INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT

No. 16-16

MAY 16

YAMA SAKURA 69

JFLCC, Bilateral Operations, and Theater Security Cooperation

Lessons and Best Practices

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Yama Sakura 69

Joint Force Land Component Command, Bilateral Operations, and Theater Security Cooperation

Initial Impressions Report

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

Foreword

(U) Yama Sakura (YS) 69 was a shared learning experience culminating in a challenging exercise. There were three keys to success during this exercise: preparation, commitment, and the way ahead.

(U) **Preparation**. Extensive exercise preparation during planning conferences culminated in a short, collaborative, computer-driven series of analyses and related daily discussions at the I Corps mission training center in November 2015. These daily analytical discussions involving the I Corps and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Middle Army deputy commanders and staffs identified key partner interfaces, different perspectives about warfighting challenges, and how to optimize understanding of the bilateral operational environment. These discussions led to further studies and crosstalk prior to the start of the exercise in December 2015. The result was a shared, higher level of confidence in the YS exercise design and objectives and the bilateral ability to conduct warfighting tasks. An important exercise objective was achieved for the near- and long-term benefit of all participating military service formations. This preparation helped the participating staffs think carefully about future ground component command and staff requirements for success against a possible complex mix of conventional and non-conventional military adversaries, asymmetric influencers, and interventionists. The shared understanding of the operational environment, associated full-spectrum threats, and close coordination to deny the enemy political and military objectives was a result of continuous collaborative sharing by highly competent staffs at all levels. Sharing ensured growth among bilateral partners. Lessons learned and applied from last year's YS 67 exercise enabled important new bilateral-operations learning during YS 69.

(U) **Commitment**. There was a commitment to share ideas about the best approaches to defeat the enemy and reach the intended outcome. There was also a commitment to synchronize conditions that allowed the ground commander to make timely decisions supported by air and maritime forces that, in turn, supported the joint task force main effort. The risks

taken by bilateral forces were minimal, resulting in the ability to fight as an integrated and synchronized land component. This demonstrated the advantage of unified action versus parallel land-component operations in multinational combat. This challenge was understood and practiced from start to finish; it was a result of previous studies and collaborative planning. Through integrated mission analysis and decision making, both the I Corps and Middle Army were able to provide timely assessments of military intervention options in accordance with political guidance and ongoing diplomatic actions. There was a better understanding of vertical and horizontal reporting among the ground components and joint task force headquarters staffs. YS 69 enabled new and important learning for all concerned. The exercise was a good example of how to bolster bilateral warfighting confidence from three-star commanders to participating Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Sailors, and Honshu civilian government authorities.

(U) **Way ahead**. To exploit the YS exercise in future years, we must continue to model the most likely bilateral-mission requirements against an adversarial suite of military and non-military capabilities that reflect possible missions in the next five to 20 years. YS exercises should continue to be used to think about and practice receiving, forming, and lodging the bilateral-response forces (joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration). YS exercises already practice bilateral planning, staff analysis, shared understanding, decision making, and key-partner interface tasks for defense of national interests and bilateral commitments.

(U) Lastly, we must pass on YS 69 learning to participants in next year's YS exercise to expand bilateral expertise and experience. All YS 69 participating commanders, staffs, officers, and noncommissioned officers should be lauded on their accomplishments as a bilateral team.



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Yama Sakura 69
Joint Force Land Component Command, Bilateral Operations, and Theater Security Cooperation Initial Impressions Report

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Introduction

(U) Yama Sakura (YS) 69, conducted 6-11 DEC 2015 at the Middle Army's headquarters at Camp Itami in Osaka, was the largest bilateral exercise for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) held in Japan. Yama Sakura 69 was a key component of the rebalance in the Pacific region; it focused on building stronger bonds and partnerships with allies. Yama Sakura is an annual bilateral exercise with JGSDF and the U.S. military that rotates among the five JGSDF regional armies. Co-hosted by United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) and the JGSDF, this year's units included the U.S. Army's I Corps and the JGSDF's Middle Army. More than 1,500 I Corps Soldiers and nearly 4,000 JGSDF members participated in the exercise.

YS 69 underscored a continued commitment by the U.S. and Japan to work as dedicated partners in support of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is proud to be a small part of these efforts. CALL is working with its Japanese counterparts at the Center for Ground Self-Defense Force Lessons Learned to gather relevant lessons and best practices that can inform future U.S. and Japanese operations.

(U) The focus of Japan's security policy has been to align itself with the international partners by pragmatic adjustments in a given security environment. After World War II, Japan adopted the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy to rely on the U.S. for security so that it could focus on economic recovery. The U.S. and Japan are currently reviewing US-Japan defense cooperation guidelines for the first time since 1997 to address growing concerns about North Korea's nuclear program, China's expansionism in the South China Sea, global terrorism, cyber intrusions, and other 21st century threats. During a joint press conference with the Prime Minister of Japan, President Obama stated:

> [T]here's a phrase in Japanese culture that speaks to the spirit that brings us together today. It's an idea rooted in loyalty. It's an expression of mutuality, respect, and shared obligation. It transcends any specific moment or challenge. It's the foundation of a relationship that endures. It's what allows us to say that the United States and Japan stand together. *Otagai no tame ni* — "with and for each other."[1]

(U) Exercises similar to YS and the routine military and interagency activities that the U.S. Army performs to deter potential adversaries and solidify relationships with allies and partners are described as deterrence and shaping activities. These are Joint Phase 0 activities that set conditions in the theater across the range of military operations. Shaping the security environment in the Pacific and elsewhere is the most cost-effective way

to ensure peace and stability and to prevent misunderstandings or conflict. The U.S. Army's relationship with international partners such as Japan are essential in protecting the U.S. and its allies' interests. The rebalance in the Pacific will be a key component of U.S. strategy as the U.S. Army transitions from over a decade of war. USARPAC; I Corps; and United States Army, Japan (USARJ) are conducting this transition while planning to take advantage of new strategic opportunities and preparing for unforeseen security challenges.

(U) Security cooperation activities such as YS 69 provide opportunities to enhance both forces' overall readiness, training, and leader development. These security cooperation activities build interoperability with allied and partner armies. This activity is informed by U.S. strategic planning guidance that directs military departments and defense agencies to develop integrated campaign support plans for the execution of steady-state shaping activities. The theater army and service component campaign support plans focus on activities that promote the achievement of combatant command objectives and contribute to campaign and guidance for employment of the force regional, functional, and global end states.

(U) Shaping the operational environment is a relationship-based and human-focused endeavor. Through their security cooperation support to the combatant command, USARPAC, I Corps, and USARJ forces provide land-power capabilities and develop understanding of the operational environment while exporting professionalism, leadership, and experience that contribute to building partner capacity. YS 69 highlights the fact that, as the Army transitions in a resource-constrained environment, there remains a premium on building and sustaining effective security relationships.

Endnote

1. From The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference, 28 APR 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-confere.

Chapter 1

Exercise Background and Goals

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral partnership between the U.S. and Japan remains a command priority for United States Army Pacific (USARPAC). A pivotal line of effort remained after the planning and execution of joint bilateral exercise Yama Sakura (YS) 69. Key exercise participants included United States Army, Japan (USARJ); I Corps (employed as a joint forces land component command [JFLCC]); and representatives from the U.S. Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy. USARJ was the USARPAC-designated, YS 69-supported command with the USARJ assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) serving as the proponent for planning.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS 69 was a U.S. Army-sponsored, simulation-driven, joint and bilateral command post exercise using warfighter simulation as the primary exercise driver. YS 69 was the 34th iteration of the Japan-based exercise series; it was the largest USARPAC security cooperation event in the Pacific. YS was designed to enhance U.S. and Japanese combat readiness and interoperability while strengthening bilateral relationships. YS demonstrated U.S. resolve to support the security interests of friends and allies in the region. YS 69 exercised I Corps' robust command post, augmented with I Corps (Forward) to form a JFLCC headquarters that executed operational unified land operations (ULO).

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The exercise goals for YS 69 included the following:

- Conduct joint, bilateral, and interagency coordination across agreed-upon bilateral planning cells.
- Increase bilateral and joint interoperability with Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Japan Middle Army.
- Support JSDF enhancement of skill sets required to conduct ULO.
- Enhance information sharing as JSDF assumes a joint operations posture.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) This year's training audience was the headquarters of the I Corps and Middle Army of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. Higher command was a simulated joint task force commanded by Australian Army Maj. Gen. Gregory Bilton, Deputy Commanding General-Operations, USARPAC. USARJ acted as exercise control, with I Corps (Forward) embedded in the JFLCC staff, theater-enabling commands, and participating subordinate units.

Chapter 2

Key Observations, Lessons, and Best Practices

Cyber Best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The assistant chief of staff, communications (G-6) in conjunction with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), Middle Army, developed a bilateral cyber standard operating procedure (SOP) to assist staffs in managing the defense of cyber operations. The Yama Sakura (YS) exercise was used to build and improve this SOP. The cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) staff, G-6, and Middle Army conducted a bilateral CEMA working group to share and synchronize cyber support to operations. Expanding cyber involvement can improve interoperability.

Network Best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps and Middle Army signal section collocated their network operations and conducted bilateral communication updates, which enhanced information sharing on network operations, network troubleshooting, and defense of cyber operations.

Information Operations Best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The information operations staff officer (G-7) and Middle Army conducted a bilateral information operations working group to share and synchronize information-related capabilities in support of operations. In addition, this working group demonstrated the benefits that information operations brings to the fight, both in exercises and actual operations. Expanding information operations involvement can further improve interoperability.

Fires and Targeting Best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The fires and targeting sections were bilaterally functional. They conducted separate meetings for targeting and then came together at targeting working groups and coordination boards for bilateral decisions and approval on targeting issues. Although there were differences in the process among the nations involved, several tactics, techniques, and procedures were incorporated into the process. Compared with YS 67, the targeting process for YS 69 was significantly more fluid due to the efforts of the Center for Ground Self-Defense Force Lessons Learned and several planning sessions between the headquarters.

Intelligence Best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Bilateral intelligence operations worked well. Although the U.S. Army and JGSDF did not have perfectly interoperable communications systems, both staffs established well-organized processes to share intelligence. The establishment of the bilateral intelligence cell, consisting of analysts from both forces, was critical in mitigating communications issues to provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence. The bilateral intelligence cell was influential in developing new Japan Self-Defense Forces military doctrine for intelligence operations.

Sustainment Lesson

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) U.S. forces introduced ARFOR-level tasks in an academic manner outside the YS exercise. The introduction of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; common-user land transportation; and noncombatant evacuation in an academic manner provided an excellent foundation for future training and a possible addition to YS. Planners and logisticians gained an appreciation for Japan's laws and existing bilateral coordination mechanisms.

Interoperability Lesson

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Interoperability continues to improve. The creation of a JGSDF ground central command is underway. This headquarters will function similar to a field army with actual operational command and control capacity and capability, exploring cross-service and cross-domain issues that continue to be a challenge. There is an opportunity to assist the JGSDF Military Intelligence Corps to transition the Military Intelligence Command into an operational intelligence headquarters. A need exists for improving logistics; the YS exercises enable understanding of other systems. Both commands' G-6s should continue to work together to achieve a true bilateral common operational picture. The improvement in bilateral planning, execution, and cooperation since YS 65 has been significant.

