

CRM LESSON PLAN REPORT

THREAT ASSESSMENT
071-FREBB007 / 02.0 ©

Analysis
21 May 2013

Effective Date: N/A

SCOPE:

None

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SECTION I. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

All Course Masters/POIs Including This Lesson	Courses				
	<u>Course Number</u>	<u>Version</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Status</u>
	9E-F59/950-F38	02.0	Dismounted Counter-IED Tactics Master Trainer	N/A	Analysis
	POIs				
	<u>POI Number</u>	<u>Version</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Status</u>
	9E-F59/950-F38	02.0 ©	Dismounted Counter-IED Tactics Master Trainer	0	Analysis
Task(s) Taught(*) or Supported	<u>Task Number</u>		<u>Task Title</u>	<u>Status</u>	
	Individual				
	171-610-0002 (*)		Recognize Threat Tactics and Battlefield Organization	Approved	
	301-35F-3253 (*)		Evaluate the Threat (SL3)	Obsolete	
	301-35F-3254 (*)		Determine Threat Courses of Action (SL3)	Obsolete	
	191-330-4049 (*)		Prepare a Local Threat Assessment	Approved	
	191-330-4053 (*)		Conduct a Risk Assessment	Approved	
	031-627-3014 (*)		Integrate Threat Assessment into Mission Planning	Approved	
Reinforced Task(s)	<u>Task Number</u>		<u>Task Title</u>	<u>Status</u>	
Knowledge	<u>Knowledge Id</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Taught</u>	<u>Required</u>	
	011-331K	Theater threat	Yes	Yes	
	011-339K	Threat capabilities and limitations	Yes	Yes	
	011-773K	knowledge of threat level I	Yes	Yes	
	052-K-00095	Knowledge of Environmental Threats	Yes	Yes	
	301-K-110	What the specific threat is.	Yes	Yes	
	301-K-120	What a threat is.	Yes	Yes	
	301-K-73	The threat capabilities.	Yes	Yes	
Skill	<u>Skill Id</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Taught</u>	<u>Required</u>	
	301-S-74	Evaluate threat capabilities.	Yes	Yes	
	011-546S	How to identify a specific threats	Yes	Yes	
	011-468S	Determine threat capabilities and limitations	Yes	Yes	
	011-526S	How to determine threat capabilities and limitations	Yes	Yes	
	301-S-198	Identify threat systems in the geographic area of responsibility (AOR).	Yes	Yes	

**Administrative/
Academic
Hours**

The administrative/academic (50 min) hours required to teach this lesson are as follows:

<u>Academic</u>	<u>Resident Hours / Methods</u>		
Yes	2 hrs	0 mins	Discussion (small or large group)
<hr/>			
Total Hours(50 min):	2 hrs	0 mins	

**Instructor
Action
Hours**

The instructor action (60 min) hours required to teach this lesson are as follows:

<u>Hours/Actions</u>			
	0 hrs	10 mins	Classroom Breakdown
	0 hrs	15 mins	Classroom Setup
	2 hrs	0 mins	Training Rehearsal
<hr/>			
Total Hours (60 min):	2 hrs	25 mins	

Test Lesson(s)

<u>Hours</u>	<u>Lesson Number Version</u>	<u>Lesson Title</u>
None		

**Prerequisite
Lesson(s)**

<u>Hours</u>	<u>Lesson Number Version</u>	<u>Lesson Title</u>
None		

**Training
Material
Classification**

Security Level: This course/lesson will present information that has a Security Classification of: FOUO – For Official Use Only.

**Foreign
Disclosure
Restrictions**

FD3. This training product has been reviewed by the developers in coordination with the MCOE Fort Benning, GA foreign disclosure officer. This training product cannot be used to instruct international military students.

References

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
ADP 5-0	The Operations Process	17 May 2012
ATP 2-19.4	Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques	10 Feb 2015
ATP 3-90.37	COUNTERING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	29 Jul 2014
ATP 5-19 (Change 001 09/08/2014 78 Pages)	RISK MANAGEMENT http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp5_19.pdf	14 Apr 2014
DD FORM 2977	DELIBERATE RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET	01 Jan 2014
FB (Safety) Form 385-1-E	Daily Risk Management Assessment Matrix	01 Oct 2013
FM 2-91.6	SOLDIER SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE: FUNDAMENTALS OF TACTICAL INFORMATION COLLECTION	10 Oct 2007
FM 3-06.20 (Superseded)	(Superseded by ATP 3-06.20, 10 MAY 2013) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations	25 Apr 2006
FM 3-24 (Change 001, June 02, 2014)	INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf	13 May 2014
FM 3-34.210	Explosive Hazards Operations	27 Mar 2007
FM 3-34.5	Environmental Considerations	16 Feb 2010

Student Study Assignment

Review the following prior to class:

1. Chapter 3, section II ATP 2-19.4 (FM 2-19.4), Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques.
2. Treat Assessment Rubric.

Instructor Requirements

Instructor/Facilitator must be certified in the following courses: Army Basic Instructor Course (ABIC) or DOD equivalent, Dismounted Counter-IED Tactics Master Trainer (DCT-MT) Course, Combat Life Saver (CLS), Small Group Instructor Course (SGIC), and Hand Held Device (HHD).

Support Personnel Requirements

NONE

Additional Support Personnel Requirements

<u>Name</u>	<u>Student Ratio</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Man Hours</u>
Combat Lifesaver		1	2.0
NCOIC		1	2.0

**Equipment
Required
for Instruction**

<u>ID - Name</u>	<u>Student Ratio</u>	<u>Instructor Ratio</u>	<u>Spt</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Exp</u>
4110-01-485-3548 - Chest, Ice Storage, White, 162 Quart Capacity	1:5	0:0	No	0	No
5820-00-NSN - SCREEN, PROJECTION	0:0	0:0	No	1	No
5820-00-T93-6432 - PROJECTOR, VIDEO, LCD EPSON ELP33 WITH REMOTE	0:0	0:0	No	1	No
5860-01-363-8730 - Laser Pointer	1:15	0:0	No	1	No
5895-01-540-4543 - Computer, Laptop	1:10	1:3	No	0	No
6530-01-290-9964 - Litter, Folding, Rigid Pole	1:15	0:0	No	0	No
6545-01-532-3674 - Medical Equipment Set, Combat Lifesaver, Version 2005, UA 245A	0:0	0:0	Yes	1	No
6665-01-381-3023 - Wet Bulb-Globe Temperature Kit	1:15	0:0	No	0	No
6685-01-590-1047 - Monitor, Heat Stress: Questemp 44	1:15	0:0	No	0	No
6760-00-985-6749 - Tripod, Photographic	1:30	0:0	No	0	No
7021-01-C17-2297 - PC Tablet, Data Entry: Galaxy Tab 2 WIFI 16GB Samsung	1:1	0:0	No	0	No
7110-00-T81-1805 - BOARD, DRY ERASE	0:0	0:0	No	1	No
7110-01-208-6438 - Board, Marker, Melamine Writing Surface, 2 X 2 Foot	1:30	0:0	No	0	No
7240-00-098-3827 - Can, Military	1:30	0:0	No	0	No

(Note: Asterisk before ID indicates a TADSS.)

