. Review MCWP 3-16 and know the three levels of attack analysis and know what responsibilities each of them have. Reference TM 11-7025-297-10-1 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) Operational System Software Version 6.4.0.1

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Training- Review CATS and PME to ensure Attack Guidance Matrix are incorporated in AFATDS training. Consider vignettes to establish step by step inputting data into the Attack Guidance.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Security of the Movement

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Crew Served Weapons were not manned nor staggered in the movement.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The unit was challenged in having convoy security with the crew served weapons. During the movement weapons were not staggered in the movement. All weapons were oriented in the direction of the vehicle in front of them. This will cause fratricide within the convoy. Qualified personnel need to be tasked to man the assigned crew served weapons. Personnel need to know how to maintain and operate the weapon to ensure the weapons performance will not hinder the movement.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The RTU will ensure Soldiers are qualified on all crew served weapons. The RTU will ensure all weapons are maintained and functional.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Organization- Ensure adequate crew served weapons are assigned to the unit.
Training- Ensure all personnel are trained and qualified on all crew served weapons.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 5.2.1.2 Organize Command Post to Support Command Functions

Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Set-up and Tear down

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Priorities of work during the Set-up and Tear down of the TOC were not established.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The unit was challenged in the tear down of the TOC. During the tear down procedures equipment was not re-packaged in a manner that would enable the unit easily pick up and move their equipment. This hindered their ability to set up load plans, which resulted in a loss of critical time that was needed for additional tasks. The lack of load plans also made it difficult for personnel to track all like items and ensure they were organized, which could have led to loss/damage to equipment that is needed IOT make a TOC fully mission capable.

During the TOC Set-up, priorities of work were not established causing there to a lag in dissemination of orders, which resulted in the TOC not being established in a timely manner. During TOC Set-up two priorities that need to be emphasized: communication to higher and subordinates elements and security of the TOC's perimeter. During the set-up it took the unit about 2.5 hours to establish communication to their higher echelon and subordinate units. Due to the lack of direction, and guidance security was minimally manned and could have resulted in the TOC being overran by the OPFOR. Setting up priorities of work will enable successful TOC operations in a timely manner and keep everyone gainfully employed.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Conduct TOC set-up and tear down rehearsals with all TOC personnel to establish battle rhythm. Annotate in TACSOP priorities of work and TOC layout to avoid confusion. Review load plans of equipment in vehicles and annotate in TACSOP.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 5.2.1.1 Organize People, Information Management Procedures, and Equipment and Facilities (Fire Direction Vehicle)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Using the M1097 HMMWV shelter truck limited the space for personnel and equipment for FDC operations.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The FDC's was challenged in having a sufficient vehicle for Fire Direction operations. The current vehicle in use is limited to two personnel during operations. The AFATDS operator is currently set up in the center of the shelter with the section chief behind him to observe data input into the system. The RTO (Radio Transmission Operator), Centaurs operator and recorder position themselves right outside the back door to collect data as soon as they can get it. Ideally the recorder is right beside the AFATDS operator collecting data off the AFATDS or receiving it from the operator. The Centaur operator needs to be collocated with the AFATDS operator so data can be cross checked between both systems. The purpose of these two systems matching data is because it is a secondary check for the FDC. The RTO needs to be positioned within the vehicle, so sending and receiving transmissions can be monitored by section chief or the FDO (Fire Direction Officer). The FDO currently has his situational map sitting on a table that is in the tent behind the vehicle. In this situation, with the FDO outside the vehicle, information could be misunderstood and has to be repeated. The FDO needs to be in the vehicle so he can assist in the supervising of the Fire Direction operations and execute fire missions in a timely and safe manner. Equipment that effects operations are currently stored in boxes that are placed in the tent during occupation. FDC personnel are transported in other unit vehicles making it a challenge for the FDC to maintain firing capabilities on the move.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Review vehicle set-up and load to facilitate FDC Operations.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Material- Review MTOE for possible upgrade for Stryker variant to support FDC operations.

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Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 5.2.1 Conduct Command Post Operations to Support Tactical Operations; Frequency Management

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Brigade Fires Cell was on the Battalion Fire Direction Net. This issue caused multiple transmissions to be questioned during fire mission processing to subordinate FDC's.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The Battalion FDC and subordinate FDC's were challenged in having clear and concise radio transmissions for fire missions. During the rotation the Fires Cell was using the RETRANS to establish comms to the Battalion FDC. The RETRANS became ineffective from the opposing force and caused the Fires Cell to establish comms on the Battalion FDC frequency. In this situation, this could cause confusion on the frequency for all elements to understand specific radio transmissions.

The Brigade Fires Cell and the FA Battalion FDC use two FM Radio Frequencies separate from the frequencies that are used from Battalion FDC to the subordinate FDC's. Brigade to Battalion uses one frequency for voice transmissions and the second frequency is used for digital transmissions for the AFATDS to receive fire missions from Brigade. The same concept is used for the Battalion FDC to the subordinate FDC's. The reason being is to avoid confusion and have control of fire missions and to prevent unnecessary radio traffic during fire mission processing.

