


# Asymmetric Warfare Group Analysis of Support to Regionally Aligned Forces in PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM

December 2015



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## PREFACE

The U.S. Army is currently implementing the regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept. It is a total-force undertaking in which RAF units must maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals but also possess a regional focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geographies, and militaries of the countries where they are likely to be employed. In addition, as part of their focus on training, RAF units must be able to impart military knowledge and skills to others.

In 2014, researchers from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) analyzed select U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) tactical mission summary (TMS) reports to discern how AWG supports the RAF concept. The RAF study

from 2014 was focused primarily on AWG reports from AFRICOM. The following study is focused on AWG observations gathered while conducting missions in PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM. The TMS reports were analyzed using a research methodology, further described in this paper, to categorize relevant observations. Observations from these three combatant commands (CCMDs) were categorized into major findings, minor findings, best practices, and lessons applicable to a RAF mission. Finally, an analysis of similar findings and shared themes from all three CCMDs is presented.

AWG sponsored and JHU/APL conducted this research and analysis.





## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Research Requirement

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) researchers analyzed thirty-two U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG)-provided tactical mission summary (TMS) reports to discern trends, patterns, and implications with respect to AWG's support of activities conducted by the U.S. Army that have implications for conducting a regionally aligned forces (RAF) or RAF-relevant mission. The term "RAF-relevant" denotes that the RAF concept is not necessarily in use in all the combatant commands (CCMDs) covered by this report. In some cases, another term is used to denote activities that are similar to a RAF mission. The key difference between this paper and the AWG RAF study from 2014 is that this study is designed to glean information from missions in PACOM, NORTHCOM, or SOUTHCOM that may not be specifically RAF missions but have implications if a unit was tasked with conducting a RAF mission in these CCMDs. The overall goal of this research was to gather information collected by AWG that addresses challenges and issues that a RAF unit would face when operating in these respective environments. In this paper, RAF activities are categorized into four phases. These four phases include planning, preparation, employment, and recovery operations.

The research that supports this paper had three specific goals:

1. From the analysis, provide major and minor findings related to AWG's support to units who are conducting missions that have implications concerning the RAF concept.
2. Analyze activities that were successful and effective, including best practices and lessons identified for the planning, preparation, employment, and recovery of RAF operations.
3. Determine common themes that appear across all three CCMDs.

### Procedure

A review of U.S. Army documents concerning RAF provided a foundation from which to analyze AWG TMS reports. Researchers reviewed U.S. Army Strategic Planning Guidance from 2014 and U.S. Army Field

Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, which provided fidelity on RAF and security force assistance (SFA) activities. The AWG Command Brief and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 10-5, Organization and Functions (27 December 2013), helped researchers delineate AWG major responsibilities so they could analyze TMS reports for operational advisor (OA) observations and activities that are applicable to the RAF concept. Finally, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Guidance on Common Training Standards for SFA (January 2014) was used to broadly thematically organize SFA activities and to develop a cross-referenced research methodology with which to conduct a qualitative analysis.

To comprehensively and qualitatively analyze the AWG TMS reports, the research team used a TMS report analysis matrix (TAM) to organize and categorize information by AWG mission and cross-reference it with the RAF requirements outlined by U.S. Army guidance. The team selected research factors based on a review of military planning processes and AWG mission requirements. The team then mapped these research factors to the matrix so they could analyze AWG OA activities related to the RAF concept and derive RAF-applicable information from the TMS reports. The research included four factors:

1. Operational planning construct—plan, prepare, execute (employ), and assess (recover)
2. AWG key tasks (four)
3. Common training standards for SFA
4. Mission analysis operational variables [political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT)]

### Findings

The research team derived forty-nine major findings and one hundred and thirteen minor findings from the AWG reports. Additionally, one hundred and seventy-eight best practices and five lessons learned resulted from the analysis. Commonalities discovered by the analysis are graphically depicted in this report for easy reference.

This document includes two distinct products:

1. A research report for each CCMD identifying:
  - a. Major and minor findings
  - b. Best practices
  - c. Lessons identified
2. Common themes and trends from the PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility (AORs).

Major findings highlight areas that OAs identified and researchers classified as critical to RAF missions. Minor findings are those insights, trends, patterns, or implications identified through analysis that reflect important, yet ancillary, information related to the RAF concept. For the purposes of this paper, a best practice is a product or process that can enhance the RAF concept. A lesson identified has the potential to enhance AWG internal processes related to the RAF advisory mission.

AWG is uniquely positioned and networked to bridge the Conventional Force (CF)–Special Operations Force (SOF) relationship identified in the Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance 2014. AWG is operationally and

tactically arrayed to leverage years of AWG–SOF interaction and to transition SOF SFA experiences and related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to the RAF. AWG has the expertise and facilities (e.g., Adaptive Soldier/Leader Training and Education, Asymmetric Warfare Adaptive Leader Program, and the Asymmetric Warfare Training Center at Fort A.P. Hill) to provide tailored pre-mission and specified training to help RAF overcome adaptability issues for this new mission, as well as to improve training for this additional mission, making it more efficient and effective.

AWG has a wealth of knowledge and established relationships—including a history of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partnerships facilitated by the AWG liaison officers at the CCMDs—that can provide sound guidance for the RAF mission and connections to global organizations. AWG’s regional alignment affords the group the ability to deploy the same personnel on a routine basis to operate in these regions, fostering relations with interagency members, embassy staff, and host-nation partners that can further enhance AWG’s support to the RAF.



## SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

**Review the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) tactical mission summary (TMS) reports for information, insights, trends, patterns, and implications related to the regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept and implementation of the concept of operations.**

Central to the U.S. Army's future force structure is the RAF concept.<sup>1</sup> Regional missions will be driven by combatant command (CCMD) requirements, and forces must understand the cultures, geographies, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.<sup>2</sup>

The theater army provides the geographic CCMD with RAF and specially trained forces with competence in languages, cultures, history, governments, security force assistance (SFA), foreign internal defense (FID), and threat knowledge in areas where conflict is likely to occur. These U.S. Army forces enable combatant commanders to shape the operational environment (OE) by developing relationships with partner-nation governments and their security forces. Theater armies direct the activities of theater-assigned forces and RAF to achieve the host country's objectives.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. Army Capstone Concept states that "Army forces integrate the capabilities of regionally aligned conventional and special operations forces in security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform. Supported by the appropriate policies, legal frameworks, and authorities,

the Army leads security force assistance for partner units, institutions, and security sector functions."

AWG provides global operational advisory and solution development support to the Army and Joint Force Commanders through seven major responsibilities/functions, per U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation (TR) 10-5. For the purposes of this study, the four key tasks from the AWG Command Brief [operational advising; identification of capability gaps; solution development;<sup>4</sup> and assistance with doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) integration] were used to maintain consistency of data reporting among the TMS reports analyzed. AWG TMS reports are driven by the group's key tasks and focused operations. Therefore, analysis of AWG's support to the RAF concept was taken in the context of the overall construct of plan, prepare, employ, and recover to delineate operations for a RAF unit.

The methodology utilized for this study is similar to the methodology used for the RAF study from 2014. As such, the description of the research methodology in this RAF study is similar to the description found in the first RAF study.

**Develop a qualitative research methodology to analyze AWG TMS reports and report findings related to the RAF concept.**

To review and evaluate AWG's support to RAF in the planning, preparation, employment, and recovery mission areas, the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) team of analysts used a TMS report analysis matrix (TAM) developed for the first RAF study. From this TAM, certain research factors were used. The researchers analyzed the TMS reports involving the four AWG key tasks and cross-referenced them with specific advisory support provided to the RAF in the categories selected from Guidance on Common Training Standards for SFA.<sup>5</sup>


1 "Regionally aligned forces (RAF) include Army total force organizations and capabilities that are forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; and prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Combatant command requirements determine regional missions. RAF maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals, but also possess a regional mission and training focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed. RAF must be able to impart military knowledge and skills to others. Units assist partners in developing their individual and unit proficiency in security operations at the tactical level. Army generating forces assist partners in developing their institutional capacity for training, professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. RAF assist partners in developing security sector programs that professionalize and strengthen their ability to synchronize and sustain security operations" (FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, p. 1-6).

2 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013*, p. 14.

3 FM 3-22, pp. 3-25.

4 For the purposes of this study, definition of the key task solution development was broadened to be more inclusive of OA recommendations. The authors recognize that this expanded definition does not meet the strict internal AWG solution development process, as this study had no insight into that system, but provide the data solely for AWG consideration.

5 Two of the six stated purposes of the *Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SEA)*, January



**Figure 1. AWG RAF Support Analytic Process**

The team then further analyzed the TMS reports to review support with respect to the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) OE construct. (Note: The majority of observations found in this study are related to the political and military elements within the PMESII-PT construct).

Figure 1 illustrates the analytic process.

The researchers grouped their findings according to the following categories:

- AWG key tasks
- Customer [for the purposes of this study, either U.S. forces or partner nation forces (PNFs)]

- Plan, prepare, employ, and recover operations
  - SFA-applicable training standards (prioritized from Guidance on Common Training Standards for SFA)
- The findings yielded the following themes in AWG activities, which are detailed in the following sections of this report:

- AWG activities supporting RAF preparation
- AWG activities supporting unit training during RAF preparation
- AWG activities supporting RAF interagency training during RAF preparation
- AWG activities supporting RAF employment
- AWG activities supporting a PNF during employment
- AWG internal processes of potential benefit in supporting the RAF concept

2014, include: "1.4 To provide a menu of SFA tasks with associated common training standards in order to identify common KSAs [knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes] for Service and joint force commanders and to allow individuals and units to operate effectively in the conduct of SFA activities both unilaterally or jointly in any operational environment. The SFA standards address both the individual KSAs recommended to effectively operate in foreign cultures and contribute to the collective capabilities required to successfully perform the identified SFA developmental tasks: organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) FSF 1.5 To provide a standardized list of SFA KSAs in which the Services and the DoD Components can use to identify, train, and track individual and collective SFA capabilities."

## SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) presents a unique set of challenges for a unit implementing the RAF concept. First and foremost is the large size of PACOM. The PACOM area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses approximately half the earth's surface and more than half of its population. The thirty-six nations that comprise the region include: two of the three largest economies and nine of the ten smallest; the most populous nation; the most populous democracy; the most populous Muslim-majority nation; and the smallest republic in the world.<sup>6</sup> The PACOM AOR is also the

most militarized region in the world, with seven of the world's ten largest standing militaries and five of the world's declared nuclear nations.<sup>7</sup> Additional focus was placed on PACOM with the current administration's 2012 "Pivot to East Asia" regional strategy. Part of this strategic shift aimed at bolstering the United States' defense ties with countries throughout the region. A RAF unit operating in this region should be prepared to adjust to a wide range of circumstances found in this unique OE.

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<sup>6</sup> U.S. Pacific Command strategy website, <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMStrategy.aspx>.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.



Photo Credit: U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs

U.S. and Malaysian Armed Forces service members gather for a lunch of food gathered and hunted in the jungle during a survival demonstration conducted in the Pantí Forest Reserve, Malaysia, as part of the Keris Strike 12 exercise, September 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012.



## SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Preparation in PACOM\*

## Summary

AWG operational advisors (OAs) identified various RAF-applicable observations in which units could have been better prepared for their assigned missions in PACOM. AWG provided guidance and expertise accordingly. AWG identified deficiencies in several pre-deployment activities that have the potential to prevent units from being properly prepared for RAF missions in PACOM.

## Analysis

AWG OAs highlighted the importance of having the right equipment for the mission but also planning for unanticipated circumstances which may affect what equipment is needed. The RAF unit should be prepared to react effectively to mission changes. RAF units should take advantage of preparation time to ensure communication plans, messaging standards, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) interoperability are reinforced.

## Implications

RAF units should use their time wisely to conduct mission preparation. Any time available should be focused on tasks that will contribute to mission success.

Allocating equipment, scheduling RAF-specific training, and making contact with other organizations that have operated in the mission location are some important considerations.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs recommend preparing detailed communication plans that account for a variety of contingencies. These communication plans should involve reaching out to U.S. SOF and working to achieve unity of effort. Communication should focus on a basic understanding of what the RAF unit hopes to achieve. Effective communication will alleviate concerns other partners in the OE may have about activities the RAF unit will be conducting in the region.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting RAF preparation and further analyzed using the research methodology. Evaluation of this information resulted in fifteen findings and seventeen best practices applicable to AWG activities supporting RAF preparation.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- AWG OAs observed that unanticipated circumstances resulted in a lack of equipment, which degraded capabilities in executing unplanned RAF mission contingencies. During planning, the RAF unit should identify a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communication plan that assists in identifying mission-essential equipment and personnel to facilitate initial operating capability.
- Communication personnel at all levels will have their abilities tested in PACOM. A well-planned and rehearsed communications network architecture is essential for a successful RAF mission. Communication planning should incorporate a solid PACE plan to alleviate any potential issues. Leaders at the company level and above should conduct an introductory meeting with elements of the U.S. Embassy in the host nation (HN) to explain which activities will be conducted on the RAF mission.
- One of the RAF units supported by AWG lost several key leaders to Department of the Army (DA) levy assignments prior to an important RAF mission. This had the adverse effect of taking away individuals who were important to the RAF mission.
- The information operations (IO) narrative should be understood and reinforced to support the desired strategic outcome of the RAF mission. Any unit conducting a RAF mission should consider how to properly message kinetic training in a way that supports the strategic message. One way to accomplish this is to incorporate widely used social media outlets.
- Engagements between a RAF unit and U.S. SOF operating in the same area improved SOF–Conventional Forces (CF) interoperability and allowed mutual support. These engagements enhanced U.S. capabilities within the OE and created future opportunities for collaboration. Communications between the RAF unit conducting PNF training and the SOF element in country allows commanders to manage total force unity of effort and synchronize messaging to the PNF.
- Combined with the U.S. military’s combat experience in recent conflicts, the 25th Infantry Division’s (ID’s) growing jungle expertise is a tool that can be leveraged to build PNF capacity.

## Minor Findings

- A U.S. combined counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training team was discussed during the RAF unit’s planning phase; however, potential lack of synchronization and communication outside of scheduled conferences may have contributed to a confusion of roles, responsibilities, and event coordination. Clear and concise guidance on roles, responsibilities, and event coordination are essential to a successful RAF mission.
- The RAF unit was unable to procure U.S. Army issued maps specific to the supported region prior to and during their deployment. This resulted in the PNF having to provide maps to U.S. forces. These PNF provided maps were in a different map datum than U.S. forces used in their global positioning system (GPS). A RAF unit should be aware of this potential problem and develop contingency plans to mitigate this type of circumstance.
- The RAF is an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) concept, but the DA does not recognize it as a deploying patch chart unit. The ASCC RAF units are not classified as a deploying unit when working in a specific OE. The lack of recognition as a deploying unit can create a problem with the RAF unit receiving Rapid Equipping Force (REF) equipment.
- AWG recommends exploring the possibility of creating an expeditionary force equipment package (specific to the OE, in this case focused on the jungle OE of PACOM). Creating an expeditionary force equipment package specific to the OE would enhance the RAF force



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- by providing a scalable method for supporting mobile capabilities.
- A RAF unit supported by AWG was simultaneously managing deployed and home-station forces. This dual management situation stressed the RAF unit's capacity to conduct the RAF mission.
  - In some instances, a potential lack of synchronization and communication outside of scheduled conferences between the RAF communities of interest may have contributed to a confusion of roles, responsibilities, and event coordination.
  - AWG OAs identified a need for RAF units to work with the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) to update Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.8 Infantry Platoon & Squad and the Ranger Handbook. AWG recommends the update focus on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) concerned with reconnaissance, ambush, raid, and platoon attack.
  - Understanding the various networks that operate within and influence the OE will facilitate RAF pre-mission OE analysis. The quality of this OE analysis affects the overall RAF mission.
  - Working with a PNF down to the lowest organizational level is an opportunity to reinforce IO themes, which in turn supports the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP). Every U.S. Soldier should understand the IO message and be able to communicate that message to the PNF and the civilian population.

