DISCLAIMER: The observations below are TF 5 input to JRTC Trends 1st and 2nd Quarter, FY 16. These observations are pending approval for publication and therefore are not an official CALL product. However, these observations represent TF 5 trends as of 27 May 2016 and are provided to assist BEBs prepare for FY 16-17 JRTC rotations. For current trends – please contact TF 5. For official CALL products – please see the CALL website, printed publications, or speak to your installation CALL representative.

Task Force 5 Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB)

SUSTAINS

Sustain Trend 1

SUBJECT: Primary Alternate Contingency and Emergency (PACE) Communications Plan for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Platoon

OBSERVATION (TF5): UAS platoons lack organic digital communications to support flight operations.

DISCUSSION: UAS platoons require augmentation to establish and maintain digital communications. Digital communications are essential to receive weather and airspace control measures. Without this information, the UAS platoon is unable to conduct flight operations. BEBs have begun to augment the UAS platoon with varying success. Almost all UAS platoons receive digital communications either in the form of a specific system or adjacent unit. A lack of rehearsals results in undetected faults in the communications systems, which can disrupt the information flow to the UAS platoon.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Brigade engineer battalions (BEBs) should continue to resource UAS platoons with digital communications and rehearse using these systems at home station or during receiving staging and onward integration (RSOI).

Resources: Field Manual 3-04.155 *Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations.*

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Sustain Trend 2

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Company Mission Command

OBSERVATION (TF5 MP Company): Military police companies and platoons are improving with regards to establishing a common operational picture (COP) because units are bringing key equipment for establishing a command post.

DISCUSSION: MP platoons and companies need to bring equipment to establish mission command systems to enable situational understanding. Effective command posts are essential for detailed planning and effective platoon/company operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should continue to establish command posts on the foundation of FM radio, Joint Capabilities Release, and analog maps per Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, Chapter 1, "Command Post Organization and Operations. Build to incorporate:

- Battle rhythm for reporting to higher and lower units
- Maintain running estimates (friendly, enemy, sustainment)
- Synchronize company intelligence support teams (CoIST)

References: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command* and Field Manual 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations; FM* 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*; Operate a Command Post (07-2-5135).

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Sustain Trend 3

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Company Load Plans

OBSERVATION (TF5 MP Company): MP units are improving their use of organizational items at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

DISCUSSION: Units need to bring their full modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) capabilities when deploying to the JRTC, which reduces the unit's overall capability. Underused equipment at JRTC include:

- Optics (PAS-13, PVS-14, MELIOs)
- Communication [Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) set for prepositioned vehicles, JCR command post (CP) stand alone, COMP-201 Antenna, ASIP CP set].
- Special equipment (Raven, non-lethal weapons capability sets (traffic control point, riot control, detainee))
- Sustainment (MKT, contact vehicle, wrecker)

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Deploy maximum equipment deployed to the JRTC to exercise systems and increase Soldiers' tactical and technical advantages. Use troop leading procedures to plan load out with precombat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs).

Reference: Training Circular (TC) 3-39.30 *MP Leader's Handbook* and Field Manual 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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IMPROVES

Improve Trend 1

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Operations **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BEBs typically struggle to provide effective mission command of their functional tasks, simultaneously with special tasks generally assigned to the battalion such as brigade combat team (BCT) command post (CP) defense, engagement, area security, and terrain management.

DISCUSSION: BEB commanders must have a commander's dialogue with the brigade commander to establish the roles and expectations of the BEB. The BEB was designed to provide battalion commander level mission command of assigned engineer forces, both organic or echelon above brigade (EAB) engineers, and organic companies [Signal, Military Intelligence, Head and headquarters company (HHC), and Forward Support Company (FSC)]. "In extreme circumstances, the BEB may be directed to secure BCT CPs or execute security missions for areas that are not assigned to another unit in the BCT area of operations, or the BEB may be assigned responsibility for base camp defense, sustainment area defense, or terrain management. The BCT must weigh the risks that are associated with these missions. They could diminish the BEB ability to operate as a functional headquarters, or they could reduce engineer support to combined arms battalions and cavalry squadrons. If the BEB assumes responsibility for these special missions, the fundamental role of the BEB changes from being a supporting unit in the BCT to being a supported unit of the BCT. To mitigate risk, the BEB staff may recommend additional engineer augmentation from EAB units and staff. The BEB can defeat Level 1 threats and, with augmentation, organize response forces to defeat threats that are more organized." Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-34.22 *Engineer Support to the Brigade Combat Team*

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BEB commanders should analyze the risk to the BEB's functional mission with respect to additional tasks and communicate these risks to the brigade commander and his staff in order to receive augmentation. Brigade commanders and their staff need to understand the BEB staff does not have representation from all warfighting functions (WfFs) (Fires and Engagement) required for the area security and terrain management. Therefore, the BEB will require augmentation in order to successfully perform additional tasks such as area security. Lastly, the BEB must train the staff to conduct the military decision making process (MDMP) and provide mission command for area security tasks since it is very likely BEBs will continue receive area security and other additional tasks required to support overall accomplishment of the BCT mission.

Reference: ATP 3-34.22 *Engineer Operations--Brigade Combat Team and Below*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations.

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Improve Trend 2

SUBJECT: Mission Command of the Signal and Military Intelligence Companies **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): The brigade combat team (BCT) task organization of brigade engineer battalion (BEB) subordinate often results in the signal company and/or military intelligence company (MICO) working directly for BCT staff sections. Without a command relationship to a battalion headquarters, these companies struggle with receiving mission orders, understanding commander's intent, receiving sustainment support, and reporting/battle tracking.

DISCUSSION: Brigade staff members are unable to provide effective mission command and sustainment for enabler companies. Each BEB company should have a command relationship with a battalion headquarters and should not work directly for a BCT staff section. Both the BEB and BCT staff need to collaborate to ensure command/support relationships are clearly defined in BCT and BEB orders. In many cases, special caveats may be required to ensure required sustainment and reporting occurs that is not covered within the specific command/support relationship.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The role of the brigade staff is to identify the requirements and missions for enablers and assign tasks to a battalion for execution. The battalion (maneuver, reconnaissance, or BEB) should provide mission command, battle tracking, and sustainment for assigned enablers. For example, the BCT S2 and S6 should provide technical guidance for the brigade communications network and intelligence collection while the BEB ensures assigned units comply with the technical guidance and receive required sustainment. This requires close collaboration between the BEB and BCT staffs.

Reference: Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities

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Improve Trend 3

SUBJECT: Lack of Brigade Engineer Battalion Detailed Planning

OBSERVATION (TF5): Brigade Engineer Battalion staff is untrained, inexperienced, and lacks the processes to developed detailed plans through MDMP.

DISCUSSION: All Battalion staffs must be trained how to complete all MDMP steps. It is especially important that the Brigade Engineer Battalion staff have a good understanding of MDMP because of the wide range of missions assigned to the BEB. BEB's are frequently asked to solve numerous, difficult, and unfamiliar problems for the BCT. A staff that understands how

to execute MDMP will be able to leverage the MDMP process to build effective plans to enable successful execution by subordinate units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BEB staffs should develop a planning SOP for MDMP and regularly practice their procedures for MDMP. Special attention should be given to detailed staff running estimates, COA development, and wargaming as these are the areas where BEBs staff struggle the most.

References: Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*
ART 5.0 Conduct Mission Command

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Improve Trend 4

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Collaborative Planning with the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Staff **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BCTs lack processes and procedures that enable BEB organic and attached company commanders to collaboratively plan with the BCT to shape requirements based on capabilities.