**Materials
Required***Instructor Materials:*

1. Lesson plan with Appendix A, C, and D as applicable
2. PowerPoint lesson presentation
3. Video
4. All references linked to this lesson plan
5. Visitor Book
6. Risk Assessment

Student Materials:

1. Student Disc
2. All references linked to this lesson
3. Pen/Pencil and note taking material

**Classroom,
Training Area,
and Range
Requirements**

<u>ID - Name</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Student Ratio</u>	<u>Setup Mins</u>	<u>Cleanup Mins</u>
72114-0-0 Enlisted Barracks, Transient Training, 0 Square Foot, 0 Starting Point , Service Points, or Persons Supported		1:30	0	0
74046-0-0 Consolidated Open Dining Facility, 0 Square Foot, 0 Seats		1:30	0	0
44224-0-0 Organizational Storage Building, 0 Square Foot, 0 Cubic Foot		1:30	0	0
17120-M-1200-30 Classroom, Multipurpose, 1200 Square Feet, 30 Students	1		15	15

**Ammunition
Requirements**

<u>DODIC - Name</u>	<u>Exp</u>	<u>Student Ratio</u>	<u>Instruct Ratio</u>	<u>Spt Qty</u>
None				

NOTE: Before presenting this lesson, instructors must thoroughly prepare by studying this lesson and identified reference material.

1. Have on hand identified reference materials linked to the lesson plan.
2. Review presentation and develop a list of questions to use during class.
3. Review and prepare conference/discussion material presented.
4. Ensure all equipment listed for this Lesson Plan (LP) is present, operable, and set up for use before class.
5. Refer to the practical exercise, Appendix C, of this lesson plan. When necessary develop additional situations to use during the practical exercise.
6. PowerPoint users: Ensure the Instructor's file has been called up using Microsoft PowerPoint Viewer and Instructor/slide 1 is displayed on the screen before class.
7. Whenever noted, slides are available to assist in explanation of task steps. Use slides as needed during class or practical exercise to reinforce training. The Instructor may choose to use/not use the LP SLIs as developed, modify the existing SLIs content/order or insert new material as is necessary based on audience analysis to assist in Soldier learning. Changes must be annotated as a pen/ink change on the vault file master LP, VIP LP, and Instructor LP.
8. Whenever necessary, ask leading questions of Soldiers in order to prompt Soldier discussion.
9. Most materials associated with this LP are provided to Soldiers in digital format loaded on their school issued CD and student handout unless stated within instructional notes. Instructor will have to issue all necessary materials to Soldiers in hard copy unless they have individual Soldier laptop/digital capability.
10. Encourage Soldiers to relate their first hand experiences during the activities.
11. Facilitate this lesson using Instructor's methodologies.
12. Control group activities using Instructor's techniques.

1. DURING INSTRUCTION

- a. Follow the lesson plan, show and discuss slides as appropriate, and facilitate group discussion.
- b. Ensure students stay attentive and pay proper military respect to senior officers, dignitaries, and/or guest speakers.
- c. Ensure students take notes and actively participate in group discussions and stay focused on the lesson training objectives.

2. AFTER INSTRUCTION

- a. Ensure proper police of classroom and other areas used by the students.
- b. Ensure that no classified/sensitive material is left in the classroom.
- c. Check classroom for security, cleanliness, and energy conservation before departing area.
- d. Annotate FB Form 1087a, Instructor/Evaluator Comment Record as appropriate.

3. BEFORE USING EQUIPMENT

- a. Ensure students are given a specific safety briefing, if necessary.
- b. Perform proper power up/down procedures for computer equipment.

Note: The above examples in no way limit the safety precautions that the individual instructor/facilitator may stress. There may be specific instances during conduct of lesson that the instructor/facilitator may caution students about.

**Proponent Lesson
Plan Approvals**

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date</u>
None			NO DATA

SECTION II. INTRODUCTION

Method of Instruction: Discussion (small or large group)
 Mode of Delivery: Resident Instruction
 Instr Type (I:S Ratio): Military - ICH, ABIC/FIFC Qual and CIED SME (1:5)
 Time of Instruction: 5 mins

Motivator

Slide 1: Introduction and motivator

It is extremely important that you identify the enemy's most likely and most dangerous Course of Action (COA) and communicate it to your leadership in a timely manner. Your failure to do this could result in placing everyone involved in extreme danger.

Note: Use this statement or develop one of your own relating to the material.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note.

1. Motivator statement is included in the note pages of slide #1.
2. Introduce yourself before presenting the motivator. Only needed for the first time delivering instruction to the students.
3. Make sure that students review the Treat Assessment Rubric prior to this class.

Slide 2:

NOTE. Inform the students of the following Terminal Learning Objective requirements.

At the completion of this lesson, you [the student] will:

Action:	Integrate Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) threat assessment into mission planning and execution.
Conditions:	In a classroom and field environment setting, given student resources, lesson plan, and current reference materials, operations order, and dismounted operation during a Situational Training Exercise (STX).
Standards:	Integrate C-IED threats IAW ATP 2-19.4, Dismounted CIED Smart Book and achieve a score of 80% or greater on threat assessment rubrics during tactical mission planning 1, 2 and 3. The integration includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Integrate Counter C-IED threats assessment into mission planning and execution. 2. Interpret the threat assessment triad. <p style="text-align: center;">Learning Domain: Cognitive Learning Level: Synthesis</p>
Learning Domain - Level:	None assigned
No JPME Learning Areas Supported:	None

Terminal Learning Objective

Safety

Safety Requirements in a Classroom Setting:

Requirements

Safety is of the utmost importance in any training environment. During the training process, commanders will utilize the 5-Step Risk Management process to determine the safest and most complete method to train. Every precaution will be taken during the conduct of training. Safety is everyone's responsibility to recognize, mitigate, and report hazardous conditions.