In the event that the frequencies are tied into the units RETRANS and RETRANS goes down then alternate means need to be established to have communications with the Battalion FDC. Brigade will not establish communication on the Fires Frequency.

With three elements being on the same voice frequency this could cause a firing incident. For example multiple fire missions are given to the Battalion FDC from the Brigade Fires Cell. The Battalion FDC distributes the missions to their subordinate FDC's. With all three firing batteries having different missions, and Brigade on the fires radio frequency then Radio traffic on this net could be misunderstood and a subordinate FDC could shoot their mission when it was intended for a different firing FDC. At this point Battalion loses control of their subordinates FDC's.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Establish a Communication Parameters Card with primary and alternate frequencies for all Fire Elements. Communication Parameters needs to be annotated in Digital SOP. Conduct long and short range voice and digital radio checks to ensure all frequencies do not interfere with any other fire elements. Establish communication through the use of TACSAT (Satellite Radio) or HF (High Frequency) radio systems.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training – Review CATS to communication tasks related to TACSAT and HF radio system operations.

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OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Article 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations; Warrior Task and Battle Drills

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Reacting to a Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attack and use of Crew Served Weapons

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Unit was challenged in training in a CBRN attack. During the CBRN attack the time standard of donning the protective mask is nine seconds and executing MOPP 4 in eight minutes was not met. This caused Soldiers to become casualties resulting in personnel covering down on duties outside of their scope of responsibility.

Soldiers had a difficult time operating in MOPP 4, while at NTC due in part to fatigue and dehydration. They were not accustomed to weather index nor were they prepared to operate for long periods of time in MOPP 4. Conducting CBRN training at home station will ensure that Soldiers are aware of what they are capable of doing under MOPP 4 conditions. Secondly it will allow Leaders to determine workloads that can be performed under those conditions.

The unit was challenged in knowing performance steps of their assigned crew served weapons. In clearing of the weapons, negligent discharges occurred. All Soldiers need to know how to conduct maintenance and how to do function checks for all weapons in their unit. Maintenance will identify parts that are missing that hinders the performance of the weapon. It was observed that a section was questioned on their crew served weapon and it was noted that the charging handle was missing. Dead-lined weapons take away from your security. Daily maintenance and cleaning needs to be enforced by the section chief and by the platoon leadership.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Warrior Training needs to be conducted and evaluated by leadership to ensure Soldiers understand individual task and meets Unit Mission Essential Task List (METL). Review Warrior Task to be involved in routine weekly/monthly training focus.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

Chapter 4
MSCOE Focus Topics

Military Police Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Company Command Post Operations (NTC 15-03, JAN 2015)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Observations and Lessons Learned during the 558th Military Police Company, National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-03, 22 JAN – 6 FEB 15.Company Command Post Operations

