



Red Diamond Threats Newsletter



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ACE Threats Integration

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Chief Editor



TTR COMPENDIUM, VOL. 1, ON ARMY TRAINING NETWORK

by [Angela Wilkins](#) and [Jon H. Moilanen](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) has published the Threat Tactics Report (TTR) Compendium, Volume 1, as a compilation of the first four published TTRs: [ISIL, Russia, and North Korea, and China](#) and is posted on [ATN](#).



TTRs study threats and operational environments with a focus on the military variable of actors (regular forces and/or irregular forces), to include capabilities and limitations, tactical observations, and recent actions. The TTR series is produced in accordance with *Intelligence Community Directive Number 203: Analytical Standards* (Effective: January 2015). ACE-TI coordinates each TTR with relevant subject matter experts (SMEs) at organizations such as the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), HQDA G-2, Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), TRADOC G-2 Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), and other SMEs from TRADOC and FORSCOM.

Each TTR includes a comparison of an actor's real-world tactics to threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrinal concepts and terms for training. The TTR methodology also identifies where the conditions specific to actors are present in the [Decisive Action Training Environment \(DATE\)](#) and other US Army training materials for representation or replication of these conditions across all training venues. **Note.** See ATN navigation with common access card in this issue of *Red Diamond*.

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by [Jon H. Moilanen](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE-Threats Integration, Operations, *Red Diamond* Newsletter (IDSI Ctr)

This issue of *Red Diamond* begins with an article on the Al-Shabaab Janaale attack. TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration released a Threat Action Report (TAR) on the 1 September 2015 al-Shabaab attack on Ugandan army personnel located in Janaale, Somalia. Analysis examines the importance of the date chosen for the attack, the possible reasons behind the attack, and the technical reasons behind the success of the al-Shabaab attack.

If You See Something—Say Something. Our antiterrorism situational understanding is a responsibility of each individual in observing and protecting his daily home, work, and recreational environments. The *If You See Something, Say Something™* phrase is more than an antiterrorism and force protection campaign slogan. Protecting the US Homeland is a shared action responsibility to know the threats and know the enemy.

The Fall of Ramadi. The capture of Ramadi is part of an ISIL strategy to take control of Anbar province, and to threaten and attack Baghdad. ISIL has regularly used offensive tactics consistent with Hybrid Threat (HT) doctrine outlined in TC 7-100.2, *Opposing Force Tactics*.

Russian Tactics in Syria. Recent information shows that the Russians are methodically establishing infrastructure to support transport aircraft, heavy weaponry, and troops. Russians use stealth to infiltrate troops and equipment, INFOWAR to deny and then justify this build-up, intelligence and special forces units to gather intelligence

and set the conditions for offensive action, and airstrikes followed by small units of Russian special forces and “advisors” used to control key terrain. Russia may continue these tactics to maintain a military presence in Syria, much as it has done in Crimea and Ukraine.

Refugees in CENTCOM. Hybrid Threat (HT) actors, including the regular forces of the Syrian regime, irregular forces such as the violent extremists group ISIL, and criminal human traffickers recognize the opportunity these displaced populations represent. They are exploited as a source of profit and propaganda for these regional threat actors.

Iranian Air Forces. This article is a primer for Iran’s military aircraft and air defense systems, and discusses organizational elements, missions, and capabilities for both elements of Iran’s air forces—the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). The subject of Iran’s military missile capabilities will be addressed in a future issue of the *Red Diamond*.

Email your topic recommendations to:

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Director's Corner Thoughts for Training Readiness



by [Jon Cleaves](#), Director, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC)

The team is deep into the process of preparing the next update to the *Decisive Action Training Environment* (DATE). DATE is an environment spanning an entire region of the world and the base DATE publication cannot hope to cover every square mile of it with the detail you need to conduct your training. That is where you and your organization come in.

You know best what those needs are, and you are the ones writing the scenarios that use DATE as a foundation. As you write those scenarios, you will develop detail—target folders, networks, local infrastructures, and other key pieces of data that you need to provide fidelity to your training. What needs to happen now is for us to intelligently share this data across the force. If you have developed detailed data on a portion of the DATE, I encourage you strongly to work with my team to incorporate that information into a centrally held and shared database. As you do so, work with us to identify that piece of the DATE region that is “yours” to detail. This means we will coordinate among all the key users of DATE—CTCs, CoEs, MTCs, etc. to logically divide the responsibility for creation of detail among the scenario/course/exercise designers that use DATE.

CTC locales should be obvious, as they already have analog locations inside the region. We want to expand this so that CoEs, MTCs, and other users have a location inside DATE that works for their training in which they can have primary say for the detailed development of political, social, and infrastructure data. This will avoid duplication of effort and provide, in time, the rich detail we all need throughout the entire region.


I enjoin you to contact my DATE lead, [Ms. Angela McClain-Wilkins](#), and [Mrs. Laura Deatrick](#) if you are not already an invitee to our DATE Working Group **8–11 December 2015**. Even if you cannot make it to that event, we want to partner with you to help get your work incorporated into DATE and deconflict overlaps so that the entire enterprise is working to a goal where sufficient detail exists to support all necessary training conditions for all the venues making use of DATE. The users of DATE are free to add, through us, new groups and actors into the environment and provide detail on existing actors and groups.

Our role is to provide quality control into that process and resolve conflicts. For example, we can make the information on SAPA or the Bilosovars or a town in Atropia as detailed as we like and add to it as much as we like, but there can only be one version of SAPA.

So, if there is simply no group of actors in the environment that meets your training needs, we will take the work that you have done to fill those needs and add it to the mix. What we cannot have is multiple versions of DATE. That would defeat one of its core purposes.

We look forward to working with you!

JON



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TC-Training Circular		
TC 7-100	11/26/2010	HYBRID THREAT
TC 7-100.2	12/09/2011	OPPOSING FORCE TACTICS
TC 7-100.3	01/17/2014	IRREGULAR OPPOSING FORCES
TC 7-100.4	06/04/2015	THREAT FORCE STRUCTURE ORGANIZATION GUIDE
TC 7-101	11/26/2010	EXERCISE DESIGN
TC 7-102	11/26/2014	OPERATION ENVIRONMENT AND ARMY LEARNING

Threat Tactics Course—TTC

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

7-11 MAR 2016

TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

New **TTC Point of Contact: Jon Moilanen**

jon.h.moilanen.ctr@mail.mil

Limited Seats Available for MAR 2016 TTC.