## Best Practices

- A RAF unit should ensure that common access cards (CACs) will not expire before the start of the RAF mission. A RAF unit should have a plan for issuing new CACs while conducting a RAF mission.
- Every U.S. Soldier participating in exercises with PNF should have a current passport and government travel card.
- A RAF unit should conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) on information systems before a RAF mission deployment.
- The supported RAF unit created a working U.S. Army deployment model identifying AORs for each respective echelon. AWG OAs recommend continued development and implementation of this deployment model during expeditionary operations to further define responsibilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
- The MCoE should review the Infantry Company Modified Table of Organization & Equipment (MTOE) so that capabilities such as organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and company intelligence support teams (CoISTs) are manned, trained, and equipped for the RAF mission.
- A central location to consolidate information for a unit preparing to conduct a RAF mission would be beneficial.
- An unclassified portal should be created to provide country pages and exercise information that is accessible to units participating in RAF missions.
- A RAF unit should use the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), a regional division headquarters, or the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) to maintain continuity between RAF exercise iterations.
- Further analysis within the intelligence community is needed to pursue alternate home-made explosives (HME) composites that are likely to migrate into the PACOM OE.
- PACOM should explore C-IED applications of alternate types of HME currently being utilized across other AORs that may have applicability in PACOM.
- U.S. Army National Guard members may be experts in certain fields outside of their military positions. These individuals can provide knowledge that the active U.S. Army component may lack when it comes to advising. Finding the subject matter expert (SME) to serve as an advisor on a particular topic should be considered when planning for a RAF mission.



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- RAF units should identify potential enablers and communicate with them as early as possible in the mission planning phase.
- RAF units should work with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to ensure maps are available as early as possible for RAF forces.
- Maps are no longer available from the old NGA site. The RAF unit's S4 should be able to obtain electronic and hard copy maps from "eMall" (<https://dod.emall.dla.mil/>). The supported RAF unit's Raven and Shadow operators can also obtain their digital terrain elevation data (DTED) from the eMall.
- AWG OAs recommend that units deploying to a jungle environment should reference the 25th ID's Jungle Green Book for RAF mission planning.
- AWG OAs recommend that for RAF mission planning, a RAF unit should assign responsibilities to the lowest level possible. RAF units are encouraged to continue planning efforts and communication outside the Joint Event Life Cycle (JELC) process to synchronize efforts and shape pre-mission and partnered training.
- RAF units should coordinate with U.S. National Guard units and leverage the National Guard SPP. Some of these U.S. National Guard units may have years of experience working with a particular PNF.

## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in twenty of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Possess knowledge of the Department of Defense (DoD), interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Proficient/certified/qualified in military occupational specialty (MOS)/Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)/Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) or capability being provided
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Train foreign security forces (FSF)
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Advise FSF
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Possess knowledge of security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), foreign military sales (FMS), and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Possess a basic understanding of insurgency
- Develop FSF
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes



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## SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting Unit Training During RAF Preparation in PACOM\*

## Summary

AWG identified deficiencies in several pre-deployment training areas that have the potential to prevent units from being properly prepared for RAF missions.

## Analysis

The OAs' observations stressed the importance of jungle expertise for RAF units operating in PACOM. There are several ongoing efforts to develop jungle training, and these opportunities should be utilized by RAF units deploying to a tropical environment.

## Implications

Understanding how a tropical environment can affect communications, equipment, and operations in general are important considerations for RAF pre-mission training. The 25th ID's Jungle Operations Training Course (JOTC) addresses many of the challenges that a RAF unit will face in this environment. Attending this course can assist RAF units by helping Soldiers gain an understanding of the challenges associated with working in tropical conditions. AWG OAs noted that

when RAF units do not have the capability to conduct operations in a tropical environment alongside a PNF, their missions are at risk.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs should continue to observe and assess the 25th ID's JOTC to ensure that the most regionally up-to-date jungle operations information is provided to Soldiers. AWG should take advantage of its role as a global operational advisor to facilitate course relevance by providing programs and organizations information tailored to the unique challenges associated with operating in PACOM.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in seven findings and six best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting the training of units during RAF preparation and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- U.S. Soldiers did not have the requisite skills and knowledge needed to operate in an austere jungle environment. Planned jungle training with a PNF was not conducted due to U.S. Soldier unfamiliarity with the jungle OE.
- An AWG supported RAF unit conditioned its Soldiers for operations in a tropical environment in a short period of time. The RAF unit focused on acclimatization, physical activity, sleep, and caloric intake to ensure Soldiers were prepared for operations in a tropic environment.
- RAF units must understand the foreign disclosure approval process and ensure their efforts are in line with the TSCP.
- During the initial planning conference (IPC), it is essential to identify the PNF for which the U.S. element will be training. Because this was accomplished, a RAF unit AWG worked with came in well prepared with an understanding of the OE and the PNF to be trained. This enabled quick cohesion between the PNF and the RAF during training.

## Minor Findings

- The 25th ID JOTC field training exercise (FTX) is an effective collective training event that can be improved upon by incorporating more of the terminal learning objectives (TLOs) from the first week of the course into the exercise scenario.
- The 25th ID JOTC should incorporate a personnel recovery (PR) class into the FTX survival day. This PR class should include information on lost Soldier drills, standing PACE plans, link-up procedures, rally points, and local danger areas.
- The JOTC course schedule should be modified to allow for a “round-robin” style rotation through survival, mobility/waterborne, and tracking classes.

## Best Practices

- Units deploying to a jungle environment would benefit from attending the 25th ID’s JOTC.
- The 25th ID should incorporate the Training Brain Operations Center (TBOC) into jungle training exercise support. One recommendation is to use the TBOC to make a virtual trainer to provide Soldiers baseline jungle training prior to conducting the JOTC.
- To prepare junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for army-to-army engagements, have them teach purpose-driven classes at the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) and during preparation for RAF missions.
- A supporting unit battalion commanding officer should role-play as PNF during the RAF train-up cycle to add depth and relevancy to the training scenario.
- U.S. SOF and CF should incorporate Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) and target development into future training and operational planning.
- TRADOC and Installation Management Command should work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to reduce airspace restrictions over military training areas. This will increase effective training time at home station and allow units to increase the number of experienced Raven operators.



## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following seventeen of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Train FSF
- Advise FSF
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE); antiterrorism (AT); and force protection (FP) measures
- Possess a basic understanding of FID TTPs
- Provide force protection FP and sustainment



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## SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Interagency Training During RAF Preparation in PACOM\*

## Summary

AWG provided assessments of interagency-related training, with recommendations to enhance RAF preparation during deployments in PACOM. AWG also provided observations on how interagency awareness or the lack thereof can affect the RAF mission.

## Analysis

RAF units should have an understanding of which relevant organizations are operating in the country the RAF unit is supporting. RAF units should also make an effort to contact interagency partners in the HN supported as well as other regional SMEs. Communication with other partners in the OE will enhance the RAF mission effectiveness.

## Implications

RAF units should have knowledge of embassy protocols, authorities under which their units must operate (Title 22 or Title 50), and the lead role of the U.S. Embassy regarding operations in a particular country. A RAF unit should also have a detailed

understanding of the interagency environment in a particular region.

## Recommendations

AWG should continue to leverage its interagency networks and provide RAF recommendations that can be highlighted to enhance RAF awareness about the interagency environment. These recommendations highlight the need for appropriate communication bridges between RAF leadership and U.S. Country Teams so that RAF units can properly understand and scope the RAF mission for interagency partners.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in four best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting interagency awareness and training during RAF preparation. The information was further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Best Practices

- Company and above leaders should conduct an introductory meeting with elements of the U.S. Embassy in the HN supported. The regional security officer (RSO) is a great resource for current threats within the country. These meetings provide DoD and Department of State (DoS) leaders with important personal contacts in case of an emergency.
- When supporting a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission, a RAF unit should consider the minimum knowledge and capabilities required. The RAF unit should focus on core concepts related to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.
- The special operations team supported by AWG successfully leveraged a global enabler to enhance internal awareness while demonstrating interoperability between DoD and non-governmental agencies (NGOs). RAF units preparing to deploy to an austere environment should integrate a list of known government and non-government agencies operating within the OE into pre-mission OE development.
- RAF units should conduct a subject matter expert exchange (SMEE) focusing on actual TTPs used by potential enemies in the supported OE. The SMEs can come from outside organizations or may come from within the RAF unit. The ultimate goal of the SMEE is to develop the RAF's intelligence analysts.

## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twelve of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Develop FSF
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Train FSF
- Advise FSF



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## SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Employment in PACOM\*

## Summary

Conducting a realistic assessment of the OE is a critical first step for a RAF unit. RAF units should seek out all available resources to help with this endeavor.

## Analysis

AWG documented a number of instances that highlight the detailed nature of properly understanding the OE. To gain an understanding of the OE, a RAF unit needs to know how to use enablers to gather information on the OE. One of the key observations noted in this section is the importance of enablers and how to effectively employ them.

## Implications

A proper understanding of the OE involves detailed analysis of the many factors that can affect the RAF mission. Building a common operating picture (COP) can help synchronize RAF and PNF operations during the employment phase. The COP will also affect how the RAF unit employs its enablers. RAF units should consider the entire spectrum of enablers available to assist with the RAF mission. These enablers can include ISR, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), military information support operations (MISO), interpreters, chaplains, and contracting officers.

## Recommendations

The use of ISR can enhance RAF operations, and the RAF mission can provide training opportunities for ISR

that may not be available in the continental United States (CONUS). A RAF unit may have an opportunity to conduct ISR operations in a unique environment that presents a new set of challenges. Developing new methods to employ ISR can provide valuable TTPs. IO offers an important enabler capability. Synchronization is important to developing IO that supports the RAF mission. RAF units should have a clear message that supports all RAF activities from the tactical to the strategic levels. RAF units should have a plan in place prior to deployment but should be prepared to alter the plan as the situation changes during the operation. During OA mission engagements, AWG should continue to assess RAF units for deficiencies and best practices and provide doctrinal references and Army guidance when appropriate (e.g., FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, Army Training Management guidance). Doctrinal references can be combined with AWG OA guidance and TTPs to provide a realistic assessment of the RAF OE.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in nine findings, fourteen best practices, and one lesson with RAF applicability. This information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting RAF employment and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- Historically, conducting radio communications over long ranges in a jungle environment has proven problematic due to factors such as dense vegetation and mountainous terrain. RAF units should plan for this problem when operating in PACOM.
- Unified messaging and expectation management efforts from the strategic to tactical level will enhance and strengthen U.S. and PNF engagements abroad. Messaging must support the entire operation for the duration of a RAF mission.

## Minor Findings

- The use of ISR could enhance the effectiveness of RAF training and the RAF mission while also providing methods to enhance force protection measures.
- RAF units should capitalize on unanticipated opportunities to include enablers in operations. Including enablers will enhance expeditionary operations.
- For a RAF unit, company-level capabilities in mission command, ISR integration, and communications are difficult to practice at home station. Exercises in a HN provide an opportunity to close capability gaps and practice procedures normally conducted during combat operations.
- AWG OAs observed that for a supported RAF unit to use its only organic ISR asset, a commander had to pull NCOs from elsewhere in the unit. This situation was due to the fact that experienced ISR pilots are usually NCOs. Using NCOs to operate the ISR platform for the company affects their squad and platoon by taking key leaders away from their normal duties.
- The PNF's inability to create a COP during an exercise's hazardous materials (HAZMAT) scenario was a hindrance to the PNF's ability to effectively conduct crisis management. RAF units should anticipate that the PNF COP may not be complete.
- As RAF units conduct bilateral operations in PACOM, it is essential to maintain proficiency with contracting officer and pay agent duties at the platoon level. A small amount of discretionary spending to secure goods and services with local vendors is essential to meeting training requirements.
- AWG OAs observed that a particular joint exercise challenged the RAF organization's ability to execute tasks at all levels, across multiple occupational specialties, and in an austere environment.

## Best Practices

- Red team/Blue team exercises facilitate understanding of enemy TTPs for construction and emplacement of IEDs.
- AWG OAs noted that decentralized authority to conduct EOD procedures was key to timely actions on an objective for a RAF unit.
- During partnered training, a RAF unit should include interpreters based on agreed measure of effectiveness to achieve the commanders' desired outcomes.
- A RAF company command post that includes a CoIST will enhance the commander's ability to understand the OE and conduct mission command.
- Involving MISO enablers during RAF pre-deployment training and deployment provides an additional asset that can enhance a RAF unit's messaging capabilities. This inclusion will also provide an opportunity to work closely with the RAF unit's public affairs officer (PAO).



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- The utilization of an EOD element, social worker, and chaplain can provide the commander valuable awareness of a RAF unit's well-being. The awareness gained can be used as a tool to adjust operational tempo.
- RAF units should maintain the same logistics task force (LTF) throughout future exercises to enhance LTF operations. This enhancement will occur through understanding RAF requirements, maintaining relationship continuity, continuing established and synchronized battle rhythms, and providing a more accurate prediction of task force logistic consumption rates.
- There is a need for a small, lightweight antenna, specifically designed for frequency hopping in a jungle environment. Solution development is required to mitigate this capability gap.
- While supporting a mission, AWG OAs reported that each individual PNF soldier carried a bucket to wash themselves and their laundry each day. This TTP enabled the PNF to keep themselves and their equipment clean while decreasing their individual load.
- AWG OAs observed that a short-term solution for the lack of Raven operators is to use personnel from the RAF unit's headquarters element.
- A RAF unit should consider building a combined SMEE team that plans, trains, and executes tasks as a cohesive element. This SMEE can operate throughout the planned event to achieve desired training outcomes for events that span across several occupational specialties.
- Clarification of command support relationships and authorities will enhance the understanding of employment, limitations, and constraints for a RAF unit.
- Planning and establishing a battle rhythm for all echelons early will enhance a commander's ability to predict and mitigate shortfalls. This established battle rhythm allows the commander to be proactive and maintain flexibility.
- RAF units should explore the use of focused operations in the form of an Attack the Network (AtN) methodology.

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## Lesson Identified

- AWG members and RAF units should establish a means to procure local phones and SIM cards to facilitate regular communication with supported elements.



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twenty-three of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF employment:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Possess regional experience/orientation/ expertise
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Train FSF
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Develop FSF
- Advise FSF
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Possess language capability
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Possess a basic understanding of insurgency
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Equip FSF



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## SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting PNFs During Employment in PACOM\*

## Summary

AWG OAs' wealth of experience with PNFs provides detailed information on associated training and employment issues.

## Analysis

AWG OAs' global operational advisor missions and networked capabilities allow AWG to be uniquely suited to fill and assist operational gaps and provide insights for the RAF concept and broader U.S. Army elements. This is particularly the case when it comes to PNFs. AWG has the ability to observe PNFs in multiple OEs and understand similar challenges faced by different PNFs.

## Implications

In their role as OAs, AWG members frequently interact with PNFs, requiring appropriate reporting [e.g., After-Action Reports (AARs), lessons identified]. These reportable observations, tied to a tailored dissemination

process, can be of direct benefit to supported RAF units.