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: CP operations were extremely efficient. Military Police Company Digital and Analog trackers set the standard at NTC. Units integrated BFT TOC kits despite being limited by connectivity. The unit also established battle tracking by using analog systems that enabled the Commander to clearly understand the battlefield in which he was operating.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Best Practices – The Rotational Training Unit (RTU) created/resourced battle tracking boards that clearly illustrated Men/Weapons/Equipment (MWE) and assets available. Simultaneously, developed tracking boards that maintained the CDRs PIR, CCIR, and FFIR/EFIR, which enabled all personnel in the TOC to clearly understand the CDRs intent and allowed for critical decisions to be made at critical moments in the battle. They also maintained topographic and overhead photo maps both with digital and analog systems, which allowed for redundant battle tracking techniques. The RTU was able to execute TOC operations in accordance with FM 6-0, Chapter 1, due in part to a fully developed TOCSOP and battle rhythm events being rehearsed at home station.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Material: Units must ensure they create internal battle tracking mechanisms (i.e. battle boards, staff journals, status boards displaying internal logistics, personnel, and equipment) T: Personnel assigned to the TOC must conduct refresher or sustainment training prior to deployment. Training subjects should include intelligence link analysis, prioritization of orders and FRAGO's, and TOC SOP's.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Military police (MP) support to Brigade & Battalion Movement Control (NTC 15-03, JAN 2015)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Observations and Lessons Learned during the 558th Military Police Company, National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-03, 22 JAN – 6 FEB 15.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: MPs are able to limit, control, block, or direct mounted or dismounted forces traveling on the MSR, by employing special circulation control measures. Although Traffic Control Posts (TCPs) were utilized during this rotation, other movement control measures such as route signing, holding areas, and defiles were not part of the movement plan. As a result, units moving on the battlefield during the rotation entered one-way traffic defilades simultaneously, and were subject to missing movement times due to lack of route signing informing leadership of the most efficient way to travel.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Per FM 3-39, the Provost Marshal is responsible for creating a battle space Traffic Control Plan, which in turn is validated by MP's within their sector of operations. Lack of a Traffic Control Plan negated the implementation of overlays, which annotate control measures, alternate routes, holding areas, and defiles. During MP route reconnaissance missions, patrols must annotate and report obstructions and restrictive driving areas. To include natural defense and assembly areas, dead communication zones, and driving times and distances IOT support and/or update the battlefield movement control plan.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training:** MP squads must train on terrain analysis IOT properly communicate route reconnaissance information and intelligence. Sustainment and refresher training on the establishment of Traffic Control Posts, defile and holding area operations must be implemented into the unit training plan.
Leadership: Traffic Control Plans must be created as soon as the battle space area has been identified, and must then be validated with on-the-ground patrols by MPs as soon as operational restraints allow.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Military Police Operation Orders (OPORDs) and dissemination of mission information (NTC 15-03, JAN 2015)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Military Police Operation Orders (OPORDs) Observations and Lessons Learned during the 558th Military Police Company, National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-03, 22 JAN – 6 FEB 15.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The Rotational Training Unit (RTU) was able to develop a thorough process when developing the situation and mission paragraphs of the OPORD, however the execution paragraph was lacking and substandard. The RTU was not able to clearly "paint the picture" as a result there was a lack in the understanding of the Common Operating Picture (COP). Additional materials such as Maps, overlays, and terrain models could assist with the understanding of the COP, but were not disseminated down to the lowest levels. This in part led to confusion and or lack of understanding the overall scheme of maneuver. Again, this could have been alleviated with the use of graphics and overlays.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: MP small unit leaders must use Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) to provide a framework for planning and preparing operations. Initial assessments must be completed utilizing METT-TC, and Leaders must be aware that they do not have to wait until higher headquarters completes their plan to begin their own planning.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training:** Units that are able to articulate a sound training program requires the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders to give OPORDs under the observation of an evaluator who then gives feedback on content and presentation. It is critical that all soldiers have a complete understanding of graphic control measures and operational overlays. Teams must possess this critical information prior to mission execution to ensure accomplishment and avoid potential fratricide incidents. **Leadership:** Leaders must ensure their OPORD briefings contain the following: Command Presence, only critical facts and assumptions, a balance between centralized and decentralized control, simplify and brevity in details not covered in SOP's, and provisions for direct coordination among subordinates.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: MP Police Intelligence Operations (PIO)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Observations and Lessons Learned during the 558th Military Police Company, National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-03, 22 JAN – 6 FEB 15.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) is a technique that can be utilized by the RTU to employ Military Police, which enable them to become a force multiplier of the battle space manager. MP leaders must recognize that access to operations of combat support make the mission of the intelligence gathering tertiary to our routine business. PIO is one of the Commander's tools for making the MP a vital component to the total battle space in any operational environment.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Brigade and Battalion Commanders, with input from the Brigade Provost Marshal, must determine the best way to employ Military Police for the PIO function and communicate their intent to the lowest levels within their command. PIO contributes three elements of information to the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection effort. These three elements of information include: tactical / operational, criminal, and police. MP leaders must realize that accurate reporting of information is critical to the decision making process. Platoon Leaders must relay all intelligence collected on the ground through the chain of command and ultimately to the battalion commander as quickly as possible.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training:** MP units must implement training that encompass joint operations with host nation police, host nation military forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, and the staff judge advocate. Subject matter experts, such as Military Police Investigators or HUMINT should be utilized to train MP's on tactical battle field questioning.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Provost Marshal (PM) Cell is not manned in accordance with MTOE (NTC 15-03, JAN 2015)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Observations and Lessons Learned during the 558th Military Police Company, National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-03, 22 JAN – 6 FEB 15.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The PM cell (which by MTOE should be staffed with three individuals 31A [O-3]; 31B30; 31E30) was manned by one 1LT. Assignment of a post-Command MP Officer is crucial. The cell consists of a newly promoted 31A 1LT with no operations or deployment experience. The lack of proper staffing and experience was a mission hindrance, due to an inability to communicate priorities of effort and support, acceptable mission risks, and advising the Commander on policing and corrections as they relate to the rule of law and stability tasks.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The lack of qualified personnel assigned to this position had a negative impact on military police utilization and mission success. There is also a degradation of MP capability in all five functions as the PM cell is not being integrated into Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), resulting in maneuver commanders being unaware of MP capabilities.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Organization: Units must be cognizant of their MTOE/TDA and fill staff positions accordingly. **Personnel:** When filling MTOE personnel slots, a conscious effort must be made to put the most senior and experienced leaders in positions that will allow the full spectrum of MP capabilities to be communicated to leadership and implemented into the MDMP

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Military Police Company Rules of Engagement (ROE) (NTC 15-03, JAN 2015)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Rules of Engagement (ROE) Observations and Lessons Learned during the 558th Military Police Company, National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-03, 22 JAN – 6 FEB 15.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: While operating in populated areas, MPs continue to struggle with understanding the ROE due to an inability to discern between a hostile act and hostile intent. Commanders and those in leadership positions are not communicating the ROE based on the intent and concept of the operation, and Soldiers do not have a baseline knowledge of the Escalation Of Force (EOF) threat assessment process SOP.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons Learned: Improve Soldiers understanding of Rules of Engagement by issuing Cards down to the Soldier level. Ensure that ROE, weapons posture, and hostile act versus hostile intent is discussed during Operations Orders. Utilize the Engagement Skills Trainer shoot/don't shoot scenarios in order to increase MP lethality on the battlefield, to prevent civilian casualties, and establish EOF SOPs. Develop non-lethal kits as options for platoons that include non-lethal munitions to support combat operations.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Leadership:** Commanders at all levels must communicate the distinction between the use of force for mission accomplishment and self-defense. **Training:** Soldiers must train on proportionality of force and the force continuum, effects of collateral damage, and established unit EOF SOP's.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Soldier awareness of media (non-combatants) presence on the battlefield (NTC 15-03, JAN 2015).

