Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE)

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REMOVE ALL CELL PHONES

Purpose

This program of instruction will provide staffs and Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoIST) a basic understanding of the IPOE process and its role in developing a Personnel Recovery (PR) plan.

Agenda

- What is IPOE?
- IPOE process:
  - Define the Operating Environment (OE)
  - Describe the environmental effects
  - Evaluate the threat
  - Determine threat Courses of Action (COA)
- Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE) in IPOE
- What does this all mean?
- References and resources

What is IPOE?

A Four-Step Analytical Process Accomplishes the Following:

- Continuous: always being updated
- Reduces uncertainties: terrain, weather, and threat
- Helps visualization of enemy capabilities and possible COAs



Step 1: Define the Operating Environment

- Identify significant characteristics of the environment, both physical and social:
  - Terrain that may isolate or create choke points
  - Key players, both friendly and enemy
- Identify the limits of the OE:
  - US, host nation, threat groups, etc.
  - Control measures (military or civilian)
  - Boundaries that are not well-defined (i.e., AFG-PAK)
- Who are the stakeholders in a PR incident?
- Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps (what don't we know?)

Initiate a collection plan to start filling information gaps

Step 2: Describe the Environment's Effects

- How does the environment affect both enemy and friendly operations:
  - What are the effects of terrain and weather on an Isolated Person (IP)?
  - What are the risks based on the personalities of local leaders (friendly or enemy)?
  - Are risks higher during certain holidays or due to world events?
  - How can this impact the following:
    - Evasion
    - Resupply
    - Recovery
- How will this influence Isolated Soldier's Guidance (ISG) or the Evasion Plan of Action (EPA)?
  - Will additional parameters need to be added?
  - How often are these documents revisited?

ASCOPE in IPOE

Areas/Structures
Political precincts/districts
Religious boundaries
Police/military boundaries
Threat zones
Criminal areas
Governmental or official buildings
Displaced persons camps
Street/urban patterns



Orgs/People/Events
Political/military
Religious sects
Criminal groups
NGOs
Ethnicity
Cultural nuances
Media or messaging
Religious or political holidays

Capabilities
Electricity, water, fuel, health services, security, transportation

ASCOPE: Areas

Address terrain analysis from a civilian perspective:

- Tribal areas
- Territorial boundaries
- Religious boundaries
- Political boundaries
- Roadways/networks
- Urban, rural, mountainous
- Security force boundaries
- Locations of government centers
- Distance from effective government control



Unit boundaries – How do they align?

AREAS


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BOUNDARIES


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
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
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MILITARY

AREAS
POLICE


AREAS
GOVERNMENT


AREAS

ASCOPE: Structures

How a structure's location, function, and capabilities can support or hinder operations:

- High payoff targets:
  - Government Centers
  - Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) facilities
  - Bazaars/markets
  - Utilities
- Cultural sites that are protected:
  - Mosques
  - Hospitals
- Facilities with practical applications:
  - Radio stations
  - Jails (hardened structures)

Not only physical value, but what is the PR impact?

ASCOPE: Capabilities

Capabilities can refer to the actual infrastructure as well as the ability of local government to provide key functions and services:

- Are local government leaders effective?
- Is there a non-governmental leader with influence?
- Actual infrastructure:
  - Sewage
  - Water
  - Electricity
  - Academics
  - Trash
  - Medical
  - Security

ASCOPE: Organizations

Consider all non-military groups or institutions in the Area of Operation (AO) – Cultural, Social, Religious:

- Some groups may be indigenous to the area:
  - Tribes
  - Political involvement of insurgent groups
  - Media (TV, radio, newspapers, periodicals)
- Others may come from outside the AO:
  - Non-Government Organizations (NGO)
  - International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
  - Doctors without Borders
  - Other Government Agencies (OGA)
  - Contractors
  - Intergovernmental orgs?

ASCOPE: People

For all non-military personnel that USF encounter in the AO:

- How do they communicate?
  - Word of mouth
  - Paper media
  - Mosques
  - Satellite television
  - Cell phones/PTT
  - Internet
  - Jirgas
- What about influential local leaders (elders, religious leaders, etc.)?



These can all aid two-way traffic before and after an isolating event.