DISCUSSION: BEB subordinate companies can significantly assist BCT planning, especially the signal company, military intelligence company, and, when assigned, EOD, military police, and chemical companies. Both collaborative and parallel planning help optimize available planning time. *Collaborative planning* is commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners sharing information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts regardless of physical location throughout the planning process. Commanders, subordinate commanders, and staffs share their understanding of the situation and participate in course of action development and decisionmaking for development of the higher headquarters plan or order. [Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0]. Planning in real time with higher headquarters and subordinates improves the overall planning effort of the organization. Additionally, taking advantage of subordinates' input and knowledge of the situation in their areas of operations often results in developing better COAs quickly [Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*].

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: When available, BEB units and company commanders can directly assist BCT staff during the planning phase. With detailed knowledge of their units' strengths and weaknesses, company commanders can greatly assist BCT staff in the initial planning process. This is especially useful technique for the signal, MICO, explosive ordnance disposal, military police, and chemical companies.

Reference: Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities

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Improve Trend 5

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Battle Rhythm **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BEBs struggle to develop a battle rhythm that drives the operations process through the incorporation of functional and integration processes such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), targeting, and the military decision-making process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION: The battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations (Joint Publication 3-33 *Joint Task Force Headquarters*). An effective battle rhythm establishes a routine for staff interaction and coordination, facilitates interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate units, and facilitates planning by the staff and decisionmaking by the commander. The battle rhythm also enables cyclic MDMP which allows the commander to understand his unit and operating environment, mitigate risk, identify opportunities, maximize the capabilities of the BEB to achieve the BCT mission, and share information vertically with both subordinate and higher headquarters.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: We recommend linking the battle rhythm to functional and integration processes (IPB, targeting, and MDMP) to drive the operations process. We recommend the commander receives a morning battle update brief (BUB) from his staff to update current and future operations and to provide planning guidance to the staff. The BUB gives the commander information from the same running estimates that feed IPB and mission analysis; this will help the staff maintain accurate running estimates. The commander then should make time to circulate among subordinate units or higher headquarters while the staff conducts planning activities throughout the day. During the day, the staff should conduct, at a minimum, a logistics synchronization meeting and operations synchronization using targeting methodologies. These meetings will help the BEB apply appropriate resources to operational requirements, identify risks, and develop risk mitigation measures. These synchronization meetings are similar to course of action (COA) development and wargaming; they allow the staff to identify and solve problems for the commander. At the end of the day, the commander should conduct a commander's update brief (CUB) with his subordinate commanders. The CUB is similar to COA approval and allows the staff to backbrief commanders on the results of the logistics and operations synchronization meetings and what adjustments are required to the BEB's plan. The CUB will help to ensure shared understanding between the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders. It is especially important that the BEB establish and rehearse its battle rhythm prior to the rotation. The BEB should develop a standard operating procedure (SOP) to describe the battle rhythm. The SOP should list roles, responsibilities, and reporting requirements. The SOP should also cover the purpose, frequency, composition, agenda, and input/outputs for all meetings.

Reference: Army Doctrine Reference Publication ADRP 5-0 *The Operations Process*

ART 5.2 Conduct Command Post and Operations

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Improve Trend 6

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Common Operating Picture (COP) **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BEBs struggle to establishing and maintaining an effective common operating picture (COP) that enhances shared understanding with subordinate units and higher headquarters.

DISCUSSION: The BEB does not establishing or maintain a COP that can be shared vertically with the higher headquarters (digital) and subordinate units (analog). Often the BEB will establish a COP in Command Post of the Future (CPOF) to report to the brigade combat team (BCT) but the CPOF COP cannot be shared with subordinate companies. The BEB will belatedly establish Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) overlays, which can be shared down to platoon level, but fail to establish procedures to maintain the accuracy of these overlays. Map overlays are infrequently updated and focus on small areas such as the BCT command post (CP) defense and not the brigade area of operations. Additionally, the BEB does not track organic units that are tasked organized to other battalions within the BCT or task organized to BCT staff, which limits the BEB commander's understanding of BEB units and how the BEB commander can assist the BCT in accomplishing the mission. The BEB current operations (CUOPs) is unaware of what information must be tracked and why the information must be tracked because the BEB military decision-making process (MDMP) did not produce a synchronization matrix, execution checklist (EXCHECK) or other execution products. Additional, the BEB CUOPs typically lack awareness of the primary alternate contingency and emergency (PACE) communications plan down to platoon level and the capabilities of subordinate companies to report information.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The BEB should establish what information must be tracked and it should be reported and displayed. The BEB needs to nest the battalion COP with company and platoon COPs and establish reporting requirements that account for the PACE plan available to teams, sections, platoons, and companies. The standards for the battalion COP and reporting requirements should be described in a SOP and rehearsed prior the unit's rotation. Platoons and companies typically lack CPOF so JCR/Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and analog maps are most appropriate as the battalion COP. However, the BCT and higher headquarters use CPOF so the BEB staff must have procedures and processes to transfer the analog/JCR COP to CPOF to share understanding vertically with the BCT and higher headquarters. The BEB must also establish reporting requirements and train both subordinate units and staff on maintaining the COP. Leaders from the staff down to platoon leaders must be able to maintain a JCR and analog COP. This requires dedicated and repetitive training. Lastly, the BEB must track all organic units and teams. The BEB commander and staff cannot assist the BCT in accomplishing the mission without understanding the location and status of organic and assigned assets. The BEB should track all BEB elements so the BEB can make recommendations to the BCT staff to solve problem and ensure the best use of BEB resources. The use of a deliberate handover brief

between plans and CUOPs that includes a synchronization matrix and EXCHECK can help the BEB CUOPs in tracking unit operations. The CUOPs team needs to understand the PACE plan down to platoon level and monitor communications with all subordinate units.

Reference: Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* and Army Doctrine Reference Publication ADRP 5-0 *The Operations Process*

ART 5.2 Conduct Command Post and Operations

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Improve Trend 7

SUBJECT: Integration of Both Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Organic and Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) Enablers **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BEBs struggle with integrating EAB units into the BEB and BEB units into supported units.

DISCUSSION: Issues with organic enablers are typically due a lack of prior training at home station. The most successful integration at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) occurs when units have developed relationships through home station training. However, operations at the JRTC often require frequent changes to the task organization and BCTs will meet some enablers for the first time at the JRTC.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: We recommend BEBs develop an integration checklist, by warfighting function (WfF) that is modeled off an in/out processing checklist. The key result of the integration checklist is that the gaining unit receives updated information by WfF to update running estimates, establish a primary alternate contingency and emergency (PACE) communications plan, reporting expectations between units, and understands the capabilities, limitations, and constraints of the enabler unit. A useful tactic technique or procedure (TTP) is for the BEB S3 or XO directly coordinate with their counterpart in the gaining battalion to ensure the enabler unit is successfully integrated.

Reference: ATP 3-34.22 *Engineer Operations--Brigade Combat Team and Below*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities

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Improve Trend 8 -

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Tracking of Engineer Defensive Operations **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BEBs do not have sufficient systems, processes, and tools to battle track engineer operations in the defense.