Information-Sharing Lesson

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Joint solutions to issues surrounding amphibious operations, air and missile defense, special operations forces, and intelligence will take time and bilateral cooperation. The creation of bilateral joint systems and structures is critical. Assistance should be given in the development of the JGSDF's United States Army Training and Doctrine Command-like organization. There is also a need to work through implications on the bilateral coordination mechanisms affected by the United States Army Japan-I Corps (Forward) split. Equally critical will be advancing bilateral counterintelligence cooperation and interoperability.

Chapter 3

Observations

(U) *This chapter has a range of theater-strategic to brigade-tactical observations. This range of observations is meant to inform future staff officers from United States Army, Japan (USARJ); I Corps; United States Army Pacific (USARPAC); and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) on the conduct of the Yama Sakura (YS) exercise and best practices and insights on what went well and what did not. Taken holistically, this chapter also provides U.S. Army forces in other theaters with information on the use of joint force land component command (JFLCC) operations, exercises, and security cooperation.*

Civil Affairs

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Under an armed attack situation, the Government of Japan began its response with the issuance of a defense operation order. The defense operation order allowed the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to begin operations. The transition from Phase III, Combat Operations, to Phase IV, Civil Protection, occurred only after: (1) cessation of all hostilities throughout the country, (2) the Government of Japan ordered the withdrawal of the JSDF, (3) the defense operation order was terminated, and (4) the Government of Japan issued the civil protection dispatch order (see Figure 3-1 on page 9).

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The Government of Japan clearly delineated the transition from Phase III with the defense operation order to Phase IV under the civil protection dispatch order. Because of this delineation, the JSDF had limited experience and knowledge of civil affairs tasks and activities. U.S. forces are more accustomed to civil affairs actions occurring concurrently with combat operations, depending on the need and operational environment. The usage of civil affairs is a military commander's decision. This is a stark contrast of civil affairs usage between the two forces. This usage creates not only a disparity in understanding, but also a potentially valuable learning experience. The civil affairs master scenario events lists (MSELs) utilized during this exercise were couched within the Government of Japan's framework, restricting the exercise participants from potential learning opportunities.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Increasing and expanding civil affairs MSELs to issues beyond those couched in a Government of Japan framework and the scope of the defense operation order would increase realism in the exercise environment. These MSELs would encourage exercise participants to delve into the Government of Japan framework and test when and to what extent civil affairs activities can occur. Having MSELs that are not couched within the Government of Japan framework would encourage U.S. forces to think within the Government of Japan framework and JSDF to increase their knowledge of civil affairs activities. Change in MSELs would also facilitate interoperability by compelling each force to think bilaterally and outside ordinary operating parameters. This would be achieved with a strengthened civil affairs augmentation in the exercise. Civil affairs could then work with Government of Japan actors to recommend proper actions and the approval authority for these actions.



Figure 3-1. Japanese transition process from Phase III to Phase IV

Space Operations

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Integration of space force enhancement (SFE) should be expanded.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The space support element (SSE), with support from an attached Army space support team (ARSST) (see Figure 3-2 on page 12), worked with JFLCC forces to provide SFE for increasing joint force effectiveness in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); missile warning; environmental monitoring; satellite communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing. These areas were covered throughout the exercise. They presented tremendous opportunities for training the SSE and integrating key staff. Although problem sets in these areas were discussed among the staff, effects were rarely replicated in the exercise simulation. MSEL events were presented to test the SSE's response but they often did not involve or had limited effect on other exercise participants. As a result, opportunities for staff integration training were lost and the potential to build bad habits, procedures, and unrealistic expectations was created.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) A contested environment with regard to SFE was realistic and needed to be built into scenarios. SFE MSEL injects needed to be properly scripted into scenarios and simulator designs. The SSE, ARSST, and white cell personnel have to be involved early in the development and integration of injects into the scenario. Without this integration, injects do not simulate or provide a realistic environment for military forces.

Observation 2

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Before and during the exercise, the SSE and ARSST integrated within the I Corps and JGSDF staff.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The ability of the SSE and ARSST to integrate within the I Corps and JGSDF staff significantly improved space capability synchronization, awareness, and integration. Currently, the JGSDF does not have a space officer to liaise with the SSE and ARSST. The SSE and ARSST integrated within the I Corps staff and JGSDF staff through working groups such as cyber electromagnetic activity (CEMA),

information operations (IO), targeting, and intelligence, enabling them to provide SFE to increase joint force effectiveness in ISR; warning; environmental monitoring; satellite communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing. These areas were covered throughout the exercise. They presented tremendous opportunities for training the SSE and ARSST and key staff integration. Integration provided opportunities for staff integration training, training staff members on space-capability support, and improved mission readiness.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Bilateral integration with the JGSDF and I Corps staff in the space section significantly enhanced space integration and synchronization among the SSE, ARSST, I Corps, and JGSDF staffs. One method the SSE and ARSST successfully used was providing classes to staff sections and the JGSDF on space support for operations. With the rise of threats in the space domain, bilateral integration and staff integration were crucial to making exercises realistic and building bilateral space mission readiness.



Figure 3-2. Army space support team

Sustainment

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) To be successful, any operation in the Pacific requires reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of forces by air and sea.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) RSOI occurs during all phases of the operation, but is most critical during Phase 0, Shape; and Phase I, Deter, when the theater is being established. Across the Pacific, I Corps sought opportunities to train on critical Phase 0 and Phase I tasks through joint and partnered exercises to maintain readiness and global reach. YS was one such exercise with a rotating regional army of the JGSDF.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Previous YS exercises and Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) analysis identified that a table-top exercise (TTX) or discussion between senior civil and military personnel would be effective to increase the understanding of logistical and political requirements necessary to conduct Phase 0 and Phase I operations. In YS 67, the RSOI TTX addressed the broad concept of RSOI and stressed the importance of establishing the framework required to conduct Phase 0 and Phase I in Japan. The RSOI plan for YS 69 was built on the foundation established in YS 67; it highlighted the agreements and actions required to conduct RSOI and integration of a JFLCC in Japan. The following actions were recommended:

- Continue table-top discussions (TTDs) and TTXs to focus on RSOI and increase civilian agency involvement.
- I Corps, USARJ, 8th Theater Sustainment Command, and 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command should look at opportunities to train mission command nodes required for RSOI. They should also establish a common operational picture that includes working with civilian counterparts who can exercise the necessary authorities to conduct RSOI in Japan and the Pacific.
- I Corps should codify an RSOI plan from YS 67 and YS 69 and provide a template to USARJ, I Corps (Forward), JGSDF, and the Japanese Ministry of Defense.

Observation 2

(U) RSOI in Japan presented unique complexities.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS 69 occurred on the westernmost portion of Honshu, the main island of Japan and the location of the JGSDF Middle Army area of responsibility. The Middle Army area of responsibility is approximately the size of the state of Tennessee, bound in the east by the Hida Mountain Range and in the west by the Seto Inland Sea and Sea of Japan. The area is densely populated along the southern coast. This area contains cultural and historical significance to the people of Japan, which must be considered when conducting operations of any type. With three major commercial seaports and two international commercial airports in the Middle Army area of responsibility, the infrastructure supports the reception of U.S. military personnel and equipment.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Review the laws of Japan guiding the circumstances under which U.S. forces are able to conduct Phase 0 and Phase I tasks. Understanding these laws, rules, and regulations is critical for operations and exercises in Japan, particularly for conducting RSOI of a deploying JFLCC element. I Corps and USARJ should leverage time between YS exercises to work with civilian counterparts when conducting RSOI operations. USARPAC and USARJ should explore linking Orient Shield and YS scenarios to validate RSOI processes in Japan through Pacific Pathways. USARJ should establish the Ground Combatant Command Coordination Center for YS 71 to exercise ARFOR's responsibilities associated with executing RSOI and to learn from increased collaboration with both JGSDF and Japan Ministry of Defense civilian counterparts.

Observation 3

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) There was a joint manning capability shortfall in the higher command and Joint Task Force-Japan sustainment cell.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Transportation and medical in the support area were critical sustainment tasks (see Figure 3-3 on page 16). Several MSEL injects focused on events (ballistic missile attacks or chemical spills) that impacted the operability of aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs). Once the JFLCC staff took action, it was unclear of the status on APODs or SPODs and, therefore, consulted the higher command. Similarly, the Joint Task Force-Japan sustainment cell

conducted joint boards to coordinate and prioritize movements. Fortunately, the air mobility command representative attended and shared his knowledge of air movement operations for logistics and medical with the higher command staff. A U.S. Navy Reserve captain surface warfare officer located in the higher command also assisted the sustainment cell by obtaining information on maritime logistics and medical plans and coordinating SPOD assessments. In addition, there were no air or sea procedures provided in the starting exercise data. Similarly, the JGSDF was without air or maritime logistics or medical experts to consult with in the higher command.

Lessons and Best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Have United States Forces Japan (USFJ) Maritime (Navy, Marines, and Merchant Marine) and Air Force elements attend all planning conferences and the YS exercise to provide true joint expertise in the Joint Task Force-Japan sustainment cell. Have sustainment cell representatives prepare starting exercise data and establish operating procedures at the planning conferences.



Figure 3-3. JFLCC RSOI concept

Observation 4

(U) An RSOI table-top discussion (TTD) was conducted for planning and events.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Over the past 30 years, RSOI has not been acknowledged as part of the YS exercises. By commencing each exercise with forces on the ground, the Japanese remained unaware of the extent of the preparation involved to establish logistics sites and assets to support the arrival of U.S. troops. Therefore, the planning and execution of the RSOI TTD between the I Corps and Middle Army paved the way for future discussions and scenarios for RSOI (see Figure 3-4 on page 18).

Lessons and Best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Sustain RSOI discussions with the regional armies, the Japan Ministry of Defense, and unilateral partners in order to develop a scenario for future exercises.



Figure 3-4. RSOI TTD

Observation 5

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The RSOI exercise design included strategic and operational levels of sustainment from the initial planning conference to the TTD.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) RSOI involved all levels of sustainment, from the strategic to tactical levels, involving both the U.S. and Japanese (see Figure 3-5 on page 20). Synchronization was required by both countries' procedures to receive personnel and equipment into Japan. Strategically,

USFJ played a pivotal role in communicating host-nation support, transload objectives, joint movement control, and joint RSOI requirements to the JGSDF general staff office. U.S. forces in Japan must take on the role of interoperability by utilizing U.S. Sister Services to fully employ their functions in defense of Japan. Operationally, USARJ played a pivotal role identifying common-user land transportation responsibilities and common-user logistics (CUL) support. USARJ and I Corps (Forward) played an important role relaying information to the joint command. USARJ also coordinated for Army prepositioned stocks release with USARPAC based on requests received from combatant commands. It was key to ensure that all organizational levels of both countries' militaries were involved in planning the operation to be successful for the exercise and real-life situations.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Involve both U.S. and Japanese military logisticians at the operational and strategic levels in RSOI planning from the initial planning conference to execution of the TTD. Also, ensure that decision makers from the Japan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are included with the political-military section to ensure discussion among the liaison officers and regional armies.



Figure 3-5. RSOI improvements

Observation 6

(U) Department of Defense (DOD) Civilians from Army Materiel Command (AMC) were utilized during the exercise.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) There were several DOD Civilians utilized as logistics assets during the exercise. These assets included an AMC logistics management specialist, a logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) representative, and two United States Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) personnel, all from the 403rd Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB). The logistics management specialist's knowledge on requesting equipment from Army prepositioned stocks and depots was useful for assisting with redistribution property assistance team operations during Phase IV. The LOGCAP representative was advantageous in increasing the overall understanding of contractor augmentation within the framework of the Government of Japan and the regulatory guidelines of the U.S. As RSOI operations were explored during the exercise, the beginning steps to LOGCAP support were explored. There was less work for the CECOM representatives in the YS command post exercise, considering that they are traditionally a field-level asset for repairing equipment.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The DOD Civilians were incredibly useful. Therefore, their use should be sustained. Because the CECOM representatives were field-level assets, it would be more useful for these two positions to be transitioned to two additional logistics management specialist assets from the 403rd AFSB for future YS exercises. Additional information on the proper procedure for requesting LOGCAP support in pre-exercise academics would also be beneficial.

