INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT/ COLLECTION REPORT

NTC Rotation 15-02
Decisive Action Training Environment
Initial Impressions Report
(IIR)
9-23 November 2014

1 February 2015

(U) Table of Contents

(U) TRADOC Intent

(U) TRADOC CoEs, AMEDD, and USASOC, in coordination with the Center for Army Lessons Learned, will during Decisive Action rotations at NTC and JRTC collect observations, insights, and lessons based on the DOTMLPF domains that will shape the Warfighting Functions.

(U) CALL Collection Concept

- Collection involved observing AARs, conducting right seat rides (RSR), and interviewing selected observer/coach trainers (O/CT) and unit personnel
- CoEs/schools provided subject matter expert (SME) RSR proficient in current and emerging doctrine to observe the rotational unit's execution of key aspects of their WfF
- SME RSR focus during the rotation was OILs for use by their CoE/school/organization
- CoEs/schools/tasked organizations will forward all prioritized OILs and potential changes to the WfFs to CALL for consolidation, staffing, and distribution
- CoEs/schools/organizations will provide recommendations to enhance the CTC training experience to CALL
- CALL will disseminate OILs to the Army

(U) Executive Summary

This report provides a summary of insights, observations, and best practices collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the TRADOC Centers of Excellence (CoE) and AMEDD from NTC Rotation 15-02, Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). The CoEs collected observations and lessons based on the DOTMLPF domains that will shape the Warfighting Functions. This report was collected and written by TRADOC Center of Excellence and CALL personnel and contains observations, opinions, and analysis of their observers. It does not reflect the observations and opinions of the observer-coach/trainers (OC/T) or the leadership of the NTC Operations Group. This report is organized by Warfighting Function and according to CoE focus topics:

Some observers use Rotational Training Unit (RTU) when referencing the unit.

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Chapter 1

Intelligence Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
01 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Pre-rotational training

(FOUO) Description
The MICO commander planned and executed training utilizing both a unit training plan and a unit training calendar in accordance with **ADRP 7-0**. The unit training plan was constructed as a road map of training events, individual through collective. The unit training calendar depicted major training events and the order in which they were conducted

(FOUO) Discussion

- The MICO constructed its training plan based on the company Mission Essential Task List (METL) which in turn was nested with the Engineer Battalion and Brigade METLs.
- The Brigade Engineer Battalion Commander directed squad and platoon level certifications for the MICO. The challenge was figuring out what that meant for Military Intelligence training and how to translate that for the commander.
    - ✓ Squad Certifications was conducted in order to test and verify section to squad sized elements in multiple intelligence disciplines and platforms.**(see example in additional information section below)**
    - ✓ Platoon Certifications included Multi-Function Platoon (MFT), Intelligence Collection Platoon (ICP), and UAS Platoon tasks and operations in support of the Brigade Command Post Exercise (CPX) to certify leaders and platoons **(see example in additional information section below)**
- Training for NTC Rotation 15-02 began in February 2014.
    - ✓ Individual/Section Training conducted February to May 2014
    - ✓ Squad and Platoon Level Certifications conducted May to July 2014
    - ✓ Company Training and Certification conducted August to September 2014
    - ✓ Battalion/Brigade Level Certification conducted in October 2014, culminating with NTC Rotation 15-02 in November 2014

The MICO training plan not only focused on Intelligence tasks but also included Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills to include marksmanship, physical training, communications, medical, chemical biological, radioactive, nuclear (CBRN) and leadership. The MICO Commander stressed the importance of individual Soldier tasks to shoot, move and communicate. **(see example in additional information section below)**

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- The Rotational Training Unit (RTU) Military Intelligence Company (MICO) and Brigade S-2 pre-rotation training plan was designed to address other units' lessons learned during intelligence operations at NTC rotations.

- The unit training plan (UTP) aims at achieving unit training proficiency and leader development within a given period. The UTP lays out a series of training events—a roadmap—that leads the unit to achieve the objective of training proficiency in select collective tasks. As part of the UTP, the unit can include a unit training calendar that depicts the unit's major training events and the sequence in which they will be executed. **(ADRP 7-0)**
- Subordinate unit METLs align with, nest with, and support their next higher unit's METL. Subordinate unit METLs usually do not change since they are based on the higher unit's METL and the unit's designed mission. Based on the unit's METL and the higher commander's guidance, the unit trains on the supporting collective tasks most important to the success of the mission and gives the unit the most flexibility to adapt to new missions. **(ADRP 7-0)**

Planning for unit training begins with the commander determining the unit mission, reviewing the unit's METL, and determining the tasks that the unit must perform to support the higher unit's mission. Figure 3-2 describes the development of a unit training plan. **(ADRP 7-0)**

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training, Leadership and Education

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
02 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Military Intelligence Company Commander (MICO)/Brigade S-2 Relationship

(FOUO) Description
The Brigade Intelligence Cell (BICE) is not being fully leveraged by the Brigade S2, both in staff planning processes and in current operations.

(FOUO) Discussion

- The relationship between the MICO commander and the Brigade Staff was effective due to the following observations:

1. The MICO Commander stated, while serving as the acting Brigade S-2 prior to becoming the MICO Commander, he understood the importance of building a strong relationship with the brigade S-2 and staff.
2. Prior to NTC Rotation 15-02 the MICO Commander and his Soldiers trained with the brigade S-2 personnel to formalize the best plan for the MICO commander to assist the brigade.
3. The MICO commander was heavily involved in the MDMP process IAW FM 2-19.4.
4. The MICO commander had a good understanding of capabilities and limitations of all his organic assets and assets for echelons above brigade in order to assist in production of the ISR plan and integration into the scheme of maneuver.

- The MICO Commander collocated his company command post within the Brigade Intelligence Support Element (BISE) allowing for continuous updates of all organic MICO assets system status.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- During the brigade's planning, the MI Company commander assists the brigade S-2 with the development of the Intelligence running estimate and all Intelligence products and deliverables needed to support the brigade orders process. These include but are not limited to the mission analysis briefing, base OPORD input, annex B, and annex L. The MI Company commander advises the brigade S-3 on the employment of Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) Intelligence collection platforms. **(FM 2-19.4)**
- The MICO commander normally operates from the company TOC, co-located with the brigade TOC. At the TOC, the commander supervises planning, monitors operations, and interfaces with the staff. **(FM 2-19.4)**

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Leadership and Education

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
03 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Employment of the Brigade GEOINT Section

(FOUO) Description
GEOINT cells comprise geospatial engineers and imagery analysts. Combining these skill sets into one cell facilitates a collaborative environment for geospatial engineers and imagery analysts to achieve maximum development of GEOINT products.

(FOUO) Discussion

- The Brigade GEOINT/Topographic team was comprised of five 35Gs (1 x brigade and 4 x MICO) and four Geospatial Engineers (1 x 125D, 1 x SFC, 1 x CPL, and 1 x PFC).
- The Brigade's GEOINT and Topographic teams were collocated enabling concurrent production of GEOINT products.
- The GEOINT/Topographic section received Request for Information (RFI) through the section's OIC (125D) enabling him to determine priorities of work.
- Approximately one month prior to the rotation, The GEOINT section received training from the Intelligence Center of Excellence New Equipment Training (NET) team on the Tactical Ground Station (TGS). Soldiers from the Rotational Training Unit (RTU) stated this training helped immensely in their understanding and employment of the TGS during the rotation. This training allowed the RTU to configure their TGS and Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS) to provide optimal support for GEOINT operations.
- The GEOINT/Topographic section used both their DTSS and TGS systems concurrently to create an economy of workload for each system. The DTSS was used to pull Imagery through Net-Centric Geospatial Intelligence Discovery Services (NGDS) from the Global Broadcast System (GBS) and store imagery locally. The TGS was configured to provide the OSVRT feed for FMV and then broadcast that feed to the S-2 Current operations section on the Tactical Operations Center floor. A 35G was assigned to monitor and exploit FMV.
- Moving Target Indicator (MTI) analysis was conducted on the MOVINT client by 35Gs located in the Brigade Intelligence Support Element (BISE). This provided All Source Analysts (35F) immediate access to MTI forensic analysis to enhance the All Source assessments and situational understanding.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- GEOINT cells comprise geospatial engineers and imagery analysts. Combining these skill sets into one cell facilitates a collaborative environment for geospatial engineers and imagery analysts to achieve maximum development of GEOINT products. **(TC 2-22.7)**
- At BCT levels, GEOINT cells focus on directly supporting commanders' GEOINT requirements. This does not exclude GEOINT cells from providing support to other elements within the BCT. **(TC 2-22.7)**

- GEOINT cells require staff coordination to identify and properly task members comprising the cell. Forming an effective GEOINT cell and synchronizing its efforts requires teamwork between the Intelligence and engineer staffs. The G-2/S-2 is responsible for the GEOINT cell and collaborates with the engineer coordinator to capture geospatial requirements. The G-2/S-2 and the engineer coordinator must coordinate with their respective technicians and the G-3/S-3 to ensure clearly established priorities for the geospatial effort throughout the operations process. **(TC 2-22.7)**

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Organization, Training, Leadership and Education

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
04 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Cueing of GEOINT Assets

(FOUO) Description
- The GEOINT section from the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) used Full Motion Video (FMV), Moving Target Indicators (MTIs) and National Assets to cue and provide redundancy to identify high value and high payoff targets as well as answer the Brigade Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).

(FOUO) Discussion
- The GEOINT section conducted MTI forensic analysis to help shape the collection plan as well as cue other assets to positively identify enemy equipment, ultimately helping determine the enemy course of action. For example: MTI indicated locations of possible enemy activity. This cued the shadow UAS and in turn cued National Level assets providing more fidelity of the activity, enabling analysts to determine the enemy's course of action.
- The GEOINT team efforts led to identifying multiple High Value Targets (HVT) and High Priority Targets (HPT) including the enemy Brigade Tactical Group command and control node, air defenses, indirect fire asset locations and the disposition and

composition of the enemy obstacles and defensive posture during battle period four (Counterattack). This resulted in the brigade S-2 locating the enemy vehicles and obstacles the Brigade Commander wanted to shape successful subordinate battalion task force operations.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- The RTU successfully cued assets to identify and destroy HVTs/HPTs resulting in the success of brigade shaping operations.
- The RTU understood the importance of ensuring redundancy within their collection plan. The brigade was able to achieve redundancy with GEOINT capabilities to successfully identify HVTs/HPTs.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

- Cueing involves the use of one or more information collection assets to provide data that directs collection by other assets. For example, sweeping the AO electronically with a surveillance system can reveal activity triggering direct collection by a more accurate sensor system. Cueing maximizes the efficient use of limited collection assets supporting multiple, often competing, information collection priorities. An effective strategy includes plans to create opportunities for cued collection. **(ATP 2-01)**
- Redundancy planning as part of collection strategy development involves the use of several same discipline (or same-capability) assets to cover the same target. Redundant tasking is appropriate against high-payoff targets when the probability of success by any one system is low. **(ATP 2-01)**

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
05 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
ISR/Fires Rehearsal (Best Practice)

(FOUO) Description

- During the ISR/Fires rehearsal for battle period 4 (counterattack) the brigade S-2 gave a detailed description of how the enemy defense was arrayed and known obstacle composition and locations. (Additionally, the S-2 briefed multiple enemy courses of action developed during the MDMP process.)

(FOUO) Discussion

- The brigade S-2 and brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) briefed the high value target (HVT) and high payoff target (HPT) lists and the status of those targets as well as the targets destroyed during the defense transition to the counterattack. Additionally, the S-2 briefed the collection plan to identify and target the remaining HVTs/HPTs to shape the deep fight.
- During the rehearsal the brigade commander emphasized the High-payoff Target List of the five specific enemy capabilities he wanted destroyed, in order to shape the fight for the combined arms battalions. (Reference FM 3-60, Table 1-1).

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- The S-2 portrays the enemy forces and other variables of the operational environment during rehearsals. The G-2 (S-2) bases actions on the enemy course of action that the commander selected during the MDMP. The G-2 (S-2)—
  - ✓ Provides participants with current intelligence.
  - ✓ Portrays the best possible assessment of the enemy course of action.
  - ✓ Communicates the enemy's presumed concept of operations, desired effects, and end state.
  - ✓ Explains other factors of the operational environment that may hinder or complicate friendly actions.
  - ✓ Communicates the key civil considerations of the operation. **(FM 6-0)**
  - ✓

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
06 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Predictive Analysis Challenges in the Military Decision Making Process

(FOUO) Description
During Battle Period 3 (Deliberate Defense) the RTU's Brigade XO stated, "There is a lack of predictive analysis performed by S-2 personnel.

(FOUO) Discussion

- During Battle Period 3 (Deliberate Defense) the S-2 section was reporting locations of enemy equipment but did not provide the analysis of why the equipment was there and how the information fit with the most likely enemy course of action."
- During battle Period 3 the XO mentioned, "The S-2 section did not use the Decision Support Matrix to ensure their analysis was predictive in nature, which resulted in the brigade commander not having the information needed to make a decision."

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- Predictive Intelligence enables the commander and staff to anticipate key enemy actions or reactions and develop corresponding plans or counteractions. Intelligence is vitally important in influencing operational decision making. Commanders must receive the Intelligence in a timely manner, understand it (because it is tailored to the commander's critical information requirements [CCIRs]), believe it, and act upon it. Through this doctrinal concept, Intelligence drives operations. **(FM 2-19.4)**

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

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(U) Number (ID)
07 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Wide Area Security (WAS) Threat Dissemination Challenges

(FOUO) Description
The unit tasked with rear area security was unaware of the threat to the Brigade Support Area.