If you have not received a confirmation email on your attendance request, your organization is NOT registered to attend.

by [H. David Pendleton](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Directorate (CGI Ctr)

This month, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration released a Threat Action Report (TAR) on the 1 September 2015 al-Shabaab attack on Ugandan army personnel located in Janaale, Somalia. This TAR not only examines the threat actions of the attack, but provides an overview of the security situation in Somalia, a brief history of al-Shabaab and other events leading up to the attack, and the ramifications for the success of the insurgent group over the Ugandan military. The TAR concludes with an analytical assessment of al-Shabaab's success and the training implications for US Army units facing a similar insurgent group.

Introduction

Before 2015, al-Shabaab normally conducted squad- or platoon-size ambushes against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) convoys or raids against isolated outposts. Uganda is one of the countries that provides soldiers to AMISOM. Al-Shabaab's attack on 1 September 2015 at Janaale confirmed the insurgent group's change in tactics as it represented its third larger-scale attack against AMISOM forces in fewer than six months. During the last two attacks, at Janaale and previously at Leego, al-Shabaab massed at least 200 fighters and conducted similar assaults at both locations. Al-Shabaab attacked a Burgundian force at Leego, but a Ugandan compound at Janaale.


Attack—1 September 2015

Al-Shabaab's Abu Zubeyr Brigade (or Battalion) of about 200 fighters initiated the assault at Janaale at 0530 hours local time when one of its fighters killed himself by detonating a suicide vehicle borne IED (SVBIED) at the entrance gate to the

AMISOM base. Almost simultaneously or a few minutes immediately beforehand, other groups prevented reinforcements from arriving by blowing up two bridges—one in Qoryooley and the other in Janaale. The destruction of the bridge in Janaale also made it more difficult for the Ugandan troops to escape the attack. Al-Shabaab further isolated the Ugandan military compound by cutting phone lines into and out of the village. The attack occurred simultaneously with a massive fog that prevented AMISOM air assets, including drones, from coming to the Ugandan soldiers' aid. The al-Shabaab fighters entered the compound through the gap blown in the base's defenses or by removing razor-wire obstacles. The attackers held a decisive advantage early on, not only because of the element of surprise, but because much of the Ugandans' heavy infantry weapons, such as machine guns, had been recently moved to be used against Islamic extremists in other parts of the country. Additionally, the Ugandan soldiers failed to maintain proper security levels or institute proper access procedures to the compound. After the approximately 100 Ugandan defenders conducted a "tactical withdrawal" to regroup, the AMISOM soldiers claimed to have driven the attackers off, but the attackers may have left because al-Shabaab accomplished what it set out to do. The

entire raid took only approximately one hour and the attackers left the compound before any reinforcements could arrive. The attack caused much destruction, the loss of military equipment, and the kidnapping of several Ugandan soldiers to be used later in al-Shabaab propaganda videos.

During the attack and afterwards, al-Shabaab claimed its force controlled the Janaale base, captured a large quantity of military supplies, and even took prisoners. The Ugandan force immediately denied all of al-Shabaab's claims, many of which eventually turned out to be true. According to a Somali military official, it took 30 minutes for AMISOM units to take control of one of the bridge sites. Local witnesses told the media some AMISOM soldiers jumped into the nearby river in an attempt to avoid being killed or captured. Other media reports indicated there were several wounded soldiers lying along the river after the raid ended. Late in the day, four helicopters were still searching for approximately 40 missing



soldiers. After the attack, al-Shabaab claimed its fighters killed anywhere between 50 and 80 of the AMISOM soldiers and their Somali partners living on the Janaale base in retaliation for AMISOM soldiers killing innocent Somali civilians at a wedding in Marka on 31 July 2015.




Figure 1. Tactical sketch of Al-Shabaab Janaale attack

Aftermath

Reports on the number of casualties suffered by the Ugandan force changed repeatedly in the days and weeks after the event. Initially, Uganda claimed that only approximately ten soldiers were killed and none were missing. It was not until two weeks later, in Japan, that the Ugandan president admitted that 19 soldiers died during the Janaale attack and that six of the soldiers were still missing. In response to the poor performance by the Ugandan soldiers, its government investigated and then prosecuted four of the military officers in the chain of command for their failure to properly defend the base and protect their soldiers.

Analytical Assessment and Training Implications

The TAR contains eight assessments and two training implications for the attack. The analysis examines the importance of the date chosen for the attack, the possible reasons behind the attack—including retaliation against the Ugandans for previous actions in Somalia, and the technical reasons behind the success of the al-Shabaab attack. The latter includes the isolation of the objective, exploiting the weaknesses, low morale, and poor leadership in the Ugandan/AMISOM forces.

While detonating an SVBIED similar to the one that al-Shabaab used to initiate the Janaale attack would be difficult to simulate in a training environment, all other aspects of this type of raid could be conducted at a combat training center or even home station training. The size of the attack—200 military personnel in the main body plus supporting forces—may be difficult to replicate in local training areas, but should be possible at a CTC. For home station training, a smaller-scale assault using similar techniques is a possibility.

Many ACE Threats Integration products related to Somalia and al-Shabaab can be found on the [Army Training Network](#) (ATN). ATN products include the Horn of Africa Operational Environment Assessment (OEA), an al-Shabaab update, and threat reports on other al-Shabaab attacks. See the full TAR for additional information on the Janaale attack.

**KNOW THE THREATS
KNOW THE ENEMY**

If YOU See Something, Say Something

by [Jon H. Moilanen](#), U.S. Army TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Directorate (IDSI Ctr)

Antiterrorism awareness and situational understanding of threats and enemies are everyone's responsibility. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) encourages an informed and aware public capable of self-advocacy. Each individual has a duty to be an active agent in observing and protecting his daily home, work, and recreational environments. *If You See Something, Say Something*[™] is more than an antiterrorism and force protection campaign slogan. Protecting the US Homeland is a shared action from Federal to local community levels. Each individual has a responsibility to know the threats and know the enemy.

