U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group Operational Advisor Summary

Inside this issue:

- **Lessons Learned on Base Camps and Force Protection**
- **Combined Arms - Assured Mobility Patrols**
- **Advising Part II**

Lessons Learned on Base Camps and Force Protection

Historically, early tribes and then societies practiced defense of their communities. In ancient times, they defended the walled cities of Troy, Babylon, Jericho, and Mycenae. In the middle ages, castles were built to defend against siege warfare. As a society, we have come a long way since the medieval times; however, many of these early defensive principles are applicable today. The purpose of this article is to highlight several key principles of base camp defense and Force Protection (FP) as they relate to outposts, operating bases, or Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) at host nation (HN) provided fixed sites throughout the world.

Why is base camp defense and force protection critical? The price of lapses in planning, intelligence, security, short sightedness, understanding rules of engagement, and the uncoordinated integration of HN military and guard forces is the loss of life. The table below lists examples of determined enemy attacks against CF or US service members. Investigative panels and After Action Reviews (AARs) found in almost every case, that these attacks were preventable or the losses could have been reduced by following existing doctrine.

1979 US Embassy Tehran, Iran	1979 US Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan
1983 US/French Embassies Beirut, Lebanon	1998 US Embassies Nairobi, Tanzania
2000 USS Cole Yemen	2000 Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia
2010 US FOB Afghanistan	2012 FOB Bastion, Afghanistan
2010 US FOB, Iraq	2013 US Facility, Afghanistan

Unfortunately, CF are often not afforded the luxury of choosing the exact location of their base camp based on terrain alone. Location is often driven by centers of gravity, population, ministerial or governmental leaders, airfields, Main Supply Routes (MSRs), partner bases or where the HN can accommodate CF. Sometimes these locations push the limits of FP planning and require non-standard approaches to security.

The best defense is a strong offensive is a phrase often linked to Carl Von Clausewitz. Although he did not actually say this, it does have merit in today's operational environment (OE). Historically, CF have a habit of hunkering down and becoming defensively restricted to a site. CFs are often lulled into a false interpretation that Special Operations Forces (SOF) and HN security forces will handle the threat networks to keep CF bases safe. This is not true – your unit is the only entity that can maintain wide area security around your base. Yes, SOF and HN forces are combat multipliers that compliment your efforts, but they cannot replace them. What does this really mean to a unit ? It requires continued targeting and a force that has the capability and enablers (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets (manned, unmanned, fixed), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Counter Intelligence (CI)) to respond on and off the base to maintain pressure on networks in places like Afghanistan or a failed state. In other locations, CF employ a Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) and targeting process to maintain Situational Awareness (SA) and Situational Understanding (SU) for their own protection and a HN partner to share the information with for military or police interdiction.

Mindset and Posture – the Weak or Warriors. Threat forces have survived over a decade of war – who and what would you attack? A heavily fortified location packed with highly disciplined warriors or a soft target? The enemy looks for soft targets – we can impact the perceptions of others based on our physical posture and actions. Mindset is evaluated by our approach to and conduct of ordinary tasks like patrolling, entry and search procedures, movement around the base, and interaction with HN forces. Maintaining an offensive

Lessons Learned on Base Camps and Force Protection

posture and mindset does not require standing at the high ready. It requires weapons that are an extension of a Soldiers arms – they smile and interact professionally and are ready regardless of the orientation of their weapon – they have mentally rehearsed scenarios, dissected angles, and identified available cover. They are finely tuned warriors, heads on a swivel, constantly scanning and assessing – they are ready.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Weapons Status. History provides multiple examples of Soldiers whose lack of understanding of the ROE and weapons status contributed to an attacker's success. Even today, Soldiers are not always confident of exactly what the ROE allow, even in imminent threat situations. Weapons status is a delicate subject – bottom line, we ought to train the way we fight. We do not train SMs on "amber status" (magazine in the chamber, bolt forward) loading and engaging drills – these actions extend the engagement. As a result, the instinctive (trained response) is a Soldier aiming their weapon, moving the selector switch to fire, and hearing that awful sound of the hammer dropping on an empty chamber. Quick thinking Soldiers will tap the magazine, rack the charging handle, assume a good sight picture and fire again. Given the nature of insider threats, the speed of a SVBIED approaching an Entry Control Point (ECP), we will need every second to mitigate threats verses immediate action drills. Maintaining weapons in a "red" (round chambered, weapon on safe) status whenever operating in threat environment is the best prevention.

