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SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

OPERATIONS IN THEATER

Lessons and Best Practices

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER

Security Force Assistance Operations in Theater

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Foreword

In this newsletter, it is the intent of the Center for Army Lessons Learned to further the body of knowledge regarding Security Force Assistance (SFA) in ongoing operations. It is a critical aspect of the Afghanistan strategy and we recognize the outstanding efforts of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, for their hard-won insights into conducting SFA. These chapters will help future units and leaders understand that SFA supports the professionalism and sustainable development of the capability and capacity of a host nation's foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. SFA efforts are critical in assisting our partners in becoming proficient in defending against internal and transnational threats to stability (i.e., supporting foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or stability operations).

Again, it is our intention to provide the reader a chance to learn through our experience, and to that end we hope you find this document useful.

DANIEL R. WALRATH
COL, IN
Commanding

Security Force Assistance Operations in Theater

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Introduction

The purpose of this CALL newsletter is to highlight the importance of the U.S. Army effort in the planning, execution, and assessment of security force assistance (SFA)—the lynchpin of U.S. strategy in the transition out of Afghanistan. To facilitate a better understanding of the mission and its context for those who will come after them, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (2BCT, 101st ABN [AASLT]), authored the five chapters in this newsletter on its SFA mission during Operation Enduring Freedom. SFA is a set of Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government in support of the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. FSF are all organizations and personnel under host nation (HN) control that have a mission of protecting the HN's sovereignty from internal as well as external threats. SFA activities are primarily used to assist an HN in defending against internal and transnational threats to stability (i.e., supporting foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or stability operations).

It is important to understand that SFA supports the professionalization and sustainable development of the capability and capacity of an HN's FSF and their supporting institutions, and those FSF that are part of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). SFA activities also may be used to assist in the following:

- HN defense against external threats.
- Contribute to multinational operations.
- Develop or reform another country's or IGO's security forces or supporting institutions.

In all cases, SFA activities are conducted with, through, and by the FSF to improve their capacity and capabilities through "organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise."

Chapter synopses are as follows:

- Chapter 1, "I'm Here Because We're Leaving, 18 Points for Combat Advising in Eastern Afghanistan," is the result of 20 hours of interviews with 85 combat advisors from 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, three United Kingdom civilian intelligence trainers, and two United Kingdom civilian Afghan cultural advisors/linguists. These advisors, trainers, and linguists worked at the *Kandak* (battalion) and brigade level in Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman, and Kapisa provinces. The 18 points addressed in the chapter are a summary of the most commonly mentioned and salient trends described in the interviews.
- Chapter 2, "Fire Support, Afghan Style," is by a security force advisory team (SFAT) member, who describes his experiences as a fire support officer in charge of SFAT Team 28, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, of 2BCT, 101st ABN (AASLT). Their mission was to advise and assist the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), and later Afghan Local Police, in Southern Kunar province, Afghanistan, specifically the Watapur, Narang, and Tsowkay districts.
- Chapter 3, "The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Brigade-Level Targeting Methodology: Historical Context and a Method Developing Enduring Capabilities in an ANA Brigade," describes an ANA brigade advisor targeting methodology that focuses the team's advisory efforts on development of the ANA brigade's staff functions while increasing the ANA brigade commander's capacity to understand, visualize, describe, and direct his organization towards mission accomplishment.

- Chapter 4, “The Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Developmental Campaign Plan Development and Application of the AUP Big 6,” describes the experiences of the 2nd Brigade Support Battalion, 2BCT, 101st ABN (AASLT), performing SFA and providing SFATs for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police in Regional Command-East.
- Chapter 5, “Combat Sustainment Advising-The Decisive Effort: Essential Elements to Achieve Success,” describes the development of the Afghan Security Force partners to become self-reliant and ultimately relieve coalition forces of security requirements in the region known as the north of Kabul. They describe the essential elements of their success, how they organized, simplified priorities, and executed rules of engagement.

Chapter 1

"I'm Here Because We're Leaving" 18 Points for Combat Advising in Eastern Afghanistan January 2013

by CPT Spencer L. French, Military Intelligence, 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Edited by MAJ Kwenton Kuhlman and CPT Santino Maffei

> Like the foreman carpenter, the commander must know natural rules, and the rules of the country, and the rules of houses. This is the Way of the foreman.
>
> The foreman carpenter must know the architectural theory of towers and temples, and the plans of palaces, and must employ men to raise up houses. The way of the foreman carpenter is the same as the way of the commander of a warrior house.
>
> The foreman should take into account the abilities and limitations of his men, circulating among them and asking nothing unreasonable. He should know their morale and spirit, and encourage them when necessary. This is the same as the principle of strategy.
>
> —The Book of Five Rings, Miyamoto Musashi

Analytical Methodology

Between September and December 2012, CPT French conducted approximately 20 hours of interviews with 85 combat advisors from 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment (1/502 IN); international civilian intelligence trainers; and two international civilian Afghan cultural advisors/linguists. These advisors, trainers, and linguists worked at the *Kandak* (battalion) and brigade level in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman, and Kapisa (N2KL) provinces for at least five months as of the time of their interviews. Some, including the United Kingdom (UK) civilian intelligence trainers, had worked in Afghanistan for more than four years. The UK civilian cultural advisors/linguists were born and raised in Afghanistan. The interviews with the six advisor teams of 1/502 IN were recorded separately. CPT French recorded, then transcribed, these interviews. Trends (i.e., if more than two teams made a similar observation) were annotated. The 18 points that comprise the below article are a summary of the most commonly mentioned and salient trends described in the interviews.

Introduction

Team FIRST STRIKE (1/502 IN) deployed to the N2KL (north of Kabul) region (part of Regional Command-East) under Team STRIKE (2nd Battalion, 101st Airborne [Air Assault]), Task Force (TF) MOUNTAIN WARRIOR (4th Battalion, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team [4/4 IBCT]), and commander, Joint Task Force-1 (under the command of 1st Infantry Division Commander MG William Mayville) April 2012. FIRST STRIKE's mission was to advise and assist the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Border Police (ABP).

Team FIRST STRIKE (1/502) advised the 2nd Battalion, 201st ANA Brigade at Jalalabad Garrison, Nangarhar Province, and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Joyce, Kunar Province. The Headquarters, Headquarters Company, of the 1/502, advised 3/2/201 ANA Kandak (KDK) and 3/1/201 ANA KDK, at FOB Bostick, Kunar Province. Company A, 1/502, advised 1/1/201st ANA KDK at Command Observation Post (COP) Kalagush, Laghman Province, and the 2/3/201st ANA KDK at FOB Tagab, Kapisa Province. Company B, 1/502, advised 2/1/201st ANA KDK at FOB Mehtar Lam, Laghman Province. Company C, 1/502, advised the 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 KDK at FOB Bostick, Kunar Province. Company D, 1/502, advised the 2nd ABP Zone 1 KDK at COP Monti, Kunar Province.

Team FIRST STRIKE's and Team STRIKE's mission as a whole was unique in that 2/101st ABN (AASLT) only deployed advisors to N2KL, while 4/4 IBCT conducted the Battle Space Owner (BSO) mission. Given that future brigade combat teams (BCTs) would deploy advisors organic to the deploying battle space integrator (BSI) brigade, Team FIRST STRIKE and Team STRIKE accumulated lessons learned and experiences unlikely to be exactly duplicated during the remainder of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A).

While many of the experiences of Team FIRST STRIKE are unique both to the time, place, and circumstances of advising in N2KL during the spring through late fall of 2012, some experiences are universal to advising or typical in Afghanistan as a whole. Primarily, when advising Afghans, personal relationships, either positive or negative, trump any lessons learned about effective advising techniques that one might practice. The purpose of this document is to provide 18 key points on how to build that relationship with one's Afghan partner, how to effectively communicate with one's Afghan partner, and finally how to understand the perspective, actions, and motivations of one's Afghan partner.

Point 1

> "Your relationship is your greatest asset; cultivate it."
> —2/201 ANA BDE Advisor Team

The advisor must first recognize that despite his position as an officer or senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) in the most capable armed force on the planet, he enters his position as an advisor in a position of weakness. His ability to deliver results and contribute to overall mission accomplishment is entirely dependent on his relationship with his Afghan counterpart and with the multitude of other Afghan personalities with whom he interacts. Once established, his relationship and access to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can become a powerful force and contribute not only to the accomplishment of his own mission (professionalizing the ANSF), but also protecting the force as a whole.

The first step to establishing and cultivating that relationship is to be a student of Afghan history. This will be dealt with in greater detail in Point 18, but at a minimum, an advisor who does not have a basic grounding in the political/economic/cultural history of the last 35 years in Afghanistan cannot be effective. While "The Bear Went Over The Mountain" and "The Other Side of the Mountain" are both excellent starting points, the purely tactical literature is not enough to navigate through working with the ANSF.

Similarly, while it is not cost-effective to make every advisor both a Pashto and Dari linguist, the advisor must be able to hear the difference between the two tongues. While not necessarily a cultural *faux pas,* greeting Afghans in their preferred tongue, and saying "thank you" using the proper language implies a basic appreciation for the widely divergent backstory of Tajik and Pashtun ANSF personalities. Saying *tashakur* (Dari) rather than "thank you" to a Pashto speaker, demonstrates that one is a gifted amateur trying their best. Saying *mannana* (Pashto) instead of "thank you" to a Pashto speaker at least implies that one might be a dedicated student of Afghanistan and thus a serious counterpart. Once again, recognizing the sound of the different languages and responding accordingly has nothing to do with one demonstrating one's linguistic skills; it demonstrates that the advisor knows "the nuance and difference…that one understands Afghanistan, and that can help one make inroads."[1]

Likewise, English must be used carefully. Twelve years of war in Afghanistan has given almost every ANSF soldier/policeman at least a basic understanding of some English phrases. Even if they do not understand the words, most Afghans who have worked with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces know the cadence of English, and many can even tell the difference between various types of English accents (British English versus "Television American English,") It is ill advised to "talk-down-to" the Afghans, they will pick up on the difference in cadence. Having sidebar conversations with one's English-speaking counterparts is likewise risky.[2]

With the initial communication conditions set, the first real step is to prove to one's ANSF counterpart that one does not have "any competing interests/allegiances."[3] Afghanistan has a generally low level of trust in institutions and persons outside of the greater-family unit. Part of this is cultural, but much of it is due to the perception that over the past 35 years the people of Afghanistan have been constantly toyed with and used by the Superpowers (e.g., Pakistan, particularly Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence). Furthermore, the constant threat posed both by the "legitimate" Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the insurgent elements keeps ANSF generally wary and suspicious. Proving that one legitimately has no ulterior motive and is "in their (the ANSF counterpart) corner"[4] are an often overlooked principles of relationship building. This "proof" could be sharing personal information to demonstrating a measurable degree of care over the well-being of the counterpart, his family, or his subordinates.

Finally, "the Afghan stereotype of Americans is that we are brash and overbearing."[5] Defying expectations here is critical to separating the advisor from whatever negative experiences the Afghan has had with Americans, and aligning the advisor with whatever positive experiences the Afghan has had with Americans. This can be done by saluting superior Afghan officers (implying that the advisor sees the ANSF as an allied military member rather than a client military to be bullied), establishing "two-way" communication with the Afghan counterpart from the beginning ("we will teach each other and I can be an honest sounding board for your ideas") rather than establishing "one-way" communication ("I am here to improve your performance"), and generally taking one's time before making any major recommendations to one's Afghan counterpart.[6]

One's relationship with their ANSF counterpart needs to be founded on trust, a trust that is continually reinforced by the advisor's words and actions. The ANSF counterpart must trust that the advisor:

- Is somewhat knowledgeable of Afghan history and society in order to believe that some of the advice that the advisor provides is valid within the Afghan context.

- Has no ulterior motive and legitimately is seeking the betterment of the ANSF counterpart both personally and from an institutional perspective.

- Sees the counterpart as an "equal" and that the counterpart's experiences and thoughts are valid.

Ensuring this reinforcement of trust happens falls squarely on the shoulders of the advisor.

Point 2

> "Know the Afghan rhythm."
> —3/2/201 ANA Kandak (KDK) Advisor Team

"It is especially important to know the background timing (the way another structures their actions in time), otherwise your strategy will become uncertain."[7] The advisor must understand the Afghan rhythm and, instead of fighting it, work at the same pace and rhythm. Typically the advisor has completed at least one other combat tour. During this tour the advisor spent 9-15 months working 16-18 hour days (if not more) communicating instantly with e-mail, chat, and telephone. Following his tour, the advisor returned to the United States and took approximately one month of leave, returned to the garrison schedule for a period of time, and then transferred for professional education or a new position.

This is not the Afghan rhythm. The ANSF are "in garrison" at the same time as being "at war." Expecting one's ANSF counterpart to match the advisor's pace from his "last tour" is unreasonable.[8] Due to the inefficiency of their personnel system, many ANSF members have been in the same position for multiple years; many of the higher ranking members have been at war for almost 10 years straight.[9] Thus, while not excusing laziness, the advisor must recognize that many commanders and their staffs are exhausted, both mentally and physically. ANSF counterparts will periodically take multiple weeks of leave during what the advisor sees as "important combat operations." While every situation is unique, the advisor must ask himself, "is this absence a product of legitimate laziness/dereliction of duty, or would my counterpart never get time with his family if he was around for every one of these 'vitally important' events?"

Furthermore, the Afghan daily battle rhythm is very different from the American daily battle rhythm. Afghan days are built around prayer, the same way that the Afghan year is built around *Eids* (religious holidays). For example, expecting one's ANSF counterpart to be available between 1300 hours and 1500 hours (prayer and post-prayer personal time) is unrealistic. Forcing the issue by visiting one's Afghan counterpart during that time marks the advisor as inept. It would be as if the advisor went to visit an American counterpart at 0630 hours on a weekday in Garrison. The American counterpart would see the advisor as inept for attempting to visit during physical training hours. Similarly, *Eids*, particularly *Small Eid* after *Ramazan* (also known as Ramadan), and *Eid-al-Adha* (approximately 45 days later) are important social and religious battle rhythm events. Much the way that the U.S. military would experience significant stress if Christmas block leave was cancelled every year for 10 years running; expecting the ANSF not to observe these holidays and their associated leave periods in their war-garrison environment is unrealistic.[10]

The advisor, instead of becoming frustrated over these periods of seeming "inactivity," should embrace the Afghan rhythm. Attempting to coach change to something as basic as the religious-

cultural way that an Afghan structures his day is both outside the scope of the advisor's mission and impossible. Instead the advisor should structure himself and his initiatives with an eye to the Afghan rhythm. Proposing new training, initiatives, methods, and practices before the start of Ramadan for instance is not the correct timing. Coaching one's Afghan counterpart on some new practices or new methods after *Eid-al-Adha* is more in keeping with Afghan rhythm. Seeking out one's Afghan counterpart early in the morning, and making oneself available throughout the afternoon and early evening, is much more appropriate than visiting during the morning, breaking for lunch, and coming back in the early afternoon.

In conclusion, it is very easy for the advisor to fall into the trap of associating ANSF failures with their battle rhythm. One might present a strong argument that the timing of prayers throughout the day hurts the ability of the ANSF to press home its operations, planning meetings, or training sessions, and that the periodic absences of ANSF counterparts for the various *Eids* and other family events lead to a certain degree of attention-deficit disorder on the part of the ANSF. Nonetheless, the ability of the advisor to affect this situation is very limited. Instead of fighting the current of the Afghan rhythm, the advisor should look to rectify other problems within his scope of control (i.e., working through the ANSF personnel system to assist in rotating out exhausted staff members instead of trying to encourage one's counterpart not to take leave during a major operation).

Point 3

> "Visit your counterpart like an Afghan."
> —7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 KDK Advisor Team

As with rhythm, when visiting his counterpart the advisor must recognize that the Afghan style of conversation and culture of "visiting" is quite different from the American or Western style. All would-be ANSF advisors have heard the mantra "have three cups of tea before getting to work" or "open your conversation with talk of family," but this, while effective as a starting point, is not the full story of how Afghans typically visit and interact.

Americans, particularly military Americans, hold a meeting or conduct a visit with an agenda, or a list of specific points that need to be discussed. Upon discussing each topic and coming to some resolution, the American moves on to the next point on the agenda and repeats the process. After business is concluded and the meeting closes, Americans are comfortable shifting topics to personal non-business talk. Americans typically begin to feel that "time is being wasted" or some "unease" if the conversation stalls, there are audible pauses, or progress is not being made toward resolving one of the issues on the agenda.

Afghans on the other hand, while having an agenda or a list of things that they feel need to be accomplished, rarely—if ever—proceed in the above fashion. Generally they are more comfortable skipping from one topic to another, backtracking to a previous topic, and allowing audible pauses in conversation to occur, while interspersing all of this with personal talk. Sometimes they will change location midway through a conversation so as to allow the conversation to continue over lunch, tea, or simply for a change of scenery. Participants in the meeting may come, go, and come back again depending on their schedule. In the end, like American conversations or business meetings, resolution is eventually reached on each issue or it is decided to table the issue for another meeting.