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Observations and Lessons Learned during the 558th Military Police Company, National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-03, 22 JAN – 6 FEB 15.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: A keen situational awareness of the language barriers must be consistently examined. Soldiers must be aware of the Media's pervasive presence on the battlefield is not always a hindrance, but a source of information. Situational awareness of the civilian/non-combatant population is critical for military operations. Non-combatants may not be made the object of direct attack, but may suffer injury or death incidental to a direct attack on a military objective. Exploitation by local government, insurgents, terrorists, and drug/criminal organizations, can put non-combatants in the forefront of danger, especially in an urban setting.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: MPs were not able to deal with more than one battlefield variable at one time. Being able to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants became an issue on a few occasions. Understanding the motivations between combatants and non-combatants can cause confusion on occasion, causing the mission intent to become disarrayed with mission accomplishment.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Training: Training must stress a challenging conventional and unconventional fight on a cluttered battlefield where non-combatant casualties can have a detrimental effect on the US Army mission. **Leadership:** Commanders must recognize that there may be a host nation or enemy use of perception that use US Military incidents against us during information operations.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

Chapter 5
Sustainment Focus Areas
CASCOM Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO Title: Synchronization of Sustainment Operations

(U)/(FOUO Description: Sustainment Rehearsal/Brief

(U)/(FOUO Discussion: On training day (TD) 07, the rotational training unit (RTU) conducted a sustainment rehearsal/brief to set the conditions for providing logistical support during force on force operations scheduled to begin on TD08. Key members of the staff conducted a thorough rehearsals that will support the BDE during all four phases of force on force operations. This was an essential event, because it allowed key members across the BDE the opportunity to gain a common operating picture (COP) of the maneuver throughout the rotation. The rehearsal/brief highlighted all the locations of essential logistics nodes throughout all four phases of the operation. It also highlighted the capability of key logistics assets that would be supporting the various phases of the operation.

> Sustainment operations are fully integrated with the BCT battle rhythm through integrated planning and oversight of ongoing operations. Sustainment and operational planning occurs simultaneously rather than sequentially. Incremental adjustments to either the maneuver or sustainment plan during its execution must be visible to all BCT elements. The sustainment synchronization matrix and sustainment report are both used to initiate and maintain synchronization between operations and sustainment functions (FM 3-90.6)

(U)/(FOUO Insights/Lesson: Based on feedback from the OC/T TM, the following observations are systemic among several RTUs: (1) the staff did not conduct a roll call prior to the start of the rehearsal/brief to ensure that key leaders were present. This was a key oversight, because it is essential that pertinent information be disseminated across the BDE. Valuable mission critical information was being briefed. (2) The sight location for the rehearsal/brief was not optimal it was difficult to hear the information being disseminated due to wind, noise from generators as well as other distractors. Those factors should have been considered prior to the terrain model being selected.

In order to achieve a common operating picture (COP), proper dissemination of information to key leaders is essential. Therefore participants should be identified, notified so a proper roll call could have been conducted. This event was significant and selection of the site should have enabled all personnel to clearly hear the information as it was disseminated. Ultimately, all environmental issues should have been considered prior to the selection of the site IOT eliminate distractors and increase the COP.

(U)/(FOUO DOTMLPF Implications:
N/A

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(U)/(FOUO Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO Title: Synchronization of Sustainment Operations

(U)/(FOUO Description: Gaps in Communication Delayed Sustainment Support

(U)/(FOUO Discussion: The RTU struggled with communication at echelon. There were instances where it was evident that significant gaps in communication delayed the receipt of critical supplies and/or sustainment support to the RTU. One such example, included an incident where one of the subordinate units assigned to the RTU submitted a request for a HET to recover a disabled M1 during the rotation. It was not clear exactly where the breakdown in communication occurred. However, the crew sat for almost two TDs waiting for the recovery assets. Based on the information I received the request was initially submitted to the BDE S4 shop. However, it appeared that they did not take the required actions necessary to action the support request. This is one of at least four examples that I witnessed during my observation of the rotation.

(U)/(FOUO Insights/Lesson: Despite the detail sustainment rehearsal being conducted prior to the execution of the operation, the sustainment support was not executed as planned. At the user level, unit personnel did not seem to have a clear understanding of the sustainment concept of support (CoS).