## Recommendations

Working with a PNF can be challenging. Building an effective team can alleviate some of the issues associated with working with a PNF. Coordination and integration are vital to achieving unity of effort between the RAF and the supported PNF. RAF units should attempt to coordinate with the PNF prior to mission execution and look for ways to enhance teamwork and build cohesion once in country.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in twenty-three findings and nineteen best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting PNFs during employment and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- U.S. forces and PNF units were unable to coordinate with one another before training execution. This lack of coordination resulted in units alternating training partners from one day to another, resulting in a lack of cohesion and unity of effort.
- A particular RAF unit's integration with PNF counterparts was minimal before training was executed. The RAF companies were not aligned to one PNF company each; instead, the partners seemed to switch around from day to day. This practice hindered coordination.
- Effective partnering is critical to the success of RAF operations. Failure to effectively partner can result in overall mission failure.
- Lack of situational awareness and cultural understanding by U.S. forces conducting a RAF mission can alienate the local population. AWG observed a situation in which U.S. service members were in danger of becoming targets of local agitators due to a lack of cultural and situational awareness.
- A RAF unit assisted by AWG maximized opportunities to build relationships with the PNF. This effort led to a better understanding of the PNF. One method used by the RAF unit was to encourage participation by the PNF. Another method was to incorporate the right individuals from the PNF at different levels of command.
- PNF and U.S. Soldiers working together without interpreters during training enhanced teamwork by encouraging Soldiers to create alternative means of communication.
- AWG OAs observed a PNF expeditionary unit that was able to conduct a wide spectrum of operations. The PNF's bivouac operation was a key technique that enabled the PNF's quick reaction to changes in the mission. The PNF bivouac footprint for an individual was simple and streamlined. This streamlined footprint allowed the element to quickly react to a change of mission on short notice. In many cases, RAF units can learn valuable techniques from a PNF.
- The lack of a PNF IED COP resulted in the absence of historical and current IED activity on a particular RAF mission. Inclusion of a collective IED activity visual product to provide awareness and enhance threat understanding can assist the PNF with IPOE.
- RAF units working with a PNF should present a human rights and capabilities briefing to the HN. These briefings support the TSCP and U.S. priorities. Ideally, the HN would present a briefing on its capabilities immediately following the U.S. capabilities briefing.

## Minor Findings

- Developing a U.S. EOD unit to provide direct support to a PNF would greatly enhance PNF operations.
- Sending PNF personnel to the U.S. Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent (EORA) course can provide the PNF unit with organic IED expertise.
- AWG OAs observed that a PNF conducts staff planning differently than U.S. forces. The difference is especially apparent during IPOE. The PNF skips straight into enemy course of action development. A RAF unit should assist PNFs with conducting IPOE and ensure all steps are conducted.
- Rapid rapport establishment allowed for the understanding of PNF wants, needs, and desires. This understanding ensured that the focus remained on continued development of PNF capabilities.
- A supported PNF unit had no experience conducting air assault operations. If the PNF wants motorized units to have the capability to seize airheads or beachheads, they will need to increase air assault and air-ground integration training.
- A supported PNF was not receptive to adjusting plans. Training schedules were accurate to the minute and



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strictly adhered to by the PNF. The U.S. platoons conducting the training had a difficult time adjusting to this PNF practice. PNF units had a difficult time adjusting to the U.S. tendency to adjust schedules as needed to accommodate training.

- AWG observed that a supported PNF had limited unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) capabilities. A RAF unit should be prepared for this contingency and adjust accordingly.
- U.S. Soldiers were not exposed to the HN culture prior to participating in a particular exercise. AWG recommends that Soldiers leave the base whenever possible. Organized events are important to exposing Soldiers to other cultures. In some cases, simply taking public transportation can enhance cultural awareness for U.S. Soldiers.
- The PNF supported did not train at night and did not appear to have night vision capability. RAF units may have to conduct combined nighttime ranges, training exercises, and UAS flights to introduce the PNF to basic night operation TTPs.
- RAF units should continue to assist PNFs with developing narratives, messaging, and themes used to communicate with target audiences. When conducting crisis response operations, RAF participants should have pre-planned and pre-approved messages. These messages can be roughly

categorized as best, most likely, and least likely, according to the situation. Including media outlets during training events can provide a better working relationship and understanding between all participants.

- The PNF conducted operations using the most current U.S. C-IED TTPs. The PNF considered mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) within the OE when considering TTP adaptations.
- PNF weapons had some functional issues due to years of continuous service and the high humidity of the jungle environment. The RAF unit's ability to conduct small repairs on PNF weapons enabled zero degradation in training and built partner cohesion.
- It is necessary to understand that many PNFs lack the budget or knowledge base to conduct training as effectively as the U.S. military. When conducting partnered training, maximize training time by having a solid program of instruction (POI) with support from the PNF. A rapid skills assessment of the PNF may be necessary. This assessment may cause changes in the POI but will result in the best training for both parties.
- The political situation in a certain HN led to the cancellation of all U.S. training with the PNF. RAF units should monitor the political situation in the HN and be prepared to modify training as necessary.

## Best Practices

- AWG OAs observed that a particular HN government and its port authorities were very concerned about mitigating the threat of an Ebola outbreak. Building partner capacity at ports of entry may help mitigate this threat. Continuing port security SMEEs are recommended by OAs as a future course of action.
- The PNF tactical units supported during an exercise may have compromised their movements due to communication procedures. It was recommended that RAF units develop a communication frequency matrix for rotating operating channels and preventing a compromise of unit activity.
- The PNF supported in a particular exercise identified equipment that would enhance their operations. Some of this equipment included IED jammers, robots, mine detection equipment, and information on the most relevant TTPs for using this equipment. RAF units should be prepared for these types of requests from a PNF. The RAF unit should be familiar with the applicable regulations concerning the transfer of technology and information.
- Company-level capabilities in mission command, ISR integration, and communications are especially difficult for a RAF unit to practice at home station. PNF exercises present an opportunity to close capability gaps and



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- demonstrate practices associated with wartime activities to U.S. partners.
- PNF units should be trained on the use of unattended ground sensors (UGS) to effectively monitor threat activity in a mountainous jungle environment.
  - A RAF unit may need to conduct combined nighttime ranges, training exercises, and UAS flights to introduce the PNF to basic night TTPs.
  - A RAF unit should continue to conduct joint exercises to maintain working relationships as part of a joint force. These exercises can enhance operational skills and OE understanding through combined partner training.
  - RAF units should integrate small UAS capabilities into combined U.S. and PNF training as much as possible. Even if the HN's aviation regulations limit UAS flights, simulations should be used to demonstrate the value of UAS as an ISR platform.
  - In many situations, a RAF unit should promote the establishment of a PNF fusion center. The fusion center can help incorporate military and civilian capabilities and achieve a greater unity of effort for the PNF.
  - The PNF supported were much regimented in their execution of operations. It may be helpful to consider contingencies and details that are normally left to subordinates at a higher organizational level during early planning. These different styles of conducting operations should be considered as the exercise gets closer to the execution of training.
  - Habitual relationships between the U.S. and PNF companies should be emphasized at the beginning of an exercise.
  - Creating habitual relationships with the PNF down to the platoon level will ensure junior leaders have the ability to coordinate daily for training and logistics. These relationships will also give U.S. Soldiers a better chance to learn about cultural norms, customs, and courtesies of the PNF.
  - Provide ample time and guidance to partnering units to tactically integrate and develop standard operating procedures (SOPs), command and control (C2), and specialty teams during combined events at the tactical level.
  - RAF units should communicate with their respective PNFs as early as possible. A RAF unit should also seek to conduct an assessment of the PNF at the start of combined training events.
  - A critical factor for RAF units conducting train, advise, and assist (TAA) missions with a PNF is to communicate early with the U.S. Country Team. The communication should focus on which type of training the RAF unit intends to conduct. A RAF unit should submit all products for review by the U.S. Country Team well in advance. This coordination can ensure that the training correlates with the TSCP.
  - U.S. Soldiers should understand that most countries lack the systems and processes that the United States employs for crisis management. When advising a PNF, a RAF unit should focus on how the PNF conducts crisis management and scenario development. This will help determine where the United States can provide the most effective assistance.
  - A RAF unit should partner with the PNF within six to nine months of the PNF returning from a deployment. This will lead to more up-to-date information regarding the issues the PNF is facing in their current OE.
  - A RAF unit should promote continuous coordination with the PNF supported to broaden training objectives.
  - Future exercises with a PNF should include combined air movements by larger forces, not just a single platoon. These exercises should include a mission to secure an airhead followed by movement of armored vehicles by fixed wing aircraft. This exercise should integrate attack aviation as well as UAS .



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twenty-four of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF employment:

- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Train FSF
- Advise FSF
- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Develop FSF
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Possess language capability
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Organize FSF
- Equip FSF
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/ assessment
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Establish/maintain unity of effort



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## SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Below the Tear Line: AWG Internal Processes Related to PACOM\*

## Summary

AWG OAs identified various observations related to AWG organizational processes, products, and equipment in the PACOM AOR.

## Analysis

AWG OAs are engaging a host of organizations that are involved with the RAF mission. These engagements are continuing to add to AWG's body of knowledge on how to work with a PNF. Consolidating this information is important to advising not only RAF units but all AWG supported units. AWG should continue to reach out to TRADOC organizations such as the TBOC and U.S. Army organizations such as the MCoE Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Doctrine Branch to learn how these organizations can assist with the RAF mission.

## Implications

The information can flow both ways between AWG and other organizations with a vested interest in RAF operations. These organizations can inform AWG on the current standards for training and doctrine. AWG

OA observations can help feed organizations concerned with developing doctrine for training a PNF.

## Recommendations

To enhance reporting effectiveness, AWG should develop mission-focused TMS reports for OA use and establish a knowledge management system to facilitate more comprehensive use of information, including access to and utilization of AWG observations and activities. The AWG reporting process should also focus on pushing AWG observations to organizations concerned with RAF operations. A process to properly route AWG reports to outside organizations should be implemented and standardized.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in twelve findings and sixteen best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG internal processes of potential benefit to the RAF concept and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Minor Findings

- AWG has made contact with the MCoE IBCT Doctrine Branch tasked with updating the new Jungle Operations Field Manual (FM) and plans to interface extensively with them in fiscal year (FY) 2015 to assist in providing tactical observations into that publication.
- AWG advisory assistance for a RAF unit may involve medical expertise provided by the AWG physician assistant (PA).
- AWG can advise units on the availability of elements such as the TBOC. The TBOC may be able to assist in developing future training scenarios that accommodate incorporation of the 21st Century Soldier Competencies.
- An AWG EOD technician built an attached sickle device and a grappling hook to support C-IED training with the PNF. AWG's assistance with training on devices, initiating methods, and integrating current emplacement techniques was well received by the PNF. Solution development techniques like this should be captured in a central repository and shared with invested organizations.
- The AWG C-IED SMEE should be an annual event. This event should identify the feasibility of assisting with solution development on alternate HME composites in conjunction with PNF senior bomb technicians.
- The IED/HME lab being developed at the Asymmetric Warfare Training Center (AWTC) may be available for export to the JOTC to use in situational training exercise (STX) lanes.
- AWG was asked by the PNF to support the AtN Expert Academic Exchange (EAE). In supporting this exercise, AWG was asked to assist the PNF in building an increased capacity to identify networks to counter violence in their OE.
- AWG contributed to the AtN EAE, which was the first such venue for sharing AtN methodology and capabilities. AWG OAs should continue to provide AtN expertise.
- AWG is positioning itself to assist with SOF-CF interoperability. AWG continues to evaluate how to utilize CF in conjunction with SOF deployments.
- AWG should work to increase the JOTC leadership and cadre's knowledge of Adaptive Soldier Leader Training and Education (ASLTE) and 21st Century Soldier Competencies .
- The AWG capability is widely known in combat environments. A way to increase AWG advisory capability is to conduct face-to-face engagement with units in the pre-deployment phase. These engagements will set AWG advisor teams up for success. Engaging the unit AWG is supporting prior to the mission minimizes the ambiguity of how AWG can assist.
- An AWG team supporting a partnered exercise distributed subterranean virtual trainer DVDs, weapons of mass destruction-effects (WMD-E) flipbooks, and vulnerability assessment model (VAM) handbooks. The AWG team also spoke about broader AWG initiatives to give the exercise more context on the capabilities AWG can provide. The process of sharing this type of information should be standardized.



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## Best Practices

- The AWG team supporting an exercise was asked by the PNF to participate fully in all areas of the exercise and to provide feedback. The AWG team was also asked to provide relative training injections that mirror enemy TTPs being used by the threat in the HN. AWG advisors should be prepared for these types of assistance requests from a PNF.
- Explore the option of partnering with National Guard Special Forces detachments to provide specific border intrusion training to deploying PNF units. The training could include the use of UGS, tracking techniques, and focused operations.
- Personal clothing and equipment options for tropical environments should be explored. Clothing should be lighter. Boots should be vented and dry quickly. Fighting load carrier (FLC) systems should allow for better ventilation from the torso.
- AWG OAs should be embedded into battalions participating in the JOTC courses to build jungle competency within AWG squadrons.
- AWG should continue to monitor the political situations affecting the PNF supported. AWG OAs should maintain contact with the PNF for developments on the U.S. military engagement strategy.
- When the political situation allows, AWG should continue support to PNF and expand future support at the operational and strategic levels.
- U.S. Soldiers tasked to conduct expeditionary missions as part of RAF could receive individual-level training at home station using AWG's Expeditionary Operations Training Curriculum (EOTC).
- AWG OAs should be incorporated into the annual EAEs. Incorporating AWG into the exercise planning and execution could reveal alternative training methodologies.
- AWG Dog Squadron should replicate a light-emitting diode (LED) IED for use in training scenarios at the AWTC.
- AWG was able to glean previously unknown IED construction and emplacement TTPs from a supported PNF that had encountered these types of IEDs during real-world missions.
- Dog Squadron should work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) explosives laboratory and associated partners of interest in the C-IED community to further solution development and analysis regarding LED IEDs.
- AWG should conduct an annual assessment of the Lightning Academy Adaptive Leaders Course. AWG recommends that an AWG Asymmetric Warfare Adaptive Leader Program (AWALP) team conduct an annual certification of the curriculum of the Lightning Academy Adaptive Leaders Course.
- A mechanism should be established for AWG personnel to cover or reimburse mission-related equipment purchases.
- An AWG OA team should embed with a brigade conducting a RAF mission at that unit's National Training Center (NTC) rotation.
- AWG should continue dialogue on the weapon of mass destruction (WMD)/subterranean operations (SbTO) synchronization efforts.
- To maximize the effectiveness of Taiwan-related Asymmetric Operations Working Group (AOWG) events and VAM mobile training teams (MTTs), AWG should utilize the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) to define participants from the CCMDs, ASCC, and Special Operations Command (SOC).



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twenty-two of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Train FSF
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Advise FSF
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Possess a basic understanding of insurgency
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Assess foreign FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Conduct negotiations, mediation, key leader engagement, and conflict resolution
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources



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SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PACOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# PACOM Trend Data

Most of the information illustrating trends has been woven into the body of the report as reflected in the analysis presented. However, the following figures and

tables provide a quick reference that depicts AWG's broad ability to support the RAF concept.




Figure 2. AWG TMS Data Summary for PACOM

Table 1. Major and Minor Findings by AWG Key Tasks and Operational Planning Areas for PACOM

AWG Key Task	Plan		Prepare		Employ		Recover	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
Operational advising	1	0	7	15	1	1	0	0
Identify capability gaps	0	4	11	30	0	5	0	0
Solution development	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Assist DOTMLPF integration	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0

AWG OA observations and activities discerned from the TMS reports resulted in the following RAF-applicable SFA summary.