Observation 7

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Assets were requested from Army prepositioned stocks. There were knowledge gaps on how to request equipment and on the ramifications of requesting all or only part of a set.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Army prepositioned stocks assets and equipment in Japan were supported through the 403rd AFSB. The logistics management specialist representative from the 403rd AFSB was a great resource for properly requesting assets from Army prepositioned stocks. There was a knowledge gap on utilization and request procedures for equipment from Army prepositioned stocks. Operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan operated with theater-provided equipment; Army prepositioned stocks assets were handled without involvement from logistics planners outside the AMC structure.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Additional information on Army prepositioned stocks asset and equipment utilization in pre-exercise academics would be beneficial. This would be particularly valuable for developing a strong understanding of RSOI processes.

Observation 8

(U) A DOD Civilian was provided by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This civilian's knowledge on the services and specific operating parameters of logistics in the Pacific theater was incredibly beneficial.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) DLA is the DOD's largest logistics combat support agency; it provides worldwide logistics support to military services and civilian agencies. DLA sources and provides nearly all the consumable items for the U.S. Armed Forces, including food, fuel, energy, uniforms, medical supplies, and construction materials. DLA Pacific is the agency's primary liaison to USPACOM. Warfighter support representatives are DOD Civilians that operate as the singular interface to the various services DLA provides. A full understanding of DLA capabilities and request procedures for services did not exist at the beginning of the exercise. However, a warfighter support representative from DLA Pacific was stationed in Korea and was utilized for this exercise. This representative had a great knowledge of logistics operations in the Pacific theater and was an asset for YS 69.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Include DLA capabilities information in pre-exercise academics or a capabilities brief at the beginning of the exercise.

Communications

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The areas designated for the staff sections during the exercise were truly bilateral with JSDF and U.S. forces working alongside each other. Areas were designated by function, with each staff section having a work area. However, there were more personnel than work areas. The majority of the sections had access lines for Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System-Japan (CENTRIX-J), Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR), and contracted commercial internet access. The lack of space resulted in limited resources and potential cross-domain violations. This was particularly true in the higher command working area.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The setup was very well done and fully adequate. However, the issue was the number of personnel utilizing the space. The biggest concern was that access to information is critical in an actual operational environment. In an actual armed response, information security would be critical to mission success. Additionally, the layout and number of access points were approved during planning conferences; however, many changes were made in the system layout, room diagrams, and access points at the beginning of the exercise.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Bilateral working areas were instrumental in ensuring interoperability between the forces. The JTF tactical operations center allowed the staff to work together and commanders quickly addressed the primary staff sections. The limited space could be easily addressed by having functional working areas for additional staff in a separate location. For example, the JTF tactical operations center would have an area for the primary staff members and an assistant from both forces, but a separate working area for any additional members of the staff. This setup would facilitate primary staff members in addressing their staff with more detailed instructions. It would also allow for a better working environment; staff members could discuss their individual problems and issues without disturbing other staff sections. Updating and utilizing a bilateral operations layout standard operating procedure (SOP) could alleviate many of the issues with initial setup. Additionally, early identification and verification of the system layout, room diagrams, and access points could resolve many of the initial setup concerns.

Observation 2

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) CENTRIX-J was the primary operating system for the exercise. Not all of the personnel properly requested CENTRIX-J user accounts prior to the beginning of the exercise. As a result, there were issues with access, particularly for external units involved in the exercise. Connectivity is always an issue, particularly in a bilateral environment. Determining means and measures to address connectivity issues can alleviate any concerns. An SOP should be established for granting access, updating access, and ensuring connectivity.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Information was provided before the exercise outlining procedures for gaining access to CENTRIX-J. Despite this information, there were still accessability issues.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) A more robust assistant chief of staff, communications (G-6) access team would be beneficial, especially during the beginning of the exercise. Personnel from this team should arrive and be available as early as possible. To address connectivity issues at the beginning of the exercise, the G-6 staff should conduct CENTRIX-J briefing and access testing during the initial RSOI in-processing brief.

Observation 3

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Data transfer from the JSDF system, Rikushiki, and U.S. forces system, NIPR, to CENTRIX-J was time, energy, and resource intensive.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Members of both forces were accustomed to utilizing their own systems. Many of the exercise participants had pre-tailored products that had to be utilized during the exercise. However, these products were only tailored to one system, either Rikushiki or NIPR. Data transfer during the exercise had to be approved by a Soldier's supervisor and the G-6 personnel. The data was then taken to a separate location where the information was reviewed and then transferred to CD. It was a time-consuming process that had a negative impact on interoperability. The increased time to transfer data restricted timeliness of receiving information and, at times, because of the extensive time delay, the information was simply never transferred.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) One solution for alleviating issues with data transfer is to designate CENTRIX-J as the singular system for usage during the exercise. Exercise participants would then be forced to create all products and reports on the CENTRIX-J system, allowing easier transfer of data. However, eliminating the other systems would potentially risk losing historical documents that could be useful during the exercise. Using CENTRIX-J as a singular system could also increase the need for CENTRIX-J computers and initial data uploading before the exercise.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Another solution is to employ a cross-domain solution system such as Radiant Mercury Guard. The Radiant Mercury Guard system scans emails, attachments, and documents. As information is scanned, the system searches for key words in the documents and other attachments that should not be transferred between systems. Exercise participants could then still use their own systems and products without increasing the amount of initial data uploaded before the exercise. However, this system would be resource intensive and expensive to use because of the additional licenses needed. Additionally, it would require the sender to have a joint secure email account. Users from both forces would need to be identified before the exercise to ensure the accounts and systems were functioning correctly.

Observation 4

(U) Few systems had access to a language translation program.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) A language program does exist with the capability of translating documents and emails in an extremely quick and timely manner.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Increased usage of a language program would greatly enhance interoperability. The increased number of licenses for the program would be an additional expense, but the need for interpreters would be reduced and products could be created simultaneously for use by both forces. The primary output of the staff sections was products and data. The ability to immediately translate this information could lessen the workload and ensure there is less confusion and conflicting outputs from the two forces. The G-6 would also have an increased timeline to prepare computers and software for the exercise.

Observation 5

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The Middle Army commander's initiative group (CIG) was formed under the guidance and direction of its commanding general. The CIG was designated to work for the Middle Army chief of staff. The I Corps commanding general maintained a full-time CIG in garrison and utilized it throughout the exercise. During the exercise, both CIGs had well-established working relationships.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Both countries' CIGs functioned as the commanding generals' go-to elements for issues or projects that did not fall directly under the assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1); assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2); assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3); or assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4). Both CIGs served to inform the other country's commanding general of what to expect at any given engagement. The Middle Army CIG received primary guidance directly from the Middle Army chief of staff and the commanding general. I Corps prepared talking points from its commanding general and forwarded them to the Middle Army commanding general in advance. Important briefings, relevant talking points, and speeches originated from both CIGs (see Figure 3-6 on page 28).

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The CIG was a relatively new concept for the JGSDF. The first use of a CIG by JGSDF was created by the Eastern Army at YS 67. Now, both countries employ a CIG that interacts with and promptly shares knowledge to the commanding generals. U.S. forces were more accustomed to using the CIG to inform the commanding general. Therefore, the U.S. CIG reported directly to the I Corps commanding general. The CIG responds immediately in providing the commanding general with comments and recommendations for any upcoming key engagements the commanding general deems important. The purpose of a CIG is the commanding general's decision. The I Corps embedded its permanently assigned Japan liaison officer inside the CIG to provide understanding of cultural differences. Important decisions and information were passed quickly to the Middle Army CIG or directly to the Middle Army commanding general in order to provide the intent of the I Corps commanding general before the prearranged meeting between commanding generals. Each commanding general had enough time to understand issues and formulate questions.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Both CIGs served their respective commanders using the knowledge and expertise of seasoned officers. The CIGs provided the necessary information to each commanding general during the YS 69 exercise. Japan may look at increasing and expanding the operations of its CIG in preparation of future YS exercises. Japan may also look into increasing the scope and responsibility of its CIG, especially for real-life events or hostilities. The CIG addressed the commanding generals' most challenging requests and questions. The JGSDF Middle Army CIG was not a permanent section organization in the regional army headquarters; it was only set up for the YS exercise. The JGSDF should continue to operate a CIG during YS and consider creating a permanent CIG element for each of its regional armies.



Figure 3-6. Command and staff activities

Fires

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Interoperability between the JGSDF and the U.S. Army has been enhanced by ongoing interaction between key staff. One example of how this was demonstrated during YS 69 was through the fires process.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The level of interoperability between the U.S. Army and JGSDF continues to develop and improve with each activity, exercise, and engagement. This is due to an understanding of respective doctrine, processes, and systems and how to integrate or adapt processes to achieve the most effective interoperability.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Targeting for YS 69 by the Middle Army and I Corps utilized a combination of national and bilateral processes (see Figure 3-7 on page 30). At the subordinate command level, national processes were developed bilaterally before they were built into U.S. digital systems: the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and Joint Automated Deep Operational Coordination System (JADOCS). Interoperability in the dynamic fires cell in the Combined Operations Integration Center was at an effective level due to preparation and coordination prior to the exercise. The JSDF had access to JADOCS, but not AFATDS. Therefore, the resultant procedures needed to be understood. Battle drills were conducted by the U.S. Army and JGSDF for three days prior to the commencement of the exercise, resulting in responsive dynamic targeting. The lethal targeting process was integrated by the JGSDF targeting officer. Upon receiving a target request from his own sources, the targeting officer entered data into JADOCS where it was checked against high-payoff target, high-value target, and time-sensitive target lists, and then prosecuted by joint fires.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Understanding the differences among doctrine, processes, and systems was essential before establishing a bilateral headquarters. Conferences, liaison among subject matter experts, work-up exercises, and battle drills were successful methods applied prior to and during YS 69.



Figure 3-7. Bilateral targeting battle rhythm

Observation 2

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The layout in the Combined Operations Integration Center and the Bilateral Coordination Facility was functional and integrated well with Japanese counterparts. However, the larger footprint impacted information sharing (see Figure 3-8 on page 31).

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The YS 69 layout was well-balanced and strengthened interoperability and information sharing. However, the duplication of national cells such as U.S. fires cells and JSDF fires cells created a larger footprint. A larger footprint resulted in some elements being farther away (fires, judge advocate general, intelligence, and Tactical Airspace Integration System cells) within the Combined Operations Integration Center. For example, the Tactical Airspace Integration System cell was three tables away. This arrangement was workable, but presented a slight risk of delay such as when gaining airspace clearance.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Consideration of footprint and proximity of other cells should be considered when planning the Combined Operations Integration Center where the decision cycle is more rapid (see Figure 3-9 on page 33).