(FOUO) Discussion

- The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) S-2 developed enemy courses of action and a critical events list for the WAS threats but did not disseminate information or products.
- The unit tasked with rear area security was unaware of the threat to the Brigade Support Area.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- The intelligence staff disseminates Intelligence within the staff to higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. Through the intelligence staff, the S-2 integrates IPB and threat situation products into decision-making and planning processes. The S-2 ensures the timely delivery and presentation of Intelligence in a form readily understood and directly usable by the unit commander, staff, and subordinates. **(FM 2-19.4)**
- Dissemination consists of both "push" and "pull" dissemination techniques:
  - ✓ The push technique allows the unit to send tailored intelligence products down to its subordinate units and across to adjacent units. Subordinate units can also push products up to the next higher command. Examples of these products include–
    - Early warning and previously unanticipated threat activity or information on other conditions of the operational environment affecting operations.
    - Responses to the PIRs of subordinate units.
    - Tailored products that the unit or staff requested in advance.
    - Current threat situation graphics and reports.
  - ✓ The pull technique allows units to retrieve products considered relevant to their operations and consumes less communications and processing resources. The pull technique involves the unit intelligence staff having direct electronic access to databases, intelligence files, web-based homepages, or other repositories of higher and lower echelon intelligence organizations. Pulling intelligence is preferable to submitting RFIs, provided the desired information already exists in a usable form in an accessible database or website. **(FM 2-19.4)**

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
08 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Intelligence Asset Communications Challenges

(FOUO) Description

- The Military Intelligence Company (MICO) intelligence assets such as HCTs and Prophet Sensors experienced inconsistent communications with the brigade command post resulting in lost intelligence opportunities because information was not reported in a timely manner.

(FOUO) Discussion

- Although the intelligence enablers had published Primary Alternate Contingence Emergency (PACE) plans, these enablers did not always have the means of communications stated on the published PACE plan. For example, the primary means of communications for the HUMINT Collection Teams (HCT) was FBCB2 and the HCTs did not have access to FBCB2.
- A mitigating factor that created communications issues for the MICO intelligence enablers was late integration with the subordinate units they were tasked to support. The late integration did not give the collection assets or the supported unit time to understand each other's means of communications and PACE plans.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- The mechanism for reporting will be covered for each specific operation in the OPORD for that mission based off METT-TC considerations and organization and is dependent on the specific command or support relationship delineated in the OPORD or FRAGO. General principles based on command or support relationships are as follows: **(FM 2-19.4)**
  - ✓ When a unit is attached, it will operate on the communications nets of the unit to which they are attached.
  - ✓ When in GS, the unit will maintain all communications links to its parent unit with other communications nets as specified in its orders.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training, Materiel, Leadership, and Education

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
09 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Common Operational Picture (COP) and Battle Tracking Challenges

(FOUO) Description

- The brigade XO stated the staff sections were populating information into different digital systems but the information was not visualized in a collaborative way to properly depict a usable COP.

(FOUO) Discussion

- The brigade XO stated some individuals were putting information into Command Post of the Future (CPOF) and others were populating Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) ... the COP must be produced on one commonly used digital system to provide a shared understanding throughout the staff.
- The Brigade did not have an operational Data Dissemination Service (DDS) to transfer intelligence products to Command Post of the Future from DCGS-A and receive operations products from CPOF to DCGS-A.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- The tactical operations tempo can quickly overwhelm any staff, including the staff of a digitally enabled brigade. Information is the key to digital operations, and the COP is the brigade's primary focus and visualization mechanism. Without an accurate, up-to-date COP, the BCT could lose information superiority at a critical point in the operation. Therefore, in addition to established staff procedures, the digital staff must have standardized techniques and procedures to manage digital information and maintain the COP. It is essential the staff establish and practice these SOPs before being thrust into crisis planning. **(FM 2-19.4)**
- Each commander may need information presented in different formats based on the mission, CCIR, and command philosophy. Similarly, staff leaders need specialized displays supporting their own needs and functional area. The COP provides a mechanism to integrate and present all individualized products in a common forum. As the standardized information base, it offers a quick check on the latest information on threat, friendly forces, the operational environment, and facilitates discussions between commanders and staff leaders. **(FM 2-19.4)**

- SOPs establish the routine external and internal distribution of products. The digital CP also requires a focal point to control what is displayed, when, to what level of detail, and how often. **(FM 2-19.4)**

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
10 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Multi-Function Team (MFT) Challenges

(FOUO) Description
The MICO did not have dedicated Multi-Function Team (MFT) vehicles authorized on their Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).

(FOUO) Discussion
- The Rotational Training Unit Military Intelligence Company (MICO) Commander decided to employ both SIGINT and HUMINT capabilities independently based on requirements, where each capability could maximize its opportunity to collect.
- The MICO did not have dedicated Multi-Function Team (MFT) vehicles authorized on their Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). This required the use of three separate vehicles to form one MFT. One vehicle for the prophet sensor, one vehicle for Human Control Team (HCT) and one vehicle for the Tactical Site Exploitation Team.
- Maneuver units weren't receptive to taking three vehicles from the MICO with them during operations as they are viewed as an additional burden due to the lack of crew-served weapon systems on any of the MI vehicles.
- The Brigade decided to task three 35Fs from the Tactical Site Exploitation team and use them as traditional all source analysts within the brigade intelligence support element.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
- The MFT provides a multidiscipline collection and initial analysis capability. Its flexible design permits it to be employed as a team or broken into sub-elements for simultaneous

missions, based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC).
The MICO First Sergeant recommended a same vehicle MFT solution, making it blend in with the unit they are supporting, so it is not singled out and targeted. For example, an MFT within a Stryker Brigade should be equipped with a Stryker combat vehicle. The requirement of multiple vehicles without a weapon system makes maneuver units apprehensive in integrating them into their formation.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Doctrine, Organization, Materiel

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
11 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Tactical Employment of the Prophet System Challenges

(FOUO) Description
Prophet sensors were employed too close to one another to provide an effective cut.

(FOUO) Discussion
- Prophet sensors were employed too close to one another to provide an effective cut. **(See Additional Information Below).**
- There was minimal discussion of Prophet sensor placement during course of action development.
- Additionally, the prophet sensors arrived too late to effect friendly forward unit coordination before the operation began resulting in no time to discuss or identify suitable Prophet emplacment.
- The Trojan Lite (T-Lite) must be stationary to communicate with the prophet sensors. The T-Lite was not consistently operational due to consistent movement.
- The BCT S-2, BCT Collection Manager, MICO Commander, and Multi-Function Platoon Leader identified primary, alternate, and supplementary collection positions for the Prophet sensors to allow optimal collection; however, they discovered the difficulty in determining the trade-off between optimal collection positions and survivability on the battlefield.

- ✓ During Battle Period 1 the Prophet was emplaced too close to the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) and the Prophet control and T-lite were destroyed resulting in the loss of 37 reports.
- ✓ During Battle Period 2 the Prophet was emplaced too far behind the FLOT resulting in minimal collection and was eventually destroyed by advancing enemy forces.
- ✓ During Battle Period 3 the Prophet control was not employed within visual line of sight of the prophet sensors and the T-Lite, creating a lack of communications between the sensors and T-Lite. This resulted in intelligence information not being disseminated to Prophet control for use by the brigade's SIGINT analysts.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- Military Intelligence Company (MICO) and SIGINT leadership should conduct capability education with maneuver commanders (down to the company-level) on system capabilities and employment of systems. The education process will improve understanding of capabilities and employment creating greater success of intelligence collection. **(FM 2-19.4)**
- The Ground Collection Platoon leader, in conjunction with the MI Company commander, may require additional security augmentation from the (BEB) S-3 who may forward the request to the BCT S-3. Operating alone should be the last choice when employing Prophet Teams, as it seriously degrades their collection capability and survivability. **(FM 2-19.4)**
- Positioning the intercept antenna is the most important factor to consider when selecting sites. The Prophet Collection team cannot intercept a threat signal or find a threat emitter unless it acquires the target. Numerous conditions can interfere with a team's ability to acquire threat signals. At a minimum, the following conditions need to be considered: metallic conductors, military objects (radars, friendly emitters etc), terrain, urban objects and vegetation. **(FM 2-19.4)**
- Prophet teams are most effective when—**(FM 2-19.4)**
  - ✓ Employed in a stationary mode. DF accuracy is increased.
  - ✓ Operated in a multi-station formation.
  - ✓ Positioned to minimize system receiver interference. This increases the potential capability of the team to acquire threat emitters of significant interest in a timely manner.
  - ✓ Positioned to optimize overlapping areas of intercept coverage.
- Prophet collection team sites must meet certain requirements to accomplish its mission. These sites must—**(FM 2-19.4)**
  - ✓ Be located within range of targeted transmitters.
  - ✓ Ensure that the receiving antenna is positioned to intercept the arriving signal.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine, Organization, Materiel

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

- Two stationary Prophet collection teams are able to approximate the general vicinity of an emitter. This approximation is determined by the intersection of two LOBs and is referred to as a "cut." Two teams working together or one team moving between two sites can produce a cut (provided the emitter remains stationary). A cut indicates the approximate location of an emitter. This data is adequate for nonlethal (electronic) attack but inadequate for targeting by lethal attack delivery systems.

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
12 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Define Roles and Responsibilities/TACSOP

(FOUO) Description

- The Brigade S-2 did not have a collective SOP which disrupted the unit's ability to organize and disseminate intelligence.

(FOUO) Discussion

- Individual single source sections from the MICO had Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
- The Brigade S-2 did not have a collective SOP which disrupted the unit's ability to organize and disseminate intelligence.
- Brigade S-2 section lacked defined battle drills and procedures for specific situations hindering their ability to provide single source fusion into one collective assessment.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- Continuity of operations within the S-2 staff and the brigade ISR elements reduces turmoil and ensures sustained support to the brigade. The S-2 section must be capable of sustained 24-hour operations at each brigade CP under a variety of conditions (for example, digital or analog operations, reduced staffing, and chemical environment). Development, practice, and enforcement of S-2 SOPs ensure continuity. S-2s should cover the following procedures: **(FM 2-19.4)**
  - ✓ Shift change briefings or meetings.
  - ✓ Sleep and eating rotation schedules.
  - ✓ Staff drills for actions such as ISR planning, orders production, and retasking.
  - ✓ Standard report and graphic product formats.
  - ✓ CP organization and operation.

- ✓ Battle drills for continuation of operations (TOC displacement, loss of equipment or personnel).
- ✓ Succession of staff supervision (command).

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Leadership and Education

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
13 jcg 112114

(FOUO) Title
Detainee Operations Challenges

(FOUO) Description
Units found themselves not transporting detainees in a timely manner or not at all.

(FOUO) Discussion
- Units found themselves not transporting detainees in a timely manner or not at all. The hesitation to transport detainees from the point of capture/objective to the EPW Collection Point (ECP) was due to unit's not wanting to take forces out of the fight.
- The Rotational training Unit (RTU) commented the HUMINT Collection Teams could benefit by providing maneuver units with tactical questioning training prior to the rotation. The MICO 1SG stated this training would also assist the HCTs by giving maneuver units the ability to tactically question and help triage detainees/EPWs for intelligence value.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
- During the unit's home station train up, the RTU planned for ECPs and exercised transporting detainees from point of capture to the ECP. The challenge for the RTU was replicating large distances between point of capture and ECPs often found at NTC.
- In support of combat operations, detainees, to include EPW, are normally exploited for PIRs and other combat information as close to the point of capture as operationally feasible. EPWs are evacuated as rapidly as possible to the highest echelon-holding facility in the theater for detailed interrogation. **(FM 2-19.4)**

- Tactical questioning is direct questioning by any Department of Defense personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain time-sensitive tactical intelligence information, at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent with applicable law **(ATTP 2-91.6).** The RTU recommended maneuver forces train prior to deployment/rotation to assist HCTs with screening and triage of EPWs for intelligence value

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

- **Tactical Questioning:** The expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value. Soldiers conduct tactical questioning based on the unit's SOP, ROE, and the order for that mission. Unit leaders must include specific guidance for tactical questioning in the order for appropriate missions. The unit S3 and S-2 must also provide specific guidance down to the unit level to help guide tactical questioning. **(FM 2-0)**

Chapter 2

Maneuver Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
01 DDM 11-16-2014

(FOUO) Title
Junior Leader Troop Leading Procedures, Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs)

(FOUO) Description
Junior leaders assigned to the brigade experienced challenges conducting TLPs, PCCs and PCIs.

(FOUO) Discussion
One of the most common trends discussed during the Senior NCO Mid-Rotation After Action Review was related to junior leader execution of TLPs, PCCs and PCIs. Discussions with OC/Ts and Soldiers in the unit revealed that disciplined execution of standardized PCC/PCI checklists could have improved unit readiness during the conduct of troop leading procedures. Although the unit had SOPs, many Soldiers were not well versed or were not executing procedures outlined in the SOPs.

Below is one sample of a combined arms battalion that depicts where squad level troop leading procedures were not performed.

	A Co	B Co	D Co	ENG	SCT
Co OPORD					
Co Rehearsals					
Overlays Distributed					
Co Fires Rehearsal					
PLT OPORD					
PLT Rehearsals					
SQD OPORD					
SQD Rehearsals					

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Units should continue to improve SOPs and expose Soldiers to them early in the unit training cycle. Units should order the handbook mentioned below as a guide for developing SOPs. Leaders

should continue to stress enforcement of standards and procedures through active/aggressive inspections and checks (PCCs and PCIs). Units should also ensure measures are taken to ensure the 1/3, 2/3 rule is enforced to allow enough time for junior leaders to conduct required TLPs following receipt of the order.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine: In August 2014 the Training Analysis Feedback Team at Fort Leavenworth released the *Battalion Tactical SOP Handbook.* This handbook is available on the Army Training Network at https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=271

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
01 MBG 11-15-2014

(FOUO) Title
CBRN Skills

(FOUO) Description
The unit experienced challenges planning and conducting CBRN operations.