DISCUSSION: BEBs lack processes and procedures to track friendly and enemy engineer unit locations, commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) status updates, obstacle control

measures, planned and executed obstacles, survivability preparations, obstacle locations, barrier material availability and locations, and key engineer Class V. The result is delayed, incomplete, and ineffective engineer support to the brigade combat team (BCT) defense. One reason BEBs struggle to track engineer effort in the defense, when the requirement to manage engineer effort is greatest, is that BEB are usually conducting area security, engagement, and BCT command post (CP) security simultaneously during the defense. Improved staff training, more refined standard operating procedures (SOPs), and improved collaboration with the assistant brigade engineer can improve BEB performance during the defense while simultaneously conducting other missions for the BCT.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BEB should increase collaborative planning with the assistant brigade engineer to develop tracking tools such as synchronization matrices and commander's cards as outlined in Appendix C, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-37.34 *Survivability Operations* and Figures 2-3, 3-3, and 3-5 in ATP 3-90.8 *Combined Arms Countermobility Operations*. These tracking tools will increased shared understanding among BCT and BEB staffs, supported maneuver battalion, and emplacing engineer unit. Additionally, the BEB should establish reporting procedures and standard reports such as reports of intention, initiation, completion, and transfer to track the status of obstacles and survivability effort. The BEB needs to establish a process to track the availability and location of CL IV barrier material. The battalion logistics synchronization meeting is a good venue to review CL IV barrier material and key CL V (crater, shape, SPIDER) for the defense. A best practice observed at JRTC is the development of mission configured loads (MCLs) for wire obstacles. Developing configured loads can improve the ordering and delivery of CL IV barrier material to obstacle locations. Units should incorporate MCLs into unit SOPs.

References: Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-37.34 *Survivability Operations* and ATP 3-90.8 *Combined Arms Countermobility Operations*.

ART 7.2 Conduct Defensive Tasks

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Improve TREND 9

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) in Shaping Terrain **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BEBs struggle with shaping the terrain with obstacles due to the inability to use conventional mines.

DISCUSSION: US land policy restricts the use of non-self-destructing antivehicle land mines and all types of antipersonnel land mines. This means only artillery delivered antivehicle land mines (RAAM) and anti-vehicle Volcano are the only land mine systems available for use by the brigade combat team BCT. Terrain shaping resources organic to the BEB are six D6 dozers, three sapper platoons, and one route clearance platoon for hand emplaced wire obstacles,

demolition obstacles, and SPIDER networked munitions. SPIDER munitions, when integrated with direct and indirect fires, can provide an effective barrier against dismounted breaching of anti-vehicle obstacles and can protect unit flanks from likely enemy assaults. Several BEBs deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with contracted SPIDER trainers who really helped the unit properly employ SPIDER systems. Additionally, the BEB typically fails to maximize obstacle effort with existing resources for several reasons. Because the BEB and assistant brigade engineer fail to determine obstacle effort required in each battalion task force (BN TF) engagement area, the BCT defense order or maneuver battalions don't request adequate engineer support for engagement area development. This typically results in lost obstacle effort as engineer resources must be mobilize into each BN TF area of operations (AO). Additionally, the BEB is usually still completing survivability positions in the lodgment at the start of the defense. A lack of analysis of the effort required for the defense vs protecting key systems in the lodgment prevents the BEB commander from recommending when to transition blade effort from protection of the lodgment to supporting engagement areas forward.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BEBs should incorporate the SPIDER Networked Munitions System into their tactical obstacle plan and should request contractor support from the program manager whenever possible. BEBs should also train on integrating obstacles into maneuver battalion engagement area development in order to enhance the overall effectiveness of obstacles. Effective BEB systems to ensure CL IV barrier material and key CL V (shape, crater, and SPIDER munitions) are available will greatly help obstacle emplace by preventing delays due to resources. Additionally, the BEB should identify a decision point when to assign blade assets and engineer platoons to battalion engagement area development. Understanding the obstacle and survivability effort required to support the commander's intent will help the BEB recommend when to transition the BCTs limited blade assets from protecting assets in the lodgment to supporting defensive preparation in forward engagement areas. Survivability preparations in the lodgment can resume once the obstacle/survivability effort is complete in each BN TF AO.

References: Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-37.34 *Survivability Operations* and ATP 3-90.8 *Combined Arms Countermobility Operations*.

ART 7.2 Conduct Defensive Tasks

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Improve Trend 10

Subject: Engineer Support to Offensive Operations—the Breach **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): There is insufficient planning to synchronize breach operations.

DISCUSSION: There is limited or no obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) provided to engineer reduction units. The lack of obstacle intelligence causes limited or no reverse breach planning

which results in battalion task forces (BN TFs) not organizing to breach enroute to the objective. Units do not plan for both mounted and dismounted breaches. Typically, units will plan for stealth dismounted breaches and struggle to open vehicle lanes that allow for the rapid building of combat power on the objective. Units also do not deploy to the Joint readiness Training Center (JRTC) with Mine Clearing Line Charges (MICLIC) or not plan to employ their MICLICs.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: TF engineers should conduct deliberate reverse breach planning driven by OBSTINTEL. The BCT and brigade engineer battalion (BEB) can enable TF engineer planning by ensuring there is a BCT plan to collect OBSTINTEL and disseminate the information to BN TFs. Typically BCT unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and other systems are tasked with route reconnaissance and not tasked with identifying enemy obstacles. All available ISR should be considered for determining the location and composition of enemy obstacles. BEBs can provide engineer reconnaissance teams to BN TFs or the Reconnaissance Squadron to help identify critical information about engineer obstacles (depth, width, composition, possible bypasses, etc.). BN TFs must organize to breach obstacles enroute to the objective and have a plan to open vehicle lanes which allow for the massing of combat power either near or on the objective. Units should plan to use their MICLICs to open vehicle lanes. BEBs may avoid using their MICLICs due to a lack of armored vehicles for breaching under fire. However, up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or RG-31 mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) can provide protection for MICLIC crews or the MICLICs can be used to reduce obstacles out of contact to open vehicle lanes.

BEST PRACTICE: See Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 01-19 July 01 *Trend Reversal: Combined Arms Breaching*

Reference: ATP 3-34.22 *Engineer Operations--Brigade Combat Team and Below*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities

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Improve Trend 11

SUBJECT: Engineer Reconnaissance Teams

OBSERVATION (TF5): Brigade Engineer Battalions are providing Engineer Reconnaissance Teams (ERTs) to BCT Cavalry Squadrons with limited success.

DISCUSSION: Brigade Engineer Battalions are organizing Engineer Reconnaissance Teams (ERTS) from organic Route Clearance Platoons for many reasons. BEBs are experimenting with engineer task organization, attempting new TTPs to develop obstacle intelligence, and looking for additional ways to add value to the BCT. ERTs observed at JRTC in the last six months were not integrated IAW ATP 3-34.81 *Engineer Reconnaissance* as part of the brigade information collection/intelligence collection effort. ERTs are also not typically not assigned BCT NAIs in a task force AO. ERTs are typically used simply to reinforce the Cavalry Squadron without any direct linkage to obstacle intelligence requirements, PIR, or reporting back to the Brigade Engineer to enable more detailed breach/mobility planning. Cavalry Squadrons generally

welcome the additional combat power provided by ERTs but look to ERTs as mobility support assets or security teams and not reconnaissance assets. Squadrons will utilize ERTs to breach obstacles to maintain mounted reconnaissance freedom of movement or emplace obstacles to support screen and guard missions. A lack of detailed planning to integrate ERTs results in limited ERTs effectiveness because ERTs lack assigned NAIs, PIR, and reporting requirements to the Brigade Engineer. However, engineer support to the Cavalry Squadron does increase freedom of movement for mounted reconnaissance elements and improve the capability of the Cavalry Squadron. Lastly, integration during home station training is essential for effective utilization of ERTs. Units that employed ERTs for the first time at JRTC typically failed to achieve any benefit from ERTs due to poor integration with the supported unit.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BCT and BEB MDMP should result in PIRs, NAIs, and reporting requirements to ERTs and supported units that enable mobility planning within the BCT. ERTs should integrate with supported units during home station training. ERTs should be brigade level reconnaissance assets and included in the BCT intelligence collection plan. Engineers providing mobility support to the Cavalry Squadron should not be called ERTs, rather should be called mobility support teams or simply engineer teams. This will prevent confusion on the task and purpose of engineer teams supporting the Cavalry Squadron.