Base Defense Plans and Common Operational Graphics. Most units do a very good job of developing and publishing a basic base defense plan. In fact, units are adept at identifying critical assets and ensuring appropriate facilities are integrated into the plan. Two areas of recommended focus are base defense plan rehearsals and integration of partner and coalition elements inclusive of communication plans and systems. The addition of a Gridded Reference Graphic (GRG) and or panoramic photographs assists units with flattening communications. In addition, these tools support mission command and allow the precision movement of forces to critical locations while supporting enhanced battle tracking. Below are some additional considerations:

- Everyone on the base should participate in base defense rehearsals – not only first responders.

- Is the engagement chain of Detect, Recognize, Identify (DRI) and engage realistic at our ECPs? Rehearse dismounted and mounted threats and time the entire process to verify your standoff. Ensure rehearsals include communication systems up and down the chain of command and with foreign partners (do language barriers create a time delay?) What is the impact? Does the unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) need updating?

- How are CF partners integrated into our defensive plan? Have we rehearsed with them?

- How do ECPs collapse back into the base during an attack? Who will make the decision and when?

- How do we signal and communicate with private security company personnel? What actions do they take during an attack? Has the unit conducted no-notice rehearsals to evaluate the plan?

- Ensure local nationals working on the FOB/COP have limited access during rehearsal.

Tower Fundamentals. In the medieval period, towers provided clear fields of fire, often protruding out from the castle walls to provide a better view, protection from attackers, and firing slots for archers. Modern towers should provide the same fundamental capabilities reinforcing their use as fighting platforms, not observation platforms. Threat forces have demonstrated their willingness to attack towers with RPGs and machine gun fire in support of a ground assault. Leaders can evaluate towers and determine if they are in need

Lessons Learned on Base Camps and Force Protection

of a tactical upgrade. With a little ingenuity, almost every tower is capable of supporting Common Remote Operated Weapons Systems (CROWS) or internally mounted crew served weapons systems (M249 or M240B machine guns). Common weapons considerations are listed below:

- Are crew served weapons bipod or tripod mounted? Not just in the tower! Are gunners getting behind the gun to indentify dead space and make sure they cover the primary sector of fire? Are fields of fire still clear? How do the windows open (left, right, and inward)? How much time does it take to open the window? Does the gunner need sandbags to improve the internal platform? Where is the dead space around the tower? Who will cover the dead space during an attack?

- Do crew served weapons overwatching entry control points (personnel, vehicle, and high speed avenues of approach) have armor piercing or Saboted Light Armor Piercing (SLAP) ammunition available?

- Does the tower really provide geometry of fires? Is the tower tied into towers on their left and right?

- When was the last time someone walked out from the tower so the gunner can confirm line of sight distances? What is the enemy's view of our position? Can we improve our position? Do we need to emplace obstacles or add more obstacles?

- How long are the tower shifts? How long do we expect Soldiers to operate in a heighted state of alert? Are these times and shifts realistic? Rotate personnel frequently and get them out of the tower and on the ground to keep them in the fight.

- Is every tower equipped with observation devices: electronic, spotting scopes, binoculars, Night Vision Devices (NVDs)? When was the last limited visibility rehearsal integrating NVDs?

- Weapons maintenance and associated functions checks are conducted on a regular basis.

Defensive Fighting Positions and Posture. CF needs to resist the tendency to simply accept a defensive posture on the base or fixed site. Many locations lack defensive fighting positions built throughout the area that complement the base security. Defense of a base camp or urban structure is everyone's responsibility. The following considerations will assist leaders in assessing their posture. Is our response to a ground attack designed to push everyone to bunkers? Are bunkers designed to offer protection from indirect fire while also serving as a strong point fighting positions? How many people can defend from the bunker? Are primary and alternate sectors of fire assigned and rehearsed during drills?