(FOUO) Discussion

The unit experienced challenges with planning and conducting chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) operations. While conducting rehearsals the unit did not employ CBRN detection devices, plan or rehearse actions upon a chemical attack. During planning the unit determined that their MOPP Level Readiness was MOPP Ready with JSLIST nearby when a threat of chemical weapons use probable. Additionally, the unit did not plan for decontamination triage for the elements exposed to CBRN agents. During a movement to contact one unit's axis of advance was hit with a persistent chemical attack. The unit proceeded to drive through the contaminated area and continue towards their objective. CBRN agent contamination should be avoided when possible. When this is not possible, personnel and equipment must be decontaminated to reduce or eliminate the risk to personnel and to make equipment serviceable. The lack of a decontamination triage resulting in CBRN casualties contaminating Role 2.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

The decontamination planner must consider the hazards that may result from CBRN contamination. Decontamination assessments include mission analysis, COA development, and the analysis and comparison of enemy and friendly COAs. Decontamination planning needs to be continuous during decisive action operations. Units must be capable of surviving CBRN

attacks and continuing operations in hazardous conditions. Appendix C, FM 3-11, July 2011, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations, discusses the basic standards of for individuals, selected personnel, CBRN staff, commanders, and organizations. The appendix also discusses the medical CBRN training requirements established in 2004 under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. The TRADOC Capability Manager, Armored Brigade Combat Team (TCM-ABCT) has observed this same trend during six previous rotations to the National Training Center (NTC) and one rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). What was common CBRN knowledge a decade ago is no longer so common in the formation. There is no longer a CBRN NCO assigned to company/troop level. During the AAR the unit expressed that the lack of a CBRN NCO has caused training challenges. The CBRN NCO in this unit was performed by a Soldier as an additional duty appointment. The unit expressed that although the Soldier attended a two week course he was not as proficient as CBRN NCOs that performed the task as their sole duty.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training/Leader Development Recommendations:

- Ensure units are trained IAW Appendix C, FM 3-11, July 2011, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations. Units must also train in accordance with the warrior battle drills and individual military occupational specialty Soldier Training Publications.
- Review institutional course programs of instruction to ensure that Soldiers are trained to execute CBRN operations and that non-commissioned officers and officers are trained to plan, execute, train and lead CBRN operations.

(FOUO) Remarks FM 3-11, July 2011, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
02 DDM 11-16-2014

(FOUO) Title
Training Circulars

(FOUO) Description
The brigade experienced challenges conducting platoon level mounted battle drills.

(FOUO) Discussion

During communications with units and Observer Coach Trainers (OC/Ts), most were not familiar with recently published doctrine containing battle drills and training and evaluation outlines. Although battle drills and training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) were not contained in doctrine, for a few years, they were reintroduced in July 2013 for armor and in August 2013 for infantry. Units can now find this information in collective task publications on the Army Publications Directorate (APD).

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Battalion publications officers can order printed collective task publications through APD for armor and infantry squad-platoon leadership to plan training including TC 3-21.8, Infantry Rifle and Mechanized Platoon Collective Task Publication, August 2013 and TC 3-20.15, Tank Platoon Collective Task Publication, July 2013, and also for the Scout Platoon. Leaders should crosswalk METL tasks to identify supporting tasks, and use the training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) contained in the TCs as a tool to measure effectiveness. TCs are also a very valuable tool for OC/Ts and are available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/TC_1.html

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine:

Units should order printed manuals through the Army Publications Directorate (APD) "Point and Click Ordering System" at https://dol.hqda.pentagon.mil/ptclick/index.aspx. Doctrinal references that are EA coded can be ordered in printed format. Manuals that are coded as electronic media only (EMO) are only available in digital format. Units can also sign up for publication updates for direct mailing upon revision. To setup an APD account for ordering printed doctrine, units need to FAX a completed DA Form 12-R to the Account Processing Team, 314-592-0920, DSN 693-9620. Full instructions for setting up an APD account are available at http://www.apd.army.mil/Orders/EstablishAccount.pdf

OC/T teams should also consider ordering hard copy TC and use the T&EOs to measure unit performance of collective tasks and battle drills.

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
02 MBG 11-15-2014

(FOUO) Title
Reporting Formats

(FOUO) Description

In many cases the unit did not use a standardized report format to report contact (SPOT, SALUTE, SALT, etc.).

(FOUO) Discussion

CO/TRP and PLT sized elements observed often did not use a standardized reporting format to report enemy visual, indirect, or direct fire contact or enemy movement activities. This impacted effective battle tracking, battle damage assessments, situational awareness and understanding, and staff analysis of projected movement and intent. It is absolutely critical for PLT sized elements to submit reports in a clear, concise manner that accurately depict what they are seeing in order to provide the commander with information. When visual contact was made with enemy vehicles, FM radio reports consisted of narratives that were confusing, lacked critical information, and failed to pass relevant information to adjacent and higher level elements.

Standard report formats can be found in FM 6-99, dated August 2013, entitled *US Army Report and Message Formats.* Overall, the manual contains various applicable reports that allow the observer to relay information in a brief, concise manner. This minimizes FM frequency usage, is consistent and aids radio discipline, and informs commanders and battle staffs without confusing chatter.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Report formats should be present in TACSOPs in order to improve standardization, enforce network discipline, and to increase unit effectiveness. Standard report formats are consistent with one of the fundamentals of reconnaissance and maneuver; “report timely and accurately.” Review institutional training strategies and home station training

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training/Leader Development Recommendations:

- Review institutional training strategies and home station training plans to ensure basic radio reporting skills are developed using standard reporting formats.

(FOUO) Remarks FM 6-99, dated August 2013, US Army Report and Message Formats

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
03 DDM 11-16-14

(FOUO) Title
Deliberate Planning of Infantry Squad Utilization

(FOUO) Description
The unit experienced challenges maximizing the capability of infantry squads.

(FOUO) Discussion
Infantry squads could have been better employed to clear dominant terrain and prevent enemy flanking anti-tank (AT) fires. The mountainous terrain along avenues of approach throughout the unit's area of operations (AO) favored light infantry offensive and defensive operations to counter enemy AT strong points. During several missions it was most common for infantry squads to be deployed as local security next to the vehicle instead of on adjacent terrain where AT systems posed a threat. Several examples below:

During the STX lanes infantry squads were routinely used for local security only. Since the unit did move slow and deliberate with Bradleys on the STX lanes, dismounts could have been better utilized to identify the enemy in advance of the Bradley platoons. In this situation the squads remained mounted on the vehicles through the attack on the engagement area (EA) and were assessed as casualties when the vehicles were destroyed. Another option would have been to dismount the infantry prior to the objective at a planned dismount point enabling massing of fires on the EA from all elements assigned to the rifle platoon.

During the battle period 2 movement to contact, a Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) halted without placing infantry squads to observe a northern piece of decisive terrain that contained a likely enemy avenue of approach. The enemy attacked through this northern cut (trail) and the BCT deployed the reserve to defeat the threat. This would have been an ideal opportunity to deploy dismount infantry to observe and report and also employ Javelins in support of the fight.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Units should conduct deliberate planning that consider maximizing the employment of infantry squads, including contingencies based upon the actions of the enemy.

The TRADOC Capability Manager, Armored Brigade Combat Team (TCM-ABCT) has observed this same trend across other ABCTs during the past six decisive action NTC rotations. Infantry leadership at company and platoon level have demonstrated a lack of knowledge, skills and attributes to conduct deliberate planning that is necessary to identify the appropriate time to deploy infantry squads based upon known or expected enemy contact.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training/Leader Development Recommendations:

- All leaders assigned to ABCT rifle platoons attend the Bradley Leader Course en route to the unit or in conjunction with scheduled PME courses.
- Units conduct deliberate planning to identify how to maximize the use of both mounted and dismounted forces.
- Professional Military Education (PME) and functional courses review course content to ensure that officers and non-commissioned officers are trained on doctrine regarding the employment of infantry squads assigned to rifle platoons in ABCTs.
- Units develop tactical standard operating procedures that address battle drills for rifle platoons.
- Platoons and companies conduct reconnaissance of the objective to determine dismount points and those locations should be depicted on the graphics. Units rehearse dismounting at dismount points.

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
03 MBG 11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
Movement and Maneuver

(FOUO) Description
Companies experienced challenges conducting mounted movement and maneuver.

(FOUO) Discussion
Movement and maneuver skills against a hybrid threat needs improvement from platoon to BCT level. Leaders who have experience performing movement and maneuver against a near peer threat in the ABCT are limited to senior NCOs and field grade officers, many who have never performed decisive action maneuver at their current grade.

Some platoons and companies are not planning for transitions at the appropriate time based upon an analysis of the Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available—Time available, Civilians (METT-TC). Some units are staying in the column formation with the traveling movement technique regardless of the enemy situation until contact is made, and then they are moving online and conducting bounding over watch (see Figure 1). This resulted in unit not having support by fire positions established when they make contact and resulting in units not making contact with the smallest element possible.



(FOUO) Figure 1: Movement

On several occasions companies and troops travelled in the column formation from the line of departure and continued to remain in the column formation through terrain where contact was likely. In some cases where platoons transitioned to the wedge formation it was after contact was made and the vehicles were too close together in the open desert terrain. Units can increase force protection and observation by opening up their formations in desert terrain. On many occasions threat targets were over-engaged by multiple vehicles position close together. Spreading out in the desert provides the unit with increased observation width that enables the unit to establish sectors of fire to identify the threat more rapidly and conserve ammunition.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

The TRADOC Capability Manager, Armored Brigade Combat Team (TCM-ABCT) has observed this same trend across other ABCTs during the past six decisive action NTC rotations. Armor and Infantry leadership at company and platoon level have demonstrated a lack of knowledge, skills and attributes to conduct mounted movement and maneuver.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training/Leader Development Recommendations:

- All infantry leaders assigned to ABCT rifle platoons should attend the Bradley Leader Course en route to the unit or in conjunction with scheduled PME courses.
- All 19 series staff sergeants and lieutenants assigned to ABCT cavalry formations should attend the Army Reconnaissance Course. If the standard scout platoon force design update is approved every platform in the platoon will be a Bradley where 50% of the Soldiers assigned will serve as crewmen.
- Units should conduct deliberate planning to identify when to transition from movement to maneuver and also plan when to dismount infantry squads to improve mounted and dismounted integration.

- Professional Military Education (PME) and functional courses should review course content to ensure that officers and non-commissioned officers are trained on mounted maneuver based upon the leader's current or predicted unit of assignment.
- Units should develop tactical standard operating procedures that address battle drills for rifle, armor and scout platoons.

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
04 DDM 11-16-14

(FOUO) Title
3 Bradley x 5 HMMWV Scout Platoon

(FOUO) Description
Scout Platoons experienced challenges deploying HMMWVs alongside Bradleys.

(FOUO) Discussion
Units continue to demonstrate challenges effectively employing HMMWVs assigned to the 3x5 platoon alongside the Bradley for several reasons. Three weaknesses of the 3x5 formation that were evident during this rotation were related to inadequate dismount squad manning, lack of mutually supporting platforms, and unequal mobility across cross country terrain between the HMMWV and the Bradley. Additionally, the Cavalry Squadron deployment with 69% of authorized personnel had a negative effect on their ability to fully man scout dismounted squads. HMMWVs were unable to provide mutual fire support to the one Bradley in their section, resulting in Bradleys having no choice but to bound and/or disengage with no direct fire support. On several occasions, during missions, HMMWVs became stuck in the sand and took hours to recover. During other times HMMWVs were 600-1000 meters behind the Bradleys and could not maintain pace, forcing the Bradleys to slow their momentum to the pace of the HMMWV while traveling cross country. OC/Ts also expressed it was very difficult for them to maintain pace with Bradleys in their light skin HMMWVs.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
In the 3x5 formation since the platoon has to man eight vehicles they only have 12 scouts remaining to dismount. The 6x36 formation (6 Bradleys) will enable units to emplace 18 dismounted personnel on the ground, an increase of 50%. The 6x36 formation will enable the Cavalry Squadron to employ scout platoons with common platforms that best support mission command (leadership with each squad), maneuver, sustainment, and CASEVAC.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Material: The MCoE recently concluded an eight month study of the ABCT Standard Scout Platoon (SSP) 6x36 Force Design Update (FDU) initiative, which consolidated data collection and

analysis efforts by TCM-ABCT/Recon, Office Chief of Armor (OCOA), DOTD, and the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) Test and Evaluation Office (T&EO). The test unit was 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1/1 Cavalry Division (CD) from Fort Hood, Texas, which converted each of their six scout platoons into the 6x36 configuration in SEP 2013. The study culminated in a SSP Proof of Principle (PoP) which revealed the SSP FDU provides the best organization to ensure scout platoons possess the required leadership, versatility, survivability, protection, mobility and firepower to perform reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) missions against any opponent in the future operational environment (OE). The report outlines the performance of the SSP formation, and addresses the way ahead to mitigate identified DOTMLPF-P gaps and limitations. The report is available for viewing at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-141790 . The VCSA approved the Standard Scout Platoon (FDU 13-01) on 20 JUN 2014. This organizational change replaces the current HMMWVs, in ABCT cavalry squadron platoons only, with A3 Bradleys. This redesign results in 36 scouts assigned to six Bradleys in each cavalry squadron scout platoon and provides the necessary protection, mobility, organizational structure, personnel and equipment to meet the scout platoon's mission. TCM-ABCT's intent is to pursue an FDU to also provide the same capability for scout platoons in combined arms battalions (CABs) as additional resources become available.