References: ATP 3-34.81 *Engineer Reconnaissance*
ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 12

Role of the Engineer Company Commander

OBSERVATION (TF5): Engineer Companies in the Airborne/Infantry BCT lack clear task and purpose when all platoons are organized in support of maneuver battalions.

DISCUSSION: Usually one, and sometimes both, engineer companies in an IBCT will have all subordinate platoons task organized to other battalions leaving the company headquarters without a clear task and purpose. This problem is part of the larger issue with regards to the Brigade Engineer Battalion structure and having two engineer companies supporting three maneuver battalions. In IBCT BEBs, there are three sapper platoons to support each maneuver battalion. This results in reduced missions for the company headquarters. In reality, each sapper company headquarters can add significant value to both BEB and BCT mission accomplishment. BEB commanders must clearly think through the task and purpose for each sapper company and set conditions for their success. The #1 issue with sapper company headquarters employment is a lack of habitual relationship with supported maneuver battalions. The lack of a habitual relationship results in maneuver battalions almost always isolating the company commander while deferring to the TF Engineer they have a relationship with, normally the engineer platoon leader. It is essential that sapper company commanders develop relationship with maneuver battalion so they can serve as TF Engineers when directed. BEB Commanders must set

conditions for this integration with maneuver battalion commanders and the BCT commander. BEB Commanders must understand that sapper companies DO NOT have to serve as TF Engineers because there are numerous other missions that engineer companies can provide mission command for in support of the BEB and BCT. These missions may include (please note this is not an all-inclusive list):

1. Manage all blade assets and serve as "TM Dig" for the defense
2. Provide area security / Defend an area / Manage terrain (BEBs are often tasked to secure and defend an area. A sapper company augmented with IN/AR could provide mission command for the mission)
3. Exercise mission command over EAB platoons
4. Execute Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)
5. Mission command the BCT reserve
6. Mission command all three sapper platoons and coordinate execution of engineer tasks for the BCT
7. Serve as breach force commander

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: During MDMP, the BEB staff must consider how to best use all subordinate headquarters to accomplish assigned missions. Following the process for developing COAs during MDMP will enable the BEB staff to recommend the task organization that best enables successful execution of BEB missions. BEB commanders need to develop how they want to utilize their sapper companies and develop appropriate training plans for their companies. For example, if one sapper company is responsible for all three sapper platoons and coordinate M/CM/S support ISO three maneuver battalions while the second sapper company controls all blade assets and the route clearance platoon then each company should have a different METL and training plan. BEB commanders also need to set conditions for their sapper companies by engaging maneuver battalion commanders and the BCT commander on how to best employ sapper companies.

Reference: ATP 3-34.22 *Engineer Operations--Brigade Combat Team and Below*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities

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Improve Trend 13

SUBJECT: Combined Arms Route Clearance - **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): Combined arms route clearance patrols are not consistently achieved due to a lack of understanding of route clearance, inefficient operations synchronization process, and immature targeting processes.

DISCUSSION: A lack of a targeting process results in route clearance platoons patrolling routes in a hazard manner with little intelligence and no combined arms integration. This results in engineer platoons merely patrolling to contact, not targeting against specific threats, and unable to defeat enemy forces defending obstacles. The haphazard nature of the route clearance also

causes a lack of a patrol schedule, no time for troop leading procedures (TLPs), increased Soldier fatigue, and reduced patrol performance over time.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The brigade engineer battalion (BEB) S3 should work with the brigade S3 to ensure route clearance incorporated into the brigade operations synchronizing meeting to develop a patrols schedule out to at least 48 hours out to give subordinates time for troop leading procedures (TLPs). Route clearance patrols should be combined arms patrols whenever possible based on the commander's assessment of risk. The combined arms route clearance patrol should have a security force capable of defeating enemy forces at the obstacle and a clearance force of engineer and/or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) to eliminate explosive hazards.

Reference: Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-34.22 *Engineer Operations--Brigade Combat Team and Below;* Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.4 *Combined Arms Mobility Operations;* ATP 3-90.37 *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities

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Improve Trend 14

SUBJECT: Combined Arms Route Clearance Versus Combined Arms Breaching

OBSERVATION (TF5): Route clearance platoons tasked with escorting ground assault convoys are performing breaching, not route clearance, and fail because breaching tenants are not accounted for the plan.

DISCUSSION: Route clearance patrols are frequently used escort convoys or serve as the lead element in a ground assault convoy. In these roles, the route clearance platoon is performing breaching but is not organized in accordance with breaching fundamentals for mission success. The route clearance platoon is capable of serving as the reduction element in a breach force but additional forces must be organized with the route clearance platoon to suppress, obscure, and secure the breach site. "The task-organized route clearance team should be prepared to employ the breaching fundamentals at any point along the targeted route as directed by the commander. [See Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.4 *Combined Arms Mobility Operations*)] The route clearance team plans for breaching the C-IED obstacle as a contingency if intelligence suggests that the risk is great enough to justify adding breaching elements to the task organization" [para 3-44, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.37 *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*]. The result is route clearance patrols fail to breach obstacles encountered during escort duties or are rapidly destroyed by enemy forces at the obstacle because the breaching fundamentals were not accounted in the plan.

In ATP 3-34.20, Countering Explosive Hazards a distinction is made between how engineers neutralize obstacles in support of maneuver versus movement. To support maneuver, engineers reduce obstacles, which is the creation of a proofed and marked lane through, over, or around an obstacle. The breaching fundamentals (Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, Assault) should be applied to best support maneuver. To support movement, engineers/EOD clear obstacles which

is the elimination of an obstacle that is usually not conducted under fire. The nature of a ground assault convoy and convoy escort duties in the decisive action training environment (DATE) require engineers are organized and augmented to apply the breaching fundamentals when task to support convoys. Combined arms route clearance patrols should target template or actual obstacles and eliminate these threats to support the movement of BCT forces in the area of operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Route clearance patrols should be combined arms patrols whenever possible based on the commander's assessment of risk. If a route clearance patrol is used to lead a ground assault convoy or escort convoys, then the route clearance platoon should organized as part of a breach force and resourced according to the breaching fundamentals. Specifically, the breach force should be sufficient to suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault enemy forces at the obstacle. The BEB should also ensure there is a plan for MEDEVAC, recovery, obstacle intelligence gathering, and that breaching tenants are addressed in the plan.

Reference: Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-34.22 *Engineer Operations--Brigade Combat Team and Below;* Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.4 *Combined Arms Mobility Operations;* ATP 3-90.37 *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices,* ATP 3-34.20, *Countering Explosive Hazards*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities



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Improve Trend 15

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalions (BEBs) Command Post (CP) Transitions **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): BEBs do not adequately plan to transition between early entry, tactical, and main CPs.

DISCUSSION: A good plan to maintain a common operating picture (COP) and reporting from the Joint Forcible Entry through setup of the battalion main CP is essential for battalion mission command and planning. Units that have not established and rehearsed SOPs for each CP and how to transition between CPs, usually struggle throughout their rotation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should have a SOP for establishing and maintaining an analog COP through each phase of the operation and variation of the unit command post and develop procedures for duplicating the COP on digital systems when upper TI is available. The unit should ensure command post evolution is included in MDMP sessions and final unit orders/FRAGOs. A good tactic technique and procedure (TTP) is to have analog products with FM/voice reporting for the early entry CP, transition to analog/Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) COP with FM/JCR reporting for the tactical CP, and develop all analog and digital mission command systems in the main CP.