Instructor note: The instructor will brief the students on the unit/facility SOP for classroom contingencies (i.e. what doors will be used to exit the classroom, rally points, severe weather, WBGT/Kestrel set up, etc).

Safety Requirements other than Classroom Settings:

Safety must be paramount in the complex outdoor environment. During the training process, commanders will utilize the 5-Step Risk Management process to determine the safest and most complete method to train. Every precaution will be taken while replicating realistic battlefield conditions. Safety is everyone's responsibility to recognize, mitigate, and report hazardous conditions. The instructor will brief the unit/site SOP and Risk Management Worksheet for all potential contingencies encountered during that training period/event (i.e. WBGT/Kestrel set up, trail vehicles for PT/foot marches, severe weather, fire, evacuation routes, muzzle awareness, range safety briefs, required medical FLA with driver and medics with emergency equipment, student injury procedures, and rally points etc).

Risk Assessment Level

Low - All Army Instructors will conduct a Risk Assessment Worksheet (DA Form 7566, CRM Worksheet, Apr 05) prior to training and brief Soldiers on identified hazards.

Assessment: The Principal Instructor will prepare a risk assessment using the before, during, and after checklist and the risk assessment matrixes contained in Risk Management FM 5-19.

Controls: See Attached DA Form 7566.

Leader Actions: See Attached DA Form 7566.

Environmental Considerations

NOTE: Instructor should conduct a Risk Assessment to include Environmental Considerations IAW FM 3-34.5, Environmental Considerations {MCRP 4-11B}, and ensure students are briefed on hazards and control measures.

It is the responsibility of all Soldiers and DA civilians to protect the environmental from damage. There are no environmental concerns during this block of training.

Instructional Lead-in

Threat assessment is not a new practice or methodology. During this lesson you will learn how to complete a successful threat assessment.

Note: Use this statement or develop one of your own relating to the material.

SECTION III. PRESENTATION

TLO - LSA 1. Learning Step / Activity TLO - LSA 1. Integrate C-IED threat assessment into mission planning and execution.

Method of Instruction: Discussion (small or large group)

Mode of Delivery: Resident Instruction

Instr Type (I:S Ratio): Military - ICH, ABIC/FIFC Qual, and CIED SME (1:5)

Time of Instruction: 20 mins

Media Type: Motion Picture / CD-ROM / Handout / Practical Exercise / PowerPoint Presentation / Sample Manuals

Other Media: Unassigned

Security Classification: This course/lesson will present information that has a Security Classification of: FOUO – For Official Use Only.

Slide 3: Integrate Counter C-IED threats assessment into mission planning and execution.

Troop Leading Procedures - (Intelligence tasks during mission analysis)

EIGHT STEPS TLP

1. Receive the mission

(S-2 or CO Intel Rep provides input on specified/ implied/ essential tasks)

2. Issue the WARNO

Five Paragraph format (min info)

3. Make a tentative plan

a. (Threat background - Analyzes the higher HQ order to determine how the higher commander views the enemy)

b. (Current Situation - Includes IED specific threats)

c. (Evaluate effects of the enemy, terrain & weather, and civil/troops)

1) Enemy - General Situation

- Disposition
- Composition
- Strength
- Capabilities by WFF
- PCOA & MDCOA

(THREAT ASSESSMENT TRIAD)

- Enemy Intent
- Type of threat
- Location of threat

2) Terrain (Location-Identify all VA / VPs)

- AO / AI / AOI
- Terrain
 - * Obstacles
 - * Avenues of approach
 - * Key Terrain
 - * Observation/ Fields of fire
 - * Cover & Concealment
- Weather

* *Visibility*

* *Wind*

3) Time

- Higher Times
- Hard Times
- Company/ Platoon TLPs
- Light Data
- Enemy Data
- 1/3, 2/3 rule

4) Civil/Troops

- Leadership
- Morale
- Training & Experience
- Capabilities by WFF

d. COA/Recommendation

- Enemy's most likely & most dangerous COA

4. Initiate Movement

5. Conduct Reconnaissance

6. Complete the plan

7. Issue the Order

8. Supervise and Refine

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. This class has direct link with the "Develop a Unit Training Program" class, which covers planning unit training and tactical mission planning IAW Troop Leading Procedures (TLP).

2. This slide covers the points listed in the "Threat Assessment Rubric", and students will be evaluated against this rubric when students apply what they've learn in tactical mission 1, 2 and 3 planning and execution during the second week

3. The Bde S-2, BN S-2 or Company Intel representative conducts mission analysis simultaneously and in support of the S-2 or company commander in order to provide the enemy threat assessment view throughout the planning process.

4. Reference. Chapter 3, section II ATP 2-19.4 (FM 2-19.4), Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques. This manual describes specific techniques used by the BCT and battalion intelligence cells for each step of the MDMP. This manual is written at Bde/BN level but it provides the basis for smaller unit intelligence/threat assessment process during mission planning.

5. RECEIPT OF MISSION. Paragraph 3-17. The commander identifies the unit's mission, commander's intent, area of operations, area of interest, and intelligence requirements.

Table 3-2. - Intelligence support to receipt of mission. Use intelligence reach to collect updated or additional enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations data.

6. Paragraph 3-21. Generally, the intelligence portion of mission analysis is an evaluation of the effects of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations

within the area of operations. Additionally, the intelligence portion includes an analysis of the higher headquarters plan or order to determine critical facts and assumptions; specified, implied, and essential tasks; and constraints that affect operations.

7. THREAT BACKGROUND.

a. Analyze The Higher Headquarters Order

b. Paragraph 3-24. The S-2 analyzes the higher headquarters order to determine how the higher commander views the enemy and which higher command intelligence assets support operations. Specifically, the S-2 evaluates the following information:

1) Threat characteristics

2) Enemy templates and COA statements for enemy COAs.

3) Event templates and matrices.

4) High-payoff target lists (HPTLs) and high-value target lists (HVTLS).

5) Target packages on areas, structures, and individuals.

6) Terrain analysis products showing the effects on friendly and enemy operations—natural and urban.