	Current PLT	Proposed PLT	Bill per Troop	Bill per CAB	ABCT TOTAL	ABCT AC (10)	ABCT ARNG (7)	Army TOTAL
Personnel	36	36	0	0	0	0	0	0
M2 BFVS Vehicles	3	6	6	0	18	180	126	306

(U) Figure 1: Standard Scout Platoon

(FOUO) Personnel: The NTC is a culminating training event where units should contain maximum personnel for training. The Human Resource Command should continue to strive assign maximum personnel to BCTs early in the training cycle to enable unit success.

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
04 MBG 11-15-2014

(FOUO) Title
Direct fire control measures

(FOUO) Description
The unit experienced challenges planning and employing direct fire control measures.

(FOUO) Discussion

During multiple battle periods units did not employ direct fire control measures to control their organic weapon systems. The lack of fire control measures use by multiple companies resulted in numerous fratricide incidents throughout the brigade (see Figure 1 for one example). Fire control measures will be effective only if the entire unit has a common understanding of what the fire control measures mean and of how to employ them.



(FOUO) Figure 1 Fratricide

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Leaders are responsible for defining responsibility within the engagement area (EA) by assigning each unit a sector of fire or direction of fire. The leader should control his unit's fires so he can direct the engagement of enemy systems to gain the greatest effect. Leaders need to determine the most advantageous way to use direct fire control measures to mass the effects on the enemy and

reduce fratricide from direct fire systems. Primary graphic direct fire control measures techniques used are unit boundaries, target reference points, sectors of fire and engagement areas. Other direct fire control measures include trigger lines, maximum engagement line (MEL), final protective line (FPL), principle direction of fire (PDF), priority targets.

Leaders assign sectors of fire to Soldiers manning weapons or to a unit to cover a specific area of responsibility with observation and direct fire. In assigning sectors of fire, leaders consider the number and type of weapons available. The width of a sector of fire is defined by a right and left limit. Leaders may limit the assigned sector of fire to prevent accidental engagement of an adjacent friendly unit. The depth of a sector is usually the maximum range of the weapon system unless constrained by intervening terrain or by the leader (using a maximum engagement line [MEL]). At the platoon level, sectors of fire are assigned to each subordinate by the leader to ensure that the unit's area is completely covered by fire. Targets are engaged as they appear in accordance with established engagement priorities. Means of designating sectors of fire include target reference points (TRPs), Azimuth, clock direction, terrain-based quadrants, and Friendly-based quadrants.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training/Leader Development Recommendations:

- Ensure units are trained IAW FM 3-21.8, July 2007, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. Units must also train in accordance with the warrior battle drills and individual military occupational specialty Soldier Training Publications.

(FOUO) Remarks FM 3-21.8, July 2007.

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
05 DDM 11-18-2014

(FOUO) Title
Countermobility

(FOUO) Description
One unit ensured engineer assets were employed at a 99% utilization rate.

(FOUO) Discussion
One Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) maximized the time for using the engineer assets to prepare for the defense with a 99% utilization rate. Engineer assets were actively employed, however, the positions that were prepared were not constructed to standard (see Figure 1). The 500 meter tank ditch was effective in turning the COEFOR into the unit's engagement area (EA). The CAB did not construct any Abrams, Bradleys or infantry fighting positions.



(FOUO) Figure 1: Engineers in the Defense

The unit emplaced direct fire weapons systems within 500 meters of the anti-vehicle (AV) ditch and initiated direct fires when the enemy was within ~1000 meters. This action did not take maximum advantage of the standoff lethality our weapons systems can provide to defeat the threat.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
The unit used the entire 16 hours to construct the one AV ditch for the defense. To ensure engineer assets are most effectively employed units should assign synch dozers to supervise positions and ensure the engineers relocate to the next mission once the standard is met. Vehicle crews should also proof positions prior to blade departure to the next position. Units should calculate the primary resources that are required (Class IV/V obstacle material, platoon hours, and blade team hours) for each obstacle type using planning factors and standard obstacle designs.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Doctrine: Units should utilize Combined Arms Countermobility Operations (ATP 3-90.28) to plan for engineer use during the preparation of the defense. ATP 3-90.28 provides doctrine for conducting countermobility operations across the range of military operations. See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data, and appendix F for troop and equipment work rates and other planning factors that are then adjusted based on mission variables and individual unit capabilities.

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
06 DDM 11-13-2014

(FOUO) Title
Range Cards / Sector Sketches

(FOUO) Description
The unit made an effort to develop sector sketches; however there is room for improvement.

(FOUO) Discussion

Platoon leaders created sector sketches, however the sketches did not contain all required content necessary to best develop a platoon fire plan. Some items missing from the sketches included maximum engagement lines (MEL), cardinal direction, grid coordinates for vehicle and infantry squad positions, and a final protective line. Below are a few samples of platoon sector sketches from the unit STX lanes at NTC:



(FOUO) Figure 1: Platoon sector sketches from the unit STX lanes at NTC

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Units could consider adding standard samples of sector sketches to their unit SOPs. One TTP is for platoon leaders to carry pre-printed sector sketches that have the space on the front for the sketch with doctrinal directions on the reverse of the form. The leader can then refer to the reverse of the form to make sure they fill in all necessary portions of the sector sketch. Units can establish the same TTP for range cards. Each vehicle should be equipped with at least two range cards; one for the vehicle and one to turn in to leadership. If the platoon laminates their range cards and sector sketches they can reuse for training and use alcohol markers to add content.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
(FOUO) Doctrine: For additional information on ABCT rifle platoon range cards and sector sketches refer to ATTP 3-21.71 at
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/attp3_21x71.pdf

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OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
07 DDM 11-13-2014

(FOUO) Title
Managing and Clearing Airspace

(FOUO) Description
The brigade experienced challenges managing and clearing airspace, especially while repositioning command posts.

(FOUO) Discussion

TOC A/B Concept: The brigade established a Mobile Command Group (TAC), TOC A (Current Operations) and TOC B (Plans) for conducting operations. The concept had an advantage to echelon mission command functions while one TOC maintains mission command while the other TOC repositions. The concept worked well when the unit had the right personnel at each location for handover of staff operations to ensure communication on upper TI. The unit experienced challenges when they did not have upper TI established for all functions at the stationary TOC prior to relocating the other TOC. The MTOE equipment authorized for upper TI mission command systems for the Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) / Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) posed challenges as there were not enough common systems for all command posts.

(FOUO) TAIS: The brigade is authorized one AN/TSQ-221 Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS), and the TAIS does not have a mission command on the move capability. When TOC A had to jump the unit lost the complete capability this system offered. When the TAIS is on the move the ABCT does not receive the track data published over the joint tactical data network. Usually when the TAIS is on the move the whole ADAM Shelter is on the move including the BCT's Air Defense Systems Integrator (ADSI) where the TAIS receives its data.

> The TAIS is a mobile, airspace management system providing combined air-ground operational environment management based on joint service and information system inputs. It is the Army's system of record for the integration and synchronization of Airspace Command and Control (AC2) and Air Traffic Services (ATS) within the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) System of Systems (SoS). TAIS provides situational awareness of friendly and enemy air activity and is interoperable with joint, coalition, and civil aviation forces.

(FOUO) ADAM/BAE Cell Training Challenges: The other variable that challenge clearing fires is the ADAM/BAE situational understanding of the airspace. The ADAM/BAE must conduct air battle management by constant communication with aircraft as well as continuously monitoring/de-conflicting airspace. If not, the cell can be delayed in providing timely information for the brigade to make decisions. Units must also be prepared to rely on the air picture from higher if their BCT Sentinel Radar goes down as they can rapidly lose situational awareness of the air picture.

ADAM/BAE Cell "Big Four" Subsystems



Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI)
-Joint Radar Display through Link 16
- Displays near real time air picture (2D or 3D)
- Displays ATO (aircraft call sign display)
- Displays ACO (Airspace Control Measures)
-Integrates Joint air picture with Low Level Air Picture (Sentinel Radar)
- Receives and displays TMW data
- The Main HUB of the ADAM/BAE Cell

Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD or C-RAM C2)

-Sentinel Radar Display
-Provides FW/RW SA for friendly and enemy air platforms
- Displays near real time air picture (2D or 3D)
- Integrates Air Defense and Acquisition Radars to provide Sense and Warn Capability
- Mission Command Station for attached MAMD units



(FOUO) Figure 1 ADAM/BAE Cell Big Four Subsystems

ADAM/BAE Cell "Big Four" Subsystems



Air Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS)
-Air Defense Planning tool
-Provides Sensor, weapons and threat analysis during mission planning process
- Displays near real time air picture (2D or 3D)
-Disseminates Call for Fire messages to AFATDS from C-RAM acquisions
-Displays TBM Early Warning Data
- Provides Air Tracks to ABCS thru BCS server

Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS)

- Airspace Management System
- Displays active Airspace Control Measures (ACM)
- Processes and de-conflicts ACM Requests
- Provides Airspace Control Orders (ACO) to ABCS through BCS
- Displays near real time air picture (2D or 3D)



(FOUO) Figure 2 ADAM/BAE Cell Big Four Subsystems

Fires Responsibilities for Airspace Management: Fires have a few responsibilities during a clearance for fires battle drill. Delays can occur if the ADAM/BAE does not receive timely Point of Origin (POO), GUN Location, and max ordnance, and once the air is clear how long is it clear? When should the ADAM/BAE confirm with hire that it is still clear? These are questions that the ADAM/BAE should ask and establish TTP with the control authority. If the Effects Cell can streamline this process within the clearances for fires battle drill and become more proficient in establishing the AFATDS and TAIS connection then the ADAM/BAE will have more timely actions for clearing fires.

Raven Operations: Raven operations are usually challenged because of the aerial SA at the battalion level. The battalion often do not understand the unit airspace plan and request immediate ACMs for Raven operations that conflict with ACMs published in the ACO. Also the battalions do not maximize the advantage of preplanned ROZs. For NTC, preplanned ROZs can be any size, dimension, for any time to enable operations that is synchronized with the maneuver plan and integrated in the unit airspace plan. When battalions request immediate ROZs for Ravens, they are limited to a four hour duration with SFC-1,000 1.5 Radius, and increase the workload for the ADAM/BAE to process immediate request.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Units should identify primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) plans to maximize all mission command capabilities including transition periods, rehearse how to conduct mission command at multiple command posts, and detail successes in unit SOPs. Units can successfully accomplish airspace control through transition of mission command nodes to analog both while digital is down and when it is operational. Having the right personnel at the TAC with a map, battle book with SOP/trackers, and tactical chat or communications with the Division/control authority is the essential. Units should maintain a mixture of digital and analog tracking and have a mixture of procedural and positive airspace control measures. As long as the ADAM BAE cell maintains analog or digital communications with higher and understands the special instructions (SPINS) and rules of engagement (ROE), the BCT should not have challenges managing the airspace, but it takes repetitive training.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Material: As the Army explores options to field future mission command equipment it is vital that all warfighting functions have the capability to conduct digital and voice mission command on the move at both the TAC and the Main.

Training: A training work around is for the BCT to build a trigger in operation to move the TAIS or even ADAM Shelter to the TAC to limit airspace control without digital systems. The unit can accomplish this by maintaining analog with Division or the higher authority to manage airspace.

Doctrine: For more information refer to Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf

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Chapter 3

Fires Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)

01 MKG 11-11-14

(FOUO) Title

ART 3.2 Provide Fire Support

(FOUO) Description

MTC Fire Support Rehearsal

(FOUO) Discussion

The FSCOORD did a good job leading the MTC Fire Support Rehearsal. It was more than a scripted read back of the plan by each FSO. The FSCOORD inserted several what-ifs that challenged responses but had the effect of clarifying task and purpose or rules of engagement.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Use the rehearsal to reinforce commander's intent and how the task and purpose of each fire support task nests with that intent. Inserting what if scenarios are a check that everyone understands SOPs, ROE and intent.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training: Continue to incorporate rehearsals, establish SOP's, and use vignettes to develop the staff.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)

02 MKG 11-12-14

(FOUO) Title

ART 3.1.1 Conduct the Targeting Process

(FOUO) Description

Targeting

(FOUO) Discussion

The BCT FSO was challenged in shaping fires to set the conditions for the task forces. The BCT battle rhythm was for a work group in the morning and a meeting in the evening. This did not happen during battle period one. There was little evidence of the BCT actively looking for deep targets to shape the upcoming battle for the task forces.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Splitting staff into geographically separate locations introduced challenges that the Fires Cell struggled to overcome. Plans and Ops did not seem to be synced or actively working to detect targets to shape the upcoming fight. The staffs seemed overwhelmed and were only reacting to requests from the task forces.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training: Review and update unit SOP to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the BCT Fires Cell.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)

03 MKG 11-13-14

(FOUO) Title

ART 3.1.2 Decide Surface Targets

(FOUO) Description

Clearance of Fires

(FOUO) Discussion

The BCT was challenged to engage dynamic targets. Clearance of fires started by sending the mission in Do Not Load status to obtain the maximum ordinate for the mission and took from 3-6 minutes. Once Max Ord was known the request was sent to the ADAM/BAE to request airspace clearance which had to be forwarded to Division because of the 2000 foot coordinating altitude, often taking 15-45 minutes. Additional delays occurred with the collateral damage estimate as only two personnel were trained to complete the task.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Battle drills need to be refined within the fires cells at brigade and below and coordinated with higher HQ to streamline the process. Every effort to perform tasks in parallel should be made to shorten the critical path. Firing positions, airspace control measures and fires support control measures should all be synchronized to allow rapid engagement of fleeting targets from the HPTL.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training: Refine battle drills to improve responsiveness of the fires cell.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)

04 MKG 11-14-14

(FOUO) Title

ART 3.2.1.2.1 Request Air to Surface Attack

(FOUO) Description

Submission of Air Support Requests

(FOUO) Discussion

The BCT was challenged to effectively plan for the use of joint fires. They consistently failed to submit requests for air assets and instead relied on their USAF personnel to divert aircraft from other missions to strike targets of opportunity.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

The BCT should begin planning for employment of air during mission analysis. Draft DD 1972s should be produced at that time and refined as the planning progresses.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training: Refine unit SOPs to address the planning and use of joint fires.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
01 JAB 11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
ART 6.5.3 Establish Local Security
ART 1.5.3 Occupy and Establish a Battle or Defensive Position
Security of the Radar Systems

(FOUO) Description
No Security measures for the radar systems were emplaced while occupied and during any movement.

