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Newsletter MAY 2012



## [Army Lessons Learned Forum](#)

The SECARMY has established the Army Forum as the primary venue for force rapid adaptation and provide continuous improvement through rapid and meaningful remedial actions to identified gaps. The Forum adapts to Army needs. More information is available at the [CALL Website](#). Army Forum websites can be found at the following URLs:

NIPRNet: <https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/collaboratives/oefllforum/pages/home.aspx>

SIPRNet: <https://combinedarmscenter.army.smil.mil/collab/allf/default.aspx>

## [Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Organizing and Preparing for Success](#) [1-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team \(SBCT\) Arctic Wolves SFAT](#) [Experience and Lessons Learned Part 2](#)

With the Afghan National Army (ANA) demonstrating increased operational proficiency and the role of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) shifting to securing the Afghan people, deploying BCTs need to fully leverage their Security Force Assistance Team (SFAT) in training and developing their AUP partners. This white paper summarizes experiences and insights the 1-25 Striker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Task Force Arctic Wolves, gained during the first six months advising AUP during the Arctic Wolves MB-SFA mission in OEF. It is intended to assist deploying BCTs with organizing and preparing for their SFA mission.

## [Extreme partnership in Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan](#)

The initial assessment of General Stanley McChrystal indicated that “failing to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term, as the Afghan security forces matured, risked an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” The critical component in gaining the initiative would be partnering with the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) in a much more inclusive and integrated manner than in the past. In the Arghandab District of Kandahar Province in 2010, this battalion pushed the limits of partnership in a meaningful way to create irreversible momentum against the insurgency.

## [Village Stability Operations](#)



Village Stability Operations (VSO) continues to be an important part of assisting Afghanistan in transitioning itself into a functioning nation and further building itself into a viable democratic state. This document provides core observations related to VSO and Afghan Local Police (VSO-ALP) lessons and operating experiences from key leaders within the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 1st Infantry Division (1ID) from their 2011 VSO-ALP mission in Afghanistan. This document offers analytical insight and initial impressions related to SOF and GPF integration at the tactical and operational levels within the Afghan Theater of Operations (ATO). The timeline for 1-16 Infantry VSO-ALP mission occurred from January 2011 to January 2012.





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## IBCT/SBCT

### [CALL Newsletter 11-05: Urban Operations Fight](#)



When you look at the potential for any future contingency, the operational area most likely will include urban areas/environments. It was only a few months ago the Army conducted major combat operations in urban areas. We must not lose the lessons and insight gained from those battles. This newsletter contains firsthand experiences and subjective lessons gained from fighting in an urban environment, under the larger operational context of a counterinsurgency. Many of the examples talk to defeating an enemy while protecting the local population and “key terrain” (e.g., critical infrastructure and areas with special religious and civic significance).

### [CALL Newsletter 12-11: The Decisive Action Training Environment at JMRC](#)

In the Fall of 2011, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany conducted a decisive action training rotation against a hybrid threat. The 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team was the rotational unit. This event was only the second decisive action rotation against a hybrid threat at a maneuver combat training center and yielded extremely valuable observations, insights, and lessons learned (OILs). Leaders within the 173rd ABCT, as well as trainers of JMRC’s Operations Group, produced 19 articles highlighting these OILs and are published in the CALL Newsletter 12-11.



## Armored BCT:

### [Alpha Company, 1st Tank Battalion, USMC 90 Day AAR](#)



This after action report (AAR) is based on the experiences and lessons learned for Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, USMC, during the first ninety days of the company’s deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The topics are addressed by warfighting function and include maneuver, clearing tank fires, communication support, getting priority repair parts, and logistics.

### [SCOUTS — Selection, Training, and Operations](#)

Reconnaissance — seeing and understanding the enemy — is a fundamental issue that drives that evolution. Observer-controllers (OCs) at the JRTC are experts in evaluating unit performance to determine their success or failure in the execution of reconnaissance tasks. Here an OC revisits the selection and training of the scouts in a scout platoon and how they are employed in conducting tactical reconnaissance.





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## The U.S. Army Reconnaissance Course



Since its establishment at Fort Benning, the Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC) continues to train Soldiers and leaders in the art and technical skills of reconnaissance and surveillance. The ARC cadre uses the fundamentals of the 21st century Soldier competencies, described within the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015, in their training. This document demonstrates how ARC professionally develops the abilities of junior reconnaissance leaders to adapt to the changing environment.

## Aviation

### LOD — Hazards during UH-60 Helicopter Operations

The rugged terrain and combat conditions of Afghanistan can increase the hazards to Soldiers completing routine tasks such as exiting and entering UH-60 helicopters. The actual conditions at combat landing zones (LZ) can be vary drastically from one site to another, creating unexpected hazards for soldiers embarking or debarking from UH-60 helicopters.



## SOF

### U.S. Forces Security Force Assistance (SFA) Training and Qualification Standards

USSOCOM, in coordination with the Services and the greater SFA community, has developed SFA Training and Qualification Standards. These tasks provide commanders an outline of the required skills to enable individuals and units to operate effectively in the conduct of SFA activities and contribute to mission success.

### TC 18-06, Special Forces Guide to Information Operations, July 2011

This TC reinforces the definition of IO used by Army forces: IO employs the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), military information support operations (MISO), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to affect or defend information and information systems and to influence decision making. This TC is specifically targeted for SF; however, it is also useful to Army special operations forces (ARSOF) and the Army in understanding how SF employs IO.



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