7) Analysis of civil considerations, especially socio-cultural aspects of the local population in the BCT area of operations.

8) Information operations, civil affairs, and military information support operations assessments.

8. The enemy Threat Assessment TRIAD will be discussed later during this class.

9. Students will be evaluated when they apply this knowledge during the 2d week in tactical mission 1, 2 and 3 planning & execution.

Slide 4. Nine Principles of IED Combat

1. Maintain an offensive mindset

2. Stay observant

3. Avoid setting Patterns

4. Maintain Standoff

5. Develop and maintain situational awareness

6. Utilize Blast/Fragmentation Protection

7. 360–Degree Security

8. Maintain Tactical Dispersion

9. Utilize Technology

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Review and give an example of the 9 principles. If possible, use student experiences to expand on each principle.

a. Maintain an Offensive Mindset: Every leader must be prepared to rapidly develop the situation in order to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and advance his unit by fire and maneuver to ultimately kill or capture his adversaries. Keep in mind that aggressive, rapid pursuit is good but it can lead you to a baited ambush.

b. Develop & Maintain Situational Awareness: Good Situational Awareness (SA) is key to seeing, understanding, and then acting on pre-attack indicators to deny the enemy's advantage of surprise.

c. Stay Observant: Most IEDs found before detonation are located by the naked

eye. Every Soldier should continuously scan their assigned sector in search of IED indicators. Be deliberate - speed greatly diminishes the likelihood of finding an IED before it finds you...know where/when to use speed.

d. Avoid Setting Patterns: Watching and waiting - the two tactical disciplines insurgents have mastered to target Coalition Forces. What are they watching and waiting for? Always vary your distance when conducting your dismounted 5/25/200 meter checks. Move your vehicles forward or backward when 5/25/200 meter checks are complete and troops remounting. Vary your patterns regularly - The insurgents regularly watch for patterns and complacency to emerge prior to attacking.

e. Maintain Standoff: When practical, avoid or keep a safe distance from locations most likely to conceal an IED, e.g. Cannibalized engagement areas, irrigation canal crossings, shoulders of roadways, medians, intersections, static vehicles along the route, etc.

f. 360-Degree Security: Enemy activity that blends with the local populace is hard to detect and can threaten the unit from any direction. Therefore it is imperative that vigilant 360-degree security be maintained at all times, regardless of whether the convoy is mounted or dismounted. This includes your 5/25/200 meter checks.

g. Maintain Tactical Dispersion: In order to reduce risk, convoys must maintain adequate separation between vehicles and personnel as the situation dictates. Leaders must fight the tendency to close formations during halts. (METT-TC dependent).

h. Utilize Blast / Fragmentation Protection: Armor saves lives - use it, but don't become tied to it. Dismount when the situation allows. It is the most effective technique for spotting IEDs, along with meeting and developing a rapport with local communities.

i. Utilize your available technology: Know the capabilities and limitations of your CREW devices, their impact on other electronic systems, tactical employment techniques, and "no comms" procedures. Regularly monitor your CREW system to ensure it is turned on as well as your Passive Infrared Receiver (PIR) defeat systems. Scan using thermal imagery, if available.

Slide 5: Threat Assessment

1. IEDs are the weapon of choice for the enemy.
 - Responsible for the majority of combat casualties.
2. A detailed threat assessment of your area of operation results in a successful operation.
3. Think like an Insurgent when conducting dismounted patrols.
4. For a threat to be viable there must be intent, capability, and a suitable location.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- Threat assessment is a continuous process that begins during mission analysis in your intelligence preparation of the operational environment and must be updated throughout the execution of the operation.

Slide 6.

Check on Learning:

1. What are the nine (9) Principles of IED Combat?

Answer:

- a. Maintain an Offensive Mindset
- b. Develop and Maintain Situational Awareness
- c. Stay Observant
- d. Avoid Setting Patterns
- e. 360 Degree Security
- f. Maintain Standoff
- g. Maintain Tactical Dispersion
- h. Utilize Blast/Fragmentation

Protection

- i. Utilize Your Available Technology

2. IEDs are responsible for the majority of all combat related casualties. True or False?

Answer: True

3. Threat assessment is a one time process that begins in the mission planning phase. True or False?

Answer: False

Review Summary:

In this LSA we covered:

- Integrate Counter C-IED threats assessment into mission planning and execution, including:

- a. Intelligence tasks during mission analysis.
- b. Nine Principles of IED Combat
- c. Threat assessment - Pointed out that a detailed threat assessment of your area of operation results in a successful operation.

Note: Use this statement or develop one of your own relating to the material.

TLO - LSA 2. Learning Step / Activity TLO - LSA 2. Interpret the threat assessment triad

Method of Instruction: Discussion (small or large group)

Mode of Delivery: Resident Instruction

Instr Type (I:S Ratio): Military - ICH, ABIC/FIFC Qual, and CIED SME (1:5)

Time of Instruction: 1 hr 20 mins

Media Type: Motion Picture / CD-ROM / Practical Exercise /

Slide 7: Interpret the Threat Assessment Triad

- What are the three elements of the Threat Assessment Triad?

1. Enemy Intent
2. Type of threat
3. Location of threat

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- The threat triad combines the three most important aspects of what we need to understand to identify what the enemy is trying to accomplish, how he is going to achieve his goals, and the locations that have an increased probability of success.

Slide 8: Enemy Intent

1. This slide displays the 3-rings of the Threat Triad.
2. Determine what the enemy is trying to achieve by their actions.
 - a. Disrupt, embarrass, intimidate, or gain publicity.
 - b. Kill and injure Coalition Forces (CF), Afghan National Army (ANA), and Afghan National Police (ANP) patrols.
 - 1) Target specialize patrols Route Clearance Patrols (RCPs).
 - 2) Target First Responders, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Casualty Evacuation (CASVAC).
 - 3) Targets of opportunity (logistic convoy, vehicle recovery).

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Examples of what the enemy's intent can be.
2. The Threat Triad is a way to look at the enemy's intent and capabilities and the ground factors. These will be looked at separately. First the enemy intent is examined.
3. This will be based on what is known about the enemy's wider objectives as well as what the enemy might be trying to achieve in your local area. Aim of Enemy Kill or maim Disrupt, Distract, and Discredit.
4. Who is the target? US or coalition?

Slide 9: Enemy Intent (cont.)