(U)/(FOUO DOTMLPF Implications:

Training

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(U)/(FOUO Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO Title: Establishment of the Brigade Support Area (BSA)

(U)/(FOUO Description: Lack of urgency to fully establish the BSA

(U)/(FOUO Discussion: Security was not established in a timely manner when the RTU jumped the BSA, resulting in the BSA not being able to secure themselves. The RTU began the process of jumping the BSA on TD 10 and struggled to have the BSA fully mission capable by TD 12. They were still in the process of establishing the perimeter at the new location. Overall security of the BSA was lacking, which could have resulted in infiltration by enemy personnel. Additionally, I was informed that the BSB deviated from the original location of the BSA, due to the lack of functionality of the original site.

> The BSA should be located so that support can be maintained, but does not interfere with the tactical movement of the BCT units, or with units that must pass through the BCT area. The BSA's size varies with terrain; however, and area 4 to 7 KM in diameter is a planning guide. Usually the BSA should be positioned away from the enemy's likely avenues of approach and entry point into the BCT's main battle area (MBA). The BSB commander is responsible for the command and control of all units in the BSA for security and terrain management (pp. 9-5 FM 3-90.6)

(U)/(FOUO Insights/Lesson: Observations captured from previous DATE rotations indicate that establishing a BSA is a lost art that RTUs typically struggle with. The BCT S-4, BCT S-3, and BSB S-3 coordinate the location of the BCT sustainment support areas. The types of support areas include: Battalion and company trains and Brigade support areas. (FM 3-90.6) The responsibility of establishing the security of the BSA resides with the S3, but all personnel located within the BSA have a vested interest in the security of the BSA. Sustainment operations can (obviously) be disrupted or capabilities can be lost during an enemy attack. Therefore, security should be a primary concern upon occupying a new terrain of the battlefield. Figure 1 below is a generic depiction of BCT support areas.



Figure 1 (FM 3-90.6) (U)/(FOUO)

(U)/(FOUO)DOTMLPF Implication:
Training

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(U)/(FOUO)Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO)Title: Maintenance Management

(U)/(FOUO)Discussion: The RTU recently reorganized its logistics force structure establishing forward support companies (FSCs) to provide direct logistics support to the line units. As a results, the RTU is still adjusting to the new logistics support structure. Moreover, not all authorized positions have been filled, which made it difficult to operate at optimal level. For example the brigade is authorized 99 Stryker mechanics (91S). However, the unit have 73 assigned across the brigade. The distribution of the of the 91S throughout the RTU is as follows:

Unit	E4 & Below	NCOs
5-1 CAV	9	3
BSB	N/A	2
1-24 IN	9	3
2-8 FA	1	N/A
BEB	8	N/A
3-21 IN	14	3
1-5 IN	17	4

(U)/(FOUO)Insights/Lesson: It is too early to determine the full impact that personnel shortages will have on this type of organization in the long run. Paragraph 9-27 of FM 3-90.6 states that: "Sustainment operations can be tailored in response to changes in tactical requirements. In most cases, the BSB will provide the supplies and services required by the supported unit at a specific point in time (scheduled delivery)". However, it was observed during the rotation that the FCSs had to conduct LOGPACs due in part to the BSB not conducting routine push of supplies to the FSC. This frustrated some of the leaders within the FSCs, because it stressed the limited resources of the FSC.

(U)/(FOUO)DOTMLPF Implication:
Training/Organization

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(U)/(FOUO)Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Not enough NCO supervisory personnel

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Lack of enough deployable NCOs to support decisive action training exercise (DATE) rotation

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: One of the FSCs inside of the RTU acknowledged that they were not able to deploy with enough maintenance NCOs to (adequately) perform the first line level maintenance supervision during the rotation. As a result, the maintenance tech was forced to serve in dual roles both as the maintenance technician as well as provide the direct first line level supervision. This occurrence degraded the unit's maintenance management capability.

This occurrence is not unique to this particular RTU. In past DATE rotation, it has been observed that units are deploying to DATE rotations with personnel shortages in critical logistics positions. This creates challenges with regards to synchronization and execution of sustainment operations. Mainly due to the fact it limits the opportunity for key leaders to participate in a culminating exercises at the combat training centers (CTCs). Units must (deliberately) forecast personnel requirements in advance and exhaust all options to ensure that key personnel shortages are filled with the correct skillsets prior to deploying to the CTCs. This will (obviously) optimize the training effect during CTC rotations.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Training/Personnel

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Maintenance management/reporting

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Blasting maintenance status to high consistently

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Some units across the brigade were inconsistent with regards to blasting maintenance status to the BSB. Some units blasted their maintenance status to the SAMS-2E at the BSB consistently throughout the exercise. However, some units struggled to maintain the required STAMIS connectivity required to facilitate blasting status consistently.

One unit expressed that it was exceptionally challenged in this area because of the frequent jump across the battlefield during the exercise. This was the same unit that indicated that it did not deploy with enough NCO leadership to manage its maintenance operation. This further underscores the importance of deploying with adequate number of personnel in key positions. It is a difficult undertaking to stop maintenance operations and relocate, while trying to simultaneously maintain support to the combat units. This can only be mastered if practiced routinely, and if there is adequate personnel available to accomplish supervisory and management duties. The implied task is to train personnel consistently and ensure that key positions are filled and are able to perform their duties as supervisors.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Training

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Stryker mechanics (91S) performance

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Overall assessment of the competency levels of the school trained 91Ss.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The consensus I received from maintenance leaders across the brigade with regards to the performance of the 91S (the newly established Stryker mechanic MOS) is that the mechanics were performing well. This is an indication that the schoolhouse is adequately preparing the Soldiers to perform at their first duty station. The leaders recognized (however) that Soldiers must continue to receive on the job training at home station and in the field environment to enhance the MOS proficiency.

