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In his 15 March, 2012 *Commander ISAF Joint Command (COMIJC) Counterinsurgency Guidance*, LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti directs that, “All operations should be partnered. At the BCT level, this means coalition and Afghan units conducting a joint mission should coordinate and execute all activities together. The operating environment will determine specific coalition to partner force ratios; however, the goal should be to have a greater number of partners than coalition.” However, as US forces draw down, LTG Scaparrotti goes on to state that, “Coalition forces will gradually shift from partnering, to advising and enabling through security force assistance. Our top priority will continue to be developing sustainable ANSF capacity. Key to accomplishing this goal will be strong Afghan leadership and building CIED, logistical, and intelligence capabilities.”

Security Force Assistance is the unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, regional, or host nation security forces in support of a legitimate authority. SFA eventually enables Afghans to take the lead for security and to hold key terrain districts; districts that when in control of friendly forces, set the stage for long-term development of the economy, Rule of Law, and other functions of good governance. At the strategic level SFA is tied to ISAF’s transition process, while at the tactical level SFA is the key to building ANSF capability and capacity. SFA includes all ISAF actions to develop ANSF operational effectiveness, and includes partnering and advising, as well as providing support to ANSF units that lack the enablers for ensuring battle space awareness and dominance.

This issue of the FAT Report focuses on partnering and transition. It begins by describing the primary organizations that together form Afghanistan’s national security structure, as well as their roles and responsibilities in the security process. Following is an overview of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams; who, through their efforts in developing the mission capability of the ANSF, are the brick masons who lay the foundation for successful transition. Lastly, FAT highlights Afghanistan’s Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs). The OCCs are entities that possess qualities and skills sets similar to those of a symphony conductor; coordinating and synchronizing the “instruments” of Afghan national security, and facilitating a unity of effort that hopefully results in the “music” of sounds of support from a safe and secure Afghan populace.



National Level Security Organizations



(U) NATO’s goal of successfully transferring security responsibility to the ANSF is dependent on how successful ISAF is in helping the GIRoA to stand up an all-encompassing, well coordinated security force that is Afghan owned and operated.



Not only must the Afghans be capable of establishing and maintaining security within its own borders, but also of defending against foreign enemies. Putting the “Afghan Face” in the lead for security is the main reason for ISAF and IJC evolving to a Security Force Assistance Advisor Team concept, while slowly shifting away from the Brigade/Regimental Combat Team force structures of the past. By doing so, we not only ensure that these capabilities are established on a firm foundation, we also nurture the people’s belief and trust in its government; a critical COIN objective. But what exactly *is* the “ANSF”? What are its components, and how are they organized? This article gives the down and dirty “... for Dummies” version of Afghanistan’s national security program, with the intent of providing basic answers to the questions above.

(U) National Directorate of Security (NDS) - is the domestic intelligence agency of the GIRoA, and is charged with internal security and investigating crimes against the state. The Director of National Security reports directly to the GIRoA President. Although its mission, if compared to a similar US department or agency would more closely resemble that of the Department of Homeland Security, the NDS operates along lines more similar to the FBI.



(U) Ministry of Interior (MOI) - In Afghanistan all police forces fall under the control and direction of the Ministry of the Interior. The MOI provides the policy, guidance and direction for the policing of the population of Afghanistan. It is responsible for all national level aspects of manning, training, equipping, infrastructure, and supervision of the country’s police forces. The MOI is also responsible for ensuring compliance in legal affairs, with the Rule of Law, and in eliminating corruption and unethical behavior. The European Union (EU) serves as the lead organization for the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP), with the United States (US) providing a supporting role.



(U) Ministry of Defense (MOD) - is the part of the Central Government of Afghanistan that oversees the entire military of Afghanistan. The armed forces of Afghanistan are presently composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force. In contrast to the MOI example above, the US leads the way for the development of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Air Force (AAF), while EU forces provide supporting efforts.