- Disrupt, embarrass, intimidate, or gain publicity.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Discuss each picture and ask the students what they think the enemy intent is and explain why.
2. Just by placing a row of rocks across a road could be enough to disrupt a convoy.

Slide 10: Enemy Intent (cont.)

Kill and Injure

- CF, ANSF, and Joint Patrols

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Discuss each picture and ask the students what they think the enemy intent is and explain why.

2. We have looked at who the enemy is and what their objectives are. Now we will look at whom their intended targets are.

3. CF and HNSF is the primary target.

Slide 11: Enemy Intent (cont.)

Target specialized patrols

- Route Clearance Patrol (RCP)

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Ask the students why the route clearance patrols would be targeted by the enemy.
2. RCPs sole purpose is to find IEDs and clear routes for logistical support and CF patrols.
3. Therefore, targeting the RCPs allows the enemy freedom of maneuver in the battle space.

Slide 12: Enemy Intent (cont.)

Target first responders

- CASEVAC and Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. EOD and Medical assets are a target. Always remember that the initial attack or IED may not be the real target.
2. CASEVAC conducted in restricted terrain will limit the available HLZs.
3. Proper analysis of previous activities along the route is required to prevent utilizing the same Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ) repetitively and establishing a pattern the enemy can target.

Slide 13: Enemy Intent (cont.)

Targets of opportunity

- Logistic convoys and vehicle recovery

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. The enemy know that targeting logistic supplies can hamper operations.
2. This was a common tactic of the Afghan Mujahedeen during the Soviet Afghan War and was the main source of the Mujahedeen supplies

Slide 14: Type of Threat

1. Determine the likely method of attack.
 - a. Public Disorder
 - b. Hoax
 - c. Shoot/Sniper
 - d. IED
 - 1) Victim Operated IED (VOIED)
 - 2) Command IEDs: Radio Command Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED)/Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device (CWIED)
 - 3) Time
2. Determine the current enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. The type of threat the enemy will employ is based on his capabilities and limitations.

2. Explain that current TTPs are different in different regions of their Area of Operation (AO).
3. By knowing the TTPs you can know the likely method of attack to be expected.

Slide 15: Type of Threat (cont.)

- Public Disorder
 1. Food/Fuel shortages
 2. Bad Media
 3. Aggressive operations
 4. Anniversaries of significant events
 5. Not understanding the culture
 - a. Burning the Koran
 - b. Searching females
 - c. Using dogs

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. An example of bad media coverage is coalition forces engaging insurgents/Taliban, especially with air assets and the resulting detonation from our ordnance kills local civilians.
2. Aggressive operations can cause public order situations because if we disturb the way of life of a normally quiet area and run around arresting every military aged male simply because what he is, the population may turn against us to voice its disapproval.
3. Anniversaries of significant events can lead or even cause public order. It can range from significant religious holidays to events in history like 911 or when the Russians were defeated in the 1980's.
4. By not understanding the culture, civil unrest happens. Recently the burning of the Korans by U.S. Forces caused major riots which lead to Blue on Green violence.
5. Males searching female is the Islamic culture.
6. Using dogs in people's homes.
7. An enemy may instigate a public order situation to shield the whereabouts of an attack that is taking place. For example, when there is an angry demonstration taking place and weapons are being fired into the air, it can be very difficult to determine where a true shoot type attack is coming from.
8. Public order during search operations; if a village sees a search being conducted, the situation could turn into a public order issue, so keep the occupants inside the building and keep doors and windows closed if possible.

Slide 16: Type of Threat (cont.)

- Hoax
 1. Opportunity to observe CF TTPs
 2. Can use to distract and divert attention from their activities
 3. Can draw or divert CF to from a certain area
 4. Cause significant disruption, panic, or unrest in the local population

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. A huge cause of casualties can be complacency. If many hoaxes are used within a particular area of operations, we need to assume that real attacks will be taking place.
2. No matter how many hoaxes have taken place, we must treat every incident as a

true threat because sooner or later the device will be functional. The hoax is an excellent intelligence gathering tool for the enemy.

3. While responding to the threat of a real hazard, the enemy is gathering information and intelligence on our tactics, techniques and procedures. This method of attack can also allow a real attack to be coordinated while we and our resources are diverted to the perceived threat.

4. Even with no true attack taking place, huge financial costs can be incurred. Let's use a major airport such as Kabul International as an example. Another example of a hoax causing panic and unrest can be someone in a crowd stating that suicide bomber is amongst them. This can lead to panic within a mass of people causing injury and death by nothing more than the spoken word.

Slide 17: Type of Threat (cont.)

- Shooting

1. Direct (Line of sight)

a. Long Range (Sniper)

b. Short Range (Small arms/Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG))

2. Indirect Fire (IDF)

a. Long Range

b. Short Range

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. This is simply line of sight versus shooting over a wall or object type shots.

2. An example of a direct fire weapon would be the M4 rifle whereas an indirect example is the 60mm mortar system.

3. The statement saying a trigger man is generally required is worded as such because a weapon system can be set up to fire via time delay or other device so the attacker has time to exit the area thus gaining a measure of deniability for the attack.

4. This is especially true for electrically initiated weapon systems but can also work with mechanical initiation.

5. Shooting can be used to draw troops into a kill zone. It is essential that a threat estimate is conducted before taking cover to ensure troops don't move into an IED kill zone.

Slide 18: IED Threat (cont.)

Victim Operated IED (VOIED)

- Use of a standalone device initiated by the actions of its victim(s)

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Talk about VOIEDs, re-enforce why the Insurgent would want to use this type of switch.

2. VOIEDs use the victims patterns against them, the victim will be in close proximity, can be disguised as any item, simple to operate and does not require the enemies presence for activation.

Slide 19: IED Threat (cont.)

- Command IED

1. Radio Controlled IED (RCIED)

2. Command Wire IED (CWIED)

3. Suicide: (PBIED/SVBIED)

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Talk about Command IEDs, re-enforce why the Insurgent would want to use this type of switch.

2. Command IEDs allow the trigger man to function the device when the target is present, provide standoff for the triggerman and can be used to arm multiple devices.

Slide 20: IED Threat (cont.)

- Specific IED Time

1. Safe separation
2. Pre-set delay
3. Arming

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Time IEDs are extremely hard to employ against CF unless we have advertised that we will be in a specific location at a specific time.

2. Time initiation has predominately been used for indirect fire and rocket attacks.

Slide 21: IED Threat (cont.)

