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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY MANEUVER CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

ATZB-CIH

18 March 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 13-03, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

1. TRADOC Capability Manager-Armored Brigade Combat Team (TCM-ABCT) personnel visited NTC Rotation 13-03 (3d BCT, 1st CD) to collect unit feedback on DOTMLPF issues.
2. The purpose of this memorandum is to highlight key observations presented by members of the brigade and observer controller-trainers during the visit. The comments in this executive summary reflect an area of focus on decisive action trends observed during the rotation.
3. **Summary:** Unit maneuver, sustainment and mission command skills have atrophied. The past eight years of global operations have required Armor, Infantry and Artillery Soldiers to conduct dismounted or motorized missions on non-standard Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The result has led to an atrophy of ABCTs ability to effectively move and maneuver amassed forces on the battlefield. The below includes discussion and recommendations to improve DOTMLPF issues identified.

4. **Doctrine:**

a) **TACSOP.** Lack of a Battalion (BN) Tactical Standard Operating Procedure (TACSOP) in one Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) had an impact on reduced performance. The lack of a TACSOP resulted in no common standard for pre combat checks, pre combat inspections, reporting, load plans, execution of tactical tasks, synchronization of all assigned enablers for offense, defense, etc. Use of TACSOPs by ABCTs could mitigate many challenges the unit had during the rotation. Army Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (ATP 3-90.90) contains standards for SOPs. Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate hosts the SOP portal. Users may click on the following hyperlink: https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Portal:Standard_Operating_Procedures Recommend units upload current TACSOPs to the website for collaboration.

b) **Load Plans.** The load plans on some Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) were not sufficient to provide storage for all mission essential supplies and equipment. In many cases unit painted markings ie (23>) were in large block letters where the Combat Identification Panel (CIP) belongs. Many Bradleys had the Igloo water cooler as the only source of water, and lacked the two 5 gallon water cans stowed on the outside of the vehicles. Recommend unit SOPs address vehicle marking standard locations, storage of mission essential equipment, and classes of supply on vehicles.

c) **Sustainment Modularity.** Leaders interviewed agreed that sustainment modularity (plug and play) does not work for the ABCT and that sustainment needs to be reestablished in the maneuver battalion HHC, or the Forward Support Company (FSC) needs to be assigned to the maneuver battalion TOE and removed from the BSB TOE. There seemed to be a command relationship concern due to leaders not fully understanding ATP 4-0. Roles and responsibilities need to be better defined so commanders and staffs can perform required duties. FSC personnel working for two commanders cause confusion in command relationships and responsibilities. All personnel interviewed agreed that the Force XXI sustainment structure with a Main Support Battalion (MSB), DISCOM and DMMC was more effective.

d) **Location of Leadership for Sustainment.** Maneuver battalions placed HHC commanders and 1SGs in the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) for the occupation plan and to ensure local CTCP security was established. The BDE S1/4 was collocated in the BSA with the BSB S1/4. OC/T said this set up worked better than other rotations. The S4 had immediate interface with the SPO. If the Army returns to 3 BNs and a Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) per BDE, doctrinal changes will be required to address sustainment structure changes to meet new requirements. ATP 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion is in the process of being reviewed. ATP 4-90 final release is scheduled for October 2013.

e) **Security.** The BCT could have applied better security measures from platoon to BCT level. The BSA did not have any security/protection assigned. Equipment was dropped off in some cases far outside the perimeter of the BSA. Security could be improved in the following ways: use Abrams and Bradleys with operational turrets, position MTOE wheeled platforms with un stabilized weapons on the most threatening avenue of approach, assign a leader to supervise security. One CSM recommended the Operations Sergeant Major deploy on quartering parties and be responsible for establishing security. In rifle and armor platoon defensive hide positions vehicles were parked in motor pool line formation in many cases, versus providing 360 degree security with the coil formation or in dismounted OPs. In one instance the BCT RETRANS was placed on top of the whale and was not adequately secured. This resulted in the BSB losing FM communications range to support the BCT.