For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is one of several expanding threats to the United States of America. ISIL has publicly promoted direct confrontation with the US. Through their sophisticated messaging with high-quality media content on multiple online platforms, ISIL quickly reaches a global audience and encourages acts of violence. ISIL's calls for *lone offender* attacks are likely to resonate with homegrown violent extremists (HVEs). The Intelligence Community (IC) acknowledges an elevated threat of HVE lone offender attacks by ISIL sympathizers, and states that a lone offender presents law enforcement with limited opportunities to detect and disrupt lone offender plots.¹ The potential for violence from all types of violent extremists include but is not limited to violent white supremacists, violent eco-terrorists, violent Neo-Nazis, criminal gangs (such as MS-13), and international terrorist groups such as ISIL.

ISIL is better funded than many groups the US has faced recently and attracts a large number of recruits to its cause. How ISIL is fighting today indicates how future attacks might occur. ISIL's tactical techniques continue to include heavy use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in various forms, and suicide attacks to cause mayhem and debilitating psychological effects on victims. ISIL targets infrastructure such as dams, oil refineries, and power plants for use in population control and gathering fiscal revenue. ISIL demonstrates the ability to execute military tactics that require a level of competence and control uncommon in recent experience. Refined social media strategies manipulate readily available technology to advertise its agenda and successes to potential recruits worldwide, and threaten its enemies through graphic images and terrorism. ISIL's pervasive use of information warfare (INFOWAR) manipulates social media for increased appeal among recruits.²

US Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2 ACE Threats Integration has published an unclassified assessment of recent ISIL actions and implications for Army training readiness. This document is available on the Army Training Network (ATN) with Common Access Card (CAC) entry to the website. A compendium of threat tactics reports is also available on ATN.

HVEs remain the most likely global jihadist threat to the US homeland. While the threat posed by HVEs probably will broaden through at least 2015, the overall level of HVE activity is likely to remain the same: a handful of uncoordinated



and unsophisticated plots emanating from a pool of up to a few hundred individuals. Lone actors or insular groups who act autonomously pose the most serious HVE threat. HVEs probably will continue gravitating to simpler plots that do not require advanced skills, communication with others, or outside training. The US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) expects HVEs probably will move toward actions such as active shooter events. The NCTC notes that HVEs often stress targeting military personnel, bases, facilities, recruiting stations, and places where military personnel gather.³



The terrorist threat is dynamic and challenges US security measures and safety. The threat is real, continues to evolve, and is a present danger across the globe. Recognize that the threat environment is ever evolving and becoming increasingly complex and decentralized.⁴ Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson states, “The reality is that given how the global terrorist threat has evolved in this country and in other countries, in Europe and elsewhere, the cop on the beat may be the first one to learn about the terrorist attack. In 2015, therefore, homeland security must also mean hometown security.”⁵ DHS’s approach emphasizes the strength of local communities and the premise that well-informed and well-equipped families, communities, and frontline individuals represent the best defense against violent extremism.

Each member of the US Army—uniformed military leader and Soldier, Department of the Army Civilian (DAC), support contractor, and all family members—is integral to collective force protection and security for the US. Every Army installation, activity, unit, and local community has an easy and effective way to notify the military police or local law enforcement when something observed appears suspicious.

If You See Something—Say Something!

Endnotes

- ¹ Taylor, Francis. (June 3, 2015). See background information. Written testimony of I&A Under Secretary Francis Taylor for a House Committee on Homeland Security hearing titled: Terrorism Gone Viral: The Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/03/written-testimony-ia-under-secretary-house-committee-homeland-security-hearing>
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- ⁴ Taylor, Francis. (June 3, 2015). See background information. Written testimony of I&A Under Secretary Francis Taylor for a House Committee on Homeland Security hearing titled: Terrorism Gone Viral: The Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/03/written-testimony-ia-under-secretary-house-committee-homeland-security-hearing>
- ⁵ Johnson, Jeh. (March 9, 2015). See background information. Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson at the National League of Cities Congressional City Conference. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/03/10/remarks-secretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-national-league-cities-congressional>





by [Rick Burns](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Directorate (BMA Ctr)

The capture of Ramadi, the provincial capital of Anbar province and positioned eighty miles west of Baghdad, has always been a part of an ISIL strategy to take control of Anbar province. Among other reasons, ISIL control of Anbar province gives it maneuver room to threaten and attack Baghdad. There are also reasons why Ramadi is important to the Iraqi government. Ramadi is positioned on significant routes between Baghdad and Jordan and Syria, important resupply routes for ISIL. The Ramadi dam and the reservoir south of the city on the Euphrates River controls the flow of both drinking and agricultural water to much of southern Iraq.¹ Ramadi is the largest population center in the Sunni-dominated province and the home of the Dulaymi tribe, a group whose support ISIL will need to be able to effectively govern the area.²

ISIL has had a presence in Anbar province, taking advantage of Sunni discontent with the Shia-controlled government. ISIL openly presented itself in Ramadi as early as 2013. During a 28 October 2013 anti-government protest in Ramadi, two masked ISIL members stood on either side of the ISIL flag. In the latter part of 2013, ISIL increased attacks in the southern part of Ramadi. From September to December 2013, attacks in Ramadi's southern urban center doubled to twenty per month. From January to April 2014, ISIL attacks more than doubled to 44 a month. On 3 January 2014, ISIL launched simultaneous attacks on Ramadi and Fallujah. During those attacks, ISIL captured municipal buildings and police headquarters in Ramadi. Before the end of January 2014, local militias and Iraqi security forces pushed ISIL out of Ramadi's city center.³

ISIL's strategy, over a period of months, included offensive operations that captured key cities and neighborhoods surrounding Ramadi. By October 2014, ISIL had captured the cities of al Qaim, Haditha, and Hit along the route between Ramadi and the Syrian border.⁴ On 12 February 2015, ISIL fighters took the town of al Baghdadi, a town less than ten miles from the al Asad Airbase. The airbase, the home of the Iraqi 7th Infantry, had for several months been the target of mortar fire. About 0720 on 13



Figure 1. Pro-ISIL Twitter postina depicts members with distinctive banners [BBC](#)