Dedicated Response Forces. CF capacity to respond in the first few minutes immediately following an attack will often serve as the tipping point of the attack. Commanders need a precision, highly mobile and scalable force that can deploy partnered and unilaterally in response to high profile or complex attacks. The reality of troop to task distribution often impacts negatively on base response forces. Highly successful organizations understand the value of dedicated response forces – the first fifteen minutes can drastically change the outcome of a complex attack – forces should be poised to meet this time line.

The purpose of this article was to highlight several principles that support base defense and integrated force protection from a tactical perspective. Detailed checklists and additional information is available an the USFOR-A, Joint Security Office homepage. Additionally, units can request assistance from the AWG, the Joint Expeditionary Teams (JET), or the USFOR-A Force Protection Office to enhance their capabilities.

Combined Arms Route Clearance Operations (CARCO)

 By clearly defining the roles, key tasks, and end state of CARCO elements and attached enablers, CF can reduce the impact of these limitations and efficiently use the patrols combat power, proximity to the populace, and duration of missions to influence friendly elements and defeat threat networks.

Route Clearance Patrols conducting independent operations to clear and sanitize routes, while effective at defeating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), have limited effects on defeating enemy networks and preventing the emplacement of future devices. The amount of time to complete the mission (clear the route), shaping the engagement area, and leveraging friendly networks are in direct conflict with one another.

Effective CARCO requires synchronization between the mission command element, the clearing section, security section, and assault section. The mission command element integrates enablers into CARCO to understand the operational environment, provide guidance to subordinate leaders, and describe the environment to superiors. The goal of the mission command element during CARCO is to ensure subordinate elements' efforts are well coordinated and to bolster the development of friendly networks, while diminishing the capability and influence of threat networks.

The clearing section conducts route clearance to provide Freedom of Movement (FoM) for friendly forces. Key tasks for clearing section include: clearing roads, ditches, culverts, and bridges of IEDs; recovering and processing evidence; reducing explosive hazards; reporting enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP); and submitting reports to the mission command element. The end state of the clearing element is that a route is clear of any detected explosive hazards or found devices, and that evidence is exploited and results are reported to the mission command element.

The security section establishes a cordon to provide a safe environment to conduct clearance operations. Key tasks for the security element are: conducting screening along road networks to increase standoff of route clearance elements, controlling the population and adjacent units to mitigate Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) and exploiting friendly and enemy networks. The security element provides outer security cordon to fix enemy locations and enable an environment conducive to clearing and Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE). The end state of the security element is to create a safe environment for conducting clearing, sanitation, and TSE, which reduces CIVCAS and provides a clear description of the Operational Environment (OE) to the mission command element.

The assault element conducts lethal and nonlethal engagements to reduce the enemy, influence negative actors and bolster friendly networks. Key tasks for the assault element are detecting and engaging triggermen, destroying the enemy in hide locations, collecting against Information Requirements (IR), reporting information to the mission command element, and enrolling suspects in biometric systems. The end state of the assault element is to destroy enemy threat networks, while increasing friendly forces' reporting and bolstering Rule of Law (RoL).

Measures of Performance (MOPs) are important for leaders to understand if subordinate elements are completing assigned key task. Several MOPs include: the number of IED patrols RCPs conduct with the BSO and ANSF; the average number of external assets assigned in support of RCP elements, the number of local engagements conducted, and the number of searches units conduct off the Main Supply Route (MSR).

engagements conducted, and the number of searches units conduct off the Main Supply Route (MSR). Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are important for leaders to understand if tasks conducted are contributing to the desired end state. Several MOEs include: the IED found/cleared rate, the total number of IEDs, the number of friendly tips that result in exploited IED caches, the number of threat networks exposed, the number of target packets (lethal and non lethal) developed and approved for action, and the number of IRs answered.

By clearly defining the task, purpose, and desired end state of the multiple elements of the RCP, CARCO are better enabled to efficiently use the RCPs' combat power, proximity to the populace, and duration of mission to describe and influence friendly and defeat threat networks. For additional details, refer to Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook No 11-42, dated September 2011.