- Progression of unknown or homemade bulk explosive versus military grade explosives.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. One reason for this progression is the reduced amount readily available military grade explosives.

2. A second reason for the progression is the increased use of metal detectors by CF.

3. HME offers the insurgent a powerful explosive without the metal signature.

4. Different regions use different types of Homemade Explosive (HME).

5. It is important to know the precursors of the HME that's found.

6. How and where are they getting their military grade munitions? Are they Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) or munitions smuggled?

Slide 22: IED Threat (cont.)

- Use of more Victim Operated (VOIED) and Command Wire (CWIED) versus radio controlled (RCIED).

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- Insurgents are employing VO and CW due to the effectiveness of CF CREW devices.

Slide 23: IED Threat (cont.)

- Low metal content in IEDs.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. The insurgents have observed us employing our HHD with metal detection capability and understand they must reduce the metal content to avoid detection.

2. Explain why this type of device is dangerous.

- It is dangerous because standard metal detectors may not indicate the presence of low metal content of an IED (the use of GPR or low conductivity detection devices are required).

Slide 24: IED Threat (cont.)

- Complex IED array consisting two or more IEDs and anti-personnel mines.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Explain why the Insurgent uses complex attacks.
2. Complex attacks are normally the result of CF establishing predictable patterns.
3. When given the opportunity the enemy has the ability to develop prime engagement areas, which allows them to maximize all of their capabilities.

Slide 25: IED Threat - Video

- Video of complex attack

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Play video.
2. At the conclusion of video discuss the different aspects of this particular complex attack.
3. The key take away of this video is if forced to take an undesirable route all available enablers need to be considered

Slide 26: Location of Threat

Characteristics of a Command Threat IED Location

. IED hotspots/engagement areas have seven things in common

1. Coalition traffic
2. Workable soil
3. Line of sight
4. Obstacles between emplacement location and firing point
5. Egress route
6. Population sympathetic to their cause
7. Un-observable by coalition forces/ISR assets

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. The enemy does not randomly place IEDs.
2. He thinks tactically as we do and will employ his available resources in areas with the highest probability of success.
3. We will know talk about VA/VPs and how they relate to the enemies employment process. Our ability to think like the enemy and see the terrain from his perspective will further highlight these high threat areas.
4. All IED engagement areas that use a command switch, either Radio Controlled (RC) or Command Wire (CW), have seven factors/principles in common. (Instructor can use his/her own words to explain the slide)
 - a. Coalition traffic – why would the enemy just randomly emplace an IED, without Coalition traffic the enemy wouldn't even target this area.
 - b. Workable soil – IEDs are usually placed in the ground, and insurgents look for area where it will be easier to dig, emplace, and camouflage there IED emplacements.
 - c. Line of sight – To properly use any Command Initiated IED, the enemy must have line of sight from the firing point to the engagement area.
 - d. Obstacles between emplacement location and firing point – Obstacles prevent coalition forces from pursuing the enemy after an engagement. The obstacle will usually be between the firing point and the engagement area.
 - e. Egress route – this route will allow the enemy to withdrawal from the firing point

after an engagement. The Egress Route will usually have cover and concealment back to a built up area so the insurgent can blend in with the population.

f. Population sympathetic to their cause – its always nice to have population that will the other way or actively support you while you attack coalition forces.

g. Un-observable by coalition forces/ISR assets - IED engagement areas that allow the insurgent to emplace the IED without being observed by coalition forces ISR assets will usually have a higher success rate, because coalition forces will not have prior knowledge of the emplacement.

5. Violating the 9 Principles of IED defeat, Setting Patterns will always allow the enemy to target coalition forces with VOIEDs as well.

6. These factors when combined with a MCOO (Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay), and Honest Traces will allow your unit to predict where the enemy will target you forces with a degree of certainty.

Slide 27: Location of Threat (cont.)

- Danger Areas in C-IED operations are described as Vulnerable Points (VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA).

1. Vulnerable Points (VP)

a. Terrain restricts maneuver of the patrol through areas where there is no other way around

b. Places particularly advantageous for the enemy to position an IED

2. Vulnerable Areas (VA)

- Areas where pattern setting allows insurgents to predict with certainty that troops will use them again.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- Compare Danger Areas, and Vulnerable Points, Vulnerable Areas in terms of linear danger area and danger areas as referenced in patrolling.

Slide 28: Location of Threat (cont.)

1. VP/VAs are identified to avoid and/or mitigate.

2. Current Doctrine calls both of these dangers areas. VAs and VPs are more descriptive.

Slide 29: Location of Threat (cont.)

1. Vulnerable Points (VP)

a. Places particularly advantageous for the enemy to position an IED

b. Terrain restricts maneuver of the patrol through areas where there is no other way around

2. Vulnerable Point (VP) Examples

a. Wadi crossings

b. Road junctions

c. Culverts and bridges

d. Mouse holes

e. Previous IED engagement areas

f. Obvious support by fire positions and positions that provide cover

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- Compare Danger Areas, Vulnerable Points and Vulnerable Areas in terms of

linear danger area and danger areas as referenced in patrolling.

Slide 30: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Points (VP)

- Wadi crossings
- Canalized with limited maneuverability

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Wadi: Anywhere a track crosses a Wadi, vehicles are canalized with limited maneuverability.
2. While IEDs can be placed in avenues of approach or anywhere else within the Wadi, the narrowest point is the area of highest threat.
3. Although Wadi's are VP for mounted elements, dismounted elements have the freedom to choose their crossing points and limit the enemy's ability to target.

Slide 31: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Points (VP)

- Road junctions
- Mounted and dismounted

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Traffic, mounted and dismounted, concentrates at track junctions and often has limited options to negotiate the turn; both are easily targeted by burying a device either on the track or to the side.
2. The road junctions are natural slow down points that allows the enemy to more effectively target with command initiated IEDs.

Slide 32: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Points (VP)

- Culverts and bridges
- Footbridges over irrigation ditches and their approaches.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Culverts and bridges are ideal places to hide a device; the target is channeled into crossing where there is the opportunity to place a large device underneath; this is equally applicable for footbridges over irrigation ditches-and their approaches.
2. If dismounted elements are willing to get wet they can reduce the enemy's ability to target them.