February 2015, 20–25 ISIL fighters wearing Iraqi Army uniforms attacked the al Asad Airbase in two waves. The first attackers, the assault element, detonated suicide vests followed by an exploitation element of ten to fifteen fighters who briefly penetrated the perimeter. Iraqi soldiers killed the attackers before they could do any damage. Iraqi military reinforcements that would be needed to support an attack on Ramadi would likely come from al Asad. With pressure on the airbase through repeated attacks, ISIL effectively fixed Iraqi forces there, significantly improving the chances for a successful attack on Ramadi.⁵

From its controlled villages south of Ramadi, Albu jabr and al Humayra, ISIL launched attacks into al Hawz, al Mala’ab, Fursan, and al Hayy Dhubat. By November 2014, it controlled Hawz, Tamim, and Anbar University—areas south of Ramadi’s government complex. By the start of 2015, ISIL controlled or was seriously contesting more than half of the area around Ramadi. During the period 11–14 March 2015, ISIL conducted eight suicide bombings in and around Ramadi. By mid-April, ISIL executed attacks on neighborhoods in the southeast suburb al Sufiyah. On 27 April 2015, ISIL called for fighters in Syria to join the fight for Ramadi, implying the need for suicide bombers in the coming attack. ISIL continued attacks into Ramadi on 10 and 14 April, 2015 and again on 5 and 9 May, 2015.⁶

The stage was now set for an ISIL offensive to finally take Ramadi. Iraqi security forces were concentrated in three main areas, with a few small security contingencies scattered throughout the city. The Anbar Operations Command Center (AOCC) was a corps-level command located in northwestern Ramadi. Camp Ar Ramadi, the home of the 8th Iraqi Army Brigade, is located west of the city. The Ramadi Government Center complex, which also contained provincial government offices, is located inside Ramadi.⁷




Figure 2. Tactical sketch of ISIL attacks on Ramadi

Before and during the attack on Ramadi, ISIL was able to fix Iraqi forces in three ways. As mentioned previously, ISIL fixed Iraqi forces positioned at al Asad Airbase through numerous direct attacks and capturing of surrounding towns. An early morning sandstorm on 14 May 2015 allowed ISIL to get an upper hand on Iraqi security forces. In January 2015, ISIL also used a sandstorm to mask its attack on Kurdish units in Kirkuk. Without fear of air attacks by Iraqi and US air assets, ISIL began the attack on Ramadi unimpeded. By the time the sandstorm cleared, Iraqi and ISIL units were too closely

intertwined to effectively engage ISIL from the air. Lastly, ISIL fighters attacked police stations and other security units to fix these resources and prevent their supporting Iraqi forces defending the three primary ISIL objectives.⁸

ISIL first targeted the Ramadi Government Center Complex. On 14 May 2015, a single armored bulldozer worked without opposition for nearly an hour to clear defensive concrete barriers blocking the road to the police station next to the governance building complex. When the bulldozer reached the police station the driver detonated the bulldozer as a suicide VBIED. ISIL also targeted two other buildings within the complex with VBIEDs. Once the way was cleared, ISIL utilized six 15-ton trucks with payloads capable of demolishing portions of neighborhoods. ISIL fighters detonated a total of at least 27 vehicles loaded with explosives during the attack. Utilizing suicide VBIEDs as an initial assault force with a follow-on exploitation force, ISIL took the Government City Center Complex causing security forces to withdraw under pressure.⁹

On 17 May 2015 ISIL fighters attacked the AOCC. The attack began with three suicide VBIEDs detonating explosives at the front gate, killing five Iraqi soldiers and wounding twelve. ISIL fighters followed the VBIEDs, penetrating the perimeter. Iraqi forces retreated from the center, leaving ISIL in control of the command center.¹⁰ ISIL used the familiar technique of sending suicide VBIEDs as an assault force to open a window of opportunity for the exploitation force to achieve the primary mission, which in this situation was the capture of the AOCC.

After capturing the AOCC, ISIL captured the Ar Ramadi camp of the 8th Iraqi Army Brigade using similar tactics. During the days leading up to the attack on Ar Ramadi, ISIL had shown no interest in taking prisoners. ISIL fighters brutally killed and captured Iraqi security personnel as well as local leaders. An information operations campaign that emphasized ISIL's brutality worked effectively as ISIL captured Ramadi and then turned its attention to the Ar Ramadi camp. Those who could escape did so, leaving behind equipment, weapons, and ammunition in their wake.¹¹

During and after the Ramadi attacks, thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled the battlefield, stressing a Shia-led government in Baghdad. Fears about potentially embedded insurgents among people leaving Ramadi caused bottlenecks at checkpoints, denial of passage into safe areas for many, and tied up security forces in IDP operations. An already large humanitarian crisis was amplified as the number of Iraqis in need of support increased by thousands. In addition to the distraction and diversion of Iraqi security force resources to IDP operations, ISIL can use the Iraqi government failures in its ongoing information operations narrative to attack the Iraqi government's credibility.¹²

ISIL has regularly used offensive tactics consistent with Hybrid Threat doctrine outlined in TC 7-100.2, *Opposing Force Tactics*.¹³ During the Ramadi operation, ISIL utilized enabling and action forces. ISIL enabling forces consisted of fixing forces and assault forces. Its fixing forces prevented Iraqi security units from effectively maneuvering to support the defense of ISIL's three primary objectives. Assault forces, consisting of suicide VBIEDs, attacked vulnerable perimeter positions. Exploitation forces followed the assault forces, taking advantage of the window of opportunity created to achieve the primary mission.

Note. This article is part of the forthcoming Threat Tactics Report: ISIL (update).

Notes

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² Dina Esfandiary, ["Why ISIL's Victory in Ramadi is so Important,"](#) The Telegraph, 19 May 2015; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, ["The Islamic State's Stalled Offensive in Anbar Province,"](#) War on the Rocks, 25 November 2014.

³ Hamdi Alkhshali, ["Ramadi Could Fall as ISIS Militants Lay Siege, Iraqi Official Warns,"](#) CNN, 15 April 2015; Patrick Martin, Genevieve Casagrande, Jessica Lewis McFate, ["ISIS Captures Ramadi,"](#) Institute for the Study of War, 18 May 2015; ["The Fall of Ramadi: How ISIS Seized a Key Iraqi City,"](#) Wall Street Journal, 23 July 2015.

