

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM
AND
OFFICERSHIP IN AMERICA

Allan R. Millett



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Adapted from Allan R. Millett, *The General: Robert I. Ballard and
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
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MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

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OFFICERSHIP IN AMERICA

Allen R. Miller



THE STUDY OF THE MILITARY as old as officership itself not only but it offers its full share of approach to the study of national experiences, focus behavior, and then to use such national comparisons. Of transnational model, how "characteristics" of military history and the structure of while the transnational model experiences and cultural variations of the problem, to squeeze out the historical theory. Whichever set of theories upon a critical set of choices als in a military organization several answers, with reference rank, type of armed force, and that exists to serve the state qualify as a profession? Can hierarchically-structured, to degree can the study of a general study of military institutional, functional, structural, or

One compelling way to analyze is to use both the national frameworks while remaining concepts about professional and culture can best be accomplished through national comparisons and through military professionalism of many professions. cultural values, the comparison as both an international phenomenon. This essay is an American military professional War to World War I — in the development of professions in the growth of military professionalism world.

THE STUDY OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION IN AMERICA is neither as old as officership itself nor as arresting as the study of warfare, but it offers its full share of analytic difficulties. The traditional approach to the study of officership is to compare and contrast national experiences, focusing on social origins and political behavior, and then to use such studies as the foundation for transnational comparisons. Of undeniable utility, the national/transnational model, however, may exaggerate the national "characteristics" of military officers because it builds upon social history and the structure of peculiar national military institutions, while the transnational model may underestimate unique historical experiences and cultural variables. Students of officership are not unaware of the problem, but the usual corrective has been to squeeze out the historical peculiarities by applying sociological theory. Whichever set of theories one applies, however, depends upon a critical set of choices. Are officers the only true professionals in a military organization; if so, which officers? There are several answers, with reference to skills, age, length of service, rank, type of armed force, and social origins. Can any occupation that exists to serve the state and not to serve individual clients qualify as a profession? Can a profession really exist within a hierarchically-structured, bureaucratized organization? To what degree can the study of officership be differentiated from the general study of military institutions, whether that study is historical, functional, structural, or sociological?

One compelling way to enrich the study of the military profession is to use both the national and transnational or comparative frameworks while remaining sensitive to the general theoretical concepts about professionalism. The additional dimensions of time and culture can best be accommodated not by adhering to organizational comparisons and theoretical elaboration, but by examining military professionalism within the broad historical development of many professions. Inherently processual and attuned to cultural values, the comparative study of professions can proceed as both an international phenomenon as well as a national development. This essay is an effort to examine the critical period of American military professionalization — the era from the Civil War to World War I — in terms of sociological theory, the development of professions in America in the 19th century, and the growth of military professionalization in the industrialized, Western world.

Although professions have developed as high-status occupations in all modern societies, it is misleading to assume that an occupation is ever entirely professionalized in the ideal sense. A profession is an occupation that has assumed all or some of the attributes generally regarded as typical of all professions. While there is no consensus about the exact number and character of these attributes, they usually include the following: (1) the occupation is a full-time and stable job, serving continuing societal needs; (2) the occupation is regarded as a lifelong calling by the practitioners, who identify themselves personally with their job subculture; (3) the occupation is organized to control performance standards and recruitment; (4) the occupation requires formal, theoretical education; (5) the occupation has a service orientation in which loyalty to standards of competence and loyalty to clients' needs are paramount; and (6) the occupation is granted a great deal of collective autonomy by the society it serves, presumably because the practitioners have proven their high ethical standards and trustworthiness. Historically, professionalized occupations have been closely related to job specialization, economic development, and the expansion of knowledge about man's physical and social environment. The most salient characteristic of professions has been the accumulation and systematic exploitation of specialized knowledge applied to specialized problems.¹

The number of occupations that claim to be professions, however, makes any description of "pure" professional attributes difficult. One high priest of the study of professions insists that no occupation can claim to be a profession unless it places primary importance on "cognitive rationality," an intellectual quality which can be created only by extensive formal technical training in modern universities.² A seminal study of professions in Great Britain admitted that law and medicine had the clearest historic claim to being professions in Anglo-American culture; therefore, all other aspiring occupations must be measured against the characteristics of law and medicine. Using this standard, Carr-Saunders and Wilson defined a profession as an occupation organized around "the application of an intellectual technique to the ordinary business of life, acquired as the result of prolonged and specialized training."³

Definitions of professions tend to idealize professions and attempt to influence professionals to behave in a more socially responsible manner:

A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of learning or science, and

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his profession, e.g., the doctor
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upon the abilities accompanying such understanding. This understanding and these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the profession are modified by knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience of mankind, which serve to correct the errors of specialism. The profession, serving the vital interests of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client.⁴

Studies of professions are relatively clear about those attributes of their work professionals themselves value most. Professions are based on some system of specialized knowledge which is continually enlarged by academic research and experience. This knowledge tends to be esoteric and highly specialized with a language, methodology, and application beyond the grasp of the layman. Yet the layman needs the professional's knowledge and skill to solve common and important problems. The professional, however, asks that he, and not his client, set the conditions under which his knowledge and skill are utilized and that the client accept the professional's definition of what the problem really is. In return for his professional authoritativeness, the professional enters a compact with the client not to go beyond the "functional specificity" of his profession, e.g., the doctor will not make a moral judgment on his client's sex life when he treats him for syphilis. In return for his self-restraint in matters of material reward and emotional dominance over the client, the professional expects the client, singular or collective, to trust his technical judgment.

Professions create their own ethical codes; establish their own educational system; recruit their own members; and maintain a unique occupational culture on the assumptions that the professional's services represent social good, that the monopoly conditions that the professional prefers represent human progress, and that the professional's fundamental commitment is to the objective results from the application of his theoretical knowledge. The professional's competency will be judged by his peers, and his conduct will be determined by the norms of his profession. He will not abuse society's faith in his skill by ignoring either his client's needs or the regulating judgment of his colleagues.⁵ If society agrees with the practitioner's claims to "extraordinary trustworthiness," then it grants an occupation the high degree of autonomy that characterizes a profession, although the professional's relative freedom is conditional and ultimately depends on continuous social approval. Without constant self-policing and task success, a profession can narrow its own freedom and destroy public trust as rapidly as it gained its relative autonomy.⁶

Everett C. Hughes, one of the most perceptive students of work, agrees that professions do define their work and have a broad social mandate, but the characteristic that separates them from other occupations is the reason for their autonomy. Professions do society's difficult and morally ambiguous jobs. Professionals do other people's unpleasant tasks, make other people's mistakes for them, and salvage the pieces, so that ordinary humans can go on with their lives without guilt and a sense of failure. Because the professional is doing a difficult and unattractive task, the lay observer sees him as a charismatic hero, while the professional knows he is only playing statistical probabilities. The practitioner-client relationship is crucial, and the professional's greatest frustrations and anxieties come when he and his public have conflicting conceptions of "what the work really is or should be, of what mandate has been given by the public, of what it is possible to accomplish and by what means, as well as of the particular part to be played by those in each position, their proper responsibilities and rewards."⁷ The contingent nature of professional autonomy requires that a profession be sensitive to its public image, particularly to reassure its clients that it knows what it is doing even if they do not. If a profession successfully maintains its autonomy, then it has delivered its services as promised and has preserved the appearance of professional infallibility.