Figure 3. AWG Support by SFA Area and Operational Planning Construct for PACOM

## SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) contains a unique set of challenges in regard to employing the RAF concept. Not only is NORTHCOM responsible for working with partners in the region, it is also responsible for working on security issues to include homeland defense, as well as civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure U.S. borders. U.S. Army forces conducting RAF missions in NORTHCOM face a different set of challenges due to the unique set of rules and regulations that apply during situations where U.S. Army forces are providing support inside the United States: “Army forces operating within the U.S. encounter very different operational environments than they face outside the nation’s boundaries.”<sup>8</sup> “NORTHCOM’s AOR includes air, land and sea

approaches and encompasses the continental U.S., Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.”<sup>9</sup> NORTHCOM is also responsible for the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, and portions of the Caribbean region to include the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.<sup>10</sup> The wide range of responsibilities and restrictions presents a complex situation for units conducting a RAF mission in NORTHCOM.

Analysis identified the crucial nature of proper RAF mission planning and its impact on mission performance. AWG observed a lack of experience in non-combat operations such as defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), theater security cooperation (TSC), and the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP).

8 U.S. Army Doctrine Publication 3-28 (ADRP 2-0), *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 26 July 2012), 5.

9 U.S. Northern Command website, <http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx>.  
10 Ibid.



Photo Credit: U.S. Army NORTHCOM Public Affairs

U.S. Soldiers and Airmen with the Colorado National Guard and civilian emergency responders distribute sandbags in response to floods in Jefferson County, Colorado, September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

## SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Preparation in NORTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG OAs observed several deployed units that could have been better prepared for assigned RAF-applicable activities executed as a part of missions assigned in the NORTHCOM AOR. While providing guidance and expertise accordingly, AWG personnel identified deficiencies in several pre-deployment activities that have the potential to prevent units from being properly prepared for RAF missions in NORTHCOM.

## Analysis

AWG OAs frequently highlighted the necessity of being prepared to operate in a DSCA environment. In the RAF preparation phase, RAF units should attempt to gain a proper understanding of the rules and regulations associated with conducting a DSCA mission. AWG provided extensive observations on environmental conditions and TTPs related to the DSCA mission. The OAs provided guidance relating to twenty of the thirty-one common SFA training areas. The OAs' observations stressed the importance of POIs and selecting the right Soldiers for the RAF mission. AWG OAs noted that selection criteria for choosing the right personnel to support the RAF mission may not benefit from standard methods of selection.

## Implications

An appropriate level of understanding of DSCA and support to civil authorities in general is necessary to properly accomplish RAF missions. The OAs noted that when units do not have a proper understanding of DSCA, their missions are at risk of failure.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs should continue to observe and assess how U.S. Army units operate in a DSCA environment to ensure that the most up-to-date and accurate information is provided to Soldiers who are operating in this unique OE.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting RAF preparation and further analyzed using the research methodology. Evaluation of this information resulted in fifteen findings and twenty-three best practices applicable to AWG activities supporting RAF preparation.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.



## Major Findings

- To prepare for RAF missions, the ASCC Security Cooperation Division (SCD) leaders maintained direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with RAF leaders throughout the pre-mission planning process to ensure constant communication. This practice can lead to better synchronization and coordination for the RAF mission.
- AWG OAs noted a need for increased SOF and CF coordination in regard to the RAF mission. Improvements can be made on different levels. At the operational level, Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) and ASCCs should consider collaboration and sharing information regarding TSC efforts and planned deployments. RAF units should coordinate with the Special Forces Group (SFG) aligned with the same region for situational awareness. This coordination can also serve as a forum for sharing lessons learned about SFA missions.
- U.S. Soldiers selected by their chain of command for a mission to support a TSCP need to be carefully considered. The Soldiers need to be properly assessed to ensure they are proficient in instructing a PNF. They also must have the confidence and ability to build rapport regardless of rank, language, or cultural barriers.
- Language skills for a RAF mission are important but are not a substitute for instructor qualifications and experience. In many cases, instructor skills are more important than language skills. Units should carefully choose the members of a RAF mission to ensure the right people with the right skills are selected.
- It is imperative that RAF units identify the desired attributes of RAF team members. RAF units must carefully select Soldiers who can demonstrate these attributes. This is not to say that basic Soldier skills or knowledge of a particular subject is not important criteria. This knowledge is important, but it should not supersede adaptability, predisposition to cultural awareness, and an ability to work with a PNF.
- Integration of communication platforms between military elements and their civilian counterparts presents challenges that can hinder RAF operations. RAF communication officers should coordinate with supported civilian authorities prior to mission execution to de-conflict these issues. RAF communication officers should have a clear understanding of which communication systems civilian agencies are using and whether those systems are interoperable with military equipment.

## Minor Findings

- RAF units benefit from a detailed IPOE. Understanding the OE is critical for RAF success. The IPOE should provide a macro and micro assessment of the OE and can be tailored to concerns related to an SFA mission. The RAF IPOE could be presented to deploying forces at pre-mission training. The IPOE can then be refined or validated based on the experience of the RAF unit upon return.
- RAF units should leverage ASCC staff and other agencies to prepare as detailed an IPOE as possible to support RAF.
- RAF units performing DSCA missions can expect little time for in-depth capability briefs and pre-mission coordination. This is primarily due to the unpredictability of events that precipitate DSCA missions.
- Units should prepare for a RAF mission by conducting early engagements with the ASCCs and the outgoing RAF unit.
- A key component of a RAF mission is developing a POI and instructional methodology that will be well received by the PNF. RAF units and ASCCs should consider collaborating with TRADOC centers of excellence (CoEs) or other invested organizations to assist with creating POIs for future RAF missions.



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- A specified task often implied with TSC is for the RAF unit to prepare a schedule and build the training. RAF units should understand their responsibilities for creating and scheduling a training plan.
- TRADOC should consolidate RAF resources and points of contact into an accessible menu of resources that RAF planners can use.
- Future RAF units participating in DSCA quick reaction force (QRF) activities should consider designating personnel to act as liaison officers (LNOs) with coordinating agencies. These individuals should be chosen based on their knowledge and understanding of the QRF's mission, capabilities, and limitations. The individuals chosen should also be of enough seniority to operate on senior-level staffs.
- The RAF unit was challenged during its initial planning by lack of experience in non-combat operations such as DSCA, TSC, and familiarity with the DCIP.

## Best Practices

- Members of a RAF unit's intelligence section were given the opportunity to visit the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) during the brigade's preparation for a RAF mission. This interaction with NGIC assisted the RAF unit in conducting IPOE for the RAF mission.
- An independent Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities (FORMICA) program within the RAF unit will ensure that all mission personnel are debriefed but will also serve as a training opportunity for brigade human intelligence (HUMINT) personnel.
- RAF units should not be discouraged from using external enablers to enhance mission outcomes. RAF units should ensure the enablers are included in mission analysis and pre-mission training.
- RAF units performing a DSCA QRF mission would benefit from increased equipment allocations, especially with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) equipment.
- TRADOC should provide information to ASCCs and RAF on the range of institutional support that could be provided to RAF forces.
- To properly support the DCIP, the RAF unit AWG was working with identified the need to conduct a modified version of IPOE for each of the identified Tier 1 sites.
- The U.S. Army should look at the DOTMLPF construct to ensure unity of purpose, effort, and command to provide the most effective support to future missions. While using the DOTMLPF construct, a RAF unit can improve the overall TSC construct used to build partner capacity.
- RAF units performing the DCSA QRF mission would benefit from an increased equipment allocation configured in easily mobile containers. This would improve response times and allow the RAF unit to be more mobile.
- U.S. Soldiers are far more effective when they are already knowledgeable about the RAF mission OE and have a habitual relationship with the PNF.
- The ASCCs should continue to use RAF elements instead of randomly allocated units for RAF missions. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) assigned as a RAF should assign adaptive and culturally aware Soldiers to the RAF mission.
- Future RAF units should consider deploying with an array of medication to treat stomach problems, as well as other various illnesses, that may arise during the mission.
- U.S. officers are highly regarded and are often extended benefits that are not afforded to U.S. NCOs. This may put some leaders into conflict among ranks with the PNF. Rapport could be damaged if U.S. officers insist upon inclusion of all ranks.
- BCTs should select personnel who are predisposed to adaptive behaviors and cultural awareness for RAF missions.
- U.S. Soldiers who speak a language applicable to or have experience in a particular OE may be a good fit for





- RAF missions, provided they possess adaptability and patience.
- A particular U.S. Embassy placed qualifications on U.S. Soldiers' participation in live environment training (LET). These qualifications limited personnel participating in the LET to personnel in the ranks of staff sergeant or above. It also limited participants in the training to those who possessed real-world experience. These criteria had the unfortunate consequence of restricting participation of junior and less-experienced Soldiers, who would have greatly benefited from this opportunity.
  - Commanders tasked with providing RAF support to a DCSA mission should consider implementing commanders' critical information requirements (CCIRs) that are specific to DCSA.
  - RAF units should consider the human dimension as it pertains to the DCSA mission and present scenarios, vignettes, and case studies to help determine how the human dimension may affect the OE.
  - RAF units can migrate many of the best practices identified from operations in other locations into the DCSA QRF mission.
  - TSOCs and ASCCs should consider sharing information regarding TSC efforts and planned deployments.
  - The ASCC should consider creating a proper use memorandum (PUM) for the designated RAF brigade early enough in the mission planning cycle so it can be signed by the Department of Army G2. This will ensure the RAF brigade is effectively covered when it comes to certain activities.
  - RAF units seeking to add new material to POIs should submit these new items as soon as possible to ensure the information is approved and translated in time.
  - RAF forces engaged with TSC should coordinate closely with ASCCs to develop a POI that is in accordance with PNF practices and culture.
  - RAF units should have a digital and analog PACE plan.

## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twenty of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Train FSF
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Possess language capability
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Possess medical capability
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Proficient in SERE, AT, and FP measures
- Provide FP and sustainment
- Advise FSF



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## SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting Unit Training During RAF Preparation in NORTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG identified deficiencies in several pre-deployment training areas that have the potential to prevent units in NORTHCOM from being properly prepared for RAF missions.

## Analysis

AWG provided extensive observations on pre-deployment training for RAF. The OAs provided guidance relating to twenty-one of the thirty-one common SFA training areas, highlighting the important role DSCA training, Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) training, and Title 10 training can have in preparing RAF units. The OAs' observations stressed the importance of creating a curriculum focused on SFA mission analysis and planning, building effective advisor teams, and possessing regional experience.

## Implications

Knowledge of cultural factors and PNF capabilities is necessary to properly accomplish RAF missions. This level of understanding also extends to the culture of civilian agencies that may be supported in a DSCA environment. AWG OAs continue to note that some

RAF units do not have a clear understanding of how to operate in a DSCA environment.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs should continue to observe and assess programs such as DSCA training and Title 10 training to ensure that the most up-to-date and culturally accurate information is provided to RAF units. AWG should maintain its role as a global operational advisor, which affords it the opportunity to facilitate course relevance by providing organizations information tailored to specific OEs in NORTHCOM. This information includes insights not only on PNF but civilian agencies supporting missions in the homeland.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in eighteen findings, twenty-two best practices, and one lesson with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting the training of units during RAF preparation and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- U.S. Soldiers on RAF missions should not expect their PNF counterparts to possess a conversational grasp of English. RAF units should consider that FDO procedures and translation services require significant advance planning for the vetting of training material. U.S. Army personnel need to have a better awareness of FDO and translation requirements, especially as RAF missions become more prevalent.
- The RAF mission in a DSCA environment contains a unique set of circumstances. Unfamiliar restrictions and situations are prevalent in a DSCA environment, and adaptability is an important characteristic for a RAF unit in this environment. RAF units tasked with conducting DSCA missions need to make a concerted effort to develop adaptable leaders and organizations. Future RAF forces should incorporate adaptability training to produce organizations that are comfortable in this type of environment.
- RAF units have identified the need for standardized Title 10 authorities training.
- Standard rules of force (SRUF) during a humanitarian disaster (HD) present a new set of rules when compared to the normal standard rules of engagement (ROEs) construct. SRUF require training and constant reinforcement. The Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) legal team should work with the RAF unit legal team to produce a SRUF brief tailored for the RAF mission.
- The RAF unit tasked as a QRF indicated that there had been little time for training due to its current schedule. The RAF unit specifically mentioned not having enough time to train on DSCA, CBRNE, or riot control operations.
- RAF forces should be aware of the environment in which they will be operating. FP should be included in RAF pre-deployment training to ensure all personnel have a basic understanding of the OE.

## Minor Findings

- AWG OAs observed that RAF units typically deploy without the benefit of a mature communication infrastructure. During pre-mission training, the ASCC can familiarize the RAF unit with the communication PACE plan and necessary communication equipment. This can assist the RAF unit with communication issues before they arrive in country.
- In the event of a QRF activation, the ASCC, RAF, and other supporting TSC forces require a high level of synchronization. This synchronization will benefit from habitual relationships, both from training and real-world execution.
- RAF units should incorporate adaptability themes into every training event to enhance adaptability for the individual Soldier and organization.
- Prior to deployment, the ASCC intelligence staff members and the SCD conducted a pre-mission threat briefing for the OE. These types of threat briefings assist with RAF unit planning and should be made a standard practice.
- The ASCCs SCD staff officers conducted a threat brief with RAF personnel prior to deployment to ensure U.S. Soldiers understood the general security environment in which they were about to deploy.
- RAF units must allow time for enabler team building and pre-mission training. RAF elements should not be discouraged from using external enablers to enhance mission outcomes. RAF units should ensure the enablers are included in mission analysis and pre-mission training.
- RAF units should encourage PNF members whenever possible to inform RAF participants of the PNF's military culture and norms. RAF units should leverage available foreign officers to enhance pre-mission training.
- The ASCC has developed a thorough and systematic approach to prepare RAF units for TSC. Based on HN



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demand, most of the TSC conducted by the ASCC is in the form of short duration mobile training teams (MTTs) comprising six to ten U.S. Soldiers. This training is presented to a wide cross-section of different units within the PNF on a host of military subjects. The ASCC members highlighted that the level of military-to-military engagement has increased dramatically.

- TRADOC's ISR Topoff MTT was extremely helpful in preparing the RAF unit to execute its mission. The ISR Topoff provided a tailored training package complete with briefings, informational handouts, a pocket reference, and

stay behind material so the brigade could continue to train new Soldiers.

- Assigning a single and consistent representative from the PNF throughout the ISR SMEE was important, allowing the team to effectively build on complex concepts throughout the FTX.
- The use of the ColST training program during pre-mission training better prepared the RAF units for their mission.
- To facilitate training, it is imperative that RAF units train with foreign weapon systems to better support PNF marksmanship courses.

## Best Practices

- RAF units should request additional information and training on domestic ISR limitations and permissions due to the unique restrictions involved with operating in NORTHCOM.
- FP measures should be included in any RAF pre-mission training to ensure all personnel have a base understanding of their environment and the associated risks.
- TRADOC should broaden its reach to include assistance to operational forces through MTTs and further promulgation of adaptability training. Teaching is a core competency of RAF missions; this is an area in which RAF and PNFs would benefit from improving their capacity to teach and learn.
- RAF training must focus on the unique aspects of RAF and TSC. This training can translate into core competencies for RAF units.
- RAF training should include vignettes and experience gained from previous missions to add context to the POIs.
- RAF units need to train on crowd control measures at the team, squad, and platoon level. This training should include employing both organic equipment and additional riot control equipment such as shields, batons, and tear gas.
- In addition to rapid deployment and cross loading training, RAF units should train on basic defensive concepts, with a focus on defense in depth, crowd control, and CBRNE awareness. RAF units should also have a thorough knowledge of applicable rules of force.
- The 3rd ID's Sledgehammer Academy is an effective model for conducting RAF training. This training meets combatant commanders' requirements for providing capabilities to support operational missions. This model provides valuable training for bilateral and multilateral military exercises as well as TSC activities.
- Civilian agencies, U.S. National Guard units, and regular army units should consider using the Guardian Training Center (GTC) to train for DSCA missions.
- RAF units assigned the DSCA mission should consult with the ASCC to determine if there are any sites near their home stations that will enhance DSCA training.
- U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) should carefully consider the training requirements it places on RAF units to ensure the training directives are complimentary to the RAF mission.