⁴ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, ["The Islamic State's Stalled Offensive in Anbar Province,"](#) War on the Rocks, 25 November 2014.

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
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by [John Cantin](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Directorate (BMA Ctr)

In September of 2015, the Russians publicly acknowledged what had been common knowledge for at least a year—that Russian troops and equipment were being moved to Syria to support the Assad regime. Most of the Russian effort had been confined to the Russian naval base at Tartus, but recent intelligence shows that the Russians are methodically establishing bases at Bassel al-Assad Airport, Homs, the port at Latakia, and Damascus International Airport. These installations are being built up to support transport aircraft, heavy weaponry, and troops.

This deployment and buildup of facilities for military use is all part of the Russian practice of what is commonly referred to as “Hybrid War.” The Russian foray into Syria uses some of the same tactics that the Russians have employed in Georgia, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine. This article will describe the methods that the Russians used to gain a foothold in Syria and how they expect to exploit their initial military success. It is important to note that the Russians do not use the term Hybrid Warfare to describe these tactics. This is the term that the Western media, think tanks, and analysts have developed to define this method of warfare. The Russians have used terms such as *indirect*, *asymmetrical*, and *non-linear* when discussing what is commonly referred to as Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid Warfare is a part of the strategy/policy of what can be called Indirect Action that the Russians believe is essential to protect their interests. To the Russians, using covert methods, information warfare (INFOWAR), and special operations troops to make up for conventional disadvantages has been the norm for decades.

Russia is using the same strategy they employed in Georgia and Eastern Ukraine with one key difference. Instead of supporting an insurgency against an established government, they are supporting an established government (the Assad Regime) against an ongoing insurgency (Islamic State [ISIL/ISIS], the Free Syrian Army [FSA], and the Al-Nusra Front). In a sense, the Russians are using a reverse strategy from their previous military moves.

Russia has maintained a naval base at Tartus since 1971, under an agreement with the Syrian Ba’athist government. This base has allowed Russia to maintain a military presence in Syria and provided the Assad government with military equipment, advisors, and training. From 1960 to 1980 Syria received most of its military equipment from the former Soviet Union, and many Syrian army officers received training in the Soviet Union or were trained by Soviet advisors in Syria.

The Russian naval base at Tartus provided the Russians with an entry point for supplies, equipment, and personnel into Syria. In the same way that the Russians smuggled equipment and personnel into South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, the Russians were able to set the conditions for a robust logistical effort in Syria. Since July, the Russians have moved men and materiel into Tartus and Bassel Al-Assad Airport. The latest estimate of Russian equipment is:

- Six T-90 or T-72s Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), confirmed with imagery
- 12-15 howitzers (D-30s), confirmed with imagery
- 35 armored personnel carriers, confirmed with imagery
- Single Source reports the use of BTR-82A in combat
- Prefabricated housing for at least 500–2,000 additional troops
- Mi-24 (Hind) helicopters
- Mi-17 (Hip) helicopters
- Numerous logistical trucks (Bassel al-Assad International Airport)

- UNK BN from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (likely Tartus “selfies”)
- Russia deployed mixed aviation regiment:
 - 12: Su-24M2s
 - 12: Su-25SM2s
 - 10: Su-30SMs

The Russians began to reinforce their security force at the Port of Tartus in May–June of this year. The build-up continued over the summer as advisors, security personnel, and engineers began to build support facilities and improve the infrastructure of Bassel Al-Assad Airport. Barracks were built, runways and hangars were improved or constructed, and a robust security system was installed.

To augment and legitimize the deployment of equipment and troops, the Russians have initiated an INFOWAR campaign that presents this effort as a “battle against international terrorism.” Since there are Russian jihadists fighting with ISIL and other terrorist groups, President Putin has stated numerous times that the Russians are simply fighting the terrorists in Syria before they return to Russia. With the memory of two wars in Chechnya and numerous terrorist attacks (the Beslan school siege and the Moscow theater standoff to name just two), this is not a hard sell to the Russian public.

On 30 September 2015 President Putin asked the upper house of the Russian Parliament for permission to deploy the Russian military to Syria. This was unanimously granted under the guise that Russian troops would be fighting “terrorist groups” and only using air power. The compliant Russian media attempted to legitimize this request by reporting that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had requested Russia’s help.

The INFOWAR theme has been used before, most recently in the Second Chechen War. The idea that the Russians are simply fighting terrorists will be the mantra for the Russians during this campaign. As Russia conducts airstrikes against Assad’s enemies, ground forces with Russian “advisors” will simultaneously move into territory that will provide Syria with a buffer area to give the Damascus regime time and space to continue offensive operations against ISIL, FSA, and Al-Nusra.

Russia wasted no time after the parliamentary decree to use force. Later that day (30 September 2015), the Russian Air Force launched airstrikes in Homs province in Syria, a crucial area to both Assad and the Russians.

The Russians gave the US a one-hour notice of the bombing, therefore denying the US time to react both diplomatically and militarily. The element of surprise and speed that was used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was used to catch the US and the world off guard.

By 1 October the Russians had stepped up their deployment of aviation assets to their newly refurbished airfields by inserting over fifty planes and helicopters into Syria. This rapid deployment capability was made possible by the slow and steady buildup of troops and equipment at the Tartus depot. The key equipment, materiel, and personnel were already pre-positioned at the Tartus base, ready to receive and maintain the aircraft as they arrived.



Figure 1. [Russian fighter jet in Syria](#)

By using the INFOWAR tactic prior to offensive military action, the Russians have repeated a tried and true tactic—continually repeat the message that you want a diplomatic solution to an ongoing problem/crisis while stealthily moving troops and equipment into place. This is then followed by sudden and unexpected military action. By the time the rest of the world realizes what has happened (and lodges indignant complaints and protests) the Russians are in a military position of power and advantage. This was done in Crimea with great success and is being conducted by the Russians in Syria now, albeit at a slower, more methodical pace.

As the Russians improved their defenses of Tartus and Bassel Al-Assad Airport, they also stepped up their covert operations by coordinating for arms shipments to Syrian government forces and coordinated with Iranian backed militias in Syria.