The effective advisor is one who is comfortable being "uncomfortable" with the (from a Western perspective) rambling nature of Afghan conversations. In fact, being slightly "uncomfortable" and feeling like time is being "wasted" is likely a good indicator that the conversation is proceeding in a way that is comfortable for one's Afghan counterpart.[11] Unfortunately, many Americans attempt to visit Afghans in the American fashion of having an agenda and not moving on to another topic until resolution is reached on each issue in turn. This causes most Afghans to "turn off" or become disinterested or tired by the conversation.[12] Often attempting to press on a certain topic until resolution is found, results in the Afghan simply agreeing or providing "what they know you want to hear," to end the uncomfortably direct conversation.

An advisor does not have to open with personal talk and tea (sometimes the Afghan counterpart will open with work-related topics), but embraces the flow of the conversation as the Afghan moves the conversation to another topic. The advisor should have confidence and embrace the opportunity to take conversations off on a related tangent (especially if it is a personal or nonwork-related tangent), trusting that eventually the conversation will return to the main topic. The effective advisor does not "fill" pauses in the conversation too quickly if it appears that the conversation has tapered off. But once again, and most importantly, the effective advisor has tactical patience and is comfortable spending 80 percent of a conversation chatting about personal topics with approximately 20 percent of the conversation revolving around work-related topics (often intermixed with the personal topics and storytelling).

Spending two weeks of rapport-building before working with an Afghan as one would work with an American, or starting a visit with three cups of tea then having an American-style meeting are not effective techniques. Instead, the advisor needs to understand the circuitous nature of Afghan conversations, spend time observing how his counterpart meets with other Afghans, and become generally comfortable "wasting time" with his counterpart and allowing the conversation to progress in a way that is natural for the Afghans who are involved.

Point 4

> "Both in fighting and in everyday life you should be determined through calm…
> An elevated spirit and a low spirit is weak. Do not let the enemy see your spirit."
> —Miyamoto Musashi (16th Century master swordsman and teacher)

The effective advisor is not stoic, but is always patient, calm, and relaxed around his counterparts. He never displays a heightened emotional state, never demonstrates a lack of composure, never appears uncontrollably frustrated, and rarely if ever appears to be hurried or anxious. He is friendly, open, and personable by Afghan standards of conduct. This includes body language, tone of voice, content of speech, and general demeanor.

As one team leader put it, "I can't think of one instance in which I had to raise a voice or get upset; a logical explanation at an even tone worked best every time."[13] As an advisor, one's patience will be tested every day. The effective advisor stays calm and understands the background and reasons behind the conversations or events that are testing his patience and never rushes to action without bettering his understanding and letting the situation develop. Many times what is petty to the advisor is greatly important to the Afghan, while conversely what is of great importance to the advisor is petty to the Afghan. One example is casualty reporting. From the American perspective it is incredibly important to know the type of injury, how it was caused, and what treatment the casualty has already received. Americans often are

befuddled by the seeming lack of Afghan interest in tracking casualties. The lack of medical training at lower levels and rapid/capable medical evacuation assets mean that for the Afghans, detailed casualty tracking is unfortunately relatively useless, given their inability to truly assess the casualty and care for him until he arrives by ground casualty evacuation.[14] In this case, and many others, the effective advisor is patient and mature and does not leap to conclusions or demonstrate frustration.

The effective advisor is generally positive, friendly, and warm. By Afghan standards this includes hugging, holding hands, and what Americans would define as "flattery." Telling an Afghan that he is a wonderful man, that you love him, and are in awe of his many achievements is not hyperbole or flattery by Afghan standards.[15] Similarly these "over the top" words, along with hugs and tearing-up of the eyes are not seen as a lack of emotional control by Afghan standards and are acceptable, whereas shouting or cursing (acceptable in some military situations) are seen as a lack of emotional control.

Finally, the effective advisor is not prideful. He does not demonstrate an undue sense of entitlement or superiority due to his nationality. Consequently, the effective advisor is as good a listener as he is a talker. He shows respect when Afghans are talking and is raptly attentive, even while waiting for a translation.[16] The effective advisor practices this emotional balance not only to inspire the confidence of his ANSF counterpart, but to maintain his own mental health throughout his time working with the ANSF.

Point 5

> "Islam isn't the entire story of Afghan culture."
> —2/201 ANA BDE Advisor Team

The effective advisor recognizes that while Islam is a pervasive force within Afghan culture that touches almost every part of Afghan society and daily life, it is not the entire story. For almost two decades Afghanistan was ruled by a Marxist-Leninist government. For the better part of another decade, the country was essentially occupied by the Soviet Union. As was typical within the Eastern Bloc, the best and brightest of Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s were schooled in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). There they learned not only Marxist-Leninist ideology, but valuable skills. And perhaps most importantly, as impressionable young men from a poor rural country, they saw the "progressive" and "modern" U.S.S.R. Many of these young men are now the senior leaders of the ANSF, and while they may have developed a more nuanced view over the intervening years of what is known today as the Russian Federation, the advisor cannot underestimate the effect that these formative experiences had on many ANSF personalities.

Typically these "Soviet-influenced" officers are easy to identify. They are typically majors or higher in rank. Many wear a "Stalin-style" moustache and can still understand, if not speak, Russian. Beyond the superficial indicators of Soviet-influence, some are much more substantial. For example, one ANA intelligence officer in N2KL watched Russian language television on a daily basis. A National Directorate of Security officer explained at length to the author how he viewed the conflict in Kunar as a Marxist resource-conflict between the people of the province and a new *bourgeoisie* consisting of the insurgent leadership, local warlords, and regional malign actors.[17] Thus, even 20 years after the fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan, the legacy of Communist and Soviet institutions/training remain within certain sections of the ANSF. For an

advisor to be effective, he needs to expand his "cultural awareness" beyond Afghan culture and Islam, to include Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The Soviet-influence is particularly evident in the military culture of the ANSF and amongst many of the senior leaders in particular. In general, the Soviet-trained officers are centralized and are uncomfortable delegating power to lower echelons, particularly to NCOs. They are very bureaucratic as well, interested more in things being done the "right" way.[18] For example, a Soviet-trained officer would deny a request for supplies if the form was not filled out correctly and with signatures obtained in the proper order, regardless of the urgency of the request. Furthermore, they are extremely hesitant to follow an order or take any initiative or action for that matter unless it is in a written order (a *cipher*). This is likely a way to "avoid blame" if something goes wrong. While this background does make some of these officers extremely rigid, many are very professional and doctrinally knowledgeable within their particular functional areas. The centralized system with which the Soviet-trained officers are more comfortable is also more conducive to maintaining operations security within an ANSF unit wracked with leaks and enemy collection.

There is a significant divide between these older officers and the younger Kabul Military Academy officers.[19] These new officers are trained in the western/NATO style of military leadership. Typically they are more comfortable with subordinate leaders taking initiative, relying upon their staffs, and empowering NCOs. Generally, they are also more focused on problem-solving over process. Many of the Soviet-trained officers have a hard time seeing the difference between problems within their scope of control and problems out of their scope of control, and in many cases blame problems within their organization on national or ANSF-wide systemic problems. This could be due to their "top-down" military culture that sees solutions/orders/information flowing from top to bottom. Regardless, providing recommendations or feedback to higher leadership is entirely out of the question for the vast majority of these Soviet-trained officers. Neither is soliciting bottom-up feedback from their subordinates seen as useful or acceptable, since they feel that they should know more than their subordinates at all times.[20] Publicly, these new-generation leaders defer to their Soviet-trained and *Mujahedeen* elders, but privately they criticize them and see them as outdated. Thus, even new Kabul Military Academy graduates are hesitant to provide input to their leadership in mission planning or constructive criticism (or after action review comments) after an operation. When their highers are not present, many of the younger leaders will perform more in the Western/NATO style.

The effective advisor recognizes that while it may be easier to work with the younger, Kabul Military Academy-trained ANSF leaders (because their military culture is more similar to the advisor's), he still must work through the older Soviet-trained officers to achieve success. To interface with them productively, he must first understand that many of these officers may still have a deep attachment to the Soviet system and way of thought that produced them. While Islam may be the guiding force in their life, Marxist-Leninist thought may continue to shape many of their opinions or remain the "lens" through which they view the world. Finally, their military training under the Eastern Bloc system continues to inform the way they act as military leaders. To work with these older ANSF personalities effectively, the advisor is not only a student of Afghan/Islamic culture, but also Eastern Bloc and Marxist-Leninist culture.

Point 6

> "Having a relationship with you should bring honor and prestige to your Afghan counterpart not shame or embarrassment."
> —1/1/201st ANA KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor understands that simply having an assigned advisor can be a point of pride for his ANSF counterpart, and that at no point should he do something that would bring dishonor, shame, or embarrassment to his Afghan counterpart. Having an advisor implies that the ANSF officer or senior NCO has a critical role within his organization and demonstrates to other ANSF personalities that he is deserving of respect due to the fact that he has direct access to the coalition forces (CF), and more specifically, to the United States military. In addition to seeing an advisor as a status symbol, the ANSF rank and file believe that having an advisor confers upon the advised ANSF personality the ability to leverage CF assets, thus increasing the perceived power of the advised-ANSF officer/NCO. Whether or not the advised-Afghan believes that he needs mentoring/advice, he is usually very positive about the increased status that having an advisor confers.

The effective advisor reinforces these feelings by ensuring that his ANSF counterpart feels like he has access and influence with the advisor and with the CF. This not only helps the advised-Afghan take himself seriously, but causes other Afghans to take the advised-Afghan seriously.[21]

This can be done in a variety of ways including saluting one's higher ranking ANSF counterpart, using "commander sir (*Comandan Sahib*)/deputy sir (*Mu'awin Sahib*), staff primary sir (*Amir Sahib*), brigade command sergeant major (*Breedmal-e Leewa*), battalion command sergeant major (*Breedmal-e Kandak*), first sergeant (*Breedmal-e Toolay*)," when appropriate, and generally treating one's ANSF counterpart like one would an American officer/NCO of similar rank.[22] While the effective advisor never allows himself to be bullied into "working for" his ANSF counterpart, he does ensure that both his ANSF counterpart and other ANSF personalities understand that he both respects and is dedicated to assisting his ANSF counterpart.

The effective advisor is also continually on guard against actions/situations that could bring dishonor or shame to his ANSF counterpart. This includes never publicly criticizing his ANSF counterpart (this will be dealt with in more detail in further points) or publicly implying that the ANSF counterpart does not have influence or access to the advisor. While some ANSF personalities may attempt to coerce their advisor publicly (i.e., "reminding" the advisor during a public meeting that he promised something that was never delivered), special care must be taken not to imply that the ANSF has low-influence with the advisor when denying their requests. Sometimes this can mean the advisor must publicly accept responsibility for making a mistake, or for being unclear, rather than publicly saying that the counterpart is incorrect. Most importantly, the effective advisor never publicly insinuates, implies, or gives the impression that he controls his Afghan counterpart or forces him into action/inaction. The most simple way to accomplish this is by being at one's most aggressive or persistent in private with one's Afghan counterpart, but at one's most passive or quiet in public settings. Large meetings with multiple personalities are the incorrect setting for the advisor to encourage his counterpart toward a course of action, because ideally the advisor has discussed the issues with his counterpart privately beforehand. In general though, the effective advisor understands that when Afghans are publicly shown to be weak, to be under the influence of others, or do not have the "power" of access to

or influence with others, they lose standing *vis-à-vis* their peers. The effective advisor is never a source of such loss of standing or face.

While force protection standards should never be compromised, the effective advisor takes the time to understand the procedures in place and what steps can be taken with the CF base security personnel. For instance, does the base allow ANSF to carry weapons? Drive on the base? Move unescorted? Enter morale, welfare, and recreation/United Service Organization facilities? Discussing these issues before they arise with the ANSF counterpart can reduce the number of "loss of face" situations, and thereby reduce the degree to which the ANSF counterpart feels that having an advisor brings him shame. The effective advisor also works in advance to reduce the intrusiveness of force protection procedures for trusted ANSF personalities. This could mean getting badges, passes, or vehicle registrations for one's trusted ANSF counterpart, providing photos of one's ANSF counterpart to entry control points, or simply ensuring that one's ANSF counterpart knows to call his advisor if he needs access to the CF base at any time. Afghans recognize the "double standard" applied to their access to CF facilities as compared to CF access to ANSF facilities.[23] While most understand the reason behind the "double standard," reducing it when feasible can bring honor to one's Afghan counterpart and improve one's relationship with one's Afghan counterpart.

Finally, the effective advisor observes and is cognizant of the above because he understands that Afghans typically avoid situations that cause them to lose face. If one's ANSF counterpart associates interacting with his advisor with losing face, he will minimize his exposure to losing face by limiting his interactions with his advisor or not being open with his advisor.

Point 7

> "Their failure is not your failure. Accept ANSF failure."
> —3/2/201st ANA KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor accepts ANSF failure. He allows ANSF organizations to fail rather than forcing them to succeed, and acknowledging that ANSF failure does not necessarily mean his own failure. While this may seem counterintuitive, it is precisely what defines an "advisor" rather than a "patron-client" relationship. Furthermore, almost all learning models agree that progress does not take place unless there is trial and error. Making failure impossible for one's ANSF counterpart not only stunts his growth, but actually reverses the process of making ANSF organizations independent by inserting the advisor into the ANSF organization as a key component to success.[24]

ANSF personalities recognize that due to robust digital communications capabilities and vast resources, CFs (particularly the U.S. military) are, from a relative perspective, vastly more efficient than the ANSF are in accomplishing virtually any task. Thus, as a resource/labor maximizing organization, the ANSF will regularly allow themselves to approach the point that their CF partners see as "failure," if they believe that their CF partners will not allow such failure to occur.[25] After approximately 10 years of working with CF, ANSF personalities generally understand where CF "red lines" are, and are willing to allow CF to solve ANSF problems for them. Some believe that due to the perceived "patron-client" relationship between the United States and Afghanistan, this is perfectly acceptable. Only by ignoring those "red lines" and

allowing ANSF entities to fail can an advisor force the ANSF to exercise its less efficient systems, grow as an organization, and become more efficient over time.

Unfortunately, this means being comfortable with situations or events that result in loss/destruction of ANSF property, mission failure, and even loss of ANSF lives. It also means accepting the possibility of temporary damage to the relationship with one's ANSF counterpart. Additionally the advisor must be capable of articulating to his leadership why he is allowing the ANSF to fail, and inculcating in his subordinates the same degree of acceptance of ANSF failure. As an advising organization it must be understood by all that as ANSF organizations approach independence, there are no red lines for when CF advisors must force ANSF success.

By far the best way to mitigate catastrophic ANSF failure and reduce the likelihood of damage to one's relationship with the advised ANSF organization without forcing success is to set clear timelines for when advisors will stop taking certain actions or performing certain functions for the ANSF organization. For example, over the course of multiple weeks, when one ANA KDK was engaged with the security assistance force in a certain area the ANA KDK would not maneuver on the enemy. It would simply become static, seek cover, and ask the advisors to provide CF air assets. The advisors informed them that as of a certain date they would have to begin requesting CF air assets from their ANA brigade, rather than from their KDK-level advisor team. The first time after the specified date that elements from this KDK were engaged they followed their normal procedure, the advisors reminded them to call their brigade, and the element in contact took casualties. During subsequent engagements in the days following, not only did the ANA begin to call its higher headquarters to request CF air assets, the element on the ground began to alter its techniques, successfully maneuvering on the enemy, likely because the element in contact knew that the ANSF system for requesting CF air assets was less likely to provide rapid results. Essentially, the decision of the advisor team to allow the ANA KDK to fail in the short-term, resulted in multiple long-term improvements to the KDK's warfighting capabilities. Furthermore, since the advisor team had advertised in advance the date past which it would no longer be requesting air assets for the KDK, the damage to the relationship between the KDK and the advisor team was minimal, despite multiple ANA casualties.[26]

However, accepting ANSF failure does not mean excusing oneself from advising, or "washing one's hands" of the consequences of ANSF actions. If an advisor can foresee a potential pitfall or danger, he should never hesitate to inform his ANSF counterpart of the potential danger. Ideally, an advisor should attempt to assist the ANSF in avoiding failure by helping his ANSF counterpart think through the consequences of his courses of action beforehand. After failure, the advisor should assist his ANSF counterpart in managing the aftermath of the failure, rebuilding/repairing/healing the organization after the failure, and learning from the failure.

At its heart, accepting ANSF failure means not associating ANSF battlefield failure with CF advisor failure. The effective advisor understands that it is neither his responsibility nor place to become a key component in forcing ANSF success. If the advisor is essentially the linchpin in preventing ANSF from failing a task, he is out of place. The effective advisor doesn't want ANSF success more than his ANSF counterpart.

