COMISAF ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE TEAM

CAAT SPECIAL REPORT

INSIDER THREAT POST INCIDENT MITIGATION **Techniques:** Insider Threat Working Group Input

22 AUGUST 2012

(NIU) **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

(NIU) In order to assess the current relationship between Coalition Forces (CF) and ANSF partners, CAAT observed two units that experienced Insider Threat incidents. This report does not focus on the actual Insider Threat incidents, but rather, it studies the post-event mitigation techniques implemented and the results of those techniques. Both observed units experienced similar Insider Attacks, resulting in a CF Soldier killed in action (KIA) from, what was assessed as, an insurgent infiltration of the partnered ANSF unit. CAAT observed the development of stronger relationships and faster normalization of partnerships where advisors stepped up partnering and embraced their ANSF counterparts instead of stiff-arming them and implementing extensive force protection measures.

(NIU) **OBSERVATION**

(NIU) Prior to the Insider Threat incident, Alpha Unit's Forward Operating Base (FOB) was considered open and offered relatively free access between the CF and co-located ANA personnel.

(NIU) *Alpha Unit's Immediate Post-Insider Threat Incident Conditions:*

- (NIU) On the FOB:
    - A new Afghan Security Guard (ASG) gate and Entry Control Point (ECP) were built between the ANA and CF compounds.
    - The vehicle staging area moved from the ANA side of the FOB to its current location on the CF side of the FOB.
    - During indirect fire (IDF), Soldiers challenged all individuals entering the bunkers.
    - Local national shops on the ANA side of the FOB were closed off to CF Soldiers. Moreover, the single local national shop on the CF side of the FOB was closed.
    - Because it was on the ANA side of FOB, the PT and running track were closed to CF personnel.
- (NIU) ANSF/CF Relationship:
    - The relationship between CF and ANA was diminished and tense.
    - ANA did not want to leave their vehicles to receive the platoon leader's mission briefs. Only the ANA convoy leader for the day was present; when asked why his platoon members did not want to get out of their vehicles, he responded "I will brief them. Do not worry."
    - The only Afghan apologies came from the ANA and Afghan Border Police (ABP) Kandak (KDK) leadership or higher and provincial-level GIRoA officials. CF personnel were cognizant that the only apologies came from higher level ANA leadership.

- Only CF and ANSF leadership communicated with each other; on the NCO and Soldier level there was little or no communication.
- Platoon-level personnel no longer desired to partner with or advise their ANSF counterparts.
- ANA soldiers were placed in the front and middle of CF mounted and dismounted patrol elements. CF always maintained rear security.
- The CF to ANA ratio on patrols became 2:1 where it was almost 1:2 prior to the Insider Threat incident.
- Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) partner relationships were not affected by the incident; they were not involved. However, they offered condolences to the involved platoon.

(NIU) *Conditions Four Months after Insider Threat Incident:*

- (NIU) On the FOB:
  - The ASG gate between ANA and CF compound is complete with a small tower and gate. ANA are not allowed to enter the CF side of the compound with weapons. An exception is made only for ANA Personal Security Details (PSD) for high-ranking ANSF and GIRoA leadership.
  - ANA maintain their own MP squad (hand-selected by the ANA Kandak commander) for CF protection on the ANA compound.
  - Specific to the ANA platoon that was involved in the event, the platoon leader is still the only one briefed on missions prior to departing the FOB.
  - The vehicle staging area prior to the SP is still located on the CF side of the FOB.
  - Civilian contractors who need to work on the ANA compound are escorted by armed CF Soldiers from the Quick Reaction Force (QRF).
  - The PT and running track have reopened; however, a roving guard from the CF must provide security at the PT and running track from 0500 until 0700 hours. The track is only open during those hours.
  - All local national shops have been moved to the bazaar area on the ANA side of the FOB. CF members visiting the bazaar must move in four-man teams.
- (NIU) ANSF/CF Relationship:
  - Tension has decreased, especially between the ANA and CF leadership.
  - Only CF leadership will attend meals with ANSF counterparts. They are provided two CF personnel for security.
  - Overnight missions are rare.

- Relationships have returned to some level of normalcy; however, CFs have a significantly increased level of awareness towards their ANSF partners.
- Partnership continued only because it is the mission.

(NIU) **OBSERVATION**

(NIU) Prior to the Insider Threat incident, Bravo Unit's relationships with all ANSF partners were considered exceptional by all reports and confirmed by CAAT observations during prior embeds.

(NIU) *Bravo Unit's Conditions Immediately Following Insider Threat Incident:*

- (NIU) On the FOB:
  - The ANA *Tolai* and leadership involved in the incident were dismissed and relocated to different ANA bases. The new *Tolai* leadership were periodically rotated out to a kandak for closer supervision and advising of the command element.
  - Access to either side of FOB for first 24 hours was restricted.
  - Buddy teams were recommended for CF personnel visiting the ANA side and were mandatory for females at all times including during PT.
  - The kandak commander made it paramount that all partnering responsibility gaps be tightened up. For instance, tardiness for Combined Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) or guard duty was not tolerated, uniform and appearance standards were stepped up, and a high standard of military bearing was enforced.
  - Bravo Unit's posture adjustments included increasing their awareness of and briefing personnel on patterns of life and working to improve the daily partnering interaction between command and staff.
  - Any Bravo Unit personnel who identified or suspected an Insider Threat would immediately report it to the commander as a Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR). Force protection became the priority when this CCIR occurred.
- (NIU) ANSF/CF Relationship:
  - The Bravo Unit command element was adamant that they would need to "pull ANA counterparts in closer and assist them with working harder on their systems."
  - Bravo Unit realized the insider threat was due to poor systems in place by the ANA. To mitigate this, CF staff surged partnering to a 1:1 ratio with all ANA staff, where prior it was not quite at this level.
  - Initially, the ANA segregated themselves of their own accord thinking Bravo Unit did not want to work with them. Bravo Unit made it clear this was not the case, and tensions eased naturally. The CF personnel stated there were no unfriendly acts or behavior from the ANA just after

this incident. The CF personnel believed the kandak was sincerely sorry and embarrassed because this man was in their ranks and they did not have systems in place to have prevented his actions.