Supervisors must continue to mentor and monitor the MOS proficiency of the 91S at home station and look for opportunities to conduct realistic training during daily operations. Furthermore, the unit should look for trends and identify systemic training deficiencies and provide that feedback to the schoolhouse for possible integration into future 91S program of instruction (POI).

One of the FSC technicians expressed that the 91S POI should be updated to include training on disassembling and maintenance of the full up power pack (FUPP). This will enable the maintainers to have the required knowledge of how to properly replace components of the FUPPs, instead of replacing the entire FUPP when a component fails. It is less expensive to repair components of the FUPP, instead of replacing the complete FUPP, routine and effective component troubleshooting would result in a positive financial impact.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Operator level maintenance

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Lack of operator level maintenance and pride of ownership impedes readiness

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: There is a general consensuses among the maintenance leaders throughout the RTU that the unit was challenged with regards to operator level maintenance. The consensus is that the operators do not have adequate knowledge of the equipment IOT conduct operator level maintenance. Furthermore, there is a genuine consensus that there is a lack of ownership among the operators for their assigned equipment. This is critical due to the fact that operator level maintenance is the foundation of any unit's maintenance program. It is the responsibility of the using organization's operators and crews to perform maintenance on its assigned equipment (ATP 4-33).

The maintenance managers indicated that substandard operator level maintenance and operator mishandling assigned equipment contributed to a significant amount of equipment failures. However, it is worth mentioning that operator level maintenance has been the challenge for many units' maintenance program. I personally experienced this during my tenure as a maintenance technician.

Units must establish comprehensive drivers training programs, with an emphasize on operator level maintenance. This will test Soldiers' ability to conduct operator level maintenance prior to certifying him/her to operate a particular piece of equipment. Commanders at all levels must understand the Army maintenance system, and the role of operators, crews and maintainers, to have the right capabilities in the right place at the right time (ATTP 4-33). Subsequently, commanders must exert the appropriate level of influence to ensure that operator level maintenance is conducted to standard. Additionally, they must hold Soldiers accountable whenever they cause damage to equipment as a result of mishandling it.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Brigade Logistic Support Team (BLST) Chief

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Location of the BLST Chief

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: During this rotation the supporting brigade logistic team (BLST) Chief was co-located with the BSB in the field. This afforded the BLST chief to observe maintenance issues and trends and provide the required support to the RTU in a more efficient manner. However, it was challenging to coordinate LAR support at the point of need on the battlefield. Because the LARs are civilians and their exclusive reliance on non-tactical vehicles (NTVs), their freedom of movement on the battlefield was restricted during force on force phase of the operation. Consequently, LAR support at the point of need was delayed whenever the supported unit fail to coordinated to get the LARs to the location where support was required.

The OC/T indicated that this was one of the first if not the first DATE rotation in which the BLST supported the unit directly from the field location. Because The LARs are responsible for providing maintenance support and/or advice on the repair and employment of critical enabling systems, the paradigm shift will undoubtedly yield dividends as more RTUs continue the trend.

Future RTUs need to continue the trend to ensure that the BLST Chiefs are co-located with the supported unit in the field rather than in the rear area. Additionally, the RTU must consider how they will integrate the civilian support personnel into the CoS (particularly) during key stages of operation and develop a comprehensive plan that is disseminated to key leaders throughout the unit. The integration plan should also be a part of the unit's sustainment rehearsal.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Training

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Maintenance Management

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Employing defense connect online (DCO) to augment the maintenance management process

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The RTU was able to routinely conduct maintenance and LOGSYNCH meetings via DCO with subordinate units despite being geographically dispersed. This allowed frequent collaboration to synchronize sustainment operations.

The OC/T indicated that the employment of the DCO to augment sustainment operations has resulted in improved synchronization of the RTUs sustainment efforts. However, they indicated that some units are able to capitalize on the use of DCO more than others.

Ideally units need to attempt to use the tactical communication systems provided by the Army to support sustainment operations and collaborations. However, they must concurrently identify alternative approved systems to augment or replace tactical systems if/when requirements exceeds capability of Army systems.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Materiel/Training

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

TCM Stryker Focus Areas

OBSERVATION REPORT

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Sustainment

(U)/(FOUO) Description: EAB support to mitigate sustainment challenges to the SBCT

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: BCT had difficulties in their ability to move equipment throughout the rotation. Support assets lacked the organic lift capability to move all equipment, to include ASL of attached organizations. The fuel consumption of the attached Tank Co and ARB put an additional strain on the BDE.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: EAB Support requirements need to be identified in the planning stage of the NTC cycle. Specifically, the BDE S3/BDE S4 and Support Operations officer need to identify EAB support requirements prior to deployment.