Point 8

> "They will come to you expecting supplies and material support because that is what has been happening traditionally…don't be afraid to say no."
> —7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Advisor Team

The effective advisor recognizes that over the last 10 years the ANSF have received supplemental supplies, equipment, and even real property from their CF counterparts, leading them to expect the same level of support from their advisors. ANSF leaders continue to view the relationship between International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to include the U.S. military, and the ANSF as a "patron-client" relationship. Under this system, it is expected that the patron (the U.S. military) will provide protection, services, life support, and ensure the general well-being of the client (the ANSF). In return, the client will be generally obedient to the patron and reciprocate with support.[27] CF at all levels do not view the relationship in the same way, and the U.S. in particular is uncomfortable with the colonial overtones of being a "patron." U.S. personnel see the relationship as a partnership, one in which both sides can share resources and support one another, but also one in which there is no expectation that one side will provide for the other. Unfortunately, the experience of the last 10 years, during which the United States materially assisted the ANSF in establishing themselves, has convinced the ANSF that they are in a "patron-client" relationship with the U.S. military and that they are entitled to receive supplies/materials from their U.S. advisors.[28] This can greatly frustrate the advisor, who often has little ability to provide the ANSF with the supplies they desire, and also feels that he is being "used" by the ANSF. Thus, the effective advisor prepares himself both for the ANSF expectations, and to say "no" in a variety of forceful, but respectful, ways.

In order to get to the point where he can begin to say "no" to ANSF requests and help them stand on their own, the effective advisor starts where the outgoing-CF unit he has replaced left him.[29] Immediately changing the level of support after a rapid installation plan/table of organization and allowance leads to direct organizational setbacks as the ANSF experience supply shortfalls they were not expecting, animosity on the part of the Afghans who see the new CF advisor team as intentionally undermining the ANSF, and the general view that the new advisors have nothing to provide the ANSF (either materially or intellectually). Ideally, the preceding CF advisor team would have followed the campaign plan to wean the ANSF off of U.S. systems, and the new advisor team only needs to continue along that path at progressively lower levels of support. If this is not the case, then the advisor team must start by generally saying "yes" to the ANSF before they can begin saying "no."

The effective advisor team starts by laying out precise timelines for the ANSF for when various categories of support will be discontinued. This campaign plan for lowering the levels of direct CF support to the ANSF unit should have ANSF "buy in." Ideally, the ANSF leadership should know the reasons and have been part of the process of deciding the exact date that the advisor team will not provide or assist in securing a particular category of support. If the senior ANSF leadership is part of the process, the effective advisor can leverage the ANSF leadership to promote the plan and accompanying positive information operations messaging to the rest of the ANSF organization, thus better enabling the advisor to say "no" to lower-level ANSF personnel after the cutoff date passes.[30] While securing ANSF key leader buy-in can appear a difficult task, generally ANSF leadership understand and respond positively to the argument that CF forces are drawing down. Emphasizing that CF presence below the ANSF corps/regional level will rapidly

become less prevalent can help the ANSF senior leadership understand that they must become more self-sustaining now or face significant shortfalls in the mid-term future.[31] Nevertheless, for the strategy of creating a campaign plan for decreasing levels of support to be effective, the advisor team must ensure that the decreasing levels of support are relatively similar across ANSF formations. For example, if an advisor team is advising an ANA KDK that is co-located with an ABP KDK, the levels of support provided to the ANA and the ABP should not be drastically different.[32] This necessitates regular cross-talk on the issue of support to ANSF on the part of co-located, neighboring, and higher headquarters advisor teams.

After the campaign plan date for the discontinuing of support passes, the effective advisor remains firm in saying "no" to the ANSF. Yet, the effective advisor also employs a number of techniques to either assist the ANSF in solving their own support issues, in defusing some residual animosity from refusing to support the ANSF, and in convincing the ANSF of the necessity of solving their own problems. Firstly, the advisor can directly assist the ANSF by helping them work through their own problem. This could be as simple as helping the ANSF in filling out their supply request form and forwarding a copy to the higher headquarters advisor team to ensure that it is not lost, or calling other advisor teams to assist the ANSF in locating a particular item that they require. This can be highly effective if combined with a straight-forward explanation for why the ANSF are not being supplied/assisted by the CF in the manner in question any longer. Remaining firm, treating the ANSF like equals with a reasonable explanation, but offering to help them work through their own system, is most likely to gain the advisor the respect rather than the animosity of his ANSF counterpart.

In the event of some lingering animosity or feelings of "betrayal," the advisor can defuse some of the feelings by acknowledging that the ANSF are not receiving everything they want or need, but pointing out that this is not uncommon in the U.S. Army as well. Informing the ANSF about U.S. Army supply shortages in garrison often leads to an eye-opening moment for ANSF leaders in which they realize that the United States does not have infinite supplies.[33] This conversation can be continued by pointing out shortages suffered by the advisor team itself, and how if the advisor team were to give the ANSF items out of hide, it would result in further shortages for the advisor team.[34] For example, one advisor team's personnel along with members of the Battle Space Integrator (BSI) slept in tents to free-up space for ANSF personnel to sleep in hard-stand buildings. By illustrating these points to the ANSF, the advisor can demonstrate that requesting supplies from CF is not a win-win situation, in fact it does cut into a limited stock of supplies.

Finally, the advisor can begin to help the ANSF see the necessity and the desirability of solving their own supply or support issues by influencing them to take pride in their independence. By directly linking their decreasing level of support to their increasing level of professionalism and playing upon their pride in that status as a "first rate" or "professional" organization, the advisor can help the ANSF take pride in working through their own systems.[35]

In conclusion, the effective advisor is comfortable saying "no" to his ANSF counterpart, having already prepared the battlefield by providing the counterpart with a clear timeline for decreasing levels of support. By treating his ANSF counterpart as an equal and providing realistic explanations for the decreasing levels of support, the effective advisor can say "no" and still maintain his relationship with his counterpart and bring the ANSF closer to self-sufficiency.

Point 9

"Offset the cost of having you around."
—7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor understands that while it is essential to the long-term viability of the ANSF to wean the ANSF off of CF logistical support, advisors consume ANSF resources themselves; it is not only unfair, but unwise, not to compensate the ANSF accordingly. Advisor teams are, often without their knowledge, large consumers of ANSF resources. These resources include primarily food and security, but also may include luxury items and vehicles not to mention time. For instance, when advisor teams at remote locations eat with their Afghan counterparts they consume foodstuffs that are carefully rationed due to the weakness of the ANSF logistical system. This can directly translate to an ANSF soldier not getting his daily ration, because feeding the "honored guests" is seen as more important. Thus, "if all you're offering is advice, you start to become a drain."[36] While at larger installations closer to ANSF logistical hubs, the effect is less extreme, the principle remains that CF advisors should ensure to offset their costs. Most commonly, CF advisors will request copies of documents from the ANSF. CF advisors should ensure to offset the "cost of doing business" with paper, ink, etc. While it is important to force the ANSF to exercise their own logistical system, advisors will seem out of touch if all they provide is advice while expecting the ANSF to provide products/items.

Point 10

"The guy in charge is not necessarily the loudest guy in the room."
—2/201 ANA BDE Advisor Team

When meeting with unfamiliar Afghans or judging the relationships between unfamiliar and familiar Afghans, the effective advisor always remembers that, "the most influential person in the room might not be the highest ranking nor the most talkative."[37] For advisors who have Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn experience, this may require some adjustment given the respect/deference accorded to more "authoritarian" Iraqi leaders.[38]

At the risk of over-generalizing, Afghans are masters of influencing and persuading and often go about it more quietly than Americans. While an influential American likely sits at the head of the table, chairs a meeting, and makes a decision, an influential Afghan may sit off to the side, speak little, and communicate through proxies. Doing so allows the influential Afghan to orchestrate a conversation and decision, rather than become a target for retaliation (physical/verbal/etc.).

This phenomena, well documented particularly in rural civilian Afghan society, is less common in the ANSF but still observable. For instance, the 2/201 ANA BDE National Directorate of Security (NDS) officer proposed having an "intelligence *shura*" to the 2/201 ANA BDE intelligence advisors. The NDS officer with some limited input from the advisors planned out quite specifically whom he wanted to have in attendance, what he wanted to discuss, and what requirements he wanted to place on lower echelon intelligence officers during the brigade intelligence *shura*. During the *shura*, the NDS officer sat to the side while the brigade S-2 parroted word-for-word what the NDS officer had discussed with the advisors. Multiple KDK NDS officers voiced their support for the brigade S-2's statements. During the entire meeting

the brigade NDS officer said nothing except to briefly agree with the brigade S-2 and thank the participants for attending. It was obvious to the advisors that the brigade NDS officer had engineered the meeting, utilizing the brigade S-2 and the KDK NDS officers as proxies. He was the most influential individual in the room, but had the advisors not met with him a week prior, they would have assumed that the brigade S-2 was the most influential individual in the room.[39]

Understanding who has influence over whom has great benefit to an advisor. With this information, the advisor can leverage influential individuals to assist the advisor in changing the behavior of a counterpart, or in negotiating an end to an administrative or organizational dispute. As stated earlier, like any military organization, rank confers a certain degree of influence. The quietly influential NDS officer mentioned above was actually the highest ranking individual in the room, although he was not chairing the meeting. Yet personal connections, family status, service history, and personal reputation all play a part in determining influence level as well. Some may have influence only over certain sections of Afghan society or the ANSF, some may be universally respected. Yet, should the advisor be able to identify and leverage key influential personalities, it will greatly enhance the ability of the advisor to improve ANSF performance.

Point 11

> "They're really not that different…they're country folks and use the same parables that we do to explain things."
> —7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor is a storyteller, who uses parables and stories to convey his point. Much is made of the differences between American and Afghan communication and learning styles, but Afghans, like Americans, are more likely to remember or take something away from a conversation if they can form a personal connection with the message or messenger. The U.S. military relies heavily on lessons learned documents, written accounts, or vignettes from combat, etc. These tools are simply professionally written and edited stories. The marginal difference lies in that perhaps Afghans are slightly more accepting of the use of stories or parables in a professional setting as a form of communication. The effective advisor leverages this to his advantage in getting his point across.

The first step in utilizing parables and stories is to learn some of the Afghan sayings from one's interpreter. While some sayings have slightly different Afghan equivalents (i.e., "You can't take hair from your beard and make a moustache" is the rough equivalent for "You can't mix apples and oranges."), many like the story of the "Boy Who Cried Wolf" are held exactly in common.[40] Communicating through utilizing Afghan sayings and parables will not only expedite the process of explaining a concept in an intelligible way, but will gain the advisor the respect of his counterpart.

Secondly, the effective advisor is ready to improvise by creating stories or parables of his own that fit the situation or concept that the advisor is trying to describe. When describing how to accomplish a certain task, it is significantly more effective for the advisor to describe how he accomplished or failed to accomplish this task in the past, rather than describe step by step how this task should be or could be accomplished. Therefore, creating a story with the advisor as the protagonist creates a personal connection between the Afghan counterpart and the situation or task being described. These stories need not be entirely factual or historically accurate. There is

nothing wrong with fabricating a believable story or parable to get one's point across.[41] Primarily though, the stories should signal that the advisor is open and has experienced the same difficulty/situation that the Afghan is facing; thus believability and genuineness is key.

Finally, encouraging Afghans to exchange their own war stories or life experiences is an effective tool for helping them work through an issue or learn a new skill. For example, when teaching a class to Afghan soldiers on counter improvised explosive device (CIED) techniques, encouraging the soldiers to describe their own experiences with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) can lead to a meaningful discussion on IED defeat. The Afghan soldiers are more likely to remember that discussion than a stock CIED class.[42] Generally speaking, exchanging war stories, especially if the advisor and the Afghan counterpart have combat experience in the same region of Afghanistan, is one of the best techniques for trust-building and advising throughout one's rotation.

Point 12

> "Know how to communicate like an Afghan…
> this means knowing how to actually use an interpreter."
> —3/2/201st ANA KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor understands that to communicate clearly to his Afghan counterpart he must know how to correctly utilize an interpreter. Much of using an interpreter comes with practice, but to utilize an interpreter correctly one must both ensure that the interpreter understands what the advisor is trying to express, and that the Afghan counterpart is receiving from the interpreter what the advisor is intending to say.

Ensuring the interpreter understands the advisor is best accomplished by briefing the interpreter on the purpose of the meeting before meeting with one's Afghan counterpart. This includes going over any relevant terms, key phrases, or numbers as well as the general tone and purpose of the meeting.[43] Trying to explain a concept or a word to an interpreter during the meeting often will break the natural flow of the conversation. While not necessarily catastrophic, and obviously not entirely avoidable, it is advisable to brief the interpreter beforehand. This can also be accomplished by matching interpreters with knowledge of a particular specialized lexicon to particular meetings. For example, a local national linguist who previously served with the Afghan National Army as an artilleryman would be likely to perform well in meetings that deal with fires.

Ensuring the Afghan counterpart is receiving what the advisor is trying to say is more difficult. This involves the advisor understanding both how his interpreter translates (whether he speaks generally word for word or conveys the concept), and how Afghans themselves speak. English has a vast and technical vocabulary with a great number of synonyms each conveying different nuances. Dari and Pashto both have a much smaller and less technical vocabulary. For example the English words "reconnaissance" and "intelligence" are expressed in Dari utilizing the same word—*kashf*. Thus, especially when utilizing technical terms or English styles of speaking that rely on some of this nuance (like dry humor or downplaying for effect), it does not translate as intended in Dari or Pashto.[44] Exaggerating (by English standards) is often necessary as well to overcome some of the differences between English and Dari/Pashto and convey one's true message to one's Afghan counterpart.[45] Similarly, indicating meaning by providing context can ensure that the interpreter is conveying an understandable message in Dari/Pashto.[46] For

example, "intelligence drives operations" could be given context by saying "intelligence we have gained by doing things like talking to our sources drives operations." Thus, the effective advisor thinks about what he is trying to say before speaking, utilizing context, exaggeration, and his knowledge of Afghan speech patterns to give his interpreter a message that will be clear when translated into Dari/Pashto.

Again, utilizing an interpreter effectively requires experience with interpreters and knowledge of the specific interpreter's capabilities. Briefing the interpreter beforehand and understanding the differences between American military English and Dari/Pashto can assist the effective advisor in communicating to the interpreter and conveying a clear message to his Afghan counterpart.

Point 13

> "Sometimes it comes down to convincing them to do what they don't want to do."
> —2/1/201st ANA KDK Advisor Team

While the effective advisor understands that compelling behavior is not the same as advising, sometimes an advisor must convince the ANSF to accomplish a certain task or undertake a certain activity. Circumstances like security during CF retrograde operations in particular require the assistance of the ANSF, and it often falls on the advisor to convince the ANSF to behave in a particular CF-desired fashion. While in many cases the ANSF recognize that assisting CF is in their long-term best interest, some may be unwilling at first, particularly if they do not see what their organization is receiving "in return" for their compliance. Thus, the effective advisor employs a number of strategies to convince the ANSF to comply, none of which include tricking, threatening, or extorting the ANSF.

Throughout, the effective advisor attempts to ensure that the final decision is an Afghan one. This means helping the ANSF leader develop the idea/compromise/plan so that when the ANSF leader executes what CF are asking him to do, the way he accomplishes it is "his" idea.[47]

The first and most simple method is to lay out the "pros" and "cons" of complying for the involved ANSF organization. This will help the ANSF personalities understand how the advisor sees the issue and vice versa. Often there is information that one party has that changes the calculus for the other.[48] Second, if the "pros" and "cons" comparison indicates that the ANSF are giving up more than they are receiving from participating in the operation or completing the task, the advisor can seek to offset the cost for the ANSF. This can be done by providing materials (sandbags to build an OP that the ANSF are being requested to construct on short notice for route security) or even personnel (while not a maneuver force, advisor teams have on occasion manned ANSF OPs to free up ANSF combat power for offensive operations).[49] Third, if the above methods have not worked, the advisor can try a personal appeal by telling the ANSF leader that the advisor's higher headquarters is pressuring the advisor, or simply asking for a favor based on the strength of the relationship.[50] While many advisors may be uncomfortable with the idea of putting stress on the relationship in this manner, or even uncomfortable with the idea of personal appeals in the first place, this strategy is quite effective, given a healthy relationship between the advisor and the ANSF leader. While at the risk of over-generalizing, Afghans are more comfortable with "favors" and "personal appeals" in a work-context than Americans. Thus, what an American advisor might see as an inappropriately forward request that mixes work with

personal connections, the Afghan counterpart might see as a perfectly normal request that he feels required to carefully consider for the sake of the relationship.

Thus, the effective advisor recognizes that fundamentally, convincing the ANSF to behave in a certain way is tied directly to the strong personal relationships between advisors and the ANSF. If an advisor "knows his audience," has created a relationship built on respect with his counterpart, and on occasion done small "favors" for his ANSF counterpart, the advisor is much more likely to be able to convince the ANSF to behave in the particular way that the CF desires.

Point 14

> "They just have to decide if they're going with the old soviet style (no NCO empowerment) or the American style (NCO empowerment)…they can't be somewhere in between."
> —7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor recognizes that most ANSF organizations are currently struggling with defining the role of NCOs within their ranks. The effective advisor, especially if he is an NCO himself, understands that it is of critical importance that the advisor assist the ANSF in defining the roles and responsibilities of the NCO within the organization, whether this means embracing the old "Soviet model" or the new "NATO model."