AFGHAN Law Enforcement



(U//FOUO) Afghan National Police (ANP) - The Afghan Police Force, often referred to as the ANP, is a professional police force that is trained and equipped to assist in the security and stability of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In order to maintain civil order and to support the Rule of Law, ANP forces are present at all levels of government throughout Afghanistan - District, Provincial and Regional, under the sole authority of the MOI. The three main branches of the ANP are the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police and the Afghan Border Police.

(U//FOUO) Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) - The AUP provides non-specialized law enforcement and security capability at District, Provincial and Regional levels throughout Afghanistan. In general, the AUP performs general policing and law enforcement tasks that include (similar to US metropolitan police departments) conducting community policing from local sub-stations, performing routine traffic duties, patrolling and manning static and mobile checkpoints, and deterring, detecting and arresting criminals. The AUP does in fact however, perform one specific specialized function: that of providing a protection force to the UN. Each province and district is under the command of the Chief of Police, who is responsible for all police activities within his respective district or province.



(U//FOUO) Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) - The ANCOP were developed to specifically deal with civil order unrest and to react to insurgents in the remote, high threat areas of Afghanistan. The ANCOP provides civil order presence patrols, a crisis or counter-terror response capability within urban and metropolitan areas, and prevents violent public incidents. The ANCOP is deployable throughout Afghanistan, and keeps law and order using proportionate armed responses. The difference between the ANCOP and all other elements of the ANP is that the ANCOP are better trained, better led, and more robustly equipped. This is reflected in the ANCOP's extremely low AWOL/desertion rate, and its high retention rate.



Law Enforcement cont.



(U//FOUO) Afghan Border Police (ABP) - The ABP protects the “green” border against illegal entries into the border security zone, which extends 55Km into the territory of Afghanistan, protects against terrorists, illegal entry of persons and weapons, and smuggling activities. In coordination with Customs Authorities, the ABP provides immigration/visa services, establishes and maintains Border Crossing Points, and provides perimeter, building, aircraft and passenger security at national and international airports (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif).

(U) Afghan Local Police (ALP) – Although not one of the three major branches of the ANP, the ALP are proving to be an invaluable counterinsurgency (COIN) asset and are worth mention. The Government of Afghanistan officially recognized an Afghan Local Police (ALP) force in August 2010. The ALP is a community focused program that provides security in areas with little or no ANSF presence. This “police” program serves as a gap filler to make up for those ANSF shortfalls. Essentially, the ALP provide for small, community-based self-defense units under the MOI’s chain of command, represented by the District Chief of Police. The ALP are representative of, and accountable to, the community, and have no arrest or investigative authorities. This program stands as a bridge solution until adequate numbers of ANSF are trained and equipped to provide security for the entire country. At the end of the period required to build up the Afghan National Police and Army, the ALP will either be disbanded or incorporated into the ANP. The ALP are set-up in selected areas, based upon requests by the local populace and following validation by ISAF and the Afghan Government. ALP recruits are vetted and approved by local shuras and district police chiefs, and are trained and mentored by US Special Operations Forces (SOF).



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Afghanistan's Military

(U) Afghan National Army (ANA) – “The Official Webpage of the Afghan National Army” states that the role of the ANA is to:

- Provide security for the central government and protect the political process as defined by the Constitution
- Replace every other militia and organized military force in the country
- Fight insurgents and terrorists
- Work closely with ISAF and other international forces.



(U) As part of its continuing drive toward self-sufficiency, the ANA created the Ground Force Command (GFC) headquarters. GFC commands the six ANA corps plus the 111st Capitol division. In 2010, the ANA’s focus was to grow an infantry-centric force that could immediately participate in counterinsurgency operations. Most of the effort was directed toward fielding additional infantry units. In 2011 the center of attention shifted; continue to grow the force but also begin building the support functions necessary for self-sufficiency. This includes leadership, specialized technical expertise, and literacy training. The GFC is scheduled to reach full operational capability by August 2012.