Figure 3-8. Layout of YS 69 Bilateral Coordination Facility and link to the Combined Operations Integration Center

Observation 3

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Although successful, creating a bilateral headquarters was challenging.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The chief of fires stated that U.S. Army and JSDF relationships, interoperability, and procedural training objectives were achieved during YS 69. This success was possible through continual improvement and building on lessons from past exercises and interactions. For effective targeting and battlespace shaping discipline to be effective, knowledge, experience, and application had to be at a mature level to gain greatest effects. The bilateral process used by the U.S. Army and JSDF was the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology. To raise the level of knowledge and use of this process for both lethal and nonlethal processes, the U.S. Army's chief of fires and representatives from the U.S. Army's information operations staff officer (G-7); assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9); fires; and electronic warfare cells delivered a two-day session to Japanese counterparts in the Middle Army. This session focused on the integration of lethal and nonlethal processes into a single process and raised the level of cooperation and understanding between both forces.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The level of knowledge and application of targeting processes were constantly improving. There was an emphasis on educating the JSDF on the targeting process. Draw on the knowledge gained from past JSDF elements rather than undertake a standing start with each YS exercise. This knowledge could be in the form of SOPs, quick tips, or information sharing. For example, during the first targeting board, there was a preference to focus on close battle and dynamic targeting rather than planning for the plus 48- to 96-hour timeframe.

Figure 3-9. YS 69 bilateral fires cells: JGSDF fires cell in the foreground and I Corps targeting cell in rear

Observation 4

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I Corps and Middle Army target prioritization was done without guidance from a joint targeting board.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS 69 incorporated joint fires of the Middle Army and I Corps. The JGSDF fires cell consisted of Middle and Northern Army personnel, with two-thirds of the personnel from the Northern Army. The JGSDF was proficient in dealing with lethal fires; it structured the fires cell around future and current fires for target nomination and management. The shaping responsibility and linking with a six-day targeting cycle was less familiar to the JGSDF. These processes were modified to synchronize with U.S. targeting process. The targeting process culminated with the bilateral target coordination board (see Figure 3-10 on page 34). The U.S. Army chief of fires found that injects were missing from the higher command joint target coordination board resulting in a lack of clarity and shared understanding of the joint force commander's focus.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) During the bilateral target coordination board, a briefing was held for the six-day planning cycle (D-1, battle damage assessment; D, current; D+1, review; D+2, approval; D+3, plan; D+4, guidance). The target coordination board's discussion focused on current operations and dynamic targeting instead of shaping. This was particularly

evident during an amphibious operation where the coalition forces suffered catastrophic casualties and did not achieve the primary objective. The information was received just prior to the target coordination board and slides for D+1 through D+6 needed updating. Dynamic targeting resources were needed in the Combined Operations Integration Center instead of planned targeting in the target coordination board.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) To maximize the training benefit for fires cells, replication of targeting guidance and products should be provided, such as those from the joint target coordination board. In the absence of these products, there is the potential for incorrect practices and learning.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Targeting and shaping with lethal and nonlethal effects and an ISR plan requires practice and application of knowledge of the targeting process. A targeting process walk-through with commanders and key staff should be considered.



Figure 3-10. YS 69 targeting coordinating board layout

Observation 5

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral targeting process was responsive and assigned assets throughout the six-day targeting cycle, from battle damage assessment to planning guidance.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS 69 battle damage assessment tools have developed and improved since YS 67. One tool developed by the U.S. in YS 67 was a "bean-counter" tool for tracking. The JSDF refined and enhanced this tool to make it more comprehensive with extra features such as report tabs. This tool feature improved accuracy when combined with other intelligence targeting products such as the battle damage assessment "gumball chart."

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The refined tool should be considered by other commands and communities of practice.

Observation 6

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The conduct of lethal fire support during YS 69 was effective.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The dynamic targeting process was validated through multiple requests for fires through the fires cell in the Combined Operations Integration Center. Requests were either generated digitally by the U.S. or manually entered into JADOCS by the JSDF fires cell.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Manual backup procedures on systems were practiced during YS 69. They formed the basis for dealing with information that was not digitally shared with the JSDF. This procedure was effective for operational continuity. Readiness also was put into practice during real outages, such as when the JADOCS server was down for approximately 90 minutes.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Maintaining manual backup skills was a way to integrate with partners who did not have system access.

Observation 7

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Maintaining a battle rhythm while presenting bilingual presentations placed additional strain on staff.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The targeting working group presented bilingual slides. The meetings presented slides on three screens. The first screen was in English, the second in Japanese, and the third was a bilingual title slide. Maintaining this process required additional lead time to prepare and translate the bilingual slides, which complicated working-group discussions. Errors occurred before the slides were collated. An understanding of which slides were accurate needed to be determined early in the process to avoid duplication of effort.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The intelligence cell maintained and presented separate current-situation national products. These slides from the U.S. and JSDF were presented in a single visual "place-mat" format. This format allowed discussion to occur about the reasons for any differences among each place mat. This format also retained national processes. This practice was more effective than maintaining a manual common operational picture.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The U.S. senior analysts in I Corps commented that information flow and intelligence synchronization among subordinate commands and the JSDF was functional due to established practices and systems. Information existed on national lines and systems at the subordinate-command level. An agreed output was a U.S. current-situation visual. This visual refined the Distributed Common Ground System–Army (DCGS-A) into a quick visual that was easier to share and discuss. This visual was also adopted by the JSDF. It was an effective way to conduct bilateral synchronization. The place-mat formats were not always the same. Any differences among respective current-situation place mats were thoroughly discussed and analyzed.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Maintaining a responsive staff was a balance between national practices and bilateral requirements. Using a single visual tool can highlight differences and aid with clarity.

Cyber

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral CEMA board was at a high level of maturity and practice due to the recent experience of personnel.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) During YS 69, the bilateral CEMA board aligned with the targeting and air-task order cycle. The CEMA board was run particularly well with bilateral discussions showing a high level of interoperability and understanding. This effectiveness could be attributed to the exercise personnel from the JGSDF. For each YS exercise, personnel always came from the 1st Electronic Warfare Unit. The result of using this unit was a great deal of corporate knowledge retained and applied each year, which built on base competencies.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Transfer of knowledge was enhanced when done physically with expertise and experience from previous rotations. Whenever possible, staff members who have recent operational or exercise experience should be incorporated into the exercise to reinforce knowledge transfer and competency.

Observation 2

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral CEMA board focused too much on the process stage rather than the planning stage due to limitations of the simulation system.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) During YS 69, the bilateral CEMA board dealt more with process issues rather than focusing on detailed planning due to limitations of the simulation system to replicate electronic warfare effects. The current workaround was provided by exercise white-cell inputs.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Expertise was at an ideal level, along with effective bilateral integration. The CEMA deputy recommended having the CEMA group take on more planning activities.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) As the level of expertise increases, consider increasing responsibilities for the CEMA group, so that it moves from the process stage to more detailed planning.

Observation 3

(U) The CEMA cell conducted a bilateral CEMA working-group meeting.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The CEMA cell conducted a bilateral CEMA working-group meeting as part of its daily battle rhythm. The working-group meeting was led by the CEMA cell and included elements from the bilateral staffs, NETOPS, IO, spectrum management, staff judge advocate, and other staff elements. The working-group meeting was conducted in a separate area and with a visual display for better understanding. In addition, outlying units were able to participate in the working-group meeting using Defense Collaboration Services. There was effective forum-to-conduct bilateral information sharing. The working-group meeting covered the overall operations for situational awareness. The following cyber capabilities were also covered:

- Nomination of targets in support of the operations
- Target guidance
- List priority of targets in support of operations
- Synchronized targets
- Cyber updates on threat social engineering (phishing). During the working-group meeting, NETOPS recommended upgrading to a cyber threat status due to social engineering attempts.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Continue to conduct bilateral CEMA working-group meetings to support the commander's intent and operations.

Observation 4

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) United States Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) participated in the YS exercises to improve cyber awareness.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Previously, ARCYBER did not support YS exercises. Cyber MSELs for the exercise were developed by individuals from the United States Army Space Command and CALL subject matter experts who did not have a strong background in cyber. ARCYBER's expertise and experience enhanced cyber influence in the exercise and provided subject matter expertise to help units understand cyber capabilities

and how to integrate cyber into operations. ARCYBER's participation in planning conferences helped develop the cyber MSEL inputs and enhance cyber awareness and integration into the exercises.

Lessons and best Practice

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) ARCYBER support to YS exercises for planning and conducting cyber MSELs can help U.S. and Japanese forces understand and integrate cyberspace capabilities into operations. ARCYBER participation can enhance cyber involvement for the exercise and benefit both forces.

Observation 5

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps and JGSDF Middle Army developed a bilateral cyber SOP.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral SOP developed by the I Corps and Middle Army identified procedures and processes required to manage cyber operations in a bilateral and coalition environment. The cyber SOP was developed specifically for this exercise; it documented procedures and processes required to manage cyber operations in a bilateral environment. The I Corps and Middle Army coordination; collaboration; best practices; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) were used to adjust and improve the SOP. During the course of the exercise, both the U.S. Army and Middle Army used the bilateral SOP to monitor, troubleshoot, and report cyber activities. The bilateral SOP assisted the U.S. Army and Middle Army forces in building a solid team to manage cyber operations.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Continue to build on the bilateral cyber SOP with best practices, TTP, and battle-drill reporting.

Observation 6

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps spectrum manager and Japanese counterpart participated in the working-group meetings.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps spectrum manager and the Japanese counterpart provided expertise in the working-group meetings. The bilateral spectrum-management team also provided reports and

frequencies management expertise at the NETOPS and CEMA working-group meetings.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral spectrum management team provided updates to include current and potential spectrum-interference reports with a range of frequencies impacting bilateral forces. Also provided were ranges of frequencies for avoiding interference and supporting operations.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps spectrum manager and Japanese counterpart explained the frequencies management process and the impact of the frequency spectrum on operations and systems. This enhanced bilateral understanding and provided an environment for mentorship and education.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The spectrum manger should continue to use working-group meetings to educate and share information with bilateral partners.

Observation 7

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) A telephonic phishing attempt was injected into the exercise to determine responses from participants.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Cyber MSELs injected a phishing attempt via telephone during the exercise. Bilateral network operations (NETOPS) reacted and responded once the incident was reported. NETOPS followed the bilateral cyber SOP in addressing the incident, blocking the site and reporting the incident. NETOPS conducted an analysis to determine information compromise, source, and a course of action to mitigate the incident. Participants attempted to gain information from individuals, such as passwords, to gain access to the unit's network. There were 20 calls made over the span of 20 minutes before helpdesk personnel were notified. Out of the 20 calls made, only four individuals (both U.S. and Japanese participants) gave the cyber personnel their information. NETOPS reported the incident and sent alerts to units by email. Overall, it was a satisfactory response to the cyber incident.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) NETOPS, along with its bilateral partner, used bilateral cyber SOP to address cyber activities, events, and reporting procedures. Continue to develop units' SOP and cyberspace procedures for cyber threats and maintain response and reporting procedures.

Observation 8

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) During the exercise, a cyber insider threat also served as a physical intruder.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) During the exercise, there was a breach by an intruder who gained access to the tactical operations center. The intrusion was conducted by a participant who carried a computer into the Combined Operations Integration Center. One individual reported the intruder. The unit announced the incident and warned the tactical operations center using the public address system. The intruder tried to access the network but without success. The intruder was detected by NETOPS but was not detained. Due to the increased focus on the cyber threat, the intruder was able to leave the area. The insider threat was not only a cyber incident, but also a physical intrusion, which security should have addressed. The unit did a search of the area to attempt to locate and detain the intruder.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The unit operated on a closed network where the biggest threat was physical insider threats. Threats can gain access through phishing attempts that focus on individuals though email or telephonic means. Threats can obtain information by accessing an individual's account and gaining access to the network. Units need to follow SOPs and enforce the following:

- Education through training
- Quality control and supervisor oversight and checks
- Enforcing established SOPs
- Social media rules of engagement for unit personnel

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Treat all insider threats as both cyber and physical threats. Develop and rehearse battle drills to address both of these threats.