5. **Training/Leader Development:** During the past 3 NTC rotations and unit visits to ABCTs units have demonstrated a degraded ability to train and conduct decisive action skills. Recommend TRADOC review institutional training POIs for content to improve the below identified training gaps.

a) **Defensive Engagement Area (EA) Development.** OC/T feedback indicates that conducting defensive operations has become a lost art. There is a general and wide spread lack of knowledge in the characteristics of the defense. All defensive engagement area preparation skills have atrophied, specifically direct fire planning and obstacle planning (direct and indirect fire synchronization), fighting positions preparation, emplacement and planning of obstacles, rehearsals, priorities of work, range cards, assignment of synch dozer, marking of positions for digging, and sector sketches. 50% of the blade assets were down for maintenance in one unit. Knowledge of the defense is a common trend reported in previous JRTC and NTC reports.

b) **Mission Command Systems Training.** Analog and digital mission command training needs improvement across the formation. NCOs and Officers assigned to the BN TOC are not trained to operate, maintain and troubleshoot all communications systems assigned. A communications

sergeant mentioned that neither he nor his 25U Soldiers received institutional training on all assigned communications suites. The communications Sergeant stated that his Soldiers need more training on HF, TACSAT, 150, 152, FBCB2 and AIC. The SKL replaced the ANCD, but according to Soldiers they are not being trained on the SKL. Recommend TRADOC review content for training assigned mission command equipment. Units send all 25B and 25U NCOs to the Signal Digital Master Gunnery Course (S-DMGC), a 5 week functional course at Ft Gordon. TRADOC, HRC and units maximize availability for NCOs to attend the S-DMGC TDY en route and/or in conjunction with already scheduled NCOES. More details can be found on the S-DMGC at <http://www.signal.army.mil/Arm...011Vol36No2Sub18.pdf>

c) **Bradley Skills.** In 2011 TCM-ABCT identified a Bradley institutional training gap with the conclusion of the Bradley New Equipment Training in 2015. Infantry Soldiers assigned to ABCT Bradley platoons currently do not receive any institutional training on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The Bradley Leader Course is optional for NCOs but has had minimal attendance. There have been no signs that unit and TRADOC sustainment training will support required levels of operational proficiency on the Bradley for Infantry Soldiers conducting decisive actions in the ABCT. Soldiers and NCOs assigned to Bradley platoons continue to demonstrate a lack of maneuver, maintenance and gunnery proficiency required in ABCT formations. Leaders at all echelons continue to express that all Soldiers assigned to an Infantry platoon in the ABCT must receive training on the BFV prior to assignment. Leaders consistently continue to state that Bradley Master Gunnery alone are insufficient to build and retain BFV skills in their units, and that all assigned platoon Soldiers, NCOs and officers require knowledge on the BFV.

Actions to Date: In March 2012, the MCoE CG directed a COA consisting of assignment oriented training for Infantry Soldiers prior to assignment to Bradley platoons and required attendance to the Bradley Leader Course for NCOs after the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and for NCOs en route to ABCTs the first time be considered to address this capability gap. Funding prioritization precluded implementation during annual POI reviews in March 2012. Data from 6 unit visits and 3 NTC ABCT Decisive Action Rotations show the issue is not improving, but becoming more apparent with the requirement for ABCTs to conduct operations with Bradleys. The Director, Office Chief of Infantry (OCOI) requested assistance to identify Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) specific functional training courses that CMF 11 Soldiers should attend at Fort Benning prior to or during assignment to ABCTs. TCM-ABCT provided a memorandum in accordance with this request. TCM-ABCT recently presented findings to the MCoE CSM, who directed TCM-ABCT to continue to work in coordination with the CSM from the MCoE Non Commissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), Office Chief of Armor (OCA), and the OCOI to seek solutions to mitigate this issue. TCM-ABCT will continue to monitor this training gap. Because of the recurring nature of this problem TCM-ABCT is updating the ABCT Capability Gaps with this training issue.

d) **Armor Institutional Training.** NCOs said Soldiers need deeper emphasis in hull maintenance and turret operations during IMT. NCOs we spoke with said if they could influence one thing about NCOES, it would be to add field time with hands on training on Abrams and BFV's. 19D NCOs said Soldiers they receive from IMT need more training on land navigation, NBC, and Call for Fire. Soldiers stated that the Call for Fire simulation trainer was good, but they believe they would get more out of learning basic hands on call for fire procedures in a field environment. 19D NCOs recommended field time in ALC needs to include: Route recon, passage of lines, screening, assembly areas, field reports. This issue is a common trend that has been reported during unit visits, CTC visits, and during interviews of NCOES students, and the NCOs have consistently recommended the same solution.