Afghanistan's Military Special Operations Command



(U) Afghan Commandos - The ANA Commandos elite forces modeled off the US Army’s Rangers, and are the ANASOC’s “direct action” force. They are designed to provide the ANA with specially trained infantry units that are capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations. Working with their US SOF advisors, the Commandos are coming into their own, and have conducted several successful unilateral missions. Commando candidates must go through a special selection process and, if selected, complete an 8-10 week training program. The Commandos have the lowest attrition rate in the ANA, and where students once received their training from US SOF, they have begun the transition to Afghans training Afghans.

(U) Afghan Special Forces (ANASF) - Much like US Army Special Forces, the ANSF A-Teams are designed along US SOF lines, and their missions include “internal defense” and “SOF reconnaissance” as well as “direct action. The ANASF are drawn from the ranks of the Commandos, and has been created to provide a special operations force capable of countering enemy efforts at the lowest level; the Afghan tribe and village. The ANASF will accomplish this through the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program (discussed in depth in “FAT 4”). Up until now, US SOF has been running VSOs. However, the goal is to have ANASF replace US SOF in this role. One reason being that the ANASF possess a better understanding of local cultural, economic, and political issues. But as previously noted, the key to winning the COIN fight is transitioning the security lead to competent host nation forces, thereby fostering growth in the people’s faith for its existing government. Replacing US SOF with ANASF helps accomplish this at the grass roots level.





Afghanistan's Military Air Force

(U//FOUO) Afghan Air Force (AAF) - Similar to our own USAF during its infancy, up until June of 2010, the Afghan Air Force was originally designated the Afghan National Army Air Corps, and was a part of the ANA. The mission of the AAF is to execute operations in support of both the national security and national military objectives of Afghanistan. Important capabilities being developed include Presidential airlift, battlefield mobility, and support to ground forces; both CAS and CASEVAC. The AAF will also provide training support to counter-narcotics aircrews. The goal is for the AAF to be independently fully mission capable by 2016.



(U) CONCLUSION –There exists other, more specialized units and entities within the MOI and MOD. However, it is the organizations described above that are the major muscle groups in the development of Afghanistan's national security capability. Hopefully this basic primer provides one with a fundamental understanding of the unique roles and responsibilities of the MOI, the MOD, and the major components that make up the ANSF. Possessing a better understanding of those whom we are coaching and mentoring provides us with successful accomplishment of our individual advisor duties.



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JTFC Web portals (requires JKNIFE account/CAC)

SIPR:

<http://jcoe.jieddo.smil.mil/training/jtfc/default.aspx>

NIPR:

<https://jcoe.jieddo.mil/training/jtfc/default.aspx>

<u>Course Titles Available</u>	<u>Unit Requirements for Support</u>
C-IED Awareness/RSOI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level I, II, Train the Trainer Training Lane Design/Setup 	Classroom, Training Area, Vehicles, Life Support for Mobile Training Team
Explosives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Home Made Explosives (HME) Awareness Explosive Hazard Reduction Course (EHRC) Level III Theory and Effects 	Classroom, Life Support for Mobile Training Team *FOR DEMOLITION COURSES: Explosives, Explosive Ranges, Emergency Responders, Communications, Explosive Rated Vehicles
Search and Site Exploitation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awareness Level III Evidence Collection and Processing Team Top Off Training 	Classroom, Training Area, Vehicles, Life Support for Mobile Training Team
Explosive Event Analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tactical Post Blast Explosive Event Exploitation Weapons Technical Intelligence 	Classroom, Training Area, Vehicles, Life Support for Mobile Training Team
Mission Specific Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tailored Courses to fit Unit Requirements Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) Mine Detectors C-IED Enablers CIDNE User ATTAC User Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) 	Units can request for a specialized course to fit the training gap. *Some courses require a Field Support Representative (FSR)/Paladin CREW Section
Host Nation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> C-IED Awareness Evidence Collection 	Classroom, Training Area, Vehicles, Life Support for Mobile Training Team

Editor's Notes

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