Observation 9

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The Regional Cyber Center-Pacific (RCCP) established a working relationship with USARJ and I Corps through the YS exercises.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The RCCP brought cyber tools and skill sets to monitor, isolate, and extract threats within the network. In addition, the RCCP provided and coordinated for offensive cyber capabilities. The RCCP was part of NETOPS, providing cyberspace capabilities and expertise in defense of the networks. In addition, the RCCP brought to NETOPS a reachback capability with other agencies. Coordination and collaboration was key in identifying the resources needed to address the requirements to support the exercise. The RCCP provided support to the exercise and monitoring of the real-world threat. During exercises similar to YS, the network supporting operations provided an opportunity for the adversary to learn processes and procedures.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The RCCP does not participate in all exercises in USARPAC. Cyberspace support must be present for all exercises. In order to obtain this support, units must request it from the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command. The RCCP brought capabilities and tools for monitoring and protecting the network. The RCCP team worked with USARJ staff in the exercise planning process. RCCP personnel were involved in planning throughout the exercise, which helped in setting the conditions for success. During the exercise, the RCCP conducted initial scans of the network and established monitoring tools. The RCCP reported threats and incidents internal to the units, computers on the wrong network, phishing attempts, and forensics functions to assist NETOPS in the defense of cyberspace.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The RCCP conducted its real-world mission during the exercise. During the planning conference, the RCCP identified real-world threats in the networks and took steps to isolate, extract, and report their activities.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) RCCP involvement was key. Factors influencing its support included the following:

- Building relationships among the RCCP and units requiring cyberspace support
- Consistent involvement in theater exercises and integration into operations, not just major exercises

- The standard toolkit did not meet all requirements. A tailorable cyber toolkit was required to meet adjustments in the mission.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Establishing the RCCP allowed the NETOPS and bilateral partners to exercise the bilateral cyber SOP to address cyber activities, events, and reporting procedures. Identifying the threat does not necessarily mean it can be eliminated without disturbing the network. NETOPS required additional support to address the threat in the network. Until this support was applied, the network remained compromised. A regional cyber center element in the NETOPS provided additional support and expertise. Consideration was made for the addition of a regional cyber center element to the NETOPS for all exercises and deployments. This regional cyber center element can provide reachback support, expertise, and guidance on cyber incidents. Battle drills should be built to function in a compromised network. In addition, ARCYBER involvement in the exercise enhanced the unit's ability to integrate cyber capability into operations and defend cyberspace.

Observation 10

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) NETOPS, along with its Japanese partners, conducted a bilateral update on network and cyber statuses.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) NETOPS, along with its Japanese partners, conducted a bilateral update to the I Corps G-6 and Japanese communications officer. The update was conducted in the bilateral NETOPS cell. The update covered the overall operations situation, and network and cyber statuses in support of the operation (see Figure 3-11 on page 44). The update also provided the status on communications. The cyber section briefed on cyber activities and actions taken against the threat. The cyber section recommended an upgrade to IO conditions from social engineering activities and phishing attempts. The update proved successful for sharing information and training purposes. The update provided situational understanding of network and cyber activities throughout the area of responsibility.



Figure 3-11. Bilateral cyber organizational chart

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The update was successful for bilateral information sharing. Bilateral NETOPS updates are recommended to provide support to the commander's intent and operations.

Observation 11

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps NETOPS was collocated with the JGSDF NETOPS.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps and JGSDF collocated their NETOPS, which enhanced information sharing for NETOPS, network troubleshooting, and defense of cyber operations. Tools for monitoring the network, along with displays, provided situational awareness on how to manage the network. The collocation of regional cyber center elements in the NETOPS provided network and cyber-monitoring capabilities. The bilateral NETOPS enhanced collaboration and coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. In addition, bilateral NETOPS educated the section on U.S. and Japanese processes and procedures.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Continue to collocate bilateral partners' NETOPS, which is key for managing multi-networks, conducting defense of cyber operations, and sharing information.

Observation 12

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The data exchange station impacted information sharing for planning and other work of bilateral partners. This resulted in a bottleneck when getting data approved.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) USARJ identified data exchange requirements in order to share information. I Corps was unaware of these requirements until deployment. I Corps set up a data exchange station in order to scan and exchange information and data among bilateral partners. These requirements created issues for data exchange over different networks and systems.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The data went through a lengthy approval process for the exchange to take place. The unit had to ensure the right authority was in place to approve data for the exchange. This process took time and resources. In order to exchange data, an individual had to get approval from the supervisor. Data then had to go through the foreign disclosure office before going to the data exchange station. This process was time consuming and impeded the staff process.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) There was also a requirement to conduct bilateral operations on a common network to enhance information sharing and understanding between bilateral partners. CENTRIX-J was used to share information among bilateral partners. CENTRIX-J provided the common operational picture for bilateral partners and was used for staff work. World Wide Web and SharePoint applications provided useful platforms for conducting staff work and sharing information. In addition, the bilateral Combined Operations Integration Center used the Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) to provide the common operational picture on CENTRIX-J.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Identify information requirements for information sharing, such as staff work, planning, and the common operational picture, with bilateral partners. Use CENTRIX-J to conduct operations and staff work. Employ firewall tools on CENTRIX-J to safeguard information.

Observation 13

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral IO working-group meeting was used for bilateral information sharing.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The G-7 cell conducted a bilateral IO working-group meeting as part of the daily battle rhythm. The working-group meeting was led by the G-7 and the Japanese IO officer. Participation included elements from the staff, NETOPS, IO, spectrum management, staff judge advocate, targeting, and other elements from both U.S. and Japanese Armies. The working group had a set agenda for participants. The working-group meeting covered IO messaging, synchronization of IO information-related capabilities with ongoing operations, and overall operations for situational awareness. The working group discussed messaging and changes to timing to be more effective and better support the commander's intent.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The update also covered the following:

- Running estimate of information-related capabilities
- Synchronized IO efforts with ongoing operations
- Ongoing activities
- Targeting

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The working-group meeting was effective for covering bilateral information sharing. Continue to conduct bilateral IO working-group meetings to support the commander's intent and operations.

Observation 14

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) IO activities during YS 69 saw an increase in involvement and MSELs that exercised nonlethal effects and IO.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The I Corps G-7 synchronized the full range of information-related capabilities during the exercise to include pamphlet drops and broadcasting. In decisive-action operations, IO assist the commander in shaping the information environment to support operations. IO played a key role in synchronizing information-related capabilities to influence the local populace and enemy soldiers in the objective areas and along the avenue of approach. IO ensured the commander's messages were shared with the populace and bilateral partners. Conducting IO during YS exercises demonstrated to the Middle Army the benefits of using nonlethal effects and IO to influence adversaries and protect information during Phase III operations. In addition, inserting more IO MSELs into the exercise can provide ways to train the IO staff section and bilateral partners on integrating information into operations.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Continue to increase the amount of nonlethal MSELs into the exercise to build and update nonlethal processes that include IO, military information support operations, operations security, public affairs, civil affairs, nonlethal targeting, and assessments in support of maneuver operations. An increase in nonlethal MSELs provided an environment to guide and mentor bilateral partners on IO.

Legal

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Bilateral discussions and working groups determined the scope and processes for contractor support during the exercise. Significant strides were made toward understanding and operating within the regulations of the U.S. and legal framework of the Government of Japan. Any potential conflict in Japan that would entail U.S. force involvement would be unique and require solutions based on specifics of that conflict. The understanding of operating bilaterally in this type of environment has greatly increased, but there is still additional work required for all exercise participants in the future.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Operations and exercises, including future YS exercises, must take into consideration the specifics of operating in a sovereign country with a fully functioning government. Over the previous 10 years, primary U.S. force operations have been in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some unique issues and difficulties were not addressed during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. During Iraq and Afghanistan operations, there were broad legal exceptions for actions taken by U.S. forces. These exceptions most likely do not apply to operations occurring in regions like Japan. Because the majority of logistics planners fostered their understanding of deployment logistics during the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, there is a knowledge gap on operating within the legal framework of an established government that does not have broad exceptions to U.S. force actions.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) For contractor support, there was extensive use of third-country national (TCN) contractors during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would be unlikely that TCN contractors would be available for use during operations in Japan. Although, it is likely that use of contractors would require utilizing Japanese civilians first and U.S. civilians second, with TCN support being unavailable within the framework of the Government of Japan. This requires unique planning where increased cost to comply with restrictions must be considered, along with a decrease in overall availability of the civilian workforce. Additionally, there are detailed U.S. regulatory guidelines for requesting LOGCAP support. For LOGCAP support to be available, it must be determined if there is organic capability of providing logistics support and if forces will be available. There is a specific determination if the organic contract command can provide these services. Only if the answer to this question is no, can LOGCAP support be requested. Even if the answer to this question is no, there are additional rules for creating a letter of justification, statement of work, and performance work statement. The initial steps for progressing through these

rules and guidelines began during the exercise, but there is still a knowledge gap for most logistics officers, particularly those lieutenant colonels and below accustomed to operating under the legal framework of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) An expanded analysis of these unique ramifications in the pre-exercise academics would be beneficial. The pre-exercise academics should specifically address operations and exercises in a sovereign country with a fully functioning government, as well as those specific to the legal framework, jurisdiction, and regulations of the Government of Japan. This would greatly increase understanding of RSOI and sustainment operations and enhance interoperability. A detailed briefing of utilization and procedures for LOGCAP support would also be beneficial.

Observation 2

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Legal ramifications for criminal jurisdiction concerns within the exercise could be explored further.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Under the status-of-forces agreement, the jurisdiction between the U.S. and the Government of Japan was particularly relevant for serious or heinous crimes occurring within Japan. The unfortunate reality was that in any real-world operation the size of YS, there would inevitably be some type of criminal act by U.S. forces. The jurisdictional issues this would raise could be particularly difficult to navigate and could have political and diplomatic consequences. It would also involve official addressment, interviews, and potential media appearances to address the concerns of the civilian population over U.S. forces in Japan.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) MSELs that included criminal acts by U.S. forces and ways they were dealt with added realism to the exercise and compelled exercise participants to consider the legal ramifications of operating within the Government of Japan framework. Information operations, public affairs, and civil affairs needed to address the added concerns raised during the exercise.

Observation 3

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Legal ramifications for environmental concerns during Phase III and IV within the exercise could be explored further.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The potential legal and political ramifications of environmental concerns during the exercise were only peripherally discussed in bilateral working groups. Chemical spills, hazardous materials, and ammunition were issues that needed to be addressed within the framework of the Government of Japan.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Including an environmental annex in the operation order would allow for broader knowledge and consideration of the legal ramifications for environmental concerns.

Observation 4

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) There was a bilateral Phase IV working group that took steps toward developing proper procedures for post-Phase III operations. However, there was significant work to accomplish in order to fully develop courses of action.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Phase IV operations presented unique issues to operate within the framework of the Government of Japan. Any steps taken by U.S. forces to dispose of various hazardous materials on the battlefield, rebuild infrastructure, relocate the civilian populace, and provide necessary services needed to be coordinated politically. It was a continuous step-by-step process to ensure compliance with all agreements and guidelines.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral Phase IV working group improved the overall understanding of the processes and procedures. Future exercises should consider a full Phase IV conference and follow specific steps required for the support and protection operations. Alternatively, having a separate designated staff or portion of the exercise devoted to Phase IV operations would be greatly beneficial.

