

Full Spectrum Urban COIN Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team

Ten "a-ha" Moments

LTC Scott A. Downey and CPT Zehra Guvendiren

Collection Management (CM) has long been considered the bane of any intelligence officer's existence, even in the days of force-on-force doctrine when intelligence operations were much simpler than they are today.

The 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division operating in the Karkh Security District (KSD) of Baghdad, Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08, felt no differently about CM when we took over authority of our Area of Operations (AO). We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems, which met CM needs within a COIN environment to maintain our relevance to the our lower and higher echelons.

We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems which met CM needs within COIN to maintain our relevance to our lower and higher echelons.

After six months of development, we implemented an improved CM cycle that optimized our unit capabilities and mitigated our weaknesses - one that supported our balanced Lethal and Non-Lethal operational tempo, and one that compounded our successes within our unique, high-density, urban AO. We combined doctrinal and a non-doctrinal approach to ensure our Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) were linked directly to the BCT Commander's Decision Points, and his Desired Effects. ***Our most unconventional initiative was to have our PIR span the full spectrum of BCT Operations, essential when fighting in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.*** Even though our experience was highly specific, the lessons we learned are universal and can be applied to any operational environment. This article outlines the ten pivotal "A-Ha!" moments in the evolution of our improved COIN CM cycle.

Pre-quel Part 1: We assumed doctrinal Collection Management was a Dinosaur

Like most units fighting the war today, we began with the premise that the doctrinal CM Cycle (IAW FM 34-2) was not well-suited to a COIN fight. ***The way we had been taught CM seemed like an archaic doctrine, written for an army of old fighting an enemy of old.*** That we were not alone in this assessment was proven by the way other units had been applying CM during the last five years of OIF. At most levels, CM had devolved into only asset management, with not half as much effort directed at requirements management. This was the reason why countless people spent countless hours organizing a UAV schedule, or a Guardrail schedule; while only one or two spent time answering RFIs to lower echelons. In the end, we realized that upper echelons felt that their primary duty to us was to provide access to collection assets, not to provide the answers to the requirements we sent to them. Of course, it is always easier to push the obligation of answering a question back to the originator, rather than finding another unit that already HAS the answer to that question. So, like many units, we decided that we did not need a CM cycle, just some asset management. In this way, we propagated the problem and became as irrelevant to our battalions as our higher headquarters were to us. Although in a bottom-fed Intel fight the higher echelon (at every level) is almost never in a position to provide additional resolution on their subordinate unit's sector.

What we called our CM Cycle consisted of submitting our subordinate battalions' UAV requests to

our Division to get approved, 72 hours before execution. When asked how we managed our assets, our reporting, and our feedback, the answer was, “we make it up as we go along.” As our information requirements (IR) got more detailed and began to assume a cycle in themselves, however, the BCT S2 decided that the CM cycle should be primary forcing function of the pace, priority, and quality of intelligence functions for a “full-service” unit – one that collects, analyzes, and distributes intelligence. Unfortunately, the CM section (which does not really exist on the BCT MTOE) was an Army-of-One, just handling the UAV request. Presuming we knew nothing about our district, and that people would want to know anything and everything about every single aspect of our AO, we figured that the sheer volume of IRs would be impossible to manage by the assigned one soldier, so we identified the need for an effective automated system to compile, organize, and track the requirements.

Pre-quel Part 2: We realized we needed some sort of system

As we began to centrally consolidate our IRs from all of our intelligence soldiers who received them, we saw the need for some sort of organized matrix. So, we put them all into a basic Collection Plan (ref. FM 34-2) and tried to tie them to the generic Priority Information Requirements (PIR) that we had adopted from the unit we replaced. We inputted these IRs into an excel spreadsheet and distributed it through e-mail, but soon found out that e-mailing 27 versions of the latest matrix to the 200+ different requestors and 50+ different asset managers became impossible to track! When confronted with the miscommunication resulting from this chaos, we decided to upload the spreadsheet onto an HTML SharePoint Portal (not an FTP folder), as a central depository where everyone could look at what everyone was asking and seeing what was already being answered.