ASCOPE: Events

Events can be routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations:

- "Work week"
- National/provincial elections
- Holidays (religious/national):
  - Ramadan
  - Eid'Al Fitr
- Agricultural seasons
- Trade cycles
- World events
- Natural disasters

Step 3: Evaluate the Threat

- Determine the threat capability:
  - Do they have cells specifically designed for kidnapping/assassination?
  - Have they attempted kidnapping or assassination previously?
  - Do they have a support network and can how can they move a victim?
  - How do they communicate?
- What are the enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)?
- Is the enemy soliciting outside resources or training?
- What are they saying? What guidance is being published regarding kidnapping?
- Who do they want? What is their motivation?
  - Criminal elements or opportunists
  - Enemy networks motivated by ideology or needing money to fund activities

Step 4: Determine Threat Course Of Action

- Develop enemy COAs from reporting (current and historic) and Significant Activities (SIGACTS)
- Identify and develop threat COAs that will influence ISG and the PR plan:
  - Develop a Situational Template (SITEMP) to develop an ISG or EPA (go/no-go areas, Designated Area for Recovery [DAFR], caches, etc.)
  - Develop an Event Template (EVENTEMP) to refine NAIs and indicators
- Develop indicators that will raise Situational Awareness (SA) of Soldiers:
  - Enemy surveillance
  - Enemy messaging or communications
  - Through local engagements and Host Nation Forces

What is the end state of the threat?

What Does This All Mean?

- Considerations of isolating an area or village:
  - Property damage
  - Damage of infrastructure
  - Local economy (business or agriculture)
  - Perception of the population
- Effects on PR:
  - Self-recovery or unassisted recovery more probable
  - Assistance from HNSF or local population
  - Preposition caches
  - Feasibility of recovery assets
  - Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) → Joint Personnel Recovery Support Product (JPRSP)
- Civil/military operations:
  - Leverage projects
  - Assistance visits (Medical Civic Action Programs [MEDCAP], Veterinary Civic Action Program [VETCAP], Agribusiness Development Team [ADT], etc.)

Continuous Process

- As information is updated, re-address the analysis (the "so what" of collection):
  - New local leadership
  - Change in threat reporting or TTPs
  - Observations from a patrol
  - Key leader or street-level engagements
- Impacts on PR:
  - Are they a team player (which team?)
  - Sources reporting that enemy TTPs are changing to isolate US elements
  - Patrol observed bazaar vendors trying to separate the trail vehicle in the patrol
  - Word on the street is:
    - Trying to get USF, HNSF, or local leader
    - On patrol or on the Common Operational Picture

QUESTIONS?

References

- JP 3-50. *Personnel Recovery*, 5 January 2007
- AR 525-28. *Personnel Recovery*, 5 March 2010
- FM 2-01.3. *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace,* October 2009 (w/ C 1 and 2)
- FM 3-50.1. *Personnel Recovery*, 1 September 2011, DRAFT
- FM 3-05.231. *Special Forces Personnel Recovery*, 13 June 2003
- FM 3-50.3. *Survival, Evasion, and Recovery*, March 2007
- Call Handbook 09-25. *Army Personnel Recovery*, 14 April 2009
- FM 3-0. *Operations*, 27 February 2008
- Chief of Staff of the Army MSG. *Guidance for Personnel Recovery,* 16 May 2005

Intel Resources

- Personnel:
  - Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors/teams
  - Human Terrain Teams (HTT)
  - Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) analysts
  - Geospatial analyst teams
  - Tactical Military Information Support Operations Team (TMISOT) or CA teams
  - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) managers
- Websites:
  - National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) → Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (JKnIFE)
  - JIEDDO → Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC)
  - JFCOM, JPRA → JPRSP
  - INTELLIPEDIA
- Reporting:
  - Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database
  - Tactical Integrated Ground Reporting System (TiGR) Net

Additional Resources

- AWG:
  - https://portal.awg.army.smil.mil (SIPR)
  - http://www.awg.army.mil (NIPR Web)
- PRPO:
  - http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/PRPO/ (NIPR Web)
  - https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/Pages/2/PersonnelRecovery.aspx (Intranet)
- JPRA:
  - http://www.jpra.jfcom.mil/ (NIPR Web)