Figure 2. [Bassel al-Assad International Airport](#). A satellite image revealed Russian combat aircraft, including 4 Sukhoi Su-30SM multirole (air-to-air and ground interdiction) fighters, 12 Sukhoi Su-25 attack planes, and 12 Sukhoi Su-24 attack planes

The Russians have also made use of private security contractors, most of whom are former soldiers with special operations training. Using contractors allows the Russians to maintain deniability and flexibility as contractors are not officially aligned with the Russian government or military. This helps the Russians build up intelligence and logistics networks that can be exploited later during increased combat operations. This is all part of setting the conditions for follow-on operations to expand combat or maintain sustained and continuous operations.

This increase in Russian presence and tempo sets the stage for possible large-scale conventional combat in the future. By constructing support systems and facilities, as well as intelligence and logistics networks, the Russians give themselves a myriad of options to shape the political/military conflict. These moves allow Russia to insert itself as a vital player in any diplomatic effort to solve this crisis, a crisis that the Russians have deftly exploited for their own benefit.



Figure 3. [Private security contractors in Syria](#)

The Russians have also deployed special forces troops to Syria to assist with training of Syrian government troops and targeting for future airstrikes. Once these forces have set the conditions for ground operations, they will most likely assist the Syrian government forces to retake strategic targets to strengthen Assad's government. This has already happened with limited offensives in Homs and Aleppo.

This is significant because it illustrates the Russian formula for offensive action. The Russians have used stealth to infiltrate troops and equipment, INFOWAR to deny and then justify this build-up, intelligence and special forces units to gather intelligence and set the conditions for offensive action, and eventually, offensive kinetic action in the form of airstrikes followed by small units of Russian special forces and "advisors" used to capture key terrain. Russia will continue these tactics to maintain a military presence in Syria, much as it has done in Crimea and Ukraine.

US forces can use the several examples of Russian intervention in Ukraine and Syria as a part of training events. One should assume that by the time US forces are deployed to a region that meets these conditions, an enemy force will already have advisors and special operations forces in place. Units should take this into account and attempt to replicate this. Also, a robust INFOWAR capability should be allotted for the Opposing Forces to ensure that US forces become accustomed to dealing with and countering INFOWAR tactics and techniques.




Figure 4. [Graphic description of fight for Aleppo](#)

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Refugee Crisis in CENTCOM

by [Jerry England](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Directorate (DAC)

The Civil War in Syria has forced many Syrian citizens out of their homes and into a displaced status as they flee religious and ethnic persecution from the various threat actors in what Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has described as an “apocalyptic disaster.”¹ In fact, approximately half of the unprecedented number of refugees arriving in Europe are from Middle Eastern conflict zones like Syria and Iraq. Spurred by relaxed policies toward immigration, untenable conditions at home, and at least tacit offer of asylum, immigrants from the Middle East’s wars are moving across multiple Army Service Component Commands in search of security and safety. According to the Office the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Syrian refugee crisis is the world’s largest mass migration event in a quarter of a century.² There are an estimated 4.1 million Syrians living as refugees in neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; there are an estimate 7.5 million Syrians that are internally displaced within Syria. In neighboring Iraq, there are an estimated 369,904 displaced Iraqis in the region.

Hybrid threat actors, including the regular forces of the Syrian regime, irregular forces such as the violent extremist group ISIL, and criminal human traffickers, recognize the opportunity these displaced populations represent. They are exploited as a source of profit and propaganda for these regional threat actors.

The crisis caused from millions of displaced persons inside and outside conflict areas like Syria and Iraq has been met with a mixed political and military responses. The various groups providing humanitarian and other assistance to at-risk groups in Syria and Iraq have called into question their effectiveness and motivations. Syrian regime elements have accused humanitarian groups of providing military assistance to rebel forces under the guise of humanitarian aid. Additionally, regional non-state actors such as Hezbollah are known to blend a variety of services including social services when assisting victims in the combat zone. This combination of assistance has the twofold benefit of providing the means to continue the fight while securing a safe haven among the population.

Militaries that choose to address these types of crises will find that the challenge is more than just providing and delivering aid but also having a clear understanding of the second order effects humanitarian assistance can bring. In many cases, the ability to control what happens to the aid after it is delivered will require checks and balances to ensure that it meets its intended targeted and is used for its intended purpose. Also, striking a balance between operational security and transparency will ensure that units that enable provision of humanitarian assistance appear legitimate. Better intelligence about the operational environment will prevent aid getting into the wrong hands. For example, during the Kobane crisis, videos from ISIL showed fighters with airdropped aid and weapons that were supposedly delivered by allied forces. Syrian government forces have also attacked humanitarian workers and facilities and have been accused of denying government services to its citizens for punitive purposes.

Sinjar Mountain

In the summer of 2014, scenes of families of Christian and Yazidi tribespeople fleeing extremist fighters to a remote mountain in western Iraq caused an international outcry as the public tried to come to grips with the newest destabilizing force in Iraq: ISIL. According to reports at the time, 40,000 people were trapped on the mountain causing an international response from both Iraqi and western military forces.³ The risk associated with this process was apparent when an Iraqi aid helicopter crashed for unknown reasons in the mountains around Sinjar, killing the pilot and injuring others while delivering aid.⁴ At the request of the Iraqi government, an interagency assessment team arrived on mount Sinjar to coordinate airdrops of supplies in order to alleviate some of the suffering.⁵ In addition to the humanitarian aid, precision strikes against ISIL armored vehicles and other targets were used to bolster security while IDPs escaped from the area. The security situation allowed US personnel to coordinate with Kurdish forces and create a humanitarian corridor to allow

the remaining IDPs to escape to camps and collection points north of the area. Many of the Yazidi that remained on the mountain were able to survive on the aid that made it to the intended recipients. It is unclear how much if any of the aid got into the hands of ISIL fighters and criminals who either used the supplies for themselves or sold them for their own profit.