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- A RAF unit should be prepared for a change of mission unexpectedly during DSCA. Commanders should insist that trainers alter training scenarios once proficiency at a task is met to both diversify unit capabilities and install adaptability in the unit.
- Additional training is needed to ensure Soldiers selected to conduct RAF are properly trained.
- Employ SMEs from DoS to cover best practices, DoS perspectives, and human rights issues for small group instruction.
- The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) has the capacity to certify future RAF unit members as instructors, with the additional benefit of presenting the instruction in the context of training PNFs within the western hemisphere.
- LET presents a cost-effective method for training RAF units. This training is especially important to allow Soldiers who have a low-density MOS to receive real-world training that is not readily available in other environments.
- RAF units should continue to execute signals intelligence (SIGINT) LET as a mechanism to train RAF Soldiers.
- To gain insight into cultural variables, ASCCs and RAF can leverage TRADOC's Cultural Center and Human Terrain System to augment training.
- For a particular RAF mission, experts from the Defense Language Institute (DLI) provided basic language skills. The TRADOC Cultural Center provided insights into culture and tips for building rapport. RAF units should seek out organizations which can assist with culture and language.
- DSCA and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) online training helped RAF personnel understand the overall concepts for DSCA missions.
- The RAF unit's intelligence personnel completed the ASCC's and CCMD's online DSCA training in an effort to increase individual understanding of DSCA missions. This practice resulted in better awareness regarding DSCA.
- Prior to any major training event, the RAF unit should attend all planning conferences and play a heavy role in scripting event injects. This will allow the RAF unit to increase collaboration with RAF partners.

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## Lesson Identified

- AWG OAs identified that the ASCC provides excellent training for operational-level leaders through the ASCC's website and resident courses. AWG should take advantage of these resources.



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twenty-one of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Possess language capability
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Train FSF
- Provide FP and sustainment
- Possess medical capability
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Advise FSF



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## SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Interagency Training During RAF Preparation in NORTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG provided assessments of the interagency environment and related training in NORTHCOM, with recommendations to enhance RAF preparation.

## Analysis

One of the main observations from this section involved the lack of radio interoperability between the military and its civilian counterparts during DSCA operations. Communications will be extremely important during a major disaster event. Increasing interoperability should be a major goal for RAF units operating in this environment.

## Implications

Communication issues represent a mission-critical element when responding quickly to a DSCA mission, especially a weather-related disaster. A RAF unit supporting a DSCA event will benefit from working

with civilian counterparts before the mission to work through communication issues.

## Recommendations

AWG should continue to leverage its interagency networks to provide RAF-applicable recommendations that can be translated to best practices. These practices highlight the need for appropriate communication bridges between RAF leadership and civilian agencies so that RAF units properly understand the scope of the DSCA mission.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in one finding and two best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting interagency training during RAF preparation and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.



## Major Finding

- AWG OAs observed a lack of radio interoperability between military and civilian teams. This lack of radio compatibility hindered communication and slowed response times. RAF units should continue to integrate civilian enablers into their formations whenever possible to increase the effectiveness of DSCA operations. A military communications representative should be present at initial briefings to de-conflict communications requirements. RAF units should keep in mind that most civilian agencies concerned with disaster relief travel with communication packages that include extra radios, which can be shared with military counterparts.

## Best Practices

- RAF units should continuously refine best practices on how to educate civilian first responder leadership on QRF operational capabilities. RAF units can also provide recommendations on how to integrate with civilian authorities in support of DSCA efforts.
- Civilian agencies may be able to loan RAF units extra radios for a specific scenario. It is good practice to coordinate with civilian agencies on communication plans and determine if they have radios to issue the RAF unit.

## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following eight of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes



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## SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Employment in NORTHCOM\*

## Summary

RAF-SOF interoperability can enhance the RAF mission. Communication between the RAF unit and its SOF counterparts can alleviate confusion and promote collaboration. Human rights issues are a consideration when working with PNFs. Human rights vetting can affect how a RAF trains a PNF. As stated in previous sections, understanding the unique circumstances of conducting a RAF mission within the United States remains critical for a RAF unit in the employment phase of a DSCA mission.

## Analysis

AWG documented a number of instances in which RAF-SOF communication was important to overall mission success. In many cases, the SOF unit will have in-depth knowledge of the region in which a RAF unit will be operating. SOF expertise should be taken advantage of both before and during the RAF mission. Knowing which organizations can assist with the RAF mission can help with all phases of the RAF mission. The RAF units should work with the U.S. Country Team on human rights vetting to ensure training is conducted in accordance with U.S. legal restrictions. Understanding how to properly vet a PNF is an important aspect of the training process.

## Implications

A RAF unit conducting a mission in NORTHCOM will face a unique set of circumstances. From working with foreign partners in the region to working within the United States, the range of missions will greatly vary. A RAF unit must have a clear understanding of the rules and constraints when operating in these environments. A RAF unit will have to work closely with counterparts who have the requisite knowledge of how to operate in these areas.

## Recommendations

AWG should continue to identify best practices for overcoming the challenges of working in NORTHCOM. AWG should continue to foster relationships between RAF units and other organizations that can assist the RAF unit with mission accomplishment.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in thirteen findings and fourteen best practices with RAF applicability. This information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting RAF employment and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- AWG OAs observed the need for increased SOF–RAF coordination. Synchronized and habitual SOF–CF interaction is a best practice learned in recent conflicts that should be applied to RAF missions.
- Human rights vetting is a critical component of TSC, not only in NORTHCOM but in WHINSEC as well. RAF units should have plans in place to mitigate the loss of rapport should an issue arise with human rights violations. Future RAF leaders should be well versed in human rights vetting procedures. RAF training models should consider familiarizing RAF personnel with these procedures.
- RAF personnel should be prepared to engage senior PNF military personnel. RAF personnel need to be aware that they are the executors of the TSC and should not make promises on anyone's behalf. RAF leaders need to have situational awareness of their authorities and the strategic ramifications of their actions.

## Minor Findings

- RAF Soldiers should understand that they are guests in a foreign country during RAF missions. The HN may have rules or procedures that are different than those to which they are accustomed. RAF units should take the PNF's preferences into consideration. RAF units should coordinate closely with the PNF leadership to ensure operations and timelines are synchronized and acceptable.
- Meeting the incident commander (IC) at the incident command post helped RAF QRF leaders understand exactly how state and local response efforts would be synchronized and controlled.
- Most tactical-level organizations are not familiar with a proper use memorandum (PUM), which defines an organization's domestic imagery requirements. RAF units should be familiar with the PUM due to its effect on operations.
- The ability to communicate in Spanish was critical to explaining complex concepts used in the ISR intelligence and analysis cycles. Despite being fluent in the PNF language, interpreters typically do not possess the technical vocabulary required to explain complex ISR methodologies.
- RAF units need to understand that response operations tend to move at a very slow, deliberate pace. If the RAF unit is tasked with a QRF mission, it should be prepared for extended periods of non-employment. U.S. Army tactical units need to be able to manage their expectations about the flow of events in a disaster response.
- If a RAF unit is tasked with responding to a disaster or possible terrorist event within CONUS, it is important for U.S. Soldiers to remember that they are helping American citizens. While the mission comes first, it is important to assist individuals affected by the event.
- Judge advocate general (JAG) representation at an operations center is essential for mission accomplishment due to the need for legal interpretations when conducting a QRF mission. The DSCA OE is uncharted territory for many RAF units and presents a situation with complex authorities and unfamiliar command relationships. The JAG can help clarify legal issues in this situation.
- Enabler support enhances RAF unit performance during QRF missions. RAF units performing these missions should consider augmenting their security force with enablers to increase effectiveness.



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- Commanders at all levels within a RAF unit should consider providing enablers to enhance the QRF's capabilities for specific missions.
- Many U.S. Soldiers are using the "Camelback" hydration system instead of the traditional canteen, which has a

CBRNE cap for drinking water in a CBRNE environment. This is a major consideration when conducting a RAF mission in a CBRNE environment. RAF units should plan accordingly.

## Best Practices

- The RAF unit's intelligence analysts were embedded with the ASCC's fusion cell. This placement resulted in the analysts developing a better understanding of the OE and a practical understanding of how the ASCC fusion cell operates. This placement also allowed individual analysts to build professional networks.
- RAF intelligence analysts from subordinate battalions rotated through the brigade intelligence support element (BISE) to participate in the weekly intelligence update provided to the commander and senior staff members. This practice provided the intelligence analysts with valuable experience.
- RAF units should consider using the HN's medical clinic if possible.
- RAF units should apply a "who else needs to know?" mindset when uncovering information, as such information may prove to be critical to other operational units involved with the RAF mission.
- RAF units operating under Title 10 authority should fully understand the resources and capabilities available from the local, state, and/or federal levels.
- RAF unit leadership should understand when and how to incorporate civilian enablers into QRF missions.
- A RAF unit supporting a QRF mission deployed a chaplain with the QRF. The primary task of the chaplain was to assist with the emotional wellness of deployed U.S. Soldiers. A secondary task for the chaplain was to provide assistance to the American citizens affected by the incident.
- The RAF unit and ASCC should strive to achieve unity of effort to the greatest extent possible when conducting a RAF mission.
- The SRUF should be disseminated down to the individual Soldier level during any RAF mission. Medical rules that apply to civilians should also be clearly understood.
- RAF units conducting a QRF mission should consider placing an LNO at the ASCC, as many other supporting units do, to improve synchronization and interoperability.
- One method to ensure situational awareness down to the lowest level is to create some sort of daily resource synchronization for units conducting a RAF mission.
- RAF units may encounter communication problems when working in a QRF capacity. To alleviate some of these issues, RAF units should embed a communication specialist with key non-military responding elements involved with a QRF mission. The QRF can also provide additional radios to key officials. Finally, the signal operating instructions (SOIs) should be created in advance to disseminate to civilian leadership.
- ASCCs should consider having a communications specialist accompany the RAF unit to assist with communications equipment.
- RAF units should assign a communications LNO to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to assist with communications and reporting.



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following seventeen of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF employment:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Possess language capability
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/ assessment
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Train FSF



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## SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting PNFs During Employment in NORTHCOM\*

## Summary

Communication continues to be an issue for RAF units working with PNF. Working through these issues will likely be the first problem a RAF unit encounters. Proper vetting of a PNF will also continue to be a concern as RAF units need to remain in compliance with human rights restrictions that apply to training a PNF.

## Analysis

C2 issues can be alleviated with a well-rehearsed communication plan while also enhancing the ability of enablers to support the RAF mission. An assessment of the supported PNF's communications capabilities and limitations will allow the RAF unit to plan accordingly and work through any issues in a timely manner.

## Implications

A communication plan is essential to conducting a RAF mission. The lack of a well-rehearsed plan can lead to

significant constraints. Prior coordination is essential between the RAF unit, PNF, civilian agencies, SOF, and the ASCC.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs continue to enhance communication between RAF units, PNFs, and SOF by leveraging AWG networks. Using the "Blue Network" to enhance communication continues to be a best practice for AWG and its supported units.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in one finding and three best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting PNFs during employment and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Minor Finding

- The PNF supported by AWG lacked a communication PACE plan. Additionally, the PNF conducted limited planning concerning the following: risk management, collection management, the establishment of target priority lists, contingency planning in case of mid-air collisions with commercial aircraft, lost or down platforms, PR, and rescue considerations. RAF units should understand that PNF planning may be lacking. RAF units can assist PNF with planning techniques.

## Best Practices

- The RAF unit should vet the PNF prior to training by screening the class attendance roster against the U.S. State Department provided list of authorized students to ensure only those vetted are present for training. This will help maintain compliance with the Leahy Law.
- The RAF unit should establish the command and coordination framework as soon as possible during any RAF deployment. Doing so will ensure a shared understanding with the PNF on the value enablers can offer.
- RAF units should consider a holistic assessment of their RAF program and determine measures of effectiveness for both individual events and the larger program of RAF assistance.

## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following eight of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF employment:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Establish/maintain unity of effort



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## SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Below the Tear Line: AWG Internal Processes Related to NORTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG OAs identified various observations related to AWG organizational processes, products, and equipment in NORTHCOM.

## Analysis

Building and maintaining relationships with other organizations is vital to AWG operations. AWG should continue to foster relationships between RAF units and organizations that play a role in RAF operations.

## Implications

Observations gathered by AWG OAs need to be consolidated in a single location to enable efficient dissemination to support missions that reoccur in the same region. AWG should maintain relationships with partner organizations to provide support to follow-

on missions in which AWG will encounter the same organizations.

## Recommendations

AWG should develop mission-focused TMS reports for OA use and establish a knowledge management system to facilitate more comprehensive access to information, including AWG observations and activities.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from AWG OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in four findings, six best practices, and two lessons identified with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG internal processes of potential benefit to the RAF concept and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Minor Findings

- The ASCC is the center of gravity for all TSC missions. AWG should interact more often with the ASCC. The ASCC SCD has a unique perspective into both TSC and RAF missions and therefore should be a primary focus for AWG engagement.
- The ASCCs are the nexus for TSC missions and RAF implementation. If AWG does not have a representative at the ASCC level, AWG is not in the “Blue Network” and is not seen as a viable partner.
- The PNF supported during a specific exercise expressed interest in AWG re-visiting them at a later date to reassess the PNF’s ISR program.
- AWG should maintain a close working relationship with a PNF’s headquarters and department of instruction. This relationship will give AWG insight as the PNF develops curricula for their forces.

## Best Practices

- AWG OAs provided advisory assistance to the leadership of the RAF air mobile training team. AWG’s assistance helped enhance the effectiveness of the POI.
- AWG has established initial relationships with Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) and may be able to facilitate future RAF units with DART professional development courses.
- A single-page graphic training aid (GTA) cataloging the various agencies that may be able to assist with the RAF mission should be developed. The disaster relief response operation in support of DSCA is one of the most challenging environments that a RAF unit will navigate. Such operations confront RAF units with many scenarios beyond the operational experience of most U.S. Soldiers and leaders.
- RAF units performing protection of critical defense infrastructure would benefit from AWG’s VAM to help categorize critical infrastructure. The VAM could also assist with making informed decisions concerning the placement of resources to protect defense infrastructure.
- AWG’s Dog Squadron should continue to coordinate with the Operational Response Command (ORC) to establish working relationships with supported RAF units.
- AWG OAs should remain synchronized with the ASCCs SCD to assist RAF units transitioning into a DSCA environment.

## Lessons Identified

- AWG OAs should be careful not to confuse DSCA and QRF. AWG OAs should not misunderstand the ASCC’s intended vision for RAF forces.
- An AWG staff member who has frequent engagement with the staff of TRADOC should determine if a document exists that informs OAs of TRADOC activity in a particular command.



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twelve of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Possess medical capability
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)



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SECTION III: ANALYSIS OF NORTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# NORTHCOM Trend Data

Most of the information illustrating trends has been woven into the body of the report as reflected in the analysis presented. However, the following figures and

tables provide a quick reference that depicts AWG's broad ability to support the RAF concept.




Figure 4. AWG TMS Data Summary for NORTHCOM

Table 2. Major and Minor Findings by AWG Key Tasks and Operational Planning Areas for NORTHCOM

AWG Key Task	Plan		Prepare		Employ		Recover	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
Operational advising	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0
Identify capability gaps	3	3	12	28	0	1	0	0
Solution development	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assist DOTMLPF integration	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

AWG OA observations and activities discerned from the TMS reports resulted in the following RAF-applicable SFA summary.