Individual and collective clients may be aware of a profession's formal code of ethics, but this understanding usually is limited to professional-client relations, not the peer relations that determine the very heart of professional life. Since a professional by definition must be peculiarly sensitive to peer-related awards of status and prestige and since peer-relations are more ambiguous than client-relations, professionals are particularly annoyed when public rewards and peer-granted rewards are not congruent. Yet a profession cannot afford for many of its members to express public dissatisfaction with their colleagues, for to do so throws the whole profession's credibility into doubt. When a professional is shocked by the unromanticized reality of his work or criticizes his colleagues for errors of technique and ethics, he is subjected to heavy pressures to maintain the cherished myths that protect the profession from lay intervention. If there is to be criticism and doubting, it must be internalized and satisfied either by formal peer-group action or informal sanctions. Such sanctions often fall as heavily upon the complainant as they do upon the transgressor. The price of autonomy is collectively paid, and no individual practitioner dares attack his colleagues, however justified his charges, without risking his career.⁸

The aspiring professional, as he begins the long and arduous *rite de passage* of formal professional training, quickly learns that

his apprenticeship contains. Like every worker he is an occupational personality, partly self-developed. He knows the characteristics of his career and the tasks he finds himself. He must learn the self that are compatible with the "professional socialization" of the others with whom he begins his work (both formal and informal). He is applying his profession's knowledge that the aspirant take possession of the skills he uses to solve problems, the current ideology, and the existing system of reward and conditions of practice. The aspirant must conform to the system. At the time he discovers that his profession is. He learns that his professional life has clustered around distinctive techniques of practice, including recruitment, and standards of the profession's internal friction. He knows that they are real and play a major part of his professional life. The current and impending conditions of how he will cope with them will influence the course of his professional life. He is formally admitted to his profession.

Unless a professional has individual clients, he cannot dominate his career. In two ways he has progressively plied the text of business corporations and complex institutions like universities. The result has been that the professional at the same time is bureaucratized. This parallel process may be essential in the search for the organization, or at least for their interests, they may flourish in status, and impersonal clients will thrive. The only real danger is offset by the stabilization. Since their professional factions and informal hierarchies

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He may be aware of a professional's understanding usually is not, not the peer relations that define professional life. Since a professional is sensitive to peer-related awards of honor, relations are more ambiguous and he is particularly annoyed when awards are not congruent. Yet a professional asks members to express public opinion for to do so throws the whole profession. When a professional is shocked by his work or criticizes his colleagues, he is subjected to heavy sanctions that protect the profession from criticism and doubting, either by formal peer-group sanctions often fall as heavily on the transgressor. The price paid by no individual practitioner is justified his charges, without

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his apprenticeship contains more than learning basic techniques. Like every worker he is confronted with the need to develop an occupational personality. His new identity is partly inherited, partly self-developed. He inherits the broadly-defined characteristics of his career and the special institutional setting in which he finds himself. He must develop stable and lasting concepts of self that are compatible with his profession. This transformation or "professional socialization" is not taken lightly by the practitioners with whom he begins his career. Although the aspirant's training (both formal and informal) is likely to center on learning and applying his profession's special skills, the profession demands that the aspirant take positive pride in the problems he faces and the skills he uses to solve them, that he absorb the profession's current ideology, and that he willingly accept the profession's existing system of rewards, collegueship, acceptable motives, and conditions of practice. The difficulty lies in the fact that the aspirant must conform to professional "absolutes" at the same time he discovers that his chosen work is intensely competitive. He learns that his profession is made up of warring factions that have clustered around disputes over theoretical knowledge and techniques of practice, institutional missions, leadership, ethics, recruitment, and standards of competence. He discovers that his profession's internal frictions may be hidden from public view, but that they are real and play a critical role in shaping his career. A major part of his professionalization is simply identifying all the current and impending conflicts in his profession and then deciding how he will cope with them. Just how well he chooses will probably influence the course of his entire career long after he has been formally admitted to his profession.⁹

Unless a professional practices alone and lives on fees from his individual clients, he customarily finds that some organization dominates his career. In twentieth century America, professionals have progressively plied their skills within the organizational context of business corporations, governmental agencies, and other complex institutions like universities, research centers, and hospitals. The result has been that occupations have often become professional at the same time that they have become bureaucratized. This parallel process is not necessarily fatal, and it may be essential in the search for autonomy. If professionals dominate the organization, or at least the part of its activities that involves their interests, they may find that they have the freedom, achieved status, and impersonal client relations upon which their profession will thrive. The only real risk is alienating the public, but this danger is offset by the stability and permanence of their organization. Since their profession is already divided into competitive factions and informal hierarchies of skill and influence, a formal

system of authority is not especially terrifying and often makes task-organization and the identification of responsible leadership much easier. As long as the organization values the professional's technique and rewards him on the basis of his performance, the practitioner is not likely to feel that his professional values have been compromised.¹⁰

The difference between a bureaucrat and a professional working within an organization may not be particularly great. They both work for a large organization and earn their livelihood (theoretically for an entire career) from it. Their organization rewards them on the basis of role performance ("merit"), not because of their popularity with some constituency. Their output cannot be directly measured by the norms of the marketplace. They operate with considerable discretion, affective neutrality, and secrecy. The major difference is probably that the bureaucrat learns to value organizational loyalty most, while the professional is still sensitive to peer reference-groups outside his particular organization. If the organization, however, permits the professional to practice as he wishes at various levels of challenge and rewards him for his performance as that performance is judged by his professional colleagues, the organization can hold the professional's allegiance.¹¹

Not all bureaucracies employ professionals and not all professions are bureaucratized, but at least some bureaucratic organizations share common challenges with professions. For example, bureaucratic organizations require a high degree of ideological homogeneity if they are large, include members with unusual characteristics, provide indirect benefits to large numbers of people, perform functions that are highly controversial and impinge on the activities of other groups, expand rapidly, and provide services that require a high degree of practitioner consensus.¹² The same condition applies to professions, particularly those that are not sure about their legitimacy. Organizations and professions that claim functional freedom in the name of some common good cannot afford members concerned only with preserving the status quo. Both require persons who are continuously pursuing new knowledge, new practical techniques, new methods of task-organization, new training, higher standards of self-regulation, new ways of judging competence, and more convincing arguments for their occupational and organizational existence. To balance the inherently conflicting multiple roles of critic, advocate, and loyalist is a fundamental challenge of professional life.