Currently, in most ANSF organizations, NCOs are not working in the Western capacity. Unlike the Western model, NCOs are not relied upon by officers as repositories of experience and organizational knowledge, they are not delegated authority to accomplish tasks, and are not empowered with the ability to take initiative within officer-defined guidelines. The ANA model more closely resembles the Soviet model of NCO empowerment. In this model, junior officers are often performing many of the duties of NCOs.[51] Given that the trust of the NCO corps is lacking across the ANSF, this is seen as unadvisable. Some of the lack of faith in the NCO corps is justified, given that most combat-arms NCOs are functionally illiterate and have a much lower educational level than their officers. Yet, some of the readily apparent inflexibility of the ANSF can be traced directly back to the lack of NCO empowerment.

Some commanders are more inclined toward the NATO model of NCO empowerment. Many commanders see the benefits of moving their organizations towards the NATO model, but are unsure of how to guide their organization in that direction.[52] Regardless, the issue of NCO empowerment comes back to the organizational commander at every level and the advisor must assist the commander in guiding his organization towards the level of NCO empowerment dictated by the ANSF organization's higher headquarters.[53] The current state of non-uniform levels of NCO empowerment within ANSF organizations is unsustainable, and it is the responsibility of the effective advisor to help guide ANSF organizations at all levels toward the NATO model, and assist the ANSF organization in enforcing these guidelines with subordinate organizations.

Point 15

> "Criticize privately, but praise publicly."
> —2/1/201st ANA KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor always criticizes his Afghan counterpart privately, but praises him publicly, while simultaneously remaining humble throughout. While shame does play perhaps an even greater role in Afghan culture than in American culture, the concept of "public praise/private criticism" is not alien to the U.S. military. Publicly criticizing a superior is almost never acceptable, and publicly criticizing a subordinate is a strong rebuke. The main difference between Afghan and U.S. military cultures is that the Afghan military culture is even more polarized. Public praise or criticism is stronger in Afghan military culture than in U.S. military culture. The effective advisor leverages this for his advantage while understanding the implications when Afghans criticize or praise one another.

Firstly, if an advisor wishes to praise his counterpart to positively reinforce good performance, doing it privately is not as effective as doing it publicly.[54] Almost universally, CF opinions are respected, and when an advisor praises an Afghan it reflects particularly well on that Afghan. Since, CF opinions are held in high regard, when criticizing, the advisor should understand what CF criticism can do to an ANSF officer or NCO. In one case, after being publicly criticized by advisors, an ANA officer went to the trouble of collecting up every certificate of appreciation or training that he had ever received and presented this paperwork to the advisor team in an attempt to convince them to reverse their opinion of him.[55]

When criticizing, even in a private setting, the effective advisor is humble but honest.[56] An advisor is not fulfilling his responsibilities if he is not able to constructively criticize his counterpart and help the counterpart learn from his failings. Thus, the effective advisor knows how to criticize without offending. Firstly, the effective advisor does not begin to criticize his counterpart until he has developed a relationship with his counterpart.[57] Much like in American military culture, one is unlikely to take the opinion of a newly-met individual seriously, and may even become offended. Secondly, an advisor can attempt to highlight the failings of the counterpart indirectly by drawing the attention of the counterpart to failings that the counterpart and a third party share.[58] For example the advisor could say "look at 2nd Kandak, they're doing 'X' and it is not working at all," implying that X is incorrect, and drawing the attention of the counterpart to X, which he happens to be doing as well. By speaking through context and inference, the advisor can criticize without even beginning to shame or embarrass his counterpart. Alternately, the advisor can utilize a more direct route by periodically giving the counterpart a task-based counseling using measures of performance from the counterpart's chain of command.[59] Doing this not only helps the advisor understand how well the counterpart is performing from the Afghan perspective (rather than the advisor perspective), but limits the embarrassment experienced by the counterpart. Since the advisor is helping the counterpart understand his success/failure as judged by a third party, the advisor and the counterpart can move to correct the failures and reinforce the success as "teammates."

In conclusion, the effective advisor is capable of providing constructive criticism to his counterpart either directly or indirectly, but always in private. Likewise, he leverages public praise to reinforce success or highlight models for others to emulate. Throughout, the advisor is humble and respectful, ensuring that the ANSF do not lose respect for themselves or feel shame due to the advisor's comments.

Point 16

> "Very few actually feel like they need your help."
> —1/1/201st ANA KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor understands that to a certain degree, his Afghan counterpart feels that he does not need the advisor's help. Many senior ANSF officers and NCOs have been at war off and on for the last three decades. Even the younger generation of ANSF leaders have experienced conflict on a day-to-day basis since childhood. Except in rare occasions, the ANSF leader has more combat experience, is higher ranking, and has more time serving within his warfighting function than the advisor. Thus, in most cases, while the ANSF leader may feel that his ANSF organization requires CF assistance, he may personally feel that he does not need the assistance of his advisor in improving his own performance.

Thus, given that the ANSF counterpart does not feel he needs assistance in improving his performance, what does he expect to receive from his advisor? Some expect to utilize their advisors to raise issues/problems to their ANSF superiors which the counterpart feels uncomfortable raising himself. Some expect their advisor to provide them with material assistance be it supplies, equipment, air support, etc.[60] As in any endeavor, the advisor must be aware of those who wish to lighten their own workload—you are not accomplishing your mission by doing "chores" for your counterparts.[61]

Most are convinced, due to their pride and extensive combat experience, that they do not require advice, mentorship, or training from their junior American mentor.[62] Knowing that this is the starting mindset of his counterpart can help the effective advisor begin to become value-added for his ANSF counterpart. Simply starting by earning the trust of the ANSF counterpart and becoming a "sounding board" for his ideas or being available to provide an opinion when asked is an excellent way to demonstrate that the advisor has something to add to the discussion. Playing "devil's advocate" for one's ANSF leader can also be useful to the ANSF leader who believes he does not need advising, since ANSF personnel rarely provide that for one another. Furthermore, asking the ANSF leader to teach the advisor is an excellent avenue for guiding the ANSF leader to discuss his thoughts on warfighting with the advisor, thus opening the ANSF counterpart to discussions on best practices.[63]

While a strongly entrenched senior ANSF leader may never believe that he personally requires advising or improvement in his performance, taking some of the above routes may assist the advisor in subtly helping the ANSF leader improve. Furthermore, by becoming a trusted "sounding board" or friend, the ANSF leader will be more likely to take more straightforward advice later in the relationship on the basis of the friendship alone. In conclusion, most ANSF counterparts may believe they do not need your advice—if you recognize this from the outset, and act in a self-aware, polite, and subtle manner, you can be truly effective.

Point 17

> "Don't let the insider threat put up barriers between you and your counterpart. Draw your counterparts in close. Make them be your host. Tell them that you feel safe because THEY are securing YOU."
> —7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 KDK Advisor Team

The effective advisor, while accepting that insider threats are real and seeking to mitigate them, does not let the insider threat either separate him from his counterpart or prevent him from accomplishing his mission. This means understanding both as an organization and as an individual that "risk is what right looks like,"[64] because the insider threat risk can never entirely be mitigated, and attempting to do so only inhibits mission accomplishment. Instead, the effective advisor embraces the fact that his security is not entirely in his own hands, and he must rely upon his Afghan counterparts to take up some of the responsibility for securing him and his team. Essentially, creating distance or standoff between advisors and the ANSF rather than eliminating barriers and building collective security solutions is the incorrect method for dealing with the insider threat. The following guidelines should be considered:

- First, it is the responsibility of the advisor team to mitigate some of the insider threat by not allowing "unforced errors." It is the responsibility of each advisor to ensure that they don't create any personal vendettas or grievances between themselves and any Afghan.[65] Minor disputes, misunderstandings, or arguments should be promptly resolved so the involved-Afghan feels that he has satisfaction. A cultural or religious fauxpas should not be allowed to linger, and advisors should take care to address any of these issues as soon as they come to their attention. While some advisors may feel it unnecessary or even insulting to have to apologize for acceptable stateside behavior, it is vital to do so to avoid allowing personal issues to fester.

- Second, advisors should assist the ANSF in solving some of the root causes of insider attacks.[66] ANSF leadership are equally at risk for insider attacks, and thus are usually amenable to working with advisors to address root causes of insider attacks when they are identified. Some root causes include soldiers not being paid on time, soldiers not being allowed to go on leave regularly/being stationed at remote sites without being relieved for long periods of time, soldiers not regularly being fed/watered, and the remains of ANSF fallen not being processed in a timely manner. While none of these factors might be the deciding factor that causes an ANSF service member to kill, they are contributing factors that create environments that breed intra-ANSF and possibly anti-CF violence.

- Third, advisors should cultivate "informers" within the ANSF organization with which they work.[67] By being friendly and open with all ANSF personnel encountered, and taking the time to converse with and develop a relationship with large numbers of ANSF personnel, the advisor can develop a network of personnel who see the advisor as a human being rather than a generic ISAF soldier. This regularly results in the ANSF service member actively seeking out the advisor to alert him to danger.[68] Simply put, as with counterinsurgency operations, the more an element knows the people of an area and has good relations with them, the more the local population is willing to assist the element in securing itself. The ANSF service members, in addition to the advisor team's direct counterparts, are the "local population."

- Fourth, advisors should take an ANSF-inclusive systematic approach to identifying potential insider threat perpetrators before they attack.[69] By working with the CF BSI S-2 section, the ANSF element S-2, and NDS sections, the advisor team can serve as a conduit of information as well as an intelligence customer. Soldiers going on leave to inertial navigation system (INS)-dominated areas are particularly susceptible to INS efforts to "co-opt" the service member and influence them to conduct an insider attack. Helping the ANSF synchronize their counter-intelligence, personnel management, and force protection efforts to prevent/mitigate occurrences like the "post-leave insider attack" not only assists in professionalizing the ANSF, but also improves security for the advisor team.

- Fifth, advisors should not make themselves fixed targets when visiting their ANSF counterparts, changing their weapon and equipment load, number of personnel moving together, and arrival and departure times.[70] Identifying a designated-shooter or "guardian angel" is also prudent, yet this designated-shooter should not be overt. The designated-shooter should not be clothed differently from the rest of the team, nor should the designated-shooter be in an obviously aggressive posture. The designated-shooter should sit facing entry-points and should not be engaged whatsoever in the dialogue going on. Having an overt or aggressively postured designated-shooter brings only marginal (if any) added security; however, it adds a layer of tension to the proceedings, degrading the ability of the advisors to accomplish their mission.[71] An effective advisor team trains continually throughout its deployment on how to engage targets in confined areas, areas with large numbers of civilians, or after having to quickly draw one's weapon.[72] Effective training for designated shooters will make them effective at securing the team without the designated-shooter having to be in a rapport-degrading, aggressive stance during advisor-counterpart interactions.

In the event of an insider attack or high-profile international incident (i.e., the 2012 "Innocence of Muslims" inflammatory video release), the effective advisor team does not disengage from its counterparts; the team pulls them in closer. Often, after insider attacks, even if they take place in a different ANSF organization or province, advisor teams are pressured to pull back from their Afghan counterparts. This is precisely the worst time to do. The advisor team should visit their counterparts and observe the ANSF organization. The advisor team likely has the best idea of what "normal" looks like, and in order to secure themselves and other CF personnel, it is the responsibility of the advisor team to see if the situation remains normal with the ANSF organization or if the environment may have changed, possibly indicating unrest or sympathetic insider attacks.[73] Furthermore, the ANSF counterparts must be reassured that the attack or international incident has not changed the relationship between the advisor and the counterpart. Instead of ignoring the issue, advisors should address it openly, relying upon higher-headquarters approved messaging and one's own knowledge of one's Afghan counterpart. It is also the advisor team's responsibility to leverage the ANSF leadership to ensure that this CF messaging reaches the service member level of the ANSF organization. In the event that the ANSF leadership advises the advisor team not to visit, the advisor team can accomplish some of the above goals (maintaining the relationship, determining the threat level, and correctly messaging the situation) by inviting the ANSF to visit the advisor team at the CF facility.

In conclusion, the effective advisor team, while taking steps to mitigate risk on its own, invites the ANSF to act as its host and secure the team. This means working together to identify potential risks before they directly or indirectly cause casualties. Yet, the advisor team recognizes

and is comfortable with the fact that not all risk can ever be entirely mitigated. If a trustworthy and familiar Afghan service member suddenly decides to kill an American, tells no one, secretly obtains a firearm, and is able to get close to the team, there is very little that can be done except ensure that he is only able to get one shot off before he is killed. If an advisor team has taken all the steps above, is engaged in collective security with the ANSF, and is only open to trading "man for man"[74] in a random killing, the advisor team has successfully mitigated risk.

Point 18

> "Know the ethnic-political history of your Afghan counterpart, because this impacts on how he will interact with you and other Afghans."
> —2/201 ANA BDE Advisor Team

In addition to being a student of Afghan history, generally defined, the effective advisor is a student of the personal experience of his counterpart and his counterpart's colleagues with Afghan history. Being a Westerner, one will never entirely understand the complex ethno-political milieu that is an Afghan *Kandak* or brigade staff. However, by understanding the history and background of key players, and how those backgrounds relate to one another within the context of post-Taliban Afghan society, one can minimize the risk of sparking intra-ANSF personality conflicts, leverage the correct leadership personalities to influence other ANSF personalities, and to a certain degree understand the motivations of one's own and other ANSF counterparts.

While it is obviously a generalization to say that there are only three dimensions to analyzing the background of an ANSF personality, the following three dimensions are relatively easy for the advisor to identify, are simple to comprehend, and in many if not most cases best help the advisor approximate the way other Afghans view the ANSF personality. The model described is less a scientific tool than a simple rule of thumb for advisors. The first dimension is "ethnicity." What is the ethnic background and birthplace of the ANSF personality? While the differences between members even of the same ethnic group hailing from the same district in Afghanistan can be vast, for the most part they share some defining characteristics (accents, dress, history, and reputation) recognizable by other Afghans. The more fidelity an advisor has on the exact background of ANSF personalities the better, but in general, understanding basic ethnic and regional background is sufficient.

The second dimension is "which side the ANSF personality fought with during the *jihad* against the Soviets." Did the ANSF counterpart fight with the *Mujahideen* or with the Soviets? Did he receive any training in Pakistan or in the U.S.S.R.? What was his position within the Communist regime or the *Mujahideen*? Again, if the advisor can determine with which *Mujahideen* party or communist regime units the ANSF counterpart served, the better, but generally knowing with which side the counterpart fought is sufficient.

The third dimension is "where the ANSF personality spent the years of the Taliban regime and what he did." Did the ANSF personality stay in Afghanistan as a civilian? Did he stay in Afghanistan and actively resist the Taliban? Did the ANSF personality flee to Pakistan or another country? Or, in the more rare occasion, did he work with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan?

One can analyze an ANSF personality and how other ANSF personalities view the first personality utilizing these dimensions. Generally speaking, and all things being equal, ethnic

groups will self-segregate for linguistic, cultural, and historical reasons. Similarly, ex-Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) officers will have more affinity towards other ex-DRA officers over persons with a *Mujahideen* background. Finally, those who stayed in Afghanistan and resisted the warlords and the Taliban or suffered as civilians under their tenure will naturally gravitate toward those with similar experiences, over those who fled Afghanistan and vice-versa. Persons who share none of the three dimensions are very likely to be antagonistic toward one another. Persons who share all three are highly likely to view each other positively. Surprisingly, often it appears that common allegiance during the *jihad* is the determining dimension when it comes to how Afghans view one another, trumped only by a common ethnic sub-group (tribal or familial) affiliation.[75]

One can see the interplay of these dimensions at work on a nationwide scale in how Afghans view a nationally recognizable figure like Ahmad Shah Massoud. *Tajiks*, particularly *Panjsheri Tajiks*, have an affinity for Massoud that is generally not shared by non-Tajiks. Even some Tajiks view him and his Panjsheri Tajik cohorts as "elitist." That being said, those who resisted the Soviets and those who stayed in Afghanistan and resisted the Taliban both have some affinity toward Massoud. Those, like Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who left Afghanistan during the 1990s, are somewhat uncomfortable embracing Massoud and his almost mythic historical legacy, because the qualities that he represents run contrary to their personal histories. Ex-Soviets, who like Massoud supporters share no love for the Taliban, cannot fully embrace him due to his resistance during the 1980s. Pashtoons who resisted the Soviets cannot fully embrace Massoud due to the ethnic slant of his resistance movement. Thus, viewing Massoud through the three dimensions, one can see both how many in Afghanistan see Massoud as a national hero, but also how many Afghans have difficulty fully embracing the martyred Tajik warlord.[76]

One illustrative, small-scale example of this is the interaction of one ANSF commander and his executive officer. The Tajik executive officer was a *Mujahid* during the jihad and, following the fall of the communist regime and the factions period, remained in Afghanistan to actively resist the Taliban with the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The Pashtoon commander on the other hand, was a Soviet-trained officer with the communist regime who fled Afghanistan to Pakistan following the fall of the *Najibullah* regime. Advisors noticed a certain polarization of the ANSF staff into factions centered around these two personalities. Advisors also noticed a degree of incompatibility between the two officers and their factions that could not be explained by ethnicity alone (given the existence of ethnic outliers within the Pashtoon-dominant or Tajik-dominant factions). It became apparent to advisors that Pashtoons, ex-communists, and persons who had fled Afghanistan after the fall of the communist regime were likely to align with the commander. Tajiks, ex-Mujahideen and persons who had stayed in Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah were likely to align with the executive officer. For example, one ex-Soviet Tajik lower-echelon commander within the unit essentially refused to attend meetings chaired by the Mujahid Tajik executive officer, and only would attend meetings chaired by the ex-Soviet Pashtoon unit commander.