Iraq: Displacement - Sinjar, Ninewa Governorate as of 04 Aug 2014 




Figure 1: Sinjar Mountain UNOCHA 4 August 2014

In other parts of Iraq, ISIL fighters applied rules and regulations designed to hold citizens hostage in their own communities. The threat is known to use civilians as human shields and ISIL has devised a list of ways to keep people tied to the areas the extremist group controls. Bureaucratic processes that allow persons of a certain age apply for passports and steep fees are some examples of how ISIL keeps control over the movement of people in its areas.⁶

Another option for those wanting to escape is to pay human traffickers who rarely provide the expected results. Once a smuggler is free from government or terrorist forces, it is common that they abandon their cargo and leave displaced people to fend for themselves.⁷ This usually involves paying the additional human traffickers or bribing government officials to move along to the next leg of the journey.⁸ The journey takes many displaced persons out of their country of origin and contributes to the large refugee problem present in the developed regions of Europe.

The Humanitarian Crisis in Syria

Over half of the surge in migrants to Europe are from Syria where access to humanitarian aid is dependent on the regional faction that happens to be in control at the time. In the north of the country around an ISIL offensive, large numbers of people were prevented from reaching humanitarian aid. In other areas where the Syrian regime is in power, aid reached tens of thousands.⁹ The story is not completely one-sided; in any given area aid will reach those who support the controlling faction. However, there is some evidence that aid is also being actively targeted.

The Syrian government has targeted a number of civilian facilities throughout the course of the war. Attacks against medical facilities and food markets have been reported by both the United Nations and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.¹⁰ These operations are adding to the large numbers of people trying to leave Syria.¹¹ Like ISIL, the Syrian government is reluctant to approve civilians to travel from volatile regions. It is unclear if this is caused by concerns for civilians' safety or because the government requires civilians to stay put in order to maintain their claim to legitimacy in contested areas.¹²




Figure 2: [Areas of Influence UNOCHA](#) 23October 2015

Large-scale crises caused by military operations increase the risks not only to civilians but to humanitarian workers and their facilities as well. Civilians are leaving villages throughout the operational area in expectation of future operations. Changing weather conditions will increase the need for assistance to civilians displaced by the fighting.

Implications for Training

There are currently 22 Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) dealing with dislocated civilians. Forces that train on population resource control, dislocated civilian operations, and non-combatant evacuation operations would be wise to include some of the operational environment information from the current crisis in Iraq and Syria in order to consider what elements are the most relevant.

Military operations in Syria and Iraq by both friendly and threat actors will continue to have an effect on the amount displaced persons in these theaters. Ensuring that civilians do not become displaced for an extended period of time should be a goal when training Army Required Tasks 7.3.3.2 Control Movement of Dislocated Civilian. Mission command will be a challenge as military forces attempt to coordinate the movement of dislocated civilians with host nation and international humanitarian communities, as well as joint and host nation forces. Additionally, consideration of the amount




military resources across the various warfighter functions will need to be limited so as to not interfere with combat operations and to not build dependence on military assistance by civilians and displaced populations. Population and resource controls measures may drain valuable resources from the military police logistics elements and from intelligence specialties.

The need to plan contingencies for displaced persons and to coordinate with authorities to assist them will mean that commanders on the ground will want to consider the second order effects with help from Civil Affairs and Intelligences specialties. The ability to support civilians forward and discourage displacement of large populations will rely on close coordination with humanitarian organizations including non-government organizations and international organizations.

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TRADOC G-2 *WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE*—UPDATE 2015 COMING SOON!



Iranian Air Force (IGRG and IRIAF)



by [Kristin D. Lechowicz](#), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Directorate (DAC)

This article is the third installment in a series focused on the Iran’s military. This article provides a basic primer for Iran’s military aircraft and air defense systems, and discusses the organizational elements, missions, and capabilities for both elements of Iran’s air forces. Missile capabilities, however, will be covered in depth in a future article.

The Iran’s Air Force, like its ground forces, is broken into two different and distinct elements. These elements consist of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). The main purpose of the Iranian Air Force (both IRGC and IRIAF) is to protect and defend Iran’s air space and sovereignty. The IRIAF’s air inventory consists of a mixture of aircraft (from a range of different ages) from a multitude of different countries.¹ However, the majority of the Iranian aging inventory consisted of US-supplied aircraft before the 1979 revolution.² Despite Iran’s creative problem solving, the issues of readiness, sustainment, and the air force as an organization is most likely problematic in relationship to operational readiness.³

<p>II. IRGC Air Force</p> <p>Personnel: 12,000 (air defense)</p> <p>Mission: Ballistic Missile Programs</p> <p>Headquarters: Tehran</p> <p>Organization: Five Brigades (BDE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15th Ghaem Missile BDE (short-range) • 5th Ra’ad Missile BDE (northwest of Tehran in Karaj) • 7th Al-Hadid Missile BDE (Western Iran Khorramabad) • 19th Zulfeqar Missile BDE (short-range) in Karaj • 23rd Towhid Missile BDE (Khorramabad) HQ 	<p>II. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)</p> <p>Personnel: 52,000</p> <p>Mission: Controls most of Iran’s combat aircraft</p> <p>Equipment: 23 Combat Squadrons (operational readiness questionable)</p> <p>Headquarters: Tehran.</p> <p>Organization: Three geographical commands: Western Area Command (WAC), Southern Area Command (SAC), and Eastern Area Command (EAC). WAC has the majority of the combat air power divided among the following bases Mehrabad, Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Omidiyeh, Shiraz and Esfahan.</p>
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Figure 1. Iranian air force snapshot

Overall, the Iranian air components do not pose a formidable threat to a technologically advanced air force. Many of Iran’s aircraft are still operational due to the efforts of Iran’s domestic military industry. The military industry has worked on gaps caused by the lack of replacement aircraft parts due to past sanctions. The IRGC clandestine elements have attempted to purchase parts from the black market using both knowing and unwitting sources.⁴ Despite Iran’s creative problem solving, the issues of operational readiness, sustainment, and training remain problematic and contradictory to the vision of Iran’s strategic goal of modernization.



Figure 2. Iranian F-14s

Jane’s reports that China supplied at least 65 F-7 fighters (a Chinese replicated MiG-21).⁵ The American F-14 and the Russian MIG-29 remain the biggest air threats to Western forces. Air elements primarily support their ground forces. Iran’s military leadership would likely position the best ADA assets and prized aircraft near strategic sites (nuclear plants) in order to interdict and deter possible attacks.