Since professionalism involves both individuals and groups, it should be examined as a dual problem. The first phenomenon is the professionalization of a particular *occupation*. In other words, one

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examines such questions as the development of a unique body of specialized knowledge and expertise in its application, the creation of client-relationships and societal roles played by the occupation, and the formation of a body of practitioners who develop a unique occupational subculture of language and behavior that sets them apart from laymen. The second type of phenomenon also labeled professionalization is essentially an *individual* experience. It is the process of professional socialization or the transformation of an initiate into a fully-accepted member of a profession. Professional socialization requires a focus upon the relationship between the individual professional and his peers, both on the interpersonal and institutional level. Socialization emphasizes the development of occupationally-motivated behavior and attitudes, balanced against an individual's pre-employment social background and psychological development. Ideally, the study of professionalism as a social phenomenon would deal with the professionalization of an occupation and professional socialization, for both are crucial to understanding professionalism.¹³

THE AMERICAN COLONIES proved inhospitable for even those occupations that approached professions in England — law, medicine, and the clergy. The American colonials mistrusted occupational elitism and viewed the concept of expert mastery of systematic knowledge and skill as unwelcome anachronisms of the Old World. The dogmatic egalitarianism unleashed in the Age of Jackson made the emerging professions' search for legitimacy difficult, and even gentlemen-lawyers, the nation's political leaders, suffered a period of relative eclipse. In an agrarian nation that had little money and scant trust in higher education and "learned" activities of any sort, the institutional foundations of new professions were slow to develop. When occupations like medicine and law approached professional status, they did so through community approval based on one-to-one practitioner-client relations or local associations, not on the basis of bureaucratic organization. Professions, like business corporations or secret fraternal orders, had a cosmopolitanism many Americans found distinctly undemocratic and pretentious. Though European professional education and the tolerant environment of the East's cities encouraged the first stirrings of professionalism in the early nineteenth century, community parochialism and restricted specialized education in America impeded the development of new professions and limited the old.¹⁴

A crucial change in American intellectual history in the nineteenth century eroded the barriers to professionalization. Importing the fundamental discoveries of Europeans, part of the

American educated elite discovered a new system of faith: science. The immutable laws of the physical and biological universe, opened to mankind through mathematics and laboratory experimentation, offered a new philosophical basis for "learned" knowledge that successfully challenged the revealed truths of religion and the deductive pieties of classical humanistic studies. For the most part these competing systems of knowledge clashed only in America's few universities, but the growing legitimacy of scientific knowledge began to affect some occupations before the Civil War.¹⁵

The most immediate beneficiary was the medical profession. The elite of European-trained physicians who founded the American Medical Association in 1846 and eventually ran astrologers, homeopaths, faith healers, and a legion of quacks out of the healing business did not ignore the occupational politics of their time. They were able to appease the social bias against organized elitism by stressing the practitioner-patient relationship. Doctors treated people in their homes; hospitals were places where the poor went to die. At the same time, physicians applied their scientific knowledge to problems of broad public concern like epidemic disease, infant mortality, and mental health. By the end of the century American physicians showed all the ideal attributes of a profession. They had medical schools for research and training, state-approved licensing regulations, voluntary collegial associations, medical journals, and inordinate power to govern themselves and judge their own work. Given society's understandable antipathy to death and disability, it is not surprising the doctors rapidly reached a high level of financial success, social prestige, and occupational freedom.¹⁶

The growth of the engineering profession was nearly as meteoric as that of medicine. Engineers not only enjoyed the distinction of being "scientific," but quickly demonstrated that they were practical men-of-affairs who wanted to use their skills to exploit the nation's natural resources, build a transportation system, and speed the mechanization of farms and factories. Like doctors, engineers worked primarily as individual experts for their clients, not in organizations. Despite the fact that engineers were Easterners with cosmopolitan training, they consciously cultivated a public image as frontiersmen armed with slide-rules and donkey engines. Even though the United States had twenty-six engineering schools by 1894 and the profession had become highly specialized and research-conscious, the American engineer won professional status by combining expert knowledge of the physical world and technology with a taste for managerial responsibility and entrepreneurship. Engineers saw themselves as neither effete academics nor governmental functionaries, but as full

partners with business. At the same time, they also valued their trustworthiness and sought high social status at the same time, thus fitting into several specific roles that did little to limit the elite's destiny.¹⁷

If doctors and engineers had influence on the public appearance of all three professions, they were doubly trapped by commonalities. Jewish rabbis faced the same lay dominance in the synagogue (unaccustomed to dealing with the same loss of authority as the American clergyman) and worked to limit the power of the American Revolution. The clergy achieved professional status, which lauded vocation, forced them to justify their business than for their religious duties. They absorbed the secular academic education, for the clergy had special training granting them unquestioned authority.

Although irreverence among Protestants and the Catholic Church found spiritual authority by the same lobbyist, fund-raiser, and reformer. Only when the Gospel and learned the teacher, social worker, began to recapture some of the old, American society limited the professional vocation. Perhaps because of development, perhaps because of spiritual values and social liberalism, the authority of European society nearly killed it.

Emerging professions and methods of science

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partners with businessmen in the nation's economic growth. At the same time, they also managed to impress the public with their trustworthiness and sense of mission. Typically, engineers won high social status at the same time that engineering was fragmen- ting into several specialties. The professional feuding, however, did little to limit the engineers' ability to control their collective destiny.¹⁷

If doctors and engineers rode happily to professional emi- nence on the public approval of their scientific callings, American clergymen of all three major faiths found that they were inextrica- bly trapped by community control. Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis faced the major challenges of declining authority and lay dominance in the nineteenth century. The Catholic clergy (unaccustomed to dealing with a laity as well educated as they) faced the same loss of autonomy in the twentieth century. For the American clergyman there was no state authority to reinforce the institutional churches; on the contrary, government consciously worked to limit the political power of organized religion after the American Revolution. In contrast with many occupations that achieved professional status, clergymen found that American cul- ture, which lauded voluntarism in religious practice and organiza- tion, forced them to justify themselves more for their social useful- ness than for their religious functions. The laity, especially as it absorbed the secular humanism and scientific positivism of academic education, found it increasingly difficult to believe that clergymen had special knowledge and unique skills that justified granting them unquestioned authority over their clientele.

Although irreverence for the clerical profession was greatest among Protestants and Jews, the hierarchy of the American Catholic Church found that it had to convince its laity of its spiritual authority by demonstrating its effectiveness as politi- cal lobbyist, fund-raiser, church and school builder, and social reformer. Only when American clergymen discovered the Social Gospel and learned the skills of secular occupations (youth leader, teacher, social worker, child and family psychologist) did they begin to recapture some of their lost status and authority. Ironi- cally, American society by approving freedom of worship severely limited the professionalization of those who chose the religious vocation. Perhaps because they contributed nothing to economic development, perhaps because they stressed traditional and skep- tical spiritual values that challenged the laity's faith in economic and social liberalism, American clergymen could not claim the authority of European clerics. The very openness of American society nearly killed one of the three traditional professions.¹⁸

Emerging professions, even when wrapped in the language and methods of science, found it difficult to develop clients, espe-

cially when these professions claimed they were serving the general public welfare. The emerging occupations might win a bureaucratic toehold at some level of government and be granted superficial professional autonomy, but unless they developed continuous, committed, specific support from politically influential clients, they found their professional status constantly endangered and weakened. All the scientific reasons and academic justifications for the profession did not suffice.