(FOUO) Discussion

The radar sections were challenged in having security. There were no security measures of the radar section while occupied and during any movement period. Security is a critical measure for any radar. Lack of security leaves the radar vulnerable to enemy detection/attack. This could result in limited radar coverage and allow for increased enemy indirect fire.
The AN/TPQ-37 radar section was challenged in constructing hasty fighting positions for security. The radar section was manned with six personnel. MTOE for this radar section is 10 personnel. The radar section was working three personnel on and three off in the 24 hour

operation of the radar. This causes an issue for the section to provide for a hasty fighting position for their defense.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Security is the Brigade CFO responsibility. CFO needs to ensure assets within the brigade are available to provide security for the brigade radars.
Ensuring security assets are available and coordinated and mentioned in OPORDS.
Ensuring radar sections are properly manned by MTOE and crew served weapons is slotted for radar sections.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Organization: Review MTOE manning to ensure adequate coverage for 24 hour operation.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
02 JAB 11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
ART 5.1.1.4 Conduct Fires Planning
Movement of the Radar Systems

(FOUO) Description
The Counter Fire Cell was challenged in management of the movement of radar systems.

(FOUO) Discussion
Movement of multiple radars at the same time prohibits radar coverage of the battle field. This also prevented the Brigade ability to track enemy indirect fire which could limit fire support for subordinate units within the Brigade.
Management of radars consists of accurate information and communication to the radars from the Brigade Fires Cell. This will enable other radars to provide coverage for movement of radars and still leave fire support for the brigade.
Responsibilities of the Targeting Officer and Counter fire Officer are IAW FM 3-09 Chapter 2.
According to FM 3-09 Chapter 1 Para 1-215 the radar coverage area the radar movement should be tasked to another target acquisition asset to provide continuous coverage.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
The CFO (Counter Fire Officer) should prioritize the movement of the radar systems to ensure radar coverage during movement of assets.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training: Review applicable POIs and consider updating and use vignettes to develop prioritization of movements of radar systems.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
03 JAB 11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
ART 1.2.1.0 Navigate from one point to another
Land Navigation

(FOUO) Description
Radar Section had difficulty navigating from one point to another.

(FOUO) Discussion
The radar section was challenged in moving from one point to another using a map and Dagger. The movement was approximately four kilometers during the day. The movement took 1.5 hours for the radar section to be within their tolerance (100 meters) of the Radar Deployment Order grid. A map was used because the Soldier did not understand the full capabilities of the dagger.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Home station training on Land Navigation needs to be conducted by all personnel and evaluated.
Training needs to consist of the full capabilities of the Dagger, I/E inputting wave points to help navigate.
Terrain features need to be identified on a map to help keep map oriented and to help judge distance.
Leaders need to enforce and evaluate Land Navigation at all levels.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training: Using vignettes to teach the capabilities of the Dagger.
Review CATS/POIs and ensure all devices are taught in the use of Mounted and Dismounted Land Navigation.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes
See figure below:



(FOUO) Figure 1: Example Radar Deployment Order

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
02 JAB 11-17-14

(FOUO) Title
ART 5.1.1.4 Conduct Fires Planning
Roles and Responsibilities

(FOUO) Description
Physical location of key radar leadership impacted the ability to support radar operations.

(FOUO) Discussion
The unit was challenged in having key personnel at the TOC to support radar operations. This resulted in the following challenges:

- Security – Radar was challenged in having assets for security.

- Complete Radar Deployment Orders- Radar was receiving bare minimal information for movement.
- Recon assets from the battalion TOC- Radar were conducting recon on the move.
- Logistical Support- at any time the radar needs maintenance support it is to be coordinated through the platoon leadership. During this rotation Logistical Support was provided by the senior leaders of the task force.

  IAW FM 3-09.12 Chapter 3 addresses the roles and responsibilities of Radar Leadership.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Radar personnel need to know the responsibilities of their position and be challenged in their roles. This will develop successful communication from the radar to the brigade counter fire cell.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
N/A

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
01 JAB 11-18-14

(FOUO) Title
ART 4.1.3.5.2 Provide Separate Loading Ammunition
Propellant Lot Management (FM 6-40 Chapter 3 Ballistics)

(FOUO) Description
Propellant Lots have an abbreviated lot code established by the battalion FDC. This Lot code needs to be the same for the battalion to prevent fire mission processing from being denied from the howitzer of mixed matched Lot Codes.

(FOUO) Discussion
The subordinate FDC's were challenged in having assigned propellant codes from the Battalion FDC. When the FDC's are to assume other units howitzers if they have different Lot Codes assigned from their previous FDC this creates a challenge for the current FDC to assume responsibility of these howitzers and to have them ready to fire.
I/E During the fire mission processing if the current FDC has Lot A for 5H (propellant charge) and the howitzer has Lot B in the PDFCS then the howitzer will not receive the mission and the mission is denied in the AFATDS because the two systems does not match in Lot codes.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

Recommend Battalion FDC assigns LOT codes for propellants and annotated in Battalion TACSOP, Digital SOP.
Conducting FDC academy or DST to ensure inputting ammunition correctly does not impede fire mission processing.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training: using vignettes to assign lot codes for propellants for all subordinate FDC's and howitzers in the battalion.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
02 JAB 11-18-14

(FOUO) Title
ART 1.1.2.1 Conduct Pre-Deployment Activities
Digital SOP

(FOUO) Description
A Detailed Digital SOP encompasses the required data for all digital devices to talk to one another.

(FOUO) Discussion
The unit was challenged in having a detailed Digital SOP. Numerous times subordinate units had to assume responsibility of radars or howitzers of a different battery. In this event units have to request by voice the required data for them to establish digital comms with the controlling element. A hard copy of a detailed SOP or a parameters communication card with this information will be beneficial to prevent any request of information in which could slow down the process of having firing capabilities.
Digital devices include the miltope at the radar, all AFATDS assigned in the brigade fires and all PDFCS of the FA battalion. This data in a Digital SOP for these devices include and IP address, URN as well as the station rank assigned.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Ensure Battalion FDC establishes a detailed Digital SOP for all digital systems.
Ensure Battalion FDC conducts DSST (Digital Sustainment System Training) to ensure all data is accurate and works for all devices.
Implement and enforce a DSST program that maintains digital comms with all digital systems.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Training: Using vignettes to establish a detailed Digital SOP and to teach comms configuration for all digital devices.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes
See figure below:



(FOUO) Figure 1: Operational Readiness Test System

Chapter 4

Aviation Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
001 JW 17NOV2014

(FOUO) Title
Aviation Task Force Maintenance

(FOUO) Description
Aviation Task Forces frequently do not have the tools and parts needed to accomplish scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.

(FOUO) Discussion
Aviation Task Forces often lack key tools and parts when arriving at NTC. As a result OR rates are lower than they need to be, less combat power is available to the commander, and wasted effort goes into to resourcing the missing parts and equipment.

The source of this challenge occurs when a unit task organizes. When an aviation squadron/battalion operates as a pure element there is typically not an issue. The unit has the tools and is familiar with the parts associated with that airframe. Also, there is tacit knowledge within the organization that for the most part, ensures the most commonly needed spare parts are on hand.

However, when a unit is task organized just prior to a deployment for real world or training the lines begin to blur. The tools are assigned by MTOE for a battalion pure of any particular aircraft, not for task forces. In some instances there are not enough tools to divide out into multiple task forces. Examples include: track and balance kits for tail rotors, flight control rigging kits, aviation vibration analyzers, etc. In other instances the parent battalion will not send forward tools that are in high demand, instead keeping them with the parent battalion to complete phased maintenance in the rear and only sending them forward if and when needed. This creates unnecessary maintenance delays for units training at NTC. Secondly, the tacit knowledge is not always available. When a task force maintenance company incorporates other airframes into its maintenance plan they do not know what they do not know. For instance a Blackhawk uses two different versions of an APU. It is important to know what type each tail number has installed. In one instance the task force brought a spare APU. Luckily it was the right one, but the installation kit to install the part was for the other APU type. Presently, there is no resource to aid in planning which would help minimize these type of challenges. Units rely on the people within the organization to have the experience to know which tools and parts will be needed.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

TO&E must address the ability to task organize into multiple elements. The appropriate amount of special tools and equipment need to be assigned to do this. Also some documentation of task force maintenance planning considerations should be developed. This could be accomplished in a BDE SOP or written into doctrine.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Doctrine- Including a chapter in TC 3-04.17 on task force maintenance planning would give organizations a guide to aid in ensuring they have the appropriate parts and tools to perform maintenance operations in a multi-airframe task force.
Organization- Creating more permanent and consistent task force relationships within the CAB would ensure continuity of personnel within the organization. This would enable better understanding of maintenance practices and requirements among various airframes.
Training- NA
Material- TO&E should include at a minimum 4 pieces of all equipment that is not duplicated in each aviation battalion type.
Leadership- NA
Personnel- NA
Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes
N/A

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
002 JW 14NOV2014

(FOUO) Title
Aviation TAA Security

(FOUO) Description
The aviation task force was challenged to provide TAA security with organic assets. This proved to be extremely difficult while establishing the TAA and conducting flight operations simultaneously.

(FOUO) Discussion
The aviation task force attempted to secure itself at the TAA in extremely austere environment. This task force also had an organic UAS Shadow platoon which increased its footprint size with the addition of the required landing strip. TF CSM stated it was not feasible to conduct flight operations and have the personnel required to secure a footprint of this size. During the first phase the task force was not near other units to share security responsibilities. By the end of battle period one the aviation task force received an M-2 Bradley platoon to assist with security.

This seemed to be sufficient for the terrain that is at NTC. The terrain is very open and an enemy can be seen at some distance with the appropriate optics. This most likely would not be the case in a more vegetated environment and would require more personnel to secure the TAA.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Consideration must be made in a Decisive Action environment to the aviation TF security. In order to establish a TAA and secure itself without external support, a great risk in security will be undertaken by the aviation TF. Planning considerations should account for one of the following: 1. Tie in with other BCT elements to reduce the amount of perimeter that must be secured 2. Provide external security support to the aviation task force 3. Do not conduct flight operations until the TAA is fully established.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Doctrine- N/A
Organization- The attachment of a Bradley platoon to assist the task force was beneficial in addressing security concerns and still allowing the unit to conduct flight operations.
Training- NA
Material- NA
Leadership- NA
Personnel- NA
Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes
There are multiple solutions to this challenge. One of the easiest ways to minimize required personnel for security is to tie in with other elements within the brigade. The volume of flight operations will ultimately determine how much support the task force requires. Because an aviation task force has a large footprint and is comprised of non-combat vehicles (while on the ground) as the preponderance of their equipment they need more support than other unit types. As flight hours increase the amount of support personnel required for maintenance, refuel/rearm, and planning increase. As a result less personnel are available to perform security.

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
003 JW 14NOV2014

(FOUO) Title
Shortage of intelligence analysts in the ARS

(FOUO) Description

UAS Shadow platoons have been added to the aviation task force, increasing its ability to collect intelligence; however there has been no increase to the amount of S-2 personnel to exploit this capability.

(FOUO) Discussion
Although this particular unit only had one UAS Shadow platoon, in the near future each AH-64 company in an ARS battalion will have an organic shadow platoon. Having multiple UAS assets in the air will require more planning for their use as well as processing the information they collect.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
In order to benefit from the increased ISR assets within the aviation task force, increasing personnel to plan/process the data would make it more useful.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Doctrine- N/A
Organization- NA
Training- NA
Material- NA
Leadership- NA
Personnel- Increase the MTOE of the S-2 section to process the increase in intelligence gathering in the task force.
Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes
N/A

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
004 JW 14NOV2014

(FOUO) Title
UAS Shadow platoon tactical training

(FOUO) Description
The UAS Shadow platoon was challenged by an apparent lack of tactical knowledge for the employment of their aircraft.