When we decided to do everything online, we quickly realized that we didn’t know where our own information was, never mind attempting to direct other people to our own products. ***So, we had to implement an effective Knowledge Management (KM) program first, as a sound base for requirements management, asset management, and intelligence analysis and distribution.*** Since we had no good model for what KM was, we again “made it up as we went along.” We revamped how we organized raw reporting, analytical products, summaries, and requests, how we sorted our folders (by topic, not by author) and websites (by topic, finished products only) and our information dissemination plans (no more e-mail distribution lists! Post it and send out a link!) We started with the S2 section but eventually incorporated the S3 section and the Chiefs of our five Lines of Operations to do the same thing because many of the unit’s IRs were not enemy-focused. (Which intelligence officer denies having received a phone call asking the time of a Governance meeting, or the date of an Economic assessment, or the effectiveness of an Information Operations flyer campaign?). Once we did this we significantly cut down on email spam, circular reporting. Everyone could find everyone Else’s’ information, across the staff, 24 hours a day. Our motto for breaking the email culture was “more people need to know than you know”, words to live by.

Pre-quel Part 3: We assumed someone else had figured it out

When we realized that what we sought to do was “graduate-level” intelligence operations, we figured that someone else must have already figured out what “right” looked like. ***We figured we could look at the Collection Plans out there from the past five years from different units but they were so archaic, rigid, and inapplicable to the unconventional battle space, not to mention that they had not matured since OIF-II, that we realized we would have to start from scratch.*** We already had some PIRs (it’s one of those mandatory products you had to do for an operation like “count the number of vehicles you have” or “make a list of important tasks.”) But, the overwhelming majority of echelons above us did not have a full spectrum collection strategy; they only had asset schedules, usually centered around full motion video (FMV) assets like UAV and Aerostats. What’s more, HUMINT and SIGINT collection strategies were often stove-piped, and not synchronized with each other. We knew that to be effective in a “fire-hose of information” AO, we had to have a living, ever-

changing full spectrum Collection Plan.

We decided to apply our improved CM cycle to support our “Intel Support to Lethal Targeting” section, which had the most perishable (time-sensitive) IRs. We had the this section write down all the IRs from each of their target packets and semi-loosely fit them under one of our five enemy focused PIRs we had at the time. We then tasked collection on these IR out in FRAGOs with the basic 5Ws, in no real priority or easily manageable format. That worked for a while ISO targeting, but as other analysts saw the benefit to the Lethal Targeting section, they too, started chipping in IRs for their analytical products (realizing that instead of just passively sitting there, waiting for a miracle to answer some of their intelligence gaps, they could GET them answered.) So, the IR list online got bigger and bigger. Fortunately, by this point, we had learned which assets could handle what types and amounts of IRs, so we began to write really effective SORs, tailored to capabilities of specific collectors.

The First A-Ha! Moment: Is Intel Bound By The Enemy?

Realizing that a group of answered IR should solve a PIR and then something magical should happen, we concluded that this was not our reality, so we went back to really grades ourselves.


Was our Intel section really helping this Brigade's operations? We looked at our priorities of effort, our PIR list, and said, “Hmm, they're all anti-enemy, but most of our operations are pro-Iraqi. Additionally, most of the phone calls we get are questions about "this local leader", "that entrepreneur", "the other doctor", "the sewage lines", etc. We always tell the requestors that we don't know the answer to their question because we're just the Intel folks, and if their question is not enemy-related, we don't care!” Then the requestor would say, “Isn't Intel supposed to know everything?” Good question! Since, on average, our unit conducted more than 50% non-lethal operations, why was our intelligence cycle just supporting the less than 50% lethal operations? “Because that's the way it's always been done,” we thought to ourselves. Obviously, this was unsatisfactory. We asked ourselves, “Is intelligence only about the enemy?”

UNCLASSIFIED



Change your thinking!

- Traditional, enemy-based PIR are just not going to cut it!
- The enemy is just one factor in the Common Operating Picture



We had been flexing all of our intelligence efforts towards defeating the enemy, so why were we still not winning the war? Maybe, because we should have been flexing our intelligence efforts towards supporting the five friendly lines of operation, instead! (This idea was way outside the box - we were excited and scared.) We asked the Commander, "Sir, would you mind if we prioritized your collection and analysis not in terms of just your enemy, but in terms of your overall campaign goals? Since your operations are 50% non-lethal, we recommend your collection efforts reflect this." The idea was approved and he supported our initiatives.

The Second A-Ha! Moment: We find only that which we seek.

For collection operations to change its focus, we had to rewrite the PIR they supported. As we rewrote our PIR to support our non-lethal operations, we reviewed our lethal PIR and saw that we had written ourselves into a box of conventional expectations of our enemy, based on old doctrine. This is a common mistake that most units make, as had the unit from which we had taken authority.