The history of forestry and social work dramatizes the professions' need for political sanction. American forestry developed from ecological treatises written in the mid-nineteenth century and the work of European silviculturists. Encouraged by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Forestry Association had developed academic programs, journals, an elite of career foresters, and a bureau in the Department of Agriculture by 1900. Between 1891, when the AFA persuaded Congress to give professional foresters a chance to save some of the woodlands in the national domain from forest fire and ruthless lumbering, until 1907, when the National Forest system was created, the foresters made a strong case for the scientific management of forestlands. They did not emphasize the aesthetic virtues of the national forests or the woodlands' recreational potential, but the economic value of controlled forests. Nevertheless, the foresters' hard-headed economic justifications for their profession were not accepted by timbermen, stockmen, and mining firms. The influence of foresters, therefore, waned rapidly after Theodore Roosevelt left office. Trees and elite urban political reformers made bad clients. Forestry had sufficient scientific expertise, group corporateness, and sense of public mission to rate professional status, but its accomplishments outside of projects sponsored or supported by private business were limited by public apathy.¹⁹

The profession of social work, like forestry, found no broad public mandate for its original definition of its functions. Despite all the trappings of a profession, including theorists in the sociology and psychology departments of America's universities, social work emerged as bureaucratized philanthropy rather than a science of reformist social engineering. It, too, was desperate for specific clients, despite the obvious need for some agency to bridge the gaps between the affluent and poor in every American city. Part of the social worker's problem was that he competed with clerics, machine politicians, health professionals, and employers for control of the poor. Only in therapeutic casework, built on the behavioral research of academics, could social work find a unique function. Certainly social workers chased many of the amateur philanthropists from direct contact with the poor and psychologically distressed. To do so, they accepted a limited, secondary

influence on the reform program of government employees. Since social work's formative years were spent in the shadow of the military alternative. Yet the dual nature of social work's development and bureaucratization made it difficult for administrative superiors to commission or approve of its work.

The development of social work (and other professions) in nineteenth-century America was a particular cultural condition of socialization.²¹ The traditional culture developed most of its power in practitioner-client relationships, but only on the basis of "scientific" knowledge and the practical application of the profession to produce immediate, observable results. To meet these criteria, it had to provide economic payoffs, but these, however, depended on the government and the degree of its involvement in politics. If a profession was because it was supported by a consensus that state action was necessary to achieve its goals. The creation of a federal government, for example, in agency "scientific" professionals like doctors in social problems like economic reformers and civil service reformers advanced to make public service careers of honest men, they were frustrated in the American party system where government jobs did not require loyalty. The Congress viewed egalitarianism as bulwarks.

For occupations that were not for loyal and powerful clients in the United States this search for occupations that cannot exist by themselves in the state. Unlike doctors, care workers did not practice except in their own right; they leave government service at least as diplomats and officials of apathy (if not hostility) to the exercise of power by the national

they were serving the general occupations might win a government and be granted unless they developed confidence from politically influential status constantly endangered positions and academic justification.

Social work dramatizes the professional American forestry developed in the mid-nineteenth century and encouraged by the American Forestry Commission, the American Forestry Association, the American Forestry Journal, and the Department of Agriculture. The American Forestry Association persuaded Congress to save some of the woodlands and ruthless lumbering, until a national forest system was created, the foresters' management of forestlands. The virtues of the national forests were recognized, but the economic value of the foresters' hard-headed profession were not accepted by the public. The influence of forest conservation was limited. Theodore Roosevelt left office. Foresters made bad clients. Forestry's group corporateness, and professional status, but its lack of sponsorship or support by the public was apathy.¹⁹

Forestry, found no broad recognition of its functions. Despite the leading theorists in the social sciences in America's universities, social anthropology rather than a scientific approach. It, too, was desperate for some agency to bridge the gap between the forest and the city. In every American city, the forester competed with the professional, and employers of social casework, built on the old social work find a unique place. Many of the amateur foresters with the poor and psychologically accepted a limited, secondary

influence on the reform process by becoming a collection of government employees. Since the poor were by definition powerless in social work's formative years, the profession probably had no alternative. Yet the dual process of professionalization and bureaucratization made it dependent on public constituencies and administrative superiors who did not share social work's sense of mission or approve of its claims to self-regulation.²⁰

The development of medicine, law, engineering, the religious vocation, forestry, and social work (as well as the emergence of other professions) in nineteenth century America suggests the particular cultural conditions that encouraged the fullest professionalization.²¹ The traditional professions of Anglo-American culture developed most fully if based on an individualistic practitioner-client relationship that dealt with the raw concerns of life and livelihood, but only if this relationship was formed on the basis of "scientific" knowledge. Theoretical knowledge and practical application of the professional's calling had to produce immediate, observable results. While the emerging professions had to meet these criteria, it was especially important for them to provide economic payoffs for the clients. Professional autonomy, however, depended on the strength of the profession outside government and the degree of influence professional associations had in politics. If a profession had a major impact on public policy, it was because it was supported by influential private clients and a consensus that state action was appropriate for the profession's goals. The creation of a federal civil service system based on merit came, for example, in agencies that employed lawyers and "scientific" professionals like doctors and engineers rather than experts in social problems like economists and social workers. Although civil service reformers advocated comprehensive reorganization to make public service careers secure for skilled, efficient, and honest men, they were frustrated by the importance of patronage in the American party system and the public assumption that most government jobs did not require special preparation except party loyalty. The Congress viewed both patronage and occupational egalitarianism as bulwarks of democratic government.²²

For occupations that aspire to professional status, the search for loyal and powerful clients is the fundamental challenge. In the United States this search has been especially frustrating for occupations that cannot exist by definition except as servants of the state. Unlike doctors, career diplomats and military officers cannot practice except in their official roles as public employees. If they leave government service, they lose professional status, at least as diplomats and officers. Given the traditional American apathy (if not hostility) to "unproductive" services and the exercise of power by the national government, government profession-

als did not enjoy the degree of autonomy won by other professions until the twentieth century.

The United States could have had professional diplomats and military officers after July 4, 1776, but it did not really accept such men as professionals until the early part of this century, and even then amateurism affected both fields. There was (and is) a cultural ambivalence about the activities of diplomats and officers. In the absence of either attractive foreign trade or the threat of war, "national security" professionals have had a difficult time rationalizing their existence or getting the public to accept their claims to expertise and social worth. Career diplomats, for example, had difficulty convincing Congress that foreign relations were crucial to the United States or that their knowledge of foreign languages, international customs, and alien cultures was especially useful. Instead, diplomatic appointments were viewed at least until 1900 as extended Grand Tours for the party faithful, for the United States had no alliances to maintain, few individual or corporate interests abroad to defend, and little inclination to affect the internal politics of other nations. It was no accident, then, that professionalism among diplomats flourished only in the Consular Service, which had specific clients among American exporters and foreign investors. When careerism spread after 1890, it grew in the lowest paid and least prestigious positions. Since both amateur and career diplomats tended to come from the same social strata, social prejudice was not an important factor in retarding professionalization. Patronage politics and the amateur tradition in government service were probably far more inhibiting than Congressional distaste for bureaucratization or the State Department's cost. The diplomats' difficulty was that they had few friends who shared their own conviction that the practice of diplomacy demanded carefully selected personnel, formal training, opportunities for merit advancement and reward, and a system of collegial regulation. Since diplomacy was an art and not a science, the diplomats were hard put to legitimize their status as professionals.²³ American military officers faced the same dilemma.