Observation 5

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Legal pressure in certain messaging areas served as a means to deter enemy commanders.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) During the early phases of the operation, there was an analysis of means to deter enemy commanders from using chemical weapons. A potential solution explored was a messaging campaign. This messaging campaign was aimed at enemy commanders. It explained and outlined the threat of international criminal prosecution for violating international law by deploying weapons of mass destruction. Ideally, this message would deter enemy commanders with the threat of individual prosecution. The finalization of a messaging campaign was ultimately cut short as the enemy utilized chemical weapons before the potential solution could be fully enacted. Further actions with the messaging campaign after the enemy's use of chemical weapons during the exercise were deemed moot.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Earlier planning of a messaging campaign and other messaging effects could have deterred enemy commanders from using chemical weapons during the exercise. Pre-emptive planning to respond to anticipated chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, combined with aggressive initial use, may produce better results in the future, leveraging legal knowledge and power to shape the battlefield. Developing SOPs for use of a messaging campaign and pre-exercise academics could ensure easier and earlier deployment of messaging effects.

Observation 6

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) There was a lack of awareness and understanding of the difference in treatment required under the Geneva Conventions for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOWs) and Unlawful Enemy Combatants (UECs).

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) There were certain proposals for actions on treatment of EPOWs and UECs that were not in line with the Geneva Conventions. This was due to a misunderstanding of the different definitions, their applicability, and the rights they inferred. Early involvement of judge advocate general (JAG) personnel prevented these plans from progressing to a later stage and possibly prevented a subsequent violation of the law of armed conflict.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Early JAG involvement in the future operations and plans sections is essential for preventing early misunderstandings from growing in size and scope, preventing waste of military time and resources, and ensuring full compliance with law of armed conflict. Inclusion of Geneva Conventions standards and training within pre-exercise academics, particularly on EPOWs and UECs, would ensure broader understanding and increase bilateral interoperability.

Observation 7

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Bilateral engagement in the JAG cell led to improved understanding and legal products. However, these outcomes could have been more integrated.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The bilateral engagement between the Japanese and U.S. legal cells increased the ability of both forces to provide accurate legal guidance to their respective commanders. The side-by-side positioning of the offices, combined with the daily legal synchronization meeting, allowed the attorneys and staffs to raise and address legal issues among each other. Furthermore, certain products would have been impossible to create without bilateral engagement. An example of these products was the creation of a tactical directive that reflected both the U.S. and Japanese viewpoints. The directive harmonized operational necessity with the need to protect Japanese cultural property.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The daily legal synchronization was of excellent value to the sections and should be retained and strengthened. The side-by-side positioning was a first step but could be improved. In the future, the JAG cells should be positioned together, as opposed to side by side to increase awareness of what each section projects. Further, an officer from each nation should be assigned to work primarily on the other nation's issues to increase bilateral awareness and interoperability. These designated officers can bring a more nuanced awareness of the other side's current projects and issues and a better knowledge of when to reach out to the other members of the cell.

Intelligence

Observation 1

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The Middle Army used battle damage assessment (BDA) techniques and procedures developed by I Corps and Eastern Army staff.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) With the assistance of I Corps, the JGSDF devised an SOP that is now in use by the Middle Army. As a result, the Middle Army G-2 demonstrated skill at depicting and explaining BDA in support of targeting.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Habitual relationships between I Corps and JGSDF had a positive impact on the development of Japanese TTP. The bilaterally developed BDA slides were exemplary. They were clear, clean, and concise.

Observation 2

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The commander's update assessment was effective overall, but needed improvement.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The information provided during the commander's update assessment was comprehensive. It incorporated reports from all divisions and brigades. Subordinate units were well-disciplined and followed established standards. As a result, it was easy to identify key information and assistance requirements. However, the pacing of the brief made it difficult to hold the attention of the audience. Furthermore, there were multiple JGSDF translators, each with varying levels of expertise. This exacerbated the difficulty of comprehension. Instead of a single, concise discussion of intelligence concerns, there were assessments spread throughout the briefing.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Incorporate simple yet effective bilateral update slides into future operations. To improve clarity and comprehension, select a small team of the best interpreters to translate the meeting. Finally, consolidate all ISR updates to streamline the overall briefing.

Observation 3

(U) Bilateral intelligence meeting participation was unbalanced.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Bilateral intelligence meetings were effective, although there was a tendency for them to have unbalanced participation. Early in the exercise, there were either large numbers of U.S. elements and a small contingent of the JGSDF, or there were large numbers of the JGSDF and a select set of senior U.S. G-2 officers. For example, one I Corps intelligence synchronization meeting included only one Japanese officer. Although the information in the meeting would have been useful for the Middle Army G-2 staff, the pace of the presentation would have challenged translators. A better example of a bilateral meeting was the combined collection management meeting. In actuality, this meeting was a more comprehensive review of intelligence actions. Key leaders from both countries attended. High-quality translation support allowed for an in-depth discussion of the intelligence situation and upcoming ISR operations.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Be wary of language barriers. Identify strong translators to support key bilateral meetings. Recognize that virtual conferences may make participation difficult for partner nations. If translation is not possible for a virtual conference, ensure that partner nations have either English speakers or experienced translators available.

Observation 4

(U) Briefing clarity was key for interoperability.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The Middle Army G-2 used a simple, effective briefing slide to present changes in the BDA. Even without translation, it was possible to understand the gist of the information. The slide itself was clear and an easy-to-update product.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) When working with partner nations, strive to keep information clear. Keep extraneous information to a minimum, and take advantage of standard symbols, color coding, and understandable legends.

Observation 5

(U) Inconsistency inhibited bilateral coordination.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Formal and informal collaboration between the Middle Army G-2 and I Corps G-2 paid dividends as the exercise progressed. There were challenges early on. Slide inconsistency, particularly for depictions of ISR support, frustrated the JGSDF senior leadership. Revisions to these ISR slides resulted in a common template. In the opinion of the I Corps deputy G-2, the revisions allowed for more bilateral coordination. Instead of worrying about formatting, discussions could have focused on operational details.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Capture slide revisions as SOPs. The resulting slides were outstanding for use in a bilateral or a unilateral environment. They were clear, concise, and easy to follow.

Observation 6

(U) Technical issues made it difficult to share information.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Although procedures for bilateral coordination have evolved well, some technical difficulties with information sharing still exist. Driven in part by system classification concerns, it proved difficult to pass files between the U.S. and Japanese G-2 networks. As a workaround, the U.S. collection management team displayed scanned copies of presentation slides. Moreover, this inability to electronically share material exacerbated previous problems with format inconsistency.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Adaptability proved to be a very useful skill. These workarounds were possible because of the trust and close-working relationship built between the U.S. and Japanese G-2 staffs. Overcoming challenges was much easier in a climate of collaboration. However, workarounds should not replace a more comprehensive approach to address systemic technical problems.

Observation 7

(U) The target synchronization meetings were well coordinated.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The twice-daily target synchronization meetings were an excellent example of bilateral coordination. There was a good balance between U.S. and JGSDF officers. Intelligence reporting was up-to-date, and ISR collection management was an integral part of the discussion. However, the meeting was primarily driven by the I Corps staff.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The procedures behind the target synchronization effort were well-planned and should continue in future exercises. However, there was room to improve the bilateral nature of the meeting. Recognizing and focusing on capabilities that the JGSDF bring to fires and IO can restore some balance to the meetings.

Observation 8

(U) There was an efficient flow of ISR reports in support of fires.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The G-2 operations ISR collection management team monitored a flood of reporting during the exercise. This information flowed over multiple chat channels. The I Corps fires team was able to monitor these channels and was satisfied with the reporting. In particular, the I Corps assistant fire support coordinator noted that full-motion video reporting worked well. However, ISR support to fires was a largely unilateral affair. There was little interaction with the JGSDF by either G-2 operations or I Corps fires teams.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The flow of U.S. ISR targeting information should remain steady and fast. However, procedures in place were seemingly better optimized for unilateral operations. Integration with JGSDF procedures still requires improvement. One simple solution is to have an experienced interpreter monitor the chat channels who can be available in the bilateral operations and intelligence center.

Observation 9

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade's processes were integrated and implemented within the I Corps G-2 operations team.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade had an assigned officer located with the G-2 operations team. This officer was in charge of collection management and fulfilled responsibilities in support of the commander's role as chief of ISR. The officer was skilled at monitoring multiple events, but could have benefited from having a larger team for support. However, resource constraints limited the number of 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade participants. As a result, the testing of this innovative new organizational structure suffered.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS holds excellent potential as a testbed for new organizational designs. This concept holds true for both U.S. and Japanese forces. For future exercises, experimentation should be identified and justified early in the joint exercise lifecycle planning process. Doing so would allow planners to better prioritize resources, which would improve the odds for testing to take place. Higher-level headquarters should also take a more proactive role in incorporating these experiments into exercise objectives.

Observation 10

(U) A simulation support team was used during the exercise for ISR support.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS was a complicated and dynamic command post exercise. For the exercise to succeed, there were significant behind-the-scenes efforts made to ensure participants received an authentic training experience. The command post exercise simulation of ISR collection and reporting proved challenging in the past. To mitigate difficulties, the Korea Battle Simulation Center originally requested a team to support ISR simulation. USARJ and the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade contributed Soldiers, resulting in a seven-person team that was optimally sized to support the operation. The team members ran three, nine-hour shifts with one officer acting as liaison to exercise participants. Although not as robust as initially desired, the team quickly grasped its responsibilities and ran an efficient operation.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Continue to field an ISR simulation support team to interface between exercise participants and simulation-center staff. Keep this ISR simulation support team optimized at six Soldiers and one officer. This number would allow three, two-Soldier teams to provide 24-hour coverage during an exercise.

Observation 11

(U) The intelligence network architecture was improved by a warrant officer.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The network connecting the exercise simulation with the I Corps intelligence support element was a source of frustration in recent exercises. To mitigate challenges, I Corps sent an intelligence network warrant officer to attend the YS 69 final planning conference. During the conference, the warrant officer's talents untangled a variety of complications. The Korea Battle Simulation Center and Korea Air Simulation Center had a better appreciation for I Corps' systemic issues. I Corps and simulation centers largely overcame their previous obstacles.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Technical experts from I Corps G-2 should always attend command post exercise planning events. Not only was it possible for a senior warrant officer to build working relationships with the Korea Battle Simulation Center and Korea Air Simulation Center, but the warrant officer also led detailed intelligence architecture-related planning. For any intelligence architecture working group, participants should come from both the ground and air simulation center. Over the long-term, USARPAC, I Corps, and the Korea Battle Simulation Center should revise SOPs to address the root causes of recurring technical difficulties.

Observation 12

(U) There was a degree of difficulty within the exercise design.

Discussion

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS 69 adequately challenged the I Corps intelligence warfighting function. The event was largely a conventional fight that had a tendency to focus on tactical-level concerns. However, it gave the various G-2 sections the opportunity to integrate into broader staff

operations while conducting bilateral intelligence activities. Although the simulation replicated technical collection capabilities, it did not do well at stimulating corps-level human intelligence functions.

Lessons and Best Practices

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) For future exercises, there should be a deliberate effort to incorporate operational and strategic aspects. Human intelligence reporting injects is one way to stimulate the I Corps and Japanese Army-level staffs. Moreover, this reporting would better exercise the I Corps counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element (G-2X). Exercise planners should begin this process early in the exercise.