Understanding these three simple dimensions to Afghan officers can help an advisor in a variety of ways. Firstly, by analyzing the ANSF organization using these dimensions, the advisor can map the social network of the organization with which he works. By mapping the social network, he can more effectively influence individuals within the network by using individuals the individual respects. In the example above, using the executive officer to motivate or influence a Pashtoon ex-Soviet staff officer, would not have been as effective as using the commander. Secondly, understanding the dynamics of the social network can help the advisor navigate the interpersonal rivalries and pitfalls of the social network. This isn't to say that there are no

rivalries or personality conflicts within a group of Afghans with a similar background. Yet, by understanding the potential historical reasons behind inter-organizational conflicts, advisors can better apply resources to correct staff friction rather than vainly attempting to resolve long-standing historical-personal conflicts.

Thus, the effective advisor takes time to understand and map the personal history of ANSF personalities with whom he works. Armed with this understanding, the effective advisor can apply influence and pressure more diplomatically.

Conclusion

The observations made by the combat advisors of 1/502 IN above should be familiar to those who have read the historical literature on advising, particularly the works of T.E. Lawrence. While the observations may differ in the details, due to the vast differences between 21st Century Afghan culture and 20th Century *Hijaz*-Arab culture, both identify that the key to advising lies in fostering a healthy relationship with one's counterpart. Crafting this relationship is not the product of "cultural awareness," but of social intelligence. Socially intelligent advisors are honest, respectful, humble, calm, observant, adaptive, and consequently effective advisors. Knowing the history and culture of Afghanistan is critical, but acting consistently in ways that reflect social intelligence is the deciding factor in being an effective advisor. Yet, even the most socially intelligent advisor cannot be effective on his own. The most effective advisors are part of teams that work together, building relationships, leveraging them in concert, and communicating to the ANSF with a synchronized and consistent message to assist the ANSF in developing their own ways to affect organizational change. Every member of a team must be a relationship builder rather than a compeller of action, capable of communicating that "he is there, because we are leaving."

Endnotes:

1. A Co., 1-502 IN, 2BCT, 101 ABN (Air Assault) "TEAM HARDROCK." CPT French interview, 2 November 2012. FOB TAGAB, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan.

2. HHC, 1-502 IN, 2BCT, 101 ABN (Air Assault) "TEAM REGULATORS." CPT French interview, 26 October 2012. FOB BOSTICK, Kunar Province, Afghanistan.

3. C Co., 1-502 IN, 2BCT, 101 ABN (Air Assault) "TEAM COBRA." CPT French interview, 22 October 2012. FOB FENTY, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.

4. TEAM COBRA interview.

5. B Co., 1-502 IN 2BCT, 101 ABN (Air Assault) "TEAM BULLDOG." CPT French interview, 18 October 2012 COP MEHTAR LAM, Laghman Province, Afghanistan.

6. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

7. Miyamoto Musashi, *Book of Five Rings*.

8. TEAM COBRA interview.

9. HQ, 1-502 IN, 2BCT, 101 ABN (Air Assault) "TEAM TALON". CPT French Interview with TEAM TALON. 5-26 November, 2012. FOB JOYCE, Kunar Province, Afghanistan

10. TEAM REGULATORS interview.

11. TEAM TALON interview.

12. TEAM COBRA interview.

13. Ibid.

14. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

15. TEAM COBRA interview.

16. D Co., 1-502 IN, 2BCT, 101 ABN (Air Assault) "TEAM WARDOG." CPT French interview, 24 October 2012. COP MONTI, Kunar Province, Afghanistan.

17. TEAM TALON interview.

18. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

19. Ibid.

20. TEAM TALON interview.

21. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

22. TEAM TALON interview.

23. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

24. TEAM REGULATORS interview.

25. TEAM TALON interview.

26. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

27. TEAM TALON interview.

28. TEAM COBRA interview.

29. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

30. Ibid.

31. TEAM COBRA interivew.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

36. TEAM COBRA interview.

37. TEAM WARDOG interview.

38. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

39. TEAM TALON interview.

40. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

41. TEAM COBRA interview.

42. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

43. TEAM REGULATORS interview.

44. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

45. Ibid.

46. TEAM TALON interview.

47. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

48. TEAM COBRA interview.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. TEAM WARDOG interview.

52. TEAM TALON interview.

53. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

54. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

55. TEAM TALON interview.

56. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

57. Ibid.

58. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

59. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

60. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

61. TEAM COBRA interview.

62. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

63. TEAM TALON interview.

64. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

65. TEAM COBRA interview.

66. Ibid.

67. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

68. TEAM TALON interview.

69. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

70. TEAM BULLDOG interview.

71. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

72. TEAM WARDOG interview.

73. TEAM HARDROCK interview.

74. TEAM COBRA interview.

75. TEAM TALON (Note: Not the result of an empirical study, but the result of a series of observations.)

76. Verini, James; *The Cult of Massoud*, 23 November 2012; Foreign Policy Magazine. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/23/the_cult_of_massoud.

Chapter 2

Fire Support, Afghan Style

by 1LT Lee Hafkemeyer

As coalition forces (CFs) in Afghanistan transition the security of the country to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the need for combat advisory teams has become more transparent. Because CF combat operations have decreased tremendously since the surge in 2010-2012, ANSF have begun spearheading their own operations in order to provide security to the Afghan people and neutralize the threat of Taliban attacks. During my most recent OEF XIII deployment, I was the Fire Support Officer in charge of Security Force Assistance Team (SFAT) 28, organically assigned to 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airbone, (Air Assault) (1/75 CAV, 2BCT, 101st ABN [AASLT]). Our mission as an SFAT was to advise and assist the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), and later Afghan Local Police (ALP), in southern Kunar province Afghanistan, specifically the Watapur, Narang, and Tsowkay Districts.

Initial preparation for the SFAT deployment was challenging on the fire support side, given our mission of advising AUP, who have no fires capabilities or weapon systems. If fires were to be used to support the AUP, they would have to contact CF or the Afghan National Army (ANA) for indirect fire support. Because of this challenge, it was my goal to integrate fires from the ANA to support the AUP located at the various checkpoints.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Once deployed to Afghanistan during the summer of 2012, my initial assessment of the fire support in the area was good. Because of the area we were deployed to, being in the infamous Pech River Valley and along the Kunar River Valley, the need for fire support was the decisive effort in the fight against the Taliban. Because 2012 marked the most notable transition of CF bases, checkpoints, and observation posts to the ANSF, it was ANSF located at these locations who received the brunt of attacks from the Taliban. The ANA artillery unit, who used the old Russian D-30 122mm cannon, continued to train because once the CF were gone fire support would have to come from the ANA artillery and mortars. But because CF were still transitioning and training with the ANSF, CF would often support the ANSF with their own mortars or artillery to deter and kill the enemy. With the battlefield handover of former CF bases, checkpoints, and observation posts, the question for us was “how do we support ANSF with our own fires if no CF is on the ground with them to call for fire?” The answer was rather simple for us—have the ANSF, to include the AUP and ALP, act as forward observers and receive training in the basics of fires observation from us.

SETTING THE CONDITIONS

At our first location in the Watapur District, the ANA had D-30 and 82mm mortar capabilities. The artillery unit, already located at our base, as well as my fire support specialist and myself, conducted training with the ANA to further enhance their competence as artillerymen in a volatile area. After three months at that location, the ANA were almost to the point of supporting their troops completely on their own, the only thing hampering their effectiveness was their logistical system which was completely broken.

Our next location was along the Kunar River Valley, which was a unique one. The base was 90 percent handed over to the ANA, and the only U.S. forces included a security force platoon, one SFAT assigned specifically to advise the ANA located at our base, and our SFAT, who was to continue to advise the AUP and now ALP. The ANA had two 82mm mortar tubes, but could only support and range one of the observation posts located next to our base; they were unable to provide any fires and were inept at execution. U.S. forces at the base had one 120mm mortar tube and one 81mm mortar tube manned by a mortar section already apart of the security force platoon. Conducting the actual fire missions was a fire support noncommissioned officer (provided by the BSO, 2/12 IN, 4BCT, 4ID) and the two SFAT fire support officers in charge, to include myself. Around our base were numerous AUP/ALP checkpoints and two observation posts. Every checkpoint and observation post got attacked at least once while we were there, and a few were attached numerous times, over and over.

For the checkpoints and observation points (OPs) that got attacked numerous times, all of them being AUP/ALP manned, my job was to develop terrain sketches for them at their locations with known points labeled on the sketch; these known points designated the locations they said they would most likely get attacked. Once labeled on the sketch, I would use the polar method of gathering a distance and direction to the point. Once the data was collected and complete, I would go back to my fire support cell and plot the points on our map for pre-planned targets, giving the fire mission data to our mortars for their situational awareness whenever we would call for fire on a known point. Once the sketch was complete, copies were given to the AUP/ALP leadership who would hand copies to the checkpoint or OP leader. If the checkpoint or OP were to be attacked, the leader there would call our fire support cell via cell phone and would tell us at which known point they were being attacked. We would then conduct a fire mission and adjust our fires based on where they were telling us to adjust to using our imagery and map plotting. We would later call these terrain sketches “Pointie Talkies”; they were very effective and often removed the enemy from the battlefield.

ADVISING AND ASSISTING

Throughout our time in the Kunar River Valley, we had great success at advising and assisting our AUP/ALP brethren, and helped them provide an increase in security for their perspective districts. The way ahead for the ANSF was on the right path, the only friction point being the ANA supporting them with their own mortars or artillery (artillery being none at our last location). Having the ANSF not rely on our fires and aircraft support is another friction point the ANSF are going to have to get over and support on their own. I believe our Pointie Talkie method we introduced to the ANSF is sustainable on their end due to the fact that the known points in the pictures can be pre-planned/plotted for the ANA firing unit to have in order to continue to support the AUP/ALP located at the checkpoints and OPs. What I learned during this deployment is that it doesn’t have to always be CF calling for fire. With the proper training and procedures, as well as the proper fire support control measures in place, the ANSF are more than capable calling for fire and killing the enemy.

Chapter 3

The Afghan National Army (ANA) Brigade-Level Targeting Methodology: Historical Context and a Method for Developing Enduring Capabilities in an ANA Brigade

by MAJ William C. Cavin and LTC Clinton W. Cox

The purpose of this chapter is to outline an ANA brigade advisor's targeting methodology that focuses the team's advisory efforts on development of the ANA brigade's staff functions while increasing the ANA brigade commander's capacity to understand, visualize, describe, and direct his organization towards mission accomplishment. Years of partnered operations, overwhelmingly driven and directed by the priorities of the U.S. battle space owner (BSO), have created an ANA organization that is proficient at the tactical execution of combat operations, but is woefully lacking the ability to perform staff functions and logistical forecasting required to sustain steady-state combat operations. Furthermore, policies enacted by coalition forces, such as an ANA:U.S. force ratio on combat missions to ensure Afghans were in the fight, further eroded the ANA's ability to develop systems to sustain themselves by generating a "grey market."

While Afghan corruption, illiteracy, and lack of motivation all remain significant obstacles to consider in the advisory effort, ANA advisors at all levels must have the wherewithal to realize that, though the ANA have been organized for many years now, the concept of independently sustaining and equipping themselves is a relatively new development brought on by the increased pace of transition. In most (if not all) cases, the ANA are massively underprepared to assume these duties brought on by years of U.S. partners logistically subsidizing operations in exchange for ANA compliance with U.S. operational priorities.

As an advisor, all efforts should be directed toward generating the ANA's staff and commander's ability to comprehend the concept of how their individual function sustains the fight and enables them to develop their own processes towards achieving that end. Cultivation of this effort requires two conditions to be present—synchronization of advisor efforts vertically from the *Kandak* (battalion) to brigade (and corps), as well as horizontally within the internal advisor unit to generate unity of effort; and the buy-in of the ANA brigade commander, who initially adopts (via approval) the individual advisory efforts and ultimately starts directing the effort based on his own understanding and priorities.

In order to outline starting conditions, this chapter briefly summarizes the operational framework that led the ANA to their present condition, as well as outline the targeting methodology 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment (1/75 CAV), used to promote the two requisite conditions stated earlier.

Historical Context

While the overarching intent is to describe the targeting methodology utilized by 1/75 CAV during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 2012-2013 while assigned as advisors to 4th Battalion, 203rd Afghan National Army Brigade (4/203 ANA BDE), it is necessary to illustrate the Afghan point of view upon arrival of the team as understood in terms of a broad conceptual model. Conditions or decisions addressed in the following paragraphs are in no way an indictment or criticism of decisions made by U.S. ground commanders. Instead, they are meant

to serve as an Afghan perspective of a rapidly changing battlefield that started to find the ANA pushed to the forefront by shifting political winds at a speed that gave neither the U.S. forces or Afghans enough time to contemplate the implications and nuances of making such a radical shift.



Figure 3-1. Arrival of advisory teams in theater.

In Figure 3-1, the star indicates the arrival of 1/75 CAV advisory teams in theater, a time that marked the beginning of U.S. forces taking the initial concrete steps towards transferring more battlespace to Afghan authority. Force manning level constraints were being initiated on in-bound units; and security force assistance teams (SFATs), such as 1/75 CAV, were being attached to BSOs for the purpose of hastening the readiness of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Prior to this transitional phase line, U.S. forces had become accustomed to a freedom of conducting operations with minimal or no Afghan support to eventually a partnered arrangement that involved like units (e.g., battalion/*Kandak*; company/*Tohli*) pairing together for planning and executing operations. While this arrangement was necessary for a myriad of valid and necessary reasons, it had the effect of compartmentalizing the ANA levels of command due to a U.S. competence and tenacity that overrode a weak ANA command structure. That effect was exacerbated by a broken ANA logistical system coupled with U.S. policies on maintaining an ANA:U.S. force ratio for daily combat operations. (See Figure 3-2.)



Figure 3-2. Operational U.S. and host nation framework.

The partnered relationship improved the tactical prowess of the Afghan forces and their ability to execute direct ground combat operations for a short duration at the small unit level. Although it varied by unit, on the whole, Afghans were mimicking the actions of their U.S. counterparts while conducting operations and becoming very proficient at the squad and soldier level of tasks. With each increasing level of leadership, however, the ANA tended to be further removed or less competent at conducting their designated functions, such as planning and sustaining combat

operations. The U.S. commander planned and directed operations and tended to seek out his partnered ANA commander after the fact to provide a set number of ANA soldiers to support the operation. Operations security, the most cited reason, often meant the ANA were only given a few hours to a day to produce the requested number of soldiers and, even then, they only had a limited understanding of the mission. This practice only increased as senior commanders began to direct a minimum of 1:1 or greater force ratio of ANA to U.S. forces as a prerequisite to conduct daily combat operations.

While the ANA's execution of combat operations improved, the fledgling ANA logistical system lagged in its ability to adequately provide all classes of supply required to sustain its combat forces and certainly could not at the pace of operations being driven by its U.S. counterpart. Out of necessity and to keep the pressure on the enemy, U.S. forces at the tactical level were forced to assist their ANA partnered units with supplies. Savvy Afghan commanders, realizing they had leverage over their U.S. counterparts due to the mandated force ratios, began to demand fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and other classes of supply as a precondition for their compliance. U.S. leaders, particularly at the more junior level, hamstrung by the force ratio policy and demands to remain on the offensive, gave in to their ANA desires and justified it with mission accomplishment.

The relationship, while effective in the short-term at accomplishing U.S. driven goals, was detrimental toward the development of the ANA as an effective, independent, self-sustaining organization. ANA staffs and commanders at all levels of command happily abdicated any responsibility for planning, directing, and sustaining operations to their U.S. counterparts. As depicted in Figure 3-2, ANA commanders had become dependent on their U.S. partners to solve their problems and had neither the inclination nor confidence to utilize their next level of command. The ANA levels of command became compartmentalized and isolated from both higher and lower force levels as the flow of information and logistics was delivered solely by their U.S. counterpart. In their defense, ANA systems were broken because the present arrangement never required the ANA to exercise its own systems and U.S. commanders were not going to let them fail. The ANA believed they were upholding their end of the partnership because U.S. capitulation to their logistical demands as trade for combat power was validated time and time again. U.S. commanders, for their part, were comfortable with the arrangement as it readily provided additional combat power toward their own priorities while minimizing the frustration of combined planning. As a result, ANA systems for internal support, sustainment, and command and control were allowed to atrophy for a number of years while yielding an ANA belief that the U.S. would always be there because we "knew" they were not competent enough to provide for themselves.