Actions to Date: The MCoE NCOA is addressing ways to provide hands on Abrams and Bradley training for NCOs through POI revisions. One option is for NCOs to attend existing functional courses in conjunction with an already scheduled NCOES course. (ie. a 19D assigned to an ABCT Scout Platoon would attend the Armored Reconnaissance Course following the Advanced Leader Course). When TCM-ABCT briefed the CSM, MCoE one of his priorities is to improve institutional training for NCOs on armored platforms. TCM-ABCT has conducted the following actions: attended MCoE Armor Critical Task Site Selection Boards (CTSSB) as subject matter experts for the ABCT, recommended training solutions during NCOA POI Working Groups, working group engagement as the ABCT user representative for the MCoE Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS). The MLDS outlines maneuver leader competencies that maneuver officers and NCOs most possess and will serve as a guideline for future leader development.

Recommend FORSCOM units send NCOs to functional courses in conjunction with NCOES. HRC identify Armor and Infantry Soldiers en route to Abrams or Bradley platoons and schedule functional training TDY en route to ABCTs. TRADOC continue to address ways for NCOs to be required to attend functional courses to build decisive action skills in the maneuver force.

e) **Mounted Land Navigation Skills.** OC/Ts stated that there is atrophy at all ranks for successfully navigating cross country when mounted. Units relied on digital FBCB2 for communications and for navigation. Units experienced difficulties when attempting to navigate with the FBCB2 while also trying to safely control the driver's movement and select best avenues of approach across cross country terrain. Recommend TRADOC and FORSCOM review training strategies for returning analog land navigation skill core competencies to formations. TCM-ABCT will address this training gap during NCOES and OES POI Working Groups and share findings with appropriate agencies for developing mitigation strategies to improve the identified gap.

f) **CASEVAC during Decisive Actions.** Leaders are very proficient at MEDEVAC during current operations in theatre, however leaders skills to conduct ground CASEVAC during decisive actions have atrophied. Units are accustomed to air MEDEVAC or ground MEDEVAC back to a FOB in theatre and have not demonstrated proficiency in ground CASEVAC planning or execution required in decisive actions. CASEVAC was not rehearsed from platoon to BCT level effectively. FM or full dress rehearsals could have better decreased died of wounds rate.

g) **Use of Operational Graphics.** There has been a common trend from NTC Decisive Action rotations on effective use of both analog and digital graphics. The perception from several rotations is there appears to be an analog graphic reproduction problem, either due to limited time, manpower, or lack of priorities of work issued for this task. One OC/T mentioned that in one BN the unit did not use acetate graphics and the unit solely relied upon the FBCB2 for graphics from higher, and those graphics lacked little refinement below BN level. In some cases, vehicles that had inoperable FBCB2s did not receive graphics at all. Squad leaders copied graphics off the FBCB2 onto their maps. The importance of analog graphics became evident to vehicle crews when in many cases 50% of the FBCB2s in platoons were down and the crews lacked backup analog graphics. Most crews stated they prefer analog graphics due to the ability to use the graphics while name tag defilade in turrets. In order to read the graphics on an FBCB2 the vehicle commanders would have to be seated and then would be unable to safely navigate the driver across restrictive terrain. Recommend units train and enforce use of analog and digital graphics at all levels. One technique is to apply permanent common BCT checkpoints (CPs) on maps and conduct map rehearsals with these graphic control measures at home station prior to deployment to the NTC. CPs can provide common references for controlling all war fighting functions.

h) **CBRNE Proficiency.** For decisive action rotations, both NTC and JRTC have challenged units by incorporating CBRNE tasks into scenarios. During all decisive action rotations units have demonstrated a lack of proficiency on CBRNE individual and leader tasks. Examples needing improvement include: individual decontamination, NBC reports, unmasking procedures, M256 kits, NBC CASEVAC and route planning, operational decon. Units had training JSLISTS, however were lacking mask hoods and gloves. Units did not have M8 or M9 paper and when asked, many crews did not know what M8 or M9 paper was. Company Teams no longer have an NBC NCO on MTOE. Recommend FORSCOM units incorporate NBC training as an additional level of difficulty in unit METL tasks. Plan for NBC avoidance, decontamination, and CASEVAC. Due to the loss of NBC NCOs at company level and unit's loss of proficiency, recommend TRADOC review POIs for CBRNE content.

i) **Movement and Maneuver.** Movement and maneuver skills against a hybrid threat needs improvement from platoon to BCT level. Leaders who have experience performing movement and maneuver in the ABCT are limited to senior NCOs and field grade officers, many who have never performed decisive action maneuver at their current grade. OC/Ts stated a common trend is lack of direct and indirect fire planning and synchronization during execution, control measures, fire distribution, engagement techniques, lack of scanning, raising TOWs, survivability drills, and platoon fire commands. When units task organize the challenge becomes overwhelming. The ABCT deployed companies' task organized as Company Teams. Armor lieutenants and captains did not employ Infantry effectively and Infantry officers did not employ Armor effectively. Platoon leaders did not understand how to incorporate FOs; Company FSO were under-utilized.