WHETHER ONE CONSIDERS MILITARY OFFICERSHIP a profession or not depends to a large degree on one's views on the morality of war as human activity and the legitimacy of the national government that employs military officers. In the European intellectual tradition, denying officers professional status may be a normative exercise of civilian control of civil-military relations. Since much Western writing on military affairs pivots on the issue of military subordination within a nation's political life, it is not surprising that the subject of professionalism is generally regarded as a sub-issue,

relevant only as a weapon in the politics of civil-military relations. Observations about a society's attitudes toward military men wield considerable influence on officers' access to professional status and function and presumably on their social standing.

If, on the other hand, military officers are expertly-led armed forces, then their status to officers will produce a different result. If control, then officership will produce a different set of occupational values of control. It is, of course, too much to expect that officers are professionals. It is equally true that an assignment is entirely self-justifying. The occupation of full-time officers is scant historical evidence. There is much difference to the incidence of military officers' pleas that they are professionals. It is of some argument about control, but by a non-prescriptive and collegial corporateness, as society they serve, ideally.

Without becoming military professionals and officership, there is considerable difference in Europe and in the United States. In increasing measure in the twentieth century, the sought professional status of military officers as a skill-oriented occupation as a skill-oriented and culturally unique career. Professionalization differed in speed and military professionalism was advanced industrial states.

The general cultural context of military professionalism was different. The most important factors in the subordination of political leadership to military officers in the adoption of European armies in the nineteenth century was the growing body of scientific knowledge and the possibility of scientific military. The sense of national identity and the agencies of the nation-state and the increasing technological advances.

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ervations about a society's need for armed forces or the degree of
power military men wield, it follows that one will not admit military
officers to professional status, for to do so would sanction their
function and presumably increase their political autonomy.²⁴

If, on the other hand, one recognizes a continuing need for
expertly-led armed forces and believes that ascribing professional
status to officers will produce a proper balance of skill and political
control, then officership will be judged a profession.²⁵ Given the
occupational values of contemporary Western society, it is, of
course, too much to expect officers themselves to deny that they
are professionals. It is equally unjust to assume that this self-
assignment is entirely selfish. Since wars and armies antedate the
occupation of full-time officership in Western culture, since there
is scant historical evidence that the status of officership makes
much difference to the incidence of wars and coups, there is merit
to military officers' pleas that their status be determined not as part
of some argument about civil-military relations or "militarism,"
but by a non-prescriptive assessment of their skill, their degree of
collegial corporateness, and their sense of responsibility to the
society they serve, ideally to the point of sacrifice of life.²⁶

Without becoming mired in the theoretical debate of social
science professionals and military officers on the character of
officership, there is considerable evidence that the officer corps in
Europe and in the United States developed professional attributes
in increasing measure in the nineteenth century. Military officers
sought professional status and worked assiduously to justify their
occupation as a skill-oriented, theoretically based, socially useful,
and culturally unique career. Although the process of profes-
sionalization differed in speed and degree from nation to nation,
military professionalism was a common development in all the
advanced industrial states of Europe and in the United States.

The general cultural conditions that stimulated the growth of
military professionalism were several and of varying importance.
The most important factors, however, were probably the differen-
tiation of political leadership from military management and the
subordination of the latter to the former; the institutional reforms
of European armies in the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic era;
the adoption on the Continent of the cadre-conscript mass army;
the growing body of specialized literature that emphasized the
possibility of scientific military leadership; the increased popular
sense of national identity and the transference of patriotism to the
agencies of the nation-state, including the standing armed forces;
and the increasing technological complexity of weapons them-
selves.

The thrust of professionalization produced a reasonably coherent rationale for professional status by World War I. The fundamental assumption was that nation-states would continue to settle some of their disputes by war and that they would maintain or create armies and navies for this purpose. The goals of military action and the character of the armed forces that a nation might use would undoubtedly vary, but the training of military forces in peacetime and their effective direction upon the land and sea battlefields of any war required men who had made officership a career. The development of large and complex military organizations, the adoption of progressively sophisticated weapons, and the increased ability of national governments to produce the resources for such armed forces provided strong arguments for specialized officership. Wartime mobilization had not yet become so total as to blur the lines between "civilian" and "military" in war-waging. Wars were to be decided on the battlefield by armed forces, and battlefield leadership was too important to be left to men who had not trained for such a role on a continuous basis.²⁷

The most impressive argument for military professionalism, an argument created by officers and eventually accepted by most civilians, was that direction of armed forces was a learned skill, not a matter of innate genius that could be found even in civilians. The organizational corollary to this assault on the idea of the "Great Captain" or "inspired amateur" concept of leadership was that military command was a collective effort that required a high degree of mutual trust and understanding between officers. Unless an officer had accepted the norms of his military organization and passed through its formal and informal educational system, he would not be accepted by his colleagues as a fully competent peer. Unless he voluntarily adhered to the prevailing concepts of his officer corps on matters of strategy, tactics, discipline, organization, and training, he could not work effectively as a commander or a member of a commander's staff. The attribute that separated a military officer from other practitioners was his understanding of the theoretical constants in the waging of war, pretentiously labeled "military science." Although officers wrote on the recurring problems of command before the Napoleonic Wars, the "lessons" of nearly twenty years of European war produced a revolution in military theorizing by career officers, theorizing which was then used as the basis of formal military education. Very little of this "military science" had anything to do with science and technology, but focused instead on strategic decision-making and the nature of war. Predictably, the search for principles of war created a special language of command even if it did not produce immutable laws for battlefield victory. As important as the strategic theories themselves was the fact that the language of

strategic discourse was served as the intellectual

To what degree the unique philosophical out "alienated" them from precision. Obviously off nation and war, the prior needs, the value of stable discipline, and the virtue anything approaching a shared, it was probably military organization an organization. Since the grew were complex and an officer could hardly av as he changed rank and a tary ethic" in their attitu were limited to regiment leaders of their armies. century armies, especially common to any manage organization and its miss continuing search for the and as much control as po external environment. A ership (physical and mor tence in inspiring men a officer from the civilian even long-term professi philosophical point of vi

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produced a reasonably coherent World War I. The fundamental issues would continue to settle at they would maintain or lose. The goals of military forces that a nation might use in the training of military forces in the land and sea who had made officership a complex military organization of sophisticated weapons, and instruments to produce the needed strong arguments for professionalization had not yet become a "civilian" and "military" in the battlefield by armed forces too important to be left to a continuous basis.²⁷ For military professionalism, eventually accepted by most forces was a learned skill, not found even in civilians. The concept of the "Great Effort" of leadership was that required a high degree between officers. Unless a military organization and an educational system, he was as a fully competent peer. The prevailing concepts of his ethics, discipline, organization, and effectiveness as a commander or attribute that separated a soldier was his understanding of the nature of war, pretentiously officers wrote on the recurrent Napoleonic Wars, the "lesser" war produced a revolution in education. Very little of it had to do with science and strategic decision-making and the search for principles of war even if it did not produce victory. As important as the fact that the language of

strategic discourse was monopolized by military officers and served as the intellectual basis for professionalization.²⁸