When we first arrived in theater we used the approach we observed other units using for their enemy PIR, which is centered on the "WHAT" or "HOW" of the enemy attack. (This approach is most often used for Force Protection priority areas.) Many units try this method because they think, ***"If I know HOW the bad guys will attack (i.e. WHAT they will use to attack), I can watch for clues about their attack and prevent or counter it."*** We had written our enemy PIR based on their example, which was centered on the "How" or "What." Our original PIR had been written similar to this:

- 1) What are the indicators and warnings that insurgents will attack our soldiers and allies, our secure areas, and our local nationals using Improvised Explosive Devices?
- 2) What are the indicators and warnings that insurgents will attack our soldiers and allies, our secure areas, and our local nationals using Indirect Fire?
- 3) What are the indicators and warnings that insurgents will attack our soldiers and allies, our secure areas, and our local nationals using Direct Fire?
- 4) What are the indicators and warnings that insurgents will attack our soldiers and allies, our secure areas, and our local nationals using Chemical weapons? (Believe it or not.)

As we started creating the analytical products resulting from this line of collection, however, we realized we were just responding to symptoms of the problem, not the problem itself. We attacked the "WHAT" approach primarily by counting various types of SIGACTs and trying to draw statistically relevant conclusions by type of attack (IED attacks, SVBIED attacks, Rocket attacks, and so on.) ***Due to the nature of this so-called "analytical method," we quickly started calling this method "bean counting."*** Units, like ours, would build all sorts of pie charts, graphs, "wheels of death" and other gee-wiz graphical products from all the SIGACTs in their sector, and present them as finished intelligence products without ever making the next mental "leap of faith" of the "so what" beyond that. This is not intelligence work and the Army would probably be better served by hiring a bunch of post-graduate statisticians to do this.

Too many MI professionals get into the endless cycle of crunching together SIGACTs to create irrelevant averages. These statistical analyses sometimes work when fighting against ONE enemy with ONE doctrinal template and ONE motivation. When fighting multiple insurgent groups, however, this creates numbers and averages that ultimately make no sense because many of the insurgent groups are operating with their own agenda and their own time line, which is completely unrelated to the group using the same types of attacks for different reasons in the next neighborhood.

Additionally, the "WHAT" approach is reactive in nature and takes units down the "Counter-IED" rabbit hole. As Air Force Lt Col Mike "Starbaby" Pietrucha stated in his presentation, "*All Over The Chart: A Few Thoughts from an Irregular Warfare Perspective*", "*Counter-IED*" is like saying "*Counter-AK-47*." Countering specific SIGACT types does not get to the root of the problem. Unfortunately, a large amount of today's Army leadership has fallen victim to the SIGACT-Trap, abundantly using the latest catch phrase, "Let's get to the left of the BOOM!" This mind set has resulted in the creation of all sorts of "Counter IED" organizations and special task forces at echelons above the BCT and Division (ones that soak up trained personnel who should be down at Battalion and below level). Good intentions gone awry.

In a bottom fed intel fight the higher the echelon you try and do Intel analysis at the less relevant you are, in the inverse of the conventional Army we all grew up in. The Intel personnel in many of these Task Forces and other Counter IED organizations would have been more effectively used manning Company Intel Support Teams, which in turn would have actually had a greater impact in the long run neutralizing insurgent groups that used IEDs as a method of attack.

The "WHAT/HOW" calamity does have a flip side, however, with the great successes of Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Air Force Weapons Intelligence Teams pushed down to BCT level. These guys and gals were heroes, and when fully integrated into the BCT can bridge the gap between the technical side of the "WHAT" and the analytical side of the "SO WHAT." Unfortunately, enemy TTPs were so continuously and quickly evolving that we could never get ahead of the enemy's decision cycle and disrupt it, which is the ultimate goal of operational level units.

We decided to shift gears to a less defensive posture (and less bean-counting) because we knew that Brigade Intelligence should drive Brigade-level lethal targeting. Of course, before you can target anyone, you need to know WHO they are. Units usually start asking about the "WHO" because they think, "***If I know WHO the bad guys are, I can find them in a crowd and stop them before they attack.***" Thus, we re-wrote our PIR centered on the "WHO" of our enemy. They were very similar in wording to this:

- 1) Who are the Sunni insurgents attacking our soldiers and allies, our secure areas, and our local nationals?
- 2) Who are the Shia insurgents attacking our soldiers and allies, our secure areas, and our local nationals?
- 3) Who are the Foreign Fighters attacking our soldiers and allies, our secure areas, and our local nationals?