Reference: Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 16

SUBJECT: Company Command Posts (CPs) **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5): Poor company CPs limit the ability of the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) to mission command due to inadequate battle tracking and reporting from company to battalion. The battalion is unable to maintain an adequate COP because company CPs are inadequate.

DISCUSSION: Company CPs are often just a green notebook in the company commander's pocket with very little digital or analog battle tracking. Company commanders struggle with limited communications with subordinate platoons and teams to receive reports and do not have a standard operating procedure (SOP) to process information within the company CP. Some company commanders do not understand the importance of a CP and deliberately fail to establish any CP at all.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES*:* Companies should train on CP operations and develop SOPs that cover manning, equipping, sheltering, protecting, and connecting the CP with subordinate, adjacent, and higher units.

References: Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0, *The Operations Process*. Also see Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*.

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 17

SUBJECT: Engineer Company Mission Command **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Engineer Companies): Engineer company command posts (CPs) struggle with their role and fail to properly battle track the scheme of engineer operations which hinders an accurate battalion (BN) common operational picture (COP).

DISCUSSION: Platoons usually do not report well for a variety of reasons, including a poor primary alternate contingency and emergency (PACE) communications plan, lack of standardized report formats, obstacle numbering scheme and complete reliance on Joint Capabilities Release/Blue Force Tracker (JCR/BFT). PACE plan at the platoon and company (PLT/Co) level is typically only JCR/BFT and FM that causes PLTs and Co headquarters (HQs) to struggle exchanging information. Members of Co CPs are often not proficient in command post functions and specifically with maintaining both an analog and digital COP. A lack of proficiency on JCR/BFT limits the system's usefulness as a COP. Commanders do not issue operations orders (OPORD) as missions change and platoons are not clear on their responsibilities to report.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Responsibilities and formats for reporting must be understood from BN to PLT level. Commanders must plan and issue orders for each phase of the operation, not just an initial OPORD in the interim staging base (ISB). CPs must be exercised at home station using digital and analog tracking systems, with thorough communications training for platoons and CP personnel alike. PLTs should bring and employ their OE-254s to extend their FM range. CPs and PLTs cannot rely solely on JCR and must have a complete PACE plan. PLT and CPs must be trained to build and use overlays in JCR/BFT.

References: Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0, *The Operations Process*. Also see Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 18

SUBJECT: Task Force (TF) Engineer (ENG) Roles **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Engineer Companies): TF ENGs are not proficient or experienced enough to balance their roles as ask TF engineer and Platoon Leader/Company (PL and Co CO.)

DISCUSSION: Platoon leaders struggle to explain their capabilities to maneuver commanders and do not understand the functions of a TF ENG. Additionally, changing TF ENG multiple times during a rotation significantly hinders integration of the TF ENG. TF ENGs do not understand enemy engineer capabilities, other assets available in the brigade engineer battalion/brigade combat team (BEB/BCT), echelons above brigade engineer (EAB) engineer capability, and how to integrate into battalion and company (BN/Co) engagement area (EA) development. TF ENGs don't know how to plan or coordinate for blade assets, resulting in significant idle blade time. The TF ENG do not integrate with the BN S2 to develop an modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), which results in the maneuver BN overlooking mobility corridors that the enemy exploits.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: TF ENGs should to be aligned with maneuver units at home station to integrate and develop relationships. A deliberate training plan is needed to ensure TF ENGs understand their functions, EA development, obstacle planning, survivability planning, and are proficient in developing key execution matrices, e.g. survivability and obstacle synch matrices.

References: Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0 *The Operations Process*. Also see Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 19

SUBJECT: Engineer Operations during the Defense **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Engineer Companies): Ineffective counter-mobility and survivability effort contribute to the brigade combat team (BCT) defense failing.

DISCUSSION: Engineers are not well integrated into the seven steps of EA development which results in ineffective obstacles. Additionally, idle blade time is generally is excess of 70% due to a lack of a survivability matrix, units not adhering to the survivability matrix, or receiving units not ready to employ the blade effort. At the team and squad level, Sappers are proficient in emplacing wire obstacles, but obstacles are not always sighted in properly or tied into terrain. Direct and indirect fires are not always planned to cover the obstacles. Poor Class IV/V synchronization causes delayed obstacle emplacement resulting in units loosing up to 80 percent of the available time to emplace obstacles.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Engineers need to improve how obstacles are integrated into the supported maneuver unit's direct and indirect fire plan. Developing an obstacle handover checklist is a way to help young engineer leaders integrate with maneuver counterparts. Engineers should train for and conduct thorough reconnaissance to identify areas to target enemy mounted and dismounted formations and where the enemy can bypass obstacles. BEB staff and company command posts must develop better Class IV/V plans to ensure resources reach

platoons in time to construct required obstacles. BEB staff must develop a survivability matrix that companies and platoons ruthlessly enforce.

References: Field Manuel 6-0: *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*; FM 3-21.10 *The Infantry Rifle Company*, FM 3-21.8 *The Infantry Platoon and Squad;* FM 3-90.1 *Offense and Defense Volume 1*.

ART 7.2 Conduct Defensive Tasks

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Improve Trend 20

SUBJECT: Engineer Operations During the Offense **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Engineer Companies): Deliberate breaches do not fully utilize breaching tenants and fundamentals.

DISCUSSION: The breach force commander is usually a maneuver platoon leader or company commander augmented with a sapper platoon or squad. Engineer squads typically will successfully execute the breach battle drill, however integration and synchronization above the engineer squad level is lacking or non-existent. The breach is typically not planned in detail nor are rehearsals conducted. Obstacle Intelligence is lacking which results in the breach force unprepared for the obstacles encountered.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task Force engineers (TF ENGs) must be trained to ensure engineer effort is integrated into the maneuver plan for the attack. TF ENGs need to work with the battalion S2 to identify enemy obstacles from line of departure to the objective, accounting for natural and tactical obstacles along the route to the objective. The TF ENG must conduct reverse breach planning to identify the appropriate engineer task organization. The TF ENG needs to ensure fires are coordinated for obscuration. ENGs need to conduct internal rehearsals of the appropriate breach battle drill and combined rehearsals with the supported maneuver unit. The ENG platoon leader or company commander could be the breach force commander but must be trained to employ direct/indirect fires at the breach site. The engineer leader should be trained at home station to be the breach force commander.

BEST PRACTICE: See Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 01-19 July 01 *Trend Reversal: Combined Arms Breaching*

Reference: ATP 3-34.22 *Engineer Operations--Brigade Combat Team and Below*

ART 5.1.1.2 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities

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Improve Trend 21

SUBJECT: Signal Company Mission Command **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Signal Company): The signal company struggles with establishing a company command post (CP) and executing CP operations.

DISCUSSION: Often, signal companies set up their company CP for the first time while at JRTC. The resulting friction with command post operations stems from not developing and validating standard operating procedures (SOPs) and not identifying and training CP personnel prior to a combat training center (CTC) rotation. Commanders rarely utilize a five paragraph company operations order (OPORD) and fail to battle track and maintain shared understanding of the brigade fight through utilization of a common operational picture (COP). Without effective CP operations, signal company commanders lack the situational awareness and tools necessary to effectively execute mission command.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Establish an SOP in accordance with guidelines found in Chapter 1 of Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff organization and Operations*, May 2014 and clearly define setup, roles and responsibilities, battle rhythm, and battle drills within the company CP. Develop both analog (large laminated map/trackers) and digital (spreadsheets and Power Point slides) means for battle tracking and portrayal of the company COP. Identify company CP personnel early in the training phase and develop a training plan for them. Physically set up the company CP and validate the CP team and company SOP during home station training prior to a combat training center (CTC) rotation.