Slide 33: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Points (VP)

- Mouse holes
- Typically placed within a few meters inside the compound

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Devices and tripwires can be laid where holes have been created in walls.
2. They are typically placed a few meters inside the compound.
3. As soldiers become fatigued after patrol, they are more likely to take the path of least resistance.
4. Discipline is required to ensure safety at all times.

Slide 34: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Points (VP)

- Previous IED engagement areas.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Anywhere an IED had been placed or a previously used position by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
2. Previous engagement areas that resulted in successful attacks will be used again.

Slide 35: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Points (VP)

- Obvious support by fire positions and positions that provide cover.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- If the position obviously provides cover or over watch the enemy will target the location.

Slide 36: Location of Threat (cont.)

1. Vulnerable Area (VA)

- Areas where pattern setting allows insurgents to predict with a degree of certainty that troops will use them again

2. Vulnerable Area (VA) Examples

- a. Linear features
- b. Previously used dirt trails and patrol routes
- c. Frequently used positions
- d. Long open stretches of road
- e. Compound interiors
- f. Channelized routes

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

Slide 37: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Areas (VA)

- Linear features
 - Often used to assist in navigation on patrols

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- American forces are creatures of habit and will habitually "handrail" linear features such as walls and roads.

Slide 38: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Areas (VA)

- Previously used dirt trails and patrol routes
 - Good indicator where Coalition Forces will travel again

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Avoid natural lines of drift.
2. Utilize honesty traces to prevent reusing the same path.

Slide 39: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Areas (VA)

- Frequently used positions
 - Over watch positions are regularly targeted

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. The enemy sees the terrain the same way as we do.
2. If the positions are obvious they will target them. Select a position that provides a

90 percent solution.

3. If required use more than one position to cover the area.

Slide 40: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Areas (VA)

- Long open stretches of road.
1. Where insurgents can see CF approach from a distance.
 2. More of a Command IED threat.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- Where insurgents can see Coalition Forces (CF) approach from a distance More of a Radio Controlled IED (RCIED) threat.

Slide 41: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Areas (VA)

- Compound interiors
1. Unoccupied compounds pose a higher threat
 2. Devices can be placed where CF is likely to go after entry.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

Abandoned compounds beyond the entrance, the devices can be placed where CF are likely to go after entry:

1. Roof
2. Viewpoints
3. Steps or stairs

Slide 42: Location of Threat (cont.)

Vulnerable Areas (VA)

- Canalized routes
- Areas where patrols are restricted by natural or manmade feature.

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- Route recon prior to execution will allow you to avoid channelized routes.

Slide 43: Threat Assessment Triad

Analyze together.

1. Enemy Intent
2. Type of Threat
3. Location of Threat

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. Each of the factors in the Threat Triad is considered in isolation at first.
2. As you can see these factors overlap.
3. It is by considering them together that you build a picture of the enemy's most like course of action.

Slide 44: Threat Assessment Triad (cont.)

Determine the enemy's likely course of action during Mission Planning.

1. Enemy Intent
2. Type of Threat
3. Location of Threat

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

1. During mission analysis and the intelligence preparation of the operational

environment a detailed threat assessment will be conducted. Mission analysis results in an understanding of the enemies most probable COA.

2. Once we have this COA we can then develop our own COA accounting for all aspects of METT- TC.

Slide 45: Threat Assessment (cont.)

1. Short Practical Exercise (PE) option
2. 60 day IED activity

Instructor/Facilitator's Note:

- Slide depicts four different data groups for 60 day activity: DTG, IED data and other type data.

1. First data group
 - a. 281600APR2013
 - b. RCIED
 - c. 10 lbs
 - d. 1 ANA truck, 3 KIA
2. Second data group
 - a. 251200MAR2013
 - b. Carbon Rod PP
 - c. 5 lbs ANAL
 - d. Found, EOD
 - e. Rendered Safe
3. Third data group
 - a. 170800APR2013
 - b. CWIED
 - c. DFFC
 - d. 1 US KIA, 2 WIA
4. Fourth data group
 - a. 051900MAY2013
 - b. RCIED
 - c. 10 lbs UBE
 - d. 1 ANA truck, 1 KIA

Slides 46, 47 and 48:

Check on Learning:

1. Which of the following is not part of the Threat Triad?
 - a. Enemy Intent
 - b. Location of Threat
 - c. Type of Threat
 - d. Local Threat

Answer: d. Local Threat

2. The aim of the enemy's intent is to Kill, Injure, Disrupt, Distract, and Discredit. True or False?

Answer: TRUE

3. What is a common enemy tactic?
- a. Target CF and HNSF
 - b. Target first responders
 - c. Target logistic convoys
 - d. All the above

Answer: d. All of the Above

4. Which of the following are considered a type of threat?
- a. IED
 - b. Hoax
 - c. Public Disorder
 - d. All of the Above

Answer: d. All of the Above

5. Which of the following is a command IED?
- a. Radio Controlled IED (RCIED)
 - b. Command Wire IED (CWIED)
 - c. Suicide (PBIED, SVBIED)
 - d. All of the Above

Answer: d. All of the Above

6. Insurgents are using low metal content in IEDs to avoid detection. True or False?

Answer: TRUE

7. Vulnerable areas are where pattern setting allows insurgents to predict with a degree of certainty that troops will use them again. True or False?

Answer: TRUE

8. A wadi crossing is considered a vulnerable area. True or False?

Answer: FALSE

9. The enemy's likely course of action is determined during

Mission Planning. True or False?

Answer: TRUE

Review Summary:

1. During this LSA we discussed how to interpret the threat assessment triad.

- a. The triad is composed of: enemy intent, type of threat and location of threat.
- b. Determine enemy intent on dismounted operations.
- c. Identify types of threats posed during dismounted operations.
- d. Identify location of threats, danger areas (Vulnerable Points (VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA).

2. NOTE. The threat triad combines the three most important aspects of what we need to understand to identify what the enemy is trying to accomplish, how he is going to achieve his goals, and the locations that have an increased probability of success.

SECTION IV. SUMMARY

Method of Instruction:	Discussion (small or large group)
Mode of Delivery:	Resident Instruction
Instr Type(I:S Ratio):	Military - ICH, ABIC/FIFC Qual and CIED SME (1:5)
Time of Instruction:	5 mins

Check on Learning

Make sure that students met the lesson objective which is, integrate Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) threat assessment into mission planning and execution including:

1. Integrate Counter C-IED threats assessment into mission planning and execution.
2. Interpret the threat assessment triad.