Unfortunately, we found that the enemy was too good at hiding themselves within non-combatants, using multiple names, ID cards, nicknames, appearance changes, etc. Thus, we felt that we were expending way too much energy at trying to just positively identify (PID) our enemy for an insufficient return. *We just couldn't figure out WHO THEY WERE!*


Finally, we realized (after much trial and error) that what we really wanted to know was WHY our operations were working or not working. We could observe whether our operations were meeting their Measures of Effectiveness and hence, assess if they were being effective. If they were not being effective, we could assume that this was because the enemy was actively targeting (or

countering) our operational goals. So, we rewrote our PIR around enemy intentions, centered on the "WHY" of an organization. We thought, **"If we know WHY our enemy is attacking our Desired Effects, maybe we can figure out how to appease them."** Much to our pleasant surprise, we realized that we could often deduce the "WHO/WHAT/WHERE/WHEN/HOW" from knowing the "WHY." So, we rewrote our PIR within the reference of our operational objectives:

- 1) Why are certain organizations attempting to infiltrate our secure areas?
- 2) Why are certain organizations attempting to intimidate local nationals?
- 3) Why are certain organizations attempting to attack Coalition Forces?

Fortunately, the "WHY" almost never changes in a culture based on ideology and principles. Additionally, if you know the "WHY", then you can deduce "WHO they are," "WHAT they want," and perhaps, "HOW to get it to them another way" or "HOW to change their minds." Moreover, since the "WHO" are not homogeneous, you can identify possible methods to unite "Them" by promoting talks amongst groups with similar intentions/desires/goals.

Evolution of COIN Analysis




The Third A-Ha! Moment: Intel Drives Maneuver (...and Maneuver drives Intel, which drives more Maneuver...)

As we deciphered the code on writing proper PIR, we stumbled upon the fact that most of our lethal targets could probably be "neutralized" non-lethally. This is, after all, the ultimate goal of a COIN campaign: **"To neutralize 100% of lethal targets through 100% non-lethal means."** These "non-lethal means" were within our Commander's Desired Effects, each facilitated by his five Lines of Operation. Our non-lethal PIR, then, had to be directly related to the Decision Points facilitating the campaign plan for his Desired Effects. Each one of his Decision Points was based on very specific Measures of Effectiveness, well-written, observable criteria used to determine when a Decision Point had been reached.

As a result, that the Intelligence Section was focusing on the "WHY" of the counterinsurgency supported the full-spectrum of our Commander's MOEs, PIRs, DPs, and DEs. This also created the necessity for everyone in the staff, not just the Intelligence Section, to be part of visualizing the problem and exacting the solution.

So, there we were, no sh*t, in Baghdad, trying to write these non-lethal PIRs. We began by polling the commander, the staff, the LOO Chiefs, and the units for what they wanted to know, but it became evident that many people wanted to know various things because they were "good to know" or "cool to know". In order to better focus our LOO Chiefs, we took the commander's intent, and broke it out into 4 main Desired Effects. We then modified our Intel priorities (PIR) to help him assess his operations and/or meet his goals. This meant that if we answered his PIR, he had to execute the associated decision point.



This became the standard for writing PIR and this is how we forced doctrine to be emplaced, where our Intel had to drive our maneuver, which in turn drove more Intel, and so on:

“If we get you an answer to this question, WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO WITH IT? Because if you’re not going to do anything with it, there’s no reason to threaten collection assets’ lives to get it answered.”

Thus, we added the following non-lethal PIRs:

- 4) Why are ISF units in our sector not yet able to take control of local security?
- 5) Why do certain populations in our sector not have access to sufficient Essential Services?
- 6) Why are certain Economic areas in our sector not growing?
- 7) Why is local Governance in our sector, at the Neighborhood and District level, not effective?
- 8) Why are our CF/Gol Information Operations not effective?