Upon the arrival of 1/75 CAV, U.S. focus remained on high-value targets and cache locations with an attritional mindset and approach as their primary purpose. The ANA were partnered across the provinces, but primarily as a static force to hold checkpoints at historic improvised explosive device locations or along lines of communication at or near strategic infrastructure. For the most part, these locations were picked out by U.S. forces or ordered from political entities such as provincial governors, the Ministry of Defense, or Parliament. The ANA did little to no offensive planning and tended to fall into providing soldiers as required to the BSO. ANA development was limited to two- to three-man SFATs at the brigade and each *Kandak*. The combat support and combat service support *Kandaks* were being utilized as infantry *Kandaks* and not performing their *Tashkel* (mission table of organization and equipment-mission essential task list) functions. Each of the ANA *Tohlis* received nearly all classes of supply from their partnered

unit. It was under these conditions that the 1/75 CAV assumed its role as the advisory team for to the 4/203 ANA BDE. In its defense, the ANA, with no formal military training and limited context, were simply executing security tasks dictated by U.S. commanders.

Organization

On 29 May 2012, 1/75 CAV deployed five SFATs to provide advisory efforts to the 4/203 ANA BDE in the Regional Command-East (RC-E) provinces of Wardak and Logar. The 1/75 CAV squadron leadership and staff formed the brigade advisory team (Figure 3-3) with company leadership forming two of the *Kandak*-level advisory teams. The remaining *Kandak* teams were created from the BSO's internal security force assistance augmentation personnel and a single Czech Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).



Figure 3-3. Host nation brigade advisor team organization.

The brigade team consisted of 16 personnel filling positions that were mandated by Forces Command (FORSCOM) manning levels. Prior to deploying, based on the lack of a fielded military police unit within 4/203 ANA BDE, the commander made the decision to augment two of the infantry *Kandak* advisory teams with the personnel slated to fill the two MP slots so the team deployed with 16 to 18 personnel. While significant discussion can be made regarding the best practice for filling each of these positions, it was not an issue for the brigade team, and for the sake of brevity will not be discussed here. (**Note:** Figure 3-3 also depicts the ranks of the personnel who held each position and does not reflect the FORSCOM mandated rank requirement for each position. The brigade team filled each slot with an emphasis on the talent and motivation of the individual taking priority over rank requirements).



Figure 3-4. Relationship between teams.

Command and Coordination

The relationship between the teams is depicted in Figure 3-4. As the brigade team, significant coordination was conducted between the other ANSF elements within the provinces. The brigade team reported directly to the BSO commander or through the brigade SFAT element, as well as the Tactical Command Post-2, who advised the 203rd ANA Corps command and staff.

During OEF 2012-2013, the relationship of the *Kandak* teams to the brigade team changed several times between operation control (OPCON) and tactical control. Basically, the brigade team received OPCON of the *Kandak* teams in the beginning as it worked to re-establish the command and control structure within the 4/203 ANA Brigade. Once rebuilt, the battalion-level U.S. BSO assumed OPCON for the elements within its area of operations to allow them to better address and improve *Kandak* systems and requirements. The *Kandak* teams still reported to the brigade team as a part of the targeting methodology to ensure the ANA brigade staff and command team were conducting coordination with the *Kandaks* and allowed the brigade team to conduct its advising and coaching themes. Again, for the sake of brevity, this system worked for the BSO and advisory teams in this situation; although additional discussion is warranted, it will not be addressed in this document.

Targeting Methodology

Upon arrival in theater, the brigade team recognized the overarching issue was the near lack of authority and responsibility the brigade had over its *Kandaks*. For all the reasons covered in the historical context section, the *Kandaks* were operating independent of guidance from the brigade and completely dependent on their U.S. counterpart for mission planning and logistics (with the exception of some Class III [bulk ammunition] push packages delivered directly to the *Kandak* locations via contractors and on-hand stockage of some crew launch vehicles). Additionally, because the brigade was relatively new, it had no other context to compare whether it was an effective organization or not. Many, if not all, of the ANA brigade staff officers felt they were effective at performing their job as it fit in with the established partnership conditions. In order for the team to assist the brigade in regaining its autonomy over its *Kandaks*, it first had to organize the efforts of the eight *Kandak* teams under the oversight of the brigade team. This was achieved by establishing the targeting system as depicted in Figure 3-5 and will be discussed in detail for the remainder of this document.



Figure 3-5. Host nation targeting methodology.

Overview

The ANA advisor targeting methodology is based on a one-week cycle (see Figure 3-5). It begins with the Kandak Advisor Update Briefing conducted on Mondays via Adobe Connect, phone bridge, and in person to capture initiatives, opportunities, and issues at each of their levels regarding their advised *Kandak*. The entire brigade team is in attendance; each member addresses each of their issues as it pertains to their specific advisory role or takes notes to work later. Once complete, each brigade advisor utilizes the information received from each *Kandak* as a mechanism to interact with his ANA counterpart throughout the week as well as coordinate the *Kandak* advisors and their counterparts to address specific problems and potential solutions. In this manner, the advisors are facilitating the conversation between the brigade and *Kandak* staffs by assisting them in understanding and anticipating issues while coaching them with recommended solutions.

On Friday, the brigade team assembles for an internal targeting meeting organized and briefed by each of the individual advisor staff functions. Each advisor briefs the current status of the targeted tasks he is working on with his ANA counterpart to include those bottom-fed from the *Kandak* advisors. The output of this meeting is two-part. First, a Target Task List depicting a consolidated and prioritized list of all significant tasks is produced and reviewed at the end of the meeting. Each task is also given a status to determine if progress is being achieved or not. Second, a list of tasks that the advisor teams must accomplish (e.g., reporting requirements specific to a particular issue) is identified for compilation into a tasking order. Once complete, the Target Task List is translated into Dari. The advisor to the ANA brigade commander brings the translated list on Saturday to the commander for his review, approval, and prioritization of tasks. This is the most crucial portion of the process in that it enables the advisory efforts of the team to help the brigade commander visualize and then direct the actions of his staff. By approving and prioritizing the list (and often recommending new areas of focus), he now becomes a part of the process, which in turn greatly eases the advisory efforts of the team. If any additional tasks from the review with the commander are identified that required *Kandak* team-level assistance, those are included in the tasking order which is sent out on Sunday. The following sections will address each of these steps individually including examples of the products produced for each meeting.

Kandak Update Meeting (Step 1)

The purpose of the Kandak Update Meeting is to gather opportunities, initiatives, and issues as a means to advising the ANA brigade staff on developing its own systems and means for solving problems. The product is organized into three slides: Operations/Intelligence, Personnel/ Logistics, and Internal Team Issues.

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PURPOSE: Provide a running estimate of HN operational statistics and logistical status for action at HN BDE level, in addition to CUAT preparation; Capture team internal requirements(admin, logistics, security) for action at BDE advisor level.

DURATION: 1 hour

LOCATION: PRI – Adobe breeze; ALT – Conference Call

CHAIR: WIDOWMAKER 6

ATTENDEES: Advisor team (XO, 1SG, S1, S2, S4, S6, ENG, MEDO, FIRES, CHOPS) HN Advisor TM

INPUTS:
- HN Unit Information Slides

OUTPUTS:
- Targets for action through the HN BDE CDR
- Targets for action through the HN ADV TM
- CUAT Running estimate

AGENDA:
- Commander Opening Comments
- ADV TM 1
- ADV TM 2
- ADV TM 3
- ADV TM 4
- ADV TM 5
- ADV TM 6
- ADV TM 7
- ADV TM 8
- Questions
- Commander's Closing Comments

Figure 3-6. Example of information provided by *Kandak* advisors to brigade advisors.

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OPERATIONS/INTELLIGENCE

WEEK OF 25 JUN-2 JUL

UNIT (Toli)	Patrols Conducted	Combined Patrols	HN only Patrols	HN led Patrols
1st Toli				
2nd Toli				
3rd Toli				
4th Toli				
Wpns Toli				
HHC Toli				

UNIT	NAMED OP	OP LEVEL	HN LED	HN UNIT SIZE
1/4/203rd IN KNK)				

Opportunities:
HN staff sections have been reliant upon coalition forces for operations planning. Although the HN S3 is familiar with MDMP process, he has not had the opportunity to demonstrate it. HN S3 is interested in planning a ground resupply mission to location xxx. MAT Advisor and HN S3 have begun discussion on a HN led ground resupply to location xxx. Conditions will be set once US forces and HN forces can coordinate the HN led mission.

Intelligence sharing revealed an INS basic training camp near XXX Village, XXX District. It was recommended to HN S2 to speak to LTC XXX to push for a patrol out of COP XXX IOT deny the enemy the territory. This is an attempt to begin intelligence-driven operations.

Initiatives:
MAT advisor and HN S3 are working to create a more accurate patrol tracker. In addition to the tracker, MAT advisor and HN S3 have begun train the trainer courses for HN soldiers to develop sustainable skills for an HN led MTT. HN S3 will also be developing a tracking system for each COP/FOB to forecast resupply mission.

Instruction on military symbols and map overlays has begun this week. This initiative's overarching goal is to set the foundation for the HN S2 to begin SIGACT tracking.

Issues:
HN S3 is still the acting S1 and is often times forced to split his efforts. Although he is fully capable in both, he is not able to fully invest in either staff position. HN S3 will continue to be hindered by the multiple jobs he currently holds. Also there is no XO to maintain the staff and battle rhythm.

Currently, the HN S2 is the only S2 staff member in the shop. His two NCOs are on leave. Will recommend a better rotation schedule IOT have efficient manning of the S2 shop.

Figure 3-7. Operations/intelligence information provided during update meeting.



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LOGISTICS / PERSONNEL

	OFFICER			NCO			SOLDIER		
UNIT	AUTH	ASSGN	%	AUTH	ASSGN	%	AUTH	ASSGN	%
1st Toli									
2nd Toli									
3rd Toli									
4th Toli									
WPNs									
HHC Toli									
TOTAL:									

KEY EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

EQUIP	AUTH	ASSGN	%
Base Station (RT 7000)			
Printers			
82mm mortar			
M240B Machine Gun			
Humvee Repair Parts			

Opportunities:

HN forces claim to be black on Class 1 but record show 10 day supply on site. US Soldiers working together with HN to conduct a third aerial resupply of COP XXX. HN S4 has begun using the HN AMR paperwork to receive HN air assets.

The HN currently have infantrymen filling Medic and Mechanic roles. HN UNIT can increase its combat power requesting more MOS qualified Soldiers.

Initiatives:

HN S4 and MAT Advisor are improving MOD-14 tracking systems and requesting replacements for broken equipment.

MAT has collected MOS details from the S1 and the local Commanders. For the shortages in MOS qualified soldiers, MAT has held train the trainer classes for the HN to become familiar with the basics of their role. Classes covered so far are Medical Training and Map Training. Drivers training will begin this week.

Issues:

COP XXX is not HN sustainable and breeds bad habits for US / HN relationship. HN are relying on the US for life support.

Currently HN UNIT does not have an officer dedicated to the S1 position. S1 has not focused on fixing the PERSTAT. The HN UNIT is short in MOS qualified soldiers, manning is over 100% because of soldiers who have been AWOL.

Need replacement XO and S1.

Figure 3-8. Logistics and personnel information to support situational awareness.

Figures 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8 depict an example of the information provided by the *Kandak* advisors to the brigade advisors during the Kandak Update Meeting. In addition to operational and logistical raw data requirements to support situational awareness, the focal point of the conversation revolves around three areas: opportunities, initiatives, and issues that are further defined in the following bullets:

- **Opportunities.** Defined as an event, either positive or negative, that opens the possibility for a teaching point—especially one that generates interaction between the brigade and *Kandak* levels. The opportunity may require resources or action from a higher-level staff officer or commander to ensure that the current behavior is either encouraged or discouraged as required.

- **Initiatives.** Defined as an ongoing event or series of events. Often these are derived from positive opportunities recommended in the past that have gained traction within the unit. The initiative may require additional resources, emphasize ways to improve, or could serve as an example for other advisors to model as a way forward in their organizations.

- **Issues.** Defined as generally negative events or conditions that are hindering progress. These may include areas concerning motivation or a lack of will, but may also include classes of supply that are hindering the ANA's ability to perform as required.

The end-state of this meeting is a synchronized effort vertically between the brigade and *Kandak* advisors, as well as laterally, between the *Kandak* teams to create an impetus towards total unit improvement rather than a scattershot effort that cannot advance for lack of focus. Additionally, the meeting allows the advisors to focus on capabilities development vice merely teaching sub-tasks because the magnitude of the effort demands a progression of systems by default. While *Kandak* advisors must develop internal systems within their units, the real ownership of system overhaul is at the brigade advisor level who must take the trends developed from this meeting and find a means to assist their advised ANA counterpart toward not only addressing immediate issues, but also a method for servicing all future issues. This meeting ensures those efforts generate effective and enduring outcomes.

Working Groups by Targeted Task (Step 2)

This portion of the methodology is simply the interaction of the brigade advisor counterpart with his ANA counterpart, the *Kandak* advisor related to his function, and the corps-level advisors as required. Each element should devise a method of meetings or interactions that allows for discussion more refined to the details of the pertinent staff function. While passing information requirements is necessary and unavoidable, advisors at each level should utilize this time to find coaching methods and solutions that will produce the desired effect. If the advice given at each level of command is synchronized, interrelated, and consistent, the credibility of the advisor is elevated in ANA opinion, which will lead to far more productive advisory efforts in the future.

Brigade Targeting Meeting (Step 3)

As discussed previously, the brigade targeting meeting serves as a means to synchronize the *Kandak* requirements with the brigade advisor effort to form enduring systems at the ANA brigade level of command. The framework of the meeting is similar to the *Kandak*-level slides in that each advisor discusses opportunities, initiatives, and issues. It differs in that each advisor also addresses development of capabilities as well as recommending tasks associated with each development. The final output of the meeting is a prioritized list of brigade advising efforts that connects the brigade commander to the process.



Figure 3-9. Advisory team meeting agenda.

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FIRES – D30 VALIDATION

OPPORTUNITIES/INITIATIVES:

1. Commander buy in to training plan, certification, and future employment to support US BDE.
2. BSO Support with personnel and equipment. They are understanding the HN systems to make an easier transition.
3. 2 FSO's have been identified to remain at Camp XXX to teach upcoming FO class.
4. BDE FSO looking into contracted FA maintenance to give training to select soldiers.

ISSUES:

1. Location XXX Basic life support NMC.
2. BDE CDR decision for FA to stay at XXX or move to XXX
3. Personnel shortage – 20+ soldiers need to attend training.
4. Equipment shortage;
   a. MOD-14 Submitted XX July 20XX. Advising HN to track down equipment.
   b. BSO supplying shortage equipment for validation training only.

DOTMLPF REQUIREMENTS:

DOCTRINE: All Manuals o/h. Printed out TFT's, FA classes printed and given to FA leadership for future use.
ORGANIZATION: 4 complete gun sections, 3 partial, FDC-3 BTRY Officers/ 4 soldiers, 3 Survey Soldiers.
TRAINING: Conduct validation training and testing. Focus repetition training on all fire missions / mission processing / CFF/ planning. Focused on Train the Trainer
MATERIAL: Binoculars, Compasses. 4 howitzers and prime movers
LEADERSHIP: Leadership is being trained with firing battery. Validation training will involve offense and defense planning and control of the battery ISO maneuver Operations.
PERSONNEL: Short 1 howitzer section (8 Personnel), 13 of 52 FO's present.
FACILITIES: Housing complete. No power. Location XXX needs BDE attention in order for FA to move in.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS / TASKS:

1. Follow up on equipment shortages with HN BDE FSO and BTRY CDR.
2. Conduct weekly AAR with advisors on Thursday 1100.

Figure 3-10. Example of products generated by brigade advisors.



Figure 3-11. Certification-validation training information provided by brigade advisors.

Figures 3-10 and 3-11 depict examples of the products generated by each of the brigade advisor components. In addition to the opportunities, initiatives, and issues, the advisor is also providing information on the status of its effort as it pertains to capabilities development captured in the standard Army literature of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). In all cases, the brigade advisor is focused on "train the trainer" or other means for getting the ANA to adopt systems that further its ability to self-sustain. The method for execution is captured as a "baseball card," where the advisor depicts his plan for the targeted advisor effort. Once all advisors have provided an update to their portion of the briefing, the team conducts a review of the current target tasks (see Figure 3-12).

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TARGET LIST

PRI	SEC	TARGET	ACTIONS REQUIRED	TREND
1	CHOP	Build Afghan –developed TOC SOP with the Afghan staff and TOC Soldiers	Need duties and responsibilities from G3. Working TOC BTL DRILL Flow Charts	⇔
2	FSO	Validate/certify D-30 platoon and supporting FA Soldiers	Develop 2 month training/ testing plan for guns, FDC, and FO's. Sketch Guns Firing point to coordinate with ANA engineers to modify Pitch plan to FA LTC for support and coordination Get personnel Decision (24 COP XXXXX), Coordinate with BSO FSO for training equipment	⇔
3	S1	Execute ANA Brigade PAI – Target DFR Soldiers and develop a standard packet for use at Kandak level	Need to verify AWOLs and develop plan to conduct PAI's at KDK level outside of FOB XXXXXX	⇑
4	S2	Develop Intel 101 class for ANA BDE G2 to teach to Kandak S2 Soldiers and AUP to foster intel sharing	Get buy-in from G2. Sit down with him and have him decide which training would serve him and his shop the best.	⇔
5	S6	Establish an ANA O&I Net	The ANA architecture must be identified and identify the appropriate nets. Retrans plan can be accomplished following the maintenance executiion	⇑
6	SCO	Establish ANA Brigade Commander's Intent/LOEs and CCIR requirements		
7	S4	Execute ASL/PLL inventory and demand tracking with 5/4/203	ASL/PLL review is happening throughout the Brigade.	⇑
8	S4	Develop Logistics 101 class with ANA Brigade G4 to teach to Kandak S4 Soldiers – Supply Shura	Brigade G4 needs to issue cipher to Kandaks. Class is held every three months.	⇔

⇑	Action is trending positive; No issues or minor issues that do not require major course correction or significant DOTMLPF
⇓	Action is trending negative; Increasing issues concerning DOTMLPF and/or ANA motivation/cooperation
⇔	Action is stalled pending the outcome of decisions/actions and/or reception of DOTMLPF requirements
⊘	Action is completely stalled; DOTMLPF requirements rejected/cost prohibitive; Recommend remove
★	Action is complete; Requires limited to no additional oversight; No additional decisions required; Recommend remove

Figure 3-12. Sample target list.