Actions to Date: The MCoE is currently establishing a Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS) that outlines maneuver leader competencies that maneuver officers and NCOs most possess. The MCOE will develop and implements the MLDS to train and educate agile and adaptive maneuver leaders capable of meeting the challenges of the operational environment, requiring the simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The strategy espouses that leader development is a deliberate, continuous and progressive life-long process that is the synthesis of the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes gained through training, education, and experience in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains.

j) **Battle Staff Proficiency.** Battle Captains and the Chief of Operations and Planning (CHOPS) tasks required in the TOCs are not standardized or fully understood by Captains and Majors. All OC/Ts evaluating TOCs recommended the addition of battle staff training in Professional Military Education (PME) for officers. Officers and NCOs were trained well on the FBCB2 and FM, but lacked training to effectively operate all assigned mission command equipment.

Actions to Date: In Oct 12 TCM-ABCT observed the same issue at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and again during the previous NTC ABCT DA rotation. TCM-ABCT has shared this training gap with the Maneuver Career Captain Course (MCCC) and will continue to follow up with the MCCC and address in scheduled 19 and 11 series Critical Task Site Selection Boards (CTSSB).

k) **Analog Reporting when Digital Systems were unavailable.** Leaders at platoon level were relying on FBCB2 only for reporting, and were not prepared to provide analog reports commonly found in unit TACSOPs if digital systems went down. A recurring trend was a lack of common standards for contact, orange, green, red or yellow reports at unit level. Leaders recommended TACSOPs standardize reports and embed report formats into FBCB2 software. This common trend is a leader training issue that has been expressed by ABCT leaders during TCM-ABCT Umbrella Week visits. During a recent visit to an ABCT following an SFAB mission unit leadership expressed that

analog battle tracking skills have atrophied amongst NCOs and officers. This skill set was necessary for leaders to effectively train the unit's Afghanistan counterparts during the SFAB mission.

6. Material:

a) **Forward Observer training on use of the Pocket sized Forward Entry Device (PFED).** Units do not know how to use PFED for fires. PFED is a device used by forward observers and fire support teams to transmit and receive fire support data. The Fires OC/T stated "In my last 12 rotations I have not seen a single unit who used the PFED successfully." Use of the PFED must be second nature in order to effectively support operations in the future operational environment.

Actions to Date: The Field Artillery School has implemented PFED training into POIs for 13F (Fire Support Specialist). NCOs in the Field Artillery Advanced Leader Course now receive 40 hours of target measurement and PFED precision fires software training. Recommend leaders train PFED skills during home station training, and since the PFED relies on FM, units must ensure RETRANS FM sites support PFED operators across the operational environment.

b) **FBCB2.** In three platoons, leaders stated while at the NTC that 50% of their FBCB2s were down, probably due to the EPLRS, and also at some point all FBCB2s in the platoon had been inoperable. The platoons recommended BFT vice EPLRS for their FBCB2s and said that BFT was much more reliable. Note: During the next NTC rotation (13-04) vehicles were equipped with the BFT instead of EPLRS, and they did not report any problems with loss of FBCB2 capabilities except in BN TOCS.

Actions to Date: The current ABCT Network strategy replaced EPLRS with BF1 in the seven remaining EPRLS Brigades from FY 14-17. The strategy will also update all active ABCTs with BF2 and Joint Battle Command software from FY 18-20. These two upgrades will provide a significant increase in capability and reliability.

c) **BFV Driver's Vision Enhanced (DVE).** BFV drivers stated the DVE has poor depth perception and a very narrow field of view. The drivers and commanders said this is a safety concern in the terrain in NTC. Drivers asked for a way to clean the DVE lens without having to unbutton the hatch and recommended a solution similar to the Stryker (water spray). Drivers also said the periscopes become dirty and asked for a windshield wiper similar to what is provided on the Abrams.

Actions to Date: TCM-ABCT has worked with PM-Bradley to move installation of DVE-W with a wide field of view earlier than planned from Engineer Change Proposal 3 (ECP 3) to Engineer Change Proposal 2 (ECP 2). If ECP 2 fielding goes as planned, the DVE-W should be installed on Bradleys between 2014-2017.

d) Bradley Notes.