The Fourth A-Ha! Moment: How To Know What You Don’t Know

When we created our final PIRs and attached DPs, we had to make the big questions easier to answer. We began with what we DID know about the PIR, and most of it we had to pull from non-Intel sources. Once we PID’d what we did know, our Intel gaps became evident and we split out SIRs to organize what we really didn’t know. We sat down with EVERY SINGLE LOO Chief to help them organize their requirements. We’d ask them what they wanted to know and they’d say, “Everything” and we’d say, “that’s not possible, so what else do you want to know?” Then, we grouped these IRs into SIRs (backwards from doctrine) but we helped the LOO chiefs tie intermediate goals/DPs to answered SIR, which helped them develop their scheme of maneuver within their lane. This synchronized not only the BCT’s Collection Management scheme of maneuver, but also facilitated the synchronization of BCT across the full spectrum of operations.

The Fifth A-Ha! Moment: How To Eat The Elephant

We ended up with this mega collection plan with 250 SORs on it, and it was an elephant. ***The 250 requirements were too overwhelming, so the assets all pushed back, saying they couldn’t possibly fulfill all of these requirements!*** We told them that some of this stuff they were probably already collecting on (fits within their own priorities), some they probably already have answered but we didn’t know about it, in which case, we could remove it, and some were very time-sensitive and perishable so they HAD to get answered immediately, if not sooner.

The asset managers said, ***“Split the SORs up, then, because I can’t feed this mega-list to my ops guys. We have our own ops to do.”*** So, we decided we had to understand the asset’s own priorities and decide how much max of their effort/combat strength we could take up without reducing their ability to do their organic ops. Our SORs got split into three categories:

- 1) Stuff that we’ll only want to know once to support a specific, time-sensitive op (specified/perishable... tasked biweekly);
- 2) Stuff that’s ever-hanging, so we’ll ALWAYS want to know updates about it (framework... changes


tasked once), and;

3) Stuff that'd be great to know if you happen to collect on it by accident (opportunistic... not tasked, but consolidated.)

Additionally, we made the Collection Plan cut-able, paste-able, and knee-board creatable, but added background products, graphics, report templates to pre-plan most of the asset's collection scheme of maneuver, as if WE were the collector, so that all they really had to do was execute. This drastically increased the quality of the reporting because it gave them more time to actually do analysis! We learned the assets, their personalities, their needs and their training... so it would be just too easy for them to execute.

How to manage it all? We published our BCT Collection Plan every two weeks, one week out from its execution, not every day like you do in a conventional environment. **We found that things in COIN just do not change that quickly.** The Battalions also did their Collection Plans on a bi-weekly basis once they had time to digest the BCT Collection Plan. In order to synchronize the assets we also publish a SIGINT and HUMINT Collection Emphasis Message (CEM) bi-weekly. All of these products I just mentioned were centrally posted on the Portal on a predicable schedule so that everyone could see what everyone else was doing.

The Effects and ISR Cycle (One Month)



Assets tend to think they know better than you, and they do have a very high resolution, high magnification, yet teeny, tiny view of the world. So, we had to show them how their info fit into the bigger picture. We gave them the WIIFM by paying for their info (front end Intel) with analysis (back-end Intel) to help them with their future ops. This is a big problem with task-organized units, even in the military where CoC is so strict, but people do NOT want to do what an inorganic higher wants them to do.

The Sixth A-Ha! Moment: How To Make More Experts

In the old days, collectors had to count BMPs, or describe enemy unit symbols via SPOTREPS, TACREPS, or SALUTE REPs to win the war. ***But, in COIN, collectors have to fulfill requirements that would require a separate bachelor's degree per SIR.*** At the BDE level, we had experts on various non-lethal topics, but only one or two in the whole unit, so these SMEs needed the eyes-on-the-ground to be their trained eyes in their stead. We facilitated this by making these SMEs develop detailed report templates that our ground-pounder collectors would pre-print and fill out the very specific questions on-site. This allowed the collector to facilitate expert analysis without the experts having to be in ten places at once.

This detailed report template could ask the collector to, "Count the number of sprockets in this widget, write down the colors of the wires at this generator, and take a picture at the hub," and when the report was turned in, the expert could tell you how many days of electricity the block would have left. ***The primary benefit was that this type of template would remove untrained observer bias.*** Interestingly, other SMEs WANTED to know the collector's gut feeling, especially as it applied to atmospheric of the human terrain, (i.e., how people looked, how they felt, etc.) and they could add those types of questions, too. These collection report templates were hyperlinked into the Collection Plan into a "Report Via" column, and were pulled down from online, and resubmitted upon completion online. We tried to make our Collection Plan as easy to execute without placing too much strain upon the BN's already thin Troop-to-Task. Ideally, each company would have had an ISR pre-briefer and de-briefer (one or two soldiers who implicitly understood the background of the reporting requirements and could pull the important information from the collectors.) The better companies currently try to do some of this in "Debrief Cafes" where all patrols must submit detailed observations post-mission, but without any detailed guidance.