(NIU) C*onditions Three Months after the Insider Threat Incident:*

- (NIU) On the FOB:
    - There are minimal separation measures between the ANA and CF compounds.
    - ANA are not allowed to walk on the CF side of the FOB with their weapons. The ANA command, staff, and personnel on duty in the CTOC, which carry sidearms, are the only exceptions to this rule.
    - When visiting the ANA side of the FOB, buddy teams are suggested for male CF personnel and mandatory for female CF personnel.
- (NIU) ANSF/CF relationship:
    - Bravo Unit has continued moving forward with their ANA partners and the grieving process is passing. A high-level of more amicable relationships has returned in conjunction with elevated CF situational awareness.
    - CF and Afghan personnel are conversing and eating together at the Afghan restaurant located on the ANA side of the FOB.
    - CAAT has embedded with Bravo Unit multiple times, prior to and after the Insider Threat incident. The ANA and CF relationship appears normalized and no differences on the FOB are visible.

(NIU) **DISCUSSION**

(NIU) The CAAT acknowledges differences between the two Insider Threat incidents, such as one occurring at company level and the other at the kandak level. However, there were more similarities than differences, and the methods the two CF units used were polar opposites. Alpha Unit reacted as most units would in that situation – by implementing extensive force protection measures, distancing themselves, and putting additional security measures in place. As a result, partnering suffered and normalcy has been slow to return; four months later it is still not at the pre-Insider Threat incident levels. Alpha Unit has done very well under the circumstances. Partnering is occurring and, with the Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) now in position, the tempo has significantly increased.

(NIU) CAAT observed that after the Insider Attack, the Bravo Unit command was adamant about reestablishing a high-level of daily interaction and repairing previously-established relationships with their ANA counterparts. Bravo Unit did not want the kandak command relieved as the ANA Corps suggested. The Bravo Unit Commander felt the kandak, by fixing its systems in place, would learn more, become more disciplined, and grow professionally. The ANA staff recognized the CF's efforts to promptly normalize relationships. The ANA immediately worked harder on improving the staff and company commands' proficiency and taking better

control of their men and operations. The ANA made most of the adjustments on their own. CAAT was informed that because of the respect between the ANA and CF leadership, the ANA recognized the approach Bravo Unit was taking and was very grateful. To keep the moral high ground with their counterparts, Bravo Unit continues to use dignity and respect as its platform. Bravo Unit also keeps “at the ready” and monitors patterns of life for red flags. Three months have passed since the Insider Threat incident with Bravo Unit, and relationships have normalized to pre-Insider Threat levels.

(NIU) **RECOMMENDATION**

(NIU) The CAAT acknowledges differences between the two Insider Threat events; however, the mitigation techniques Bravo Unit employed were effective in normalizing, even strengthening relationships at a quicker pace than a normal “stiff-arming” reaction would. The CAAT believes the following mitigation techniques could be applied if another Insider Threat incident occurs:

(NIU) **MITIGATING ACTIONS:**

- Bring your counterparts in closer. Closer association gives you a better look at each other. It also fosters a sincerity ANA and CF can see in each other’s eyes.
- The Bravo Unit Commander opted not to have the ANA chain-of-command relieved. It was more important that both the CF and ANA learned from this by fixing the systems.
- Bravo Unit staff surged forward with more active involvement in the ANA staff to correct their deficiencies, improve their systems, and make them a more functional unit by having them model appropriate CF staff good practices.
- The ANA Battalion S1, with accountability, vetting, and tracking of incoming soldiers, is the most challenged section. At all times, ANA has multiple personnel going and returning from leave. There are several problems with leave accountability. Some personnel go AWOL. Aggravating the situation, the ANA leadership takes too much leave at one time. Bravo Unit has instilled the tactical cross-load of key leaders. If the kandak Commander is gone, the kandak CSM, XO, and S3 are present; if the CSM is gone, the OPS SGM is present, etc.
- Bravo Unit Command and Kandak Command talked at length to move forward in a positive direction after the incident.
- First Sergeants and Company Commanders briefed their Soldiers on the importance of maintaining the current CF direction in light of this isolated incident. The Battalion Commander and CSM briefed all companies, and the Battalion XO and S3 briefed the staff.
- Bravo Unit believes they flattened turbulence rather quickly by continuing to work with the ANA to improve them. The unit feels the ANA were humbled by this. Normalcy was easier to gain by closing the gap with the ANA rather than pushing the ANA away.

- Both CF and ANA continued to finalize all joint C2 in the CTOC and the Joint Aide Station.
- Although Bravo Unit has some normalcy, they maintain a heightened internal awareness as individuals and as a collective force.

THE INTENT OF CAAT SPECIAL REPORT IS TO SHARE UNCLASSIFIED REPORTS TO UNITS DEVELOPING TRAINING PLANS IN PREPARATION FOR DEPLOYMENT INTO THE AFGHANISTAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH UNCLASSIFIED, THESE REPORTS CAN CONTAIN SENSITIVE INFORMATION ON CURRENT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES. RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT LEADERS HANDLE THIS INFORMATION TO BOTH SUPPORT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND PROTECT EFFECTIVE PRACTICES.

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