- **Crewman CVCs.** Bradley Platoon Leaders preferred the Bose Triport Tactical Communication Headset, NSN 5965-01-521-0941, worn under the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) however this headset is not approved for use with the Bradley. According to the Army Hearing Program (ST 4-02.501) the Tactical Communications Headset was designed for infantry passengers in combat vehicles and is compatible for use with the ACH, and designed for communications on wheeled platforms (M1114, Stryker) providing hearing protection up to 95 decibels. The combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet was designed to provide ballistic protection, intercom communication, talk-through capabilities, and hearing protection for Soldiers in combat armored vehicles up to 115 decibels.

WARNING: Bradley crews are required by TM 9-2350-294-10-1 to use the CVC with automatic noise reduction (ANS) capabilities in order to provide required hearing protection.

- **BFV Turret Drive Malfunctions.** Crews reported it took up to 6 minutes to correct turret drive malfunctions during offensive engagements under fire. The 6 minute shutdown time is a requirement by FBCB2 to prevent damage to the hard drive i.e., data corruption. However, Vehicle Version ID (VVID) A3 VVID 00.08.02.08-09R1 (SWB2): Safety Confirmation 17 Jun 2010 and A3BFIST VVID 01.08.02.10-11: Safety Confirmation 20 July 2010 (SWB2) were both fielded with the Fast Turret Restart (FTR) feature. FTR leaves FBCB2 up and running allowing the turret processor (system) to be rebooted in less than 2 minutes. If crews conduct an emergency kill by turning off the power on the turret control box prior to 6 minutes this will not allow the FBCB2 to complete its required 6 minute power down process and the FBCB2 hard drive can be corrupted. To prevent turret drive malfunctions crews should allow the FBCB2 the full 6 minutes for shutdown prior to turning off the turret and vehicle power. Bradley crews and mechanics need to check their MAL list to see what faults are being registered when this problem occurs with a 6 minute delay to be able to inform their mechanics as there may be an underlying mechanical fault causing the issue.
- **BFV Final Drive Prop Shaft.** Crews expressed a need for a prop shaft quick release for the BFV. If a vehicle breaks down it takes 45 minutes to prepare the vehicle for towing due to the time it takes the final drive clutch to be disassembled. Crews and/or mechanics are forced to remain exposed to the threat for extended periods of time to conduct this common maintenance procedure. Driving the vehicle without this being disconnected harms the final drive. The PM is aware of this problem and currently the torque value is too great to modify the current design to a quick disconnect option.
- **BFV Cargo Hatch Seal.** On several vehicles the cargo hatch seal was not preventing water and dust from entering the troop compartment. Hatch seals are randomly tested and verified by DCMA after vehicles go down the production line. However, the cargo hatch comes with a series of shims installed; you can spot them by the release lever. The maintainer can adjust these shims to correct the problem. TM 9-2350-294-20-1-2 REPLACE CARGO HATCH COVER CUSHIONING PAD/COAMING (FCAU) WP 0416 00 or REPAIR CARGO HATCH COVER LOCKING LATCH ASSEMBLY (FCAU) 0415 00.

Actions to Date: Post issues on Heavy Net, future Thunderbolt Blasts, notify all ABCT FSRs and command teams, and PM Magazine.

e) **Mission Command Equipment.** Mission Command (MC) platforms, systems, processes and capabilities are inadequate at the BCT level to conduct Mission Command on-the Move (MCOTM) during DA operations. There were not enough SIPR lines for the TOCs to complete all mission requirements. Units did not have enough FBCB2 systems to operate both TOCs and forward TACs simultaneously. For example, the BCT S2 did not have a portable FBCB2 assigned for use in the TOC, and his vehicle was in the TAC with the MICO.

Actions to Date: The Army has directed that ABCT formations must begin to integrate WIN-T capability by FY17, but current WIN-T hardware will not integrate onto ABCT combat vehicle platforms without unacceptable impacts to vehicle performance (M2 Bradley), or not at all (M1

Abrams), and wheeled vehicle solutions (MRAP, HMMWV) are not acceptable ABCT C2 platforms. TCM-ABCT is assisting the HQDA staff in developing an Armored Network Modernization Strategy effort to provide modernized Armored Brigade Combat Teams by 2020-2021. This strategy also provides a COA to place network capabilities into the formation earlier in FY17. This COA requires placing capabilities into M1068 command variants, and within the Armor and Infantry companies, this vehicle is manned by the XO and a cell of personnel to manage the increased information requirements. Additional vehicle requirements are included in a recent Force Design Update (FDU) submission. Personnel requirements are met by restructuring within the CAB.