The Seventh A-Ha! Moment: Help Me Help You

As we created more and more complicated reporting requirements, some asset managers wanted to know how this report fit into the big picture because they felt there were important questions the requester was not asking because he was not BoG. For those people, we also tied a background document to each SOR which either linked to the LOO scheme of maneuver, next two week ops schedule, or the targeting packet, or the running estimate, and the ultimate goals, vs. their current ability to meet those goals. By knowing the background of an SOR, some soldiers would return from the recon mission with the answer to an SOR, but then they'd also tell you, ***"But what you should REALLY KNOW is that the building over there is more important to this SIR because of x, y, and z indicators."*** Others, who didn't have time to learn the background, or who didn't care, just did the minimum SOR answer, and that was okay, too.

This is where the delineation of roles within the Military Intelligence Community, especially between Brigade, Battalion (and dare we say it, the Company Intelligence Support Team) is critical. This latest buzz word, the "Company Intelligence Support Team," is based on the model of the British and Israeli Armies who have extensive experience in COIN. What is the Task and purpose of this entity? ***Within the confines of reality, these teams need to be the front end and back end for ISR synchronization (i.e. Asset Management) of the ground-pounder collector.*** The whole process in COIN depends on them! If we really practice what we preach, then we have to take the "Every

Soldier Is A Sensor“ mindset to heart and use these Company Intelligence Teams to increase the quantity AND quality of ground-pounder reporting (Operational Intelligence), thus reducing the burden on the BN S2 sections, which are currently facilitating the pre-brief/de-brief turnstile for all of the company patrols. How much detailed and finished analysis can Company Intelligence Support Teams do at their level? Within today's OPTEMPO, not much. If they execute their Asset Management mission effectively, however, this will allow the BN S2 sections to better focus on intra-BN AO analysis and targeting. With better analysis at the BN level, the BDEs can then concentrate on inter-BN and BDE boundary analysis, to facilitate DIV's mission, and so on.

The Eighth A-Ha! Moment: How To Manage Success

This way, the Collection Plan became a living, breathing, working product. But, because we had now so many assets out there, working on so many SORs, we had to develop a synch meeting where we got together at the end of a cycle as a compass-check. We did this meeting on online using the "Breeze" collaboration tool, and we had all the asset and mission managers online with all the Battalion S2s.

At each one, we'd say:

- 1) For the cycle you just completed, here's what we asked you to answer. What did you answer (just to make sure we got it... and we owe you feedback on its validity and applicability into analysis next two weeks)? What couldn't you answer and why? How do we get that answered?
- 2) Then, for the cycle you just entered, back brief your acknowledgement of the SORs you are tasked to answer and your ISR scheme of maneuver to execute.
- 3) Finally, for the future cycle, here's the draft of what you will be tasked. Are these SORs feasible or not? What are your recommendations?

This was a critical evolution and with each synch meeting, our CM got better, faster, more effective, and more accurate. SIGINT and HUMINT CEMs were deconflicted and adjusted, and everyone knew why we were doing what, and how it fit into the overall effort.

The Ninth A-Ha! Moment: Let Others Do The Work For You

We didn't get dissemination/distribution under control until the second half of the tour. It was easy to disseminate tasked reporting, but inorganic, supplemental reporting to which could've also fulfilled the requirement often slipped through the cracks. To correct this, we had our S2 OPS input the incidental tips, observations, lateral unit reporting, etc, into the portal so everyone could set up auto-key word alerts. They had to be aware of all IRs and follow up with requestors to let them know the additional information. And using the portal as the primary disseminator vs. email distro list facilitated the widest possible distribution, and prevented circular reporting. At first, it was hard for them to shift to non-enemy based reporting, but they figured it out.