Figure 5. AWG Support by SFA Area and Operational Planning Construct for NORTHCOM

## SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR encompasses a variety of missions ranging from counter-narcotics to counter-insurgency operations. SOUTHCOM is responsible for providing contingency planning, executing operations, and conducting security cooperation in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean (except for U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions).<sup>11</sup> SOUTHCOM is a joint

command comprised of more than 1,200 military and civilian personnel representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and several federal agencies.<sup>12</sup> U.S. Army forces conducting RAF-type missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR must be comfortable advising on a wide range of operations and interacting with the large volume of organizations in this region.

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<sup>11</sup> U.S. Southern Command website, <http://www.southcom.mil/about-us/Pages/About-Us.aspx>.

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.



Photo Credit: 119th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

A Soldier, with the 349th Combat Support Hospital, translates instructions to soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the National Army of Guatemala regarding proper techniques for loading patients into an ambulance in preparation for the start of Beyond the Horizon 2014.



## SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Preparation in SOUTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG OAs observed several deployed units that could have been better prepared for assigned RAF-applicable activities executed as part of missions assigned in the SOUTHCOM AOR. While providing guidance and expertise accordingly, AWG personnel identified deficiencies in several pre-deployment activities that have the potential to prevent units from being properly prepared for RAF missions in SOUTHCOM.

## Analysis

AWG OAs noted that RAF mission guidance was often lacking in SOUTHCOM. As in other CCMDs, AWG emphasized selecting the right Soldiers for RAF missions and improving communication between the RAF and SOF operating in the AOR.

## Implications

Developing a working relationship with other organizations working in the AOR continues to be an important consideration when conducting a RAF

mission. This coordination should include working with the SFG and the ASCC to synchronize operations and understand other organizations' insights that may help shape the RAF mission.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs should continue to build relationships with the ASCCs and the SFG in supported AORs. Such relationships can be used to leverage support for RAF units. A clear understanding of the RAF mission should be reflected in the operations order (OPORD) and supporting guidance.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting RAF preparation and further analyzed using the research methodology. Evaluation of this information resulted in thirteen findings and sixteen best practices applicable to AWG activities supporting RAF preparation.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- The OPORD for the RAF mission was vaguely written and left out key coordinating instructions. The lack of coordinating instructions caused friction between the RAF unit and the ASCC staff. This friction hindered the RAF unit as it went forward with mission analysis and planning.
- The RAF unit felt hindered by a lack of RAF-specific guidance. The RAF unit had little doctrine or experience to draw upon as it prepared for the mission.
- It should be clearly understood that the ASCC and the U.S. Country Team, acting through the Military Group (MILGRP), may have different visions as to how to reach U.S. national goals within a particular country.
- The RAF unit felt that the SFG could have provided some necessary insight into preparing for the RAF mission and the training of the PNF.
- The translation of training products can be a lengthy and misunderstood process for a RAF unit. Planning time allowed for translating products is often underestimated. The responsibility for translation support should be clearly delineated.
- The RAF unit went through a deliberate selection process to choose the right Soldiers for the RAF mission. The RAF unit designated a company from another brigade to serve as SMEs, tasking that company with providing trainers and primary instructors during the RAF mission.

## Minor Findings

- The RAF unit received a pre-mission capabilities brief from the PNF units scheduled to be trained. This briefing enhanced the training by helping the RAF unit understand the capabilities of the PNF.
- The assignment of Soldiers who can speak the PNF's language to a RAF unit is important. Another important selection criterion for choosing RAF participants is the ability to operate in a complex environment. The tactical and technical skill needed to provide effective training should be considered when selecting soldiers for a RAF mission.
- RAF units can extract key lessons from programs like the National Guard's SPP and sister service efforts such as the Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF). These lessons can assist the RAF unit in conducting its mission.
- RAF units must coordinate closely with the ASCC and U.S. Country Teams to properly implement TSC measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). A meaningful effects assessment is crucial for determining the long-term success of a RAF program.
- RAF units should incorporate PNF doctrine and best practices when creating POIs, assessments, and MOPs. U.S. Army units tend to train PNFs to U.S. MOPs, rather than MOPs that can be realistically expected based on PNF doctrine.
- The ASCC pushed most of the OPORD and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) over the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). The ASCC should consider that the RAF unit may not have the same level of SIPRNet access. The ASCC should keep as much as possible of the OPORD and FRAGO, along with other mission planning products at the Unclassified//For Official Use Only level to facilitate RAF planning.
- Medical support and planning for RAF missions may be enhanced by the inclusion of a health care provider to assist medical planners. RAF units should consider incorporating a clinical provider into the medical planning process. Such medical support can assist the RAF in planning for austere environments.



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## Best Practices

- TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-300, entitled “Full Spectrum Operations Unified Quest 2007,” discusses in detail the Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group - Future (TMAAG-F), a notional element envisioned to be organized under the ASCC. This publication includes information about the TMAAG-F that may assist the RAF unit in the development of the RAF concept.
- Units conducting RAF training missions should develop and incorporate pre-mission training that fosters the adaptability of Soldiers.
- RAF units currently conducting the RAF mission should produce training materials for the following year to better prepare future RAF units.
- Contracting officer representatives (CORs) and field ordering officers (FOOs) should at a minimum be conversational in the local language to conduct their duties.
- RAF units should allocate more time for logistic support activities for the “Torch and Trail party.”
- AWG OAs recommend increasing the depth of crosstalk between the ASCC and SOC during RAF operational planning. This communication will help achieve increased interoperability and integration.
- U.S. Soldiers who act in a linguistic capacity should score at least a 2.2 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB).
- A handful of small teams from key elements within Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) should be deployed with the RAF during pre-deployment training.
- Units preparing for a RAF mission would benefit greatly from an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) area orientation brief given by an ODA that just departed from the mission location.
- The RAF unit should ask SOF team members operating in the same country to provide a country brief. This brief can better prepare the RAF unit.
- AWG OAs noted that FORSCOM and TRADOC must define the responsibility for training beyond “decisive action” and stressed the need for additional funding for RAF training.
- A quick reference guide specific to a U.S. Army National Guard unit operating under Title 32 orders for a RAF mission should be created. This guide can define best practices for overcoming some of the unique challenges associated with this type of mission.
- As combat operations come to an end, the U.S. Army must ensure it does not lose important lessons about CF-SOF interoperability and how those lessons apply to the RAF mission.
- The RAF unit supported by AWG stated that incorporating PNF’s doctrinal inputs in the mission planning phase would have been easier before they arrived in the HN. The RAF unit was able to change its POIs once in country to make them more reflective of how the PNF performs the training tasks.
- When creating new MOPs for a RAF mission, RAF units should determine which resources are available. These resources may include information at the ASCCs, MILGRPs, joint planning and assistance teams (JPATs), and TRADOC.
- A method to ensure accuracy when developing POIs or MOPs is to have them vetted through the MILGRP to ensure they are consistent with PNF doctrine.



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twenty of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Train FSF
- Possess language capability
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Develop FSF
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes



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## SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting Unit Training During RAF Preparation in SOUTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG identified deficiencies in several pre-deployment training areas that may prevent units from properly preparing for their RAF missions in SOUTHCOM.

## Analysis

AWG provided extensive observations on pre-deployment training for RAF missions. The OAs provided guidance relating to seventeen of the thirty-one common SFA training areas, highlighting the important role programs such as media relations and foreign weapons training can have in preparing for a RAF mission. The OAs' observations stressed the importance of including as many RAF unit elements as possible during training.

## Implications

RAF training should begin as early in the force generation process as possible and be inclusive of all RAF partners. RAF units should take advantage of the

experience of regional SOF and the ASCCs to enhance the RAF unit's IPOE.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs noted the need for a standard training model for a deploying RAF unit. The OAs also mentioned including PNF doctrinal input to accommodate training partners. Several of the recommendations in this section recognize the need for a RAF mission standard. AWG observations seem to indicate that RAF doctrine is lacking in some areas, which can lead to confusion for a unit conducting a RAF mission.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in seven findings and five best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting the training of units during RAF preparation and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Minor Findings

- The RAF unit needed PNF doctrinal input for POI development and MOPs early enough in the mission planning phase to incorporate them into the RAF training.
- Pre-mission training should ideally include Unified Action Partners (UAPs) when feasible.
- Individuals selected to be CORs, FOOs, and pay agents for the RAF mission were required to conduct online training to prepare for these positions. Once these individuals deployed into their specific countries, they were required to complete this training again as the online courses were not accepted by their theater contracting organization. A solution for this issue is needed to ensure that CORs, FOOs, and pay agents complete the relevant training accepted by the theater contracting organization.
- AWG OAs noted that there is a demand for an institutionalized RAF training model to support RAF efforts and aligned FORSCOM Command Training Guidance (CTG).
- Pre-mission training for RAF units should include a focus on operations in a semi-permissive environment.
- Pre-mission training for RAF units should include media relations training and media talking points for U.S. Soldiers. RAF planners should consider providing key talking points to RAF forces to ensure proper messaging of U.S. lines of effort. RAF units should strongly consider incorporating media relations training in the pre-deployment phase to ensure IO themes are properly understood by participating RAF unit members.
- RAF units should consider taking a course similar to the Marine Corps' Foreign Weapon Instructor Course. This course would allow RAF units to train and fire foreign weapons encountered during RAF missions, contributing to overall mission success.

## Best Practices

- It is important to include as many RAF unit elements as possible in RAF training. Inclusion of all RAF units will increase unit cohesion. Another benefit of including these elements is to allow the RAF commander to become familiar with the resources at his/her disposal for the RAF mission.
- PR training in a semi-permissive environment should be emphasized in RAF pre-mission training. PR training could be incorporated into a unit's combat training center (CTC) rotation modeled after the training and experience of the theater-aligned SFG.
- Refine FORSCOM, TRADOC, and SOC RAF training guidance to build more readiness and proficiency.
- CF and SOF units need to train together to institutionalize mutual support in joint operations. The RAF mission in Central America is an ideal place to start practicing this type of cooperation.
- The U.S. Air Force has a program called the Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP). The ASCC used this program to provide the RAF with additional linguist capacity on RAF missions. This capability should be available for all RAF missions.



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following seventeen of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess language capability
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Train FSF
- Proficient in SERE, AT, and FP measures
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Provide FP and sustainment
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes



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## SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Interagency Training During RAF Preparation in SOUTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG provided assessments of interagency-related training for the SOUTHCOM AOR, with recommendations to enhance RAF preparation.

## Analysis

Interacting with interagency officials operating in SOUTHCOM continues to be beneficial for the RAF unit. Briefings by interagency members can provide the RAF unit with essential information that can contribute to a successful RAF mission.

## Implications

A RAF unit should make it a priority to meet with the U.S. Country Team in the HN as soon as possible. The U.S. Country Team can provide informational briefings, and the RAF unit can begin building a network of

contacts with individuals who are experienced in the region. A meeting with embassy officials should be standard procedure for a deploying RAF unit.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs should continue to build networks and relationships that can be leveraged when advising a RAF unit. AWG's global mission facilitates a worldwide network of contacts that should be maintained.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in one finding and one best practice with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting interagency training during RAF preparation and further analyzed using the RAF research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Minor Finding

- The RAF unit and members of the U.S. Country Team participated in an informational brief at the embassy to discuss the training plan for the upcoming RAF mission. This informational briefing helped coordinate efforts between the RAF unit and the U.S. Country Team .

## Best Practice

- RAF units should plan to interact with many different UAPs, not only ones they are familiar with from previous combat operations. RAF units should provide RAF participants the opportunity to interact with local authorities to develop mentoring skills and develop proficiency in interacting with non-U.S. Army entities.

## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following ten of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Possess language capability
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Establish/maintain unity of effort



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## SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting RAF Employment in SOUTHCOM\*

## Summary

Analysis identified the crucial nature of proper RAF mission planning and its impact on mission performance. AWG observed numerous occasions in which RAF units were operating under authorities that may have hindered the RAF mission.

## Analysis

AWG OAs noted the difficult situation a RAF unit can encounter depending on the type of orders under which the RAF unit is operating. RAF units should understand the differences between Title 32 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code (USC) and how these differences can affect the RAF mission.

## Implications

Proper planning for the RAF unit should involve a thorough understanding of the authority under which the mission will occur. The RAF unit should seek guidance on the differences between Title 32 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code (USC). Understanding the different restrictions these titles impose on the RAF mission is important to mission success.

## Recommendations

AWG should continue to advise units on guidelines and restrictions involving the RAF mission. AWG's experience in this area can be beneficial to deploying RAF units. AWG should also continue to foster relationships with ODAs operating in the same location as the RAF. In many cases, any tension between the ODA and the RAF can be resolved by explaining the parameters of the RAF mission. Once the ODA understands that its mission and the RAF mission can be complimentary, the ODA and the RAF can work together.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in eleven findings and five best practices with RAF applicability. This information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting RAF employment and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Findings

- The RAF unit supported by AWG performed its mission under Title 32 orders. The RAF unit was not placed on Title 10 orders. The RAF unit noted that many tasks required for mission success were essentially unfunded or unmanned because the unit was operating under Title 32 orders.
- AWG OAs noted that there are administrative challenges when a Title 32 force is deployed overseas operating as a Title 10 force. These challenges are mainly due to the different authorities that are granted under Title 32 orders versus Title 10 orders. The differences between these titles are especially pronounced when it comes to lines of funding required for operations.
- AWG OAs observed that there is a need for and substantial benefit from increased coordination between SOUTHCOM's RAF efforts and SOCSOUTH's mission priorities.
- The inclusion of a two-man ODA element with the RAF provided SOF-CF interoperability and enhanced mission effectiveness. The ODA element provided a depth of experience that enhanced the overall mission of the RAF.
- AWG OAs noted that ODA team leaders were open to the idea of working in coordination with the RAF unit once they fully understood that the RAF unit's purpose was to conduct training with the PNF.

## Minor Findings

- ODAs should augment a RAF mission when feasible. Inclusion of an ODA should not interfere with the RAF unit's primary mission and should add value to the mission. ODAs should not be included solely for the sake of inclusion.
- The RAF provides U.S. Army forces an opportunity to facilitate cultural exchange in two areas as the U.S. Army continues to operationalize the RAF concept. First, the RAF mission provides for an overt exchange between U.S. forces and PNFs. Second, cultural interoperability occurs between the U.S. Army and its UAPs.
- AWG worked with two infantry battalions that staffed their RAF missions differently based on their understanding of the RAF mission's purpose. One battalion chose to rotate U.S. Soldiers into the HN in a two-week cycle, while the other battalion chose to deploy the same Soldiers for the duration of the RAF mission without performing rotations. Each battalion's mission was successfully achieved regardless of how it chose to perform its mission. Both methods should be considered as models.
- The RAF unit demonstrated adaptability and initiative on several occasions during the training, preparation, and execution phases of its RAF mission. Adaptability is important for any unit conducting a RAF mission.
- The RAF unit's Soldiers served as role players during the RAF mission because very few PNF soldiers could operate scenario vehicles. Understanding a PNF's capabilities prior to training will enhance the overall effectiveness of the training and not waste valuable time.
- The training materiel a RAF unit initially received was either outdated or produced for operations in a different country. In some cases, it was non-existent. The RAF unit AWG worked with utilized locally available resources to produce and update the training materiel. A RAF unit should be prepared for a lack of information regarding the RAF mission and seek alternative sources of information.



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## Best Practices

- AWG OAs observed the need to address the “fill or kill” methodology when responding to medicine requests. The U.S. Army personnel responsible for filling the formulary were not medically trained, and when a certain item was not available, they would simply “kill” or terminate the request instead of filling with an alternative. A RAF unit’s PA or surgeon should be involved when addressing these types of requests. The inclusion of qualified medical personnel can overcome this “fill or kill” methodology.
- The RAF unit had to retrieve the medications from the ASCC in its medical load-out and obtain a special Transportation Security Administration (TSA) letter to carry the medications on a plane and pass through customs. This was an arduous process that could have been alleviated had the RAF unit used the Diplomatic Post Office (DPO) system and retrieved the controlled substances at the U.S. Embassy upon arrival in country. The DPO routinely ships items of this nature.
- A rapid-use malaria kit would have been useful for the RAF unit in the malaria-prone mission location.
- RAF units should consider having a PACE plan for training that will allow them to easily modify training but still fulfill the customer’s requirements.
- The ASCC should assume the responsibility for providing linguist support to the RAF to fill any linguistic shortcomings.

## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following nineteen of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF employment:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Possess language capability
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Possess knowledge of SC, SA, FMS, and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Train FSF
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/ assessment
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes



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## SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Analysis of AWG Activities Supporting PNFs During Employment in SOUTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG OAs' observations reflected the need to develop a PNF that is self-sustaining and can continue to train itself. Alternative training methods should be a consideration as the situation in country may affect the original training plan.

## Analysis

The first step in building partnerships is to understand partner capacity. A RAF unit should assess a PNF capacity early in the mission to help formulate or modify the training plan. As in other CCMDs, the RAF unit needs to be familiar with foreign weapons.

## Implications

AWG OAs' many interactions with PNFs provide a body of knowledge on working with foreign partners. These

reportable observations, tied to a tailored dissemination process, can be of direct benefit to RAF units.

## Recommendations

AWG should continue to gather a working knowledge of PNFs and provide this information to RAF units. This body of knowledge will also assist AWG with advising RAF units and helping those units understand the capabilities of PNFs.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in six findings and three best practices with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG activities supporting PNF units during employment and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

## Major Finding

- RAF units should be familiar with the Leahy Law. PNF units may be on the no-train list as designated by the Leahy Law. It is the responsibility of the DoS to vet a foreign country and ensure certain reporting procedures exist to ensure compliance with the law. The Leahy Law states that “no assistance shall be furnished...to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the U.S. Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”

## Minor Findings

- Understanding PNF authorities to conduct traffic control point (TCP) operations is important. RAF units should understand PNF procedures for search and detention of individuals and supporting ROEs .
- The RAF concept supports the U.S. Army’s core tasks. Building partner capacity is a means to stabilize and strengthen a partner nation. Training alongside a PNF prepares U.S. Soldiers to work with coalition forces. RAF units should incorporate opportunities to train alongside PNFs when possible.
- Development of a PNF train-the-trainer (T3) capability is essential to building long-term PNF capacity. When possible, units should consider using a PNF-led T3 model for RAF training. This method is a practical way to accomplish parts of a RAF training mission. PNF units know their operational doctrine and understand how it is properly employed in their respective countries. RAF units should utilize the experience and expertise of the PNF whenever possible.
- For a particular RAF mission, U.S. Army blank adapters could not be used on PNF weapons. This resulted in the limited use of blanks during training.
- AWG OAs observed that deploying with an armorer or even a basic armorer’s kit can enhance PNF training. This capability allows the PNF to confidently employ individual weapons. Assisting a PNF in this way can help build rapport and increase a PNF’s basic security posture.

## Best Practices

- AWG OAs observed a RAF unit employing M-4 airsoft weapons while training a PNF. This added realism and safety to the training and overcame certain operational restrictions placed on U.S. forces and weapons within the AOR.
- AWG OAs noted that it was challenging for RAF units that are temporarily formed for a RAF mission and then disbanded after the mission is over. This method of forming RAF units fails to take advantage of the valuable experience gained during the mission.
- Consider changing the RAF training methodology from directly training temporary PNF units to creating a T3 methodology that contributes to a standing PNF MTT concept.



## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following sixteen of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF employment:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Train FSF
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Develop FSF
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Establish/maintain unity of effort
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes



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## SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# Below the Tear Line: AWG Internal Processes Related to SOUTHCOM\*

## Summary

AWG OAs contributed on various occasions to helping the RAF unit successfully accomplish the RAF mission.

## Analysis

AWG possesses multiple capabilities to advise and assist RAF units. AWG has extensive experience working in the SOUTHCOM AOR. This experience can translate into valuable expertise during all phases of the RAF mission. AWG OAs are present throughout the RAF mission cycle and provide key contributions. AWG can gather and inform TRADOC and other U.S. Army units on the latest developments regarding the RAF mission in SOUTHCOM. This is particularly the case when it comes to adaptability.

## Implications

AWG can use its experience to inform and contextualize regulations and doctrine that apply to the RAF mission.

OAs noted a lack of guidance and training requirements focused on the RAF mission. AWG can help clarify and influence this guidance by using real-world experience collected while assisting RAF units.

## Recommendations

AWG OAs should continue to be present at all stages of the RAF mission from the IPC to the AAR. AWG can leverage its extensive expertise to provide knowledge and mentorship to the RAF unit.

## TMS Reports Observational Analysis

The following information was derived from the OAs' observations and activities. Evaluation of this information resulted in six findings, two best practices, and one lesson identified with RAF applicability. The information was then thematically grouped as AWG internal processes of potential benefit to the RAF concept and further analyzed using the research methodology.

\* This section describes RAF-relevant observations and activities reported in AWG OA TMS reports. Major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons are a compilation and/or distillation of TMS reports or direct quotations from the reports.

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## Minor Findings

- AWG can provide RAF units with adaptability training to help ensure that adaptive outcomes are nested within broader training requirements.
- AWG should continue to support the U.S. Army National Guard as they prepare to execute the RAF mission. This support should cover the areas of mission planning, pre-mission training, and advisory assistance during mission execution.
- AWG conducted a meeting with the ASCC prior to the RAF missions in FY 2015. AWG was requested to provide assistance in a PR advisory role to the RAF unit conducting missions in the ASCC.
- AWG team members were invited by the RAF unit to participate in a hasty pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) of facilities within the OEs of the PNF battalions being trained during the RAF mission. The RAF unit wanted to conduct an assessment of training facilities.
- AWG team members were invited to participate in the RAF unit's out-brief with the deputy chief of mission (DCM) to present the projected training schedule for the RAF mission.
- AWG should send a small contingent to the RAF mission IPC.

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## Best Practices

- AWG should work with FORSCOM to ensure best practices are captured regarding RAF training guidance.
- AWG met with the RAF unit during pre-mission planning to exchange lessons identified and best practices. The RAF unit welcomed AWG assistance in any capacity.

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## Lesson Identified

- AWG should work in conjunction with the Army's G-3, G-5, G-7, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and respective ASCC to actively monitor and integrate past, current, and future sister service efforts and lessons identified.



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## Relevant SFA Common Training Areas (in order of priority from analysis)

The previous information was further analyzed and resulted in the following twelve of thirty-one relevant common SFA training standards for which AWG OAs provided TMS report observations in one or more reports or provided guidance and support during RAF preparation:

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency, CCMDs, and country-team activities
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in SERE, AT, and FP measures
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Proficient/certified/qualified in MOS/AFSC/NEC or capability being provided
- Assess FSF unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Develop FSF
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Establish/maintain unity of effort



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SECTION IV: ANALYSIS OF SOUTHCOM-RELATED AWG TMS REPORTS

# SOUTHCOM Trend Data

Most of the information illustrating trends has been woven into the body of the report as reflected in the analysis presented. However, the following figures and

tables provide a quick reference that depicts AWG's broad ability to support the RAF concept.




Figure 6. AWG TMS Data Summary for SOUTHCOM

Table 3. Major and Minor Findings by AWG Key Tasks and Operational Planning Areas for SOUTHCOM

AWG Key Task	Plan		Prepare		Employ		Recover	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
Operational advising	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0
Identify capability gaps	2	1	8	24	1	2	0	0
Solution development	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assist DOTMLPF integration	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

AWG OA observations and activities discerned from the TMS reports resulted in the following RAF-applicable SFA summary.




Figure 7. AWG Support by SFA Area and Operational Planning Construct for SOUTHCOM

## SECTION V: CONCLUSION

After the AWG TMS reports were comprehensively and qualitatively analyzed, the research team identified that certain findings and best practices that are important across the PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM AORs. Even though these different AORs have unique challenges as they relate to the RAF concept, there are

certain trends that have become evident based on the analytical methodology used in this study. Evaluation of this information resulted in twenty-three findings and seventeen best practices that have appeared in multiple CCMDs and are important to the overall RAF mission.

### Major Findings

- A RAF unit should identify the PNF with which it will be working with as soon as possible to enable coordination early in the mission planning phase.
- The selection of Soldiers for the RAF mission is one of the most important aspects of RAF mission planning. Careful planning is necessary to ensure personnel with the right skills and characteristics are selected.
- An overall lack of RAF guidance and doctrine pervades all three CCMDs assessed.
- RAF forces should be familiar with the assigned mission's OE. Such awareness will assist with FP and enhance pre-deployment training.
- A well-planned and rehearsed communication plan is essential for a RAF mission. The communication plan should include a structured PACE plan for unexpected contingencies.
- U.S. Soldiers should have the requisite skills and knowledge to operate in a jungle environment. The 25th ID's JOTC is a recommended course for learning how to operate in a jungle environment.
- SOF-CF coordination is important for RAF missions. Increased engagement between SOF-CF will enhance the overall RAF mission execution and improve interoperability. Coordination between SOF-CF will also create future opportunities for collaboration.
- Maintaining compliance with human rights vetting procedures is an important aspect of the RAF mission. RAF unit leaders and planners should be well versed in human rights vetting procedures and related legal requirements.
- RAF personnel should be prepared to engage senior PNF military personnel. In many cases, PNF are more attuned to military rank than U.S. personnel. This can affect the RAF mission. RAF should account for this perspective and develop contingency plans if rank becomes an issue.

### Minor Findings

- A RAF unit should conduct early engagement with the respective ASCC prior to executing the RAF mission.
- The RAF is an ASCC concept, but the DA does not recognize such forces as a deploying patch chart unit. The ASCC RAF units are not classified as a deploying unit when working in a specific AOR. The lack of recognition as a deploying unit can create a problem with the RAF unit receiving REF equipment.
- RAF units should include enablers during mission analysis and pre-mission training. RAF units should capitalize on the use of enablers to enhance RAF operations.
- Company-level mission command, ISR integration, and communications capabilities are often difficult to practice at home station. RAF missions provide an opportunity to train for such capabilities normally conducted during combat operations in an exercise environment.



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- RAF units should seek to build rapport with supported PNFs. This rapport will help with determining the areas with which the PNF needs assistance.
- RAF units should not assume that the U.S. method of conducting training is acceptable to all PNFs.
- RAF units should consider that a PNF may lack the budget or knowledge base to conduct training in a manner that is similar to the U.S. military. RAF units should therefore ensure training is feasible and acceptable to the PNF.
- RAF units benefit from a detailed IPOE. RAF units should leverage ASCC staff and other agencies to prepare a detailed IPOE. The IPOE can be refined or validated based on the experience the RAF unit has while conducting the RAF mission.
- RAF units and ASCCs should consider collaborating with TRADOC CoEs and other relevant organizations to assist with creating POIs for future RAF missions.
- RAF units should incorporate adaptability themes into training events to enhance adaptability for individual U.S. Soldiers and the overall RAF unit.
- A RAF unit should receive a pre-mission capabilities brief from the PNF to understand the PNF's capabilities and limitations.
- RAF units must coordinate closely with the ASCC and U.S. Country Teams to properly understand and implement TSC MOPs and MOEs.
- RAF units require PNF doctrinal input early in the POI and MOP development stages to properly incorporate such considerations into RAF training.
- The partnering of an ODA with a RAF unit adds value to mission execution.

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## Best Practices

- U.S. Army National Guard Soldiers may be experts in various fields external to their military experiences. These individuals can provide depth when advising PNFs that the active component may lack. RAF unit leaders should identify such SMEs to serve as advisors in specific cases.
- RAF units should identify potential enablers and communicate with them as early as possible in the mission planning phase.
- RAF units should leverage the U.S. National Guard SPP. Some of these U.S. National Guard units may have years of experience working with a PNF and can provide valuable insight.
- RAF units deploying to a jungle environment would benefit from attending the 25th ID's JOTC.
- Preparing NCOs for engagements with PNF can be achieved by teaching RAF-relevant classes at the WLC and during RAF mission preparation.
- When supporting a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission, a RAF unit should consider the minimum knowledge and capabilities needed. The RAF unit should maintain focus on these core concepts.
- RAF units should conduct an introductory meeting with elements of the U.S. Embassy in the supported HN. The RSO is a valuable resource for current threats within the HN. These meetings provide DoD and DoS leaders with important contacts in the RAF unit in case of an emergency.
- RAF units deploying to an austere environment should develop a list of government and non-government agencies operating within the OE.
- RAF units should establish a battle rhythm for all echelons early in the RAF mission to enhance a commander's ability to predict and mitigate shortfalls. This established battle rhythm allows the commander to be proactive and maintain flexibility.
- RAF units should attempt to integrate small UAS capabilities into combined U.S./PNF training as much as possible. Even if the HN's aviation regulations limit UAS



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flights, simulations can be used to demonstrate the value of UAS as an ISR platform.

- A RAF unit should seek to develop habitual relationships between U.S. RAF companies and PNF companies. This will improve future partnerships.
- Communication with a PNF should be a top priority at the start of a combined training event. Early communications will aid in developing MOEs and therefore in assessing the PNF.
- Soldiers who speak a language or have experience in a particular OE may be a good fit for RAF missions, provided they are adaptable and patient.
- RAF units seeking to add new material to POIs should submit these new items as soon as possible to ensure the information is approved and translated in time for the RAF mission.
- RAF training should use vignettes based on experiences from previous RAF missions to add context to POIs.
- RAF units should consider placing an LNO at the ASCC, as many other supporting units do, to improve synchronization and interoperability.
- RAF units that temporarily form for a RAF mission and disband after the mission may not serve as the best model. This method of forming RAF units sacrifices valuable experience once these units are disbanded.



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## APPENDICES

## Appendix 1: Definitions and Acronyms

**Definitions**

**Best practice:** A product or process by which efficiencies or effectiveness may be enhanced. These areas were identified from OA observations and activities with the potential for wider implication to the RAF concept.

**Lesson Identified:** A process that, if incorporated into normal operations, would enhance effectiveness or gain efficiencies for AWG. Lessons were derived by JHU/APL analysts from an analysis of the TMS reports and, in some cases, based on their overall understanding of the DoD, Army, or AWG, taken in the context of the RAF concept.

**Major finding:** Those insights, trends, patterns, or implications identified through analysis that reflect significant AWG mission-related support to the RAF concept characterized as mission-critical information.

**Minor finding:** Those insights, trends, patterns, or implications identified through analysis that reflect important, yet ancillary, AWG support to the RAF concept characterized as information with minimal mission impact but still provide support for partner nation FSF and cultural situational awareness.