f) **Battle Command Support and Sustainment System (BCS3).** BCS3 is hard to operate and leaders familiar with Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) mentioned that BCS3 needs to incorporate CSSCS type capabilities and ease of use. CSSCS consolidated the vast quantities of data required to integrate situational awareness within the CSS mission areas. CSSCS provided tactical commanders with timely, critical information on ammunition and fuel supplies, medical and personnel status, transportation, maintenance services, general supply, and other field services. TCM-ABCT is in communication with the Sustainment Center of Excellence to recommend BCS3 software be more user friendly like CSSCS. Recommend units use TCM-BC online training.

j) **Flat Racks.** Units are required to maintain accountability of flat racks by serial number. If flat racks were signed for by quantity instead it would increase sustainment turnaround times. The purpose of flat racks is to offload material so a unit can replenish critical supplies. Since the flat rack must be signed for by serial number, loads must be transferred between 2 flat racks. This costs valuable time for both units. TCM-ABCT will follow up with the SCoE on this issue and possible solutions.

m) **Company Maintenance Team Vehicle.** Company maintenance team only has one survivable platform that can go forward with the maneuver company, i.e. M88. The HMMWV contact truck with shop equipment (S25681) and the Forward Repair System (FRS) (F64544) replaced the M113A3. All maintainers TCM-ABCT interviewed stated a survivable platform is required to go forward with the supported company. The contact truck does not provide adequate protection, firepower, or maintain pace with other combat platforms in the formation in all terrain.

n) **Tool Acquisition.** Maintainers had difficulties turning in broken tools or obtaining the new tool boxes. Broken tools are turned in through PM-SKOT. Of the 20+ maintainers interviewed all were unaware of the broken tool turn in policy. Recommend broken tools are reported to PM-SKOT.

- PdM SKOT Website: <http://pmskot.army.mil>
- PdM SKOT Tool Warranty Replacement: http://pmskot.army.mil/SKO_Warranty.html
- PdM SKOT HOTLINE Number: 1-877-476-7568
- PdM SKOT Email: USARMY.detroit.peo-cs-css.mail.pm-skot@mail.mil

Actions to Date: TCM-ABCT provided information to a FSC maintenance technician during the rotation on the proper way to turn in hand tools. Following the rotation TCM-ABCT confirmed with the 3/1 CAV Property Book Officer (PBO) that hand tools in the BDE are being turned in and being replaced by PM-SKOT at no cost to unit.

o) **VSAT.** The Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) is in need of a Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT). Currently the CTCP is using the FSC VSAT. The CTCP is in need of a VSAT for secure mission command. Also, the unit set up the VSAT on the ground versus on top of a platform or trailer. Securing a VSAT on a platform or trailer would reduce installation time. If the VSAT is already

setup on a trailer or on top of a vehicle it would be fully operational more rapidly enabling part order. Every time the system is setup you take a chance on breaking one of many cables installed to the equipment. In coordination with PM-WIN/T, recommend a mount that swivels so a VSAT could be permanently mounted to a platform or trailer.

Actions to Date: TCM-ABCT contacted PM-WIN/T and there are no current plans to mount a VSAT on top of the shop van or trailer. PM-WIN/T thought it was a good idea and mentioned that no one has brought this idea up before. PM-WIN/T did state there is a possibility in the future once funding is available to validate the idea by mounting a VSAT on a platform to see if it will work and save Soldier set up time.

r) **FBCB2 for BSA CP:** The maintenance company has one FBCB2 in the vehicle, but lacks one for the Command Post in the BSA. Turnaround time on information would be faster if a FBCB2 was in the maintenance van with a TOC kit. An additional FBCB2 in the BSB maintenance company would provide an improved capability.

s) **Scout Platform Seating.** Scout NCOs interviewed expressed they need seating space for three passengers on the M3A3.

Actions to Date: TCM-ABCT has worked with PM Bradley to accelerate fielding a 3rd seat in M3 Bradley variants. Additionally, a recently submitted MCoE FDU requesting Scout Platoon vehicles change from 3 CFV/5HMMWVs to 6 BFoV variants and specifically requests M2 BFVs with additional seating be prioritized for Scout Platoons to assist with solving this problem.

7. POCs for this memorandum are Mr. Derek McCrea (Operations) or Mr. Stephen Harper (Sustainment) at TCM ABCT, 706.545.2684/ 706.626.1148.



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