“If I had to do it all over again, I'd have the BCT staff create an knowledge management section whose sole job is to manage requirements and reporting, incidental and specified, throughout the brigade, higher lateral and lower across the full spectrum of COIN operations, not just Intel. Of course we had limited manpower, but we would have gotten much more bang for our buck as compared to how we ended up utilizing some of our people.” LTC Scott Downey. S2, 2BCT, 1CD

The Tenth A-Ha! Moment: The COIN Approach To Analysis

We knew that at our level, we could do better big-picture analysis than the tactical level, due to manning. We had experienced that event-driven production was always too late to affect a decision because the requests for them were always reactionary. Additionally, the requestors wanted the products to prove THEIR point, not to make the right point. Finally, they were never able to provide an accurate picture because analysts did not have the time to collect on the appropriate indicators for a sufficient time. ***“Jack of all trades, Master of none” provided too fuzzy of a big picture for the operational level.***

To crack the code on being able to create BIG-PICTURE yet HIGH-RESOLUTION products, we had to change our analytical approach by:

- 1) Predetermining indicators for ALL contingencies within our campaign plan and create Running Estimates per PIR
- 2) Making specific products based on the combination of analytical products of Running Estimates
- 3) Making everybody an analyst. Intel folks, non-Intel folks, operators, janitors, EVERYONE!

So, when a specific product requirement came up, instead of dropping everything and digging into the database for all the raw Intel and analyzing it all from scratch, we had pre-packaged pockets of knowledge, which we pulled together, cross-referenced, and submitted as the party-line.

The Final Evolution: Visualizing The COIN Battlefield

Having written excellent PIR, which were actually linked to Decision Points, which were actually linked to our Commander's Desired Effects, we were able to help the Commander AND his staff visualize the evolution of a certain problem/question/situation developing on the battlefield "in time and space." ***These "Intelligence Running Estimates" allowed us to cross-reference the Local National picture with CF Operations, ISF Operations, Gol activities, and enemy attacks.*** This provided a VERY accurate representation of our Human Terrain and HOW IT RESPONDED to external stimuli, lethal AND non-lethal, friendly, neutral, and enemy. Of course, the non-lethal SMEs had to do the Running Estimates (REs) for the non-lethal PIR, while we, the Intelligence Section, provided the reporting and the "enemy piece" to augment and assist their development of their Human Terrain pictures.

Long story short, we had to "change the experiment" to provide relevant intelligence support to the COIN battlefield. We did this by reorganizing our section by well-written PIR and by LOO-functionality:

- 1) PIR 1-3 (lethal) and PIR 4-8 (non-lethal) Running Estimates showed how our desired ops were being countered; The indicators of which fed the:
- 2) Network Analysis section (Analyzing the capabilities, limitations, composition, disposition, and strength of enemy and "friendly" networks); The negative indicators of which fed the:
- 3) Targeting section which supported lethal and non-lethal targeting operations designed to increase the effectiveness of our full-spectrum operations.

4) We also assigned individual soldiers as analysts for “additional duty” positions like “Reconciliation” or “FPS liaison.” When our ePRT came in to take over these Economic, Governance, and ESS functions, half our staff handed over their projects to the DoS, as did half of our analysts hand over their products. The DoS now had in their hands reference-able products showing the EVOLUTION of various effects in our AO, and how our human terrain responded to certain stimuli.

This reorganization of the S2 section was the forcing function that made lethal and non-lethal operations WORK TOGETHER, supplementary and complementary, as they are supposed to do, in Effects-Based Operations. Once we got our Herbivores and Carnivores in the same room and talking to each other we realized that Lethal and Non-Lethal Targeting and Effects were not two different processes, it had to be one simultaneous, synchronized, and full spectrum process. This collaboration allowed us to prevent unintentional, negative consequences by coordinating all actions with all SMEs, ensured that one action would always be exploited by another, that made sure that no actions were contrary to each other. Most importantly, this full-spectrum collaboration exploited the positive effect of every mission by all arms of the unit, resulting in a snow-ball to avalanche of success in our Area of Operations.

The ability of our Intelligence Section to change its mind-set facilitated our BCT's ability to conduct long-term, methodical, full-spectrum, Effects-Based Operations, which were synchronized across every aspect of lethal and non-lethal effects. The Commander's PIR were directly linked to his Decision Points and spanned all of his Lines of Operation. As a result, the Intelligence Section, in conjunction with the LOO chiefs, identified and collected upon gaps in information across that same full-spectrum of operations. Effective COIN requires these processes to be interrelated and dependent upon each other. In addition, in a modular staff (with so many specialized entities) everyone must become both a producer of subject-matter-expertise products as well as a consumer of the others subject-matter-expertise products. This multi-faceted collaboration is essential if we expect to "win the war" in a highly complex urban COIN environment.