As a team, advisors determine the current status of the task in terms of how that task is progressing. A key depicted on the bottom of each slide outlines the definition of each trend allowing everyone to see if a targeted task is progressing, regressing, stalled, stopped, or completed. The actions required addresses the next set of tasks that must be completed in order to enable the action to further progress. Finally, a review of the priority of tasks is discussed based on operational requirements, outside influences, and the desires of the brigade commander.

The target list serves as the apex of the advisor process effort for the targeting cycle and performs a number of requisite functions, to include the following:

- First, it allows all concerned parties to quickly visualize and understand the priorities and focus of the advisor team.
- Second, it is both a rudimentary running estimate and historical documentation of the advisor team's actions for the duration of the mission. Provided to advisor teams replacements upon arrival, the document coupled with past target meeting slides, enabled the inbound team to pick up in stride the work of the outbound advisor and avoid covering completed or discontinued topics.
- Third, it focuses the efforts of the advisors laterally and vertically as each advisor is aware of what the other advisor is doing and can provide complimentary effects from their positions.
- Fourth, and most importantly, it is a simple running estimate for the ANA brigade commander that gives him the ability to give input and thus have buy-in to the advisor efforts. The ANA brigade commander becomes an active component of improving his own unit because he now has an understanding of where the issues lie within his own organization and a recommended course of action for addressing them.

ANA Brigade Commander Approval (Step 4)

As already discussed, the approval process is conducted by the ANA brigade commander advisor and his counterpart, the brigade commander.

Utilizing a translated version of the target list document, the advisor reviews the current targets, associated tasks, and status of each target with the brigade commander. The brigade commander determines if the tasks are aligned with his current priorities and adjusts the list as required to ensure advisors are focusing on the areas he deems important. Often the brigade commander will add additional areas of emphasis where he would like assistance in improving either the capabilities of the brigade as a whole or the individual *Kandaks*. Once validated for priority, the advisor reviews the status of how the target is progressing. If it is an issue of motivation or another aspect derived from the ANA level, the commander can address that specific aspect to ensure the effort remains on track. Likewise, the commander may determine that a specific target is no longer required or desired and may decide to remove it altogether. No matter what decision the brigade commander makes, the end result is all the same in concept—he owns the responsibility for improving his organization instead of abdicating to the advisor team.

Tasking Order to Kandak Advisor Teams

The final portion of the process merely captures the tasks identified over the week while executing the previous four steps and consolidates into a single document. The major point to consider is that this order should be a separate document from the BSO or other operationally generated orders as it is meant to specifically coordinate the process internal to the advisor teams.

Due to potential confusion from command relationships, it is imperative that all concerned parties, from the advisors to the BSO, understand the point of this document versus a BSO fragmentary or operation order.

Summary

As the United States continues to recede from the forefront of executing combat operations into a support and training role for the ANA, those tasked with direct advisory roles must have an empathetic viewpoint derived from an understanding of the historical context. A gradual transition of responsibility has been replaced with a more rapid shift to increasing ANA autonomy for the operational lead. In many cases, the ANA is not prepared for the rigors of conducting the staff functions necessary for sustained combat operations. While all the challenges of a third-world population contribute to this current state, future advisors must also realize that due to the demands of fighting a motivated enemy, U.S. commanders were led to consciously put counterinsurgency operations in primacy over ANA development; the already weak ANA systems were allowed to further atrophy.

Over the years, as the relationship between U.S. and Afghan forces evolved into a partnered role, U.S. commanders increasingly covered the logistical requirements and operational planning steps to ensure their ANA units could remain in the fight. With the advent of force ratio requirements for daily combat operations, the provision of these goods and services became an unspoken mandate, as the U.S. units could not conduct operations without the ANA and the ANA still did not have the ability to fend for themselves. The result was an ANA organization that felt it was playing a valid role in the partnership as it provided combat power in exchange for logistical support and compliance with U.S. commander planning.

Upon notification that the ANA would take lead in combat operations at a more rapid pace, many of its organizations were found lacking in competence, experience, and systems because they had become so reliant on their partnered U.S. unit bailing them out. Compounding the problem was the ANA perception that it was doing exactly what was expected by following the lead of its U.S. counterpart, thus requiring not only a total rebuild of ANA staff systems, but also a reconfiguration of how it conceived its staff and leadership's role toward its combat units.

As a an advisor to the ANA during this new phase of the conflict, it is imperative to focus on building ANA confidence and enduring capabilities that enables it to become self-sufficient in the realm of logistical forecasting and operational planning. The ANA has become very good at the tactical level of combat through years of mimicking its U.S. counterparts, but now require a significant bolster in its ability to sustain the operations of those tactical units. Achieving this improvement requires a synchronized approach between the brigade- and *Kandak*-level advisors to achieve a reunification of an ANA command compartmentalized by U.S. operations. This process requires bottom-up refinement from the *Kandak*-level advisors, a series of working groups throughout the week focused on specific issues, and a brigade targeting meeting that results in a capabilities focus that manifests itself into a prioritized list of targets that is reviewed and approved by the ANA brigade commander. Once complete, a tasking order that synchronizes the tasks associated with the priorities is issued to ensure all advisors are working towards a common goal.

Chapter 4

The Afghan Uniformed Police Developmental Campaign Plan: Development and Application of the "AUP Big 6"

by LTC Sean C. Williams and MAJ Jesse T. Curry

> "Vision without execution is hallucination"
>
> —Thomas Edison

In December 2011, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) received notification to deploy in May 2012 as security force assistance and advisor teams for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police in Regional Command-East. At the time of notification, the brigade was well into a deliberate training path preparing the unit to deploy in mid-2014 as a traditional battlespace-owning brigade. In a condensed time period, each battalion in the brigade-manned teams with the majority of their senior leaders (including all battalion commanders, nearly all company commanders, and many of the units' field grade officers, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants), completed a hasty train-up. Among others, the 2nd Brigade, Special Troops Battalion, provided an advisor team to focus on the Kunar Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) provincial headquarters and their subordinate police elements. Team RAPTOR, comprised of 12 key leaders from the battalion including the commander, command sergeant major, the military intelligence company commander, and the headquarters company first sergeant, essentially served as an injection of adrenaline to an already established advisor effort that had been largely under-manned and under-resourced, yet still capable under the previous prioritization of effort.

The following article will discuss the two dominant priorities during the deployment—the development of an AUP Developmental Campaign Plan and the integration of Afghan Local Police (ALP) into the AUP provincial and district structures. The article will also provide lessons learned from the application and continued refinement of the campaign plan—especially how the Afghans played a vital role in influencing the measures of performance and realistic goals.

Initial Preparation and Development of the Campaign Plan

During the three month train-up of advisor teams, the leadership across the brigade recognized the need for a framework to map out the plan to initially evaluate the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and establish target goals and end states. This effort began during the Security Force Advisor Academy at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. What resulted were "lines of effort" (LOEs) for the ANSF Developmental Campaign Plan. From there, Team RAPTOR mistakenly drafted the AUP Developmental Campaign Plan, based almost entirely off the LOEs for all ANSF with one exception. The initial AUP plan added legitimacy as a critical LOE to enable the police force to protect, prevent, and preserve safety for the Afghan public. This initial AUP Developmental Campaign Plan attempted to provide measurable milestones to assist advisors with evaluating the capabilities of each AUP district and the provincial AUP structure as a whole while also aligning advisor efforts with the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) standard ratings. The five LOEs were AUP Mission Command, Legitimacy, Integration, Sustainment, and Leadership and Influence. The overall goal was an AUP force that was synchronized across the province, legitimate in the eyes of other ANSF and the people, integrated with other ANSF and Government of Afghanistan efforts, and sustainable. The product was a valid start, but it quickly proved to be overly complicated, and in many cases, it failed to translate during application over *chai* tea and almonds with Afghan counterparts.

Once on the ground, team leaders quickly began aligning the goals of the AUP leaders and staff with the predeveloped LOEs in the AUP Developmental Campaign Plan. Advisors readily discerned that the plan needed changes in order to achieve Afghan buy-in. One key change was the shift of legitimacy as a stand-alone LOE to something that was woven throughout all LOEs. The debilitating effects of corruption, and sometimes just the perception of corruption, were more pervasive than expected and could potentially hamstring progress along any or all of the LOEs, just as they had throughout Afghanistan's recent history. With apparent agreement and encouragement by the Afghans, advisors chose to further emphasize legitimacy as a critical part of all LOEs within the framework.



Figure 4-1. Afghan Uniformed Police Developmental Campaign Plan.

Advisors at all levels across the region continued to refine the AUP Developmental Campaign Plan as advisors gained a better understanding of the actual operating framework for the police. Communication with the Afghans and incorporation of their input for priorities and realistic application was absolutely critical for the initial success of the plan. The provincial chief of police and several of his subordinate leaders provided direct input and changes to eliminate unnecessary milestones and unrealistic goals or end states. The final product, "AUP Big 6," organized key tasks at the district and provincial levels into the following six LOEs:

- Community policing.
- Support to investigations.

- Fixed site security.
- Tactical police operations.
- Sustainment and accountability.
- Command and control (C2).

The tasks within the LOEs were much simpler and included practical areas for evaluation with tangible events understandable by both advisor and Afghan police counterparts. It became easy to develop clear paths to achieve the goals. The tasks within the LOEs included the following:

- Conduct a community engagement (under community policing).
- Secure a crime scene (support to investigations).
- Supervise a checkpoint (fixed site security).
- React to contact (tactical police operations).
- Distribute and account for property and supplies (sustainment and accountability).
- Remove negative influencers (C2).

The desired end state for all LOEs was an AUP headquarters capable of the following:

- Maintaining order and protecting local districts and villages from violence.
- Supporting local system of justice.
- Coordinating operations with ANSF.
- Sustaining operations.
- Police who enjoy the trust and confidence of local population.

The refined product translated well and made functional sense—the Afghans could present this as their own plan for progress.

Continued Development and Application

Once the basic framework was established and fully vetted with the Afghans, advisors focused on assisting their counterparts to plan for ways to achieve the milestone tasks and progress towards the end state. The campaign plan enabled advisors to develop individual tools and products to focus each staff section or subordinate police headquarters toward the same short- and long-term goals. It also assisted synchronization between advisors at various levels, including across various elements of ANSF in a given district or province. One such product was an AUP 30/60/90-day milestone matrix. This matrix was truly where "the rubber met the road" in the advisor and counterpart relationship because it was the direct result of the senior Afghan provincial leaders' guided analysis of their own needs and priorities. In most cases, advisors made recommendations for potential targets, but only locked in those goals that the Afghans agreed were realistic, applicable, and achievable. Advisors often needed to encourage the Afghans to push beyond their level of comfort in order to achieve measureable progress. Even still, it often required tangible progress or small successes before the Afghans were willing to adopt the practice as a standard. The most productive advisors simply observed while offering praise and encouragement to their Afghan counterparts, knowing full well that they planted the original seed and paved the path to success.

Challenges

The development and application of the "AUP Big 6" certainly was not without its challenges. In the initial stages, the biggest challenge was simply understanding the operational environment and the specific characteristics of the leaders in place for the AUP. As with any organization,

there were overachievers, those who would perform under close direction or supervision, and those who hindered progress. Due to the wide spectrum of professionalism, capability, corruption, and work ethic among the AUP, advisors employed a number of tactics to manipulate or influence progress with the hopes that the benefits and praise after completion would convince them to fully buy-in to the plan. Though most counterparts clearly recognized the need for specific improvements, even many overachievers had become accustomed to slow progress or failure following decades of corruption, broken organizational processes, and lack of support from leadership throughout the organizational hierarchy. This created a challenge for advisors—how to convince them that failed paths of the past would somehow now produce lasting success or progress? Once again, the key to success proved to be showcasing and repeating small achievements and orchestrating accomplishments that resulted in public recognition from the provincial chief of police or other senior leaders. Small victories slowly and eventually built confidence among the AUP. While not every story was a success, the technique proved to be one of the few ways to create forward momentum and foster progress.

Although Afghan buy-in to the "Big 6" and spin-off plans was nominally achieved, advisors found that accelerating the pace of progress to meet U.S. expectations was also a significant challenge. Naturally, the AUP had a much broader perspective and outlook over time. Accordingly, success to them was measured in months and years, while advisors hoped to achieve daily and weekly progress. This was not a surprise, but it still contributed to frequent frustration. Some progress was achieved by successfully influencing the chain of command to add pressure and emphasis, but this technique could not be overused. Despite a solid and agreed upon path towards progress, this was a challenge that advisors usually could not affect. Once again, tangible accomplishments and interim milestone achievements were critical to demonstrate that success was possible and that it often provided direct benefit to the AUP themselves and the Afghan people.

Integration of Afghan Local Police

The formation of the ALP is arguably the most successful initiative in the fight for local security in many of the most isolated, contested regions of Afghanistan. "… it is essential to understand that everything of importance in Afghanistan happens in the village, not in Kabul, or even at the Provincial headquarters. Historically, Afghanistan has always been driven from the village up… ."[77] In very general terms, teams of U.S. special operations personnel, often augmented by other rotational International Security Assitance Forces/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan units or personnel, deploy into priority regions or districts and embed themselves into a village site selected in coordination with the Afghan government. Building the ALP force, typically around 300 per district, begins with the nomination of recruits by village elders. Recruits are vetted by U.S. and Afghan systems, and those approved for training enter a training course to teach them basic combat skills and Afghan core classes including rule of law, human rights, and police policies. During this time, the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) team facilitates or directly provides nearly all C2, coordination with adjacent units, equipment, weapons and ammunition, pay, and sustainment.

Following a period of combined activities with the embedded Special Operations Forces' (SOF) teams and other ANSF to improve local security, the ALP are transitioned from SOF control and sustainment to the control and support of the Memorandum of Instruction under the district chief of police (DCoP). When Team RAPTOR deployed into Kunar Province, SOF teams were preparing to transition the first ALP villages and districts over to DCoP control, in order to free the SOF teams to relocate and build more ALP.[78]

To understand the problem and pending issues, one must first comprehend the scope of what was happening. In Kunar, an average district AUP force and headquarters were 80 police; had very

little formal training; did not receive regular supplies, fuel, or pay; and were often led by corrupt or incapable DCoPs. On the other hand, three of four districts pending ALP transition had nearly 300 ALP (450 in the fourth district); were well-trained by SOF, received regular shipments of current and operational equipment, fuel, and ammunition; were paid in cash reliably every month; and had aggressive, hand-picked leaders that were accountable to their elders. In contrast, four U.S. light infantry companies (-) (the AUP district headquarters) with limited resources or sustainment for themselves were about to absorb and assume command, control, and sustainment responsibility for four elite light infantry battalions (the ALP forces).

Over the course of several months, the SOF teams transitioned into "tactical overwatch" of the ALP forces, and the district AUP headquarters painfully assumed responsibility for the ALP within the districts. While under tactical overwatch, the SOF units gradually weaned themselves away from daily contact and support of the ALP and forced them to rely on the district AUP. At the same time, Team RAPTOR and subordinate district AUP advisor teams recognized the challenges facing the DCoPs and their small, inadequate headquarters. A complementary effort was required to enable a successful transition and integration with the AUP. Team RAPTOR prioritized efforts to increase the district headquarters (DHQ) leadership, administrative, and sustainment capabilities with a focus on successful integration of the ALP. The work to build the ALP was at serious risk without a successful transition, as was the improved security at the local level.

The complementary effort by Team RAPTOR with the AUP was directly linked to the developmental campaign. The ALP were a direct inject of local support and combat power. Coupled with AUP progress along the Big 6 LOEs, small victories were more achievable, and the results quickly compounded. In many cases, the ALP helped to establish "white space" to enable AUP development. In turn, improvements by the AUP encouraged closer integration and better working relationships with the ALP. All brought improved security and facilitated the ANA to consolidate back to operating bases for training with combat capable formations.