Provide feedback and correct misunderstandings.

Review/ Summary

Slide 49:

1. Lesson: Threat Assessment
2. During this lesson we discussed how to Integrate Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) threat assessment into mission planning and execution. It includes:
 - a. Intelligence tasks during mission analysis.
 - b. Nine principles of IED combat.
 - c. Threat assessment

NOTE.

1. The Bde S-2, BN S-2 or Company Intel representative conducts mission analysis simultaneously and in support of the S-2 or company commander in order to provide the enemy threat assessment view throughout the planning process.
2. We also discussed how to interpret the threat assessment triad. It includes:
 - a. The triad is composed of: enemy intent, type of threat and location of threat.
 - b. Determine enemy intent on dismounted operations
 - c. Identify types of threats posed during dismounted operations
 - d. Identify location of threats, danger areas (Vulnerable Points (VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA))

NOTE. The threat triad combines the three most important aspects of what we need to understand to identify what the enemy is trying to accomplish, how he is going to achieve his goals, and the locations that have an increased probability of success.

Slide 50: Questions

Instructor Note:

Answer any and all Student questions

SECTION V. STUDENT EVALUATION

Testing Requirements

This lesson will be tested on Course Examination 2. You must receive a passing score of 80% on course examination/rubrics to complete this course.

Feedback Requirements

Note: Feedback is essential to effective learning. Schedule and provide feedback on the assessment and any information to help answer questions about the training exercise.

Appendix A - Viewgraph Masters

**Threat Assessment
071-FREBB007 / Version 02.0 ©**

Sequence	Media Name	Media Type
None		

Appendix B - Assessment Statement and Assessment Plan

Assessment Statement: None.

Assessment Plan: None.

Appendix C - Practical Exercises and Solutions

PRACTICAL EXERCISE(S)/SOLUTION(S) FOR LESSON 071-FREBB007 Version 02.0 ©

Appendix D - Student Handouts

**Threat Assessment
071-FREBB007 / Version 02.0 ©**

Sequence	Media Name	Media Type
None		

Appendix E - TRAINER'S LESSON OUTLINE

Threat Assessment

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DRAFT

1. The importance of this lesson: (Why)

Integrate Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) threat assessment into mission planning and execution.

2. What we want our Soldiers to Achieve: (Outcomes/Standard)

Integrate C-IED threats IAW ATP 2-19.4, Dismounted CIED Smart Book and achieve a score of 80% or greater on threat assessment rubrics during tactical mission planning 1, 2 and 3. The integration includes:

1. Integrate Counter C-IED threats assessment into mission planning and execution.
2. Interpret the threat assessment triad.

Learning Domain: Cognitive

Learning Level: Synthesis

3. Tasks to be taught

<u>Task Number</u>	<u>Task Title</u>	<u>Task Type</u>
171-610-0002	Recognize Threat Tactics and Battlefield Organization	Individual TAUGHT
301-35F-3253	Evaluate the Threat (SL3)	Individual TAUGHT
301-35F-3254	Determine Threat Courses of Action (SL3)	Individual TAUGHT
191-330-4049	Prepare a Local Threat Assessment	Individual TAUGHT
191-330-4053	Conduct a Risk Assessment	Individual TAUGHT
031-627-3014	Integrate Threat Assessment into Mission Planning	Individual TAUGHT

Additional Non-Standard Tasks

None

4. References:

<u>Reference Number</u>	<u>Reference Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
ADP 5-0	The Operations Process	17 May 2012
ATP 2-19.4	Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques	10 Feb 2015
ATP 3-90.37	COUNTERING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	29 Jul 2014
ATP 5-19 (Change 001 09/08/2014 78 Pages)	RISK MANAGEMENT http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp5_19.pdf	14 Apr 2014
DD FORM 2977	DELIBERATE RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET	01 Jan 2014
FB (Safety) Form 385-1-E	Daily Risk Management Assessment Matrix	01 Oct 2013
FM 2-91.6	SOLDIER SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE: FUNDAMENTALS OF TACTICAL INFORMATION COLLECTION	10 Oct 2007
FM 3-06.20 (Superseded)	(Superseded by ATP 3-06.20, 10 MAY 2013) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations	25 Apr 2006
FM 3-24 (Change 001, June 02, 2014)	INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf	13 May 2014
FM 3-34.210	Explosive Hazards Operations	27 Mar 2007
FM 3-34.5	Environmental Considerations	16 Feb 2010

Additional Non-Standard References

None

5. Resources

TIME: Time of Instruction: 2 hrs 0 mins

LAND: Classroom, Training Area, and Range Requirements

<u>Id</u>	<u>Name</u>
72114	Enlisted Barracks, Transient Training
74046	Consolidated Open Dining Facility
44224	Organizational Storage Building
17120-M-1200-30	Classroom, Multipurpose, 1200 Square Feet, 30 Students

AMMO: Ammunition Requirements

<u>DODIC</u>	<u>Name</u>
None	

MISC: Materiel Items and TADSS Requirements

<u>Id</u>	<u>Name</u>
4110-01-485-3548	Chest, Ice Storage, White, 162 Quart Capacity
5820-00-NSN	SCREEN, PROJECTION
5820-00-T93-6432	PROJECTOR, VIDEO, LCD EPSON ELP33 WITH REMOTE
5860-01-363-8730	Laser Pointer
5895-01-540-4543	Computer, Laptop
6530-01-290-9964	Litter, Folding, Rigid Pole
6545-01-532-3674	Medical Equipment Set, Combat Lifesaver, Version 2005, UA 245A
6665-01-381-3023	Wet Bulb-Globe Temperature Kit
6685-01-590-1047	Monitor, Heat Stress: Questemp 44
6760-00-985-6749	Tripod, Photographic
7021-01-C17-2297	PC Tablet, Data Entry: Galaxy Tab 2 WIFI 16GB Samsung
7110-00-T81-1805	BOARD, DRY ERASE
7110-01-208-6438	Board, Marker, Melamine Writing Surface, 2 X 2 Foot
7240-00-098-3827	Can, Military

(Note: Asterisk before ID indicates a TADSS.)

Additional Non-Standard Resources

None

6. A possible technique to achieve the outcome:

None

7. Conduct AAR with Soldier and Cadre.

None

NOTE: Before presenting this lesson, Instructors must be thoroughly prepared by studying the appropriate lesson plan and identified reference material.