**Acronyms**

AAR	After-Action Report	AWG	U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code	BCT	Brigade Combat Team
AIT	American Institute of Taiwan	BISE	Brigade Intelligence Support Element
AOR	Area of Responsibility	C2	Command and Control
AOWG	Asymmetric Operations Working Group	CAC	Common Access Card
ASCC	Army Service Component Command	CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
ASLTE	Adaptive Soldier Leader Training and Education	CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive
AT	Antiterrorism	CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
AtN	Attack the Network	CCMD	Combatant Command
ATP	Army Techniques Publication	CF	Conventional Force
AWALP	AWG Asymmetric Warfare Adaptive Leader Program	C-IED	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
		CoIST	Company Intelligence Support Team
		CONUS	Continental United States
		COP	Common Operating Picture
		COR	Contracting Officer Representative
		CTC	Combat Training Center
		CTG	Command Training Guidance
		DA	Department of the Army
		DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
		DCIP	Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
		DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
		DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authorized
		DLAB	Defense Language Aptitude Battery
		DLI	Defense Language Institute
		DoD	Department of Defense
		DoS	Department of State
		DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
		DPO	Diplomatic Post Office
		DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
		DTED	Digital Terrain Elevation Data
		EAE	Expert Academic Exchange
		EOC	Emergency Operations Center



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ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT TO REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES IN PACOM, NORTHCOM, AND SOUTHCOM

EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	JELC	Joint Event Life Cycle
EORA	U.S. Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent	JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Command
EOTC	Expeditionary Operations Training Curriculum	JHU/APL	Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration	JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation	JOTC	25th ID's Jungle Operations Training Course
FDO	Foreign Disclosure Officer	JPAT	Joint Planning and Assistance Team
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency	LEAP	Language Enabled Airman Program
FID	Foreign Internal Defense	LED	Light-Emitting Diode
FLC	Fighting Load Carrier	LET	Live Environment Training
FM	Field Manual	LNO	Liaison Officer
FMS	Foreign Military Sales	LTF	Logistics Task Force
FOO	Field Ordering Officer	MCoE	Maneuver Center of Excellence
FORMICA	Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities	MET	Mission Essential Task
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command	METL	Mission Essential Task List
FP	Force Protection	METT-TC	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order	MILGRP	Military Group
FSF	Foreign Security Forces	MISO	Military Information Support Operations
FTX	Field Training Exercise	MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
FY	Fiscal Year	MOP	Measure of Performance
GPS	Global Positioning System	MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
GTA	Graphic Training Aid	MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
GTC	3rd ID's Guardian Training Center	MTT	Mobile Training Team
HAZMAT	Hazardous Material	NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
HD	Humanitarian Disaster	NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
HME	Home-Made Explosives	NEC	Navy Enlisted Classification
HN	Host Nation	NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
HUMINT	Human Intelligence	NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team	NGO	Non-Governmental Agency
ID	Infantry Division	NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
IO	Information Operations	NTC	National Training Center
IPC	Initial Planning Conference	OA	Operational Advisor
IPOE	Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment	ODA	Operational Detachment Alpha
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance		
JAG	Judge Advocate General		

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OE	Operational environment	SMEE	Subject Matter Expert Exchange
ORC	Operational Response Command	SOC	Special Operations Command
OTERA	Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, and Advise	SOC SOUTH	Special Operations Command South
PA	Physician Assistant	SOF	Special Operations Force
PA	Public Affairs	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
PACE	Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency	SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command	SP-MAGTF	Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
PAO	Public Affairs Officer	SPP	National Guard State Partnership Program
PCS	Permanent Change of Station	SRUF	Standard Rules of Force
PDSS	Pre-Deployment Site Survey	STX	Situational Training Exercise
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time	T3	Train the Trainer
PNF	Partner Nation Forces	TAA	Train, Advise, and Assist
POI	Program of Instruction	TAM	TMS Report Analysis Matrix
PR	Personnel Recovery	TBOC	Training Brain Operations Center
PUM	Proper Use Memorandum	TCP	Traffic Control Point
QRF	Quick Reaction Force	TLO	Terminal Learning Objective
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces	TMAAG-F	Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group – Future
REF	Rapid Equipping Force	TMS	Tactical Mission Summary
ROE	Rule of Engagement	TR	TRADOC Regulation
RSO	Regional Security Officer	TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration	TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
SA	Security Assistance	TSCP	Theater Security Cooperation Plan
SbTO	Subterranean Operations	TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
SC	Security Cooperation	TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
SCD	ASCC Security Cooperation Division	UAP	Unified Action Partner
SERE	Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape	UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
SFA	Security Force Assistance	UGS	Unattended Ground Sensors
SFG	Special Forces Group	USC	U.S. Code
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence	VAM	Vulnerability Assessment Model
SIPRNet	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network	WHINSEC	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
SME	Subject Matter Expert	WLC	Warrior Leader Course
		WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
		WMD-E	Weapons of Mass Destruction – Effects

# Appendix 2: OA Interviews

In addition to the methodology used to analyze the TMS reports, the research team conducted interviews with the OAs who authored the TMS reports to identify trends observed on RAF missions. Open discussions with the OAs to receive their unattributed insights

regarding the RAF concept was critical for this study. The OAs identified the following findings they observed on RAF missions across PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM AORs.

## Major Findings

- A lack of RAF training may hinder U.S. Army National Guard units preparing for RAF missions. National Guard units need more time for RAF mission training.
- U.S. Army National Guard units need to prepare well in advance for RAF missions because they only have one weekend a month to train.
- A RAF mission is currently viewed as a tasking and not as an operation, which can result in a lack of resources for the RAF unit. This can limit RAF units in their pre-mission training and execution phases.
- Commanders should train Soldiers on the Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) relevant to the RAF mission.
- RAF leadership must select the right people for RAF missions. Assigning Soldiers to RAF deployments who then execute a permanent change of station (PCS) before the RAF mission begins or leave the unit before the RAF mission is complete is detrimental to successful mission accomplishment. Soldiers selected for the RAF mission should be carefully screened and then retained by the unit for at least the duration of the mission.
- RAF units should train in an environment similar to the RAF mission's OE.
- RAF units need to understand the environment in which they will operate. RAF units need to internally develop an IPOE. RAF units should emphasize cultural awareness in pre-mission training.
- RAF units are building relationships with PNFs that can last generations.
- Pre-mission training needs to align to the actual training that will be conducted by the RAF unit on the mission. RAF units need to be prepared for the actual mission they are tasked to perform.
- RAF units should understand how the supported PNF conducts training. The U.S. dependence on using Microsoft PowerPoint presentations may not resonate with a PNF.
- RAF units need to comply with human rights vetting and methods to properly ensure the PNF being trained is in compliance.
- RAF unit leaders need to be flexible and adaptable.
- RAF units should reach out to SOF units and other services that have experience working with PNF. Establishing networks is critical to mission success.
- RAF units should continue using enablers when training a PNF.
- AWG OAs observed that a RAF unit's pre-mission training consisted of too much time in the classroom and not enough instruction on how to instruct a PNF (train the trainer, or T3). RAF units should provide their Soldiers the opportunity to practice instructing through robust T3 programs.
- U.S. Army National Guard Soldiers are a force multiplier due to their experience in the civilian arena.
- RAF units should communicate with ODAs that have operated in their RAF mission AOR. ODAs can help bridge the SOF-CF interoperability gap and serve as advisors for the RAF units.

## Minor Findings

- RAF units need to better prepare Soldiers for RAF missions and ensure administrative items, such as passports, are current for the RAF mission.
- RAF missions are time-sensitive events. RAF units should take advantage of all time available to work with a PNF.
- Communication in the jungle environment exposed a capability gap of RAF units. RAF units need communication specialists who are experienced in a wide variety of environments to overcome communication challenges.
- RAF mission duties and responsibilities need to be aligned early in the RAF planning process.
- RAF units should have contingency equipment packages for each environment in which they may have to work.
- Senior leaders within SOF and CF should develop stronger relationships for RAF coordination purposes.
- RAF units are empowering junior Soldiers and providing them opportunities to develop as professionals.
- MOEs and MOPs should be developed by the RAF unit prior to the RAF mission.
- RAF units should incorporate TRADOC's 21st Century Soldier Competencies into pre-mission training.
- RAF Soldiers must be motivated for RAF missions.
- There is a need for more pre-mission expeditionary training that includes FP, threat awareness, IPOE, PACE communication planning, and medical training.
- U.S. Army National Guard units conducting RAF missions are usually tasked with other missions but are still finding the resources to successfully complete every RAF mission.

## Best Practices

- RAF unit leaders should start selecting individuals for RAF missions a year in advance.
- Law enforcement experience is beneficial for individuals conducting RAF missions.
- RAF unit leaders and planners should attend RAF planning conferences to prepare for the RAF mission.
- RAF units should leverage the U.S. Border Patrol's Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) to help prepare Soldiers for RAF missions.
- The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School could conduct MTTs on foreign weapons for RAF units.
- Ideally, RAF units should be able to observe the PNF operating in their native environment. This would allow the RAF unit to conduct follow-up training for any identified deficiencies.
- In some cases, RAF units lack SMEs but can leverage SOF experience when preparing for RAF missions.
- Current RAF leadership should include some of the next RAF mission's leadership to streamline mission handover.
- If RAF units use the Sledge Hammer Training Academy or Guardian Training Center model during pre-mission training, adaptability exercises similar to those conducted at AWG's AWALP can be used to prepare Soldiers for the RAF mission. AWALP could be used to screen soldiers for RAF missions.
- RAF units should conduct Officer Professional Development (OPD) with the PNFs.
- RAF units should develop a continuity book to present to units conducting future RAF missions in a specific AOR. This continuity book should include lessons identified and best practices from previous RAF missions.
- U.S. Army National Guard units should be granted DIRLAUTH to communicate directly with counterparts that have already completed RAF missions.

# Appendix 3: Sources

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## Appendix 4: Research Methodology

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### Baseline Documents

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1. JHU/APL and AWG Statement of Work (as amended)
  2. AWG Command Brief (March 2015)
  3. AWG TMS Reports (thirty-two)
  4. *U.S. Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*
  5. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, January 2013.
  6. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance*
  7. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC Regulation 10-5, *Organizations and Functions*, 27 December 2013.
  8. *U.S. Army Forces Command RAF Training Requirements*
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### Methodology

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1. The analysis methodology, research factor selection, and criteria development were based on the following as they related to AWG OA TMS report observations and activities in the context of the RAF concept:
  - a. A review and evaluation of applicable DoD guidance and Army regulations (e.g., U.S. Army Capstone Concept, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, and FM 3-22)
  - b. SMEs' research and experience (e.g., AWG Command Brief, ADRP 5-0, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, and other related guidance as listed in Appendix 3)
2. TMS review
  - a. Include only those TMS reports provided by AWG.
  - b. Consider only those TMS reports applicable to the RAF concept (the concept is specifically



- mentioned in the TMS report or a researcher determines that there is obvious applicability).
- c. Arrange and structure TMS report information so that it is possible to categorize the data easily.
3. Information/data analysis
    - a. Researchers analyzed TMS reports in the context of the RAF concept to determine the following:
      - i. Major findings and minor findings
      - ii. Best practices and lessons identified
    - b. Analysts reviewed observations and information in the TMS reports and associated them with the appropriate operation (i.e., plan, prepare, employ, and recover).
    - c. Analysts reviewed observations and information in the TMS reports and categorized them by AWG key tasks:
      - i. Operational advising
      - ii. Identify capability gaps
      - iii. Solution development
      - iv. Assist DOTMLPF integration (*Note:* Category selection was based on the four AWG key tasks described in the AWG Command Brief).
    - d. Analysts reviewed observations and information in the TMS reports on the basis of the thirty-one common training standards in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness *Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA)*. (*Note:* These SFA common training standards provide the best categorization with which to analyze AWG activities in the context of the RAF.) Analysts then evaluated the observations and activities in the TMS reports to align them under one or more of the thirty-one common training standards for SFA. (See Appendix 5 for the complete listing.) The following groupings guided the evaluation, which was conducted in the following order:
      - i. Five SFA developmental tasks
      - ii. Twelve collective-enabling KSAAAs
      - iii. Fourteen Individual-enabling KSAAAs
    - e. Analysts cross-checked the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness guidance with FM 3-22 (Security Force Assistance Tasks on p. 4-3, Mission Elements on p. 4-14, and Considerations on p. 5-7), as well as the *U.S. Army Forces Command RAF Training Requirements* message, to ensure appropriate categorization of AWG activities both inside and outside CONUS.
    - f. The researchers developed a TMS report analysis matrix (TAM) by using various research factors to review and evaluate AWG support to RAF in the planning, preparation, employment, and recovery mission areas. The team analyzed the TMS reports involving the four AWG key tasks described in the AWG Command Brief, cross-referenced observations with specific advisory support provided to the RAF in the areas of *Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, and then further analyzed the reports to discern support in the context of PMESII-PT. Analysts then categorized this information as advisory support at the tactical or operational level and determined whether the support had strategic-level implications. The basic TAM method is shown below with an explanation of each research factor used to appropriately categorize TMS report information and determine specified AWG RAF support.
- (OA TMS report observations: Phase + KT + SFA + Operational Variables ≈ RAF-relevant activities)**
- **Phase—Plan, Prepare, Employ (Execute), and Recover (Assess):** The operations process activities were used with slight modification, per the statement of work guidance. More importantly, however, this construct aligns with ADRP 5-0 and lends itself to categorizing data in an easy-to-view analysis of AWG activities.
    - **Rationale for use:** Used in the matrix to categorize the OAs' observations and activities in alignment with the U.S. Army's operational planning process construct (ADRP 5-0).
  - **KT—Key Task:** In accordance with the AWG Command Brief, AWG has four key tasks and aligns its missions with those tasks. This



structure provided the researchers a consistent way to categorize information in the TAM.

- **Rationale for use:** Used in the matrix to properly categorize the OAs' activities and efforts within their respective mission areas. RAF support was either explicitly or implicitly stated in the TMS reports.
- **SFA—Security Force Assistance Common Training Standards:** These thirty-one common training standards for SFA were used to appropriately identify the OAs' activities and efforts tailored to a particular region. Although other lists could be used in the TAM (e.g., SFA Considerations in FM 3-22 or the U.S. Forces Command RAF Training Requirements message), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness guidance provides a more general SFA list that is applicable across the joint force.
  - **Rationale for use:** Used to appropriately identify the OAs' activities and efforts tailored to a particular region and aligned with a common SFA training area.
- **Operational Variables—(PMESII-PT):** According to ADRP 5-0, operational variables are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment.
  - **Rationale for use:** Used to properly align observations, information, and activities in the TMS reports with particular RAF operational environments.
- g. Analysts applied the PMESII-PT framework and further analyzed OA observations and activities as appropriate. (*Note:* Other research factors can be integrated into the TAM, depending on the analysis required and/or results anticipated. For example, mission variables [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations, or METT-TC] or levels of war [tactical/operational/strategic] could be incorporated if necessary. If further research is required, then a deeper analysis into the civil considerations [e.g., areas, structure, capabilities, organizations, people, and events, or ASCOPE] might be used. If assessing FSFs, then DOTMLPF provides a good framework. The TAM is designed to be tailored and scaled as appropriate for the analysis requirements.)
- h. Analysts evaluated the information to determine major and minor findings, best practices, and lessons, and they also evaluated the data for commonalities among CCMDs.

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## Appendix 5: Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance

### Individual-enabling knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs):

- Possess language capability
- Possess medical capability
- Proficient in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE), antiterrorism, and force protection (AT/FP) measures
- Proficient in instruction techniques
- Proficient in cross-cultural communications
- Possess regional experience/orientation/expertise
- Proficient in the preparation of an area study/assessment
- Possess knowledge of security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), foreign military sales (FMS), and other training, equipping, and funding resources
- Possess knowledge of the DoD, interagency (IA), combatant commands' (CCMDs), and country-team activities
- Possess advisor-specific skills
- Possess a basic understanding of insurgency

- Possess a basic understanding of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
- Possess a basic understanding of foreign internal defense (FID) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
- Proficient/certified/qualified in military occupational specialty (MOS)/Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)/Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) or capability being provided
- Operate effectively with the FSF and among the population
- Conduct negotiations, mediation, key leader engagement, and conflict resolution
- Communicate in the SFA environment
- Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the FSF actions
- Build on current FSF capabilities and sustainable processes
- Execute all actions/activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- Establish/maintain unity of effort

**Collective-enabling KSAAs:**

- Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning
- Assess foreign security forces (FSF) unit (organizational, institutional, environmental)
- Develop FSF
- Build effective advisor/SFA team(s)
- Provide force protection (FP) and sustainment

**SFA developmental tasks:**

- Organize FSF
- Train FSF
- Equip FSF
- Rebuild/build FSF infrastructure
- Advise FSF



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