References: Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0 *The Operations Process*. Also see Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 22

SUBJECT: Signal Company Mission Command **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Signal Company): Signal company integration with the brigade S6 section often lacks clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and expectations which results in tension, conflict, and in some cases failure to effectively conduct parallel or collaborative planning.

DISCUSSION: Failure to clearly delineate their respective roles and responsibilities usually causes friction between the signal company and the brigade S6 section during the brigade military decision-making process (MDMP). In some cases the signal company commander is absorbed into the brigade S6 section as a staff officer. When this happens, the commander and signal company struggle due to the commander's inherent responsibilities and tasks not receiving the attention required.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The signal company commander should be involved in MDMP with the brigade S6 to provide a clear picture of the status of teams and equipment, and

influence plans which will ultimately affect the company's personnel and assets. The brigade S6 should plan communications support for the brigade and then work with the brigade S3, through the operations process, to task the BEB/BSTB for signal company asset utilization when necessary. The signal company commander can contribute in collaborative planning with the brigade S6 and subsequently provide details to aid in parallel planning with the BEB/brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) S3. This ensures the synchronization of efforts, frees up time for the commander to effectively command the company, and increases the effectiveness of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule for planning.

References: Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0 *The Operations Process*. Also see Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 23

SUBJECT: FM Retransmission (RETRANS) **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Signal Company): The brigade S6 and brigade signal company fail to properly plan, prepare, and execute effective FM RETRANS operations.

DISCUSSION: FM RETRANS operations are a common friction point at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the problem is NOT the availability of good terrain. Common shortfalls include poor synchronization of coverage relative to the maneuver plan, a lack of basic operator knowledge (antenna setup, troubleshooting, TLPs, and reporting), equipment shortages, and personnel shortages.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Field Manual (FM) 6-02.53 *Tactical Radio Operations*, page 4-19, provides an outline of the Brigade S6's responsibilities with FM RETRANS planning. Key to successful planning are the integration and synchronization of the communications plan with the maneuver Course of Action, planning for contingency RETRANS locations based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), determining security and logistics support, and finally reporting requirements. It is the brigade S6's responsibility to plan RETRANS and the company's responsibility to ensure the teams are manned, trained, and equipped to carry out that plan. Establish a RETRANS team standard operating procedure (SOP) including mission orders, priorities of work, precombat checks and inspections (PCC/PCI) checklists, and load plans, duties and responsibilities, and PACE communications plan. RETRANS teams must be fully trained in radio and antenna operations, proper site selection and defense, troop leading procedures (TLPs), and the basics of field craft. If RETRANS teams will co-locate with another unit, ensure proper link up and integration occur prior to mission execution.

References: Field Manual (FM) 6-02.53 *Tactical Radio Operations*; FM 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 24

SUBJECT: Command and Support Relationships **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 BEB Signal Company): Poor integration and a lack of clearly defined command and support relationships for the brigade's organic signal company, platoons, and teams as well as expeditionary signal battalion (ESB) enablers.

DISCUSSION: Brigade and battalions fail to effectively integrate their supporting signal elements. As a result, both supported and supporting units do not understand each other's missions and signal elements experience friction with integration into the supported unit's movement, security, and sustainment plans. The supported unit often does not understand the unique capabilities and requirements for the signal elements.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: It is imperative to conduct link up with the supported unit at the earliest possible point and integrate into their battle rhythm events. Participation in the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTCs) Leader Training Phase (LTP) is critical for this initial link up and planning for communications support. Develop an integration standard operating procedure outlining duties and responsibilities for the supported and the supporter. The signal company and expeditionary signal battalion enablers should develop a clearly defined enabler brief giving the supported unit their capabilities, limitations, and required sustainment.

References: Field Manual 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 25

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence Company (MICO) Attendance at the Leaders Training Program (LTP) **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION: Key MICO personnel are often absent at the LTP.

DISCUSSION (TF5 MICO): Units routinely fail to bring a knowledgeable representative from the MICO during LTP. The MICO is complex in the amount of intelligence power it brings to the Brigade. As a result, the overall military decision-making process (MDMP) has little or no input from the executor and the concept of operations is written by someone with little to no knowledge of how to properly employ the assets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units coming to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) need to ensure that a knowledgeable representative from the brigade MICO is present

during LTP to ensure that proper oversight and guidance can be established for the use of signals and human intelligence (SIGINT/HUMINT), and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) during rotations. For example by regulation, "…the S-2X is the Commander's principal advisor for all matters concerning the conduct of human intelligence.

References: Field Manual (FM) 2-0 *Intelligence* FM 2-22.3 *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*

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Improve Trend 26

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence Company (MICO) Mission Command **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION: MICOs struggle with mission command.

DISCUSSION (TF5 MICO): MICOs struggle to exercise mission command because units frequently do not establish a command post (CP) and a lack of a primary alternate contingency and emergency (PACE) plan to maintain communications with all MICO elements. Additionally, MICO's frequently do not issue operations and fragmentary (OPORDs/ FRAGOs) to ensure all elements to the lowest level understand their missions. The result is a lack of shared understanding within the MICO. The MICO commander lacks situational awareness of their formation and is unable to make accurate recommendations on how to best employ MICO assets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MICOs must come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) prepared to execute CP operations, track the status of systems/personnel, and issue OPORDs/FRAGOs. Units should rehearse establishing their command post and have clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the command post. Any command post standard operating procedure (SOP) should cover (but is not limited to):

- Precombat checks and inspections (PCC/PCIs),
- PACE plans for both administrative and technical reporting channels,
- Asset equipment capabilities and limitations,
- Reporting requirements and timelines,
- Report formats, trackers, and examples.

Units should come to the JRTC with rehearsed PACE plans that allow for the flow of information to/from the company command post and all elements within the MICO.

References: Army Doctrine Reference Publication ADRP 6-0 *Mission Command* and Field Manual 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*

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Improve Trend 27

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence Company (TF 5 MICO) Mission Command **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION: Command and support relationships are not clearly defined for MICO enablers.

DISCUSSION (TF5 MICO): The MICO typically provides small teams (LLVI/Prophet, HCTs, OMT, UAS, ISR PLT) to maneuver battalions per the brigade intelligence collection plan. These enablers often do not have specified command and support relationships, which complicates their sustainment and reporting creates confusion about which command is responsible for them. With regards to MICO assets, task organization caveats must be included in the brigade operations order (OPORD). The two most command and support relationships are operational control (OPCON) or direct support (DS). With OPCON, the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) as the parent unit has limited administrative control (ADCON) over teams operating in maneuver battalion operating areas. The brigade OPORD should specify which command is responsible for ADCON functions like personnel replacement and casualty tracking. With regards to DS, the BEB is again limited in providing sustainment for MICO teams operating forward in support of maneuver battalions. The brigade OPORD should provide caveats for sustaining MICO assets and limit how much the supported unit can prioritize the MICO asset in support. Otherwise, maneuver units will use MICO assets to collect battalion priority information requirements and not brigade information requirements. Lastly, reporting requirements and any assistance needed to move collected information must be in the brigade OPPRD. Too often MICO assets collect information that can impact the brigade's success but the information stagnates at the point of collection due to a limited primary alternate contingency and emergency (PACE) plan or a lack of understanding by the supported maneuver battalion to move the information to brigade.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Effective use of MICO assets results from carefully defining the command or support relationship so both the BEB and supported maneuver battalion understand their role to maximize the capability of the MICO asset.

References: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command* and Field Manual 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.*

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Improve Trend 28

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence (MI) Soldier Skills **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF5 MICO): MI Soldiers are too often poorly trained.