The IRIAF’s headquarters, training, sustainment, and air defense center are located in the capital of Tehran. The IRIAF is

organized into three geographical commands: Western Area Command (WAC), Southern Area Command (SAC), and Eastern Area Command (EAC) with an estimated 30,000 personnel overall divide among the three separate commands.⁶

Iranian Air Force Equipment					
Fixed Wing Aircraft in Service		Rotary Wing Aircraft in Service		Missiles in Service	
F-5	60	CH-47 Chinook	2	AIM-9P Sidewinder	UNK
C-130E Hercules	22	Bell 206	2	AA-8 'Aphid'	
Su-24	29	Sea King	2	AA-9 'Amos'	
Su-25	13	Bell 212	6	AA-10 'Alamo'	
Saeghe	3	Bell 214	19	AA-11 'Archer'	
F-14 Tomcat	44	Bell 412	2	AIM-7F Sparrow	
F-4 Phantom II (and variants)	54	Shahed 274	2	AIM-54 Phoenix	
MiG-29	48			MOM-23B HAWK	
Mirage F1	20			R 550 Magic	
J-7	60			PL-2 'Atoll'	
Boeing 707	6			PL-5	
Boeing 747	11			PL-7	
F27	15			PL-9	
Il-76	7			Sattar-1	
Y-12	9			Sattar-2	
Jetstar	1			AGM-65 Maverick	
Falcon 50	3			AS-10 'Karen'	
Falcon 20	1			AS-11 'Kilter'	
PC-6	8			AS-12 'Kegler'	
P-3 Orion	4			AS-14 'Kedge'	
Tazarve	25			AS-16 'Kickback'	
TB-21	8			YJ-6 (CAS-1)	
TB-200	4			C-801C Sardine	
F33 Bonanza	34			Fajr-e-Darya (CPMIEC C-802K)	
EMB-312	15			RIM-66 Standard	
PC-7	35				

Figure 3. Iranian air force equipment

Reporting indicates that the WAC has the majority of the combat air power divided among the following bases: Mehrabad, Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Omidiyeh, Shiraz, and Esfahan.⁷ The WAC has the key responsibility of monitoring the airspace

along the Iraqi border and is tasked with securing Tehran’s airspace. The heavy support to the WAC illustrates the importance that Iranian hierarchy has placed on the WAC’s organizational responsibilities. The SAC has the mission to protect the airspace along the Persian Gulf with bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, and Chah Bahar. The EAC main airbase in Mashhad is assigned to protect the Iran-Afghanistan border.

Jane’s estimates that Iran could potentially possess 16 combat squadrons; however, the exact operational readiness number is still a gap. Open source reports greatly vary from source to source and compounding the problem is the mix of IRGC air elements with the Artesh air assets.⁸

Iranian Air Defense Force (IRGC and IRIAF)	
List of Addition Systems and Estimated Numbers	
Strela-3 (SA-14 ‘Gremlin’)	200
Pantsyr-S1 96K6 SA-22 Greyhound	10
Igla-S (SA-24)	UNK
Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)	29
ZPU-2/ZPU-4	UNK
FIM-92A (stinger)	UNK
Strela -2M/9k32M SA-7b Grail	250
HN-5A	190
Misagh-1	UNK
Misagh-2	UNK
23-mm/ZSU-23-4	100
FM-90	UNK
FM-80/Crotale/Shahab Thageb	UNK
MIM-23 HAWK	120
Pantsyr-D1/96K6 SA-22 (Greyhound)	UNK
57-mm/ZSU-57-2	80
14.5-mm	UNK
23-mm/ZU-23-2	300
85-mm/M 1939	300
57-mm/S-60	200
40-mm/L/70	50
35-mm/Skyguard	92

Figure 4. Iranian air defense equipment

Iran’s air defense apparatus consists of a headquarters in Tehran and five regional air defense sectors. The air defense assets generally follow the ring of air bases across the northern border and down the western tiers of the country that Iran likely considered the most probably air avenue of approach. Interoperability and lack of quality maintenance for a mixture of the systems presents considerable and insurmountable difficulties for the aged equipment.⁹ Iran has a wide territory to protect and will likely use a point defense strategy to protect key bases and facilities. The following are Iran’s major ADA threats: Surface to Air Missile Systems: I-Hawk, CSA-1, SA-5, SA-6, SA-15, FM-80; Rapier Anti-Aircraft Artillery: 100-mm, 57-mm, 35-mm, and 23-mm.

Notes

- ¹ Global Security. [Iran - Air Force](#).
- ² Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, AIR FORCE Iran. 25 February 2015.
- ³ Jeremy Bender, Business Insider. [Iran is Bombing ISIS with This 40 Year Old US Fighter](#). 3 December 2015.
- ⁴ U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York. [“Four Individuals Charged in the Southern District of New York with Exporting Various Goods from the United States to Iran and China.”](#) Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office. 5 December 2012.
- ⁵ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, Air Force Iran. 25 February 2015.
- ⁶ Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. 26 January 2015.
- ⁷ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, Air Force Iran. 25 February 2015
- ⁸ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, Air Force Iran. 25 February 2015.
- ⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman. The United States Institute for Peace. The Iran Primer. [The Conventional Military](#). August 2015.

What ACE Threats Integration Supports for YOUR Readiness

- ◆ Determine Operational Environment (OE) conditions for Army training, education, and leader development.
- ◆ Design, document, and integrate hybrid threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine for near-term/midterm OEs.
- ◆ Develop and update threat methods, tactics, and techniques in HQDA Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series.
- ◆ Design and update Army exercise design methods-learning model in TC 7-101/7-102.
- ◆ Develop and update the US Army *Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)*.
- ◆ Develop and update the US Army *Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE)* products.
- ◆ Conduct Threat Tactics Course resident at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
- ◆ Conduct Threat Tactics mobile training team (MTT) at units and activities.
- ◆ Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness in threat models and OEs.
- ◆ Research, author, and publish OE and threat related classified/unclassified documents for Army operational and institutional domains.
- ◆ Support Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Home Station Training (HST) and OE Master Plan reviews and updates.
- ◆ Support TRADOC G-2 threat and OE accreditation program for Army Centers of Excellence (CoEs), schools, and collective training at sites for Army/USAR/ARNG.
- ◆ Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on threat and OE issues.

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