To what degree the process of professionalization created a unique philosophical outlook for officers ("the military mind") or "alienated" them from civil society is unanswerable with any precision. Obviously officers might stress the permanence of the nation and war, the priorities of the organization over individual needs, the value of stable institutions and traditions, the need for discipline, and the virtues of duty, honor, and country. If there was anything approaching a "military mind" that all career officers shared, it was probably a product of the priorities of a particular military organization and the officer's role in some part of that organization. Since the armed forces in which professionalism grew were complex and required varied roles in many specialties, an officer could hardly avoid the dilemmas posed by changing roles as he changed rank and assignments. Officers closest to the "military ethic" in their attitudes were likely to be those whose careers were limited to regimental duty. They were not the professional leaders of their armies. The professional elite of late nineteenth century armies, especially in Germany, exhibited qualities of mind common to any manager of large-scale enterprise: loyalty to the organization and its mission, a commitment to rational planning, a continuing search for the most efficient use of available resources, and as much control as possible over an unstable and unpredictable external environment. Although the prerequisites of combat leadership (physical and moral courage, physical stamina, and competence in inspiring men and using weapons) did differentiate the officer from the civilian bureaucrat, it is at least debatable that even long-term professional socialization produced a coherent philosophical point of view that was uniquely military.²⁹

Of all the nineteenth century European officer corps, the British were the least given to strategic speculation and professional study, presumably because they saw little need for it after Waterloo. The life of the British army officer revolved around sport, the regimental mess, parades, and haphazard field training. Officers who took soldiering as a serious full-time job gravitated to the technical branches (the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery) or went to India. The concept of scientific, highly-organized, and educated officership struck the British officer as Continental pretentiousness. The British officer felt no social compulsion to seek professional status since he was likely to come from the same social elite that managed the government, the economy, and the national institutions. Gentlemen officers of a nation enjoying geographic security and a strong navy saw little need to insist upon individual or collective privileges connected solely with officership. They much preferred retaining their inherited social status

to creating a new professional identity by studying books and attending staff colleges. Had British officers militantly sought professional status (as did the Prussians) they would have been "alienated" from their portion of English society, which they certainly were not. The serious students of strategy and battlefield command made scant headway in the nineteenth century British Army, and military reform was more a product of sporadic ministerial interest than a grass-roots development from within the officer corps. Despite three generations of military fiascos scattered around the Empire from Afghanistan to the Crimea to the Transvaal, the British officer corps ended the century with its gallant amateurism intact.³⁰

If it had not been for the Civil War, the same condition would have been true for their American cousins. Although the United States Military Academy served as a conduit for the French version of military science and European concepts of officership, the officer corps of the small standing United States Army was not even led by West Pointers until after the Civil War, and even then Academy graduates were not a numerical majority. Officership as an occupation was defined by American civil society, and the roots of its culture were in England, not France or Prussia. Military professionalism was retarded by traditional prejudices against career officers who deviated from the casual British stereotype. The American officer was not necessarily an evil influence, but his popular acceptance depended on his ability to play a socially defined role that had little to do with his competence as a battlefield commander. He was expected to be a military gentleman whose value was measured by his commitment to literary education, outdoor sport, republicanism, personal honor, and American egalitarianism. The ideal Army officer was a man of few specialties and many general aptitudes: explorer, surveyor, canal-builder, Indian agent, diplomat, author (but not of military works), and artist. The American officer was certainly expected to be a heroic and successful leader in war, but the peacetime roles most related to wartime command were those roles civilians found most "militaristic" and hence alien and scorned. Americans preferred officers whose image combined the attributes of George Washington, Audubon, and the Deerslayer, not Napoleon or Clausewitz.³¹

The barriers facing the professionalization of the officer corps of the United States Navy were not quite so acute. Most importantly, the Navy had important peacetime clients who required its services: the merchant marine and the State Department. Between wars the Navy was the visible handmaiden of international commerce and American diplomacy, and even if Congress would not fund a fleet of ships-of-the-line to protect the United States from

European navies, it funded frigates, American merchantmen from marines and sailors to protect agents. Secondly, a naval officer was a mariner, which required skills in navigation clearly denied land army officers. Thirdly, steam engines, naval officers had engineering, a development that created the engineering profession. As vessels with steampower, heat, and steel construction, the naval officer's expertise not generally associated with the Corps of Engineers. Even before the Civil War, the presence of professionalism in fleet operations, it manifested itself in the Army.³²

The Civil War killed some military amateurs and the condition of the officer corps of the postwar Army was the Civil War and World War I, which institutionalized the profession. Influenced by both Continental and American experience, created an educational system, training in the techniques of management of large troop formations. The Army's commanding generals, John M. Schofield, encouraged career officers' performance and attempted to professionalize the officer corps of the Army. Unlike the officer corps of the Navy, which were not confronted with a new technology, naval strategy, and weapons, the Army's disputes about technology and "revolution" in land warfare were not the changes in Army ordnance which were absorbed without crisis.

The Army's concern was not the nation's wartime armies on the battlefield. The generals be selected? The problem was obvious answer: career officers' experience and theoretical training of officers. Other criteria, particularly the professional. Unlike other professions (e.g., lawyers, doctors), Army officers did not deal with a "moral" matter that could be reduced to human behavior. At the risk of being labeled "inspired" and

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European navies, it funded frigates and sloops suited for protecting American merchantmen from pirates and capable of landing marines and sailors to protect American diplomats and business agents. Secondly, a naval officer had to be first and foremost a mariner, which required skills and experience in seamanship and navigation clearly denied landmen. With the introduction of steam engines, naval officers had to learn something about marine engineering, a development that brought at least some officers into the engineering profession. As the Navy shifted to more complex vessels with steampower, heavy breech-loading naval guns, and steel construction, the naval officer corps could claim a scientific expertise not generally associated with Army officers except in the Corps of Engineers. Even before the Navy realized that the essence of professionalism meant war-readiness and expertise in fleet operations, it manifested more professional autonomy than the Army.³²

The Civil War killed some six hundred thousand American military amateurs and the concept of amateurism, at least in part of the officer corps of the postwar United States Army. Between the Civil War and World War I, the Army officer corps became an institutionalized profession. Its teachers, writers, and thinkers, influenced by both Continental developments and their own experience, created an educational system for career-long formal training in the techniques of contingency planning and the management of large troop formations in war. At least two of the Army's commanding generals, William Tecumseh Sherman and John M. Schofield, encouraged more rigorous evaluation of officer performance and attempted to curb active political partisanship. Unlike the officer corps of the United States Navy, Army officers were not confronted with a new philosophy of national development, naval strategy, and war ("Sea Power"), or bewildering disputes about technology and ship design. The "technological revolution" in land warfare was to come only with World War I; the changes in Army ordnance and mobility came slowly and were absorbed without crisis.