(FOUO) Discussion
Although, great at the technical tasks associated with the employment of their UAS, the operators do not understand the tactical purpose they are achieving. A basic understanding of the

fundamentals of reconnaissance and security would aid the operators, not only in what they are looking for, but how to look for it. Based on interviews conducted, UAS operators are not exposed to this type of training until the SLC. Additionally, the officers within the platoon are technical Warrant Officers who have received limited tactical employment training. As a result the sensors on the Shadows are often looking at named areas of interest (NAIs) but not focused on a task and purpose that would provide the commander the critical information he needs to make decisions. As an example; in one instance the operators were observing an enemy bulldozer digging two days prior to their unit's planned attack. When asked if they understood what the bulldozer was digging for, they stated they did not. They were then asked if they knew what mission type their unit was about to accomplish, they also stated they did not. This is mitigated somewhat by brigade TOC oversight, but it requires a third person to constantly view what these two operators are already viewing. In an attempt provide some on the job training, the company commander who owns one of the Shadow platoons assigned two AH-64 pilots from within his company to teach some of these basic fundamentals. The platoon sergeant of this Shadow platoon stated that having these two pilots available to teach and mentor has been very helpful for the Shadow operators to understand how to better incorporate the Shadow into the overall fight.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

The unit appears to rely on someone other than the UAS operators to process what is being observed on their screens. Giving the operators similar tactical training as that of OH/AH pilots, ground scouts, or Bradley and M-1 crews would enhance their ability to employ their sensors to better support the commander's intent.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine- N/A
Organization- NA
Training- Modify training throughout a UAS operators career. Starting in AIT and extend through NCOES. Training that more closely mirrors that of other reconnaissance attack platforms in the army.
Material- NA
Leadership- Assign a recon/attack aviator as the platoon leader of the Shadow platoon or give the technical warrant more training in tactics. This would install the requisite knowledge within the platoon to ensure continuous training.
Personnel- N/A
Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

N/A

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
005 JW 14NOV2014

(FOUO) Title
UAS Integration Into The Aviation Task Force

(FOUO) Description
Aviation assigned UAS were often not available for use by the aviation commanders

(FOUO) Discussion
This NTC rotation had two separate Shadow UAS platoons with three Shadow vehicles each. One was assigned to the BCT and the other was assigned to an AH-64 company within the aviation task force. Due to broken equipment it was necessary to combine the equipment of both platoons in order to recover the UASs. This alone did not limit the ability to simultaneously employ multiple Shadows, but it took nearly two hours to get multiple Shadows airborne. In order to put a Shadow in the air there must be a primary and back up control station at the launch and recovery site. Each of these platoons has two primary ground control stations and one back-up portable ground control station, which is primarily used for emergency recovery of the vehicle if the primary ground control station becomes inoperable. Two of the ground control stations and both back up control stations were positioned at the launch and recovery site located well in the BCT rear. The third ground control station was located with the aviation task force and the fourth ground control station was located with the BCT TOC. The standard protocol was to launch a Shadow from the launch recovery site. Once airborne the ground control station co-located with the BCT TOC would then assume control of the Shadow. At that time the Shadow operators would receive all orders directly from the brigade headquarters. As a result, essentially all control of the aviation Shadow platoon was assumed by BDE HQ.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
The Shadow vehicles were under utilized during the rotation. By allowing the aviation task force commander to employ his Shadow assets simultaneously with the BCT could have created more clarity within the battle space. As a result of this limitation on employment of the Shadows, the overall aviation task force was not employed to its maximum capability. This contributed to the aviation task force challenge to significantly influence the battle. The aviation task force had 16 AH-64s available, but the most that were simultaneously in the fight was 6. The aviation task force commander had to primarily rely on information from the BCT in the management of duty periods for its crews, as well as where to employ its combat power.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Doctrine- N/A
Organization- Placing the Shadow platoon in the aviation task force gives the commander the ability to collect the appropriate information to deploy the rest of his task force. Allowing the

aviation task force commander to exercise command and control over them would enhance the entire BCT's overall effectiveness and limit the workload in managing the asset.
Training-N/A
Material- NA
Leadership- N/A
Personnel- N/A
Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes
N/A

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
006 JW 14NOV2014

(FOUO) Title
Fire Control Radar (FCR) use

(FOUO) Description
The unit did not have fire control radars installed on any of their AH-64s

(FOUO) Discussion
In the DA environment, FCRs are a critical tool in the identification and destruction of enemy vehicles. The unit stated that they had FCRs at home station, however only one of them was operable. In any event, none were installed on the aircraft.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
This may be a challenge among Apache units. FCRs may have limited utility in a COIN environment, and as a result, may not be installed on the aircraft. As more training in the DA environment occurs units will need to plan well in advance to repair broken equipment prior to deployment to combat training centers or for DA operations.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine- N/A
Organization- NA
Training-N/A
Material- Identifying broken equipment and purchasing repair parts is necessary to overcome this challenge.
Leadership- N/A
Personnel- N/A

Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes
N/A

Chapter 5

MSCOE Focus Areas

Engineer

OBSERVATION

(FOUO) Observation: Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE)

(FOUO) Description: Assistant Brigade Engineer is not being properly employed

(FOUO) Discussion: During observation of Brigade and Battalion operations during a National Training Center rotation, OC/Ts from each of the teams confirmed that the Assistant Brigade Engineer was not being properly employed. In accordance with doctrine, this O4 position authorized on the Brigade HHC MTOE was intended to coordinate engineer activities in support of the BCT.

There were several deviations which led to the issue. The BCT commander chose to make his external engineer battalion commander the Brigade Engineer instead of the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) Commander. Therefore, the coordination for ABE was with a unit that was not organic to the brigade. During battle period one, movement to contact, the ABE was pulled from his role as ABE and reassigned to the position of Chief of Operations. The ABE is typically a more seasoned O4 hand selected to serve in the position. Taking this expertise and redesignating his efforts directly impacts the products being executed and ultimately leaves a void within the brigade staff. Furthermore, in order to fulfill the gap left by this move, the battalion pushed an O3 to serve as the ABE, directly impacting the manning of the battalion S3 shop.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons Learned: The Assistant Brigade Engineer's role must be clearly established and protected in order to ensure effective engineer coordination and support for the brigade staff. Moving the authorization of the ABE from the Brigade HHC MTOE to the Battalion HHC MTOE will assist in ensuring that the position is properly maintained.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Organization. The field grade officer ABE authorization should be moved to the battalion MTOE in order to protect redirection of the officer to other duties aligned with the brigade commander's priorities versus executing the support required for the engineer effort.
Training. Company grade officers need instruction on the proper implementation of the updated doctrine in ATP 3-34.22. The ABE role should be incorporated into their instruction. Information should also be shared with the senior leaders and incoming commanders on the means of serving as both the battalion commander and the Brigade engineer.

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OBSERVATION

(FOUO) Observation: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Security Mission

(FOUO) Description: BEBs are being tasked to execute security missions without the assets needed to properly execute.

(FOUO) Discussion: During observation of brigade and battalion operations during a National Training Center rotation, the Brigade Engineer Battalion was tasked to accomplish security missions. In accordance with doctrine, this BEB may be used in extreme circumstances for the security mission. In the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), the security mission was anticipated and therefore, the doctrine supported the known need for combat force support by clearly requiring proper augmentation of the battalion during security missions. The recently updated engineer doctrine does not capture the augmentation requirement. However, it does emphasize that the use of the BEB in this capacity will greatly impact its ability to serve as a functional headquarters and potentially impact overall engineer support. Furthermore, it will have a fundamental change of the BEB role from a supporting unit in the BCT to a supported unit in the BCT.

During this rotation, the BEB commander was not given the role of Brigade Engineer. Therefore, the impact to his role as the overall functional headquarters was not evaluated in the manner discussed above.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons Learned: The BCT leadership must clearly understand the significant impact of tasking the BEB in support of a security mission. Engineer leaders must clearly communicate the capabilities of engineer units and emphasize the importance of utilizing engineers efficiently.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Doctrine. Doctrine team needs to assess need for a change to ATP 3-34.22 which identifies augmentation needed for BEB in support of security missions.

Training. Company grade officers need instruction on the importance of engaging the Brigade Engineer and BCT leadership with capabilities and ability to emphasize importance of executing relevant engineer missions.

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OBSERVATION

(FOUO) Observation: Planning for Combined Arms Breaching

(FOUO) Description: Task Forces were challenged with planning the execution of a breach

(FOUO) Discussion: Task Forces were challenged to properly plan combined arms breaching. The organizations failed to include the Task Force Engineer during planning on at least one occasion, resulting in a plan which would not efficiently and effectively include key resources. The TF Engineer injected himself into the planning prior to execution, reinforcing the need for TF Engineer involvement in TF planning. Often, the Task Force Engineer is being used as a battle captain and engineer expertise is not being included in key planning for breaching. This is due in part to incomplete integration of engineers into the staff as well as a lack of understanding of the role of the TF Engineer.
ATTP 3-90.4 states, "Mobility operations are planned by incorporating the fundamentals of assured mobility described in Chapter 1 within the planning process (and associated troop leading procedures) described in FM 5-0 and MCWP 5-1. Mobility and counter-mobility requirements and the tasks necessary to fulfill them are synchronized primarily through integrating processes and continuing activities (see FM 3-0 and FM 5-0). The planning process provides the framework for integrating the actions of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others. Table 2-1, page 2-6, provides some of the necessary mobility planning considerations linked to the steps of the planning process." It also states, "The senior engineer staff officer is the principal integrator of mobility (and counter-mobility) operations within the staff. (See FM 6-0 for a more discussion of staff duties and responsibilities.) In lower echelon organizations where certain functional cells may not exist, the staff still applies the tasks associated with that particular warfighting function.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons Learned: Combined Arms Breaching cannot be accomplished without Combined Arms Planning.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Leadership & Education. Leaders and staff need to apply ATTP 3- 90.4 for mobility planning and employ FM 6.0 and FM 3-34 to understand staff roles and responsibilities.

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OBSERVATION

(FOUO) Observation: National Training Center Rotation Planning Participation

(FOUO) Description: Non-organic Engineer units were involved in NTC rotation training.

(FOUO) Discussion: During observation of brigade and battalion operations at NTC, representatives from the Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) engineer battalion, confirmed that they had been included in the planning process for the National Training Center rotation. The battalion participated in the leadership training prior to the event, as well as unit train ups. Including the EAB battalion leadership and staff in the rotational planning process assisted in developing relationships throughout the Brigade and fostered an environment for leaders to share/compare procedures for mission execution. Conducting such teambuilding prior to the actual rotation allows for commanders to identify and address issues in a lower stress environment. It also ensures that all units have and understand the basic plan and concept of the operation for the rotation and that all units are included in all RSOI phase training, equipment draws and transportation.
Upon arrival at NTC, EAB engineer battalion received the required allocation of available equipment with no issues. OC/Ts on site confirmed that proper planning resulted in required allocations in accordance with NTC guidelines.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons Learned: Sustain. EAB and other non-organic enablers should continue to conduct planning with the brigade they are supporting. This type of coordination ultimately results in more effective communication across the organization.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Leadership & Education. Leaders must ensure staffs and commands work together to enable each to successfully communicate and execute. Developing relationships with enablers will produce successful results.

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OBSERVATION

(FOUO) Observation: Battalion Staff Execution of Staff Planning Principles.

(FOUO) Description: Battalion staffs are challenged to execute the military decision making process (MDMP) and proper staff planning in execution of a mission.

(FOUO) Discussion: During a National Training Center rotation, two engineer battalion staffs struggled to execute the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and proper engineer planning to execute missions. The echelons above brigade (EAB) engineer battalion lacked field grade officers in either of their staff field grade positions (S3, XO). Their staff was understrength

and had limited experience in the MDMP process. The BCT Commander made the EAB Commander the Brigade Engineer, requiring his continued coordination with the Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE) (field grade officer assigned to the BCT staff). When this position was vacated due to the requirements within BCT Operations section, the Brigade Engineer identified the void and assigned a captain from the battalion staff to serve in the ABE's stead while away from his primary Engineer role. This further degraded the effectiveness of the engineer battalion staff, but did allow for an officer familiar with the battalion to provide feedback to/from the Brigade level. The second engineer battalion had both field grade authorizations filled. However, both officers were new to their positions. Limited expertise in the multitude of enablers assigned to the battalion further aggravated the challenges of conducting MDMP.
The challenges could have been overcome had either staff had more experience with the process or had the staffs been established long enough to develop into a team.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons Learned: The MDMP process is taught in the Engineer Basic Officer Leader (EBOLC), Captains' Career (ECCC) Courses, and Intermediate Leader Education. Continuous effort in the planning process, especially the MDMP and engineer specific products, is vital for success.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications: Leadership & Education. Leaders at all levels must continually train staffs on planning and the Military Decision Making Process.

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OBSERVATION

(FOUO) Observation: Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE)

(FOUO) Description: Assistant Brigade Engineer is not being employed in accordance with doctrine

(FOUO) Discussion: During observation of Brigade and Battalion operations during a National Training Center rotation, OC/Ts from each of the teams confirmed that the Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE) was not being employed in accordance with doctrine. The field grade (O4) position is authorized on the Brigade HHC MTOE. This officer and his staff are responsible for coordinating engineer assets and activities for the BCT. During battle period one, movement to contact, the ABE was pulled from his role as ABE and reassigned to the position of the BCT Chief of Operations. Taking this expertise and redirecting his efforts, directly impacts the products being executed and ultimately leaves a void within the brigade staff. During the rotation, the Brigade Engineer noted this gap and filled it with a captain from the battalion. This provided some engineer coordination and planning -- directly proportional to the captain's experience level – but diminished an already undermanned engineer battalion S3 shop.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons Learned: The Assistant Brigade Engineer's role must be clearly established and protected in order to ensure effective engineer coordination and support for the brigade staff. Both the BCT Commander and the BEB Commander (Brigade Engineer) must understand this. The BEB Commander must be prepared to provide an additional officer to the BCT to provide ABE support should the BCT Commander decide to move his engineer officer to another job.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:
Doctrine. The ATP 3-34.22, discusses the ABE section responsibilities.
Organization. The ABE section on the TO&E belongs to the Maneuver Center of Excellence. Some discussion was had concerning movement of the authorization to the battalion staff versus the brigade staff in order to provide greater control of the staff by the Brigade Engineer. This discussion needs to continue.
Training. Company grade officers receive instruction on the roles of the ABE and the interaction with the BEB Commander. Implementation of the updated doctrine in ATP 3-34.22 should incorporate the ABE into their instruction.
Leadership & Education. Leaders at all levels need to read ATP 3-34.22 to clearly understand how to employ the ABE.