Recent MTOE changes to the SBCT means that it is critical movement and maneuver staff officers and sustainment staff officers work together to fully understand and state EAB requirements.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training:** The NTC LTP may identify EAB support requirements, however depending on where that falls in the collective training cycle, it may be too late to coordinate for EAB support effectively. **Leader Development:** Sustainment leaders must be cognizant of the ability of the SBCT to task organize rapidly and receive other movement and maneuver assets. The Support Operations Officer course at CASCOM mitigated this knowledge gap in the late 90s.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: In an effort to reduce the impact to the formation during future rotations / deployments, we will share insights with SWfF and explore possible training/Leader Development solutions. Detailed data on this will be provided to CDD in order to relay the impacts of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Reduction. Confirm with CASCOM that the SPO course is still offered.

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Full-up Power Packs (FUPP)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: FUPP Ground Mount Stands

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The maneuver battalions lacked FUPP ground mount stands to verify the functionality of the FUPP before installing the system. During the rotation, the unit was forced to install FUPPs without knowing the status of the system. In a few cases, the maintainers installed a faulty FUPP.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: FUPP stands and ground mount kits are part of Stryker STTE. The current authorization is 7 FUPP/ground mount kit per SBCT, with each FSC having 1 FUPP/ground hop kit.

Due to SBCTs constant deployments and their transition from Blue to Green maintenance, they may not have what they are authorized. The NSN for the FUPP stand is 4910-21-914-8116. The NSN for the ground hop kit is 4910-20-001-0671.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Materiel:** BCT leadership work with PM SBCT to identify ground mount kit shortages.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: LHS Compatible Water Tank Rack System (HIPPO)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: HIPPO reduction

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: BCT Reduction of the LHS Compatible Water Tank Rack System (HIPPO) from 20 to 10 within the BDE severally limited the BDE's ability to conduct deliberate decontamination.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Recent MTOE changes to the SBCT means that the water planning cycle is now based on 2 DOS rather than 3 DOS. The reason behind the reduction is the Army's overall plan to go from 72 hours of supply to 48 hours of supply on hand in all BCTs, due to the availability of the equipment across the Army. If, prior to or during a deployment, the BCT needs 3 DOS, then the SBCT needs to coordinate appropriately. So, a deploying/deployed unit needs to do their internal mission analysis to determine their requirements and then request.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: **Training:** The NTC LTP may identify EAB support requirements, however depending on where that falls in the collective training cycle, it may be too late to coordinate for EAB support effectively. **Leader Development:** Sustainment leaders must be cognizant of the ability of the SBCT to task organize rapidly and receive other movement and maneuver assets. The Support Operations Officer course at CASCOM mitigated this knowledge gap in the late 90s.

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes: In an effort to reduce the impact to the formation during future rotations / deployments, we will share insights with SWfF and explore possible training/Leader Development solutions.

CASCOM's tactical concept of support for Army 2020 Powerpoint is attached for distribution.

Chapter 6
Signal Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Utilization of Retransmission sites.

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Retransmission teams

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was not able to establish RETRANS communications. The RETRANS team moved un-accompanied to its location without security. The RETRANS team failed to ensure the location was in a friendly zone and consequently the RETRANS team was captured and their COMSEC compromised. The intent of the BDE S-6 was to establish enough retransmission sites throughout the BDE area of operations to gain reliable voice communications.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Though the RETRANS team was captured and the COMSEC compromised, the unit recovered by initiating a communications plan. Information can be found on the Army Training Network website, based on the guidelines of Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) for sustainment training. This tool also offers task selections, collective tasks, support tasks, and individual task. Recommend FM 6-02.53 Tactical Radios provides references on the tactical network lower tactical internet operations and RETRANS operations. ST 6-02.75, COMSEC Operations provides procedures on COMSEC Operations for tactical operations.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
D – FM 6-02.53 Tactical Radio Operations (RETRANS Operations), ST 6-02.75, COMSEC Operations (COMSEC Operations plan)
O – N/A
T – Ensure a security team is in place in accordance with Doctrine, RETRANS Operations.
M – N/A
L –N/A
P – N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Regular User vs. Domain User

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Using Domain Account for day to day activities

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Unit failed to follow DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) and Army Best Business Practices when implementing Information Assurance (IA) practices and allowed the adversary to gain domain administrator privileges, resulting in OPFOR gaining full access to the network. This was possible because the helpdesk technician was logged in using the domain administrator login for conducting day to day operations. This allowed the OPFOR access to all the unit's mission command systems the level of access the OPFOR gained gave them access to affect all logistical and tactical operations.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: First the SM should be at a minimum IAT Level I; an administrator having the proper credentials of Security plus IAT Level II, should fully understand what it means to hold that position and the responsibility that comes with it. Follow DISA STIGs http://iase.disa.mil/stigs. Establish a unit IA Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to ensure measures are being followed, minimizing IA incidents.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
D- FM 6-02.71; AR 25-2; DOD 8570.01-M
O- N/A
T- Security plus (basic certification)
M- N/A
L- N/A
P-N/A
F-N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:
Security plus certification should be a requirement for completion of 25B course.