Chapter 4
Key Leader Interviews

Interview with MG James Pasquarette, Commanding General, United States Army, Japan and I Corps (Forward)

(U) *As the U.S. and Japan review U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines to address concerns about People's Republic of China's operations in the South China Sea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, global terrorism, cyber intrusions, and other emerging threats, what are the impacts or opportunities for Yama Sakura (YS) and regional and bilateral military cooperation in general*?

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's (JGSDF's) position was based on its threat of Russia in the north, and has shifted to the south and southwest. This is a fundamental change for all the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), but has caused the ground forces to develop rapid-deployment regiments and divisions in the regional armies that can operationally deploy within Japan to support and reinforce the Western Army. United States Army, Japan (USARJ) is working to help the JSDF realize this goal. Again, this a fundamental transformation in the JGSDF's thinking, as it has been traditionally grouped into five regional armies that did not work together or crosstalk. Now they are breaking that mold and developing plans to send formations from one regional army to support another. This is new. USARJ is working to support that with, for example, U.S. Army watercraft that are forward-based here in Japan. We just have to get the crews out here. Future impacts for YS, as I discussed with GEN Wata who is pushing this transformation within the JGSDF, is making it a joint exercise. YS is ready to become a joint exercise, and we at USARJ want it to become joint by increasing the size and composition of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) from response cells to their actual operational headquarters participating with a robust joint headquarters above them.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The JGSDF in 2018 is creating a ground component command (GCC) over the regional armies that reports to the joint staff organization, similar to a United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), but with joint task force (JTF) capability that can operate within Japanese territory. USARJ will support this by splitting out I Corps (Forward) and embedding it into the GCC's bilateral coordination cell. In the next two YS exercises, we propose to reorganize the structure above the regional armies and I Corps (Forward) to replicate this arrangement

and exercise it in 2016 and 2017 to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) and interoperability tactics, techniques, and procedures prior to the GCC becoming live in March 2018.

(U) *How do you define the operational environment (OE) for I Corps (Forward)/USARJ to employ forces with the right capabilities, missions, and goals?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Firstly, USARJ is a Phase 0 headquarters. We must be ready every day to perform our Phase 0 duties while preparing to incorporate more U.S. Army forces. The OE in Japan can be frustrating if you let it, because of where JSDF sit in Japanese society. It is the opposite of countries where the military runs the government. The JSDF have recruited first-rate talent and a disciplined force that is well-equipped and educated, but limited by Japanese culture and politics. The JSDF hold far less influence than, for instance, the U.S. Political decisions on military things move slower as a result, especially in the Phase 0 environment. If events move toward a crisis, then USARJ would have to be augmented, or another headquarters brought in to conduct the operational missions. USARJ will focus on the ARFOR tasks to support United States Forces Japan (USFJ).

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Our plans to do that include establishing and physically moving the I Corps (Forward) headquarters from USARJ to create a deployable Army headquarters that can go anywhere in Japan, and conduct mission command of ground operations at the direction of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC).

(U) *How do you plan to leverage YS exercises to further security cooperation in the Pacific region from a theater security cooperation and exercise design perspective? Where are we now?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The JSDF, in support of their new national strategy, are now learning those things that U.S. forces are very experienced on, almost second nature: reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), which we struggled through together on a table-top exercise (TTX); amphibious operations, which were part of this exercise to help develop that capability; integrating airborne operations and special operations forces into a campaign, as we did in this exercise. It's difficult to fully understand these missions in an exercise. LTG Lanza has proposed in the course of the YS planning conferences, a "deep dive" into these tasks and missions such as RSOI, airborne or amphibious operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, or whatever it is we are trying to

exercise as part of the training objectives, and conducting a series of seminars on each of these tasks. We close the doors and each nation lays out its doctrine on how to conduct each of these. This will give everyone a deeper knowledge. Again, this is part of understanding the OE and operating in Phase 0 of what is going to be exercised in the subsequent YS. I think this will leverage the conferences and lead to a more useful bilateral exercise, while later reacting to the maintenance expenditure limit. That is how we will get after these really hard issues and solve them through professional discussions and seminars. If we bring in the Japanese government's relevant ministries, we can exercise these aforementioned time-consuming procedures and approvals as the ministries have control in Phase 0 and RSOI.

(U) *Do you think we have the different headquarters (USARPAC, I Corps, I Corps [Forward]/USARJ) right in terms of size and purpose, tasks, and roles? How would you like to arrange it and are we headed in the right direction?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) To start with, USARJ and I Corps (Forward) have been a single entity, one headquarters located and operating together despite one having a table of distribution and allowances and the other a table of organization and equipment. We've never separated them out and trained on their respective mission-essential task list. In March, the I Corps (Forward) headquarters is going to move from Camp Zama to Sagami Army Depot. This is going to drive us to figure out roles and missions of each headquarters separately. We will focus on how I Corps (Forward) will deploy to an austere environment to conduct mission command of Army forces, while USARJ will learn to operate without those personnel. We will reorganize as necessary to mitigate the risk of unresourced missions.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The command and control arrangement in the Pacific area of responsibility is unclear because of the presence of two subunified commands: United States Forces Korea in Korea and United States Forces Japan (USFJ) in Japan. Part of the OE here is understanding that you will report to more than one boss. I will report to USFJ operational headquarters as the Army component, administrative control (ADCON) to USARPAC as USARJ, and aligned with I Corps in my role as I Corps (Forward) commanding general. We are working on that last relationship. GEN Brooks described it by the analogy of USARPAC as a brigade combat team, I Corps as a battalion in the brigade combat team, and I Corps (Forward) as a company in that battalion with a mission as a reserve for USARPAC. USARPAC will determine the mission, where it goes, task and purpose, etc., while I Corps ensures it is trained, ready, and manned.

(U) *What were your personal lessons and takeaways from this exercise?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Learning to work with the JGSDF and realizing that there are differences between the goals of the two nations despite our close, friendly, and bilateral relationship. I have to understand the Japanese culture and know that saying no is uncomfortable, and learning the nuances of the spoken and body language that shows disagreement or difference. One has to know one's own culture and learn to not just hear, but listen, and realize there are ways of getting things done other than ours. We have to understand that while we, the U.S. forces, look at the YS exercise as an opportunity to get better, the JGSDF is under tremendous pressure, as it is required to demonstrate proficiency. There is a difference in expectations. It is important to understand that there is a gap in expected outcomes, recognize it, and find a way to come to closure on it.

(U) *What experience in your background prepared you for your position?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Serving as a brigade commander and later a deputy division commander in Iraq, and working to develop and at the same time operate with the Iraqi security forces. Again, there was a difference in expectations and the tempo of how goals would be accomplished. Secondly, working in the Pentagon several times, working in strategy jobs, particularly early-on in my career as a captain, exposed me to some really hard problems that do not have easy answers. You have to organize for it, develop a campaign plan for it, and try to solve it. We need to value broadening experiences. Rather than giving a great captain a second company command or battalion operations staff officer (S-3) the brigade executive officer position, we should move him or her outside the Army for a year. Place them in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, State Department, foreign country, industry, or fellowship to let them see and experience other ways of understanding and solving problems.

Interview with LTG Stephen R. Lanza, Commanding General, I Corps

(U) *Do you see YS moving from being a discrete exercise to being part of a training continuum with the JGSDF?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) That depends on where the JGSDF wants to take the exercise in the future and whether it takes the opportunity to link it to the rise of the GCC. From there, we need to look how we would link the GCC through future YS exercises to the bilateral JTF headquarters we build for the exercises. Next, we must examine how we will build YS based on the policy of collective defense and Article 9. Most of that, of course, is in MG Pasquarette's lane, but are of I Corps' interest.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) What I would like to see are some interim training events leading up to the YS command post exercise (CPX) conducted with the JGSDF regional army that we are going to work with once we start the exercise design. A series of TTXs with the two headquarters on how we would do, for example, an airborne operation with a brigade mass tactical jump, or how would we transition to the cessation of hostilities. Not Phase IV, but how would we accomplish the tasks necessary to achieve that? A corps headquarters operating as a combined joint forces land component command (CJFLCC) cannot simply superimpose our campaign planning over the Japanese because our phasing is not necessarily how the JSDF operates, nor should it. Our planners are speaking a different language in the exercises during the CPX. We should get this understanding out in the open prior to it in the interim TTXs.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I would prefer the JGSDF's Western Army, the one participating in next year's YS, to lay out its training objectives rather than the U.S. force imposing its own. I think there should be two sets of training objectives. One that is bilateral built by the supported commander, in this case the Western Army, and they would build our internal training objectives of the Corps for our readiness. We need to do a better job on our "road to war" in preparing for these exercises.

(U) *Based on your experiences, what are the challenges a corps faces as it prepares itself to assume the role of a JFLCC? Do we have the roles about right for FORSCOM; Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA); Joint Staff; and the combatant command (COCOM)? What needs improvement?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I Corps is in a unique position. We are assigned to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). We are ADCON to USARPAC, and tactical control (TACON) to FORSCOM. It's not so much a challenge as an opportunity to be regionally aligned to the Pacific and globally responsive. We must be ready to be employed in the Pacific area of responsibility or deployed wherever the nation requires. Whether that is a JFLCC, JTF, or traditional corps headquarters in Korea, we must have a baseline of products and procedures in I Corps. That's why having a viable SOP is so important, as we may be employed in a variety of ways. Plus, we need to have an early-entry command post capability or a tactical capability and want what GEN Milley envisions, leaving the main command post back and echeloning forward. Using reach-back methodology makes it important to have that standardized, baseline SOP that we can adjust from, depending on what mission command headquarters we are going to deploy. We used YS, Talisman Saber, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) as opportunities

to build playbooks for these headquarters, and train on them to produce a trained and ready corps headquarters.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) should work with MG Bill Rapp to integrate all of these lessons learned and integrate them into the CJFLCC course taught at the Army War College. It is a tremendous course and it would be helpful if CALL took these interviews of myself and LTG Sean McFarland, LTG Steve Townsend, and LTG Ben Hodges, who have been operating as a CJFLCC, and made them into vignettes and lessons for the students at that course. What LTG Hodges has been doing in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve is another mission that should be compiled for study or just to read about at that course.

(U) *How do you define the OE of the Pacific?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I Corps is the arm, as an operational headquarters, that helps set the theater for the USARPAC Commanding General by physically setting the theater, building partner capacity, theater security cooperation, and executing Phase 0 activities. I Corps and the United States Marine Corps' (USMC's) III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) are ADM Harris' (USPACOM Commander) operational headquarters. The Marines are first responders, as they should be, and I Corps brings unique and added capabilities, depth, and capacity to the theater. I Corps has extended logistic, engineering, and medical capability that we can bring to bear as we did recently in the Philippines. We have the capability to conduct mission command at the operational level across the range of military operations (ROMO), whether bilateral CJFLCC here in Japan, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines or Micronesia, or support of the war plans on the Korean peninsula.

(U) *Can you describe the level of support, shortcomings, and successes of theater enablers?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I rely on theater enablers, but we haven't trained much yet with having to employ them. We have an opportunity in Japan with 8th Theater Sustainment Command to train on RSOI and that's why that TTX was so important. I would envision in future YS exercises to conduct the RSOI mission while in conjunction with the exercise, conducting theater sustainment, while simultaneously the expeditionary sustainment command conducts the operational sustainment mission for the JFLCC. In this exercise, building off of last year's, the RSOI TTX had one JGSDF regional army supporting RSOI, while another regional army was the main effort in the fight. This year, importantly, we had the Japanese

Ministry of Defense here and that was very beneficial for MG Pasquarette as the ARFOR commander.