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MSCOE Focus Topics

Military Police

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID) 01rww11-13-14

(FOUO) Title Manning

(FOUO) Description The MP Company was short one squad per platoon

(FOUO) Discussion The MP Company was short by 3 squads or 36 MP Soldiers which severely hampered the MP Company's ability to conduct missions. The missions assigned to the MP Company were appropriate (detainee operations, traffic control points, route reconnaissance, quick reaction force, convoy security, and route security). However, given the shortage of squads (manpower), overtasking of the Military Police hindered the company's ability to properly execute missions. Squads were often sliced for multiple tasks; a do more with less approach. The Company Commander advised that his unit was being stretched with the number of missions, but was told to execute.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons It is incumbent on unit leadership to do mission analysis, determine the needed resources, and advise superiors if adequate resources are available to accomplish the tasks. If not, request additional resources or request change in the mission. Be prepared to execute the mission anyway, but the decision maker must be prepared for less than optimum mission accomplishment.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Leadership: Leaders at all levels are obligated to do mission analysis and advise their superiors when given tasks with insufficient resources. Recognize that sometimes the response may be, do it anyway.
Personnel: The MP Company did not its full strength of squads or Soldiers.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID) 02rww11-13-14

(FOUO) Title Manning

(FOUO) Description Brigade staff and the MP Company were challenged by a lack of a 31E C/D NCO (corrections/detention NCO)

(FOUO) Discussion Brigade staff and the MP company were both short a Corrections/ Detention NCO. Military Police Soldiers are all trained in detention operations, but the 31Bs do not have the skills and training to supervise detention operations that a 31E does. The BCT anticipated this and designated a 31B NCO to serve as a corrections/detention NCO and train to operate a prisoner of war holding area. Additionally, other Military Police were given limited training at homestation in the operation of a holding area. As a result, when the BCT directed the establishment of a PW holding area, it was well run. Detainees were properly accounted for, properly classified, and properly treated.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons By conducting task analysis and a personnel scrub in anticipation of deployment, the BCT identified a key shortfall in the lack of any assigned 31E corrections/detention NCO. This NCO would run any prisoner of war detention facility. To plan for this shortage, a 31B (military police) NCO was designated to become informed on how to run (supervise) a detention facility and to serve in that capacity. Selected Military Policemen were given additional training on how to run the facility and serve as guards. Training at home station helped mitigate any problems when the need arose during the rotation.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
Training: BCT conducted limited home station training in how to operate a prisoner of war holding area to mitigate a known personnel shortfall (31E NCO).
Leadership: BCT leadership conducting mission analysis determined key personnel shortage of 31E NCO could adversely affect field operations and planned to mitigate through home station training.
Personnel: The Brigade PMO and the MP Company did not have 31E NCOs. This key Military Police NCO position was identified as necessary, but was also recognized as not being filled. As a result, a 31B NCO was designated and given training in how to supervise a holding area. Plan to mitigate shortages before the event.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

Chapter 6

Sustainment Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID): 01-SCM-11-21-14

(FOUO) Title: BCT Organizational Sustainment Roles and Responsibilities

(FOUO) Description:
Leaders and staff primaries lack sufficient understanding of individual roles and responsibilities of key BCT and subordinate battalion staffs in support of decisive action tactical sustainment and distribution operations.

(FOUO) Discussion:
Army doctrine expresses that the BDE S4 develops, directs, and leads the BCT's concept of support in coordination with the BSB SPO and SPO planner, orchestrates the BCT's sustainment operation, integrates sustainment operations with maneuver operations with the BDE S3 and S3 Planner and leads all BDE sustainment coordination and battle rhythm events (FM 3-95).

During this rotation the BSB SPO and "Deputy SPO" (who was also the SPO Transportation Officer) executed the brunt of the BDE S4 responsibilities relative to logistics synchronization which concentrated *(limited)* visibility of the BDE's sustainment posture and operations locally at the BSA. As a result, the BDE S3 had no sustainment COP overlay to the Maneuver COP thus, an incomplete ability to manage the BCT TF AO ICW sustainment and maneuver battalion TF AOs.

Overall, the BCT experienced challenges with executing critical sustainment tasks resulting from a lack of sufficient understanding of who does what, when, where and how. Symptoms of this challenge included not employing trained and skilled personnel appropriately. Moreover, key warrant officers and MOS skills trained NCOs and soldiers were unavailable for assigned positions critical to supporting/sustaining operations throughout each battle period of the rotation. Such voids experienced by the BCT are a result of leadership and staffs not completely understanding the capabilities resident within the manning structure of the organization.

Compounding the challenges of the absence of critical staff workforce is the lack of synchronization of personnel replacements at homestation. Many of the BCT and subordinate battalion primary staff positions lacked sufficient overlap and is out of replacement/manning cycle synchronization with the BCT's annual progressive training calendar. Thus, not affording the BCT staff the ability to build, synchronize and standardize the staff team nor its SOPs.

These challenges experienced by the BCT influence a significant contradiction to the flexibility, integration, adaptability, and synchronization tenets of ULO as well as the integration, anticipation, responsiveness, simplicity, economy, and continuity principles of sustainment; all

of which are made possible through proficient, synchronized, and effective mission command teams.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons:

Homestation training is critical to the BCT's mission success both during a culminating training event (CTE) as well as an expeditionary deployment. Maximizing resources (of which includes time) is essential to commanders' ability to assess the readiness of their organizations prior to competing for validation of the readiness assessment at a Combat Training Center (CTC) CTE. BCT's and subordinate battalions must rigorously and continuously challenge staffs at every opportunity; create opportunities to train staffs, e.g. TEWTs, CPXs, and COMEXs. Commanders should also consider and engage in the development of a homestation culminating training event; one such similar to a homestation mission readiness exercise (MRE) to evaluate staff proficiency and challenge the BCT's operations process(es). The aforementioned preparedness will enable the BCT to effectively maximize focused and challenging execution of maneuvers, fires and effects with a confident and proficient mission command team capability.

Synchronization of personnel turnover replacements IAW Army manning cycles is imperative to the mission readiness and success Army BCTs. This is critical to the manning cycle turnovers of primary staffs within both the BCT and subordinate battalion headquarters. Both headquarters require simultaneous building of staff teams in order to effectively and timely synchronize the BCT's operations process(es) in support of providing sufficient and proficient mission command to maneuver enabler capabilities and combat power.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:

Training Recommendation. Strategic and operational commander emphasis focused on maximizing homestation training to achieve mission readiness well prior to CTC CTE participation; enforcement of Army progressive training model strategies designed to inform tactical commander training strategies, plans and guidance; resourcing homestation MREs ("scrimmages") to enable BCT and subordinate battalion commanders' assessment of overall readiness prior to CTC CTE participation. These recommendations are assumed to enable more effective CTC resource allocation, utilization and obligations.

(FOUO) Leader Education Recommendation. Institutional education capabilities and resources increase emphasis on understanding tactical leader and staff roles and responsibilities synchronized collectively within the BCT operations process for effective execution of mission command to prosecute overwhelming maneuvers, fires, and effects.

(FOUO) Personnel Recommendation. Assess and adjust the synchronization of the Army manning cycle(s) against planned turnovers impacting BCT and subordinate battalion staffs. Maintain priority fill of primary staffs in these organizational headquarters as critical to deployment readiness (considerations include global response force (GRF), NATO response force (NRF), regionally aligned force (RAF), and combat training center/combat training environment (CTC/CTE) rotation schedules).

(FOUO) Facilities Recommendation. Ensure and secure sufficient facilities resourcing to effectively support homestation requirements and needs impacting the BCTs ability to sufficiently navigate Army progressive training models and strategies.

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

1 encl. – The Brigade Combat Team Sustainment and Tactical Distribution Network (Roles and Responsibilities) training handout.

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID): 04-SCM-11-21-14

(FOUO) Title: Movement Synchronization and Tactical Convoy Operations (TCO) Battle Tracking

(FOUO) Description:
Effective movement control, regulation, and synchronization inside the BCT TF AO and throughout individual BN TF sectors influences the outcome of logistics and maneuver planning, synchronization, and execution collectively. It facilitates the BCT Commander's ability through the BCT S3 to manage operations inside the AO while simultaneously incorporating a BCT tactical distribution network.

(FOUO) Discussion:
The BCT was challenged by movement synchronization and tactical convoy operations (TCO) battle tracking. The BCT had no BDE Movement and Route Synchronization Plans; and no Transportation Movement Release formats or procedures developed and integrated into BDE COP. As a result, the BCT had no visibility of tactical convoys transiting in and through the TF AOs thus no TCO battle tracking at the BDE TOC A and in the BSB SPO section. This is critical to deconflicting sustainment movement traffic circulation with maneuver operations

which avoids operational disruption, fratricide, enables freedom of movement and maneuver and evasion of enemy ability to disrupt lines of communication and destroy critical sustainment capability and capacity.

Inclusive to the lack of effective movement and route synchronization, the BCT had no procedures in place to communicate intelligence collection of enemy threat and trends respective of threat to TCOs or procedures to evaluate, determine and disseminate route condition statuses to inform tactical convoy commanders and personnel for TCO planning, coordination and execution. Ultimately these deficiencies lead to TCO execution "in the blind" and uninformed execution of movement and maneuver operations which potentially poses catastrophic outcomes across the BDE.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons:

Army BCTs and subordinate maneuver BNs require sufficient unit planning, management, and coordination capability to effectively execute tactical and operational unit movement and sustainment distribution in synchronization with unit maneuvers. Symptoms of the not having movement and route synchronization plans, policies and processes resident in the BCT and subordinate maneuver BN TF mission command operations include the following.

1. Key staff primaries not understanding personnel capabilities resident in the BCT TF headquarters staff to provide sufficient planning, guidance and direction for executing effective movement and route synchronization. (FM 4-01 Transportation Operations defines the BCT S4 Mobility Cell consisting of the Mobility Warrant Officer and the Transportation Logistics NCO. As per FM 4-01, the technical expertise for transportation operations within the brigade resides with the mobility warrant officer (MWO) and the transportation coordinator (88N) non-commissioned officer. The MWO presents commanders with solutions to the deployment and distribution problem. The MWO's skills are critical to the execution of movement and maneuver from strategic through operational reaches to tactical areas of operation enabling combined arms maneuver, wide-area security, and sustaining the force. In the BCT the MWO is assigned to the BCT S4 section with an integrating relationship to the BCT S3 and operations planner. The BCT MWO plans and coordinates BCT strategic and operational movement requirements to include BCT operational and tactical sustainment movement support requirements develops, coordinates and conducts unit movement training. The BCT MWO assists the commander and staff in developing specific procedures, estimates, analyses, and timelines for deployments, decisive action operational maneuver transportation support requirements, area of operation movement support coordination to include route synchronization planning and MSR/ASR control, and retrograde and redeployments. The BCT MWO works closely with BSB SPO section, the MCB and MCTs arranging convoys in support of BCT sustainment and heavy lift requirements; ensuring uninterrupted flow of critical sustainment commodities such as fuel, ammunition, food, and water to operating forces within the BCT area of operation.

2. The requirements associated with executing the movement and route synchronization plans include but is not limited to continuous 24 hour manning of personnel capable of receiving requests for movement in and through TF AOs, coordinating sustainment and administrative movements for approval of the BCT S3, and monitoring and communicating with all movements to prevent impairing decisive maneuver operations. Army BCTs and subordinate maneuver BNs

are not sufficiently manned (as per current and future MTOEs) to execute the critical tasks involved with synchronizing and regulating movements. Effective execution of movement and route synchronization enables continuously informed and situational aware operational and tactical TCO execution. It facilitates the freedom of movement of field trains, combat trains, and support provided from the EAB LSA(s) which is critical to the expediting of sustainment to supported BCTs and subordinate BNs. Movement and route synchronization also influences and informs the BSB SPO when anticipating sustainment requirements as well as provide an operational touch point at the BCT TOC to synchronize, plan and execute the culmination of sustainment tasks and requirements; overlays the sustainment COP to the maneuver COP to reflect the integration of the two.

3. Additionally, Army doctrine does not provide the detail at the tactical level to ensure these responsibilities are captured and acknowledged; as well as learned and exercised to a defined standard. The critical tasks associated with both operational and tactical movement control are fundamental to orchestrating effective movement and maneuver in support of ULO and the achievement of winning freedom of movement and maneuver over extended distances. Tasks that can be associated with defending lines of communication, providing sustainment, providing distribution, and enabling maneuvers, fires, and effects are as follows. The tasks identified inside the bold squares highlight those that directly enable movement and route synchronization and/or those that are directly enabled by movement and route synchronization.

MET 1: Conduct Mission Command

Task Group 1: 71-8-5100 Execute the Operations Process

Supporting Collective Tasks

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications:

(U) Unit/POC/contact info:

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes:

Chapter 7

Cyber Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U) 01LAC11-21-14

(FOUO) Title: Cyber Intrusion

(FOUO) Description: Defensive Cyber Operations

(FOUO) Discussion:

A cyber attack was initiated on the RTU by the World Class Cyber OPFOR on training day 14. The scenario targeted a specific mission command system, Command Post of the Future (CPOF). On or about 0840, the RTU reported a cyber intrusion to Division stating that their CPOF system received a Red Flag with DEATH TO THE INVADERS as a description. Through limited interaction with enemy cyber operations, the RTU achieved significant gains in terms of their awareness of the impact failure to comply with IA policies and practices can have during the conduct of unified land operations.