DISCUSSION: MI Soldiers lack proficiency in the systems they are required to operate or arrive with non-mission capable systems. Units are forced to depend on Field Service Representatives

(FSR) support at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). This takes training time away from the rotational unit to get their systems operational in support of the brigade mission. The problem results from poor maintenance and incomplete training at home station, specifically with individual certifications from the National Security Agency (NSA), language skills, and other required MI MOS specific training.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: While there are real limitations at home station with maintaining MI specific systems and currency on MI specific individual training, units must manage their pre-rotational training to maximize operational systems and Soldiers current with all required training/certifications. Additionally, Red tests and system validations during the RSOI phase will significantly help the unit prior to Force on Force operations.

References: Field Manual (FM) 2-19.4, *Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations*
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Improve Trend 29

SUBJECT: Command Support Relationship for HUMINT Collection Teams (HCT)

OBSERVATION (TF5 MICO): A lack of detailed planning at the BCT and BEB staff level result in ineffective command or support relationships for HUMINT Collection Teams (HCT) that negatively impact HCT operations.

DISCUSSION: The appropriate use of well thought out command support relationships is one of the primary trends that has a large impact on the proper utilization of an HCT during DATE rotations. The majority of units fail to thoroughly think through which command support relationship will be the most beneficial and will ensure maximum utilization of HUMINT collection assets. A majority of units either put all of the teams in DS, or GS roles, without thinking through how freedom of maneuver and communications struggles will impact the ability of the team to functional at an optimal level. Additionally, a lot of the units do not know how to properly leverage the operations process to support changing the relationship and structure if it is needed. Standard command or support relationships are usually inadequate to ensure effective employment of HCTs and require caveats/special instructions to solve gaps. For example, under GS, the parent unit is responsible for sustainment and positioning the HCT. However, the BEB is usually unable to support a HCT operating in a maneuver battalion area of operations. Therefore, there must be tasks to the maneuver battalion to provide security and sustainment for the HCT when operating in a GS role. Conversely, if a HCT is OPCON to a maneuver battalion, how the parent unit will provide ADCON or what assistance the supported unit will provide for ADCON (i.e. sustainment) is not addressed in an order. Nor is the supported unit tasked with collecting HCT specific PIRs to enable the supported unit to best employ OPCON HCTs IAW the BCT Intelligence Collection Plan. There is no perfect solution with regards to command or support relationship for HCTs. BCT and BEB staff must understand the advantages and disadvantages with relationship and publish detailed coordinating instructions to ensure HCTs are effectively employed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Recommendation: It is highly recommended that anyone responsible for determining the allocation of HUMINT assets be well versed in application of command support relationships and navigating the operations process. FM 2-0 provides a good starting point in Chapter 1, paragraphs 1-102 through 1-105 on task organization considerations for HCTs and chapter 2, paragraphs 2-84 through 2-95, provide information on planning considerations and employment and control of HCTs. Individuals planning for the use of HCTs can use both of these sections to help determine, based on MA/IPB and METT-TC, the best command support relationship for HCTs. In addition to the information provided in FM 2-0, units should also consider the depth of the communication packages, freedom of movement, and logistical coordination to conduct movement that they will have available to support each potential command support relationship.

References: FM 2-0, *Intelligence*; FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*
ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 30

SUBJECT: Lack of Military Intelligence Soldier readiness

OBSERVATION (TF5 MICO): Brigade Engineer Battalions are failing to manage training of SIGINT Soldiers which significantly degrades the Intelligence Warfighting Function within a BCT.

DISCUSSION: SIGINT Soldiers arrive to JRTC without access to critical computer networks and lack required annual training. Considerable effort is required by OCTs and Fort Polk Foundry to fix shortcoming which are inherent unit training responsibilities. Specific issues are:

1. Soldiers lack access to JWICS and NSA Net because net access and PKI tokens are not maintained. This indicates Soldiers are not accessing these key systems every 30 days in order to maintain their accounts.

2. Soldiers are not current on required annual NSA certifications – 1000, 1100, 1800, 2201, and 3101.

3. Soldiers have not completed annual language training as required by AR 11-6, *Army Foreign Language Program*. This indicates BCTs lack language training programs.

Overall, the lack of network access and certifications indicate leaders and units are not effectively managing essential training required to ensure the readiness of the Intelligence Warfighting Function within a BCT.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Brigade Engineer Battalions must ensure adequate battalion and company level training management oversight to ensure all MI Soldiers maintain essential network access and certifications. BEB Commanders should have a discussion with

BCT Commanders to gain prioritization of essential MI specific training. BCT Commanders should consider MI training with regards to taskings and other priorities for the BEB. BCT Commanders may need to resource time, money, or request support from Division to ensure MI Soldiers are able to maintain their access to critical systems. Installation Foundry sites and Division G2s can provide assistance to maintain network access.

References: FM 2-0 *Intelligence*, *AR 11-6 Army Foreign Language Program*, United States Signals Intelligence Directive SP0018: Supplemental Procedures for the Collection, Processing, Retention, and Dissemination of Signals Intelligence Information and Data containing personal information of Non-United States Persons, Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 31

SUBJECT: Redundant communications for SIGINT Teams
OBSERVATION (TF5 MICO): LLVI teams do not have any or all necessary equipment to incorporate a true P.A.C.E. communication plan. Teams rarely have the ability to communicate with supported unit and no ability to communicate with the parent unit.

DISCUSSION: A lack of detailed planning by BEB staff and MICO result in LLVI teams unable to communicate with supported unit and parent headquarters. LLVI teams will lack dismounted and mounted short range radios (ASIP/MBITR) and long range communication systems or procedures. Detailed planning is required during BN MDMP and Company troop leading procedures to ensure LLVI teams have adequate and redundant systems to communicate both with supported and parent units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BN Staff/MICO should request support from BCT S6, Division G2 & G6, and supported unit to provide redundant communications for LLVI teams. LLVI teams required adequate communication systems to communicate both mounted and dismounted with their supported unit and require long range communication systems to send reports back to the CO/BN/BDE HQs. Teams should have ASIPS/MBITR, JCR, and TACSAT. There are long range communications systems available from JRTC replicated Division G2 for rotational units. There may also be systems available within the BEB and BCT. Lastly, the supported unit can provide long range communications support on both lower and upper TI to assist teams sending/receiving reports from BDE S2.

References: FM 2-0, *Intelligence*
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Improve Trend 32

SUBJECT: Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Operations **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF5 MICO): Brigades struggle to successfully conduct UAS operations because required synchronization and integration is poorly understood.

DISCUSSION: For successful UAS operations, the UAS platoon requires (1) redundant digital communications, (2) a collection plan with clear task and purpose, graphics, and NAIs, (3) airspace control measures with the brigade aviation element (BAE), (4) a security element to secure the UAS site or the brigade accepting reduced flying hours because the UAS platoon must dedicate manpower to secure themselves. Failure to synchronize and integrate the UAS platoon with the brigade intelligence collection plan and air space control measures, which is enabled by digital communications, results in poor utilization of the brigade's organic full motion video (FMV) asset. It is not uncommon to see UAS utilization rates below 20 percent.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The brigade engineer battalion (BEB) staff must be trained to monitor and enable UAS operations when necessary. The BEB staff must ensure UAS operations are synchronized with the brigade intelligence collection plan and air space control measures. The BEB staff needs to develop tracking procedures for each UAS flight, such as a conditions check or execution checklist. This will ensure each UAS flight has the required information for successful execution. The military intelligence company (MICO) commander can assist the BEB staff but ultimately, the BEB staff must monitor UAS operations so the BEB commander is informed about friction points with brigade staff that will require his/her involvement to solve.