(U) *Were you able to build an interagency team from other services, government agencies, and other countries into your staff or as a subordinate to your joint force?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Not as effectively as we could have. The model for that is what we were able to do in Talisman Saber with the Australian Government gave us its interagency capability, the Contingency Response Crisis Group, and we embedded it into our CFLCC headquarters. There are opportunities here at YS with the Department of State and other agencies to build that interagency cell to "plug into" the CJFLCC headquarters. It is essential to create and exercise that interagency capability. The Japanese are doing it at YS. Note all the Ministry of Defense personnel here at the exercise and at the planning conferences leading up to it. This is a great opportunity for young Foreign Service officers or members of the other agencies in our embassy or consulate to operate and learn how the whole of government and coalitions work together.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I Corps has a liaison officer (LNO) course that we run prior to UFG to teach people before we go in and operate with the Third Republic of Korea Army (TROKA). I think it would be a good idea, as part of that continuum of training leading up to the YS exercise, to have one of these for interagency personnel. The joint headquarters should have a course to train LNOs for the JTF and LNOs to the component parts, the Joint Force Air Component Command and the Combined Force Maritime Component Command.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) We should embed junior Foreign Service officers into a corps for a year, and travel, train, and operate in these exercises and Pacific Pathways. It is a laboratory! Then return that person to the State Department with the experience of how we operate, both as a ground force, support to an Army Service component command, and as part of the joint force as part of the engagement with other nations and their respective militaries throughout an entire region. Wouldn't that be a great training ground for a future foreign policy advisor (POLAD)? Otherwise, where else does a POLAD get that experience?

Interview with LTG Junji Suzuki, Commanding General, Middle Army

(U) *As the U.S. and Japan review U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines to address Asia-Pacific and global concerns about nuclear threats, global terrorism, cyber intrusions, and other emerging threats, what are the impacts or opportunities for YS and regional and bilateral military cooperation in general?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) In the Asia-Pacific region, where the security environment has increasingly grown severe, the presence of U.S. forces remains vitally important in order to achieve regional stability, and therefore, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. security treaty, together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan's security. Conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises in peacetime fosters understanding in each other's tactics and enhances interoperability, which will greatly contribute to preserving and improving Japan-U.S. bilateral response capacity. As mentioned in the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines, I think conducting effective bilateral exercises such as YS 69 will strengthen our deterrence force and actual capacity to respond and further reinforce the Japan-U.S. alliance.

(U) *How do you visualize the Middle Army's role in the current and near-future OE?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Given the security environment surrounding Japan, which has grown increasingly severe, JSDF's commitment to protect the lives and property of the people, as well as securing the territorial land, water, and airspace, has become more and more important. Under these circumstances, the Middle Army as the troops responsible for the defense, security and disaster relief of the Tokai, Hokuriku, Kinki, Chugoku, and Shikoku Area, which are comprised of twenty-one prefectures, in addition to being in a tough security environment, is required to respond to large-scale disasters such as the Nankai Trough Earthquake, if it occurs, and must be ready to live up to people's expectations in any situation with all our efforts as the final gatekeeper since the people expect highly of us.

(U) *Given the state of security cooperation in the Pacific region, and from the theater security cooperation and exercise design perspective, what are your thoughts on YS?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Japan-U.S. bilateral procedures, in order to enhance interoperability in hypothetical scenarios. Therefore, we do not have any particular country or region in mind with regard to this exercise. However, for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, where the security

environment has increasingly grown severe, the presence of U.S. forces remains extremely important. That is why I think conducting effective bilateral exercises such as YS 69 will strengthen our deterrence force and actual capacity to respond, and further reinforce the Japan-U. S. alliance. Also, deepening awareness in each other's capabilities and tactics through YS facilitates preserving and enhancing Japan-U.S. bilateral response capacity. I think we have to continue to strive for enriching the contents of YS in a bilateral manner by inheriting this year's success and reflecting on it next year.

(U) *How do you plan to use YS as a security cooperation activity to the JGSDF and Middle Army?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I feel that in recent years, JSDF's dialogues and exchanges with other countries have been deepened qualitatively and expanded quantitatively, while security cooperation is being promoted in the form of multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, as well as bilateral training and exercises. The Australian Army participated in this YS as an observer. In order to upgrade our engagement with the Australians from defense exchange to defense cooperation, we will need to explore and concretize the ways in which the Australian Army could participate in YS.

(U) *What do you recommend YS focus on for next year or subsequent years?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I would like YS to continue with the tradition of training command and staff activities of army and corps level, focused throughout on the preparation phase to the end-state phase There is a need to create a true battlefield-like environment for commanders and staffs to thoroughly train themselves in a situation like struggling towards delineating the most favorable course of action. With regard to our examination of strengthening architecture of the JSDF, we have to further deepen our studies over the employment of our basic operational units and amphibious rapid-deployment brigade, which are all designed for rapid deployment. In Japan-U.S. bilateral operations, we have to further consider the impact of U.S. forces' strategic deployment such as RSOI on situational progress of war and further improve linking intelligence with fire.

(U) *How different will the exercise be when the GCC is part of command and control and impact the hosting army's preparation, scenario, and lessons?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) GCC will be established for the purpose of nation-wide operations and logistics operations of JGSDF units, which transcend the regional army's boundaries and for the purpose of comprehensive coordination with the U.S. forces. Therefore, as the hosting army, we will be able to train command and staff activities with more focus on collaboration with higher units in joint and bilateral operations, as GCC assumes an important role in YS scenario as the higher command. This is because the establishment of GCC improves the effectiveness of bilateral operations with U.S. forces such as USARPAC and USARJ, and joint operations with JMSDF and JASDF. Concerning lessons learned, GCC's participation, helped by the establishment of the Japanese United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), will allow the JGSDF as a whole to accumulate all the lessons learned on the command and staff activities for exerting maximum combat power of the Japanese and the U.S. forces in bilateral counterattack against a landed enemy, in amphibious operations, and in other operations. This will contribute to the further improvement in Japan-U.S. response capacity against various contingencies under a full-spectrum environment.

Interview with COL Keith McKinley, Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, Japan

(U) *As the U.S. and Japan review U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines to address concerns about People's Republic of China operations in the South China Sea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, global terrorism, cyber intrusions, and other emerging threats. What are the impacts or opportunities for Yama Sakura and regional and bilateral military cooperation in general?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) As the Asia-Pacific strategic environment changes, so will our exercise construct with the JGSDF in order to build partner capacity and increase interoperability. Each year, both Armies need to take a critical look at the current training/exercise objectives to assess if the exercise structure meets the challenges of the operational environment. This requires exercise planners to have a firm understanding of the security environment within the theater. Exercises cannot be a "cut and paste" from the prior year and need to incorporate critical thinking.

(U) *Do you think we have the different headquarters (USARPAC, I Corps, I Corps [Forward]/USARJ) right in terms of size and purpose, tasks, and roles? How would you like to arrange it and are we headed in the right direction?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Yes for USARPAC and I Corps. However, we are reorganizing both USARJ and I Corps (Forward) headquarters to meet the challenges of the current OE within the Pacific. As you know, we are separating both USARJ and I Corps (Forward) headquarters this year. The intent is to allow USARJ to focus on strategic-level partnership with the general staff office in Ichigaya. I Corps (Forward) will focus on operational/tactical-level partnership with the GCC at Camp Asaka (to be formed next fiscal year). This mission-command structure will better integrate both Armies as well as provide increased control of U.S. Army forces within Japan. Future YS exercises will see I Corps (Forward) taking mission command oversight as the higher command.

(U) *Given the importance of YS as a security cooperation activity that supports the Pacific rebalance, what is the value of YS as a security cooperation event and how should YS progress or evolve?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) YS is the "Super Bowl" of our exercise program which culminates in a bilateral three-star command post exercise. USARJ exercises its ARFOR responsibilities by conducting reception, staging, and onward movement of an entire U.S. Army corps headquarters along with enablers. Going forward, USARJ will develop one common exercise scenario that will drive all of our exercises: Daring Fox, Orient Shield, etc. This will better capture the requirements of the operational environment, allow more coordination opportunities with the JGSDF, and consolidate resources. Also, a common exercise scenario will allow bilateral operations and intelligence briefings to occur in the months leading up to the exercise, which will enhance interoperability.

(U) *In terms of joint, combined, and bilateral operations, in what ways can this headquarters and JSDF improve interoperability? What about the U.S. Army and joint force?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) USARJ is working with USFJ and its sister components to integrate more joint capabilities into YS. The JGSDF is also doing the same. In the past, joint participation was limited to response cells. However, starting next year, joint participation will occur as player organizations. USARJ is currently working with III MEF, 5th Air Force, and Commander, Naval Forces Japan to accomplish this objective.

As YS becomes more joint in the future, the opportunities to enhance interoperability will grow in depth.

(U) *What is required to gain and maintain partners in the OE?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Trust and commitment. Trust is built at the player level during exercise planning and execution. Commitment is built at the strategic level by Headquarters, Department of the Army's resolve and resourcing for continued YS exercises.

(U) *How does the regionally aligned force (RAF) build and manage its understanding of the OE?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) I Corps, as the operational headquarters dedicated to the Pacific theater, has a deep understanding of the OE. This is maintained by an aggressive exercise program in which YS is one in a series executed each year. Additionally, USARPAC's Pacific Pathways allows rotational brigade combat teams the ability to deploy to the Pacific and work with multiple regional armies.

(U) *How does language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural understanding contribute to understanding the operational environment?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) A lot. Cultural understanding is something I learned during the last YS, but not just "Japanese culture 101." More importantly, I learned the military culture within the JGSDF. Similar to the U.S., there are different cultures within military and civilian entities. Knowing how the JGSDF thinks and frames problems better assists us during exercise planning. One example is after action review (AAR) data collection and execution. Both Armies have different ways culturally of doing AARs. In order to make future YS exercises more beneficial, these cultural differences need to be understood by both sides.

(U) *How do you utilize the resources of civilian agencies and nongovernmental organizations?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Not much was incorporated into the YS exercise design. However, this will be discussed at the next YS planning conference to see if this level of integration would better support training objectives.

(U) *How do you prepare leaders and forces to leverage the capability and capacity of the Government of Japan interagency process?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) This is mainly conducted by USFJ during joint-level exercises and not seen during YS.

(U) *What are your recommendations regarding joint and interagency training to enhance individual, collective, and organizational understanding; knowledge and expertise in planning; and conducting joint and interagency operations?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) A review of joint doctrine for both Armies is a start. Also, capability briefings need to be emphasized during planning conferences so all participants understand respective strengths and weaknesses. Finally, a solid AAR program will allow lessons to be understood prior to planning and execution.

(U) *What were your personal lessons and takeaways from this exercise?*

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) Communication is difficult. The language deficit can be bridged with an understanding of vocabulary, interpreters, and culture, but is still prevalent. Often during meetings, we talk for an hour and say the same thing making identification and solution on issues difficult.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) The JGSDF is a premier and professional military force, no doubt the most advanced within the region.

(FOUO REL JAPAN, AUS) More efficiencies need to be built in our exercise design model to better maximize resources.

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TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA at <https://atn.army.mil/media/dat/TRISA/trisa.aspx> (CAC login required).

Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID)

CDID conducts analysis, experimentation, and integration to identify future requirements and manage current capabilities that enable the Army, as part of the Joint Force, to exercise Mission Command and to operationalize the Human Dimension. Find CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cdid>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

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