- **Targeted 5 systems at Bde and Bn level:**
- **Displayed for 20 min; Synchronized to start at LD of BP4**

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- Continue the use of adversarial cyber capabilities in future rotations to alert RTU's to the realistic cyber challenges they will face from potential adversaries..
- Progressively increase the sophistication of cyber threats in future rotations to raise RTU awareness in mitigating effects of adversarial cyber attacks.
- Continue to follow DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs)
- Continuous monitoring minimizes the cyber threat. Understand the threat.

- Initiate a cyber threat scenario before the last training day that emulates the threat of our opposing forces by attacking the units during key events.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine- FM 3-38, CEMA

Training- Unit must implement sustainment cybersecurity training.

Material- NA

Leadership- Commander and Staff involvement would enhance the importance of Cyber/IA Awareness

Personnel- NA

Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

Ensure Commanders/S6 understand their role is to "Detect, Identify, and Mitigate" the cyber threat.

Include a training day of Cyber play during the unit rotation.

Develop unit training prior to unit deployment to NTC.

OBSERVATION

(U) 02LAC11-21-14

(FOUO) Title: Network Monitoring

(FOUO) Description: Defensive Cyber Operations

(FOUO) Discussion: The following is a snapshot of Defensive cyber operations for the RTU. DCO was identified as weakness, however during the rotation the World Class Cyber OPFOR had difficulties accessing their network. On training day 4 the OPFOR was able to gain access to the RTUs network. On training day 5, the RTU identified the intrusion, and reported the incident in accordance with their unit TACSOP however, the OPFOR's presence was still in the network.

Insights/Lessons

- Continue to follow DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs)
- Continuous monitoring will minimize the cyber threat. Understand the cyber threat.
- Create a scenario during the rotation that will emulate the threat of our opposing forces by attacking the units during key events.
- Continue to change default passwords

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine- FM 3-38, CEMA

Training- Unit must implement sustainment training to bridge the gap between annual IA training.

Material- NA

Leadership- Commander and Staff involvement would enhance the importance of Cyber/IA Awareness

Personnel- NA

Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

Ensure Commanders/S6 understand their role is to "Detect, Identify, and Mitigate" the cyber threat.

Include a training day of Cyber play during the unit rotation.

Develop unit training prior to unit deployment to NTC.

OBSERVATION

(U) 03LAC11-17-14

(FOUO) Title: Battle Drills

(FOUO) Description: Enemy Jamming

(FOUO) Discussion

The RTU detected several instances of jamming during the rotation. The staff did not understand the difference between jamming and a compromise therefore initiated the RTU compromise plan without the guidance of the brigade S6. The implications of doing so resulted in the entire BCT changing COMSEC keys which created a delay in future planning considerations.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- Notify Cyber Electromagnetic Activities element (EWO Officer) of suspected jamming:
- Incorporate the following in a battle drill; This will ensure the actions are understood by the entire Staff.
- Jamming
- Compromise procedures
- Power Outage
- Cyber
- Cross Domain Violation
- Loss of communications

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine- (FM 6-02.53) (FM 3-38)

Organization- NA

Training- Implement jamming and compromise procedures in home station training (FTX).

Material- NA

Leadership- NA

Personnel- NA

Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) 04LAC11-17-14

(FOUO) Title: Personnel Management

(FOUO) Description

25B40 serving as the Brigade S6 NCOIC**.**

(FOUO) Discussion

The RTUs ability to communicate effectively throughout the exercise was challenged daily due to the location, engagement of the enemy and lack of proficiency on signal systems (HF, TACSAT) During the last seven Decisive Action (DA) rotations the Cyber CoE Lessons and Best Practices analyst have observed units filling the 25U50 position with MOSs other than the MTOE position. The following illustrates trends captured by analyst:

Rotation 13-02, 25B40,
Rotation 13-04 25W50,
Rotation 14-03 25U40,
Rotation 14-06 25U,40
Rotation 14-09 25U50 (retirement)
Rotation 15-02 25B40.

Although the above MOSs are Signal, the knowledge, expertise and training supports the need of a 25U50, therefore the position should be filled by that MOS. (DA PAM 611-21).

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- Understand the unit mission and what your responsibilities are within the unit.
- Supervise, plan, and integrate the installation, employment, and maintenance of Signal support systems, to include radio, wire, and battlefield automated systems.
- Plan and conduct Division, Brigade, and Battalion Signal support operations and user owned and operated Signal equipment training.
- Develops Staff information services policy and procedures.
- Establishes unit Signal maintenance programs, policies, and procedures.
- Provides technical advice and assistance to commanders and subordinate units.
- Coordinates Signal activities with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.
- Performs Signal staff functions, and develops Signal policies and battlefield integration plans in support of Division, Brigade, and Battalion Signal operations.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine- (FM 6-02.43)

Organization- NA

Training-

Material- NA

Leadership- NA

Personnel- NA

Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) 05LAC11-20-14

(FOUO) Title: Sync Meetings

(FOUO) Description: Information Flow

(FOUO) Discussion

Synchronization meetings should be used to identify concerns and how to resolve those concerns. The RTU was challenged daily with the sharing of information internally and externally creating confusion throughout the BCT. Internal/External meetings minimize this confusion. On training day 11 I spoke with a BN S6. He stated that his FM communications with the brigade was poor and had been that way for four days due to the brigades location or lack of monitoring communications systems. Daily reporting of network health and statistics did not occur.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons

- Add S6 sync meetings to the brigade battle rhythm
- Enforce participation in the daily S-6 Sync. This would minimize confusion throughout the BCT on signal related matters.
- Maintain Situational Awareness of Signal assets throughout the battlefield that will assist in making timely Signal related decisions.
- Coordination between the BDE and BN S-6s is imperative for effective communication and capability management of all Signal assets throughout the BCT's area of operation (AO).

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine- N/A

Organization- NA

Training- N/A

Material- NA

Leadership- N/A

Personnel- NA

Facilities- NA

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

Chapter 8

Medical Focus Areas

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
01CMS11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
Medical Equipment

(FOUO) Description
Cavalry squadron Role 1s decision not to bring Medical Reset Equipment

(FOUO) Discussion
Cavalry squadron's Role 1 received Medical Reset Equipment at home station but elected not to bring it to the training event. It is unclear as to why Role 1 made this decision.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Units should bring equipment that is issued from Reset for familiarization of any changes to equipment and to identify any defects or inoperable items. Using the new equipment, the Role 1 could establish a schedule for equipment needing medical maintenance and an exchange plan for items that expire.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
D - N/A
O - N/A
T - Units miss a tremendous opportunity to train with new equipment when they elect to deploy without it.
M - N/A
L - N/A
P - N/A
F - N/A

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
02CMS11-15-14

(FOUO) Title

Personnel Shortage

(FOUO) Description
Role 2 deployed to training exercise short 30 Medics.

(FOUO) Discussion
Due to a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers, the Role 2 was short 30 medics. As a result, the RTU was challenged to accomplish some of their medical functions. However, they were able to setup tents and equipment to be functional within the 4-hour standard despite having ashortage of Soldiers. With the shortage of medics, the Role 2 was only able to setup one Ambulance Exchange Point (AXP) vice the planned three AXP. As a result, the cavalry squadron did not have established AXP support throughout all phases of the operation. As a result, the BCT had a higher died of wounds (DOW) rate.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Units should identify their personnel shortages early in the planning process to mitigate challenges prior to mission execution.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
D - N/A
O - N/A
T - N/A
M - N/A
L - N/A
P - Non-deployable Soldiers can have a major impact on a unit's readiness.
F - N/A

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
03CMS11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
Contamination

(FOUO) Description
Contamination of the Role 2

(FOUO) Discussion
The Role 2 received a patrol that had chemical casualties. The Command Sergeant Major on the patrol told the receiving Role 2 medics that the patrol was not contaminated any more. The

medics accepted this response and did not verify decontamination. The medics took the casualties into the Role 2 without conducting any patient decontamination. The casualties were, in fact, still contaminated. They contaminated the inside of the Role 2. There was no command and control outside the Role 2 resulting in contamination and cross contamination of more Soldiers, equipment, and vehicles. Once the CBRN team of the Role 2 recognized the problem, they quickly took charge to control the situation. The Role 2's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) team did a good job of decontaminating the patients, equipment, and facility and preventing further contamination.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
The Role 2 needs to understand the operational situation and the status of patients it is treating. It must maintain mission command. Any unit that has been contaminated must be decontaminated (or verify prior decontamination) before being allowed to enter the Role 2. The CBRN team of any Role 2 should verify contamination status of all personnel entering the Role 2, and be equipped and prepared to conduct decontamination of any casualties..

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
D - N/A
O - N/A
T - N/A
M - N/A
L - N/A
P - N/A
F - N/A

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
04CMS11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
Communication

(FOUO) Description
No ability to communicate with other elements

(FOUO) Discussion
The Role 2 moved locations and found themselves without any communications at the new location. The Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) systems were not functioning, and they were out of Frequency Modulation (FM) range. This resulted in a lack of shared understanding of the battle and incoming casualties. At one point, two medical

evacuation aircraft landed and the flight medic had to round up litter teams from the Role 2. This was time consuming and disorganized. They also pushed out two ambulances and two Light Medium Tactical Vehicles to establish an Ambulance Exchange Point (AXP), but the Role 2 was not in communication with the AXP, and did not develop triggers to supplement the communication struggles. Lack of communication affected the development of graphics in support of the Medical Common Operating Picture (MEDCOP).

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Units need a better understanding of their communications systems and capabilities, and they should conduct pre-combat checks / pre-combat inspections (PPC/PCIs) prior to movement. Developing graphics analog and digital is critical to mission command and the success of developing a shared understanding. Medical units (Role 2) must position themselves to maintain communication with the units in their BCT. This requires terrain analysis, planning, and an understanding of the limitations of their equipment. Out of communications means out of the fight.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
D - N/A
O - N/A
T - Units must template their communications to operate on the terrain. They must train to extend the range of their communications systems. If they out distance their communications systems, they will be out of communications and not be able to support the BCT operation.
M - N/A
L - N/A
P - N/A
F - N/A

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
05CMS11-16-14

(FOUO) Title
Role 2 equipment

(FOUO) Description
PCCs/PCIs of Role 2 equipment prior to rotation

(FOUO) Discussion
The Role 2 was challenged to ensure their equipment and supplies were operational. The Role 2 brought medical equipment that was out of calibration and supplies that were expired. Having

items out of calibration deems them inoperable, taking away from the capabilities of the Role 2. The Role 2 also had Class VIII supplies that were expired, contributing to their degraded capabilities.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
During the training exercise, Role 2 needs to have equipment calibrated and supplies within expiration dates to treat patients. It is extremely important to establish a schedule for equipment needing medical maintenance and an exchange plan for items that expire. The BCT Role 2 did not conduct PCC/PCI prior to deployment, resulting in deploying with unusable equipment and supplies.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
D - N/A
O - N/A
T - N/A
M - N/A
L - NCOs need to enforce the layout and inspection of all equipment.
P - N/A
F - N/A

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
06CMS11-15-14

(FOUO) Title
Movement of the Role 2

(FOUO) Description
The decision to move the Role 2 during cavalry squadron's movement

(FOUO) Discussion
The brigade medical planner in the surgeon section had a good plan to move the Role 2 to a designated location prior to the cavalry squadron's movement. The cavalry squadron was beginning movement at 2100. The Role 2 plan was to push out at 1500 and be setup and prepared to start receiving patients no later than 0700 the following training day. The brigade support battalion commander made the decision to change the Role 2 movement to 2100. The cavalry squadron and Role 2 were moving at the same time. When the cavalry squadron started receiving casualties, they had no Role 2 to send them to, resulting in 100% died of wounds DOW rate. Role 2 always moved in its entirety with no echelonment of care forward.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
The brigade surgeon section, support operations section, and the medical company commander must closely coordinate the Army Health System to optimize support to the ABCT. The move of the Role 2 should be phased to provide continual medical coverage. This lack of staff coordination in the decision to change the unit's movement time led to ineffective ground evacuation support and a potential over reliance on air evacuation.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
D - N/A
O - N/A
T - Units must train their movements to ensure they are echeloned.
M - N/A
L - Leadership within the brigade medical support must plan for echeloned movement; and be part of the planning process to ensure their needs are accounted for.
P - N/A
F - N/A

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(FOUO) Comments/Notes

OBSERVATION

(U) Number (ID)
07CMS11-17-14

(FOUO) Title
Medical Evacuation Request

(FOUO) Description
Multiple changes to medical evacuation mission authority.

(FOUO) Discussion
There were multiple changes to mission authority approval for medical evacuation requests. At first the Support Operations (SPO) Medical Officer was appointed mission authority for evacuation. Authority then moved to the Brigade Surgeon Section, and back to the SPO Medical Officer. Multiple changes led to confusion and caused delay in getting the request to aviation launch authority. Having established AXPs, the Role 1s were evacuating casualties to the AXP without first considering the submission of a medical evacuation request. This circumvents the medical evacuation requests for Air/Ground causing little to no utilization of air assets.

(FOUO) Insights/Lessons
Units must establish definitive processes for medical evacuation request and maintain for continuity. With the common communication platforms at the Role 2, the Role 2 commander is best suited to provide mission authority for medical evacuation requests.

(FOUO) DOTMLPF Implications
D - N/A
O - N/A
T - N/A
M - N/A
L - Unit standing operating procedures (SOP) should clarify the authority to approve medical evacuation requests.
P - N/A
F - N/A

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