References: Field Manual (FM) 2-19.4, *Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations*; FM 3-55 *Information Collection*

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Improve Trend 33

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Company/Platoon Training Readiness

OBSERVATION (TF5 MP Company): Military Police units do not arrive to JRTC trained or prepared to execute all three Military Police Disciplines (Security and Mobility Support, Police Operations, Detention Operations).

DISCUSSION (TF5 MP Company): Typically, Military Police units will focus on detention operations in preparation for their JRTC rotation at the expense of other military police disciplines. As a result, MP units struggle to simultaneously execute multiple MP disciplines during a JRTC rotation. For example, a MP platoon will typically receive missions for each squad. One squad will execute detention operations while the remaining two squads perform security tasks or HN police partnership tasks. Due to the focus on detention operations during

pre-rotational training, the MP Platoon struggles to manage simultaneous squad missions across multiple police disciplines.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Home station training must be balanced across all three military police disciplines with a special focus on detention and security operations since these are the most common disciplines executed by MPs at JRTC. MP platoons must be trained to operate as a platoon and decentralized by squad. MP platoons are best prepared for JRTC by develop solid fundamentals for each MP discipline, good procedures for TLPs, PCIs/PCS, CP operations, and patrolling as opposed to developing expertise in a single military police discipline.

Reference: Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations



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Improve Trend 34

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Company Mission Command **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF5 MP Company): MP companies bring untested and incomplete tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs).

DISCUSSION (TF5 MP Company): Untested and poorly understood unit TACSOPs forces units to create ad hoc solutions to routine events (from PCCs/PCIs to Detainee Collection Point procedures) that are not based in doctrinal reference.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop, test through application, and refine unit TACSOP in order to allow unity of effort across the organization and serve as a doctrinal foundation for tactical execution. Base collective task execution in Training Circular (TC) 3-39.30 *MP Leader's Handbook*

Reference: Army Techniques (ATP) 3-90.90 *Army Tactical Standard Operating Procedures* Chapter 2; TC 3-39.30 *MP Leader's Handbook;* Field Manual (FM) 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*; Operate a Command Post (07-2-5135).

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 35

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Support to Security and Mobility **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION: MP units are poor at security and mobility support in decisive action.

DISCUSSION (TF5 MP Company): MP units often focus heavily on detention operations prior to a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation and fail to prioritize security operations. As a result, Soldiers fail to conduct basic Soldier skills while mounted and dismounted, such as range card and sector sketch development, basic hand and arm signals, near and far recognition signals, establish a fighting position, react to contact, and react to indirect fire.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Conduct deliberate unit training management focused on the execution of all three MP disciplines at the collective level. Use training and evaluation outlines from the Army Training Network (ATN) and the Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) to build training plans and develop proficiency across the disciplines. Cross train on related infantry skills.

References: FM 3-21.10, *Infantry Rifle Company;*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 36

SUBJECT: Head and Headquarters Company (HHC) Mission Command **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION: HHC company commanders typically do not publish operations orders (OPORDS or FRAGOs) at any phase throughout a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation.

DISCUSSION (TF 5 HHC BEB): The failure to issue OPORDS or FRAGOs leads to a lack of understanding of the unit's mission and the commander's intent. Subordinates are not able to successfully employ disciplined initiative because of a lack of shared understanding of the key tasks, control measures, commander's expectations, and reporting requirements. This results in a reactive organization.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Exercise mission command and execute the operations process throughout each phase of the JRTC exercise

References: FM 3-21.10, *Infantry Rifle Company;* FM 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*.

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Improve Trend 37

SUBJECT: Head and Headquarters Company (HHC) Command Post (CP) Operations **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 HHC BEB): HHC CP operations are inadequate and unrehearsed

DISCUSSION: Company CPs are routinely ad hoc and dysfunctional. They fail to adequately track and process information that is relevant for the commander to make decisions or to convey a common operational picture. Units need to develop and test a CP standard operating procedure (SOP) at home station. The SOP should include unit specific information, occupation and layout standards, staff requirements, duties and responsibilities, necessary equipment, tracking products, tools, battle tracking methods, and standards. At a minimum, the CP should include dual FM communications, Joint Capabilities Release (JCR), and analog tracking.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Establish and validate company CP operations prior to deploying to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

References: FM 3-21.10, *Infantry Rifle Company;* FM 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*; Operate a Command Post (07-2-5135).

ART: 5.2 Conduct Command Post Operations

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Improve Trend 38

SUBJECT: Head and Headquarters Company (HHC) Role in Security **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 HHC BEB): HHC roles in area security and base defense are poorly synchronized.

DISCUSSION: The brigade engineer battalion (BEB) can receive the mission to secure the brigade combat team (BCT) main command post (CP) and will assign the base defense mission to the BEB HHC. The HHC typically struggles to execute the base defense appropriately. Plans lack mounted and dismounted primary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent, and strongpoint battle positions. Direct fire control measures, fires integration plans, and engagement/disengagement criteria are missing. Furthermore, units fail to address engagement area development and commanders fail to assume tactical control (TACON) of adjacent units to synchronize base defense efforts.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Commanders tasked with area/base defense must assume TACON of adjacent units early and exercise mission command to ensure all elements understand the mission and commander's intent. Units also need to implement the Common Defensive Control Measures as outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90, *Offense and Defense.*

Reference: (ADRP) 3-90, *Offense and Defense*; Field Manual (FM) 3-21.10, *Infantry Rifle Company;* FM 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*; Operate a Command Post (07-2-5135).

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 39

SUBJECT: Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) Head and Headquarters Company (HHC) Integration of Enablers **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 HHC BEB): BEB HHC commanders have difficulty integrating enablers like military police platoons, civil affairs, psychological operations, and others.

DISCUSSION: Units continually fail to establish and adhere to doctrinally defined command and support relationships. This leads to misuse and mismanagement of enablers. Issues typically begin upon reception on the new enabler and the company's failure to integrate the asset into the team. This leads to differences in expectations on both sides of the relationship, i.e. reporting requirements, tasking authorities, etc.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop an enabler integration checklist to effectively integrate, employ, and support non-organic units by creating a shared understanding of duties and responsibilities of all parties involved.

References: Field Manual (FM) 3-21.10, *Infantry Rifle Company;* FM 6-0 *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*; Operate a Command Post (07-2-5135).

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations

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Improve Trend 40

SUBJECT: Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Working Group **No change over the last six months**

OBSERVATION (TF 5 EOD): During Decisive Action Training Exercise (DATE) rotations, rotational training units (RTU) have not reliably held brigade-level C-IED working groups.

DISCUSSION: The C-IED working group outputs should feed the targeting process with consolidated analysis and feed recommendations to targeting. The working group should execute C-IED information dissemination, acting as an effective platform to push counter-IED information to the force. The working group supports the C-IED lines of operation (LOOs) defeat the device, attack the network and train the force. If this working group is not conducted the result is no synchronization C-IED effort across the brigade formation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: RTU develops a C-IED working group at or prior to the Leaders Training Program (LTP). The working group should be part of the brigade targeting cycle battle rhythm. RTU develops a list of C-IED working group inputs/outputs

References: Joint Publication (JP) 3-15.1 *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations*; Army Techniques Publication 3-90.37 *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*; Training Circular (TC) 3-90.119 *US Army Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Training* , ATTP 2-91.4 and 4A *Intelligence Support to Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Volumes I and II (S/NF)*; Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 09-47 ALL Handbook No. 09-49 *IED-Defeat Leader's Handbook.*

ART 5.1.2 Prepare for Tactical Operations