The most exemplary effects took hold in a small, mountainous corner of southwestern Kunar—Tsowkey district. AUP and ALP began working together under a relatively strong and committed DCoP. The ANA, a combat support *Kandak* that was functioning as a battlespace owner, demonstrated its willingness and capability to provide quick reaction forces and fire support to the AUP/ALP in contact. With the AUP and ALP taking the lead for security in the area, the ANA soon began the transition into an enabler for the rest of the brigade by providing indirect fires and engineer support throughout the area of operations, instead of manning local checkpoints. The ANA essentially began to relinquish security responsibility to the AUP and ALP. In turn, influential local leaders and elders began to fully back the ANSF and demand the same from neighboring villages and tribes, often citing "you're with us, or you're against us." Real change and progress were visible, and was showing signs of compounding success.

There was reluctance on the part of some AUP to the integration and sustainment of the ALP. In some areas, the ALP threatened established means of corruption, or represented a change to the balance of power—a threat to brokered peace between insurgent groups and the AUP. But to most, the ALP represented positive change and improvement, including to the provincial chief of police and provincial governor. With their acceptance and endorsement came appropriate emphasis, oversight, and action. As the Afghan government continued to approve more ALP for Kunar province and SOF teams began to build more ALP in Kunar, the provincial chief of police began "demanding" integration with his DHQ and DCoPs from their inception. Having already faced the challenge of integrating a complete ALP force under an incapable DHQ, the PCoP prioritized improvements and attention to the new districts now pending ALP growth. As the ALP began to grow, U.S. SOF and advisor teams leveraged the new interest and support from the

DHQ and began the process of integrating forces. Simultaneously building capability in both the ALP and AUP over time was clearly a better solution. The ALP gained the ability to function as a basic police force, while the AUP DHQ slowly gained the confidence and ability to command, control, and sustain the growing force.

Conclusion

Once finalized with the Afghans, the AUP Developmental Campaign Plan or "AUP Big 6" provided advisor teams and Afghans a foundational synchronization tool and road map to achievable success. Its creation, adaptation, and application were a deliberate process that ultimately hinged on feedback and buy-in from the Afghan police. The plan anchored advisors at multiple levels to a common set of evaluation criteria, milestones, and end state. It focused reporting, streamlined feedback, and enabled U.S. higher headquarters to understand, synchronize, and approve advisor efforts. Without such a tool, the advisor teams may have remained rudderless while struggling to synchronize fires along the LOEs leading to success.

Team RAPTOR learned two critical lessons throughout this process—be flexible and focus all efforts to achieve the Afghan plan vice the advisors' plan. Simpler was almost always better and success from an Afghan-developed plan was significantly more valuable because they understand it. The process enabled apparent success in Kunar province with indications that the Afghans will continue to use it to drive progress in the AUP for years to come.

There are a number of key take-aways from this process that could prove useful for future advisor teams. Teams facing a similar challenge may gain success by considering the following:

- Establish the initial plan, nested in higher-level guidance and in accordance with approved goals and end states. (Output: Initial Developmental Campaign Plan)
- Communicate the initial product left, right, up, and down in order to ensure that advisors have a common understanding of all facets, and are prepared to communicate the intent behind end state goals to counterparts.
- Take a hands-on and aggressive approach to learn the operational environment and all personalities involved. At the first possible opportunity, translate and share the initial plan with counterparts, focusing on the end state.
- Teach, coach and mentor counterparts as they provide input to the plan and ultimately make it their own. (Output: Updated Developmental Campaign Plan)
- Communicate the updated product left, right, up, and down and ensure advisors are reinforcing LOEs and end states with counterparts.
- Advise counterparts to expand the supporting tasks down to individual staff sections and truly take ownership. Tie those short-term milestones to dates on a calendar as a way to drive progress. (Output: Initial 30/60/90-Day Matrix)
- Emphasize short-term, achievable milestones that showcase successes and give counterparts exposure to professional gains associated with common LOEs.
- Communicate, adjust, communicate, adjust. Continue to find creative ways to motivate and create self-sustained momentum toward the end state goals.

Endnotes:

77. Don Rector, "*Afghan Local Police-An Afghan Solution to an Afghan Problem."* Accessed at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/2012%2001%20VSO-ALP%20Recter.pdf.

78. Robert Hulslander and Jake Spivey, "*Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police*," Prism 3, No. 3. Accessed at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/prism3-3/prism125-138_hulslander-spivey.pdf.

Chapter 5

Combat Sustainment Advising—the Decisive Effort: Essential Elements to Achieve Success

by LTC Sean P. Davis, MAJ William Slocum, MAJ Mark Cheatham, and CPT Jon King

Never before in the history of modern warfare was there a maneuver commander who stated that the decisive effort in this operation is logistics.[79] But that is how LTG Daniel Bolger, the Commanding General of International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, described what we logisticians in the 2nd Brigade Team STRIKE, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), were about to embark upon.[80]

LTG Bolger was not describing the massive retrograde operation that only recently began in force during this time. He was describing the sustainment advisor mission. This article will describe how we developed the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to become self-reliant and ultimately relieve coalition forces of security requirements in the region known as the North of Kabul (NoK).[81]

The essential elements of our success were divided into how we organized ourselves, how we simplified our priorities, and how we executed our advising rules of engagement. The relevance of this article is that it applies directly to aiding logisticians in building, training, and employing sustainment advisors within future Security Force Assistance (SFA) brigades.

First Element

The first essential element is in how we organize ourselves. Our method was using the technique our brigade commander called the situation template (SITTEMP). Our SITTEMP was a tool that provided an ongoing calibration to the way we interacted in our advisor world. Our advisor world was divided into three categories: higher-level advisors, adjacent units, and Team STRIKE internal. The 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, deployed more than 500 of its senior leaders as advisors, making up 37 combat advisor teams covering down on Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), and Afghan Border Police from the battalion to the corps/zone (or regional) levels. The logistical advisors made up nearly 20 percent of this formation and were very different from our predecessors.



Figure 5-1. How we organized into a mutually supporting advisor (operational command) net.

Previous advisor teams were individually formed ad hoc from very junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) without mission readiness training or pre-existing unit cohesion. What was different about our teams in NoK is that we were all Team STRIKE officers and NCOs. The Army placed a highly cohesive network of officers and senior NCOs overlaying the entire Afghan Security Apparatus in the NoK region.

Our logistical platoon leaders were log-advisors in the *Kandak* (battalion)-level teams. Three of the Combat Service Support Kandak (CSSK) teams were resourced from the brigade support battalion (BSB). Due to the importance of the sustainment-advising mission, these CSSK teams were the only *Kandak*-level teams led by a field grade officer within Team STRIKE. The brigade-level teams all had logistical advisors that were standing forward support company commanders. Finally, the ANA corps had the BSB commander and nine members of the support operations and BSB staff. This SITTEMP is depicted in Figure 5-1 and defines our communications network.

The Commanding General of Regional Command-East (RC-E), MG William Mayville, Jr., described our organization similar to that of an operational command net at a combat training center.[82] Just like the "Gold Miner Net" at the National Training Center, this SITTEMP had another key and uncommon characteristic. It included actively developing linkages to the higher national-level advisors within the regional support commands (RSC). At this time these

RSCs fell under the 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command headquarters and the Deputy Commander for Support Operations, BG Clark LeMasters. This SITTEMP shows how the sustainment advisors were now working together at the tactical, operational, and national levels in a unity of effort to develop Afghan self-reliance.

The relevance of this SITTEMP applies directly to the organization of the future SFA brigades. Regardless of the organization, what is essential to the advisor is his knowledge of reality at all levels and his communications with his fellow advisors. This vertical integration of sustainment advisors facilitated communications flow that is advisory combat power. It enabled us to show never-before-seen visibility of tactical-level problems to national-level advisors. More importantly, it would prove essential in dismissing some of the myths about the national-level deficiencies circulating through tactical-level ANSF.

Second Element

The second essential element was in simplifying our priorities and measures of effectiveness and performance. As directed by MG Mayville, our priorities in advising fell into the "big 5"—the development of Afghan intelligence, fires, route clearance, garrison operations, and brigade-level logistics (which we based on the old mechanized infantry logistical model of I-III-V-M3: Class I [food], III [fuel], V [ammunition], and medical, maintenance, and move). These six subcomponents are the indispensable "block and tackle" of sustainment and were the areas we focused on to develop our Afghan counterparts.

Class I was based on the ANSF's ability to request, store, and prepare food safely. Class III was based on how the ANSF requested, stored, issued, delivered, and accounted for fuel safely. Class V was similar to Class III, except with ammunition. Medical was assessed on how the ANSF executed tactical trauma treatment and evacuated casualties to a higher level of care. Maintenance was in the ANSF's ability to maintain its "pacing" items at 70 percent and how it maintained spare parts. Finally, the "move" component was assessed on the ANSF's ability to deliver the right stuff, to the right place, at the right time.

We didn't focus on what the ANSF was short or missing, but rather what they could do with what they had. All of the previous models of ANSF assessment were huge, 80-plus-page books using input-based nebulous evaluation standards that were mirror-imaged from U.S. models. They were an ANSF version of the U.S. Army's Unit Status Report System. How many weapons systems did your ANA counterpart have on hand? How many school-trained medics were there? How well trained was the CSSKs? Does the ANA have a standing operating procedure for transportation?

Team STRIKE changed this dynamic by evaluating more performance output-based assessments that never exceeded a single page. Some of the questions that we used to evaluate our counterparts' performance and inform our advisory focus included the following: Were the ANSF conducting command maintenance using Ministry of Defense (MoD)/Ministry of Interior (MoI) Form 2404s? Were the ANSF conducting effective resupply operations? Were they evacuating and treating their own casualties? How were they maintaining the 20-plus bases we transferred to them?

When we used the I-III-V-M3 focus areas and simple performance-based assessments, it put a huge spotlight on the abysmal ANSF sustainment operation. In the "move" category, the ANA would smuggle supplies to their bases using privately-own vehicles or single vehicle movements. Many times ANA soldiers who were smuggling supplies were killed delivering light bulbs rather than the crucial commodities needed to execute combat operations. Medically, all the casualties the ANA received were evacuated through coalition trauma treatment centers. Maintenance was not executed at all due to the supposed lack of spare parts at the national and operational level.

Supply operations were even worse. The Class III (fuel) operations were siphoned from the national/operational level into the black market; the "gray market" was the method of tactical resupply. The gray market was a phrase used to describe the bartering of fuel for operations or how coalition forces would provide fuel (and other supplies) to their ANSF neighbors in exchange for the ANSF execution of combat operations. These describe only a few of the deficiencies. The situation was untenable, and for the most part, was a coalition-created problem.

What we observed was that the ANSF had grown completely reliant on coalition sustainment operations. Our logistics were their logistics. Additionally, we observed that the tactical-level ANSF commanders executed sophisticated messaging that was effective in coercing materiel from their coalition counterparts. Coalition forces freely supported the ANA due to the perceived lack of national-level sustainment capability as communicated by its ANSF counterparts. Coalition advisors wouldn't coach their counterparts at their level because of perceived national or operational failures. Ironically, none of these coalition forces or tactical-level advisors ever traveled to the operational or national-level ANSF supply depots.[83] Had they done this, they would have seen maintenance and supply depots at the regional-level support center filled with the very items that were supposedly not available.

These priorities and revised assessment techniques informed us what to do next. We had to stop the gray market and we had to help our counterparts connect the dots between ANSF sustainment from the national to tactical level. The battle space owner, the Mountain Warrior Brigade, immediately terminated all logistical support to ANSF. No more coalition aircraft flying commodities into Nuristan. No more fuel exchanged for patrolling. ANSF now had to evacuate casualties. This single and bold act made the sustainment advising mission relevant. Perhaps for the first time in Afghanistan, the advisor-Afghan relationship involved true mentorship and not commodity bartering and patronage. Our counterparts wanted to know how to do their jobs and we had, for the first time, an effective team of advisors to do it. We only needed an effective method to advise our Afghan counterparts.

Third Element

Enter our third essential element of success—getting our counterparts to execute sustainment operations. To do this we informally developed the rules of engagement for advising or executing the five "I's" (investigate, identify, inform, influence, and instigate). First, we would investigate and identify truth, then inform our counterparts of this truth. If our counterpart failed to take action on this knowledge, we would then influence them to take action. If this failed and catastrophic failure was expected, we would finally instigate action. The final "I," instigation, was very rarely used and only as a last resort. An example of this is when we had to get the ANA to organize ANSF Aerial Resupply Operations into Nuristan. Nuristan is a very nonpermissive environment controlled by the Taliban and is a mountain-locked province with no passable ground-supply routes. The more than 1,000 ANSF members operating in remote Nuristan bases were completely resupplied using coalition helicopters.

First, we had to investigate and identify the truth. Using our SITTEMP, we discovered through our higher-level MoD advisors that the MoD and MoI did have the ability to execute aerial resupplies into Nuristan. In fact, the Afghan Air Force had more than 20 MI-17 supply aircraft dedicated to North of Kabul and MoD had an air mission request (AMR) procedure completely unused by the 201st Corps. With that we informed the ANA of this system, but the ANA's capacity to execute this resupply mission was minimal because coalition forces had been doing it for the last two years. In essence, their logic was that it was easier for others to accomplish the mission.

Next, we instigated the ANA to take the lead of this aerial delivery operation after the commanding general of RC-E terminated all coalition aerial resupplies in support of ANSF. Only until this termination of coalition support did our counterparts begin to listen and learn. This was the game changer. Then they wanted us to teach them how to conduct air mission coordination meetings to synchronize aerial delivery between all ANSF and they were receptive to submitting joint AMRs to MoD. Only then did they conduct air mission briefs 24 hours before they began to load and deliver commodities to their desperate Afghan brothers in Nuristan.

Only then did they want us (their mentors) to conduct after action reviews (AARs) covering the first month of ANSF aerial resupply missions. These AARs were done in order to make ANSF more efficient and facilitate better joint corroboration between the police and the ANA. Six months later and after the ANSF conducted over 142 MI-17 lifts of crucial supplies, the ANSF were completely self-supporting this remote location. Coalition forces have not flown into Nuristan since October 2012.

Aerial delivery was one area in the "move" category that we applied the five "Is" of advising. As we applied them to the other areas, we mentored our counterparts to achieve self-reliance. The ANA was evacuating eight of every nine casualties on its own. The ANA was transporting its own fuel and building the capacity it needed to maintain pace with its operations. The ANA was executing combined arms resupplies up the contested Pech River valley with 40-plus vehicle convoys delivering multicommodities. The bases the ANA signed for, from U.S. forces, during our time as advisors were intact and in some cases better than we left them. What was most important, however, was that the communications between *Kandak*, brigade, corps, and MoD were reoccurring with greater frequency and within an ANSF battle rhythm. Our SITTEMP became their SITTEMP because it was based on their organization.

The main point here is that the most decisive effort in getting out of Afghanistan is not moving our equipment out of the country. In order to prevent our return, the decisive effort must be preparing the ANSF to take "battle handover." Therefore, ANSF sustainment advising requires our best effort. Our SITTEMP displays such a full measure of applying the best we have to only one mission and one region's security apparatus. More importantly, a single region's success is doomed to failure if we do not dedicate our precious time and leaders to such a fight.

The problem that SFA brigades will face is how to execute the most decisive mission, sustainment advising, simultaneous to the most resource-taxing effort of mission support and retrograde operations. Future BSB commanders of SFA brigades will have to become "two brainers" with half of their critical thinking applied to Title X sustainment and retrograde and the other half to developing ANSF sustainment. The BSB commanders know how to execute the Title X portion; we have spent a career learning how to do this. Using the SITTEMP, output-based performance assessment tools, and the proposed advising rules of engagement, BSB commanders also can develop their ANSF counterparts knowledge and will to take charge of their respective regions. But ultimately, they will have to divide their teams into what they think is most decisive. They will have to be just like we claim to be, multi-functional logisticians.

Endnotes:

79. This is arguably correct as with all historical references. For example: logistics was certainly decisive in the 1940 Persian Gulf Command charged with delivering "lend-lease" tanks and materiel to Russia.

80. LTG Bolger described the sustainment advising mission as the most important mission in achieving Afghan self-reliance and it is the long pole in the tent during a VTC in January 2012 prior to our pre-deployment site survey, which defined the importance of our mission.

81. North of Kabul makes up the provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, Nagahar, Laghman, and Kapisa, and includes the 201st ANA Corps, 202nd AUP Zone, and the Zone 1 of the Afghan Border Police. The 201st ANA Corps assumed complete control of this region's security operation for 4/4ID, 12 December 2012.

82. MG Mayville, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, provided guidance during the divisions culmination exercise in February of 2012 that we should operate like operational commands from combat training centers.

83. Team STRIKE was the first consolidated advisor team to conduct "reverse sustainment terrain walks" at the national- and operational-level depots with their Afghan counterparts to show them what was available to support their operation.

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COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
Additional Publications and Resources

The CAC home page address is:

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Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal/index.asp>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.usapa.army.mil> or the Reimer Digital Library <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx> (requires AKO password and ID).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)

CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid/index.asp>.

Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell (AIWFC)

AIWFC integrates and collaborates information exchange and analysis for irregular warfare (IW) activities in order to advocate DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) solutions addressing IW threats. AIWFC synchronizes and assists in the development of IW and countering irregular threats enterprises to support a coherent Army strategy that accounts for building partner capacity, stability operations, and the integration of unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. Find AIWFC at: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/AIWFC>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.

Center for Army Lessons Learned

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US Army Combined Arms Center

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