Advising Part II

"Because advisors operate in very subjective environments, it is difficult to establish objective criteria by which to assess potential advisors. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the advisor's ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture." (FM 3-22, Security Force Assistance)

In our September OA Summary, we discussed in general terms selecting, training, and equipping the force to conduct Security Force Assistance (SFA) or Foreign Internal Defense (FID). This month, we address the selection of advisors in a bit more depth. FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, lists sixteen personality traits that "greatly enhance the advisors ability *to* adapt and thrive in a foreign culture." These personality traits provide a guideline with which to establish selection criteria.

The first issue is that we must divest ourselves of the "go/no go" mentality. As we assess personality traits, much of what we are looking for is subjective. We are looking for the *right person*, not the person who can pass a test. Selecting the right individual requires not only the use of standard tests with well-defined metrics (physical training, weapons qualification, language proficiency, etc.), but it also requires a more subtle evaluation of the individual. It is difficult to put categorize one's tolerance for ambiguity with a metric; however, it is possible to get a good sense of whether an individual has such tolerance. This can be accomplished through the use of psychological testing and interviews, as well as job sampling sessions that give the assessor an idea of how the soldier will perform in an ambiguous situation.

As a commander evaluates a pool of potential advisors, initial screening criteria are fairly intuitive. Experience, qualifications, entry level aptitude tests (e.g. GT Score), evaluation reports (e.g. NCOERs), and the normal metrics we use daily to evaluate our soldiers should be reviewed to narrow the candidates down to those with the demonstrated competencies to conduct the mission. Once a pool has been selected, the specific mission should be reviewed to determine what the "right person" looks like. At this point, we must be careful not to fall into the trap of using simple metrics to select the individual. For example, a 300 on the APFT does not necessarily mean that the individual is the right person for the job. This is admittedly an over-simplification, but the key is to not get too wrapped up in the data.

The next step is to create an evaluation that measures the traits needed for the specific position. If we use tolerance for ambiguity as one of our traits, we should look to create a situation that is sufficiently ambiguous so as to evaluate the individual's tolerance. During these sessions, we are not looking for a specific response. We are looking to see how the individual responds to the situation for evaluation purposes. Situations should include the data on hand and should incorporate scenarios which test potential weaknesses to

evaluate how candidates deal with the situation. Commanders should use Soldiers with experience in the given position to assist with these evaluations wherever possible. Once the situation is complete, the commander or his designated representative should review the evaluation with the candidate. We understand what the candidate did, we now need to assess why he did it. It is important here to set aside preconceived notions about what happened. It may be that the unconventional solution that the candidate displayed in the evaluation had good reason.

Once all of the information gleaned from this process is compiled, the candidates should be finally evaluated and ranked. At this point, we can sometimes get wrapped up trying to create a structure that develops a score in order to rank the candidates. Because of the subjective nature of the process, trying to capture the data as a score can undermine what we are trying to accomplish. All of the individuals involved in the process must discuss the pros and cons of each candidate and present a recommendation to the commander. Allowing for discussion about the candidate and their suitability will give the decision maker a better picture of the candidates than a scoring system that strips away much of the nuance that we have worked so hard to find. Armed with this information and recommendation, the commander can now make a decision on the candidates. This can be done in the form of a formal board or a committee.

We have demonstrated here an admittedly resource intensive process that can be used to build a better picture of Soldiers that need to be screened for sensitive positions. As the Army moves forward with the Regionally Aligned Force concept, Soldiers will be placed increasingly in positions where a single action (or inaction) may have severe repercussions. The level of scrutiny placed on individuals must be commensurate with the level of responsibility that the Army will expect these Soldiers to handle. These selection processes, or elements thereof, will allow commanders to mitigate some of the risks of putting Soldiers in situations that are increasingly ambiguous and will require independent thought and action that may have previously been considered "above their grade".

## AWG Task Unit Afghanistan Contact Information:
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AWG Recruiting:
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- NIPR e-mail: awg.recruiter@us.army.mil

An Insider Attack is essentially an ambush conducted at close range by an Afghan we trust or at least are

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Do you have a potential solution to defeat a new or existing enemy threat?

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