The Army's concern was managerial: who would direct the nation's wartime armies on the battlefield and how would these generals be selected? The professionalist Army reformers had an obvious answer: career officers with both practical field experience and theoretical training on the European model. To use any other criteria, particularly political influence, was non-professional. Unlike other professions (including the Navy's officers), Army officers did not claim that generalship was a "scientific" matter that could be reduced to predictable formulas for human behavior. At the risk of being called romantic irrationals and of accepting "inspired" amateurs to their ranks like Theodore

Roosevelt, Army officers insisted that their fundamental expertise was in the moral inspiration of fighting men. The professional officer was most capable of understanding and integrating both the rational and irrational characteristics of combat leadership. An army trained and organized by such officers would be the most efficient in war. The professionals recognized the value of the "scientific management" movement in business and other organizations; they recognized that technology would change the weapons of war; they appreciated the value of European military practices. But they insisted that the social environment of America and the unpredictable nature of war demanded that the professional officer be hero, gentleman, student of human psychology, and manager. He could not, however, learn or balance this set of occupational roles without long experience and formal education. This was the professionals' argument, and by 1918 they had won it with the American people.³³

By the time the United States entered World War I, the professionalization of American naval and army officers had taken observable form in the organizational sense. The sum of professionalism's institutional expression hinged on the key values of the modern military officer: the function of the officer is to prepare for and wage war in the name of the nation. The "management of violence," moreover, required life-long education, collective planning, and corporative officer responsibility to the service and society. Despite uneven acceptance by both the federal government and many officers, the structural changes in the Army and Navy clearly reflected the growing consensus on the basic tenets of military professionalism. Both services provided Line officers with mid-career training in fleet and army operations at the Naval War College (1884), the Army School of the Line and Staff College (started as the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1881), and the Army War College (1901). By holding colloquia and publishing journals, new officer associations pressed for more emphasis on education, organizational reform related to war readiness, Line officer primacy in making military policy, and greater public sympathy for the military. Duplicating British associations, regular officers formed the U.S. Naval Institute (1874) and the Military Service Institution (1879), complemented by the National Guard Association of the United States (1879).

Although civilian control was never seriously challenged, Line officers found increased opportunity (largely because of their own lobbying for reform) to express their professional opinions in institutionalized form. Ad hoc advisory groups like the War Department's Endicott Board (1885), which analyzed coast defense, and the Navy Department's Policy Board (1890), which recommended an ambitious fleet building program, gave way to formal,

continuing planning agency Department spread upward and the Office of Naval Board (1900) and the Secret the final creation of the O (1915). Although the CNO fleet commanders and the Naval Operations and the their preparedness priorities in the Navy Department created by the War Department the mobilization of 1898, create a War Department give the Line control of the ever, built upon an earlier preparedness concerns, the Adjutant General's Office and Army planners found advice to the service Secretary President.

World War I provided that American military power indeed strengthen civilian American officer corps. The professionalization in civilian the rules for a pattern of that lasted until the nuclear for the war's management. Within the war aims established Army and Navy Line office the Germans while civilian collaboratively handled the industrial mobilization on sides within the military over civilian-military conflicts or was, instead, between centers their formidable staffs. For the disputes between Admiral Commander in European water Chief of Naval Operations. A set of controversies created General Headquarters America General Peyton C. March, chief officers could not settle the civilian superiors, Secretary of the Navy Josephus

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continuing planning agencies. Line officer influence in the Navy Department spread upward from the Bureau of Navigation (1862) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (1882) through the General Board (1900) and the Secretary of the Navy's aid system (1909) to the final creation of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (1915). Although the CNO still shared substantial power with the fleet commanders and the bureau chiefs, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the General Board assured Line officers that their preparedness priorities would receive serious consideration in the Navy Department and Congress. Capitalizing on the crisis created by the War Department's temporary mismanagement of the mobilization of 1898, Army reformers persuaded Congress to create a War Department General Staff in 1903 and then fought to give the Line control of this planning agency. This change, however, built upon an earlier organizational innovation that reflected preparedness concerns, the Military Intelligence Division of The Adjutant General's Office (1885). In the Joint Board (1903) Navy and Army planners found a formal way to link their collective advice to the service secretaries and, through them, to the President.

World War I provided the critical opportunity to demonstrate that American military professionalism could coexist with and indeed strengthen civilian control, a critical problem for the American officer corps. The war also fused the general trend of professionalization in civilian occupations with officership and set the rules for a pattern of civilian-military wartime collaboration that lasted until the nuclear age. The tacit division of responsibility for the war's management was in retrospect sensible and obvious. Within the war aims established by President Woodrow Wilson, Army and Navy Line officers conducted active operations against the Germans while civilian officers and military administrators collaboratively handled the enormous problems of manpower and industrial mobilization on the Home Front. The great controversies within the military over operational questions were no longer civilian-military conflicts or even Staff-Line conflicts. The friction was, instead, between central and theater commanders, backed by their formidable staffs. For the Navy, operational policy hinged on the disputes between Admiral William S. Sims, the Navy's commander in European waters, and Admiral William S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations. For the Army, the central clash was the set of controversies created by General John J. Pershing and his General Headquarters American Expeditionary Force and General Peyton C. March, chief of the General Staff. When the senior officers could not settle their disagreements by negotiation, their civilian superiors, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, adjudicated the disputes, a

pattern of decision that satisfied civilian control. What is often overlooked, however, is that the Sims-Benson and Pershing-March conflicts centered on essential questions about the organization and deployment of combat units. All the parties argued the issues on professional (operational) grounds and seldom on any other.

The nearly complete operational autonomy that professional high commanders enjoyed in World War I rested in part on the reciprocated respect between military officers and the civilian professionals and businessmen who contributed so much to Home Front mobilization. Operational commanders and the mobilization leadership shared one challenge — responding to Allied pressures for quick, effective American participation. The Home Front leaders faced an additional domestic responsibility — to demonstrate their mastery of professionalized, scientific management. This new concept had grown during the Progressive era (roughly 1890 through 1917) to include most major public and private institutions, including major corporations. Although the mobilization managers' actual wartime performance was uneven, the war brought civilian professionals directly into the War and Navy Departments in a way that did not menace the professional officers' essential concern for autonomy in operational command. At the same time, Home Front collaboration satisfied the concern about civilian control. With World War I the American officer corps cemented its alliance with a new generation of civilian "national defense" managers, whose own professional standing enhanced the status of the military without seriously endangering the officer corps' sense of functional uniqueness and self-importance. In a sense, the war was an unparalleled victory for all American professionals and gave the military the same public esteem formerly enjoyed only by civilian professionals.³⁴

As illuminated by the theoretical literature on professionalism, the development of other American professions, and by the experience of the officer corps of other industrial nations, the history of the development of military professionalism in America illustrates the interrelationship of unique national characteristics and more general cultural values. One key issue is that of the identity of the client. Since the officer corps serves the nation, it cannot gain a public acceptance until the people (or at least the political elite) of a democratic republic come to value nationalism above other conflicting political loyalties. The only alternative for the officer corps is to see the Army or Navy as the "client," but such organizational loyalty in a pluralistic, amilitary (or even anti-military) society is unlikely to survive either Congressional budget authority in peacetime or a strategy of popular mobilization in wartime. The history of professions in America suggests that

occupational autonomy in centralized powers of government, particularly for public service, is a professional influence against a professional military officers, is an active the extra-continental thrust gave military professional enjoyed, and World War I the United States into a military worse by military professional