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Cyber Security Awareness

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Unit proved to be successful when faced with basic user level cyber-attacks.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: Unit proved to be successful when faced with basic user level cyber-attacks against them. Prior to unit deploying to the National Training Center (NTC); they were given a briefing on cyber security. The Commander gave the cybersecurity NCOIC permission to use social media as the basis for the training. As it has been proven users are our weakest link; from posting pictures of where we are and what we are doing with location on Facebook, Instagram and even twitter. Users are not aware that every picture that is posted can provide the adversary exact coordinates of where you were at that particular moment. This is because of the Xift data that is place automatically in the picture. The NCOIC also demonstrated that by just going on to www.pipl.com and type in a name, you can find out and display a lot of information about any person. By doing this, the unit personnel are better aware of the types of information the adversary can collect on you or the unit for exploitation.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Cybersecurity is critical to the success of any unit operating with the DODIN. The security climate of any organization is set by the leadership, the S6 the opportunity to demonstrate this, the unit has a clearer understanding of the critical importance of cybersecurity. Establishing a unit cybersecurity Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to ensure measures are being followed, minimizing IA incidents.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
D- FM 6-02.71 Information Assurance/Computer Network Defense
O- N/A
T- Continually conduct sustainment training on cybersecurity.
M- N/A
L- Commander emphasis would enhance the importance of Cyber/IA Awareness
P-25A, 25B, 25D, 53A, 255N, 255S
F-N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Internal/External Sync Meetings

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Lack of communication between higher and lower echelons

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The RTU was prepping to leave the line of departure to begin their attack mission. However, there were no communications between the battalion and brigade S6 sections nor was there any communication between internal brigade staff in reference to where they were placing signal assets, such as RETRANS. Due to the unit sending a RETRANS team out without notification to higher, no security team was provided to provide security for their mission. This led to a COMSEC compromise, the capture of Soldiers, and loss of vehicle and equipment. Due to the lack of communication, the brigade didn't realize that RETRANS team was in the area and they initiated a call for fire mission on possible enemy that was in the area**.**

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Providing situational awareness to higher and lower echelons on the battlefield. The use of the CPOF is an example of a central point where all information of moving elements can be used to distribute critical information providing a common operational picture.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
D- AR 600-100 Army Leadership.
O- N/A
T- N/A
M- N/A
L- Implement as part of Battle Rhythm
P- S6 OIC
F- N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Field Service Representative (FSR)

(U)/(FOUO) Description: RTU dependence on FSR

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The RTU had difficulty keeping the Trusted Gateway System (TGS) operational during the rotation. The RTU was challenged when dealing with troubleshooting issues as they came about. Instead, of initiating troubleshooting procedures the RTU contacted the FSR to troubleshoot the system. The steps that the FSR took to bring the system back up were basic 10 level tasks. The FSR, checked the cables, which he replaced and the docking station, which had a bent pin. The docking station was replaced and the system was back in operation.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: Home station troubleshooting and maintenance training is essential for communications systems/equipment. Establishing a maintenance SOP would define the roles of user level maintenance prior to requesting FSR support. An effective SOP will also aid the unit in reporting maintenance issues through a formal reporting tool such as REMEDY therefore creating trouble tickets giving the S6 and Executive Officer (XO) visibility on communications systems.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
D- N/A
O- N/A
T- Quarterly training on equipment; proficiency; SME
M- N/A
L- Commanders should be specific on what requires FSR support; implement in SOP or policy letter
P- N/A
F- N/A

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(U)/(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

OBSERVATION

(U)/(FOUO) Title: Service Desk Operations

(U)/(FOUO) Description: Service Desk operations at BDE and BN were lacking standardized Service Desk operational procedures.

(U)/(FOUO) Discussion: The unit had challenges during service desk operations based on the standardization of operations. Signal personnel were pulled from other positions to manage the service desk, but lacked formal service desk training. The two methods of tracking trouble tickets were SharePoint and paper written tickets. There were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in place to govern Service Desk operations at the BDE S6 or BN S6 locations.

(U)/(FOUO) Insights/Lessons: The Service Desk is the primary location and central point of contact for handling user and other communications/services related issues. Soldiers assigned to the Service Desk are pulled from other MTOE positions and tasked to be service desk operators. Units need to ensure that the Soldiers that man the Service Desk are properly trained to handle all functions associated within the Service Desk. The Cyber Center of Excellence (Cyber CoE) has a DRAFT Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Service Desk Operations, to act as a guide for units to follow when organizing and structuring their Service Desks. Using the Service Desk SOP within the BDE would standardized operations throughout.

(U)/(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
D –Service Desk operations discussed in FM 6-02.71, Network Operations.
O – N/A
T – All Soldiers tasked to be Service Desk operators need to receive training on unit service desk operational requirements based on unit SOP and Cyber CoE Service Desk CONOPS. Cross training of MOS's would be helpful when assigning a service desk operator.
M – N/A
L – Educate leadership on the importance of Service Desk operations. Ensure unit implements a service desk operations SOP.
P – ALL
F – N/A

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