In terms of models, off drew its central concepts from Given their dramatic influence Navy and Imperial German American officers, but it not that the U.S. Navy was *sui* its smallness and frontier comparable to the regular British equal importance is the America flourished during mental reform for most American professionals filled the and the linkage of professional probably made Line officer political elite. The increased expanded strategic response also gave military officers previously enjoyed in peace Army and Navy (stimulated mirrored the increasing very dependence of the U Progressive era suggests the general respect for organization America. The most appropriate alike were corporation management not the German *Grosse* nationalism, the crucial profession was its ability to foreign military models while nation's emerging civilian power War I, military professional of public esteem. Major General of the American Expeditionary Radio Corporation of America in terms that can be applied "An organizer and a leader

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occupational autonomy in a democracy based on the limited, de-
centralized powers of government is fragile for any profession and
particularly for public service professions. The countervailing in-
fluence against aprofessionalism, especially for diplomats and
military officers, is an activist foreign policy. In the American case
the extra-continental thrust of American interest after the 1880's
gave military professionalism a legitimacy it had not previously
enjoyed, and World War I provided the last impetus by thrusting
the United States into a military conflict shaped for better or for
worse by military professionals on a global scale.

In terms of models, officership in America after the Civil War
drew its central concepts from both foreign and domestic models.
Given their dramatic influence on European affairs, the Royal
Navy and Imperial German Army served as obvious models for
American officers, but it may be closer to the truth to recognize
that the U.S. Navy was *sui generis* and that the Army, because of
its smallness and frontier constabulary missions, was more com-
parable to the regular British Army than to the German Army. Of
equal importance is the fact that military professionalism in
America flourished during the Progressive era, a period of funda-
mental reform for most American institutions. Significantly, civil-
ian professionals filled the front ranks of Progressive reformers,
and the linkage of professional people with organizational reform
probably made Line officer reformers more acceptable to the
political elite. The increased size of the Army and the Navy and the
expanded strategic responsibilities of the armed forces after 1898
also gave military officers more policy relevance than they had
previously enjoyed in peacetime. The new complexity of both the
Army and Navy (stimulated both by growth and new technology)
mirrored the increasing complexity of American society. Yet the
very dependence of the United States upon professionals in the
Progressive era suggests that military officers benefited from the
general respect for organizational expertise in Progressive
America. The most appropriate paragons for civilians and soldiers
alike were corporation managers and public service professionals,
not the German *Grossergeneralstab*. In an era of ardent
nationalism, the crucial accomplishment of the American military
profession was its ability to draw its technical inspiration from
foreign military models while it drew its political strength from the
nation's emerging civilian professional elite. Legitimized by World
War I, military professionalism in America reached a new plateau
of public esteem. Major General James G. Harbord, chief of staff
of the American Expeditionary Force and later president of the
Radio Corporation of America, described General John J. Pershing
in terms that can be applied to the whole American officer corps:
"An organizer and a leader, a negotiator, and a diplomat of the

kind our country needs, we owe him as much for building an integral American army as we do for the high quality of leadership he gave it after it was created. Not of the era of our Civil War or that of 1870 in Europe, he was a pioneer in directing the management and administration of the tremendous agencies of mechanized modern warfare. Not the last of the Old, he is one of the first of the New."³⁵ Such qualities placed the American officer corps within the ranks of the nation's leadership elite. They also met American society's criteria for public service professionalism.

- ¹ Wilbert E. Moore with G. R. H. Moore, *Roles and Rules* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 3-22, 54.
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- ³ A. M. Carr-Saunders and E. A. Shils, *Professionalism and Social Structure* (London: Clarendon Press, 1933).
- ⁴ Morris L. Cogan, "Toward a Theory of Professionalism," *Education Review*, 1957, pp. 1-10.
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- ⁶ Eliot Freidson, *Professionalism and the Social Structure of Medicine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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- ⁸ Moore and Rosenblum, pp. 66-83; Harvey L. Smith, "Differentiation," and T. H. Parsons, "Policy," in Sigmund Neustadt Jr., *Man and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); William J. Goode, "Communitarianism," *American Sociological Review*, 1944, pp. 194-200; Rue Bucher and Charles M. Johnson, *Professionalism and Social Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933).
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- ⁴ Morris L. Cogan, "Toward a Definition of Professions," *Harvard Education Review*, 12 (Winter, 1953), pp. 48-49.
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- ⁶ Eliot Freidson, *Profession of Medicine* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970), pp. xvii, 71-84, 335-383.
- ⁷ Everett C. Hughes, *Men and Their Work* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), pp. 8-9, 76, 90-91.
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- ¹⁴ Daniel Boorstin, *The Americans: The Colonial Experience* (New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 191-265; Daniel H. Calhoun, *Professional Lives in America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Roscoe Pound, *The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 130-242.

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³¹ Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1776-1865* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968) and "The American Military Tradition," in H. C. Allen and C. P. Hill, eds., *British Essays in American History* (London: E. Arnold, 1957), pp. 207-224; Charles R. Kemble, *The Image of the Army Officer in America* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973); Brig. Gen. William H. Carter, "The Army as a Career," *North American Review*, 183 (November 2, 1906), pp. 870-876; Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 117-196.

Huntington in *The Soldier and the State* (pp. 143-221) attempts to equate Southern "conservatism" with a regional sympathy for military professionalism, but Cunliffe found little special Southern interest in military professionalism in the European tradition. Allen Guttman, "Political Ideals and the Military Ethic," *The American Scholar*, 34 (Spring, 1965), pp. 221-237, finds little classical conservatism in any American region or epoch.

For a description of pre-Civil War professionalism, see William B. Skelton, "Professionalization in the U.S. Army Officer Corps during the Age of Jackson," *Armed Forces and Society* 1 (Summer, 1975), pp. 443-471.

³² On the professionalization of the naval officer corps, see Peter Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of American Navalism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1972); Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942); John A. S. Grenville and George B. Young, "The Admiral in Politics: Stephen H. Luce and the Foundation of the Modern American Navy," in *Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 1-38; and

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³⁴ Peter Karsten, "Armed Forces and the American Organizational Tradition," in *The American Organizational Tradition* (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 197-232, 295-300. For a discussion of the impact of the military profession on the development of the American organizational tradition, see Peter Karsten, *Impulse and War: The Civil War and the American Organizational Society*, pp. 1-10. For a discussion of the impact of the military profession on the development of the American organizational tradition, see Peter Karsten, *Admirals, Generals, and the American Organizational Tradition, 1898-1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972); Edward M. Kennedy, *The American Military Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); and Edward M. Kennedy, *The American Military Tradition: The Career of the Sword: The Career of the American Military Tradition* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1972); and Edward M. Kennedy, *Baker and the American Organizational Tradition* (Baruch and the War Industry: New York: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

³⁵ Maj. Gen. James G. Harbo, *The American Military Tradition in France, 1917-1919* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

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